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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1992 AND 1993

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 1507

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1992 AND 1993 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEARS FOR THE ARMED FORCES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 6
MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

APRIL 17, 24; MAY 15; JUNE 5, 18, 1991

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

MANPOWER PROGRAMS

APRIL 17, 1991

	Page
Jehn, Hon. Christopher, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Personnel	3
Reno, Lt. Gen. William H., Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, U.S. Army	17
Boorda, Vice Adm. Jeremy M., Chief of Naval Personnel, U.S. Navy	27
Hickey, Lt. Gen. Thomas J., Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, U.S. Air Force	42
Smith, Lt. Gen. Norman H., U.S.M.C., Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps	47

RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD

APRIL 24, 1991

Duncan, Stephen M., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, accompanied by Lt. Gen. John B. Conaway, ANG, Chief, National Guard Bureau; Maj. Gen. Donald Burdick, ARNGUS, Director, Army National Guard; Maj. Gen. Philip Killey, ANG, Director, Air National Guard; Maj. Gen. William F. Ward, USAR, Chief, Army Reserve; Rear Adm. James E. Taylor, USN, Director, Navy Reserve; Maj. Gen. Hollis E. Davison, USMC, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Marine Corps Reserve; Maj. Gen. John J. Closner, USAFR, Chief, Air Force Reserve; Rear Adm. John N. Faigle, Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters	112

MEDICAL PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MAY 15, 1991

Mendez, Enrique, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs	273
Ledford, Lt. Gen. Frank F., Jr., Surgeon General, U.S. Army	288
Zimble, Vice Adm. James A., Surgeon General, U.S. Navy	298
Miller, Lt. Gen. Monte B., Surgeon General, U.S. Air Force	316

TOTAL FORCE POLICY REPORT, AND MANPOWER AND FORCE STRUCTURE PLANS

JUNE 5, 1991

Jehn, Hon. Christopher, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Personnel	439
Duncan, Hon. Stephen M., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs	442
Libby, I. Lewis, Principal Under Secretary of Defense, Strategy and Resources	454
Fedorochko, Brig. Gen. William, Jr., Deputy Director for Force Structure and Resource, The Joint Staff	462
Ensslin, Maj. Gen. Robert F., Jr., President, National Guard Association of the United States, accompanied by Lt. Gen. Lavern Weber, Executive Director, National Guard Association of the United States	747
Hultman, Maj. Gen. Evan L., USA (Retired), Executive Director, Reserve Officers Association of the United States	759

Page

Smith, Rear Adm. Lester Robert, USNR (Retired), National President, Naval Reserve Association 768
Doyle, Col. Kevin, USMCR, President, Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association 772

UTILIZATION OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY SERVICES

JUNE 18, 1991

Roth, Hon. William V., a U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware 803
Jehn, Hon. Christopher, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Personnel 804
Vuono, Gen. Carl E., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 823
Kelso, Adm. Frank B., II, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy 824
McPeak, Gen. Merrill A., USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force 826
Gray, Gen. Alfred M., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, U.S. Marine Corps 828
Amico, Jean A., Gunnery Sergeant, Headquarters Company, Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California 847
Leifeste, Susan, Staff Sergeant, Motor Sergeant, 82d Airborne, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 847
Thomas, Gary, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry Battalion Commander, 101st Airborne, Fort Campbell, Kentucky I60840 848
Shupp, Michael A., Captain, Company Commander, Company A, 211st Light Armored Infantry Battalion, Camp Pendleton, California 849
Frey, Richard, Master Chief Electronics Technician, Submarine Specialist, Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Chicago, Illinois 849
Palmer, Glenn E., Combat Controller, Chief, Standardization Training, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois 850
Holdener, Brenda Marie, Lieutenant, Helicopter Combat Support Sqaudron Six, NAS, Norfolk, Virginia 850
Prewitt, Christine, Major, Senior Pilot, Flight Scheduler, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland 850
Costantino, Becky, Chair, Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services 860
Sagawa, Shirley, Senior Counsel/Director of Family and Youth Policy, National Women's Law Center 864
Donnelly, Elaine, Executive Director, Coalition for Military Readiness 868
Barrow, Gen. Robert H., USMC (Ret.) former Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps 895

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1992 AND 1993

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

MANPOWER PROGRAMS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., Hon. John Glenn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Glenn, Kennedy, and McCain.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director.

Professional staff members present: Frederick F.Y. Pang.

Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; George K. Johnson, Jr., and George W. Lauffer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Phillip P. Upschulte, assistant to Senator Glenn; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain; and Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN GLENN, CHAIRMAN

Senator GLENN. Good morning. I apologize for the slight delay here. We have a number of other hearings going on this morning, and the ranking minority member, John McCain, is over at the White House. I understand he will be here shortly. So we will go ahead with the hearing this morning.

The Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel meets this morning to begin a series of five hearings on manpower and health programs associated with the 1992-1993 Defense Authorization Request. Today's hearing will focus on active component personnel programs such as the planned active duty end strength levels of each of the military services, and the recruiting, retention, training, and loss management programs associated with the planned active duty end-strength levels.

In order to give as much notice as possible to our subcommittee members and to the Department of Defense, I want to outline the

rest of the subcommittee's hearing schedule before we start our hearing today. On April 24, we will have a hearing on the manpower plans for the Reserve and National Guard components, and how these components fit into the Total Force Policy Plan. On May 8, we will have a hearing on medical programs including follow-up on a number of issues addressed last year in the National Defense Authorization Act for 1991.

The subcommittee has also reserved May 15 and June 5 as hearing dates to follow up on the first three hearings, and to oversee other personnel utilization, compensation and policy issues relevant to the subcommittee's markup of the fiscal 1992-1993 defense authorization request.

To set the context for today's hearing, I want to briefly summarize what we did last year. One of our highest priorities last year, and it will continue to be a high priority this year, was to sustain and, where possible, to enhance the management and combat effectiveness of military personnel as the military services build down over the next 5 years.

With this priority in mind, we authorized an active duty end-strength plan that would allow the military services to gradually phase its reductions at the rate of approximately 100,000 per year to avoid degrading combat readiness. We also provided a safety net of transition benefits to assist military personnel who may be involuntarily separated as a result of these reductions.

An important element of the plan was the establishment of active duty end-strength levels for each of the military services for fiscal year 1995, based on the reduced threat and the resultant force structure and mission changes the military services were expected to make over the next 5 years.

Now, despite the manpower requirements of the Persian Gulf conflict that have temporarily interrupted the start of the phase-down in active duty strength levels that was to begin this fiscal year, the 1992-1993 defense authorization request indicates that the military services intend to stick to the overall reduction targets for 1995. I will follow up with some questions on this matter to make sure that we clearly understand where each service plans to be in terms of active duty end strength in 1995.

With regard to the active duty end-strength levels for fiscal year 1991, we provided authority in the Desert Storm supplemental authorization bill we just passed for the DOD to waive the levels we mandated last year. This authority was provided in recognition of the manpower requirements in the Persian Gulf conflict. I will be interested in hearing from our witnesses on the extent to which they expect to exercise this waiver authority, and the effect of Desert Storm manpower requirements on the active duty end strengths of the 1992-1993 defense authorization request.

Before turning to our witnesses, I want to note that we have two new members on our subcommittee this year, Senator Wallop and Senator Smith. I want to welcome them; they are not able to be here this morning because of other committee work. But we certainly do look forward to working with them as we proceed to our work this year.

I am very happy that Senator McCain remains the ranking minority member on the subcommittee. Senator McCain, as many of

you know, and I have worked very closely together since I became chairman of this committee in 1988, and I certainly value his leadership. I have said many times how we provide for our men and women in uniform and their families is a bipartisan matter. To me, there is not a Democratic agenda nor a Republican agenda as far as I am concerned.

And I think the latest proof of this was the comprehensive set of Desert Storm personnel benefits that we recently authorized in the Desert Storm Supplemental Authorization Act. Both Senator McCain and I chaired task forces on our respective sides that resulted in a unanimously supported package of benefits for our men and women in uniform and their families. So I certainly look forward to working with Senator McCain this coming year.

I want to welcome our witnesses today. The Honorable Christopher Jehn, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Personnel; Lt. Gen. William Reno, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel; Vice Adm. Jeremy Boorda, Navy, Chief of Personnel; Lt. Gen. Tom Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, U.S. Air Force; Lt. Gen. Norm Smith, Marine Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Each of our witnesses has submitted written statements, and without objection they will be included in the record. And I will ask each witness to summarize their written statements. Mr. Jehn, we will start with you. Welcome back here again.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER JEHN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

Mr. JEHN. Thank you very much. It is good to see you again, sir. As you said, I have a lengthy statement that I will not try to summarize right now but just make a few brief comments.

We are appearing before this committee today to discuss the President's 1992–1993 budget. And as you said, it is the first of several hearings that we will have on this subject. I would like to note two really important differences between this year's situation and those of previous years. First, as everyone knows, we have just successfully completed a major military operation, a successful campaign against the aggression committed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

And, but perhaps more important for our long-term defense posture, the 1992–1993 budget that the President has submitted to the Congress for its consideration reflects a significant change in defense strategy. So let me talk about both of those points.

First, I think we cannot really talk about the war without noting its enormous success and asking why. To me, first and foremost, the success of that operation is due to the courage and professionalism of all military personnel, from privates all the way up to General Schwarzkopf and his generals and admirals. But I think credit is also due, a lot of credit is due, to those who really made it possible: our predecessors in DOD, Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Carlucci, the leadership offered by President Reagan.

But I think also it is appropriate for us to note as well, as you have in your opening remarks, that when it comes to supporting and developing an effective and militarily capable fighting force, the Congress has played an important and essential role. And we

thank you very much for the support, particularly the support this committee has offered, for the last number of years.

I do not think this operation would have been possible 10 to 12 years ago. And I think the progress we have made in the last 10 years, much of it due to the efforts of you and your colleagues on this committee, is noteworthy.

Many lessons will be drawn from the events of the last 6 or 8 months, but two are especially important as far as I am concerned, in the role I have to play in the Defense Department. The first is, of course, the wisdom, to me, of adopting an all-volunteer force. We are convinced, and we were convinced before the war and we are even more convinced now that the war has successfully ended, that volunteerism is in fact the only sensible way to produce a military force for the United States.

And I think the second lesson I draw from all of this is the wisdom of the adoption, at more or less the same time that we adopted an all-volunteer force, of a total force policy. And the first thing about that, I would say, is the total force policy worked as well as our policies related to the all-volunteer force.

A lot of attention has been given, and most people begin to think about the total force, only in terms of reserve components and active components. But I think it is also important to note that the civilian employees in the Department of Defense made essential and important contributions to the Persian Gulf War, as did contractors and host nation support, the other three elements of the total force. So I would say that the policy has been vindicated, and I think its wisdom has been amply confirmed by the events of the last 8 months.

For that reason, the 1992–1993 budget that we have submitted to you for your consideration strongly supports both an all-volunteer force and our total force. And despite these constants, though, I want to turn to the second point I made, and that is that this budget reflects a new strategy. There are some constants running through it, but there are some important changes as well. And I want to emphasize those right now.

We no longer face, to the extent that we did 5 years ago, the threat of global war with the Soviet Union and its allies, and the attendant threat of a short-warning invasion of Europe. Instead, we believe we need to prepare for major regional contingencies, not unlike the one we have just successfully dealt with.

So based on these new realities, we have developed and proposed a new force structure, a department of smaller size, and we continue our efforts to further streamline the Department's infrastructure and improve its management. But despite all of that, we will continue to emphasize, and do emphasize in the budget we sent over here, the importance of readiness and combat capability of the force, and continued support for our people in the form of support for pay and other elements of compensation.

For example, the budget proposes a 4.2 percent pay raise in 1992, and a 4.7 percent pay raise in 1993. You will also find strong support for a dependent school system, child care, family support centers, and other elements of our network of support for service members' quality of life. These were all important also in our support to members and their families during the Persian Gulf war.

So I solicit your support and the support of your committee for these important items, and I look forward to talking further with you about the budget and our proposed new program. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jehn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. CHRISTOPHER JEHN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to testify before you today on the manpower program of the Department of Defense. I am especially proud to represent the Department at a time when the overwhelming success of Operation Desert Storm has demonstrated the high quality and dedication of the men and women serving in our Armed Forces.

As the Secretary of Defense said in his annual report, "As this report is prepared, the Defense Department is engaged in two formidable tasks: one in response to an immediate crisis and one in response to longer-term changes in the strategic environment." While all elements of our total force have been immersed in the combat operations in the Persian Gulf, we have been formulating a strategy to reduce and reshape American military forces for the post-Cold War era.

The changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have led us to reassess our national military strategy of the past four decades. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and the anticipated implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, if ratified, mean that a long period of visible Soviet preparations would probably precede a Europe-centered global war. This allows a new focus for U.S. security strategy and permits us to reduce force levels without jeopardizing our safety or that of our allies. Changing world dynamics also permit a decrease in U.S. forward presence, particularly in Europe.

We can now reshape and substantially reduce our military forces. However, the forces that remain must provide (1) an appropriate rotation base for forward presence, (2) versatile and ready conventional forces for crisis response and regional conflict, (3) a capability for reconstituting larger forces for global war, and (4) offensive and defensive nuclear strategic deterrence for the Nation and its allies. In the future, we will give priority to preserving a mix of forces that best meets these requirements.

Desert Storm, of course, complicated our planning for this new strategy. We are also keeping a close eye on developments in the Soviet Union and need to keep our options open if our assumptions about a decreasing threat change. We hope you will support us in maintaining the flexibility a complicated world situation will require during the coming year.

My statement today describes our current manpower request and programs and outlines the effects Operation Desert Storm has had on both.

FISCAL YEARS 1992–1993 MANPOWER REQUEST: RESHAPING AND REDUCING THE FORCE

The following table shows the President's budget request for active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian manpower for fiscal years 1992 and 1993, programmed fiscal year 1991 numbers, and actual numbers from fiscal year 1990.

TABLE 1

[End strengths in thousands]

Component	Fiscal year 1990	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993	Change (1990–1993)
Active Component Military Strength					
Army:					
Active	732.4	702.2	660.2	618.2	—114.2
SELRES [1]	18.2				
Navy:					
Active	579.4	569.7	551.4	536.0	—43.4
SELRES [1]	3.4				
Marine Corps	196.7	193.7	188.0	182.2	—14.5

TABLE 1—Continued

[End strengths in thousands]

Component	Fiscal year 1990	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993	Change (1990–1993)
Air Force:					
Active	535.2	508.6	486.8	458.1	—77.1
SELRES [1]	4.0				
Total:					
Active	2,043.7	1,974.2	1,886.4	1,794.5	—249.2
SELRES [1]	25.7				
Selected Reserve Military Strength					
Army National Guard	444.3	457.3	410.9	366.3	—78.0
SELRES [1]	(7.3)				
Army Reserve	310.0	318.7	282.7	254.5	—55.5
SELRES [1]	(10.9)				
Naval Reserve	152.8	153.4	134.6	127.1	—25.7
SELRES [1]	(3.4)				
Marine Reserve	44.5	43.9	40.9	38.9	—5.6
Air National Guard	117.8	117.0	118.1	119.4	+1.6
SELRES [1]	(0.8)				
Air Force Reserve	83.8	85.6	81.2	82.4	—1.4
SELRES [1]	(3.2)				
Total	1,153.2	1,175.9	1,068.4	988.6	—164.6
SELRES [1]	(25.7)				
Civilian Manpower					
Army	380.4	363.1	329.3	314.7	—65.7
Navy	320.5	309.7	292.4	285.3	—35.2
Marine Corps	20.5	20.2	18.9	18.5	—2.0
Air Force	248.9	239.0	222.9	220.6	—28.3
Defense Agencies	102.5	119.7	139.4	136.5	+34.0
Total	1,072.8	1,051.7	1,002.9	975.7	—97.1

[1] SELRES called to active duty under Title 10, U.S.C., section 673b in support of Operation Desert Shield as of September 30, 1990.

Our fiscal years 1992–1993 military manpower request begins transition from a Cold War posture, primarily oriented on the Soviet Union, to a more versatile posture shaped to meet the requirements of the 1990s and beyond. By fiscal year 1996 both active duty and reserve military end strength will be about 20 percent lower than in fiscal year 1990.

Our objectives while we make this reduction are to maintain a balance between mission and readiness requirements and personnel considerations, while remaining sensitive to fiscal constraints and the impact our decisions today will have on the future force. We plan to reduce the number of recruits to the level we need to sustain our new force level. Much of our strength reduction will be achieved by reducing the number of people we recruit. However, too large a reduction in new personnel would result in long-term readiness risks and stagnation for those in our career force, so we will have to be careful in making these reductions. We will use existing strength management policies, whenever possible, to reduce our personnel inventories to the level required to sustain our new force level. For enlisted personnel, tighter reenlistment and high year of tenure policies will reduce the inventory while improving quality. For officers, continuation boards, promotion policies, and selective early retirements will produce similar results. We want to protect our military members who are near retirement; whenever possible, qualified members who have completed 15 or more years of service will be protected until retirement. Finally, we will rely on reduction-in-force policies as a last resort.

We are committed to making sure that, at the end of the transition period, a satisfactory balance exists between the grades and skills of those serving and the grades and skills required to man the force structure effectively. To ensure this result, needed changes in officer management authorities were provided in the fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Act, and we appreciate the help this subcommittee gave us in this area. Statutory restrictions that inhibited effective reductions in the size of the officer work force were eliminated; and, as a result, we now have more

flexibility in the area of voluntary and involuntary retirement or discharge of commissioned officers.

The request for active military end strength for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 reflects a total reduction of 249,200 from fiscal year 1990 actual end strength levels. This significant reduction will be achieved by a number of force structure cuts and implementation of approved base closures and realignments and a myriad of Defense Management Review initiatives.

The requirements of Desert Storm, however, have made it impossible for us to meet our authorized fiscal year 1991 end strengths. The primary reason for this is the implementation of Stop Loss authorities allowed by title 10, United States Code. In August, the President authorized the Secretary of Defense to implement the Stop Loss program. This program allows the services to retain all members who are participating in, are in direct support of, or possess critical skills associated with Operation Desert Storm. To date, all services have implemented some level of Stop Loss. In late March, the Department peaked, with 29,900 members having been affected by this program. The legislative relief provided in the Persian Gulf Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 will give us the necessary management flexibility to get back on track with our planned reductions by mid-1992, without resorting to the severe involuntary personnel management actions that would have otherwise been required. I thank this subcommittee for helping to provide that much-needed legislative relief.

Our civilian estimates for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 reflect reductions resulting from a smaller military force structure and management improvements. During fiscal year 1990 total civilian employment in military functions declined by 44,000, and we anticipate another 97,000 reduction from the fiscal year 1990 level by the end of fiscal year 1993. In order to prepare for these reductions and to avoid potential involuntary separations, we have restricted the hiring of new employees since January 1990. On March 29, 1991, the Deputy Secretary established policy for the remainder of fiscal year 1991. The DOD components can now hire two employees from outside the Department for every five employees who leave. Only a few employment categories are exempt from this overall hiring limit—medical, safety, and security positions; college recruiting, summer hires, and work study programs; and employees necessary to support the National Drug Control Strategy, implementation of the Defense Management Report, and Persian Gulf activities. There is no limitation on internal placement of current DOD employees or on nonappropriated fund employees converting to appropriated fund status.

The fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Act requires us to submit a civilian employment master plan for industrially funded activities and to notify Congress each time we deviate from the master plan. In addition, we must identify and justify planned involuntary separations or furloughs at those activities. We, of course, plan to use strategies other than furloughs or involuntary separations whenever possible to achieve a smaller, more flexible work force and want to work with you to ensure that we satisfy the intent of Congress without such extensive reporting. We also request your support for flexibility in workload execution—including freedom from legislated employment ceilings and floors—and for avoidance of non-programmatic reductions to the work force. Finally, while we are fully committed to achieving appropriate reductions in the costs of foreign national civilian employment at overseas military installations, such reductions—particularly those that involve country to country negotiations—will take time. We ask that you not impose any arbitrary reductions in the funds available for foreign national compensation.

As we plan for reductions in our manpower levels, we realize that some of our decisions may have a profound effect at the community level. To assist affected communities, the Department has conducted an Economic Adjustment Program since 1961. The fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Act strengthened this program and continued the authorization for grant assistance to communities unable to fund completely the planning activities required to adjust to the sometimes abrupt impacts caused by Defense program changes. In some communities, the Desert Storm deployments have caused severe business losses. Our Office of Economic Adjustment has been helping those communities set up task forces to tackle this problem. We have also underwritten detailed economic surveys and analyses to help the communities develop targeted responses to the cutbacks.

Before leaving the subject of our manpower request, I would like to note that it reflects our efforts, to improve the performance of our personnel and reduce cost. These efforts include development of quality and productivity self-assessment guides, work force motivation techniques such as gain sharing and recognition through group and individual awards, productivity enhancing capital investments, awareness through education and training, and various statistical and analytical

processes. As the Department reshapes its forces, these quality and productivity initiatives will be tailored to support organizational change, application of new technology, and a smaller, more flexible work force.

FORCE MANAGEMENT: THE TOTAL FORCE

I closed my overview statement last year by saying that we would be spending a great deal of time in 1990 answering these questions: What should we expect our military forces to be able to do, and how shall we use the elements of the Total Force to do it? I was right, but in ways I could not foresee.

When I originally made this prediction, I was thinking primarily of the work we were doing in conjunction with the Total Force Policy study. I will not revisit the findings of that study in this statement but will say that our work on it has helped us reevaluate old assumptions and consider new ideas for enhancing Active and Reserve component integration in a fiscally constrained environment. However, the most graphic lessons for Total Force Policy have been provided by Operation Desert Storm, where all the components of the total force have made significant contributions.

Reservists and National Guardsmen have been essential to the success of Desert Storm. As we said in the Total Force Policy Report, "the prompt integration of Active, National Guard, and Reserve forces into a formidable 'Desert Shield' is eloquent testimony to the capability of the Reserve forces generally, to the often unique skills and experience they bring to the Total Force, and to the progress that has been made in recent years in implementing the Total Force Policy." The President's authority to call upon the Nation's Reserve forces—under sections 673 and 673b of title 10 of the United States Code—has worked well in filling our manpower needs in a crisis, as has the recall of selected retirees. Desert Storm has demonstrated the importance of having active duty and Reserve forces that are able to deploy rapidly and stay deployed for a considerable period. In the future, any composition of our force that detracts from readiness and deployability should be eliminated from the equation.

Civilians, too, provided critical support to Desert Storm. Civilian technicians and engineers have performed maintenance on aircraft, missiles, radars, tanks, and helicopters at regional locations, just as they do in the United States.

Host nation support, another component of the Total Force, has also been essential to sustaining a U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf. The facilities and supplies made available to U.S. forces by the Saudi government have reduced costs associated with the operation.

The lessons we finally learn from the Persian Gulf crisis and how we relate them to shaping the military forces of the future remain to be seen. However, I can say with no hesitation that Desert Storm has demonstrated that the Total Force Policy is not merely a philosophy but a method of operation that works.

PERSONNEL: RECRUITING, RETAINING, TRAINING

Like everything else, however, the Total Force Policy will work only if we have the right numbers of people with the right aptitudes and training to make it work. This will be especially true of a smaller force. The next section of my statement will describe how we try to reach this goal and how Desert Storm has affected our efforts.

Recruitment Advertising

For the last several years, the military services have successfully recruited the high-quality people demanded by the increasing complexity of modern national security strategies and the high-technology weaponry and support systems deployed to execute them. This was also true for fiscal year 1990. Since fiscal year 1982, recruits have been of higher quality than the average eligible youth population. In fiscal year 1990, 95 percent of all recruits were high school graduates (versus 75 percent of the youth population), and 97 percent scored average or above on the enlistment test (versus 69 percent of the youth population).

Since the deployment of American troops to the Persian Gulf, we have carefully monitored recruiting trends to determine if enlistments have been significantly affected. This is difficult since the effects of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm are intertwined with the effects of the impending force drawdown and associated budget cuts, and the impact of the economy on recruiting. Nevertheless, for the first 5 months of fiscal year 1991, all services met or exceeded their accession requirements, as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2.—Active Component Non-Prior Service Accessions by Service

Total Accessions [Thousands]

Service	Fiscal year 1991 through February			Fiscal year 1990 through February		
	Objective	Actual	Percent	Objective	Actual	Percent
Army	36.1	37.5	104	30.8	31.4	102
Navy	26.5	26.6	101	24.8	24.9	100
Marines	12.3	12.6	103	12.8	12.9	100
Air Force	12.1	12.1	100	15.4	15.4	100
DOD	87.0	88.8	102	83.9	84.5	101

The quality of enlistees has also continued to be high. As Table 3 shows, for the first 5 months of fiscal year 1991, 97 percent of all new recruits were high school diploma graduates (HSDG) compared with 90 percent for the same period in fiscal year 1990. The percent of non-prior service (NPS) enlistees who scored average or above on the enlistment test (Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Categories I through III) rose from 95 percent in fiscal year 1990 to 99 percent for the same period in fiscal year 1991. Based on these data, we expect the services to meet their fiscal year 1991 end-of-year accession goals with quality higher than that of fiscal year 1990.

TABLE 3.—AFQT I–III and HSDG Accessions

[Percent of Total NPS Accessions]

Service	Fiscal year 1991 through February		Fiscal year 1990 through February	
	AFQT I–III	HSDG	AFQT I–III	HSDG
Army	98	96	95	88
Navy	99	96	91	87
Marine Corps	99+	97	99	93
Air Force	99+	99	99+	99
DOD	99	97	95	90

Thus, for fiscal year 1991, we are optimistic about the health of future recruiting. However, there are many factors that can adversely affect recruiting success, including youth labor market variables (such as employment and pay) and youth population demographics. In addition, we now face smaller recruiting budgets as a result of downsizing initiatives. Recruiting and advertising budgets for fiscal years 1988–1991 are shown in Table 4. The table reflects an austere program—a $58 million decrease from last year's budget measured in current dollars. The reduction primarily affects the active force program.

TABLE 4.—DOD Recruiting and Advertising Resources [1] [2]

[Current $ in millions]

	Fiscal year 1988	Fiscal year 1989	Fiscal year 1990	Fiscal year 1991*
Active Components				
Army	615.6	618.5	576.0	513.0
Navy	333.4	342.2	374.3	371.2
Marine Corps [4]	152.3	146.3	160.7	154.5
Air Force	155.6	156.5	160.5	144.4
Joint	114.7	123.3	114.0	112.0
Active Totals	1,371.6	1,386.2	1,385.5	1,295.1
Reserve Components				
Army National Guard	279.6	261.3	259.8	272.1
Army Reserve	204.1	182.2	214.2	237.8

TABLE 4.—DOD Recruiting and Advertising Resources [1] [2]—Continued

[Current $ in millions]

	Fiscal year 1988	Fiscal year 1989	Fiscal year 1990	Fiscal year 1991[3]
Naval Reserve	85.5	88.3	90.3	90.5
Marine Corps Reserve	49.0	51.9	53.9	52.5
Air Force Reserve	35.6	33.0	33.7	32.3
Air National Guard	43.1	45.7	47.5	46.2
Reserve Total	696.9	662.4	699.4	731.4
DOD Totals	2,058.5	2,049.2	2,084.9	2,026.5

[1] Includes all funds identified as enlisted, officer, and medical recruiting resources.
[2] For all years shown, Active force includes cost of "kickers" (Army College Fund and Navy College Fund) and Reserve components include funding for the Montgomery GI bill.
[3] Fiscal year 1991 figures show service programs consistent with the fiscal years 1992–1993 President's budget.
[4] Since active Marine Corps recruiters perform Reserve NPS missions, resources in the active budget were aligned to the Reserve Program.

The impact of the Persian Gulf crisis on Reserve recruiting is difficult to assess at this time. Through February, the Army appears to be most affected, with the Army National Guard achieving 72 percent of its recruiting objective, compared with 102 percent for the same period last year. The Army Reserve achieved 102 and 82 percent of its goals for the first 5 months of fiscal year 1990 and fiscal year 1991, respectively. Several factors unique to the Reserve components have constrained reserve recruiting efforts. For example, Reserve recruiting was affected by the Active component Stop Loss action. Army Reserve recruiting also was initially suspended in those units activated and deployed to the Persian Gulf; this policy was modified in November to permit limited recruiting for activated Army Reserve units. Despite the drop in recruiting quantity, the Army National Guard and Reserve continue to focus on quality recruiting. We believe the Reserve components will meet their recruiting objectives in the near term. The effect on future recruiting, however, remains to be seen as activated reservists return to hometowns across the Nation.

To satisfy force structure requirements mandated by Congress, the Department of Defense uses recruitment advertising designed to encourage young Americans to consider military service as a post-high school option. While our message to prospective volunteers emphasizes elements of military service most likely to appeal to them, no attempt is made to hide the realities of military life. In the unlikely event that a few applicants do complete their initial processing at a recruiting station and arrive at basic training still unaware of the primary mission of the military, their first exposure to marksmanship, hand-to-hand combat, and physical training surely ends their confusion.

Because of the publicity surrounding Operation Desert Storm, the propensity of young men and women to enlist may change. Recruiting may become tougher during a period when we are also suffering cuts in the recruiting and advertising budget. Table 5 depicts the decline in advertising funds since fiscal year 1988.

TABLE 5.—DOD Recruitment Advertising Resources

[Current $ in millions]

	Fiscal year 1988	Fiscal year 1989	Fiscal year 1990	Fiscal year 1991
Active:				
Army	73.5	74.2	76.6	44.7
Navy	19.4	19.4	25.2	16.2
Marine Corps	14.8	15.2	16.3	11.0
Air Force	14.8	14.8	16.3	10.0
Joint	27.0	31.3	15.6	13.4
Active Totals	149.6	154.9	149.9	95.3
Reserves:				
Air National Guard	15.6	14.3	14.0	10.8
Army Reserve	22.9	20.8	21.4	19.4
Naval Reserve	4.0	4.3	3.9	3.2
Marine Corps Reserve	2.7	2.6	2.0	1.9

TABLE 5.—DOD Recruitment Advertising Resources—Continued

[Current $ in millions]

	Fiscal year 1988	Fiscal year 1989	Fiscal year 1990	Fiscal year 1991
Air Force Reserve	3.9	3.7	3.8	3.2
Air National Guard	2.1	3.1	3.7	2.6
Reserve Totals	51.2	48.8	48.7	41.1
Budget/Budget Submit	200.8	203.7	198.7	136.5

Totals for fiscal year 1988, fiscal year 1989, and fiscal year 1990 are actual expenditures. Fiscal year 1991 figures reflect current service estimates in the fiscal years 1992–1993 President's budget. Totals may not add due to rounding.

Operation Desert Storm has focused the country's attention on many of the factors that make recruiting so challenging. However, it has also increased awareness of the military in young people, and given the circumstances that made Desert Storm necessary, we believe the reasons young people are enlisting may have changed. Pride, patriotism, and being part of a team now seem more important to young men and women than career opportunities and benefits of military service. In any event, we are certain that our Nation's involvement in the Persian Gulf will have an influence on how we should advertise in the future. We already have made some changes to our advertising strategies. First, we are not advertising as much as we did last year at this time. After the outbreak of hostilities in January, the services suspended virtually all mass media advertising. Second, the message contained in the advertising that continues has been refocused to emphasize the rewards derived from serving our country. For example, we changed our joint-service ads from a training and opportunity message ("Opportunity is Waiting for You") to a theme stressing the rewards that can be derived from doing something for our country ("Stand Up, Stand Out").

While the discussion above has focused on military recruiting, recruiting a competent civilian work force continues to be vital to our success because these people provide essential operational, maintenance, and administrative support services for our military forces. The key to successful recruitment and retention of highly qualified civilians is an effective civil service system that offers competitive recruitment and retention incentives and streamlined processes for hiring. With the passage of the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990, we have gained the ability to offer pay more competitive with the private sector, and to use recruitment, retention and relocation bonuses. We believe these new tools will be of great value to the Department, particularly in high-cost areas like San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York. We are grateful for your passage of this legislation and are working with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on its implementation within the Department. In addition, we are working with OPM on alternative classification and performance management systems in furtherance of efforts to enhance our ability to recruit and retain civilians, particularly in critical shortage categories, such as scientists, engineers, and accountants.

Socioeconomic and Minority Status/Women in the Military

With regard to socioeconomic status, our enlisted military members come from backgrounds that are only slightly lower in socioeconomic status than the national average. We recently surveyed over 10,000 recruits in basic training and asked questions that captured information about their backgrounds. Based on this survey, we know that the majority of recruits' parents had a high school education or better, were married, owned their own homes, and were employed. The contention that the enlisted force is recruited primarily from the lower socioeconomic strata of society is not supported by the facts.

As to Black representation, since the implementation of the volunteer force, it has steadily increased, both from a recruiting and a retention perspective. In fiscal year 1990, 20.8 percent of our enlisted active force were Blacks, which compares to 12 percent in the national 18- to 44-year-old population. With respect to accessions, in fiscal year 1990, 20.7 percent of our non-prior service enlisted recruits were Blacks, compared to 13.9 percent in the 18- to 24-year-old population. Other ethnic groups (e.g., Hispanics, American Indians) are under represented in the military. In fiscal year 1990, Hispanics represented 6.9 percent of non-prior service enlisted accessions, compared to 11 percent in the civilian population of enlistment age.

In a volunteer environment, two factors determine force composition: (1) who is willing to serve, and (2) whom the services choose to accept, based on their enlistment and reenlistment standards. Those who are opposed to over representation of Blacks assume that service in the military is onerous. Evidently, Blacks disagree. Not only do they voluntarily enlist, their reenlistment rates are higher than the rates for whites.

Changing the racial or ethnic mix of the military would require the use of quotas by race or ethnicity. Under our current system of voluntary enlistments, the services make no attempt to regulate the minority or socioeconomic characteristics of new recruits. Rather than using social, race, or ethnic criteria for enlistment, they use enlistment standards that ensure the best qualified applicants are selected. That is, the military offers opportunities based on merit, not demographics. In many cases, the civilian sector has lagged behind the military in equal opportunity. The presence of significant numbers of minorities in a volunteer career force reflects the Department's success and the civilian sector's shortcomings.

Our policy to provide women full and equal opportunity with men to pursue appropriate careers in the military has resulted in dramatic changes over the past two decades. Since 1972, the number of women on active duty has climbed from just over 45,000 to 223,000. A similar increase has occurred in the Reserve forces. Women make up 11 percent of our active duty force and over 13 percent of our Reserve force, serving in a wide variety of critical positions. Force reductions will result in a decrease in the number of women in the Armed Forces; however, we expect their overall representation to remain stable or climb slightly. Women made up over 6 percent of the total military force in the Persian Gulf. Because they are restricted from assignment to direct combat positions, their representation in the Gulf force was less than the 11 percent representation they have overall. During the past several years, the military departments reviewed all noncombat positions closed to women. Their reviews used DOD guidance for interpreting combat exclusion laws and a DOD-developed standard for risk assessment. As a result of these reviews, over 31,000 additional positions were opened to women. The services continue to evaluate positions closed to women and are working to integrate more enlisted women into nontraditional skills. They are also emphasizing women officer leadership development to prepare women for assignment to key billets and command. As these efforts continue, we should see women serving in a broader range of skills and levels. In addition, results of a DOD-wide survey on sex roles has highlighted concerns about sexual harassment. These concerns are being addressed by improving and better targeting our existing programs to prevent and combat sexual harassment.

Training

The planned reductions in our forces make it essential that their readiness and qualitative advantage over potential adversaries be preserved. The key to maintaining readiness at the unit level is providing adequate training funds to maintain operating tempo (OPTEMPO). Adequate OPTEMPO not only trains the unit to perform its mission but serves as the final check to make sure the system works. And, OPTEMPO, when compared to the cost of the forces, is cheap.

Because the need to maintain each unit as a quality organization increases as our forces are reduced in size, each of the services has budgeted sufficient funds to maintain OPTEMPO at the required levels. This year's budget request funds a training tempo approximately the same as in fiscal year 1991. Active Army ground and air training operations will continue at 800 miles per year for combat vehicles and 14.5 flying hours per month for tactical aircrews. Navy steaming days remain at 50.5/29.0 days per quarter for the deployed/nondeployed fleets. Flying hours for active Air Force tactical aircrews will hold at about 19 hours per month in fiscal year 1991, dropping to about 18 hours in fiscal year 1992 as certain high-OPTEMPO aircraft are transferred to the Reserve components.

The collective training conducted by the unit to develop proficiency in performing its missions is the culminating event in the DOD training process. The other type of training, individual training, consists of formal schools and training centers and on-the-job training in operational organizations. Despite intense competition for scarce resources, the services are continuing to provide challenging training in each setting for both Active and Reserve personnel.

Military training student manyears are the principal measure of individual, institutional training requirements. The student manyears (loads) requested by the service components are shown in Table 6. The Department will require student loads consistent with end strengths and the availability of funds to implement individual training programs.

TABLE 6.—DOD Training Loads/Student Manyears

Components	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993
Army	68,106	66,580
Navy	60,100	59,370
Marine Corps	21,193	20,718
Air Force	28,847	28,474
Army National Guard	14,626	14,468
Army Reserve	13,597	13,095
Naval Reserve	2,336	2,476
Marine Corps Reserve	3,514	3,710
Air National Guard	2,769	2,771
Air Force Reserve	1,663	1,698
Total	216,751	213,360

Upcoming military strength reductions will decrease some training costs but will introduce some new training requirements. Clearly, reductions in new people will directly reduce requirements for recruit, initial skill, and officer acquisition training programs. But accelerated separation and retirement, while they will help to achieve strength targets, will also mean the loss of qualified personnel. Their replacements will, in many cases, require additional skill development training or cross-training. Deactivation of operational units will eliminate the collective training costs of those units deactivated. However, some of the cost savings from deactivations and closures will be spent in meeting additional training requirements of remaining units whose missions must be realigned or consolidated. Training to meet high readiness standards will be critical in creating the needed flexibility to address a wide variety of contingencies.

We continue to emphasize cost-effective training management. Weapon and support systems are being designed to minimize both the number and the skill level of people needed to operate them. Training delivery systems (including computer-assisted instruction, interactive courseware, embedded training, and simulators) are systematically developed when justified for training effectiveness and efficiency. Particular emphasis is being placed on training systems that will help alleviate unique training problems faced by Reserve component units. Steps to assure that training software is portable and training simulators interoperable will provide further training cost-avoidance despite relatively high initial investment costs.

In the area of civilian training, we have sought for several years the ability to pay for degree-related training. We are pleased that the fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Act granted us this authority for skills in short supply or required in critical positions, such as in our acquisition work force. We believe this will improve our competitiveness with private industry for college graduates who have skills in high demand and for whom degree training is significant to their advancement, such as scientists and engineers. We also believe this will enable us to provide retraining opportunities as we attempt to keep a skills balance in our work force during the drawdown.

Retention

During most of the current decade, military retention patterns have been very healthy, and the Department has continued its success in retaining a high-quality officer and enlisted force during the past year. While we expect no difficulties in the near term, we continue to experience shortages of pilots, nuclear officers, and medical personnel and people in certain mission-critical enlisted specialties. Maintaining the grades and skills necessary to man the future force will require intensive management and judicious application of scarce bonus resources. As we continue to wrestle with the size and scope of future manpower reductions in light of a reduced budget, the picture has been clouded by our deployment in the Persian Gulf. While we expect no difficulties during fiscal year 1991, it is too early to tell what effect Operation Desert Storm and budget reductions will have on retention.

While we continue to reenlist eligible members, we cannot compute the current reenlistment rates due to the use of the Stop Loss authority. Any reenlistment rates computed at this point would be misleading as the pool of men and women eligible to reenlist or separate has been significantly reduced. We will, of course, continue to monitor retention.

Many of the Department's problems with civilian retention stem from the problems I have already mentioned about recruitment of civilians, and we hope that the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act will not only help us recruit but also retain highly skilled civilians. As the civilian work force is reduced, our Priority Placement Program will become increasingly important in keeping employees with the skills we continue to need. This program provides employees whose positions are adversely affected by base closure, contracting out, functional transfer, or other actions that result in a reduction-in-force the opportunity to be placed in vacant DOD positions for which they are qualified. We will also be working with OPM and other Federal agencies to maximize efforts to place our employees in other Federal positions.

TOOLS: COMPENSATION, QUALITY OF LIFE

Our ability to recruit and retain the people we need is significantly affected by our ability to provide adequate compensation and quality of life incentives. The next section of my statement discusses these incentives.

Compensation

We appreciate this subcommittee's efforts in the compensation area for fiscal year 1991 and seek your continued support. The challenge for us in fiscal year 1992 and beyond will be to maintain our competitive position given the fiscal constraints we face.

The President's budget requests pay raises of 4.2 percent in fiscal year 1992 and 4.7 percent in fiscal year 1993 for military personnel. We have been using the civilian wages and salaries component of the Employment Cost Index (ECI) as the basis for comparison with military wages. According to this measure, since 1983 the military pay raise has been less than the increase in the ECI, except in 1989. Recent economic research by the Department has raised questions, however, about the validity of this index as the appropriate standard of comparison because of demographic and structural differences between our force structure and the civilian labor market. The Seventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) is studying the selection of an appropriate index. Regardless of the standard that is chosen, we remain committed to closing any pay gap completely over the long run.

Our incentive programs will become increasingly important in helping us to align a reduced personnel inventory with future force structure. As the force is reduced and the need to recruit high-quality personnel becomes more pronounced, competition for a declining youth population will provide a continuing challenge. The enlistment and selective reenlistment bonus programs are two of our most effective tools in meeting recruiting and retention requirements. Maintaining adequate levels of funding for these bonuses will be critical in attracting enlistees to and retaining members in the highly skilled, mission-critical, and arduous duty specialties.

Two areas of particular concern to us that are being addressed by special pays and bonuses are pilots and health care professionals. The recently enacted increase in aviator continuation pay, the extension of the aviator retention bonus, and a declining force structure—operating together—should resolve some of our pilot shortages within the next few years. However, pending changes to drive up the wage scale and increases in hiring in private industry could reduce the positive impact of our programs. We will continue to monitor retention in this critical area closely.

Congress, and the Department, have long recognized the need to augment normal military compensation in order to attract and retain physicians. As a result, they are among the highest paid professionals in military service; however, we still have shortages in certain specialties, especially surgical, where the total compensation package we offer lags significantly behind private sector comparability. The fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Act significantly modified special pay authority for physicians on active duty, establishing a permanent multi-year contract retention pay. We provided specific rates and eligible physicians for the new Multi-Year Special Pay, along with new directions on Incentive Special Pay, to the services in recent implementation guidance, and a report to Congress describing implementation is currently being prepared. As for nurses, the fiscal year 1990 Defense Authorization Act authorized Incentive Special Pay of up to $6,000 per year for nurse anesthetists. The fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Act expanded this authority to include other nurse specialties when they demonstrate critical staffing shortages. We are working with the services to determine if critical staffing shortages will exist after the bonus is expanded to general nursing staff skills.

Moving to allowances, in the spring of 1990 the Department completed its biennial survey of housing expenses incurred by members drawing allowances for housing in the United States. Over 620,000 valid responses were received for residences in

over 334 military housing areas. The survey concluded that housing costs rose 8.2 percent on average compared to a 7.8 increase in housing allowances over the same 2-year period. The 4.1 percent funding increase in the fiscal year 1991 Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) program, while welcome, was insufficient to overcome past years of funding constraints. To overcome the shortfall and to pay the full VHA entitlement in fiscal year 1991, it was necessary for us to reprogram the additional funding required. We hope to avoid reprogramming in the future and have programmed funding for future years based on full VHA entitlement.

In January of this year, we implemented the provision in the fiscal year 1990 DOD Authorization Act that limited the amount of any decrease in a member's pay due to reductions in his or her VHA resulting from adverse housing market conditions. We have also implemented the overseas up-front Move-In Housing Allowance (MIHA). MIHA assists overseas members by defraying the initial cost of local economy housing at the time these expenses are actually incurred. This lump sum payment has significantly reduced the financial burden imposed on many of our overseas service members and has improved the accuracy of overseas housing allowance reimbursements.

Desert Storm has highlighted several aspects of military compensation that come into play in a combat situation. Our military personnel in the Persian Gulf area are receiving Imminent Danger Pay, Family Separation Pay when applicable, and Certain Places (Foreign Duty) Pay. These special pays helped to make up for the loss of Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) for enlisted members upon deployment to the Persian Gulf that occurred because deployed members are fed by the government. They should not be construed, however, as a replacement income because the purpose for these payments is not to replace BAS, but rather to compensate members for arduous and hazardous duties away from their families. Congress has asked the Department to submit a report on various options for reforming the BAS entitlement. We have reviewed several alternatives but will not propose any changes to the BAS entitlement until the 7th QRMC has completed its full review of the overall compensation system.

Beyond the special pays mentioned above, in a combat zone all compensation of members other than commissioned officers is excluded from taxable income. Commissioned officers may exclude $500 per month. There is no withholding of Federal income tax for service in a combat zone. In addition, various tax-related actions such as filing returns, paying tax, and claiming refunds may be delayed for the period in a combat zone and 180 days thereafter. For members who take advantage of this delay, there will be no penalty or interest payable on taxes owed. In addition, thanks to the passage of H.R. 4, interest on refunds will be payable from April 15 when filing of the return is delayed.

The Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization provides for increases to existing special pays and new benefits for participants in the Persian Gulf conflict. We are grateful to the Congress for recognizing with this piece of legislation the dangers and sacrifices endured by our troops.

Quality of Life

As we move forward with restructuring and downsizing of our force, we intend to sustain, and, where needed, bolster support systems operating in our military communities. Reductions in community services will be taken cautiously to ensure that we do not withdraw support systems prematurely. Such shortcuts during this process would have a negative impact on the morale of our departing service members, many of whom are overseas. For those leaving, we must address specific concerns for proper reintegration into the civilian work force and community. For those who will remain, a stable quality of life will help us retain the best.

Our involvement in Operation Desert Storm has demonstrated that past investments in quality of life have been sound. The military exchange and our Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs have provided tremendous aid to and support for forces in the Persian Gulf. Here at home, our network of family support programs has proven its worth in the outstanding assistance provided to our military families. I believe we have demonstrated our commitment to these programs in funding as well as policy. Some highlights of specific quality of life programs follow.

The Department has established the Transition Support and Services Directorate to facilitate development and implementation of transition assistance benefits for separating military personnel, civilians, and their families. We have developed a DOD-wide core Transition Information Program, which will be enhanced by specific service initiatives. We believe that by treating departing personnel fairly and with dignity, the Department will maintain its image as a quality employer, and by so doing, continue to be able to recruit the best and brightest.

The successful readjustment of veterans into civilian life is a mutual responsibility and concern of the Departments of Defense, Labor (DOL), and Veterans Affairs (DVA). As part of the DOD Transition Information Program, we have entered into agreements with DOL and DVA to expand pilot and ongoing outplacement and readjustment programs. All three Departments are committed to establishing and maintaining a program to furnish counseling, assist in identifying employment and training opportunities, insure awareness of veterans' benefits programs, and provide any other information that will ease the return of veterans to the private sector.

In addition, as has always been our policy, members who are separated will be provided retirement or separation benefits where eligible under existing laws. I am particularly pleased about the eligibility changes recently enacted for separation pay; for the first time, regular enlisted members are now eligible for this pay. Also, the transition benefits package that we are putting together based on legislation passed by Congress last year will make our program compare favorably with the best found in the private sector. We are still concerned, however, about the need to expand unemployment compensation benefits to 26 weeks for involuntarily separated service members.

Other important aspects of the DOD program include the development of innovative automated systems to assist separating personnel in determining the private sector opportunities that best suit them: a resume data base for voluntary referral to private sector companies, an electronic bulletin board for publication of job and training opportunities, a decision information tool to explore career and training information, and a personalized training and occupational verification profile. In addition, we are enhancing relocation assistance services, including the introduction of automation, which will not only assist service members who are leaving, but also will continue to be a mainstay for military personnel changing duty stations.

In the area of child care, the Department has progressed in its implementation of the Military Child Care Act of 1989. We have a strong commitment to quality care and are continuing to expand availability, primarily through care in family homes. Increases to caregiver wages and improved caregiver training are reducing staff turnover and enhancing staff professionalism. We have established inspection teams throughout the services and DOD to monitor compliance with standards for health, safety, and quality. In addition, we have issued standard fee guidance to ensure comparability of fees within DOD and to establish affordable rates for service members. The system is still adjusting to these changes and needs time to implement and adjust fully to new guidance.

The Family Advocacy Program addresses child and spouse abuse. We expect demands on this program to increase as military families are faced with the uncertainty caused by world conflict, transition, fear of job loss, and impending economic hardship. Current funding levels are inadequate, and caseloads carried by counselors are three times larger than standards established by leading national agencies. The services have identified additional requirements for fiscal years 1992 and 1993, and we have increased funding for prevention efforts and treatment programs to meet 55 percent of those requirements. We must prepare to assist our families through crisis and therefore ask you to support the program increase we have included in our budget request.

Another program crucial to our families is our dependents education program, which enrolls over 195,000 students, mostly overseas. During the drawdown, our goal is to maintain the high quality of education currently provided by dependent schools worldwide. Many schools will decline in enrollment rather than closing; in this event, we must recognize that the cost per student will increase as economies of scale decrease.

Regardless of the drawdown, the Department remains committed to excellence in our dependents schools. We are emphasizing achievement of the President's National Education Goals and have set objectively measurable goals to support these goals, including doubling the percentage of high school graduates who complete physics and calculus courses. This year, 2,300 teachers are being trained to improve the teaching of mathematics at all grade levels. The quality of our education system is evidenced by the results of our performance at all grade levels on nationally administered standardized tests and in participation and performance on the SAT college entrance exam. Yet, considering direct educational costs, we spend at the national average per pupil.

The DOD Morale, Welfare and Recreation program is a major contributor to community life on military installations. Libraries, sports and athletic programs, military exchanges, military clubs, youth services, craft shops, and other activities serve approximately 12 million people, generate over $10 billion in sales, employ 220,000 people, and account for about $5.2 billion in program cost, exclusive of cost of goods

sold. About $1.2 billion is funded by appropriated funds; the remainder is provided through nonappropriated funds support.

With congressional assistance, the Department has restructured MWR activities to make them more business-like. This has resulted in MWR business programs becoming more efficient and therefore less reliant on appropriated fund support. Other recent changes to MWR programs include the expansion of patronage eligibility to a larger population of the Reserve components and their families. MWR, with its makeup of revenue- and non-revenue generating community programs must maintain a minimum level of appropriated funds to sustain a strong quality of life on each installation. We are faced with a potential drop in revenue as installations close and we bring some of our forces back from Europe. We intend to monitor carefully the impact of this transition on the quality of life of our service members and their families.

The Persian Gulf mobilization has reinforced the direct link between mission readiness and morale support activities for our forces. The establishment of stress-relieving activities and essential services for our service members became an issue of paramount importance for a "waiting" force. Recreation kits, televisions with VCRs, Desert FAX, and culturally acceptable reading material and entertainment for our troops contributed to morale. We also leased a cruise ship to provide secure Rest and Recreation (R&R) for service members on 48 to 72 hours leave from the peninsula.

For the family members left at home during Desert Storm, Family Centers have provided the focal point through which we could best organize contact and assistance. The centers established hot lines to assist in information flow and expanded services and hours of operation to accommodate the most pressing needs. The services offered typically include emergency financial assistance, child care/foster care coordination, stress management, relocation assistance, family support groups, liaison with the family support programs of the Reserve components, and information and referral. When operating under ordinary business conditions, our 367 Family Centers respond to over 9 million requests for assistance annually. The number of requests increased substantially with force deployments. The Family Center has provided the infrastructure to mobilize a community effort and clearly is essential to mobilization of the force.

CONCLUSION

Despite the stresses of war, our volunteer force continues to perform well. I am convinced that with proper attention to and funding for recruiting, training, and compensation and quality of life incentives, it will--while smaller—be able to maintain the readiness necessary to defend our interests around the world in the coming years. We request your continued support in making sure this happens.

As I mentioned in the introduction to my statement, flexibility will be crucial to our success as we plan for the future in the aftermath of Desert Storm. We need to be given the necessary flexibility to reshape the forces in a manner that preserves our readiness and qualitative edge. Although this reshaping will include manpower cuts, decisions on the size of the reductions should be preceded by the identification and assignment of missions and the modification of force structure based on those prescribed missions.

With your help, we can guide the volunteer force successfully through the changes the next few years will bring. I hope we will be able to work together to accomplish this goal.

Senator GLENN. Good. General Reno.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM H. RENO, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PERSONNEL, U.S. ARMY

General RENO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. It is a pleasure for me to appear before the committee and to share with you the pride that we in the Army justifiably feel for the dramatic and outstanding performance of our forces during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I also appreciate the opportunity to discuss the challenging years ahead and the programs we see so critical to sustaining and shaping your Army.

Mr. Chairman, I became the DCSPER on the 1st of August 1990, and on the 2d of August the pace picked up quite a bit as you could

expect. Since that date, we have been working and managing the personnel posture of the Army along what our Chief of Staff and Secretary call three vectors. The first being to support the operation in the desert; the second being to maintain readiness worldwide in the U.S. Army, and finally, planning the detailed plans to reshape the Army as you mentioned in your opening comments.

Operation Desert Storm and the continued maintenance of worldwide readiness demanded, therefore, extraordinary personnel measures. At the height of the operation we had activated over 142,000 Reserve component personnel. Additionally, we called to active duty approximately 5,600 Reserves in 9 TTAD status and a little over 1,200 retiree recalls. Our active duty force, due mainly to stop loss, increased to 745,000.

We achieved this total force through the mechanism of the reserve force call-up, through stop loss in all components, and by exercising foreign service tour extensions overseas. Desert Shield and Desert Storm also saw the first use of Title 10, 673(b), with an initial call-up of reservists on August 23, and the eventual call-up of 118,000 as a part of the partial mobilization. The call-up was an overall success, and we gained invaluable experience for our future planning and policy determinations for both the guard and reserve and active, the individual ready reserve and the retired community.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you personally, Mr. Chairman, and the Members of your committee, for your help in ensuring and expanding the protections and benefits afforded to our service men and women of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The legislative history of the Persian Gulf benefit bill will reflect your personal involvement in caring for our soldiers. The Army knows full well how much the support of this committee, the Congress and American people across the nation contributed to our success in the operation.

As we speak this morning, the Army has reversed its policies that caused the build-up of the force for Desert Storm. Today the active Army end strength stands at a little under 740,000, with over 117,000 reserve soldiers on active duty. We have reversed our stop loss policy and expect all personnel to be released by September 30, 1991. We have released over 13,000 of the 17,000 Individual Ready Reservists called up, and we are demobilizing the Reserve component units expeditiously as they come from Saudi Arabia, Europe, and from within CONUS.

All of these forces did not see duty in Southwest Asia. While we supported Desert Storm, we maintained forces for other contingencies worldwide. Both active and reserve forces were a part of this readiness force.

Our task now is to finish redeployment and demobilization as we sustain readiness across the Army, and reduce our end strength simultaneously. As we do this, we are committed to continue to care for our soldiers and their families, to welcome them home with ceremony and dignity, and to transition them back into a serving force, into their armories and their civilian jobs, or into a new life as a civilian, whatever the case may be.

As a consequence of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, we will miss our fiscal year 1991 end-strength objective by a small amount,

but we will back on track as you suggest by the end of fiscal year 1992. In this post-Desert Storm period, we find that what we believed all along has been confirmed by the build-up and by the performance by our units on the battlefield. We are now certain, as Mr. Jehn said, that the policies and programs that will lead to a smaller army must be intelligent, effective, and fair as the one that served us so well over the past decade in building the great army we have.

Reshaping the Army must begin with strong emphasis on our continued commitment to recruiting and retaining high quality men and women. Desert Storm has again proven the value of quality. High-tech weapons, sophisticated tactics, and individual initiatives all demonstrated in the operation, argue compellingly for quality.

Our draw-down will also be characterized by the same fairness which characterize our present force. But we face a difficult period. We must remember that everyone in the Army today has met the quality standard as a volunteer. As well, the smaller Army of the future will be essentially the best of the best. Recruiting and reenlistment standards will need to reflect that fact. To maintain these standards requires resources, and for those, we will need your and the committee's help.

Our soldiers and their families, both essential to our overall readiness, now face a period of change and some uncertainty. We owe them the same loyalty and competence they have demonstrated to the Nation. The people we must ask to leave are quality men and women, and they must be treated accordingly. Our continued success with high-quality personnel, training, and readiness will depend in the future, as it does now, on our attention and care for soldiers and their families. We will not lose sight of this fact as we proceed with the draw-down.

Our success over the next few years is dependent, as well, on the continued support of your committee and the Congress. We will ask for additional flexibility so that we may decrease the size of the Army, maintain readiness, and retain a high-quality level force the Nation has come to expect. We need, for instance, the Warrant Officer Management Act to achieve the reshaping flexibility that you have given us with the commissioned officer corps. At West Point we need a final fiscal year 1995 student body end strength and the flexibility to manage towards that number over the next 4 years.

We will also need continued support for our recruiting and family programs, both so vital to our overall goal of readiness. Quality begins with recruiting and is sustained through sound reenlistment programs. As we transition to a smaller force, we will offer services and benefits to those we must ask to leave, to our alumni. This includes enlisted and officer Reserve components and the outstanding civilians that have supported the Army for so many years. We will need your support and assistance as we transition these veterans and their families to the civilian world and in many cases, we expect, to the Reserve components.

The Army truly appreciates the support of this committee, and I personally look forward to working together with you during my tenure as DCSPER in the years ahead.

[The prepared statement of General Reno follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. William H. Reno, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee;

It is indeed a pleasure to appear before this committee and discuss those programs that are so critical to sustaining and shaping your great Army.

The people of this country have an Army of which they can be justifiably proud. At its peak, the Army had over 300,000 men and women deployed in Southwest Asia. The performance of our soldiers in liberating Kuwait and defeating the Iraqi army was outstanding. This was a total Army effort with Active, U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units, Individual Ready Reservists and civilians serving together to achieve this great victory. Our plans, our training and your support over the last 10 years made this possible. Each man and woman in uniform thanks this committee for its support.

THE THREE VECTORS: DESERT STORM, READINESS, RESHAPING

Since August 2 of last year, the Army has moved along three vectors simultaneously. We have supported and fought in Desert Storm. We have maintained readiness world wide throughout the Southwest Asia crisis. And we have continued to plan and prepare for the difficult and dramatic reshaping that confronts us. No one vector is separate and distinct from another; they are related.

My statement today reflects that relationship. While Desert Storm is not completed, its success sets the stage for new focus on reshaping and continued readiness. The personnel policies and programs that will lead to a smaller Army must be as intelligent, effective and fair as the ones which served us so well over the past decade.

IMPACTS OF DESERT STORM

Requirements of Operation Desert Storm demanded some extraordinary personnel measures in supporting the campaign. We interrupted planned force reductions and increased our strength temporarily. Today the strength of the Active component is about 741,000 along with 7,891 TTAD Reserve component soldiers and recalled retirees which add to the authorized Active component end strength. We also activated over 140,000 other Reserve component soldiers to support Operation Desert Storm.

One important part of our personnel manning strategy was implementation of STOP LOSS. In this program, soldiers scheduled to end their active or reserve service were extended indefinitely. STOP LOSS was and is important to us for two reasons. First, it permitted us to stabilize the force world wide. Even as our attention was focused on Southwest Asia, we had to maintain Army readiness around the world. STOP LOSS, combined with indefinitely extending foreign service tours maintained the strength and cohesion of Army units world wide. This stability ensured readiness and allowed us to turn our attention to supporting the force in Saudi Arabia. Second, STOP LOSS allowed us to keep trained, experienced soldiers on active duty, minimizing the number of reservists we were required to call-up.

We did not totally suspend separations. We continued to separate those who reach mandatory retirement, those with extreme hardships and those whose conduct is unacceptable. I can tell you that the number of hardship requests has been very small. Now that the situation in Southwest Asia is stabilized and relevant political decisions made, we are phasing out STOP LOSS expeditiously, releasing affected soldiers as quickly as possible. We will phase these separations to ensure we do not forfeit the readiness we have worked so hard to achieve. We expect to release all soldiers who were held by STOP LOSS by July 7. However, we intend to be sensitive to the needs of the soldiers and their families. Any soldier needing more time to make an orderly transition may extend their service through September 1991.

In addition to STOP LOSS, we also suspended our involuntary loss programs for fiscal year 1991. We felt it both incongruous and insensitive to notify a soldier in the desert, in harm's way, that he or she was being involuntarily separated. This suspension affects both enlisted and officer programs such as: Qualitative Management Program (QMP), Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERB) and Reduction in Force (RIF).

Given the increased Active component end strength at this point in the fiscal year, we will not be able to attain the congressionally mandated end strength of 702,000 by the end of fiscal year 1991. We will exceed Active component end strength as well as congressional limits on senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) strength, officer end strength and DOPMA grade ceilings. We estimate that we will exceed the active component end strength by about 8,000. The Persian Gulf Conflict

Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 authorizes us the necessary flexibility to manage the force in fiscal year 1991. We will be back on track in fiscal year 1992.

It is important for the committee to understand that as we exercise the authority to exceed these limits, the Army is not acting in a cavalier manner. Our officer and enlisted accession programs are programmed against the fiscal year 1995 end strength target of 520,000 rather than our current strength or our programmed fiscal year 1991 end strength of 702,000. The senior NCO and officer promotion plans are based on the fiscal year 1991 programmed end strength of 702,000. We are not using the increased end strength of Operation Desert Storm to over access or over promote.

RESERVE COMPONENT MOBILIZATION

Operation Desert Shield/Storm marked the first use of Presidential Call Up Authority under Title 10 USC 673b, and the most significant use of Partial Mobilization authority since the Korean War. The initial call up of Reserve units occurred on August 23, 1990, only 21 days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As the crisis in the Middle East developed, the need and subsequent authorization for additional Reserve component personnel increased, culminating in the partial mobilization authority of 220,000 under which we have been operating.

The Army activated 1,041 Reserve component units with 68 percent of them (703) actually deployed to Southwest Asia. These units provided combat forces as well as combat support and combat service support services, such as transportation, water, petroleum, linguist and military police functions. Forty-one (41) backfilled VII Corps units in Europe and 297 were integrated into the CONUS sustaining base. These Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units consisted of 124,901 soldiers. Reserve component units have contributed significantly to the success of Operation Desert Storm. As shown in figure 1, 25 percent of the personnel who served in Southwest Asia were members of the Reserve components.

FIGURE 1



From the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, over 22,000 retirees, Reserve component unit members, Individual Ready Reservists and civilians have written or called to offer their services to the Army. Volunteers were matched by grade, specialty, and training readiness and ordered to a temporary tour of active duty. These volunteers accounted for approximately one-third of the 21,845 individuals ordered to active duty, and all volunteers who matched requirements were called in order to minimize the number of IRR soldiers called to active duty involuntarily. Importantly, Commanders throughout the Army attested to the high state of preparedness and motivation embodied in each IRR soldier. They have also done a great job.

FIGURE 2

RESERVE COMPONENT INDIVIDUALS ON ACTIVE DUTY

(As of April 5, 1991)

	Volunteers	Involuntary	Total
Retirees	1,229	126	1,355
Temporary tour of duty	5,536		5,536
IMA		1,784	1,784
IRR	818	12,352	13,170
Total	7,583	14,262	21,845

Of particular note is the large number (1,167) of retirees who were quick to volunteer and assume duties in CONUS, Europe, and Southwest Asia. This group of knowledgeable and experienced veterans was invaluable as they took the place of active component doctors, nurses, pilots and technicians who were then available for deployment to Southwest Asia.

Equally impressive was the response to the Army's involuntary call-up of the Individual Ready Reserve. Of the 20,920 soldiers ordered to active duty by Western Union Mailgram from the Army Reserve Personnel Center in St. Louis, only 223 are not accounted for and only 4 were declared Absent Without Leave.

Approximately 2,738 of the IRR soldiers called to active duty were accessed, trained, equipped and deployed to Southwest Asia; another 4,488 deployed to Europe, and 2,818 were assigned to units within the United States. When offensive operations terminated, there were 3,619 still in training. We began releasing these soldiers from active duty on 4 March, with due recognition for their services. Orders for those who had not reported were canceled. To ensure accuracy of data used for future planning, each soldiers' status was determined, and he or she was advised that had the operation continued, he or she would not have been released from active duty.

Because of this partial mobilization, we did not fully use the Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS), which is the Army's management information system for mobilizing replacements and filler personnel. The limited number of personnel required for Desert Storm and the lack of train-up time mandated that only those most qualified and experienced soldiers be involuntarily called to active duty. For this reason, we concentrated on calling soldiers who had been released from the active Army or reserve unit duty within the past 12 months. While these soldiers were technically deployable, they were each given a thorough training evaluation and received refresher training at mobilization stations and TRADOC schools. Each was certified as being trained to standard prior to deployment to Southwest Asia or elsewhere within the Army.

Operation Desert Storm also provided another "first" for the Army—execution of the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) concept. This, too, was a highly successful and important phase of the operation. The activation of CONUS Replacement Centers at Fort Benning, Fort Knox, and Fort Jackson, each staffed with approximately 80 personnel from the U.S. Army Reserve, provided the Army maximum command and control of individual replacements. We not only processed military replacements but also processed civilians deploying to the theater. This was done to ensure standards were met in survival skills, particularly chemical warfare. The CRC's allowed us to focus logistical support to ensure every soldier and civilian was equipped and processed properly and to make efficient use of air transportation to the theater. Some of the tasks accomplished in these CRCs were: issue and zero

rifles, issue and fit protective masks, complete pre-deployment inoculations, and training in chemical warfare.

Even before the beginning of the ground phase of Desert Storm, the Army began preparing to bring our soldiers home. The personnel management plan we have developed is based on three fundamental principles. First, we will and must sustain the readiness of the Army as we redeploy, demobilize, reconstitute and reshape the Army. The second is to ensure we attend to the needs of individual soldiers and their families. To this end, we planned adequate decompression time, continuing family support, welcoming ceremonies, and reintegration into the Reserve component structure. Our third major concern is to ensure our actions support shaping of the Army of the 1990's and the many force structure and stationing changes planned to implement DOD and congressional guidance.

CIVILIAN SUPPORT TO DESERT STORM

More than 1,500 civilians in over 100 specialties served on temporary duty supporting Desert Storm in Southwest Asia. Those civilians performed jobs soldiers were not expected to do. For example, a soldier is responsible for basic preventive maintenance on his vehicle, such as changing a tire or checking the oil. Troubleshooting major equipment failures and determining where to fix them is a job performed by the Army's civilian specialists.

Civilian members of the Army throughout the world provided substantial support to our soldiers. Without the expertise and dedication of thousands of Army civilians, we would not have been able to pull off the largest logistical support operation since World War II. Their performance should have removed any doubt about why we need the best and the brightest in public service—whether they are loading, moving, shipping or purchasing supplies, combat material or spare parts, installing and maintaining communications systems, constructing facilities, providing expert technical assistance on weapons and equipment operation or processing and preparing troops for deployment from the United States.

MILITARY PERSONNEL PROGRAMS

Recruiting and Retention

Success on the battlefield is predicated on the quality of the soldiers we recruit and retain. Desert Storm has again proven the value of quality soldiers and leaders. The international environment with its continuing threats to peace in the Middle East and elsewhere requires nothing less than an Army filled with quality soldiers to accomplish its mission. As the Army is reduced in size, the focus on quality is more compelling. The technology of today's and tomorrow's weapon systems, the sophisticated tactics required to fight and succeed, and the soldier flexibility necessary to accomplish the mission contribute to the strong need for continued support of recruiting and retention programs.

Competition for these quality youth and for scarce resources is increasing. To sustain the quality gains of the recent past, adequate recruiting and retention resources must be provided. We must have proper incentives to recruit and retain these quality soldiers in both the Active and Reserve component.

The Montgomery GI Bill, with the Army College Fund, has been instrumental to the success of achieving quality for your Army and, through these great young people, the success in Operation Desert Storm.

The Army College Fund Plus (ACF Plus) has been highly successful in attracting and enlisting quality men and women in specific difficult to fill specialties. This program which ties a Reserve component commitment of 2 years to active duty for 2 years has expanded the recruiting market for quality youth and attracted quality men and women who might not otherwise enlist. Since July 1, 1989, 6,576 youth have enlisted for this program to include 1,680 women.

In the first two quarters of fiscal year 1991, the Army accessed 45,490 soldiers which was 3,352 or 8 percent above the goal of 42,138. For fiscal year 1991, 85 percent of the annual goal of 85,000 accessions was accessed or contracted during the first 6 months of the year.

The quality of these new soldiers is exceptional. Through March, the non-prior service quality achievements are 96.6 percent high school graduates, 78 percent scored in the top half of the entrance test—the Armed Services Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)—and only 1.5 percent of the accessions scored in the lowest allowable range. For the whole year, the accessions plus those in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) continue to reflect strong quality achievement with 97.2 percent high school graduates, 75.9 percent in the top half and only 1 percent in the lowest range of the ASVAB.

Reserve component recruiting through March shows an overall decline. The Army National Guard achieved 72.0 percent and the Army Reserve 79.2 percent of their respective missions. Curtailment of recruiting for activated units and STOP LOSS contributed to some of this decline. The Army adjusted our Reserve component policies to provide more opportunities for enlistments. We continue to focus on quality and have set improved quality marks for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. We must restructure the incentives programs to support RC manning in a post Desert Storm environment.

As we reduce the size of the Army, we will reduce the number of high quality young men and women recruited and retained in the force. Several changes must be made to our retention program in order to support the reshaping plan. First, we will retain the best soldiers. Those separated will be targeted to our Reserve components, which will continue to fulfill an important role under mobilization, as evidenced in Operation Desert Storm. We will reshape our reenlistment options to align them with our needs. At the same time we will keep those options that will help us retain those very high quality soldiers and to place them in critical skill and leadership positions. As you can see, we can no longer allow all soldiers who qualify for and desire to reenlist to do so. Our policies will ensure that quality soldiers are given the first opportunity to stay in the Army. Retention incentives will bed vital to the effort to alleviate critical skill shortages and encourage quality soldiers in overstrength skills to seek retraining into shortage skills.

U.S. Military Academy

The United States Military Academy is vital to the Army and the Nation. The fiscal year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act mandates a reduction in the size of the Corps of Cadets. We will reduce the entering class by 100 cadets this year with annual admissions eventually limited to 1,000 in 1995. Normal attrition with this reduction will decrease the size of the Corps of Cadets by about 1,300 to 3,200, 30 percent below the current level. We understand the intent of the Congress to reduce the size of the service academies; however, the resultant reduction is too deep and too restrictive. Last year the Secretary of Defense directed, and the Army supported, a reduction in the size of the Corps of Cadets from 4,400 to 4,000 (or about 10 percent). We would ask the Congress to change the language in the fiscal year 1991 Authorization Act to permit us to manage the size of the Corps of Cadets based on an "end strength" in lieu of specifying the entering class size. We also believe the proper size for the Corps of Cadets is at least 4,000.

Reserve Officer Training Corps

Another provision in the fiscal year 1991 Authorization Act directed the Army to terminate Active Guard Reserve (AGR) support for the Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC) by September 30, 1991. We feel the continuing presence of these highly professional members of the total Army is vital to our charter to produce the best lieutenants possible for both Active and Reserve forces. We have stopped assigning AGR officers to ROTC duty. We plan to phase out the current AGR support through normal assignment rotation. A forced reassignment of all these quality officers in this fiscal year would cause undue hardship on the officers and their families. I am sure we are meeting the spirit and intent of the legislation.

Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA)

Last year, the Congress granted the Army the DOPMA flexibility we requested. I want to thank the committee for your support on this critical issue. Those provisions grant us the management authorities we need to reduce the officer corps. Similarly, we will be seeking legislation to modernize our Warrant Officer Management System. Current warrant officer statutes are out of date and do not give service secretaries the management tools needed to shape their warrant officer forces properly. There is legislation pending before the Congress which contains all the management authorities we seek. It essentially gives the Army the same management guidelines for the warrant officer corps that DOPMA provides the officer corps. It replaces the old dual promotion system, provides authority to retire warrant officers selectively and allows tenure to specified points based on Active Federal Warrant Officer Service. A new grade, W5, is proposed as a necessary management tool and an incentive for retention of the most highly skilled, experienced technicians and leaders.

Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)

The recent activation of reservists for Operation Desert Storm illustrated the need for a responsive Reserve component officer management system that will provide for the quickest assimilation of personnel during mobilization. The Reserve Of-

ficer Personnel Management Act, which Department of Defense will be proposing again, closely aligns the Active and Reserve systems, creating a "Total Army" officer management process. It provides for selective continuation, selective early retirement, flexible zones for promotion and a balance between management objectives and equitable treatment of individual career expectations. Further, it provides increased management flexibility to the Reserve components as they realign their force in consonance with the reshaping of the Army.

HUMAN RESOURCES

I would not be providing you a complete picture of the personnel program if I did not address the Army's Human Resources Programs. One of the first things I did as the DCSPER was to establish a Human Resources Directorate, under a brigadier general, to ensure that the gains of the past 10 years were not lost as we reduced the force and that our plans for reshaping the Army considered human resource impacts.

The number of women officer, NCOs and enlisted personnel continues to increase in today's Army. I am confident that we will continue to provide full and equal career opportunity for women. We are assigning them in all skills and positions except those closed by the Army's Direct Combat Exclusion Policy. Currently 86 percent of all enlisted Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), 91 percent of all warrant officer specialities and 96 percent of all commissioned officer specialties are open to women. Women comprise 11.4 percent of the Active component, 20.5 percent of the Army Reserve and 7.1 percent of the Army National Guard. Women account for about 9 percent of the force deployed to Southwest Asia where they performed with both distinction and courage.

As the total active force decreases, there will also be reductions in the number of females. However, we plan to enlist the same proportion of female soldiers in the future as we have in the past and this will cause incremental growth in the proportion of females in the Army. Plans call for accession programs which will ensure that female officers remain at or above 12.5 percent of the force starting in fiscal year 1991.

One of the most emotional issues, and certainly one of the most highly publicized, is the policy on assignment of single and dual military parents. Our policies are longstanding, effective and, I submit, worked well in Operation Desert Storm. They were not developed in haste nor specifically for Operation Desert Storm. Currently, we have about 45,650 single parents—31,850 men and 13,800 women—and 51,849 soldiers married to another military member—33,179 men and 18,670 women. Of the couples, 35,012 are enrolled in the Married Army Couples Program which is a voluntary program to identify couples for joint assignment as much as possible. At the height of the deployment, we had about 16,104 single parents and 2,462 dual military couples enrolled in the Married Army Couples Program who were deployed to Southwest Asia.

Single and dual military parents are required to maintain an up to date Family Care Plan which includes provisions necessary to care for dependent family members upon the soldier's deployment. These plans are reviewed and validated annually. If the commander finds the plan to be inadequate, the soldier must bring it to standard or face separation, voluntarily or involuntarily. Members of the Reserve components are subject to the same provisions. Upon activation, reservists must present an acceptable Family Care Plan or they are released. We have many studies that indicate single parents and dual military parents do not have a negative impact on readiness because they have planned for the eventuality of deployment and have provided adequately for their dependent family members. We are an all volunteer force, and the vast majority of our single and dual military parents acclimate to their situation and perform magnificently as they have in Southwest Asia.

The troop reductions of the 1990s will be different from all previous reductions. This time we will reduce a high-quality volunteer force that enlisted with an implied opportunity and an expectation for a worthwhile career. Minority group members comprise over 40 percent of the total enlisted force. Blacks make up 32 percent of the total enlisted force. Black women make up 49 percent of all enlisted females. They are the majority in career fields such as: Supply and Services 55 percent; Petroleum and Water 58 percent; Administration 52 percent, and Food Service 54 percent. Large cuts made in these career fields will result in proportional losses of black soldiers, which could then result in blacks representing a higher share of the overall Army reductions.

As a world class equal opportunity employer, the Army is very sensitive to potential impact of force reductions on minorities and women. Therefore, I can promise you we will work our reduction programs with that in mind.

TRANSITION BENEFITS

Our mission to sustain a quality force is dependent on our ability to recruit and retain quality. As we transition to a smaller force, we cannot forget the people who volunteered to become part of the Army, met our standards for retention, but who will be asked to depart before completing a full career. In compliance with the fiscal year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, the Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) was established to provide a comprehensive system to assist transitioning Army personnel in a caring, organized and disciplined manner; ACAP is targeted to service all transitioning personnel; Active and Reserve component soldiers, civilians and their family members emphasizing retention of quality personnel.

ACAP will synchronize current transition services and provide, at selected installations, Army-wide ACAP Transition Assistance Offices and contracted Job Assistance Centers. Designed as an enduring program, ACAP will provide support to an estimated 180,000 to 220,000 separating personnel annually, with the capacity to surge in order to meet the needs of those being involuntarily separated. This program will support our soldiers and civilians around America as these great young Americans will be returned to society, having gained the values and ethics of service. Resources are budgeted to fund this critical program.

Ultimately, ACAP will promote the Army's ability to recruit a quality force in the years ahead. The package of transition benefits in the fiscal year 1991 Authorization Act is very comprehensive and will ease the burden on those enduring involuntary separation during the build down. One inequity that remains is the unemployment compensation available to involuntarily separated military personnel compared to that available to civilians. We ask your support to make unemployment compensation for involuntarily separated military personnel the same as is available to civilians.

COMPENSATION

The Military Compensation System must support manpower readiness requirements of the Armed Forces and should further the concept that a military career is a dignified, respectable, and honorable profession. Military compensation must be sufficient for service members and their families to maintain a standard of living commensurate with the level of responsibilities inherent in their service to country and within those standards of living expected within our society. Although patriotism is basic to an individual's commitment to serve a career in the Armed Forces, at the same time, patriotism by itself is neither adequate compensation nor adequate motivation for a career. I ask you to support the military pay raise and the bonus and incentive programs in the fiscal year 1992/93 budget.

CHILD CARE, COMMUNITY AND FAMILY SUPPORT

The Army is fully implementing the Military Child Care Act of 1989. Oversight requirements and directed staffing and funding levels have been met. In fiscal year 1990, The Army provided child care services for over 174,000 children of soldiers and Department of the Army civilians. However, a waiting list of over 23,000 remains. GAO and Department of the Army Inspector General studies have found current facilities are insufficient to meet the demand. Child care center hours have been expanded, alternative care programs established and support groups established for child care staff whose spouses deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm. We are closely monitoring the execution of funds and compliance with standards to reduce the probability of institutional child abuse and increase the availability of quality, affordable child care. Concurrently, we are developing a facility strategy to correct deficiencies in older child care facilities.

Family support and family assistance programs, which are critical to soldier and family wellness during peacetime, proved to be invaluable during Operation Desert Storm. Toll free telephone numbers, family support groups and family assistance teams are operating in each State. This has truly been one of the good news stories of Operation Desert Storm. You should share our pride in the outgrowth of support of families across America to support both our soldiers and the families they left behind.

Force reductions and smaller budgets pose unique problems for Morale, Welfare and Recreation funding. During the build down, nonappropriated funds revenues

will decline significantly. Using nonappropriated funds to meet appropriated fund responsibilities puts further pressure on declining soldier dollars. MWR services will be needed more during the transition to a smaller force to care for the soldiers and their families as we deactivate units and involuntarily release soldiers. Adequate appropriation levels and reimbursement authority remain critical requirements for the Army. We need congressional approval to continue reimbursement through the process of reshaping the Army. The cap on fiscal year 1991 reimbursements at the fiscal year 1990 level is too low in light of the support that was required for Desert Storm. Relief from this cap is critical to provide commanders the necessary flexibility to execute the military child care requirements.

As we focus on the future force reductions, and smaller budgets, we cannot forget those who served honorably and are now retired. Medical care and full cost-of-living adjustments to retired pay and survivor benefit plan annuities are the most critical concerns. These men and women served with the knowledge that the Nation would provide these benefits, and we should provide nothing less.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by reinforcing several points.

The Army recognizes that it will get smaller. We have planned for it, and we are prepared to execute that plan. We are concluding an important military operation. Our successes in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm are the result of a decade of hard work, sacrifices and excellent support from the Congress and the American people. As we transition from Operation Desert Storm to the business of reshaping the Army, we need to work together to ensure the gains of the last 10 years are not lost and that we treat our soldiers and their families with care and compassion. It is a mission that we can accomplish with the same success that we enjoyed in Desert Storm. I look forward to working with you to that end.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee and I shall be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, General. Admiral Boorda?

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JEREMY M. BOORDA, CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL, U.S. NAVY

Admiral BOORDA. Good morning, sir. As always, Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here.

This committee has been a real friend to our Navy people. And in my nearly 3 years as Chief of Naval Personnel, the staff and the members have become personal friends as well. And you turn to friends in times of trouble and with special problems, and that is certainly true here. And I would like to review a little bit of history and talk about that if I might.

Last year we had a problem that was so pervasive that it would have hurt readiness in serious ways and would have devastated morale. Sequestration, an event that we all hoped to avoid, did happen. The Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the Secretary of Defense moved quickly and identified funds to protect Navy people. But for a variety of reasons, what would have been a routine reprogramming in previous years suddenly was anything but routine. And we were faced with a specter of delayed promotions, canceled very well-earned transfers from sea to shore duty, early involuntary separations, and even more. And it would have affected over 32,000 Navy people. It was a personnel disaster in the making.

You, and in this case I really do mean you personally, and Senator McCain were the first to step in. You led the way in the Senate, and you and the other members of this subcommittee and the full committee stepped up to the plate and hit a home run for our people. The example you set carried the day. We got the repro-

gramming, and we thank you for it. Nearly 600,000 Navy men and women join me in saying, well done.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Admiral BOORDA. Well, those sailors have all paid us back, you, me, and the Nation. They were first on the scene in the Gulf with our Middle East force ships that have been there for over 40 years. Two carrier battle groups quickly joined them, and they were joined almost as quickly by our Marine Corps sister service. And those forces were all that stood between Iraq and Saudi Arabia at the beginning of this operation. They were there at the outset, on station and combat-ready on the first day.

Our years of forward deployment and constant readiness were proven to be wise indeed when they were tested. The sacrifice of Navy and Marine Corps people, as they make tough deployments every day of every year, pay dividends because they were there on station and ready from the beginning.

Those first sailors and Marines were joined by others and the Navy and Marine Corps team eventually grew to nearly 200,000 people. Over 120 ships were on station, conducting the most comprehensive maritime sanctions operation in history. And they did that flawlessly. And they joined in combat operations once they began. I am not going to go further into their successes. The Nation saw them on CNN and we are all well aware of what happened.

Navy people have responded to your support in other ways as well. Today, we have the highest readiness in our recent history. Our ships are well manned and our training is self-evident. Reenlistment rates are high, the highest in 17 years. And I say 17 years because that is as far back as I looked. The right people are staying, and they are staying in the right numbers. Recruiters, who have a tough job, and they always have a tough job, are bringing in the highest quality recruits in modern times.

Our mid-grade pilot shortage is coming down. Medical manning is going up. Promotion opportunity is healthy, and there is absolutely no shortage of well-qualified people competing for those promotions. In short, you have got a great navy manned by great people, and we all can be proud of them.

But now we face a new challenge, one that was interrupted by the war. And that is, as you well said, reducing in size while keeping faith with our people and maintaining a smaller force at the same high readiness levels we have all come to expect. And my message to you today is that we can do that.

Last year you agreed with us that there was a right way to reduce. And the first step was to take as many reductions as possible through reduced recruiting. We have done that, but we have managed it so that we are going to take in enough people to not have a hollow force or hollow year groups as they march through their careers.

Next, and I am not happy to report this, we have had to resort to selective early retirements for 442 captains and commanders. That was painful for the Navy. We tried to avoid that as long as possible, and did. And it certainly is painful for the officers involved. But to get down to the numbers of officers authorized, there simply is no other way. And I expect that we will have to continue those

selective early retirements through the reduction years in order to stay within the strength limits.

And that also lets us provide career opportunity and promotion opportunity for young officers coming up. Given the numbers, given the size of the reductions over the years, we really have no choice. Our long-established, enlisted high-year tenure policies are accomplishing exactly the same thing on the enlisted side.

We will not have to resort to RIF's, and I want to say that twice. The Navy, given the numbers in the budget, will not have to RIF people. Given the end strengths that we now have and planned for the out years, it simply will not be necessary. That is good news for Navy people. Good performers who want to stay in the Navy and make it a career, up to and including retirement, will have the opportunity to do so.

So with respect to overall numbers, we are going to be all right. I do need your help. As we come down in size, it is important that I have the right mix of people on active duty. Said another way, you have to shape the force. We have to have the right numbers and the right grades with the right years of service and in the right skills. In order to do that, we have to continue a number of key programs, and I will mention just a few.

The ones I am going to mention, we really rely on, more now than we did at times when we were growing, or were staying level. Shaping the force is a big job for a personnel chief. First, selective reenlistments bonuses are essential to motivate the right people to reenlist. And we will need about 22,500 selective reenlistments every year, bonus reenlistments, so that we end up with the right number of people in the right ratings.

Continuation of the aviation continuation bonus at present levels is also required if we are to drive down the mid-grade pilot shortages, even as we adjust the junior overages by reducing pilot training. Once gain, it is a matter of shaping the force, not just reducing it. That program is working. And we reduced the mid-grade pilot shortage by nearly 200 people this year. That is a real bargain for the money we put in there. That is a well-structured program, and I beg you to continue that at exactly the same levels we have it this year. We target that well and it works.

Getting the balance right between the junior pilots, which we control by training, and the mid-grade pilots, which we control by applying the bonus, is what this is all about. Our plan is solid. We have briefed it to the staff and I am comfortable that we have our act together.

Medical incentives that you have authorized are also working. Medical recruiting is up and retention of doctors is up as well. Again, we just have to continue what we are doing. We are on the right path.

Change-of-station money and training funds are also critical as we draw the force down and try to shape it. Many people who want to stay for a career are going to need to be retrained. And that takes the PCS funds and the training funds that we have in the budget.

And I guess what I am telling you is that we have got a great Navy right now. You helped us create it. And our personnel plans are working, and you approved those. And many of them you wrote

right here. Our people are responding to what we are doing. What we need to do now in the Navy is continue on with our strategy.

I very strongly seek your support for the budget as it is presented so that I can provide our people with stability and predictability, because that is what Navy people have come to expect, and they are responding to that. They certainly have shown that they can and will stay with us if we give them half a chance. And they deserve that stability now more than ever. So if you help me provide it I promise you that next year when the chief of naval personnel comes up here he will tell you once again what a great job the Navy has done.

Thank you, and I do look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Boorda follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. J.M. BOORDA, U.S. NAVY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

NAVY MANPOWER POSTURE STATEMENT

I'm pleased to be here to discuss Navy's manpower program for fiscal year 1992. Last year at this time, in our discussions on Navy manpower reductions and reprogramming, I talked about the importance of maintaining *stability* in our personnel programs—to keep the faith with Navy people and to protect the combat readiness of the fleet. I described how the Navy's retention and readiness would plummet without the required funding and the necessary number of trained, experienced men and women to operate and support our ships and aircraft squadrons.

Balancing priorities and making the hard decisions, you supported our reprogramming request for fiscal year 1990—giving Navy men, women and their families another good year of stability including:

— No delays in the hard-earned promotions of sailors and officers.

— No need to reschedule or freeze the permanent change of station (PCS) moves already planned and budgeted by Navy people and their families.

— No abrupt changes in the bonus programs that retain those in skills that are critically needed and in short supply.

— No requirement to force good sailors out of the Navy.

On top of your positive action on reprogramming, you approved a Navy manpower program for fiscal year 1991 to give Navy men and women yet another year of *stable, predictable personnel programs; reasonable pay and benefits;* and *adequate quality of life* for individuals and families—even as the Navy reduced significantly in size. You gave us flexibility to reduce manpower levels without hurting sailors or mid-career officers. You gave Navy men and women a message, loud and clear: That they are *important* to you and the Nation, and that any peace dividend would not come at the expense of their aspirations, their careers, or their families.

We are grateful for those key decisions you made on the 1990 and 1991 manpower programs. Navy men and women got your message and responded just as expected: Our retention rates of trained, experienced sailors and officers stayed healthy. In fact, they edged up to all-time highs in several categories. Our people continued to perform with motivation and dedication, and with the support of Navy families back home. As a result—with the right people in the right places, the Navy was ready to respond quickly and effectively to Iraqi aggression, United Nations mandates, and the U.S. commitment in Operation Desert Shield. Throughout all aspects of Desert Storm, Navy men and women, together with their Marine Corps counterparts, performed exceptionally well in all aspects of the operation. We had almost 90,000 sailors on station—at sea and in the desert—and you can be proud of every one of them. I certainly am.

PERSONNEL FOR DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

Desert Storm created two divergent priorities in Navy manpower planning:

— Our first priority was to make sure that the ships, squadrons, construction battalions, fleet hospitals, logistics units and all the other Navy commands and staffs committed to Operation Desert Storm had the right personnel needed to accomplish their missions. The Navy provided the ships and support for amphibious forces, as well as the corpsmen, doctors, chaplains and other support personnel for Marine forces in the desert.

— Our second priority in manpower planning remains to maintain the flexibility necessary to come back to the glideslope for manpower reductions that are currently mandated for the Navy, and to do so without forcing sailors out of the Navy involuntarily.

To support the Central Command and General Schwartzkopf's campaign plan, Navy deployed many units that were scheduled for decommissioning, overhauls or time in their homeports. We also activated Naval Reserve units that have unique mission capabilities not present in adequate supply or—in some cases—not present at all in the Active force. Finally, we needed to increase the manning levels in some units above their usual peace time complements to ensure they had the people necessary for sustained combat operations.

As a result of these actions, we had more than 610,000 people on duty at the height of Desert Storm, at a time when you directed us to be coming down. We have budgeted for an active duty fiscal year 1991 end strength of 569,721. However, we added personnel and enhanced our capabilities for Desert Storm in ways that gave us flexibility and options for manpower reductions downstream. We did so by making full use of our ready and motivated active-duty force; augmenting them with well-prepared units and individuals from the Naval Reserve; recruiting some Navy veterans who had critically needed skills; and using "stop loss" only very judiciously when other alternatives could not meet requirements for certain categories of personnel. Let me explain in more detail.

First, we met most requirements with active-duty personnel in their regular assignments. When Operation Desert Shield opened in August, we had Navy ships on the scene in the Middle East Force, augmented quickly by two aircraft carrier battle groups from the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. All of these ships and aircraft squadrons had the right numbers of trained, experienced and motivated personnel on board to react effectively to fast-breaking events and mission orders. As our national commitment increased, we deployed additional units from the United States to Southwest Asia. Because our forces were well manned, these often short notice deployments required very few transfers and immediate augmentations of personnel.

Second, we used Presidential authority to call up Naval reservists to help meet essential manning requirements generated as a result of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. For example, when we moved doctors, nurses and corpsmen from our Naval hospitals to deploy with two hospital ships, a fleet hospital ashore and Marine units, we called up reserve medical personnel to replace them in the most critical positions. In later months, when medical requirements grew, we called up additional reserve medical personnel to increase the patient capacity of the hospital ships, deploy two fleet hospitals, and support additional Marine units committed to the operation.

Other Naval Reserve units mobilized to give us the port security, cargo handling, mine warfare, combat search and rescue, intelligence and other capabilities needed for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Beginning in January—when naval participation in the operation nearly doubled, we began calling up Naval reservists to augment the crews of some deployed ships and squadrons to bring manning to levels needed for sustained combat operations. Many individual Naval reservists volunteered for such duty.

During Desert Shield/Storm, we activated nearly 20,000 members of the Naval Reserve. Their preparedness and their response to the call to duty was impressive and gratifying to Navy leadership and deckplate sailors alike. And as their missions are completed, these Naval reservists are returning to their families, homes and civilian jobs—in turn helping the Navy get back on the glideslope for a reduced end strength.

In a *third* step to meet the requirements of Southwest Asia operations, we recruited several hundred Navy veterans who had certain skills and experience that were in short supply. We have thousands of Navy veterans who would like to come back in the Navy at this time, but we have been very careful because we did not want to add to active-duty end strength in a way that would impact the career opportunities of sailors already onboard or force us to separate anyone involuntarily after Desert Storm. For the same reason, we did not significantly alter our non-prior service recruiting goals.

The *fourth* and last step that we used very sparingly is "stop loss," the authority to delay the departure of personnel eligible for discharge, resignation or retirement. Based on weekly analysis of current and forecasted manning, we applied stop loss only for three categories of Navy personnel:

— We first used stop loss in December for Navy personnel assigned to Marine Corps units in Desert Shield. That action applied to medical personnel, chaplains and religious program specialist, and other personnel who served with Marine Corps

in Desert Storm. We used stop loss in this instance to help sustain support and preserve unit integrity when the Marine Corps applied stop loss to their units committed to the operations.

— When medical requirements increased in January with the growing possibility of hostilities, we applied stop loss to other Navy doctors, nurses, corpsmen, Medical Service Corps officers in eight specialties, and oral surgeons. We used stop loss only after taking into account on-board medical personnel plus those still available in the reserves, and determining that we could not meet the increased demand for medical support without each action. Our final application of stop loss was made to Navy Arabic cryptolinguists. As one would expect, their talents were in great demand during Desert Storm. The number impacted for fiscal year 1991 is fewer than 10.

The total number of officers and sailors affected by stop loss actions was fewer than 9,000. Actually, based on current retention rates, we would have expected fewer than half of them to actually exercise their options to leave the Navy when they were eligible for separation or retirement. So we have held relatively few people, with little long-term impact on end strength.

EXECUTING NAVY MANPOWER STRATEGY

By taking these approaches to the personnel requirements generated by Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, we are staying *on course* with the Navy manpower strategy we discussed last year. We are reducing our active-duty manpower using the same steps that you prescribed in the fiscal year 1991 Authorization Act:

First, by recruiting only the minimum number of new enlisted and officer personnel necessary to enter our training programs and to meet our current and projected manpower requirements. On the officer side, we have reduced officer candidate schools to minimum student levels, lowered the number of students entering the Naval Academy, and reduced the number of Naval ROTC scholarships offered at civilian colleges and universities. To keep a smaller NROTC program cost-effective, the Secretary of the Navy came to the difficult decision in January to consolidate 16 geographically colocated NROTC units into 8 consortia and to close Navy units at 5 other schools. Those units will not close until 1996 to permit students already enrolled in Naval ROTC to graduate and be commissioned.

The *second* step in ours manpower strategy is to retire enlisted and officer personnel who have completed their careers, making room for more junior people to earn advancements and pursue their own Navy careers. Officers are retiring under the maximum tenure rules of DOPMA, and enlisted personnel are retiring under the Navy's comparable policies of high-year tenure. In addition, because the fiscal year 1991 Authorization Act imposed specific requirements for reducing officer personnel, we very reluctantly formed selective early retirement (SER) boards to identify captains and commanders for early retirement. This is the first time that the Navy has been required to use this option. Using the procedures specified in DOPMA, the SER boards convened in December and selected 442 officers to retire no later than August 1, 1991. Although each and every one of these officers was notified personally and confidentially, it is a painful process and several have written to me citing their successful and faithful service, often including combat experience in Vietnam. I have responded to them—and explain to you today—that, given the requirement to reduce our officer strength rapidly, early retirements are much preferred to forcing mid-career officers out of the service without retirement benefits and the chance to complete their service careers. It is, nonetheless, painful for the officer and for the Navy.

The *third* step in our manpower strategy, and in the sequence you prescribed in the Authorization Act, is to control the number of enlisted personnel and officers who are permitted to transition into the career force after their first enlistments or periods of obligated service. We have not resorted to this step, nor to the *fourth* step of RIF'ing mid-career personnel short of retirement. By purposely avoiding these steps, we have maintained our standards and opportunities for reenlistment and advancement—giving our men and women confidence and motivation as they do their jobs and pursue their careers. The reduction strategy you specified is a good one and we are following it.

Recruiting

Recruiting results for 1990 were very successful and continue to be successful in 1991. In 1990, Navy achieved its highest quality in over a decade. We attained 100 percent of our enlisted accession goal of 70,492 with 63 percent Aptitude Category One (compared to 58 percent in 1989). Ninety-two percent were High School Diploma Graduates (compared to 89 percent in 1989) and only 7.1 percent were in the

lowest acceptable aptitude category (compared with 11.1 percent in 1989). We clearly turned the corner on a 3 year trend of declining recruit quality. And, for the second year in a row, we improved the quality of life indicators for recruiters. This is an area we have wrestled with for a long time and I am very proud of this achievement. Because recruiting is tough, high pressure duty, we focused on improving the working conditions of our recruiters. The efforts have been successful and recruiting is now recognized by the sailors in the fleet as a satisfying job. Navy recruiting is now made up of over 90 percent volunteers compared to just 35 percent only 2 years ago.

This motivated, volunteer recruiting force is more likely to succeed in finding the required high quality recruits who are such a critical element of our manpower strategy.

Retention

The Navy retention picture for fiscal year 1990 was the best in the post Vietnam era. So far in 1991, retention rates run even slightly ahead of the 1990 rate. We have not seen any negative impact from Desert Storm at this point. Actions taken in Congress have been major contributors to this success. Congressional support for Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB) as well as support for the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) program is yielding results. We have been able to target SRB funds to selected mission critical, sea duty intensive, skills which have generally lower retention rates and have been able to maintain readiness and manning levels. Because of adequate PCS support, Navy has also been able to stabilize sea/shore rotations and to move people at their expected rotation dates. We have been able to coordinate force structure reductions with personnel reductions so that the balance of requirements and people available to fill them is maintained. In doing so we have been able to avoid involuntary separations. We have not had to break faith with our mid-career sailors and force them out of the Navy. Additionally, judging from responses to our separation questionnaires, the increased visibility provided to quality of life issues such as child care and military housing has proven to be a success. The actual *gross* enlisted retention figures for fiscal year 1990 were:

	Percent
1st term	38.3
2nd term	55.7
3rd term	70.6

In related actions which enhance recruiting efforts, Navy has capitalized on initiatives in reducing first term attrition, desertion and unauthorized absences. By screening out nonqualified candidates early in the basic training process, Navy concentrated more effort and resources on those with the potential to succeed and, as a result, it brings more eligible candidates to their first term retention point. Recruiting materials are more realistic and accurately depict the recruit training environment. No longer do we allow a sailor who has minor problems in early phases of recruit training the automatic option of separating from the service. We have implemented a discharge moratorium for minor issues during the first 3 weeks of recruit training. We have found that the success rate for recruits increases dramatically for those who make it through the first 3 weeks. Navy has expanded its treatment of minor correctable ailments at the recruit training center level. Finally, the "moment of truth" program which enables a recruit one last chance to declare any disqualifying information is credited with attributing some candidates before extensive training resources have been expended.

In fiscal year 1990, first term attrition was 11.59 percent compared to 13.56 percent in fiscal year 1989. Desertion is another indicator which shows the quality of the sailor and the job satisfaction they attain. Desertion for fiscal year 1990 is 8.79 deserters per 1,000 compared to 8.97 per 1000 for fiscal year 1989. (The 1980 figure was 27.0 per 1000). Unauthorized absences also are near stable with 17.41 per 1000 for fiscal year 1990. (The 1980 figure was 82.0 per 1000). Retention, attrition, desertion and unauthorized absence are effective measures of the high quality of personnel which the force enjoys today. Navy saves resources each time a sailor reenlists or each time the desertion rate or unauthorized absence rate falls since resources are not spent to find and retrain a replacement sailor.

Officer Retention

The fiscal year 1990 results for overall officer retention were strong but we face continued difficulties in Aviation, Nuclear Power and Medical.

Aviation: The pilot midgrade shortfall was reduced by about 200 in fiscal year 1990 to a level of 1,100. Strong airline hiring continues into fiscal year 1991, but the effects of Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) and the Increased Aviation Career In-

centive Pay (ACIP) are taking hold. Pilot retention in fiscal year 1990 was the highest since fiscal year 1984. Our estimate is that ACP is the key component in preventing an additional 120 pilot losses per year. Future pilot retention may be influenced greatly as a result of Desert Storm and turmoil in the aviation industry. How much the excitement and thrill of military aviation is offset by factors of security and family separation is not likely to be observed until late fiscal year 1991. We are of course, watching this closely.

Nuclear: The inventory of experienced O4-O6s are still short by 25 percent of requirements. This shortage is most severe in the post-command officer ranks. Consequently, we continue to extend sea tours or assign back-to-back sea tours in order to compensate for the shortfall. Efforts to retain these critical officers through bonus programs and reducing operational tempo are paying dividends.

Medical: Because of higher pay and family stability in the civilian sector, the retention of medical personnel continues to challenge us. Aggregate fiscal year 1990 retention showed modest gains but the rates for doctors and nurses remained well below desired levels. As of September 30, 1990, 4,195 physicians were on active duty as compared to 4,060 at end fiscal year 1989; 3,057 nurses were on active duty as compared to 3,000 at the end of 1989. The incentives contained in the 1991 DOD Authorization Act—Physician Special Pays, Nurse/Non-Physician Bonuses/Special Pays are expected to improve retention rates through fiscal year 1993. The present Desert Storm stop loss impacts most heavily on our medical professionals and it remains to be seen how they will respond, post-Desert Storm, as the stop loss is lifted.

Selective Early Retirement

The final element of our officer retention picture should include the results of our Selective Early Retirement (SER) review. This was conducted in December of 1990 in an effort to shape the force as Navy gets smaller. The board designated 299 captains (O-6) and 143 commanders (O-5) for early retirement. This will help our future efforts to reduce the force while avoiding adverse action to junior or mid-grade personnel.

Joint Officer Management

Navy has made significant progress in meeting and surpassing tour length requirements for joint service. The current requirement for tour lengths for O-4 through O-6 is 36 months and the fiscal year 1990 Navy average length was 38.9 months. Flag officers are required by law to have a 24 month tour and Navy averaged 28.8 months for fiscal year 1990. Navy's fill rates for assigning qualified joint officers into joint billets is also above the minimums. The fill rate for critical joint duty billets is required to be 80 percent filled by joint service officers, Navy is at 83.7 percent. The joint duty assignment list requires 50 percent fill with joint service officers and Navy filled 55.2 percent for fiscal year 1990.

Women in the Navy

Career opportunity and upward mobility for women continues to improve as women are assigned to an increasing number of billets open for them at sea. Currently, our 60,000 women make up 10.1 percent of the total Navy. Approximately 2,600 women were assigned to Desert Storm including hospital ships, tenders, combat logistics ships, military sealift command ships, construction units, fleet air reconnaissance squadrons, fleet hospitals and a public affairs unit. Women now make up 6.2 percent of total Navy E-6 through E-9 petty officers compared to 3.8 percent in the mid-1980s. Within the female ranks, 16.9 percent of women are E-6 through E-9 compared to 8.7 percent in 1985. More than 8,100 enlisted women are now at sea and another 5,000 enlisted women are assigned to aviation squadrons. By the end of 1990, in a direct reflection of the rise of the number of service women, eight women—four at sea, four ashore, were serving as Command Master Chiefs.

On December 27, 1990, Navy celebrated an important first as Lieutenant Commander Darlene Iskra assumed command of the U.S.S. *Opportune* (ARS-41). Commander Iskra, who is a special operations officer, is the first Navy woman to serve in command at sea. In December 1991, we expect to have our first female Commanding Officer of an AO-177 class replenishment ship. Of the 331 female officers at sea, 11 are currently assigned as executive officers. Although force structure reductions are planned for certain classes of ships in which women currently serve, cuts are also being made to the units which are available to men. Therefore, reductions of billets for women will not be disproportionate.

Women at the Naval Academy

As a result of concerns at the Naval Academy, Navy commissioned four separate reviews. The Navy and Naval Academy have taken the specific findings and recom-

mendations from the four reports for action. Most actions have been completed, other longer term issues continue to be worked. I can assure you, the Naval Academy is committed to the principle of equality of women midshipmen. Important changes have been made to achieve that goal.

Navy Women's Study Group

The Secretary of the Navy convened a follow-on Navy Women's Study Group in November 1990 to review the 1987 study of women in the Navy. This group was headed by Rear Admiral Roberta Hazard. They produced a truly significant report which has recently been released. The study reviewed in-depth some 20 areas of concern to women (e.g. career opportunity, pregnancy, equal opportunity sexual harassment, rape, physical fitness, fraternization, single parents, homosexuality, housing, medical care, uniforms etc.) and provided 150 recommendations on actions to help improve each area. Navy is now engaged in implementing these recommendations.

The findings and recommendations of the report were generated from a comprehensive, 10-week study, conducted by 26 Navy men and women who represented the spectrum of officer and enlisted communities. All members had experience working with Navy women; 14 members had commanded naval activities afloat or ashore in which large numbers of women were serving.

In order to reflect the concerns and perceptions of Navy women and men in their results, the study group conducted over 4,000 surveys and 2,700 interviews of Navy men and women from 160 commands in 23 geographic locations world-wide.

The study group concluded that the majority of recommendations of the 1987 Study on the Progress of Women in the Navy are being implemented. As a result, the Navy has significantly improved the assignment opportunities for women officer and enlisted personnel, principally by opening to women billets on 24 ships of the Combat Logistics Force as well as two fleet reconnaissance squadrons.

The 1990 study concluded that improvements were also evident in other arenas as well. For example, it noted improved training and awareness regarding prevention of sexual harassment, and qualitative improvements in family services; morale, welfare and recreation; child care, and medical care programs.

They also found that the Navy still has important work to do to make progress toward its goal of full integration and assimilation of women within the constraints of the law. We are committed to do just that.

Shore Manpower Requirements Determination

We have begun a 5-year review of the Navy's shore manpower requirements. Upon completion we will have evaluated every shore billet in the Navy to ensure that we have the leanest, most efficient shore establishment possible. By the end of fiscal year 1991, we will have completed roughly one-third of our review which is scheduled for completion in fiscal year 1994.

OUTLOOK FOR 1992

Up to this point I have presented a positive, optimistic Navy manpower picture where force structure and people are in balance. The potential does exist, however, to upset this delicate equation. I would like to review elements of the fiscal year 1992 plan contained in the President's budget and show how that plan is the correct one to maintain the balance.

BUDGET REQUEST FOR 1992

End Strength: The fiscal year 1992 budget requests 551,400 total active duty personnel. (graph 1) This includes 481,932 enlisted (including midshipmen) as well as 69,468 officers (graphs 2 and 3). The budget request represents a reduction of 18,321 when compared to fiscal year 1991.

NAVY END STRENGTH
PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET



OFFICER END STRENGTH
PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET



ENLISTED END STRENGTH
PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET



The net reduction is a result of:

Ship Manpower:	
Ship Retirements	−12,924
Ship Transfers	−1,796
Manning for New Ships	+6,288
Increased Unit Manning	−893
Total	−9,325
Net Ship Manpower	−9,325
Aircraft Squadron Manpower	+83
Fleet Support Manpower	−2,264
Shore Infrastructure	−6,815
Total	−18,321

Navy Manpower End Strength is on a steep downward ramp from the current levels till 1996. There are several critical elements we must address in order to successfully reach this goal. First, we must continue to avoid the creation of a hollow force. We cannot afford to have more force structure to fill than we have qualified personnel to assign to that force. Officer and enlisted personnel must be accessed in quantity and quality to avoid creating future midgrade shortfalls.

Second, the desired end strength targets cannot be met solely through reduced accessions. Cuts to force structure may require continued selective early retirements as well as reduced officer and enlisted accessions. While the major emphasis will be placed on lowered accession goals, Navy needs to provide opportunity for advancement and promotion. Our current plan meets the congressional objective to draw down first through accessions, next through retirement of eligible personnel, third by restricting entry into the career force and last by separating career-personnel. We have only had to use the first two methods. These have been the basic elements of the Navy manpower strategy for some time. I believe our plan is very lean. Reductions to the officer end strength below the level contained in the budget will require separations through RIFs in fiscal year 1992.

Third, Navy has introduced a new variable in the force mix—the 2-year obligation. This program is designed to attract 15,500 General Detail (GENDET) acces-

sions in fiscal year 1991. Since the term of contract is shorter, the introduction of this category gives us increased flexibility to manage strength issues while still maintaining near term fleet readiness.

The manpower plan which Navy has submitted for fiscal year 1992 is sound. It will result in a dedicated and ready but smaller Navy. We have asked for the right number and the right quality of people, to avoid hollow forces and unnecessarily lengthy assignments at sea. Personnel actions not accurately matched to force structure reductions will bring imbalance, hardship and reduced readiness. Approval of the plan will yield a strong manpower posture and continued high combat readiness as evidenced in Navy's Desert Storm performance.

Military Pay

We also ask for your support for the basic tools to keep our personnel fairly compensated. A fair compensation package is essential to supporting our sailors and their families. It allows us to attract and retain the kind of people we need. Military pay raises have been significantly behind private sector wage growth. Since 1983, the Employment Cost Index (ECI) has exceeded military pay raises in every year except 1989. The ECI is projected to rise by 5.5 percent in 1992. Similarly the Consumer Price Index has exceeded military pay raises in all but two of the last 9 years. The CPI for 1992 is projected to increase by 5.4 percent. The 4.2 percent pay raise requested in the budget should be supported.

Military Retirement

One of the Navy's most important compensation incentives is the military retirement system. Maintenance of appropriate cost of living adjustments for present and future retired military members under age 62 is especially important to avoid a serious breach of faith with current members and retirees who pursued military careers with the expectations of a predictable retirement system. Further changes to the retirement system, which is one of the Navy's most effective incentives, could change the attractiveness of military service and have serious effect on retention and readiness.

I now would like to share with you my outlook on the specific manpower issues for 1992.

Recruiting

Several of the factors which were helpful in our recruiting success in fiscal year 1990 have been eliminated. Congressional reductions to advertising dollars in fiscal year 1991 eliminated television advertising. Television advertising has proven effective in making contract goals with high quality recruits. It also has a major impact on increasing awareness of Navy career opportunities in the critical 18-21 year old market. Navy must fill an additional 7,000 technical first term billets through 1993 (above previous plans) to meet the demands of the advanced hardware systems being introduced to the fleet. Requirements for highly qualified recruits who are so very difficult to obtain are rising at a time when we are prevented from adequately reaching a critical portion of the eligible audience. I am sure we can meet the requirements of the Navy and continue to provide high quality candidates, but we can't do it by further cutting resources and putting the burden squarely on the recruiters' backs. They need your help.

Navy ROTC

As force reductions are initiated, accession levels will be decreased proportionately. Therefore, NROTC accessions will be reduced over the next several years with reductions from the current level of 1,600 commissions per year to 1,100 in fiscal year 1995.

Failure to adjust the NROTC infrastructure and consequent program overhead would have resulted in smaller less viable units and unacceptable increase in the cost per NROTC commission. Navy therefore took action to downsize the NROTC program. This action *combines* 16 geographically collocated NROTC units into eight new consortia units by 1992, and *closes* five less viable units by 1996. The result is a reduction of the number of NROTC units/consortia from 66 to 53, a reduction of infrastructure that keeps the Navy's ROTC production sources in balance with accession goals and scholarships. The NROTC program will remain the Navy and Marine Corps single largest source of unrestricted line officers. It provides significant numbers of quality officers to nuclear, aviation and surface communities. It is also a major contributor to the Navy meeting its minority officer goals.

Retention

The challenge of high tempo operations and simultaneously reducing the force as it draws down through 1996 requires delicate handling. The unknowns introduced by Desert Storm are certain to impact officer and enlisted retention. The full extent of the impact may not be known for several years. Whether the satisfaction of performing a splendid job in the Nation's service can offset the rigors of war, the increased operating tempo, and increased family separations remains to be seen. We are retaining good people now and we must continue our important retention incentives. Congress should fully support proven programs such as the Selective Retention Bonus (SRB) and Enlistment Bonus (EB) programs. Our fiscal year 1992 program will target only those skills with low retention rates and/or high replacement costs. The SRB program is extremely cost effective. For example, one Electronic Technician costs $42,610 to train through "A" school. Navy can reenlist that same technician for 6 years for a $20,000 bonus. We win two ways. We keep the trained sailor and enhance readiness and we save money. Because of historical attrition rates and current retention rates, Navy would need to access three recruits to replace the same technician at the 6 year point. Enlistment Bonuses are also very important tools to attract the very highest quality high school graduates into our most critical skills. Eighty percent of the EB program goes to recruit candidates who have elected to enter the Nuclear propulsion program. Continued congressional support for these programs is essential to maintain Navy's balance as we shape a smaller force.

Officer Retention

Aviation: Navy is currently short about 1,100 pilots in pay grades O3/O4. This is an improvement from the 1,300 which I reported last year. The shortage was caused by low retention in fiscal year 1985 through fiscal year 1989 as well as by low pilot training rates in fiscal year 1978 and fiscal year 1979. Nonetheless, despite 5 years of strong economy and unprecedented airline hiring, pilot retention has gradually improved. For example in fiscal year 1990 overall pilot retention (combined Jet, Prop, Helo) met requirements for the first time since fiscal year 1984. Although Jet retention is still significantly below requirements (34 percent vice 45 percent required), it has at least been stable rather than declining. While the future of airline hiring may be dampened by a downturn in the economy, the long term picture indicates that aggressive airline hiring will continue. The authority for Aviation Continuation Pay expires at the end of fiscal year 1991. However, Navy believes we will continue to require the authority for Aviation Continuation Pay as a means to stabilize aviator retention. Navy also has to continue efforts to control non-monetary factors. Issues such as family separation, adequate flying hours for safety and readiness, quality of life and compensation programs are keys to solving our mid-career shortages.

Nuclear: Attracting and retaining high quality officers into the nuclear power community is difficult and challenging. These officers are highly sought after in the commercial marketplace. Despite the planned reduction in numbers of nuclear hips, shortfalls will continue to exist in the grade of Lieutenant Commander through Captain. Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay (NOIP) and SUBPAY have been invaluable in retaining these high quality officers. Retention of these officers is vital to ensuring continued safe reactor operation.

Medical Officer: Revisions to physicians' special pays as well as bonus/special pays for some nursing and non physician programs contained in the fiscal year 1991 DOD Authorization Act should help in reducing shortages in the medical community. Your continued support in this area is greatly appreciated. The "Stop Loss" during Desert Storm and our lack of ability to make reliable post-Desert Storm retention predictions is a concern. As a result it is important to continue incentives for medical department officers for the foreseeable future.

Training: Within Navy, training is an important warfighting support issue. Our training effort begins with initial design of the weapon and provides for training for individuals, units and battle groups at all stages of weapon employment. The success of this continuum concept is evident in the readiness and performance of our personnel now in the Persian Gulf.

As Navy declines in size, our training infrastructure will also be reduced. Staffs at Navy training centers are being reduced and consolidated. We are seeking to offset funding losses through innovations such as closed circuit satellite hook-ups and software improvements for interactive training in classrooms. These initiatives are essential to stretch training dollars. Fortunately, Navy has never had a better trained, more highly motivated sailor graduating from recruit training and our initial train-

ing courses. One of the reasons is that training is being conducted in a cost effective way on some of the most technologically advanced training equipment in the world.

Special Interest

I want to address an issue of special importance and fairness to a great number of sailors—the need to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act. This issue affects many Filipino sailors in the U.S. Navy who joined the service directly from the Philippines. The Department of Defense has endorsed proposals for several years now which would correct this matter.

Since most of ours Filipino sailors enlist in the Navy directly from the Philippines without first attaining permanent residence status, they acquire no immigration status when they join the Navy. Because of the nature of their world-wide naval service, few can qualify for immigrant visas and, in turn, for naturalization. These are high quality, well educated candidates. Competition for entrance into the U.S. Navy is intense. In 1990, more than 100,000 applied for 400 openings. All are high school graduates, most have some college credits, and many have completed college. They receive the same compensation as do U.S. citizens in the Navy and advance in the same way from seaman to Master Chief Petty Officer.

I encourage Congress to rapidly and favorably consider the proposals which have been already re-introduced in the House (H.R. 737) and passed unanimously by the Senate (S. 296) to correct this inequity.

SUMMARY

Our men and women deserve our full support. They have it from this Navy leadership and from you, the Congress. We must ensure that the high level of support continues when the fighting ends.

The Navy's fiscal year 1992 manpower program will provide that support. It supports the programs which will produce the right quantity and quality of sailor. The budget is based on the same rationale that produced the high quality force that performed so admirably in the Persian Gulf. Your understanding and assistance in the past has enabled us to ensure that our sailors were ready. Your support for this budget will help us to be ready for whatever lies ahead.

APPENDIX A

THE MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY (MPN) APPROPRIATION REQUEST

The fiscal year 1992 MPH request is for an appropriation of $19,597,700,000 in obligational authority. This is a net increase of about $351 million from the current fiscal year 1991 funding requirement. The major factors include: annualization of 4.1 percent January 1, 1991 pay raise ($160 million); 4.2 percent pay raise effective January 1, 1992 ($538 million); variable housing allowance ($29 million); inflation ($16 million); offsetting decreases are: average strength reduction of 12,748 ($360 million); and $57 million decrease in Retired Pay Accrual. For fiscal year 1993, $19,892,700,000 has been requested, an increase of $295 million over fiscal year 1992. This includes: annualization of January 1, 1992 pay raise ($177 million); 4.7 percent pay raise effective January 1, 1993 ($597 million); and inflation ($15 million); an offsetting decrease of 15,861 workyears ($448 million); and Retired Pay Accrual decreases $51 million. The following paragraphs provide explanations on funding required for selected budget activities; and Chart A reflects funds requested for all six budget activities, as well as the percent of each to the total program.

CHART A.—Military Personnel, Navy Amount ($000) by Budget Activity

Budget activity	Fiscal year 1990	Percent	Fiscal year 1991	Percent	Fiscal year 1992	Percent	Fiscal year 1993	Percent
Pay and Allowances—Officers	4,580,685	23.8	4,646,545	24.1	4,738,436	24.2	4,818,049	24.2
Pay and Allowances—Enlisted	13,177,469	68.3	13,344,617	69.4	13,555,167	69.2	13,743,037	69.1
Pay and Allowances—Midshipmen	40,037	.2	41,969	.2	42,151	.2	42,746	.2
Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel	853,700	4.4	568,742	3.0	581,457	3.0	588,911	3.0
Permanent Change of Station Travel	588,846	3.1	604,768	3.1	636,934	3.2	654,936	3.3
Other Military Personnel Costs	40,915	.2	39,826	.2	43,555	.2	45,021	.2
Total Direct Program	19,281,652	100.0	19,246,467	100.0	19,597,700	100.0	19,892,700	100.0
Reimbursables	124,281	.....	314,800	.....	320,700	.....	347,900	.....

CHART A.—Military Personnel, Navy Amount ($000) by Budget Activity—Continued

Budget activity	Fiscal year 1990	Percent	Fiscal year 1991	Percent	Fiscal year 1992	Percent	Fiscal year 1993	Percent
Total Financial Program	19,405,933		19,561,267		19,918,400		20,240,600	

1. *Pay and Allowances of Officers.* $4,738,436,000 is requested to support planned officer strength in fiscal year 1992. This represents a net increase of about $92 million from the fiscal year 1991 level. $4,818,049,000 is requested in fiscal year 1993 (a net increase of about $80 million from the fiscal year 1992 level). The increased requirements are attributed primarily to pay raise, variable housing allowance and special pay. The funds required in this budget activity are based primarily on the monthly strength plans and resultant workyears indicated in Chart B.

FY–91 AND FY–92 OFFICER STRENGTH PLAN
(in thousands)



2. *Pay and Allowances of Enlisted Personnel.* Planned enlisted strength will require $13,555,167,000 in fiscal year 1992. This represents a net increase of about $211 million over the fiscal year 1991 level. $13,743,037,000 will be required in fiscal year 1993—an increase of about $188 million. The increases are for pay raise and variable housing allowance.

The funds required in this budget activity are primarily based on the monthly strength plans and resultant workyear as indicated in Chart C. Budgeted workyears in fiscal year 1992 are 3,772 below a "straight line" computation between the end strengths of fiscal years 1991 and 1992. For fiscal year 1993, budgeted workyears are 2,871 lower than the fiscal years 1992 and 1993 end strength "straight line" computation.

FY–91 AND FY–92 ENLISTED STRENGTH PLAN
(in thousands)



3. *Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel.* The amounts required for Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel are $581,457,000 in fiscal year 1992 an increase of $13 million over fiscal year 1991 and $588,911,000 in fiscal year 1993, an increase of $7 million over fiscal year 1992. These increased requirements are due to the fiscal years 1992 and 1993 pay raises; offset by workyear related decreases.

4. *Permanent Change of Station Moves (PCS).* The Navy PCS Program will require $636,934,000 for fiscal year 1992, a net increase oF about $32 million from the funding level currently planned for fiscal year 1991. The fiscal year 1993 program requires $654,936,000, a net increase of about $18 million over fiscal year 1992.

The cost variances include pay raise, inflation factors and industrial funded service increases/decreases as provided by OSD.

Chart D on page A-9 shows planned moves and average costs by travel category across the years. Navy's goal for fleet readiness is to man installations and ships with qualified personnel. Accession, separation, training and organized unit moves are mandatory when required to attain force levels and to provide training for that goal.

The Navy can only institute policies to change minimum move requirements for operational and rotational moves. The fiscal years 1992 and 1993 moves represent 29 percent of the total Navy move program.

Only limited opportunities exist, however, to restrict these moves without upsetting efforts to maintain skill and grade balances and increase the career force. While the Navy continues to make every effort to minimize move requirements, adequate PCS funding is absolutely essential to recruit, train, develop, and retain the best fighting force possible.

We need congressional understanding and support for the Navy's fiscal years 1992–1993 PCS Program.

CHART D.—Permanent Change of Station and Average Costs by Travel Category

Category	Fiscal year 1990 Actual		Fiscal year 1991 Estimate		Fiscal year 1992 Estimate		Fiscal year 1993 Estimate	
	Moves	Average Costs	Moves	Average Costs	Moves	Average Costs	Moves	Average Costs
Accessions	80,233	782.37	81,674	761.83	74,456	737.82	74,022	770.26
Separations	81,113	1,009.07	86,084	1,045.59	84,241	1,069.97	80,643	1,111.88
Training	34,160	1,916.77	34,637	1,941.19	34,581	1,998.09	34,551	2,051.81
Operational	47,330	3,038.24	44,940	3,151.00	46,036	3,265.64	46,104	3,368.12
Rotational	35,501	6,092.64	34,696	6,288.76	36,415	6,585.03	36,449	6,831.79
Unit Moves	5,696	3,500.00	7,174	3,833.43	8,051	4,302.57	8,004	4,381.31
Total Moves	284,033		289,205		283,780		279,773	
Composite Average Costs		2,077.68		2,098.05		2,251.51		2,348.10

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, Admiral. General Hickey?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS J. HICKEY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PERSONNEL, U.S. AIR FORCE

General HICKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always an honor to appear before this committee, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to represent our service members before the Congress.

I wish, as a first order of business, to join Admiral Boorda in thanking you and this committee for your saving support last year on the reprogramming action. It allows me to be especially proud to be here today and to represent our service men and women who served in and supported Desert Storm worldwide, for truly a goodly number of them would not have been here without your help.

Total force worked very well for the Air Force in Desert Storm and Desert Shield. The Air National Guard, the Air Reserve personnel who we activated were combat ready, and they carried their full share of the burdens on each of the many missions which were accomplished during Desert Storm and Desert Shield.

A crucial element behind the superb accomplishment of those armed forces in Desert Storm is the support, again, provided not just last year but by the Congress and this committee over several years of work that allowed us to recruit and train a highly effective and motivated group of very dedicated men and women. The relief that you have provided in the supplemental bill this year allows the Air Force to exceed our established fiscal year 1991 end strength, and we will need to do that from about 508,500 to 514,000 is our best current estimate.

This end-strength flexibility will enable our service Secretary to provide the optimum mission support that we need in the Middle East while continuing to accomplish our missions both in the United States and overseas through judicious use of the stop loss program. And we appreciate this flexibility, and we are putting it to good use. The Air Force will be back on line towards meeting the end strength set in the President's budget by the end of fiscal year 1992, and carried out to 1995. That will mean a 28 percent reduction in personnel since 1986.

The Air Force has been using a balanced, programmatic reduction approach in the draw-down. It is an approach that includes limiting accessions and increasing career force losses, reducing career force entries, and reductions in force as a last resort. And we do have reductions in force through involuntary separations in both the 1992 and 1993 programs.

As we draw down, our release programs will be tailored to support the remaining force structure, and will allow for targeting of skills that we need to access, to train and to enter into the career force. Concerning base closures, the personnel with base operating skills can be easily utilized elsewhere, while members with specific weapons skills that are disappearing can be accommodated through retraining into similar or shortage skills.

The Air Force appreciates your past support in helping us deal with the pilot retention problem by authorizing the aviator continuation pay. Force structure reductions have caused us to face a dilemma that is often difficult to comprehend, but it is the same one, again, that Admiral Boorda touched on. On the one hand, we have a rapid decrease in cockpits and in seats, and it makes us temporarily bloated or over in the young, inexperienced pilots that we have between 2 and 6 years of service. And the ones that we train in are therefore restricted.

And on the other hand we are facing low retention rates over the foreseeable future, which, due to competing demands in the private sector, continues to make it difficult to meet our total requirements. We are still losing two out of every three pilots at the first opportunity at the end of their initial obligation to leave, when they have that opportunity to leave the service.

On top of that, the reduction in cockpit seats also dictates that we reduce the number of new pilot accessions to match the smaller number of places that we can assign them. We need continued authorization for the bonus; it remains a critical part of the efficient management of our pilot force.

I, too, have prepared a statement and ask that it be submitted for the record, and I stand ready to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of General Hickey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. THOMAS J. HICKEY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL, U.S. AIR FORCE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor and a privilege to appear before you during this historic period to discuss manpower and personnel issues facing the Air Force today. Over the past 4 years, I have noted the hallmark of this committee has been a spirit of cooperation in addressing the welfare and needs of our service men and women. I look forward to a continuation of that spirit as we work together with the manpower and personnel issues abounding today.

Your past support for the personnel in our Armed Forces is evident today as we enjoy great success in Operation Desert Storm. Thanks in large part to your efforts, we have fielded a well trained, highly motivated military that is unsurpassed in the world today. You have shown your support for our troops by ensuring they are adequately compensated for their commitment and sacrifices.

Current legislative initiatives illustrate the good faith of Congress toward the men and women serving our country in the Armed Forces and the families they left behind. Your efforts to provide assistance in a multitude of areas, such as tax extension, Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Act update, and veterans' benefits, to name a few, emphasize your understanding of the needs of our returning warriors.

The situation in the Middle East has been the catalyst for social and political debate. Obviously, our participation in Desert Storm is not without critics. We have

all heard criticism of tactics, policies, and weapons systems and history will judge those areas. However, I have yet to hear the first critical comment about our men and women participating in Operation Desert Storm. The American people recognize that our military personnel are ready and able to answer the call whenever and wherever the country needs them. They served honorably in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, and Operation Just Cause in Panama. Now they continue to serve with pride and distinction in Operation Desert Storm. These actions have provided us with the most valuable resource possible for our Armed Forces—battle tested and trained warriors.

The Air Force is suffering from institutional schizophrenia. We are enacting unprecedented All Voluntary Force reductions while involved in the largest air operation in recent history. For example, the Military Airlift Command have moved passengers and cargo at a pace 10 times that of the Berlin Airlift. One of the major lessons we have learned from our involvement in the Middle East war is that a balanced force is crucial to our ability to accomplish the mission. Accordingly, we need to move with studied caution during the force drawdown. Wholesale non-programmatic reductions must be avoided. The makeup of the remaining force after reductions should be the cornerstone of the drawdown policy.

Now, more than ever, a concerted, coordinated effort between Congress and the Air Force is needed. Continuing to provide for the well-being of our people during a period of decreasing budgets will be a challenge of considerable proportion.

RECRUITING

The exact impact of Operation Desert Storm on recruiting is yet to be determined. However, medical recruiting will be our biggest challenge for fiscal year 1991. We are feeling the impact of Reserve recalls in this area. The call to active duty of medics from Reserve and Guard components and the recall of those with a military service obligation has significantly reduced the recruitable market. The application flow for active duty recruiting October 1990 through January 1991 was down 15 percent in the Nurse Corps, 18 percent in the Biomedical Sciences Corps programs, and 55 percent for Physician Assistants from the previous year.

RETENTION

Pilot retention is a problem that will continue as long as airlines continue to hire our experienced aviators. In the short term, some air lines have announced furloughs and possible hiring slowdowns due to the immediate problems of a slow economy and unstable oil prices and supply. More significantly, the long range picture shows no appreciable change in airline hiring due to pilot retirements and projected airline growth. Today's economic picture has resulted in a 25 percent reduction in airline hiring. Possibly as a result, USAF pilot retirements are down 13 percent and separation requests are down 5 percent from last year. The full effect of increasing flight pay and the pilot bonus is difficult to quantify, however, we see these programs as a positive retention tool. Increasing flying hours may also contribute to improving pilot retention. Cumulative continuation rates, an indicator of retention, have decreased, but may have bottomed out.

Shortages in several medical specialties remain despite recent legislation to increase special pay and support personnel. Physician specialists continue to pose substantial recruiting and retention challenges. Among our allied health professionals, we have had significant problems retaining clinical psychologists, optometrists, and physical therapists.

The Air Force has to compete with civilian industry to retain members with critical skills in today's market. Your assistance with the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program has helped us to stay competitive and allowed us to sustain acceptable retention rates for most skills. However, retention rates in some critical skills are disconcertingly low, even with the SRB. A viable SRB program is one of the most effective management tools we have available to aid retention efforts.

FORCE DRAWDOWN

Air Force philosophy has been to meet force reductions through a balanced approach of reduced accessions and the voluntary loss programs, while resorting to involuntary separations only when other avenues have been exhausted. The fiscal year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provided the services with a uniform, orderly process for implementing strength reductions which parallels this philosophy and included guidance to maintain the current officer to enlisted relationship in future reductions. While a ratio has not historically been our method of end-strength management, we have worked hard to comply with congressional

intent. At the first programmatic opportunity, we carried the officer-to-enlisted ratio derived from a newly streamlined and downsized force into the outyears. However, applying this ratio, coupled with the magnitude of the reductions proposed through the FYDP, will necessitate the broadest use of all available separation tools, including involuntary ones.

Between fiscal year 1986 and the end of fiscal year 1990, the Air Force drew down by nearly 73,000, primarily through reducing accessions and offering voluntary early separations to both officer and enlisted personnel. The exception was fiscal year 1988 when a selective early retirement board (SEAS) for senior colonels and lieutenant colonels was conducted. Following this, and in anticipation of pending steeper reductions, changes were made in fiscal year 1990 to some Air Force programs to generate additional losses. High-years-of-tenure (HYT) for enlisted personnel in most grades were reduced. In addition, changes were made in the first term reenlistment program to tighten quality control measures while at the same time procuring career commitment earlier in the first enlistment. This provides more accurate force management and shaping capability as well as reduced enlisted career force entries. Accessions were reduced to the minimum level necessary to sustain future experience levels. Further, the Air Force held a selective early retirement board in 1990 to reduce the retirement eligible officer population.

Fiscal year 1991 will be a particularly challenging year, but not because of the size (26,675) of the reduction effort. In comparison to fiscal year 1988 and fiscal year 1990, the reduction itself is 13 percent and 25 percent smaller, respectively. The challenge is that never before have we executed major reductions in back-to-back fiscal years and during a mobilization to support a war effort. Reductions in consecutive years force a draw from decreasing pools of eligible voluntary candidates and a move to involuntary measures. In addition, our stop-loss program associated with the war effort hinders reductions in many areas. The Air Force can accomplish a back-to-back reduction while complying with the NDAA although we will resort to some involuntary measures. An officer reduction-in-force (RIF) is not needed in fiscal year 1991 because of waiver provisions in the fiscal year 1991 NDAA precluding involuntary separations. The fiscal years 1992–1993 PB request contains RIF/SERB provisions for both years. We have advised the Office of the Secretary of Defense of the need to waive officer end strength for fiscal year 1991 in excess of the provisions in the fiscal year 1991 NDAA. We have little doubt that such relief will be forthcoming. However, that is just one-half of the solution. Legislative relief is also needed to pay for the additional people we will have on board at the start of fiscal year 1992.

CIVILIAN DRAWDOWN

Approximately one-third (239,000) of our force is civilian and they play a vital role in the accomplishment of the Air Force mission. Thousands of civilians are working in direct support of Operation Desert Storm, 140 are actually serving in the Gulf and approximately 3,500 employees have been called to active military duty. Last year saw the passage of significant legislation for our civilian force. The Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act, establishment of the Acquisition Corps, and NAF portability legislation will have a lasting positive effect on our efforts to effectively manage this critical resource.

As we resize the Air Force, civilian strength will be reduced. We are committed to minimizing the adverse impact on employees. To do this we must continue to manage our resources to budget and not be restricted by end-strength limits. We appreciate the elimination of ceilings in fiscal year 1991 and encourage that they not be reinstated in future years. A major concern in managing our civilian resource is nonprogrammatic reductions, particularly those tied to burdensharing in the area of foreign national pay. Reductions of this type often do not achieve immediate cost savings and may result in increased cost due to severance pay and other benefits mandated by agreements. Further, separation of foreign national employees in the Gulf region may have a direct negative impact on our ability to respond in the Persian Gulf.

TOTAL FORCE

For the Air Force, the Total Force Policy worked well and stood us in good stead as we mobilized for the air operation now underway in the Middle East. Air Reserve component flight and maintenance crews have been responsible for approximately one-half of the airlift missions to and in the Kuwaiti area of responsibility. This is our first opportunity to really test the Total Force Policy and the lessons learned will enable us to fine tune our policies to better respond to future situations. The

current balance of the total force allowed the Air Force to respond to Operation Desert Shield/Storm quickly with mostly active units while sustaining the mission elsewhere with activated Air Reserve component personnel. This serves to illustrate that future force reductions need to be balanced between total force components, thus avoiding automatic Reserve component build-ups at the expense of the Active component.

COMPENSATION

In recent months we have asked our people to make immense sacrifices on behalf of their Nation. The casualties of war—killed, wounded, and missing—have already given far in excess of what we could ever repay. Military service will always require the willingness to make these sacrifices and our warriors realize this. We have the moral obligation to appropriately compensate the men and women who volunteer to shoulder our country's military burden.

Military pay is a basic GI barometer against which troops measure the public's true appreciation for their contributions to the Nation's security. It is a cornerstone of our efforts to attract high quality recruits and retain professional career personnel. It will become even more important as we reduce the force. We appreciate this committee's efforts in the compensation area for fiscal year 1991 and seek your continued support. The challenge for us in fiscal year 1992 and beyond will be to maintain our competitive position given the fiscal constraints we face. The President's budget requests pay raises of 4.2 percent in fiscal year 1992 and; 4.7 percent in fiscal year 1993 for military personnel. We have been using the Civilian Wages and Salaries component of the Employment Cost Index (ECI) as the basis for comparison with military wages. According to this measure, since 1983 the military pay raise has been less than the increase in the ECI, except in 1989. Recent economic research by the Department of Defense has raised questions, however, about the validity of this index as the appropriate standard of comparison because of demographic and structural differences between our force structure and the civilian labor market. The Seventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) is studying the selection of an appropriate index. Regardless of the standard that is chosen, a strong commitment to our professional forces dictates every effort be made to closing any pay gap completely over the long run.

Housing allowances (Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)) continue to be a focus of significant concern. Legislation enacted in 1985 indicates congressional desire for housing allowances to reimburse our people at 85 percent of the national median cost of housing for their grade. Since that time, housing allowances have slipped until they now reimburse members only about 81 percent of their cost.

We are grateful for your help in recent years with reducing out-of-pocket expenses for military members during permanent change of station (PCS) moves, especially in the areas of increased household goods shipping allowances and the dislocation allowance. However, a recent survey indicates that our people still incur significant costs and are reimbursed only $1 out of every $2 they must spend in the course of a government-directed move. Over one-half report they must borrow money or use savings to pay for PCS expenses. On the average, members report out-of-pocket lodging and meal expenses of $450 and expenditure costs of $800 for house hunting trips. This is a significant burden for our people.

Despite the coming force reductions, we will continue to face stiff competition from the private sector for many of our most critical and highly technical specialties such as health professionals and pilots. We must continue to address many of these concerns through judicious and efficient use of special pays and bonuses, not only as a means of attracting new accessions but to meet continuing retention needs as we downsize the force. In the case of pilots, for example, the rapid force structure reductions actually hamper our capability to replace skilled pilot losses; our replacement needs actually exceed the number of cockpit seats available to train and mature new pilots. Under such circumstances, we must place an even greater premium on retention.

HEALTH CARE

A recent survey revealed that health care plays a major role in Air Force families' perception of their quality of life. While members are generally pleased with the care they receive themselves, there is concern for the care available to dependents.

The Air Force has managed to maintain a relatively stable health care environment despite the deployment of significant numbers of health care technicians and

professionals to the Persian Gulf. The additional strain on medical care has forced more families out of military medical facilities and into the community. Any lag in coverage due to Gulf related activities has an adverse impact on quality of life for our Air Force families. The 200 percent increase in CHAMPUS deductibles helps to address budget deficits, but it does so at the expense of service families.

Our existing Dental Care Program is well received and greatly appreciated by military families. However, the fact is 80 percent of America's large corporations provide more comprehensive dependent dental care plans than we offer our military dependents. Rising private sector dental costs and the statutory limits placed on the dependent dental plan are increasing out-of-pocket expenses for our service men and women.

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

The Air Force is proud of the recreation programs we have established to help ease the tedium and provide a slice of home for our people involved in Desert Shield/Storm. Our Morale, Welfare and Recreation troops hit the ground with the first deployment wave and started recreational programs for not only our forces, but those of the other services as well. The overwhelming accolades received from field commanders and troops alike point out the tremendous value of programs such as these; programs that are frequently under fire during times of peace, but are essential to a commander in times of war.

CONCLUSION

I'm sure everyone on this committee agrees that our troops have earned your continued full support. Operation Desert Storm is resulting in the most valuable resource any military can possess—battle-trained and tested high quality personnel. These are the experienced people we need to meet future threats to our country and to train tomorrow's airmen.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, General. General Smith.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. NORMAN H. SMITH, U.S.M.C., DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General SMITH. Mr. Chairman and Senator McCain, I am pleased to be here this morning as I always am, to talk to you all about the Corps and about our marines. I also want to echo my colleagues' comments in thanking you both for your very visible support last year in that personnel trauma that we had between us.

It is a particular pleasure to appear before you in view of the Corps' contributions to the military successes out in southwest Asia. Those contributions are attributable to combat readiness and a total force manpower policy reliant on superbly talented marines and of sailors and civilian employees. Your investment in our commitment to readiness and force quality paid off this year in the accomplishments of marines and sailors serving with marines all over the globe. Manpower resources requested in the fiscal year 1992 and 1993 President's budget support our continued commitment to excellence and our readiness.

The premiere challenge in this year's budget request was to provide the nation with the type of ready, expeditionary, self-sustaining, versatile Marine Corps that is expected, but with fewer people and resources. Our request satisfies that challenge. We are requesting support for 188,000 and 182,200 marines in fiscal year 1992 and 1993 respectively.

Our actions in reducing the size of the corps are designed to preserve readiness and responsiveness while protecting the welfare of our marines and their families. Your efforts in supporting this re-

duction relative to entitlements and transition assistance and its benefits are very greatly appreciated, and I again thank you.

I do have three concerns, though, for 1992 and 1993, and I want to briefly mention them. The budget request contains no manpower account flexibility. Our strength reduction will be accomplished through attrition, through reduced accessions and retention controls. We will protect our qualitative edge and our skilled marines, and we are going to keep our lean officer enlisted ratio to 1 to 8.8. We have eliminated new payments in the enlisted bonus program, and the aviation continuation pay program. And we have cut new payments of the selected re-enlistment bonus program by one-fourth. We literally have no latitude to address unfunded obligations or unforeseen requirements.

Second, from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1993, our civilian strength will be reduced 9.6 percent, or 1,965 total employees. I consider future civilian manpower cuts as a threat to our readiness and our ability to properly sustain the operating forces.

And third, sir, recruiting will become increasingly more challenging. The future of the all-volunteer force depends on the proper combination of recruiting leadership, training, and adequate resources. We must not drop our guard on the importance of quality accessions to the corps.

Thank you, sir, for allowing me to speak to you. I am, hopefully, prepared to answer any of your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Smith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. NORMAN H. SMITH, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee: It is an honor for me to appear before you again this year to present the status of Marine Corps manpower, to address our fiscal years 1992 and 1993 requirements as contained in the President's budget, and to discuss our view of the future of the Marine Corps.

TOTAL FORCE

For a number of years Marine Corps manpower chiefs have testified about the Marine Corps' Total Force manpower concept and its associated policies. By integrating Active and Reserve forces, civilian employees, and our retirees under a single leader, we are able to consistently serve the Nation as its premier force-in-readiness. It is our belief that the absolute foundation of the Total Force concept is our commitment to the highest standards of excellence. These standards beget quality marines—quality marines provide the readiness, responsiveness, versatility and capability to respond to the needs of the Nation in crisis and in peace.

The crisis in Southwest Asia (SWA) has validated our integrated Total Force concept and the importance of building the force with quality people. From the start of the crisis, marines in SWA have performed as you have the right to expect, and they have had the outstanding, responsive support of the other members of the Total Force.

Although the challenge in SWA is the point of main effort for your Marine Corps today, my remarks will focus on the challenge we will face when the storm in the desert has been stilled. That challenge will be force reductions. Our fiscal years 1992–1993 budget request addresses that challenge and simultaneously identifies our requirements for a ready, expeditionary; self-sustaining, versatile Marine Corps. In the budget years, fewer defense dollars will support a smaller Marine Corps—but a Corps which will be as ready and responsive to the future needs of the Nation as the one which serves superbly today in Operation Desert Storm and elsewhere around the world.

ACTIVE FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND MANNING

The Marine Corps is requesting active duty end strengths of 188,000 and 182,200 for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 respectively. Although these strengths are achievable without excessive or capricious manpower actions, they reflect reductions which again cut into the muscle of the Marine Corps—its operating forces. Since our lean supporting and training establishments cannot sustain significant cuts, reductions necessary to reach 182,200 in fiscal year 1993 must come disproportionately from our infantry, artillery, armor, and combat support forces—forces which have already felt the effects of reduction actions in fiscal years 1989 through 1991.

The Nation expects to have a versatile, responsive, combined arms capable Marine Corps which will be balanced, self-sustaining, and able to respond rapidly to conflicts anywhere in the world. To meet those national expectations at 182,200 will be very difficult. Below that strength, we will not be able to do all that is expected. Continued reductions below the 182,200 level will erode our balanced Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept and degrade our ability to rapidly respond and sustain ourselves. We will not be able to effectively maintain our three division/three air wing structure and we will lose capability to provide the Nation with a force-in-readiness in a world of uncertainty.

The force structure reductions shown in our budget request were difficult to achieve. Based on our experience in developing the fiscal years 1992-1993 budget, I believe that there are two factors which should be weighed in future manpower reduction actions considered for the Marine Corps.

First, your Marine Corps can be protected from painful force reduction actions (i.e. involuntary separations, RIFs, etc.) precipitated by excessively steep reduction profiles. Major force structure reductions can be effectively managed, readiness protected, and the welfare of our people safeguarded if the rate of reduction is not precipitous. It is the steepness of reduction profiles, not the magnitude of the cut, which will cause turbulence and disruption of the force.

Second, the Marine Corps must be given the necessary flexibility to reshape the force in a manner that preserves readiness and a qualitative edge. Although reshaping the force may include additional manpower cuts, decisions on the size of the reductions must be preceded by two actions:

— Determination of a nationals military strategy and related Marine Corps missions.

— Determination of appropriate force structure and required manning levels.

Our end strength reductions in the budget years will be accomplished primarily through attrition, retention controls, and reduced accessions. We will protect our skilled marines as much as possible and our officer-to-enlisted ratio will remain at the current level of 1:8.8.

Budget year changes to the Corps' force structure preserve the readiness of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) while accommodating an end strength reduction of approximately 11,500. We plan to hold the manning of our Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units at the 90 percent level. We will continue to assign approximately 70 percent of all marines to our operating forces, maintaining a traditionally high "tooth-to-tail" ratio between the operating forces and the supporting establishment.

MARINE OFFICERS

An effective officer corps is critical to Marine Corps readiness. Accordingly, we are managing officer reductions carefully with an eye on three objectives. First, we have planned to preserve the readiness and morale of our officer corps. Next, we have designed our officer plans to create a sensible balance between the retention of experienced, proven leaders and the accession of the young officers who will be the leaders of tomorrow. Finally, we have been sensitive to ensuring that all officers are treated with the respect and dignity they have earned.

Our reductions will be made by decreasing the number of accessions and by making use of the recently enhanced authority for selective early retirement (SER). We will increase separations by reducing augmentation opportunities, but we have no need to conduct a Reduction-In-Force (RIF). Our reduction plans fully comply with your desires and the Defense Department's uniform strength reduction policy guidance. The reduction profile for the budget years is shown below:

	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993
Officer end strength	19,757	19,180	18,591
Reduction from prior fiscal year	201	577	589
Percent reduction from prior fiscal year	1.0	2.9	3.1

The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) grade table limitation to the numbers of field grade officers we are permitted to have on active duty remains a troublesome issue. The Marine Corps has valid requirements for approximately 700 more field grade authorizations than we currently possess. This situation continues to place us at a distinct disadvantage in meeting requirements to fill joint billets and results in average time to promotion (flow points) beyond DOPMA guidelines. We are currently preparing a request for a legislative amendment seeking a permanent increase in the Marine Corps field grade officer grade tables. We ask for your support in this matter.

Since my appearance before you last year we have made some positive strides in improving our aviator retention rates. We used the short-term provisions of the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) bonus program, paying $6,000/year for 2 years in return for a 2-year active duty service obligation. Approximately 83 percent of the eligible marines participated in the ACP program. Although we met our planned fiscal year 1990 pilot retention goal, I am still concerned that we are short of most types of aviators. However, we believe that a combination of the current positive trend in retention and accurate inventory planning for the budget years will allow us to close the gap in our pilot shortages. We do not plan to utilize ACP in the program for this budget submission, but may have to reconsider that decision if our retention plans are unsuccessful. Eliminating pilot shortages will continue to challenge us since the availability of pilots is affected by traditionally high attrition rates, civilian airline poaching, national economic conditions, and uncertainty over the scope and intent of force reduction actions.

ENLISTED MARINES

The character, quality, and performance of our enlisted force is superb. We have worked very hard to ensure that our manpower management actions comply with the uniform strength reduction requirements, protect the quality of the force, and treat all marines fairly.

Our reduction profile for the budget years is shown below:

	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993
Enlisted end strength	173,978	168,820	163,609
Reduction from prior fiscal year	2,716	5,158	5,211
Percent reduction from prior fiscal year	1.6	3.0	3.0

Our reductions will be accomplished largely through reducing the number of accessions. Some reductions will also come from our career force. The Secretary of the Navy has authorized us to conduct an Enlisted Selective Early Retirement board (ESERB) in fiscal year 1991 to improve promotion flow and balance grades and skills. We intend to seek authorization to conduct ESERBs in fiscal years 1992 and 1993 as well. With the authorization of enlisted separation pay we will be able to more strictly enforce the high-year tenure provisions of our Enlisted Career Force Control (ECFC) program. Our budget reflects some transitory grade growth (less than 1 percent in higher enlisted grade seniority) in our enlisted force. We have also taken care to ensure that no element of our enlisted force bears an unequal share of the reduction.

We are similarly concerned about retaining our best marines and the key skills they possess. The Marine Corps concluded fiscal year 1990 by attaining its first term reenlistment objective and most of the intermediate/careerist objective. Our future retention efforts will target quality marines and the tough-to-replace skills that will be so important to a smaller Marine Corps. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB)

has proven to be an effective retention tool for targeting critically short Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) and keeping the right marines on board. This program is important to us and one for which we seek your continued support.

MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) unit activations and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) activations during Operation Desert Storm have justified our efforts to integrate Reserve and Active units into the Total Force. The smooth integration of reserve units with their Active component gaining commands is a direct result of integrated training at all levels.

Let me give you a feel for the value of your investment in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR). As of February 23 we had activated 24,950 members of units of our SMCR. This is approximately 64 percent of the 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Air Wing, and 4th Force Service Support Group. Of the marines activated, 66 percent are serving with our forward deployed MAGTFs in SWA or Okinawa. Ninety-one percent are assigned operational missions with our four MEFs.

Marine Reserve units have also, as a result of Desert Storm, assumed several Active component missions. Reserves are providing the Air Contingency Force for FMF Atlantic and will participate in Exercise Battle Griffin, a major northern NATO exercise. Other Reserve units have been activated for the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) for service with III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in the western Pacific. The 4th Marine Aircraft Wing has flown 5,500 hours in support of the Active forces. Since August 1990, the 4th Marine Division has assumed the I MEF mission to support Joint Task Force—6 in its efforts to stem the flow of illegal drugs across the southwest U.S. border.

Our fiscal year 1992 Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps (RPMC) request will support an end strength in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve of 40,900, a decrease of 3,000 from fiscal year 1991. Our Full-Time Support (FTS) fiscal year 1992 end strength request is for 2,170 marines, the appropriate level required for administration and training support of the requested Reserve strength.

The Marine Corps Reserve continues to provide capable, and responsive forces to augment the Active force. The Reserve Marines who have been ordered to active duty in support of Operation Desert Storm have clearly demonstrated that the Marine Corps Reserve is an indispensable part of the Total Force. A Reserve that is fully trained, fully manned, and in possession of modern equipment is vital to the sustainment of the Active forces during high intensity operations.

CIVILIAN MANPOWER

The Marine Corps' Total Force is enhanced by a thoroughly professional civilian work force. Civilians fill a variety of professional, technical, trade, and administrative positions. Approximately 46 percent of the personnel working on our bases and stations are civilians. As outyear budget reductions dictate further military structure cuts, we see the civilian work force playing an increasingly important role in the Total Force.

The civilian manpower structure currently programmed for fiscal year 1991 is austere. Our request for funding in the President's budget supports a work force that is stretched to an irreducible minimum. I consider future civilian manpower reductions as a threat to our readiness and our ability to properly sustain the operating forces. Our programmed civilian end strength is shown below:

Fiscal years:	
1991	20,159
1992	18,914
1993	18,542

The programmed reductions to the Corps' Civilian Manpower Program are significant and demonstrate that we are doing our share when it comes to civilian cuts. From fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 1993 (estimated) our civilian end strength will be reduced 9.6 percent—1,965 total end strength.

The Marine Corps recognizes that reductions to Active military forces will precipitate commensurate cuts in the other areas of the Total Force. We have anticipated these reductions and planned for them accordingly. However, we cannot sustain further civilian end strength reductions or increased workload without a commensurate reduction in mission requirements. Adequate funding is essential to enable the civilian work force to properly support the FMF.

RETIREES

We have long recognized the important contribution that retired marines continue to make to the Corps after their active service is completed. We have been inundated with calls from retirees earnestly offering their services in support of Desert Storm. Our war plans include reliance on our retirees. We draw from a population of approximately 36,000 retired marines who are under the age of 60. Today approximately 500 retirees have been recalled to active duty in support of Operation Desert Storm. Their spirit, energy, and knowledge substantially benefit the Total Force, not only during times of crisis, but in peacetime as well. The traits which made them good marines are welcomed in the civilian communities of this Nation and are a positive testimony in our recruiting efforts. We ask for your continued attention to the programs which support our retirees.

TRAINING

An essential element of manning our Total Force is ensuring marines arrive at their first operational unit trained for combat and deployable. We will continue our emphasis on Marine Battle Skills Training (MBST) for every marine. The program has been extraordinarily successful in providing marines a common denominator of basic warfighting skills which are routinely followed by unit based sustainment training.

Our centralized process of classification and distribution finds and matches the best qualified marine with the projected needs of the Corps. While classification of recruits is prescribed by long-established criteria, the distribution and management standards are less precise. The By-Name-Assignment (BNA) System is a new, large scale attempt to make the distribution of marines graduating from the Recruit Depots and Marine Combat Skills Training as effective as possible. The system provides the common data base for comprehensive training management and it gathers cost-per-graduate data which will facilitate budgeting for future training requirements. Since approximately 30 percent of our marines attend initial skill training conducted in our sister services' schools, the use of BNA will greatly enhance our effectiveness in taking full advantage of a declining number of available school resources.

PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS)

An effective PCS program significantly contributes to overall force readiness. The PCS plan represented in our budget request supports and enhances readiness by:

— Providing proper grade/skill balances Corps-wide;
— Permitting operational moves to fill critical billets;
— Permitting proper manning of deploying units;
— Providing key retention incentives in support of reenlistment options.

We will meet the challenges of force reductions by remaining flexible in our force management actions. One of the principal tools on which we will rely for management flexibility will be the PCS move program. For this we seek your continued support.

RECRUITING

I am pleased to report to you that we accomplished our recruiting goals for fiscal year 1990. Not only did we exceed our Total Force accession requirements, but the overall quality of our new marines, officer and enlisted, was superb. For example, 95 percent of the enlisted accessions were Tier I high school graduates. In the area of officer recruiting, the average Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score of applicants accepted into our various commissioning programs was 1,159. The application standard requirement is 1,000.

Similarly, in fiscal year 1991 we are on track in both the quality and quantity of new accessions. Our recruiters are doing well and we are continuing to succeed in attracting high caliber young adults. Your wisdom in supporting our emphasis on recruiting quality during the past decade is apparent today in readiness in SWA. Preserving and perpetuating those quality standards and gains will require the proper combination of leadership, training, dedication, and resources in the years ahead.

Despite our successes, I am keeping a wary eye on the future of recruiting. I sense that the mission I give my recruiting service each year is becoming increasingly more challenging for several key reasons:

— Qualified Military Available (QMA) continues to decline causing increasing competition among the services and the private sector for diminishing numbers of quality applicants.

— We have indications that some school boards are willing to deny military recruiters access to high schools and student lists—actions that are detrimental to the continued success of the all volunteer force concept.

— With increased competition and fewer available resources in fiscal year 1992, I am as concerned as you are with the extra pressures we are putting on our recruiters and the effects of those pressures on recruiter quality of life.

— We are watching very closely how the current crisis impacts recruiting under the all volunteer force concept.

Failure to consider and counter the negative implications of these factors will affect the quality of our future accessions and the ability of our recruiters to complete their missions successfully. Our plans for accomplishing the recruiting mission consider these factors very carefully. However, our ability to counter their effects depends on our effective and timely use of proven recruiting, marketing, and advertising programs. Your vital support of those programs in the past has made the difference and we ask that your support continue in the difficult years ahead.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Programs which safeguard and improve the work and living environment for marines and their families are popularly known as "quality of life" programs. Today, with the number of dependents exceeding the number of marines, and with so much of the Corps deployed, emphasis on quality of life programs is vital. They not only provide a multitude of services for dependent families here in the States, but they also contribute to the peace of mind of those marines who are stationed away from home. Concerned leadership, realistic training, discipline, and esprit de corps, complemented by our quality of life programs, are the basis for the Marine Corps' high state of manpower readiness and for the Corps' widely recognized tradition of caring for its own.

COMPENSATION

Today's quality Total Force can be protected and perpetuated through your continued support for a compensation package of pay and benefits which is comparable to the civilian sector. We are particularly appreciative of the Bateman Amendment adjustments which prevent individual VHA rates from dropping more than the annual increase in pay, basic allowance for subsistence (BAS) and basic allowance of quarters (BAQ). Although we support passage of the proposed fiscal year 1992 pay raise of 4.2 percent, any pay comparability gap with the civilian sector will still remain for the foreseeable future. It is inevitable that this continuing disparity between military and civilian compensation will negatively impact recruiting and retention.

FAMILY PROGRAMS

Concern for Marine families is an important element of our manpower planning. Through the efforts and facilities of our 18 Family Service Centers (FSC) we are meeting the needs of single marines and married marines and their families. FSCs offer diverse services and programs which include help with family needs generated by the deployment of one or more family members, personal and financial counseling, stress management, and family "wellness" programs. Literature and information is also provided regarding the rights and benefits of being part of a marine family. Other programs under the cognizance of the FSCs include:

— The Family Advocacy Program (FAP) provides services and prevention programs for child and spouse maltreatment. We expect to expand FAP support capabilities in fiscal year 1992 with increased congressional funding.

— The Exceptional Family Member Program, designed for family members with special medical or educational needs, now has 384 participants. This not only benefits Marine families, but it helps ensure that our assignment process considers the special needs of marines before inappropriate assignments are made.

— In anticipation of force reduction actions, the relocation assistance capabilities are being reviewed at our installations where more than 500 marines reside. We intend to automate our Relocation Assistance Program by the start of fiscal year 1992 to better assist Marine families in making normal PCS moves and in the larger transitions from military life.

— Concomitant with relocation assistance, our Employment Resource Centers provide valuable help to separating and retiring marines as well as spouses of those on

active duty. The services provided by these centers will be expanded as necessary to meet increased needs precipitated by congressional transition assistance provisions.

— We continue to make progress in achieving congressional targets established in the Military Family Child Care Act of 1989. Although we are committed to this important dimension in the lives of Marine families, demands on the Child Development Centers continue to increase. Additional support will be required if we are to continue to fulfill the needs of our Marine families.

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION (MWR)

The importance of MWR in the lives of marines and their families cannot be overlooked. Commanders consider MWR to be a key link to the motivation of deployed marines. During the past year much of our effort was focused on providing prepackaged MWR materials to deployed marines. At home, commanders have supported dependents with a variety of special MWR events and activities to help ease family tensions and stress brought about by the crisis.

MWR has been successful in capitalizing on new market opportunities in both our service and retail operations. New, innovative service contracts and increased assortments of merchandise now provide greater conveniences and wider choices to Marine families who patronize our exchanges. We request your support in reducing the restrictions which hinder us from operating more business-like, profitable operations.

As we look to the future, I am concerned about the effects that reduced appropriated funding and various revenue generating restrictions will have on MWR. The steady decline in appropriated MWR funding has caused the Marine Corps to use nonappropriated funds to cover appropriated fund shortfalls for items such as maintenance, utilities, inter-service support agreements, and child care requirements. While we have taken steps to reduce costs, the practice of using the nonappropriated funds to pay bills will eventually cause us to lose important MWR programs and services.

We also continue to be concerned about the proposed merger of service exchange systems and the possible erosion of MWR benefits that might result. The Marine Corps has distinguished itself from the other services by being able to provide patrons with unique, quality goods and services in a specific geographical location. This tradition and service will be lost to many of our patrons if merged into a larger organization.

DESERT STORM IMPACT

I would be less than candid if I did not mention that our ability to execute the program contained in the President's budget is directly affected by our fiscal year 1991 actions in SWA. In supporting Desert Storm we are taking manpower actions that are directly opposite of the actions we would normally take to prepare ourselves for a year of sharp reductions.

We are keeping the Secretary of the Navy and the Defense Department fully informed of our fiscal year 1991 status as it is affected by Desert Storm. Should the effects of the SWA crisis extend into fiscal year 1992, the execution of the force reduction actions contained in the President's budget will have to be re-phased. We recognize that any re-phasing or delay would be temporary and contingent on the timing of the resolution of the crisis. Accordingly, we will not take any unnecessary force management actions which will complicate or prevent resumption of the force reduction actions contained in the President's budget.

I also assure you that our post-Desert Storm actions will be executed correctly and with emphasis on protecting the rights and legal privileges of all those concerned. Marines leaving active duty will receive timely, effective administrative and medical processing. We intend to return marines to their civilian lives with as little turbulence as possible while guarding against taking hasty actions which might jeopardize their best interests. The stand-down process will be difficult and we will welcome your patience, support, and guidance.

CONCLUSION

The high state of readiness of today's Marine Corps is evident in all parts of the world. That readiness, characterized by responsiveness, versatility, and usefulness to the Nation, is the product of a Total Force commitment to quality and your reliable support. To meet the challenges of the future we intend to remain committed to a Total Force based on quality. With your continued support, we will be able to do what has to be done to ensure that the Nation is as well-served by its Marine Corps in the future as it is today.

Senator GLENN. Before we get to questions, Senator McCain, I commented earlier, John, before you got here, how much I appreciated your efforts over the time we have worked together on this committee; you have done an outstanding job, I look forward to working with you this year again, and look forward to any comments you may have.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I was late, I was down at the meeting at the White House with some Native American leaders and the President, and I felt that was an important meeting to attend. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for all the courtesy you have shown me and the minority staff for many years, we truly work together in a bipartisan fashion, and it is a great privilege to do so.

I would like my written statement to be made part of the record.

Senator GLENN. Fine. It will be included.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Mr. Chairman: I would like to add my welcome to the witnesses today, and I want them all to know that I cannot fend the right words to properly express how proud I am of the job that our men and women have done and are doing in the Persian Gulf. The swift victory that they achieved has brought great honor to our military services and has liberated a country that was subjected to a brutally inhumane occupation.

Critics of our President and his policies must never forget that the only reason even a part of the world is free today is because of the sacrifice Americans have made throughout the twentieth century. This century will be long remembered as the bloodiest to date in history, but history will also record that there has never seen a country that has been more benevolent in victory, nor more generous with its treasures. Unfortunately, the victory was very often won at great cost in lives and blood.

In this case, we were very fortunate that the victory was swift and our casualties few, though I do not for a moment underestimate the sorrow and anguish of the families of our men and women who gave their lives and of the families of our fallen comrades.

All of you here today can take great pride in the fact that you were instrumental in building the armed forces of which America is so rightfully proud. Had we not worked together over the last decade to rebuild our military strength, we might well have been a paper tiger that would have had to stand idly by while Saddam Hussein raped first Kuwait then Saudi Arabia.

I greet the future, however, with mixed feelings. On the one hand the Soviet threat to Western Europe is receding. On the other, we have met a despot on the field of battle and defeated him. Yet, the uncertainty of the future fills me with trepidation. I hope that for the sake of domestic political expediency, we are not making a grave mistake by undertaking these force reductions.

If you share the doubts that I have expressed, please do not hesitate to let Senator Glenn and me know. Now is the time. Not two years from now when it will be too late.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Mr. Jehn, let me run through the 1992–1993 defense authorization request which proposes active duty end-strength levels of 1,886,400, and 1,794,500 for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 respectively.

With regard to these end strengths, the defense manpower report you submitted to us in February said "ongoing Operation Desert Storm requirements and the uncertainty around the intensity and duration of these requirements make the end-strength estimates very fragile."

How do you characterize them now? Should they be adjusted? Are these active duty end-strength levels tied directly to force structure reductions that military services can make in 1992 and 1993 without risking combat readiness and hollowness? In other words, do those figures still appear valid?

Mr. JEHN. I think the first thing to say is we know a lot more now than we did when we submitted the manpower report to you a month or so ago. And what we know is that the prompt conclusion of the war in the Persian Gulf has made it a lot easier to get back on track towards those numbers in 1992 and 1993. So answering first your question about the 1992 and 1993 numbers, those numbers are indeed tied to force structure changes, the details of which, of course, my colleagues here are well-equipped to answer, but I can try to answer some as well.

A separate question is the end strengths in 1991. As you noted in your opening statement, the Congress granted the Secretary of Defense the authority to set or reset end-strength numbers for 1991, and we have already done that. Just last week, the Deputy Secretary signed a directive to the services setting their end strengths for 1991, and each of the services is roughly speaking close to about 1 percent off where we intended to be at the end of 1991.

Those are numbers that we arrived at in close consultation with the services and the leadership in the military departments, and those are numbers that we all feel very comfortable we are going to be able to reach without imposing hardships on the people involved. The result, of course, is that we are going to enter 1992 with slightly more end strength than we had originally anticipated, so we are going to need a little additional money to cover the higher average man years we will have during 1992. But by the end of 1992, we will have achieved the end strengths that we have included in the budget for 1992.

Senator GLENN. Now, will that come through on a supplemental? How will that be taken care of? That is not in the budget now, is that right?

Mr. JEHN. That is right, it is not in the budget now, and I am sure the comptroller and OMB are working with members of the Congress to figure out exactly how to provide that money.

Senator GLENN. Okay, can you give us any estimate this morning as to how much that might be?

Mr. JEHN. No, I cannot.

Senator GLENN. Okay, when will that be available, because that would be important.

Mr. JEHN. I would imagine in the next couple of months. When Mr. O'Keefe, the Comptroller, and I last talked about it, his guess was that by the time the appropriations committees start marking up, we will have some good numbers. And we will probably have some pretty good numbers in before that. As I said, the clarity of the situation has increased markedly just in the last month or so. So we will very soon be ready to give you those numbers.

Senator GLENN. We would like to have that not only before the Appropriation Committee marks up, but before the authorizing committee, which is this one, marks up also, because we have to make those adjustments perhaps from account to account to take care of this, under the rules for operating.

Mr. JEHN. We will try to get those to you as soon as we can.
[The information follows:]

Our current estimate of the fiscal year 1992 cost, by service, of the approved increases in active duty end strengths for fiscal year 1991 follows:

(Dollars in millions)

Army	$479
Navy	37
Marines	12
Air Force	38
Total	$566

Senator GLENN. Okay, now let us run through with each service here for 1991, and then I will get to 1992 and 1993 on the second round. General Reno, your authorized 1991 active duty end strength was 702,170. We provided authority to grant a waiver on this if you had to. Does the Army plan to use the waiver? If so, what will be the Army's 1991 active duty end strength? I think you indicated you were going to use the waiver. What are your actual figures on that?

General RENO. Mr. Chairman, that is correct. We will use the waiver and we will end the fiscal year at about 710,000. That is our target.

Senator GLENN. 710,000. You will be about 8,000 over then.

General RENO. That is correct.

Senator GLENN. Will you have to involuntarily separate people to achieve that end strength?

General RENO. Not in fiscal 1991, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Admiral Boorda, the Navy's authorized 1991 active duty end strength, 570,500. Do you plan to use the waiver? You indicated you would not have to do any involuntary separations.

Admiral BOORDA. No, sir, we will not involuntarily separate anyone, given these numbers.

Senator GLENN. How about your numbers?

Admiral BOORDA. We will come in at about 573,000, about 2,500 over. And that is the number that the Secretary of Defense has authorized. And that is due totally to keeping the Midway, the carrier Midway, she was deployed there, and the two battleships longer than we intended to.

Senator GLENN. General Hickey, Air Force had authorized in 1991 510,000. I think you indicated you are going to be 514,000. Is that right?

General HICKEY. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, that is correct.

Senator GLENN. Okay, so it is going to be about 3,000 over the waiver.

General HICKEY. Roughly about 4,000, and they are essentially stop loss that we have not been able to release, that work in aerial ports and are backing out of the Middle East.

Senator GLENN. Okay, well, those should be readily releasable, then, at the end of their time period, I would guess.

General HICKEY. Yes, sir. And so they will not take, in most cases, an extraordinary effort to offset or try and find out the losses to replace them. We will let them go as soon as we can.

Senator GLENN. And how about involuntary separations?

General HICKEY. We have none that are additive because of Desert Storm or Desert Shield. There are involuntary separations already built into the program that we submitted in the President's budget for 1992 and 1993. Those are still there, but there——

Senator GLENN. To get down to this 514,000 in the next year, will you require any involuntary separations?

General HICKEY. No, sir.

Senator GLENN. Not in that. General Smith, how about the Marine Corps? You are authorized 193,735 in 1991 and what were your figures on that again? I think you indicated you would not have to involuntary separate, is that right?

General SMITH. That is correct, no involuntary separation, yes, sir. The waiver authority is needed because of our uncertainties with the stop loss. In other words, our marines, subject to stop loss action can stay in up to 90 days after they return to continental United States from forward deployment. We appreciate the authority for a 1-percent waiver. I do not anticipate using the waiver authority any more than I absolutely have to, so I am going to give you an end-strength number there, Senator, between 193.7 and 195.6 thousand.

Senator GLENN. Okay, you would just be, well, you would be about 1,700 to 1,800 over the max, then.

General SMITH. Yes, sir, at max. We would be back on track toward the fiscal year 1992 end strength during the first quarter of fiscal year 1992.

Senator GLENN. Okay. You people have made some big perturbations here over the last year, I realize, and been up against some tough number-crunching problems and getting people over there and the right numbers over there and all of that. I am very pleased that you are back this close to it, again, in your end of 1991, for your 1991 estimates on this. I think that is pretty good. You should be able to get back on that 1992–1993 barring any other unforeseen circumstances.

Now, let us go through 1992–1993 end strengths. General Reno, the proposed active duty end strength for the Army is 660,200 in 1992 and 618,200 in 1993. Secretary Stone recently testified before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that the Army would have to cut the better part of 100,000 people from the force in the next 15 months in order to hit the 1992 end strength. He said the Army cannot do that and preserve the quality of the force.

At the same hearing, General Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army, testified that the Army will need assistance in 1992 because, in order to meet the current end-strength levels in 1992, the Army would have to make cuts that are not in the best interests of the readiness and quality of the force.

What active duty end-strength level should we authorize in 1992 that would protect the quality and readiness concerns raised by Secretary Stone and General Vuono?

General RENO. Mr. Chairman, to answer the last part of your question first, our recommendation is that the authorization be at 660,200, and then 618,200. The Army, in drawing down, will be drawing down force structure concurrently with the manpower reductions. General Vuono, the Secretary's statements in early

March, were made, as Secretary Jehn suggests, at a time when there was far less clarity than there is now.

We are now redeploying much faster than expected. We have reversed stop loss and the other measures that caused our force to grow, earlier than expected. We will be drawing forces out of Saudi through Europe and out of the structure faster than expected when they testified in March. So the 100,000 gap is now 710,000 to 660,000. So we have about a 50,000 active duty problem. And that is manageable within the current authorizations we have.

Senator GLENN. You will get back on track then for the 660,200 and the 618,200 in 1992 and 1993, then, as you see it now.

General RENO. Sir, that is correct. And we will get back on track with concurrent force structure reductions. Now, there will be involuntary separations, and I am sure you will be questioning that later. But the 50,000 will cause involuntary separations.

Senator GLENN. That is for 1993.

General RENO. For 1992 and 1993.

Senator GLENN. Okay, how many involuntary separations do you estimate?

General RENO. Mr. Chairman, it will be—first, let me make a point. We are currently presenting alternatives to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary, and those alternatives are addressing a smooth ramp of involuntary separations, where you would reduce each year a substantial number over the draw-down period through 1995. We are looking also at alternatives which would cause us to take deeper involuntary separations quickly in order to stabilize and reset the force.

I do not have a policy decision on that yet, Mr. Chairman. But I can tell you that the numbers are substantial, and I would like to provide that, if I may, for the record, because the decision will be made shortly.

[The information follows:]

Seventy-nine percent of the fiscal years 1991–1993 end strength reduction will be achieved through reduced accessions and increased voluntary separations. Of the involuntary separations required, over half will be from initial term or retirement eligible inventories. The following shows increased involuntary separations planned by each service:

	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993	Fiscal years 1991–1993 percent of ES reduction
ARMY total	0	14,373	13,440	
Officer	0	5,873	4,840	
Enlisted	0	8,500	8,600	
NAVY total	[1] 442	400	400	
Officer	442	400	400	
Enlisted	0	0	0	
USMC total	[1] 376	1,200	1,050	
Officer	215	200	200	
Enlisted	161	1,000	850	
USAF total	[1] 4,041	7,613	9,030	
Officer	511	2,252	2,160	

	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993	Fiscal years 1991–1993 percent of ES reduction
Enlisted	3,530	5,361	6,870	
DOD total	4,859	23,586	23,920	21
Officer	1,168	8,725	7,600	51
Enlisted	3,691	14,861	16,320	16

[1] With two exceptions, the fiscal year 1991 involuntary separations are early retirements. The exceptions are (1) an estimated 1,500 enlisted airmen who will be separated under the lower high year of tenure policy for grade E4 announced by the Air Force in May 1990, and (2) an estimated 100 additional Reserve Marine Corps officers on the active duty list who will not be selected for a Regular commission. These figures do not include those involuntary separations which occur under existing strength management programs. For example, approximately 2,000 officers and 2,000 enlisted members who are separated annually for promotion nonselection are not included. However, where service promotion or tenure policies are being changed to achieve the strength reductions, the resulting increases in promotion nonselection separations are included in the above figures.

Senator GLENN. Okay, fine, we would like to have that, too. And I went over a couple of minutes on my time. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Reno, I think you make a very important statement in your prepared statement. You said that the troop reduction in the 1990's will be different from all previous reductions. "We will reduce a high quality volunteer force that enlisted with an implied opportunity and expectation for a worthwhile career. Minority group members comprise over 40 percent of the total enlisted force. Blacks make up 32 percent of the total enlisted force. Black women make up 49 percent of all enlisted females, et cetera."

I am wondering if it is fair, in your view, to impose these Draconian, involuntary reductions on not only all of the men and women who serve, but particularly minorities who have been able to take advantage of the military; it might be the last of the meritocracies. And I wonder if that offends a basic sense of fairness and equity in our society.

General RENO. Senator, first of all, we share your concerns and I personally share them. As a part of our reshaping strategy, to use Admiral Boorda's words, we are doing everything we can to ensure that we minimize the number of soldiers and officers that we involuntary separate. For example, we are complying to the letter of the law by assessing at a number no greater than that which we need for an army of 520,000 that is in authorization.

So we are cutting out on the front end. We will comply with the law and execute selective early retirement to the maximum, so that we release the maximum number that are vested with a retirement benefit. We will seek every opportunity for volunteers to leave. For example, we are now——

Senator MCCAIN. General Reno, if I might interrupt you, you are not answering my question. I understand what your policies are going to be. I wonder if you would answer the question. Do you find that, from a moral standpoint, it is offensive that we would involuntarily separate men and women who have chosen to make the military a career.

The reason for these involuntary separations is because of the declining defense budget. Although we are, as we have done for many years, shaping a force structure around a budget rather than a budget around requirements to defend this Nation's vital national security interests.

I find it terribly unfair to these brave men and women to involuntarily separate them. It seems to me that the Congress of the United States and this committee, and the administration, should readjust our budget so that we do not involuntarily separate people.

It has taken me a long time to come to that conclusion. I think that there are certain programs that we could delay or reduce their funding given the diminishing threat from the Soviet Union. Perhaps this committee should equitably adjust the defense budget and it would not be a lot of money to prevent this incredibly unfair policy which we are inflicting not only on all men and women in the military, but many of our minorities who have had the unique opportunity to frankly better themselves, and more importantly, better this great Nation.

General RENO. Yes, sir, Senator I apologize for elaborating. The point I was going to make, we are doing everything we can to keep it from being Draconian. Having said that, yes, absolutely, it is unfortunate we have to do that. This is the first time we have had to step in and make these type reductions on a volunteer force of the quality we have.

The driver behind that is the reduction to a strength of 520,000 that is in the authorization bill. That is the driver against those numbers.

Senator MCCAIN. Which is driven by the budget, as we know.

General RENO. To some degree, yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Does anyone else want to comment on that? Admiral Boorda?

Admiral BOORDA. Well, we are in the position of not having to do that across the entire 6-year defense plan, we will not have involuntary separations. That assumes a lot of things that I am assuming turn out to be true, retention rates and what-have-you.

We are going to have to continue to do selective early retirements, and that bothers me. Those are people who thought they had 30-year careers as captains, and 28-year careers as commanders, and they do not have that now.

Senator MCCAIN. No admirals, sir?

Admiral BOORDA. Yes, sir, we are sending a lot——

Senator MCCAIN. I was only joking.

Admiral BOORDA. I know you were.

Senator MCCAIN. General Hickey, do you have any, or General Smith?

General HICKEY. I share your concern, Senator. I have been in this business, in this position, since 1986. We have already reduced the Air Force about 100,000. We have tried every way we can think of to do those kinds of reductions without involuntary things. And now, after that first 100,000 is gone, we have another significant 5 years of cuts. And we have run out of flexibility. It is unfair; the world is unfair. And with the conditions we have, I do not see an alternative.

General SMITH. Certainly, sir, the Marine Corps is vitally aware of the tremendous contributions that minority marines have made to the all-green Marine Corps. As you are well aware, we like to look at all marines as green. We are trying to be fair. We are trying to take care of our people and still provide the combat readi-

ness and flexible force that you and the American people expect of the Corps. Thank you, sir.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. Since we are on sensitive issues, I would like to bring up with you the issue of women and combat. Clearly, as we anticipated, in fact, Senator Glenn and I had several discussions on this issue in previous years, the issue of what is "in combat" and what is "not in combat" becomes more blurred as the range of missiles and aircraft increase to outside the immediate battlefield area.

We had several situations where women not only found themselves in combat to where we had the loss of women both as prisoners as well as due to enemy hostile fire. I think it is time we reevaluated the combat exclusion policy for women. Clearly, women have demonstrated again that they can perform any role that they are called upon that any male is called upon to do.

General Hickey, what is your justification for continuing to *not* allow women to fly front-line combat aircraft.

General HICKEY. Well, Senator, in my own personal view, the last impediment to doing that is the law, which precludes us from doing it. There are a lot of anomalies in the way that it is even stated and the way that we have implemented it. But that is really the only crux in my view.

I think in the last year or two it has been the leadership of the Air Force's view that as I said last year before another committee, that there is not, including fighter pilots and pulling 9 G's, a mission in the U.S. Air Force that women are not physically and mentally capable of performing. And I have not changed my mind since I said that the last time.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, General. General Smith.

General SMITH. Senator, I think the Corps will continue to employ our fine corps of women Marines in excess of 9,000 exactly as they are allowed to be utilized, as prohibited by the combat exclusion law. They did a great job in tough situations in southwest Asia; I have seen them deploy all over the world and do a great job. But the law and our policies governing that were functioning within that, and I do not think it is broken; I do not think anything needs to be done with it.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, General. Admiral Boorda.

Admiral BOORDA. Well, I think it is a tough question for you as well as us. Clearly, we in the Navy have pushed the limits of the law and have women doing, I think, all the things we can do within 6015. However, we are looking at that again as a result of our recent study that Admiral Bobby Hazard did.

The real question I think for you becomes one, as you change the law—and I do not mean you personally, I mean the entire Congress—if we are going to do something like that, it has to be truly equal. And you will recall, as we all do, the tremendous brouhaha over babies and mothers and fathers and what have you, and combat is not a voluntary occupation. And deploying is not voluntary.

And we would have to be willing to undertake the commitment to make it truly equal opportunity for both males and females to have both the opportunity to serve and also some of the sacrifices that go with it. I think that is a real hard question to answer, and

there is a lot of debate behind that, both inside our halls and yours as well.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Could I, with your indulgence, perhaps have General Reno, answer this question since this line of questioning is continuing. Thank you, continue General Reno.

General RENO. Senator, very quickly. As the other ground force, I would align with the position that General Smith enunciated. We had five killed, 21 wounded, two captured, as you well know. But each of them suffered their fate, respectively, consistent with our current policy. The female soldiers, all 26,000 in Saudi Arabia, performed magnificently. And as my colleagues have said, trained to standard, they can equal the performance of their male counterparts in the position to which we have them assigned.

The thing that is unique to the ground force, in our judgment, is the rigor and the probability of capture when they are committed with the forward combatant forces. We feel that the policy is appropriate; our policy is a derivative of the law, and we would not see any compelling reason to change.

Senator McCAIN. Well, General Reno, it is my understanding there was a female Army doctor who was shot down during a combat search and rescue mission in hostile territory.

General RENO. Sir, that is absolutely correct.

Senator McCAIN. The fact remains that women in the military that I have spoken with feel that they are inhibited from progressing up the career ladder because they are prevented from being in the front line business of combat.

My question is, are we going to make everybody equal and give them an equal opportunity and an equal risk, as Admiral Boorda has just pointed out? Or are we going to continue the unrealistic policy without further examination, which says that women will not serve in combat. As you just stated, I do not know what the percentage is, but certainly women did serve and sacrifice in combat situations, no matter how you may want to describe their specific roles in Desert Storm.

So, Mr. Chairman, I think it is an issue that you and I should examine and pursue, in light of the Persian Gulf experience, it is appropriate to re-evaluate. And I thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. I would like to continue getting these end strengths for 1992–1993 pinned down here before we go onto other subjects in my questioning. I did not mean to bring criticism.

Admiral Boorda, your proposed active duty end strength is 551,000 for 1992, 536,000 in 1993. Can you hit those? And should we make other adjustments, or can you still hit your 1995 level of 501,000?

Admiral BOORDA. Yes, sir. By April, our 1995 level now I show as a little higher than that in our budget submission. But we will be on the glide slope for reductions by April of next year, and sooner if I can do that. And I can make all those reductions without any RIF's, involuntary separations, other than the SERB that I mentioned earlier.

Senator GLENN. General Hickey, your proposed active duty end strength for 1992 is 486,000, and for 1993 is 458,100. Can you hit those without any adverse effect on quality and readiness? And do you have any suggestions as to a change, are you suggesting any change in end strength? Or are there other adjustments, and can you still hit your 1995 level of 415,000?

General HICKEY. Yes, sir. I think the 1992 strength—and I do not think we have a disagreement—I think it is 486,800. However, we cannot make the 415,000 target without significant adverse personnel actions.

Senator GLENN. I had 486,000.

General HICKEY. Okay, I think I am carrying 486,800 and 458,100 in 1993.

Senator GLENN. I have 458,100 for 1993 also.

General HICKEY. At any rate, we are planning on being on-line for both of those strengths with the President's budget that is in there. Built into those are officer reductions in officer force (RIF) of 1,600 in fiscal year 1992 and 1,900 in fiscal year 1993 because as you can see, the officer numbers are going down in excess of 4,500 per year in each of those years.

Senator GLENN. That is the next level, that is the next thing I will get into, the officer programs.

General HICKEY. Yes, sir. Other than the involuntary officer programs, we can make it on line. We are taking those cuts to maintain 4.29 officer to enlisted ratio which is where we currently have found ourselves. The chief, General McPeak, has committed we are not going to get beyond that. And so we are holding to that for these next several years.

Senator GLENN. Before we go on to General Smith, I hope as we pull down, I hope everybody is looking at this officer-enlisted ratio. Some of you have been around here long enough to remember some of the fiasco we got into here about 6 years ago, and that was a jolly good one. I wound up over in the tank with the chiefs one day, solo, defending us, and wound up turning the chiefs around that day, I must admit.

So we scrubbed each one of the services top to bottom on this officer-enlisted ratio; we made lots of improvements in there. And now everybody is pretty happy we did that. I do not want to see us drifting back into some of those old patterns again. And we have got to be watching those things as we pull down our total forces.

General Smith, the proposed active duty end strength for the Marine Corps is 188,000 for 1992, 182,200 for 1993. Can you do that, and do you suggest any change of end strength in 1992 or 1993? And are you still planning for that 177,000 final 1995 level?

General SMITH. Yes, sir, for 1992 and 1993, we can make those end strengths, and we are going to do everything possible to maintain, as I mentioned earlier, our force in readiness and our nonhollow forces.

Senator GLENN. We have had a lot of discussion about what the final level should be on the Corps. You are mandated to have three Marine divisions and three air wings. Can you do that? What is the recommended figure for 1995?

General SMITH. Well, what we are working on right now in 1995 is 170,000.

Senator GLENN. 177,000.

General SMITH. Well, in the defense plan it is 170,600.

Senator GLENN. What do you think it should be?

General SMITH. Well, I frankly think it should be, as the Commandant has mentioned over here several times earlier, 182,200. It is the irreducible minimum for the Marine Corps. If the Corps is to expected to maintain its global presence, its flexibility, its constant motion with the Navy counterparts, we are going to need 182,200.

Senator GLENN. We will look at that when we shuffle our numbers here.

Mr. Jehn, let us go to the Officer Programs.

The 1991 Defense Authorization Act prescribed active duty officer in-strengths for each of the military services: 99,291 for the Army; 69,992 for the Navy; 19,757 for the Marine Corps; 95,027 for the Air Force.

Now it also gave the SecDef authority to waive these ceilings in 1991 to the extent necessary to avoid involuntary separations. A report we recently received from you, which I will pass out at this time, which will be included in the record at this point, indicates that waivers have been granted to the Navy and Air Force to exceed their 1991 officer strength levels by 1,103 for the Navy, and 1,633 for the Air Force.

The Report specifies officer and in-strengths for each service for 1991 through 1995, but indicates—and I quote—"These end-strengths are in concert with the President's 1992-1993 budget but do not reflect the potential need to increase total end-strengths as a result of Operation Desert Storm."

Now, do you expect any changes to the 1991 Officer End-Strengths you specified, and what would be the revised officer end-strengths for each service?

[The information follows:]

Planned active duty officer fiscal year 1991 end strengths by service are shown below:

Army	103,020
Navy	71,255
USMC	19,782
USAF	96,860

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL,
Washington, DC, April 1, 1991.

Hon. Sam Nunn, *Chairman,*
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

The Conference Report (Report 101-123) on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 asked the Department of Defense to provide the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate the officer end strength plans for each of the military Services for fiscal years (FY) 1991-95. Enclosed is that report.

End strengths for FY 1991 for the Navy and the Air Force reflect waivers granted by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to avoid involuntary separations in FY 1991. Those waivers were granted pursuant to Section 401(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-501) and permitted increases in officer end strength of 1,103 Navy officers and 1,633 Air Force officers.

These end strengths are in concert with the President's FY 1992-93 budget, but do not reflect the potential need to increase total end strengths as a result of Operation DESERT STORM. Beginning last August, we implemented Stop Loss authorities allowed by title 10, United States Code, to maximize our readiness in Southwest Asia.

Those actions and postponement of several planned strength reduction measures may necessitate further adjustments from these programmed officer end strengths for FY 1991.

A similar letter is being sent to the Chairman and the Ranking Republican of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee.

Sincerely,

CHRISTOPHER JEHN.

Enclosure: As stated

cc: Hon. JOHN WARNER, *Ranking Republican*

PROJECTED NUMBER OF OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY

Fiscal Year 1991 - 1995

Programmed End Strength

	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993	Fiscal year 1994	Fiscal year 1995
Army	99,291	95,481	89,468	84,530	78,790
Navy	71,095	69,468	67,557	65,782	65,196
Air Force	96,660	92,020	86,594	84,077	82,667
Marine Corps	19,757	19,180	18,591	18,002	17,413

Mr. JEHN. Once again, I will give you basically the same answer I gave you for the overall end-strength numbers. When we submitted this report to you, we still did not have the final authority to modify end-strengths as a result, or in response to, the requirements imposed by meeting the requirements of the Persian Gulf War. We now have them.

As I said last week, the Deputy Secretary issued overall end-strength guidance to the services. I expect this week he will do the same for officer end-strengths. As you have noted, for the Air Force and the Navy, we have already granted them some relief from the 1991 end-strength numbers in order to minimize or lessen the requirement for involuntary separations. All four services will need somewhat more officer end-strength, just as they need overall end-strength somewhat higher, to meet 1991 numbers. But by the end of 1992 we will be back on track for those numbers.

Senator GLENN. Do you have to have an increase in 1992 or what will be the end of 1992?

Mr. JEHN. By the end of 1992 we will be back within the President's numbers.

Senator GLENN. So you will not require changes for 1992-1993?

Mr. JEHN. We do not believe so at this time, no sir.

Senator GLENN. General Reno, Admiral Boorda, General Hickey, General Smith, do you all agree with those figures?

General HICKEY. Yes, sir.

General RENO. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Okay, gentlemen, General and Flag Officer Levels.

Mr. Jehn, the 1991 Defense Authorization Act prescribed limits on fiscal year 1991 General and Flag Officer strengths. It was 386 for the Army, 250 for the Navy, 326 for the Air Force, 68 for the

Marine Corps. Authority to waive these limits was subsequently provided in the Desert Storm Supplemental Authorization Act.

Will this waiver authority be exercised? And if so, what will be the General and Flag Officer strengths for each of the military services in fiscal year 1991?

Mr. JEHN. At this time, I really cannot answer that question. This is something we are looking at right now. First we adjusted overall end-strengths. We expect to get a decision from the Deputy this week on officer end-strengths. The next thing we go to, and are currently staffing and analyzing is a requirement for waiving overall grade limits, including the limits on the General Officers. So we will be processing that in the next couple of weeks.

Senator GLENN. When can we expect to have that, can you give us a date?

Mr. JEHN. Oh, I imagine that will all be completed within the next 2 or 3 weeks. So we will be able to give you numbers when the Secretary and the Deputy make their decisions.

Senator GLENN. By mid-May, we hope?

Mr. JEHN. I think so, that is a reasonable expectation.

Senator GLENN. Not later than that, because we are going to be getting into our mark-up, and we are going to have to have those figures before that if you can give them to us.

Mr. JEHN. I do not think that is an unreasonable request at all.

Senator GLENN. All right, good.

[The information follows:]

Active duty general and flag officer fiscal year 1991 end strengths by service follow:

Army	386
Navy	250
USMC	68
USAF	326

Senator GLENN. Well, I am going to have to read a rather lengthy question here and I think rather than start it right now, when my time is almost up, we will go ahead and—John, go ahead with yours—oh, Ted is here, I am sorry.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jehn, there are two areas that I would like to cover with you this morning. One is on the benefits package that was passed, associated with the Desert Storm.

As I understand, you are in the process of implementing that. Am I correct?

Mr. JEHN. That is correct.

Senator KENNEDY. And if you would be good enough to work with the staff of this committee and others, just so we have some idea of how that is being implemented and the time that is being implemented, we very much appreciate that cooperation.

And I would like to cover one additional area. And that deals with what the different services are doing on the childcare funding. There is a very considerable disparity between the services, as of September 30th, for the execution of the GS positions—these are the permanent personnel that will be working with the childcare.

The Army has authorized 329 positions, they have executed 329; the Air Force, 372, they are at 129, which is 35 percent; Marines

77, they have executed 14, which is 18 percent; and the Navy 222, they have 38, which is 17 percent.

So you have a very wide disparity between the services about who is executing the GS positions—these are the permanent personnel. If you take the difference between 1990 and 1991 with regards to what the different services are doing in terms of childcare funding, the Army has gone from $56.2 million to $91.8, a very considerable increase.

The Air Force has gone from $34.8 to $46.9. Looking through the various statistics, it looks like the Air Force is coming on stream. The Army is clearly the institution that has implemented these programs in the most effective way. The Navy has gone from $22.4 million to $26.4; and the Marines have gone from $6 down to $5.5.

Any one of the services want to make a comment on that? I would be glad to hear that out.

Admiral BOORDA. Sure, I would be glad to do that first, for the Navy.

The reason the civilian numbers look the way they do is that we did not get authority from Congress until very late in the year to shift employees from non-appropriated funds that do not count in your tally, to appropriated funds, GS employees that do count. We do have that authority now. But that was done so late in the year last year that it really did not affect the majority of our people shifting positions.

Senator KENNEDY. Did that apply to the Army as well?

Admiral BOORDA. I really do not know about the Army. I can tell you we had most of our employees were non-appropriated fund employees. So it affected me, particularly.

General HICKEY. I think we had the same problem in the Air Force. We did have traditionally different support streams between the services in our approach. And I know on the part of the Air Force, like the Navy, we had a much bigger transition to make.

Senator KENNEDY. Admiral, will you hit those goals by the end of this year?

Admiral BOORDA. We are going to make our numbers. And we will also make the funding numbers as well. We will meet the requirements of the Act with appropriated funding. In fact, we just had a recent Commanders-in-Chiefs Conference down in Florida, where we all agreed that we would shift money around as necessary to do that.

Senator KENNEDY. General Hickey, is it your intention to hit those?

General HICKEY. Yes, sir. We had a long way to go. We only put $12 million in appropriated funds into our childcare in 1989. And we had a $41 million goal in 1990. And we only hit $34. So we hit about 85 percent of the increase. We have 1,278 new appropriated-fund civilian positions authorized. And that is a significant number. We split them over 2 years—584 in 1991, and the resultant 694 in 1992. And we intend to fill those, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. General Smith, do you want to take whatever accolades for achieving all the goals you have?

General SMITH. Well, I do not have any accolades to receive on that one, sir, because we have not received the money. The Marine Corps looks upon that as a target. We are working toward that.

Considering the competition for resources and the very small TOA that the Marine Corps receives anyway, we are doing the best we can on it. We know we are short on it. We are working on it. I have great people on the staff and out in the field working to do that. But we are short money.

Senator KENNEDY. Well——

General RENO. Senator, if I may make a point?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes.

General RENO. I think General Smith touches a very good issue. The commanders in the field are really hard-pressed for funds and priorities compete. The success of our program, I think, is driven by the fact that there are three principles: number one, command emphasis; number two, we are a people-intensive organization; number three, the law was good and its execution serves the soldier and the families and the youngsters.

But the thing that we did that was, I think, most beneficial, we provided the resources and the guidance from the top, so that they did not have to compete at the lower level as to how they spend it. And that made it launch quickly.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I think you should certainly be commended in implementing it. What we have seen is that the total numbers on the waiting list have increased from slightly over 44,000 to 60,000—which, I think, is a reflection not only on the quality, but on that sliding scale, the availability. And so it would certainly appear, in terms of the numbers, the waiting list, that there is an increasing number in the service who want to utilize that particular benefit.

But I appreciate your response. We will be looking to see how the services are responding to that, and hopefully by the time we get through the end of the year there will be the kind of accommodation to this program which was both intended and which, apparently, the Army is able to achieve.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Reno, although it is not exactly in your area of expertise, we found out that the so-called round-out brigades—and I received this information from talking with people throughout the Army—that the round-out brigades will need more additional training before deploying than we had originally anticipated. Is that an accurate statement in your view?

General RENO. Senator, that is an accurate statement.

In all of the planning that we did prior to actual execution of Desert Storm, we assumed 30 days. What we learned with the three brigades that were called up, and trained at Fort Hood and The National Training Center, in California, is that 60 days is a more realistic number. A brigade is a complex organization that requires synchronization of combat capability. And the evidence suggests very strongly that that should be the new target date.

Senator MCCAIN. And did we not have a larger number than anticipated of people who, for medical or other reasons, were not available to serve?

General RENO. Sir, we did. It was more than we expected. And after being called to active duty, there were continued trickling of

soldiers that became medically disqualified for deployment, because of injuries in the rigor of the training that we put them through.

Senator McCain. And some of it was partially due to the age of some of our non-commissioned officers?

General Reno. Sir, age was a factor, absolutely.

I do not believe it was the dominant factor. The dominant factor would be the state of physical conditioning as they went into that training.

Senator McCain. Overall, is not one of the lessons, as far as Guard and Reserve are concerned, that when they have transferable skills, in other words doing basically the same kind of work or profession in civilian life, that not only was adequate, but in some ways invaluable for those Guard and Reserve units?

In the case of combat units, such as tanks, for example, where—because of physical reasons they are unable to engage in the kind of training on an intensive basis, necessary to maintain that level of efficiency, that is where we found the shortfalls. Is that also, in your view, accurate?

General Reno. Senator, that is an accurate statement. And I would add one additional point.

The units that have a single mission, like transportation, like maintenance, also—as a unit—train very effectively and were prepared for deployment much faster than other units that had multiple skill requirements such as an armored or infantry organization.

Senator McCain. I think it would be important that when we adopt our future plans and policies for contingencies that we take into consideration these lessons learned, recognizing that Guard and Reserve units provided invaluable assistance in many areas, a critical part of our effort in the operation.

But there were also areas where they were not as ready to carry out their missions and roles as we had anticipated. That is not in any criticism of those units themselves. But it is more in the nature of the training that they were able to obtain while they are in the Guard and Reserve status.

Would you agree with that?

General Reno. Sir, I think you have made a very good point. And I would agree with that. The units that we deployed to Saudi Arabia were principally single-mission units. And they did just superbly.

As I suggested those that are more complex require more training time.

Senator McCain. Would any of the other witnesses like to comment on that? Is there anything additional on that issue?

[No response.]

If not, I would like to turn to the issue of pilot retention.

It is my understanding, General Smith, that the Marine Corps continues to maintain high levels of retention of pilots. Is that true?

General Smith. Yes, sir. Over the past several years we have crawled up in that very vital pilot age group, captains and majors. We have gone from several years ago about 37 percent, up to 43. For our continued stabilization percentages, we need 42. So I am delighted to say that we have made some progress in that direction.

Senator McCAIN. Unfortunately, that is not the case—in my understanding—with the Navy and the Air Force. And I also understand that our aviation continuation pay needs to be reauthorized. And Admiral Boorda, I would like to have your and General Hickey's assessment on the pilot retention situation.

Admiral BOORDA. Actually, our pilot retention this year is going to be 41 percent. And 41 percent is what I need to sustain the force.

Just with ACP this year we made a dent in our mid-grade shortage of about 120. We made another dent in that by having lesser requirements. Because we are coming down in size. So the bonus is doing what we intended it to do. Retention is up. I am still worried about jet retention. And I think we need to continue doing what we are doing.

Senator McCAIN. Jet retention is carrier pilots?

Admiral BOORDA. We are at about 34 percent, and we need to be at about 38 to 41 percent.

We are doing better, and the bonus is working.

Senator McCAIN. And you view the reason for it as the bonus, or one of the primary reasons?

Admiral BOORDA. I think that is one of the reasons. I think you and Senator Glenn are equally well or better-qualified than I to think about now how people view what they just did and the excitement of doing that. We had a lot of deployments. We are going to have some quicker turn-arounds, although we are trying not to do that.

I think we are going to wait and see. I think this is the wrong time to be changing the parameters of the equation. I think we are making progress. You know we made a lot of progress last year in carrier pilots. And this is not the time to do an experiment with those guys.

But I do not know what numbers you are looking at. Because our numbers really are better this year. And our mid- grade shortage is coming down. As I described a little earlier, my real problem right now is trying to balance the junior force and the mid-grade force so that it all—the year-groups come out all right. And I am using every tool I have to do that without hurting people.

Senator McCAIN. General Hickey.

General HICKEY. I am not as optimistic as Admiral Boorda is in terms of Air Force statistics.

Our retention rate for fiscal year 1990 was 34 percent. And through the first quarter of 1991 it is still at 34 percent. It was 36 percent in 1989. It has stayed at 34 percent, even though last year, as we started fiscal year 1991, we upped the bonus to the 50 percent up-front. It was the last piece of flexibility that we had to offer. And we offered that.

Right at the present time I am getting about a 31-percent take-rate for the bonus, for those people in the 7th and 8th years of service. Starting in fiscal year 1994 the end of the initial obligation will shift to the 8th and 9th years of service because of longer active duty service commitments. And we had a 39-percent take-rate in 1989, and a 33-percent take-rate in 1990. And it is hovering at the same level right now.

Again, as I mentioned in my opening words, we have an anomaly in that we are taking down about 10 active force wings. And within that, there are a whole bunch of pilots that have 2 through 6 years of service that we now have to find another cockpit to put in. They need to continue flying for their gates and for their own experience as a new UPT graduate. And yet—I have a surplus of those. But when I go down into the 7, 8 through 14 years, where we are targeting, then everyone of those year-groups is short, and the retention rate is very low.

So I think it is much too premature to drop the bonus program.

Senator McCain. General, do you feel that the reduction in hiring by the airlines, which is obviously a result of the slow-down in the airline industry, has had an impact on retention—which, by the way, we all know is temporary? And what are your recommendations to the committee as to what other steps you think would be appropriate to try and address the problem?

General Hickey. I have been watching very closely, the data, by month, with the hope that maybe the reduction in hires on the civilian side of the house would have some positive influence. It has not yet. Now it may be too early. I do not know.

The high-year of hires was over 9,000 on civilian hiring, airline hiring. And it is down in the 4,000–5,000 level right now. So that is significant.

Once again, unfortunately, if you look at what all of us are training, in terms of DOD's total fixed-wing pilot production, it is something less than 2,500 right now. So if they got all of our pilots, each and every year, we could not meet their demand. And so I think the demand is still high enough so that it may be a little bit more soft, in terms of the market. But a young pilot who wants to leave the military and go work will probably find plenty of options.

Senator McCain. Okay, the second part of my question was what are your recommendations—or do you have any—as to how we can further address the issue?

General Hickey. Well, I have been an advocate for a year or so of this committee's recommendation to have a commission, which looked at pilots as a national resource. And I am disappointed that that has not been reported back to you. Because I think that there are still—and will be continuing—requirements to do that. And it is moving along, but not as consistently or as speedily as I had hoped that it would.

Senator McCain. Secretary Jehn, do you have any comment on this commission?

Mr. Jehn. The commission, as you know, was suggested by this committee. And as we have looked at it, we have urged the Department of Transportation to assume leading responsibility for it. Because I think most of the issues that the commission ought to address are those that the Department of Transportation is more cognizant of and more responsible for.

Senator Glenn. May I interrupt you just one second here, John? I will tell you, I have talked to the Department of Transportation. I will not put names to it.

Senator McCain. I can only laugh.

Senator Glenn. Yes, because they say that the Department of Defense is not being cooperative in this effort. And some of the

money that was supposed to be put in to fund this has not been forthcoming. And so the whole thing appears to be bogged down right now. Now is that correct or not?

Mr. JEHN. It is correct that we are not going to provide any funds. We have been as cooperative as we can be, short of supplying funds to get the commission going.

Senator GLENN. Was this not supposed to be a cooperative effort? Each department was going to share a portion of the expense?

Mr. JEHN. The discussion has been around whether that, in fact, ought to be. And as I say, the decision in the Department has been that the bulk of the issues that would be addressed are those that are most appropriately addressed within the Department of Transportation.

Senator GLENN. I disagree with you there, and for this reason.

About 2/3 of the pilots that go to work for the airlines, historically have come out of a military background. And whether they are hired out of the military or not, at this rate of 7,000 per year that was predicted for a 10-year period, that is the reason we asked for that commission. So it is a matter of how fast you are losing pilots and how attractive the airlines make it to suck pilots out of the military. So it is your problem too.

How much are we talking about on this? We thought this was such a minuscule amount to put together a study group, we did not even think about providing any money for it. That can come out of petty, petty, petty cash, I would think, getting people together to try and put together a little report to us on how we are going to cope with this, and to study the problem.

Obviously we have gone up and down because of Desert Storm. We need a better estimate of what the airlines are going to need for the future. Airline hiring is down for the moment, as was indicated, and undoubtedly will be back up again. As is commercial hiring. But it appears that DOD is the stumbling block, then, in getting this study for us that we thought was very important. Is that correct?

Mr. JEHN. Well, you may have different views of exactly what the commission ought to do. And I suggest we ought to talk further about the details of it.

The staff at the Department of Transportation and the staff within the Department of Defense have estimated the total cost of such a commission at something on the order of $500,000 or $600,000. So it is not what we consider petty cash.

Senator GLENN. Your portion of it would be a small portion of that.

Mr. JEHN. The discussion had been that we would absorb half of that. That is right, sir.

Senator GLENN. For a report that lets us know how to deal with pilots in the future, I think $250,000 from the Department of Defense is not all that excessive.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, could I just comment?

I thank you for allowing me to, again, exceed my time. I am in the unique position, Secretary Jehn, of being the ranking republican on the Aviation Subcommittee, of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee. And believe me, those people at the De-

partment of Transportation do not have any idea about how to address the core of this problem that Senator Glenn just described.

And that is military pilots that are leaving the military in order to become airline pilots. I am not opposed to a joint commission. But clearly the expertise lies in the men and women who are in leadership in the military, who understand what motivates a pilot to leave or to remain in the military.

I cannot expect someone over at the Department of Transportation to understand this, because we are talking about what motivates men and women to take certain actions as to what they want to do with their lives.

I guess, Mr. Chairman, it is up to us to shape legislation that does not recommend it, but requires it. And, in concert with—or with the assistance of the Department of Transportation, I know of no other way.

Mr. Chairman, you and I, and this committee, and these personnel chiefs have spent thousands of hours on this issue of how we can retain these incredibly important and valuable men and women. And Secretary Jehn, I am very disappointed.

So I guess, if the Chairman agrees, and I can get 51 votes, we will mandate it—which I did not want to do. And if requires $250,000, I know that out of the $294 billion budget, that's probably critical. But we will see if we cannot just mandate it—which is something that neither the Chairman nor I like to do.

Senator GLENN. If you would yield, John, I would suggest that they go back and talk this over, over there, if you will.

Mr. JEHN. I will do so.

Senator GLENN. I am not trying to bend your arm, just a little bit. But obviously this is a military problem and a civilian problem. We addressed it last year. It is part military, part civilian, since the military supplies most of the pilots and we are talking about 7,000 a year for the next 10 years. That is 70,000. What is two-thirds of that? That is an awful lot of pilots coming out of the military. If we keep these same ratios and we have to retrain everyone of those guys on just UPT it is $1 million. You get into the RAG training and things like that. Before the pilots are sent out, they have another couple of million, depending on which kind of airplane they are flying. And then by the time you get a person through their first real squadron assignment, and then you have a combat pilot that you really can say go up and do the job. And that is what they did over there in Iraq.

That is where you have an honest-to-goodness combat pilot. But by that time, you have $4 to $6 or $7 million invested in that person. And then the airlines make him a good offer and away you go. We have stanched a little bit of that with some of this incentive business, and we tried to address it. But it was with that background that it was definitely a military and a civilian problem, that we asked of this commission—we did not have the people, the resources, or anything here. You are the ones that are affected. We asked that the commission be put together. And apparently it was given very short-shrift. That is the background of it. If you can go back and relate that to some of the people over there, and say we still would like to see that commission, and if you could let us know within a week, or 10 days, of what the decision is over there.

If not then I will be happy to join my colleague here, and we will put it in law, and you will have to do it.

Mr. JEHN. Well, we will go back and look at it. And I think we need to talk further to——

Senator GLENN. I would rather do it on a voluntary basis. If after you have talked to them they have some questions about it, I would be glad to talk to whoever you want me to talk to.

Mr. JEHN. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Let me get back, not to that, but the pilot requirements, since we are on that subject here, for a moment.

The reductions in aviation force structure over the next 5 years, pilot requirements in the Air Force and Navy will be coming down substantially. Air Force and Navy have cut back a number of new pilots entering the inventory, as has already been mentioned.

General Hickey, in order to accommodate some of the pilot candidates who are coming out of ROTC, and who now face the prospect of either giving up on going to pilot training, or taking a rather long delay in entering such training, I suggested one day to General McPeak that he should consider giving priority to these pilot candidates for undergraduate pilot or navigator training slots identified for the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.

It seems to me that the Air Force should do this before taking people in to whom no previous commitment was made. What do you think of that?

General HICKEY. I will be very truthful, sir. I had not had that issue presented to me in such a skillful way as you just did.

The numbers that we do have for the Guard and the Reserves are relatively small. But they are helpful. I would also tell you that in dealing with our problem, we are filling a significant number of Guard and Reserve-unit cockpits. We are putting active-duty people in those for the next 2 to 3 years at the rate of at least two per squadron, plus an advisor per squadron, to use the flying time and the cockpit seats that are available there.

I have trouble with cutting the Guard and Reserves off totally for the pure reason that they also need a mix. If they rely only on the active duty force for their inputs, then all the pilots they get are essentially senior captains and field graders. And it makes it easy for them to, from an operational place, to deal with them. But it also gives them some rank imbalances and some age imbalances.

So they need a continuing minimum flow of new people in there. And they may be—as a matter of fact, we have tried, under another program to put undergraduate pilots directly in the Guard and Reserve units. And when we did that some years back, it was not a very successful program. Neither side was very happy with those.

There may be another way to do that and make it more successful.

Senator GLENN. Could you look at this and get back to us and talk about it? Our staff will be glad to work with your staff on this, and then give us a letter back on that as to whether you think that is doable or not, if you would.

General HICKEY. Yes; sir.

[The information follows:]

A copy of the reply from the Air Force is enclosed. These candidates now have the opportunity to continue to pursue flying opportunities, with the expectation that these opportunities will increase in the future.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,
Washington, DC, April 26, 1991.

Hon. JOHN GLENN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel,
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN GLENN:

During the 17 April 1991 Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel hearing, you asked if the Air force had considered using ROTC pilot candidates in Guard and Reserve UPT slots. During earlier discussions with General McPeak you had posed that same question. General McPeak's response (Atch 1) is still the Air Force's considered position on this issue.

This proposal was one of the many options we considered before the utilization decision was made concerning ROTC candidates. As explained in the attached response, certain difficulties were realized during our evaluation of this proposal. However, we are providing information about Guard and Reserve flying opportunities when ROTC candidates express an interest. At the present time, three individuals have taken advantage of this opportunity.

I appreciate your continued interest in this area and look forward to working with you as we seek to meet the future challenges of rated management.

Sincerely,

THOMAS J. HICKEY,
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USAF,
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel.

1 Atch: Gen. McPeak's Response

CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,
Washington, DC, April 16, 1991.

Hon. John Glenn,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and personnel,
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I appreciate your interest and concern for the Air Force's pilot dilemma. The attachment provides our perspective on the issues you raised.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss them in more depth, especially changes to the Aviation Career Incentive Act gate system, or to answer any other questions you might have on pilot management.

Warm regards.

MERRILL A. MCPEAK, GENERAL, USAF

Attachment:

Question 1. Have you done any studies to assess whether or not AFRES pilots returning from the Persian Gulf still want to continue as reservists? (If substantial numbers do not, there may be room for the excess UPT graduates.)

Answer. There have been no formal studies to assess the potential problem of reservists exiting the AFRES after stop-loss is lifted or after units are demobilized. We have had numerous discussions with both ANG and AFRES commanders in the field. While there is uncertainty about what will happen, they do expect losses to be somewhat higher than normal. The biggest area of concern is within the airlift squadrons. It is difficult to predict loss rates, because an individual's desire may change once he or she returns to more normal operations.

The units are aware of normal losses (e.g., retirement) and in most cases have a replacement pool waiting. Generally these replacements will require very little training. We are working with the ANG and AFRES on an initiative to assign experienced pilots from the active force to reserve component squadrons. This will make room available in active units for more UPT graduates and other pilots who need to fly. We intend to season our new pilots in the active force to help ensure a standardized level of training and mission capability.

Question 2. Have you inquired as to the Army's ability to absorb excess UPT graduates? How about the Navy?

Answer. We have discussed this issue at length with both the Army and Navy. Quite frankly, budget cuts forced them to take similar actions, especially the Navy. Last fall the Navy cut UPT students in training, cut their accession pipeline, and we understand they will also "bank" 40 strike pilots in fiscal years 1991 and 1992. These actions were necessary to match their pilot production and accession pipeline with projected aircraft availability. As a matter of fact, the Navy called us to see if we could help them by taking some of their UPT graduates.

Question 3. Regarding UPT graduates who won't fly for 24-36 months, would it be prohibitively expensive to fly them in a "propeller aircraft—an Aero Club type"? How about extensive simulator training to keep their pilot skills sharpened?

While it would not be prohibitively expensive, we feel it would be inadvisable for several reasons. First, we see little or no payoff in terms of an ability to shorten the requalification training program needed to return these pilots to active flying. Second, many of our bases do not have propeller aircraft which could be expensive to buy/lease, or would limit assignment opportunities to a few bases. Third, the major weapon system simulators that might be available to some of these pilots are fully utilized. Fourth, mandatory extracurricular flying activities for these officers detracts from time when they can be fully utilized in their primary job. We are confident some of these officers will join Aero Clubs and fly as their schedules permit; however, we don't think it should be mandatory, because of its minimal value in retaining pilot skills.

Question 4. Will the USAF need legislative help with relief to the requirements of our gate system?

Answer. The Air Force supported the recent gate management legislation and will meet its standards. However, as we have reviewed the dynamics of managing the pilot force, and in particular the "banking" of pilots for 24-36 months, the 9 of the first 12 years gate does not give us, or the individual, any margin of error. Therefore, we suggest a legislative change to the first gate, changing it to 8 of the first 12 years of aviation service. This would give us the flexibility needed to manage "banked" pilots who otherwise might not meet their first gate, because of training availability, temporary medical grounding or assignment limitations. This change would still keep the original intent to devote a majority of a pilot's company grade years to the cockpit. Additionally, this change combined with the transition authority will provide some flexibility as the AF manages year groups that were accessed prior to force structure cuts.

Question 5. Should affected ROTC pilot candidates be used as the first source for Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard UPT and UNT?

Answer. Your suggestion to allow ROTC pilot candidates to use Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard UPT and UNT training quotas was one of the many options considered before we made our decision. While this appears to be the fair thing to do, there are complexities involved that are not immediately apparent.

As you know, Reserve and Guard UPT and UNT entries have traditionally been recruited from the local community. Unit members living in the local area are more readily available to the unit, are employed within the community, have their roots there, and tend to provide long-term stability to the unit.

It is unlikely that the majority of reclassified ROTC pilot candidates will fit the profile of a typical Reserve or Guard UPT/UNT entry. For those that would be willing to relocate, the biggest concern is their ability to find employment in the local job market.

It is also important to note that reclassified ROTC pilot candidates are offered several alternatives. Besides release from active duty, reclassified candidates may also go on active duty in a variety of non-flying assignments. Those that choose active duty service may then apply for UPT/UNT. Beginning in fiscal year 1994, allocations for active duty personnel to enter UPT will increase by over 100 slots to approximately 120 quotas per year.

We are already providing information about Guard and Reserve flying opportunities when a candidate expresses interest and are putting them in touch with Reserve and Guard flying units. We will continue our efforts in this area to ensure every reclassified candidate is made aware of the opportunity and put in contact with appropriate units. At present, three have already been hired, two in the AFRES and one in the ANG.

Senator GLENN. Admiral Boorda of the Navy had a similar problem, although smaller in magnitude than the Air Force. They took action to cut back on new entrants into pilot training.

Has the situation in the Navy stabilized or are there ROTC pilot candidates that you are either assigning to other duties or delaying entry on?

Admiral BOORDA. I think we have about 1 year's jump on this problem, to be quite honest with you. And so the first thing we did was we looked inside the training command and said, who is not doing well? We found about 133 youngsters who were going to be real risks when they got to the RAG, or what we call the FRS now and let them go. We found some pilots that we could transition over to the Coast Guard. And Norm Smith is looking at taking a few for us.

That will get us down in the training command where we can get rid of some pools. And I do not think I need to describe that to you. You probably remember it from your days.

We have cut back on the number that we are putting in. But we have not had to say no to anyone we had already said yes to. And I think our numbers are now reasonable.

What that does for us, Senator, is it stretches-out undergraduate pilot training longer than we would like while we are in a transition period. But by this summer, we will have our pools down, by this fall, by next summer we will begin to start shrinking the amount of time it takes a youngster to go through. And we will be back on track.

So I think we got on it early. Some of the things we did, I wish we had not had to. I would have liked to continue all 133 of those to the end and see how it worked. But we could not do that. And it is a little longer now to get through than I would like it. But we see the light at the end of the tunnel. I think we are on track. We have not broken a promise to anybody.

Senator GLENN. Right.

Mr. Jehn, the "Military Manpower Training Report for 1992" which you submitted earlier this month contains a chapter on flight training. But there is no mention in that chapter about the Air Force and Navy problems. With regard to flight-training trends, the report states, and I quote, "The service trends for flight training in fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993 call for maintaining the rates of training initiated in fiscal year 1979. The rates reflect an on-going effort to return pilot and navigator inventories to long-term, sustainable levels which, in the late 1970's, were adversely affected by several years of unexpectedly high attrition rates for flying personnel."

Now, I am not sure whether you still stick with that statement or not, or whether that statement squares with reality here. Because there are problems driving the cutbacks of new pilot entrants into the Air Force and the Navy. And why were they not addressed in this report?

Mr. JEHN. Well, the only thing I can speculate, sir, is that that report was built-up from service inputs. And over the last few months, the services—particularly the Air Force—have changed their plans markedly, as they have come to fully understand and recognize the extent of their problem. So I would argue, as we put a report like that together, we were faced with an important challenge. And that was to make it consistent with, and to make it reflect the 1992 budget proposal. And we are continuing to readjust

and modify the plans for not only the production of pilots, but also the production of other skilled personnel.

Senator GLENN. We just got that report earlier this month. That is a very recent report. Is it that far out of date? We just got it.

Mr. JEHN. Frankly, it sounds like in this particular area it may be out of date.

Senator GLENN. Could you go through that report again?

Mr. JEHN. We will go through it and provide you with a corrected run-down, if that is appropriate.

Senator GLENN. Give us a correction and a letter for the report, or whatever you want to do. But bring it up to date. Because we are supposed to have that available to use during our mark-up.

Mr. JEHN. Okay.

[The information follows:]

Air Force and Navy flight training loads requested in January 1991 were accurate and consistent with the President's fiscal year 1992 budget. The data and tables in Chapter VI of the fiscal year 1992 MMTR reflect declines in total flight training from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1992 of 22.3 percent for the Air Force and 36 percent for the Navy (during the same period DOD total flight training declined 23 percent). Subsequent to calculating and compiling Flight Training requirements for the President's budget, requirements for UPT graduates were further reduced, primarily as a result of overall force reductions and adjustments to follow-on pilot assignments. Because pilot requirements are still being adjusted as a part of on-going internal PPBS actions, UPT and other Flight Training loads will continue to be adjusted, not to exceed congressionally authorized ceilings. As specified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, "The average military student loads authorized in subsection (a) shall be adjusted consistent with the end strengths authorized in parts A and B. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the manner in which such adjustments shall be apportioned."

Senator GLENN. The subcommittee held an oversight hearing last year on the whole officer procurement program, not just pilots, the whole officer procurement program in the military service. And we reviewed, in considerable detail, the relative costs of the various sources of officer procurement, and the officer procurement practices of each services.

As a result of this hearing, the committee's report language in the 1991 Defense Authorization Act directed the Department of Defense to evaluate and report on the findings of the CBO, GAO, and its own findings in this area.

Now, I am pleased to note that the DOD report has been submitted in response to this requirement, and I will ask that it be included in the record at this point, which indicates that DOD has taken certain actions that will result in officer procurement efficiencies, saving about $222 million over the next 5 years as I understand it.

[The information follows:]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL,
Washington, DC, March —, 1991.

Hon. SAM NUNN,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

Enclosed is the report on the evaluation of the June 1990 Congressional Budget Office paper concerning officer commissioning programs, as requested by the committee in language accompanying S. 2884, Fiscal Year 1991 DOD Authorization Bill. Our review of this important area has resulted in several actions that will save approximately $222 million over the next 5 years and help streamline and improve cost effectiveness in officer commissioning programs overall.

I hope the report will prove useful in your committee's consideration of Defense manpower programs, particularly as they apply to officers. A copy of the report is also being sent to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, and to the Ranking Republicans.

Sincerely,

CHRISTOPHER JEHN.

Enclosure: As stated

cc: Hon. JOHN WARNER, Ranking Republican

OFFICER PRODUCING PROGRAMS

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE REPORT ON OFFICER SOURCES, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTERNAL REVIEW

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Force Management and Personnel)

February 1991

INTRODUCTION

This report responds to a request by the Senate Committee on Armed Services in its report to accompany S. 2884, the Fiscal Year 1991 Department of Defense Authorization Act. The committee requested the Department's evaluation of reviews by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and General Accounting Office (GAO) of military officer commissioning programs, as well as results of the Department's own review conducted in the summer of 1990. Since the GAO report had not been issued as of the original deadline for the Department's submission, by agreement with the chairman of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, this report will address only the CBO's and the Department's reviews.

The CBO paper entitled, "Officer Commissioning programs: Costs and Officer performance," dated June 1990, reviewed the three principal sources of active duty officers for the Armed Forces. These sources (Service academies, Reserve Officers Training Corps [ROTC], and Officer Candidate School [OCS]) were examined in terms of costs compared to the performance of graduates. The specific performance measures for graduates were: average length of active commissioned service, comparative promotion experience, and rate of involuntary separation from active duty by reason of misconduct or poor promotion performance.

The CBO paper concluded that academies were the most expensive source, followed by ROTC and 0CS. CBO acknowledged that DOD budget costs were all that were considered for the paper, and that significant other public sector costs exist in college programs that produce officer-qualified graduates. For example, Federal grants, State and Federal minority assistance programs, and other Government-funded assistance programs provide a significant amount of support for undergraduate programs nationally. The Department concurs with the presentation of cost data.

The CBO further concluded that performance of graduates, in terms of average length of active-duty service and promotion experience, slightly favored academy graduates; however, when certain characteristics such as race, marital status, and military occupational specialty were adjusted to isolate source of commission, the average lengths of service were not significantly different. The Department agrees with these findings. However, we believe there may be other measures of retention and performance that may prove more illuminating as quality indicators related to commissioning source. These are described in greater detail below.

Finally, the paper concludes that separations of officers for misconduct were minimal in all cases, but that ROTC graduates suffered the lowest percentage of such separations. The CBO did not extract Marine Corps data for this study for the valid reasons that Navy ROTC and academy programs support the Marine Corps officer accessions to a small degree, and that the remainder and majority of Marine officers are commissioned through Marine Corps Platoon Leaders' Course and OCS programs.

The paper stated that the Congress may wish to evaluate different commissioning sources to -determine if any should be protected against reductions and whether all sources were necessary. In fact, the Department and the Services have already initi-

ated substantial reductions in all officer commissioning programs as a result of congressionally mandated officer end-strength reductions over the fiscal year 1991-96 timeframe. We believe, however, that retention of all our officer commissioning programs is necessary in view of the contribution of each to the Total Force.

DOD OFFICER PRODUCING PROGRAM STRATEGY

Before discussing the CBO paper in detail, it is useful to list several factors in the area of officer procurement related to the CBO's areas of interest. As a result of projected force reductions under consideration for fiscal years 1991-96, the Department undertook a review of officer producing programs in June 1990. This review was to provide the proper mix of officers from the different sources while reducing the numbers of graduates in a manner consistent with maintenance of a high quality officer corps. As a result of the Department's review, the Deputy Secretary issued a decision memorandum on October 31, (Appendix), which effected reductions in certain commissioning programs and initiated additional analyses of other programs. These actions and related considerations are presented below.

Concurrent with publication of the CBO paper and the DOD review of officer producing programs, the GAO was reviewing officer procurement as well. These combined reviews pointed to a need for DOD to articulate strategic objectives in terms of officer procurement, with principal focus on stable production requirements of each program and standardized cost oversight and reporting. Attainment of these objectives will require a dedicated effort by the Department to develop specific criteria, which include, but are not limited to:

- Standardized cost elements in each commissioning program that will align with the annual president's budget submission appropriations categories and program element codes to ensure accurate cost reporting.
- Measures of effectiveness of officer performance, other than available promotion and retention data, to analyze mission attainment of commissioning programs.
- Standardized ROTC unit viability criteria to ensure genuine cost effectiveness in this program.
- Appropriate mix of commissioning sources in a peacetime, steady-State environment.
- Additional oversight of Service academies at the DOD level, to include general and specific review of curricula, student body, facilities, and faculty issues, as appropriate.

It is clear from this list that these objectives will take time and careful coordination between the services and DOD. The basic objective of the Department in officer procurement is maintenance of a high quality officer-corps with effective leadership skills, produced through a variety of sources at reasonable and identifiable costs.

CBO PAPER: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND DOD RESPONSE

The Department generally agrees with the findings of the CBO study, with minor exceptions. Cost data were obtained from DOD, and retention, promotion, and separation data used by CBO were supplied by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC and by the services. During the course of CBO's effort, however, DOD and service officials responsible for officer procurement were not involved in any activity other than data submission. Had there been greater interaction, we believe more appropriate questions could have been asked, and a more comprehensive presentation of officer performance indices might have been possible. For example, analyses that isolated specific year groups of officers for comparisons based on commissioning sources, instead of an aggregate population of officers over a 10-year period would have been informative.

In terms of the performance of graduates, the paper determined that academy graduates served slightly longer on active duty than did graduates from the other commissioning sources, that academy graduates attained the grade of O-4 (major or lieutenant commander) at slightly higher rates than ROTC and OCS graduates, and that ROTC graduates experienced fewer involuntary separations for misconduct or poor promotion performance than graduates of the academies and OCS. In each of the measures, CBO noted that external factors influenced performance outcomes, and that the statistical significance of performance measures was reduced by these factors.

DOD COMMENTS

In the case of retention, CBO aggregated all active duty officers commissioned during the period 1979-89 and determined the average length of active service

within the population. This group included a majority copulation of officers under obligated-service conditions, which tends to obscure that portion of the population eligible to make a voluntary retention decision. It further includes officers commissioned in later years (1986–89) whose service is well below the average length of service for the population.

CBO also used regression analysis on the aggregate population to isolate the effects of source of commission to show that officers with similar characteristics, including marital status, military specialty, race, and sex, remained in service for comparable terms regardless of source of commission. The Department believes that a more useful comparison can be made by comparing the percentage of officers in active service after 10 years to the percentage represented by a particular source at time of commissioning. This would exclude the effects of service obligation and occupational training (i.e., flight or nuclear power training) from different commissioning sources. For example, if academies constituted 15 percent of a particular year group in the commissioning year, what percentage do they represent in the current year?

Moreover, the Department also believes that performance trends by year, after completion of active service obligation, are more useful than average performance of a multi-year population. We are requesting DMDC to analyze information which will break out individual officer year groups used in the CBO paper, particularly those year groups beyond initial service obligation and beyond 10 years, to show the percentage of total officers commissioned and the percentage of officers remaining on active duty. We expect to have results of this analysis by spring, 1991.

In an earlier analysis of officer retention provided by the services, data indicated that the percentage of officers, by source, remaining after initial obligation was significantly greater for the fully-funded commissioning programs (academies and ROTC scholarship) than for other commissioning sources. It should be noted, however, that officer candidate schools provide a significant number of new officers who satisfy short-term occupational specialty requirements. Officer candidate schools also allow the services to rapidly increase the supply of new officers, should the need arise.

In comparative promotion experience, CBO analyzed mean time to promotion to grades 0–3 and 0–4, by source, for promotion eligible officers in the population. Academy graduates generally experienced more rapid promotion progression. The Department concurs with the CBO findings concerning promotions. There are several factors, however, that influence "promotion," particularly in the junior officer grades of 0–3 and 0–4. One is the fact that officers commissioned by the academies are initially designated at the top of the officer lineal (precedence) list with the first date of rank of the commissioning year group. This translates into an earlier opportunity for selected officers to attain the promotion grade for pay purposes, the actual date of promotion, as officers with higher lineal numbers are promoted first.

Another factor influencing promotion performance is that selection for promotion by a statutory board bans that those officers chosen are considered to be best qualified for promotion. Therefore, we believe that time to promotion, in particular for relatively junior grades (0–3 and 0–4), is not a clear indicator of quality, as current policy is that all fully qualified officers in grade 0–2 will be selected for 0–3, and a large majority of qualified officers (averaging more that 80 percent) will be selected to 0–4.

There are additional career achievements which may be more indicative of performance, such as attainment of command billets (battalion, ship, squadron, or equivalent), and selection for advanced degree or professional military education. Since these attainments are also based upon selection board action in many cases, they will contain the same inconsistencies as a review of evaluation data; however, these professional attainments are much more restrictive than is promotion (a much smaller percentage of 0–5 officers are selected for command than are selected for promotion to 0–5). We will analyze these statistics through DMDC to determine the significance of commissioning source.

Historically, the measures of officer quality other than the personnel evaluation systems of the services have been inadequate. Officer evaluations and fitness reports themselves are based upon commanders' perceptions of leadership ability, forcefulness, judgment, and professional abilities, among other criteria, for officers assigned to their commands or organizations. If it were possible to extract and utilize weighted values out of these reports, which are submitted annually for officers, it might be possible to present certain trends in officer performance indicative of quality that may, in turn, be linked to commissioning source.

Officer evaluations suffer from several invalidating factors. In the first place, they are highly subjective. They are based upon individual commanders' perceptions, and

inconsistencies from one commander to another skews results for otherwise similar performers. Second, evaluation data on officers are not centrally recorded as a database. The information is entered into individual officer service records for the purpose of evaluation by promotion and other selection boards.

As a result, we are initiating an effort to investigate additional measures of quality linked to commissioning source. We have requested DMDC to develop a survey instrument intended to measure effectiveness of officers. This approach was suggested by the CAO in another report on officer commissioning programs entitled, "DOD Service Academies: Improved Cost and performance Monitoring Needed" (Draft dated January 10, 1991). If a promising instrument can be developed, DMDC will survey superiors, peers, and subordinates of officers from each of the sources to assess effectiveness in the field based upon those factors most closely associated with commissioning programs, such as leadership, integrity, and professional knowledge. We anticipate this survey will take approximately 1 year to develop, administer, and analyze. The results, coupled with professional attainment data and year-group retention analysis, should help clarify the relative strength of commissioning programs.

DOD REVIEW OF OFFICER COMMISSIONING PROGRAMS

In initiating the review conducted during the summer of 1990, the Deputy Secretary of Defense specified three considerations in officer producing programs: (1) reducing costs, (2) ensuring a proper mix of backgrounds, skills and experience, and (3) maintaining a sound structure, with no hollowing of the force. This resulted in an analysis of governing considerations in design of the officer corps, (factors such as professional ethics, leadership skills, academic background, and others), trends in officer accessions (commissioning mix and cost), measures of performance, and possible alternatives for the pending reduction in commissioning requirements. We projected a 19-percent reduction in total officers over the course of fiscal years 1992-96, and a concomitant reduction of new officer commissioning requirements totaling 2,277 below those included in the then-existing Program Objective Memorandum (POM) projections.

Among the additional considerations in forecasting reduced commissioning requirements were lead times for each source (5-year mission planning for ROTC and academies, 1-year or shorter for OCS), and the flexibility of each source to respond to potential short-term growth requirements. Finally, the requirement for Reserve component commissions was considered as well, since sustaining the Reserves is an important concern for initial officer basic training and for mobilization.

The Deputy Secretary's decision memorandum of October 31 resulted in actions by the services that are expected to realize a savings of $222 million in officer procurement costs over the next 5 years. These include savings in reduced academy and ROTC enrollments and academy-instructors and lower student loads at academy preparatory schools.

ACTIONS COMPLETED, IN PROGRESS, AND INITIATED

As a result of the several activities outlined above, the Department has taken actions to centralize certain aspects of officer commissioning programs, to expand oversight of others, and to articulate the strategic goals in officer production and quality through the drawdown and beyond. Execution of the decision memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense resulted in immediate action to:

- Reduce ROTC programs by at least 19 percent over 1992-96.
- Reduce end strength of the academies from 4,500 to 4,000.
- Reduce academy and preparatory school costs due to smaller enrollments.

The above actions will accomplish several goals. First, they will retain a balanced mix of new officers. Each commissioning source will continue to supply the approximate percentage of new commissions it has through the buildup of the 1980s. Second, they will save approximately $222 million over the same timeframe. When additional actions are completed, they will also improve the level of DOD oversight of officer procurement. The Department has drafted revised directive guidance on ROTC program management which specifies criteria for ROTC unit viability and identifies standardized cost reporting and cost-per-graduate computations for ROTC programs. Additionally, we have enlisted the assistance of the DOD Comptroller to identify standardized costs in academy programs and begun development of measures of effectiveness for graduates of various commissioning programs.

SUMMARY

The CBO report reflected an accurate portrayal of the relative differences in costs and measures of performance of the respective commissioning sources. We believe, however, that a more comprehensive presentation is possible and are developing different data sets for analysis of known measures (retention, source representation, and promotion of specific year groups), and new measures of officer performance.

The Department's own analysis of officer producing programs supports the findings of CBO. It has also resulted in a number of concrete actions designed to align officer commissioning programs with the anticipated force reductions, among which are reduction of ROTC and academy annual commissions concommitant with the overall military personnel reductions for fiscal years 1992–96. We have also begun to upgrade the level of officer program oversight on the part of DOD through initiation of standardized cost reporting and improved policy direction in areas such as ROTC unit viability and service academy staffing practices. Our goal remains a balanced, high-quality officer corps produced at known-and reasonable cost in support of excellence in the Total Force.

APPENDIX

The attached memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense outlines actions to be taken by the services as a result of the Department of Defense review of officer commissioning programs.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

31 OCT 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Officer-Producing Programs

The "Report on Officer Accession Programs: Fiscal Years 1990-1997," demonstrates the need to adjust the Department's officer-producing programs in light of the planned reshaping of the armed forces. Accordingly, I direct as follows:

Unit Size at Service Academies. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall ensure that the Corps of Cadets at the U.S. Military Academy, the Brigade of Midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy, and the Corps of Cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy are reduced in size and do not exceed the following:

Date	Maximum Personnel in Corps/Brigade on Date
September 30, 1992	4,300
September 30, 1993	4,200
September 30, 1994	4,100
September 30, 1995	4,000

Faculties at Service Academies. The Secretaries of the Military Departments, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, shall review faculty arrangements, including the mix of civilian and military faculty members, at the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Naval Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy. They shall take appropriate actions to reduce over time the cost of those faculties, in a manner consistent with the performance of the missions of the Academies. They shall report to me by November 30, 1990 the results of their review, actions planned, and expected cost reductions.

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall reduce the number of Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarships as necessary to achieve a reduction in commissions of officers produced through ROTC programs of 19% over the period 1992 through 1996.

Academy Preparatory Schools. The Secretaries of the Military Departments, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, shall submit to me by November 30, 1990 a plan for reducing the cost of the Academy preparatory schools, in a manner consistent with the performance of the missions of the preparatory schools.

Officer Candidate School/Officer Training Schools and Professional Commissioning Programs. Officer Candidate School programs, Officer Training School programs, and Professional Commissioning Programs, such as health, legal, and chaplain programs, are authorized to continue without significant change.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel may issue such instructions as may be necessary to implement this memorandum.

19914

Senator GLENN. One of the efficiencies cited in the report deals with the civilian military mix of the faculties at the military service academies, and those vary quite widely as we are all aware.

Have the military services reported to you, as required, and what actions are planned in this area?

Mr. JEHN. The services each responded to that report.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has, in fact, directed the services to take a number of actions—actions they proposed—that would result in savings, as I recall, over the 5-year defense program of about $200 million. Not all of them correspond exactly to the ones you will find in that report, however. And in particular, the recommendations concerning the increased use of civilians at the military academy at West Point, and the Air Force Academy have not been adopted to the extent that that report suggests. But the services have, I think, done a very excellent job of coming up with a list of economies.

Furthermore, as far as the GAO report is concerned, we have not yet received their final report. And when we do, we will, naturally, react to it and try to respond to any good suggestions and recommendations they may have.

The issue of costs at the service academy, as well as costs throughout the department, is a continuing and critical concern to us. And we will be looking at those numbers on a more-or-less continual basis over the next few years.

Senator GLENN. The Deputy Secretary, Mr. Atwood, put out a memorandum for all of the secretaries of the military departments, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the subject, Officer Producing Programs. And he asked that these things all be done, screened, and reported back to him by November 30, 1990, the results of the review, actions planned, and expected cost reductions.

Was that done by November 30?

Mr. JEHN. I am not sure it was done by exactly November 30, but it has been completed. And each military department sent back to the Deputy Secretary proposals for altering, changing, reducing costs at the service academies. And the Deputy has accepted those proposals.

Senator GLENN. When would we get the results of that report? Do you know? Was there a date required that we put on that originally?

Mr. JEHN. I do not recollect. We can certainly check that for you.

Senator GLENN. If you would, we would like to have that, too.

There was a little different concept—and while we will await the final report, but just a comment—I remember talking to General Hickey about this. And they had a different concept of some of the things to be accomplished at the academy, as opposed to Annapolis, which uses about half civilian, half military on the faculty. The Air Force used all military, as I understand. They took people, sent them back to school to qualify them to teach history, or whatever, and then had their tour out there.

And they felt that having people like that come back and be at the academy as role models, in effect, that you got a lot of benefit out of that. And I wonder if these kinds of things have been talked about.

What we turned up last year—and we were not trying to push this in any particular direction. What we are trying to do is say that we had such a disparity from one academy to another, was it justified to keep on doing it that way. But there were really some differences that appeared to us. Maybe it did not justify the extra expense. That is the reason we asked for that kind of a study.

Do you have any comment on it?

General HICKEY. No, sir, except to say that we did go through it excessively—extensively—excuse me, not excessively at all. [Laughter.]

General HICKEY. I think all of us have a better understanding of what each of the other services do at their academies now. And I think part of that response to the Secretary Atwood memo that we wrung it out pretty well, and made the changes that looked like they made sense for all of us.

Senator GLENN. Well, what led us first to look into this was the fact that when we came up with a cost-per-graduate of the different academies there was a huge disparity from one to the other. And we could not really account for it. The faculty-mix was part of it, and transferring people in and out, and so on. But that was the reason we asked that this be done. And we obviously still need to get more information on this. Also, if you can get that for us.

[The information follows:]

In an October 31, 1990, memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed a review of faculty arrangements (to include civilian/military mix) at each of the service academies and cost reductions at the preparatory schools. These reviews resulted in plans that should produce combined savings of approximately $22.9 million annually over the 5-year period, 1992-1996. These savings are primarily the result of reduced enrollments at the academies and preparatory schools. As a result of the services' effective validation of current faculty staff practices, no change in civilian/military faculty mix has been directed. These issues are the subject of continuing reviews, both within the Department and by the General Accounting Office.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Jehn, general officer transition positions. Before the Senate adjourned last year, it acted to confirm the retirement of General Michael Dugan, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, for retirement in the grade of General.

In its report accompanying this action, the Committee on Armed Services expressed its view on the proposed retirement date of General Dugan. As you will recall you sent a letter to the Committee with regard to General Dugan's nomination, that subject to Senate confirmation, the effective date of General Dugan's retirement would be January 1, 1991.

With regard to this date, the committee report states:—and I want to read this, because I want to make sure that we understand what we are doing here and what we are going to do in the future in this regard, so let me read the committee report language:

This was not just a subcommittee here, this is the full Armed Services Committee—"The committee notes that the primary reason for allowing General Dugan to retire on January 1, 1991, is permit him to take advantage in the increase in the basic pay for the grade of general, upon which his retired pay would be calculated.

The basic pay for the grade of general is currently capped at the rate of pay for an executive level 5 civilian, $6,516.60 per month. Under current law, the executive level 5 pay rate will increase on January 1, 1991, to $8,151.60 per month.

Because the retired pay for officers such as General Dugan is calculated on the basic pay of the highest grade held, satisfactorily, on the date of retirement"—that gets out from under the 3-year thing—"General Dugan will gain a substantial increase in retired pay, $17,625 annually, if he retires on January 1, 1991. The com-

mittee recognizes the very abrupt nature of General Dugan's relief from his position as Chief of Staff of the Air Force. However, section 601(B)(4) title 10, U.S. Code provides for a generous transition period for officers in General Dugan's circumstance.

This section allows General Dugan to continue to hold the grade of general, while awaiting retirement beginning on the day he is relieved from a position designated to carry one of those grades, in General Dugan's case, the grade of general, and ending on the day before his retirement, but not for more than 90 days.

Since General Dugan was relieved of his position on September 17, 1990 and is awaiting retirement, he can hold the grade of general until December 16, 1990. The Committee believes that retaining General Dugan on active duty beyond this 90-day transition period primarily for the purpose of allowing General Dugan to take advantage of the higher rate of basic pay that will go into effect on January 1, 1991, is not in keeping with the spirit and intent of the transition authority.

While the committee recognizes that the Secretary of Defense may retain General Dugan on active duty beyond the 90- day transition period, the committee strongly disagrees with this course of action. The committee is concerned not only about the circumvention of the generous 90-day transition period, but the effect that such a favored decision for one senior officer could have on the perception of all other military personnel, of the fairness and integrity of the personnel system.

In summary, while the committee recommends that General Dugan be retired in the grade of general, the committee opposes the continuation of General Dugan on active duty beyond the 90-day transition period, primarily to enhance his level of retired pay. The committee has directed that a copy of this report be immediately furnished to the President and the Secretary of Defense."

Now, that is all out of the report language, but not withstanding the committee's views, General Dugan was retired on January 1, 1991, which raises several questions.

And I would add this. They are not directed at General Dugan—who, as it turned out, quite accurately predicted the effectiveness of the air campaign in the Persian Gulf—but of the policy implications of this decision to extend his time period out just to take advantage of the pay.

First, were any exceptions made for any other general or flag officers in regard to their retirement dates so they could take advantage of the January 1, 1991 pay raise?

Mr. JEHN. Not that I know of.

Senator GLENN. Would you let me know of anybody who has extended out to January 1991 just the get the additional pay?

[The information follows:]

I am not aware of any officer who was extended on active duty just to get the additional pay.

Senator GLENN. Why was General Dugan singled out for the particularly favored treatment?

Mr. JEHN. I think it is a mistake to characterize this as a decision that was made entirely for the purpose of getting General

Dugan to that point where his retired pay would be affected by the expected pay raise.

Senator GLENN. What other reason was there?

Mr. JEHN. General Dugan was asked to do a careful review of a variety of general officer and Air Force business by the Secretary. The feeling was it was productive work for him to do, and that was the decision made by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense. But we certainly understand your concern, sir.

Senator GLENN. What were his particular qualifications that made him more qualified than anyone else to do what study?

Mr. JEHN. His lengthy service to the Air Force in positions of high responsibility, including being the chief of staff and commander of a specified command.

Senator GLENN. Was there any disagreement in DOD with the substance of our report, what we recommended?

Mr. JEHN. I cannot answer that question, sir. We have not discussed it at any length.

Senator GLENN. Was there any report?

Did General Dugan make the report that you are talking about, the study?

Mr. JEHN. As far as I know. Perhaps General Hickey can answer that question. But as far as I know, he did what he was asked to do by the Secretary of the Air Force.

Senator GLENN. What study did he accomplish, do we know, General Hickey?

General HICKEY. Yes, sir. He had two different projects that I am aware of. The first had to do with an evaluation or an assessment of the officer evaluation system which we had changed just about a year ago and had in being about a year. And I got that for review and comment. And the second had to do with rated officer management. And again, I had pieces of that. But primarily, I think that was handled by the operations community.

Senator GLENN. Well, the general impression and view from the outside, at least, is that he was extended to take advantage of the retirement pay. I do not think anyone really doubts that. I certainly do not think you would find a single member of the Armed Services Committee here that thinks anything except that we made a very strong recommendation and it was absolutely ignored. And to extend one person out to January 1 just to take advantage of that pay, and that is that.

In our opinion here—and I think I could probably speak for the committee on this because we have discussed it a little bit—it seems very unfair to the other people. You have other people that were retiring during that same period, I am sure. I do not know how many. I have not asked for a whole study of that and do not know that we really need to get back into that to make our point.

But I do not have the least bit of doubt myself that he was extended for whatever WPA job there was over there that somebody else might have done just to get him out to that January 1st date. And that is the way it appears from here. And I have got to be brutally frank with you.

So my point in bringing this up and making an issue out of it is that—are we going to continue this? When we get to the end of every year are we going to have projects over there for people? Are

we going to extend them out? Is every service now going to have a few people that want to hit a higher pay rate that takes effective on a certain date?

Particularly, when the committee went on record in such a strong statement, there was feeling here that we were dealt with rather shabbily in this case. So he is retired and in the higher grade, and I do not propose any legislation to undo that. But I think you would be well advised in the future to make certain that if something like that is being considered that not only do we know about it, but we just do not do that. It is not fair to the other people.

You take one person—I do not care if he was chief of staff of the air force or what he was. You take one person and you give them very favored treatment over other people that are just as deserving perhaps and have given just as lengthy and fine service to their country—and so we felt we were dealt with rather poorly in that regard.

Okay, a new subject. Mr. Jehn, during our conference with the House on the Desert Storm Supplemental and Personnel Benefits Act we received from you by fax House language regarding the deployment of mothers of newborn children. You called to indicate your support of the language that you faxed to us, and I want to read the language to you:

"It was the sense of the Congress that the armed services shall strive to devise and implement a uniform policy with respect to the deployment of mothers of newborn children. Such policy should provide that to the maximum extent possible, mothers of newborn children under the age of 6 months shall not be (a), deployed in the case of a mother on active duty, (b) activated if activation requires separating the mother and child, or deployed in the case of a mother serving in a reserve component."

End of the sense of Congress resolution.

Now, the Congress did not adopt this language because it was unclear to us as to what DOD's unequivocal position was on it. I understand General Powell communicated his strong opposition to it. Also, aside from the policy issue, the language was deficient in that it only addressed mothers but not other parents or legal custodians. The issue is likely to come up again.

And, you know, what we found when we looked into this—you may recall our discussion before on this—was that every service had an appeals process to it, which I had thought, up to that point, was adequate. I thought they were right, presumed they were all basically the same. As it turned out, there was quite a different appeals process for each of the services.

And what we asked was that one policy be set forward that applied to everybody so Reserves would get the same kind of treatment, in particular, and members of the regular establishment also. Now, we passed the Sense of the Senate resolution that I offered. And the resolution we passed on February 20th, 1991, this year expressed the sense that the Secretary of Defense should promptly prescribe regulations governing the assignment of military personnel with minor children. That was about 2 months ago we passed that. What is the status of that and what provisions will it contain?

Mr. JEHN. I think we have done exactly as the Sense of the Senate resolution asked us to do, sir. As you, too, discovered, we discovered that while the net effect of the different service policies was pretty much the same regarding the treatment of parents, and particularly the mothers of newborns, the written policies were, in fact, different, and perhaps appeal procedures were different as well.

So we felt, as did you and the Senate, that we needed to consolidate all that. We have prepared and completed preparing a modified version of our assignment directive. A draft directive is now out for final comment from the services, and that process should be complete within a matter of a few weeks.

Senator GLENN. Okay, good. You all have been consulted on it then, each one of the services, is that right? And you are in the process of commenting on it? Okay, good. I hope we can come up with one standard policy, because one of the things I got complaint letters about, I am being treated this way, and so-and-so that I know that is over in this other service got what I wanted and I cannot get it and it is not fair. And we received letters like that and that is what brought us to some of the areas of concern here.

On the military personnel benefits package that Senator Kennedy addressed a few minutes ago, let me list some of those provisions. I want to follow up on the status of some of the benefits. When will the retroactive increase in imminent danger pay from $110 to $150 a month be paid to all eligible members?

Mr. JEHN. The defense accounting and finance services are right now trying to prepare pulling together a list of those who were entitled to that benefit. We are going to try and get checks directly to them so they will not have to ask for it or appeal for it. That is under way right now.

Senator GLENN. When can we expect to get the regulations that specify procedures for certain survivors of deceased military personnel to apply for SGLI, Servicemen Group Life Insurance, death gratuity that matches the amount of the coverage of the deceased member, and how will you ensure that all eligible beneficiaries are aware of this benefit?

Mr. JEHN. Well, that is a little harder to do than the corrections to the imminent danger pay provisions. But there again, my staff, the staff of the accounting service, and so on, are working that problem. What we are going to probably have to wind up doing, though, is trying to notify people we think were eligible for or we believe are eligible for the increased gratuity, the increased benefit, and ask them to write us a letter asking for that and then make a determination on a case-by-case basis.

The thing that makes that easier, however, than the IDP situation is, of course, the much, much smaller number of people involved. So we are actively working on both those problems right now and hope to have a resolution very shortly.

Senator GLENN. Fortunately much smaller numbers of people.

Mr. JEHN. Yes.

Senator GLENN. When will the increase in death gratuity pay from $3,000 to $6,000 be paid to eligible survivors?

Mr. JEHN. Again, that is something we are working on right now. And I imagine all these things will be resolved in a matter of just a few weeks.

Senator GLENN. How soon can activated reserve medical personnel expect to receive the medical special pay as we authorized, and how will you ensure that each eligible reservist is paid, especially since many are being deactivated and being transferred from active to reserve pay systems right now?

Mr. JEHN. Again, I have basically the same answer for all these changes in pay: that the accounting services themselves, and our own Defense Manpower Data Center, are all working very actively right now to try to pull together the numbers and lists of people that are entitled and to sort that out as quickly as we can.

Senator GLENN. Now, this one is a little bit different. How do you plan to allocate the $20 million we authorized to supplement the increased need for child care and the $30 million we authorized for family assistance programs. Things changed very rapidly about the time we passed that. Is that whole thing changed now, or do you plan to go ahead and implement those?

Mr. JEHN. No, no. We are going to spend that money. As you may well know, all the child care centers and family support centers throughout CONUS and overseas as well, greatly expanded the extent and range of their services as Desert Shield and Desert Storm picked up. For instance, the child care centers offered longer hours. They also offered single parent—parents who were left alone, basically, with their children—the opportunity to just drop the kids off for a few hours so errands could be run and this sort of thing.

So the result was expenditures in excess of what we planned. We asked the services to each pull together a list of programs and additional expenses that were incurred to provide these expanded services. We will get those responses back from the services and then allocate the $20 million according to what we have heard from them. And that process, again, is under way right now.

Senator GLENN. As I mentioned earlier, Senator McCain on his side of the aisle and I on mine, we were both asked to chair task forces involving all of the Desert Storm personnel benefits. And I had 16 different Senators on my committee. We had meetings, and staff did a tremendous amount of work on that, and worked back and forth with your people at the Pentagon.

Mr. JEHN. That is right. We very much appreciate all of that.

Senator GLENN. We came up with what I think was a pretty good package, seined out things that were important and that really had some meat to them. And I think most of those things were pretty good. I am not saying we did a perfect job. My next question is, are there any other initiatives we need to pursue to treat the people out of the Persian Gulf conflict fairly?

Mr. JEHN. That is an active matter of consideration in the Department right now. And in fact, you will soon be hearing from us, for example, on a number of the things you introduced in that supplemental benefits bill that we think need to be made permanent.

Senator GLENN. Yes; and that was going to be one of the next questions. We have a series of things there like the death gratuity,

things like that, that obviously we think are long overdue toward being made permanent.

Mr. JEHN. Yes, sir. They should be.

Senator GLENN. And we maybe did not expect Desert Storm and the funding of some of these things to end quite as abruptly as it ended, but we can be thankful it ended quickly.

Mr. JEHN. But we are glad it did.

Senator GLENN. We are delighted it did, but now we have to get legislation in and we——

Mr. JEHN. You will be hearing from us on those kinds of questions over the next month or two.

Senator GLENN. All right, good.

I will start with General Smith and go across. Do you have any suggestions in this area as to things that you think we need to treat people fairly as they come back, both regulars and reserves?

General SMITH. No, sir. I think the package is pretty complete and it is certainly the obvious focus of our attention here among the personnel chiefs.

Senator GLENN. Good.

General Hickey, any suggestions?

General HICKEY. No, sir, I have nothing further.

Senator GLENN. All right. Admiral Boorda?

Admiral BOORDA. No; but I would like to echo what we just said. I hope that after the bloom is off the rose a little bit we will not forget that many of those pays have not been adjusted in years and years. I think you hit the numbers about right, and I hope we can make those permanent.

Senator GLENN. Some of these things went back a long, long time since they have been adjusted. We have been remiss. I guess we all have. Collectively, we can say we all were remiss in not pointing these things out earlier.

General Reno?

General RENO. Mr. Chairman, I would echo the comments of my colleagues and make two other points. I am sure, as all the services are doing, we are doing a detailed scrub of lessons learned. And within that will be an evaluation and a presentation to DOD of proposed legislation that would support both the active, the guard, and reserve.

I would also like to make one other point on your questions on the death benefits, et cetera. I just want to assure you and the committee that we are working very feverishly to ensure that all of these benefits are very precisely and quickly provided to the beneficiary. For example, we have the network of the casualty assistance officers. And they are linking back directly to the families of some 200 people that we lost through combat and/or accidents in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

And so we are doing it all on a face-to-face basis to get it done quickly and precisely. And I am sure that we are all working to meet the intent of the committee.

Senator GLENN. Well, I am glad. We are all thankful that this ended as fast as it did. I do not think anyone had a way of foreseeing that. I saw a figure the other day that may be indicative of what a lot of people were thinking about in that I think it was 16,092 body bags were sent over to the Gulf. You do not send body

bags for wounded. And so I think we can all be grateful that some of these benefit programs did not become as necessary as we thought they might be.

General HICKEY. Mr. Chairman, if I might also—I did not have any suggestions on newer benefits, but I would add that I think all of us collectively need to make sure that we do not concentrate so much on those people who were in the theater that we forget about the other people that were on duty that were not over there. I think probably some of our most frustrated members were those who could not get into the area and could not participate more actively and did an awful lot of support work. And I know you are familiar with that, but I just—I think that is something that we need to keep reminding ourselves of.

Senator GLENN. Absolutely right. Most of these things—the long-term changes do apply to everybody wherever they are. Death gratuity was not, these are things we want to make permanent in the future just because we think it is fair, period.

Lessons learned: We had a good conversation 4 weeks ago this past weekend when Senator McCain and I were part of a Senate group over there. We had a chance to meet with General Schwarzkopf, and my question to him was, we have seen all the things that work right. What I what to know is, I went through a couple of fracases myself in the past. I know that nothing ever works that good in combat. What did not work well? And he laughed and said, how many hours do you have?

But he went through quite a list of things that we now have to get to work on on this committee. Some of it involves manpower to some extent and some does not. But just things that were of particular interest here—I just had a little I used for a speech I had in my pocket. Fast sea lift—we were apparently trying to get ships from all over the world, leasing them from anybody in sight almost, trying to get the sea lift to get over there.

Tactical air intelligence on the battlefield was very poor. We had one national guard outfit, General Hickey, doing air recognizance over there and their photos were taking 2 or 3 days turnaround time to get back up to the squadrons to use them and things like that. Mine sweeping out in the northern part of the Gulf—we have not done good work on mine sweeping for many years. Land mines—there ought to be better ways than line charges to deal with that. Maybe we can do something in that regard.

He also brought up the reserve performance, combat support, combat service support, and some of the areas that did not work as well as we might have anticipated. In that regard, we have some work to do. Another one, we take great pride in our night battle capability. And we have developed that with all the FLIR on the aircraft and helicopters and make attacks, and yet one of the problems—all the enemy—all the bad guys are not north of a certain line so you know that anything you shoot at up there is okay.

In a flowing battlefield situation pilots were making runs at night over there and could not identify the T-72 and the M-1. And so we need a way of identifying things on the ground like that, some way such as we have for radar from air to air where a radar signal is received on an airplane that triggers off a mechanism and sends a signal back to the radar source showing that it is a friendly

airplane. But we do not have a similar thing that works in the IR spectrum yet.

And so those are just a few other things I thought might be of interest here this morning, although it does not deal with the subject of our hearing this morning. But you mentioned lessons learned. That is what triggered that. So we have to work on a lot of these areas as we have the wind-down of this operation.

Mr. Jehn, we have not received any legislative proposals from DOD so far this year on any personnel benefits or personnel management initiatives. Do you have any proposals you want us to consider in our mark-up? What are they, and when will we receive them?

Mr. JEHN. We have been thinking about a number of things, and as of today I have nothing that I am prepared to discuss with you. But I hope to have some very shortly. We realize your time constraints, so we are talking about the next few weeks at the latest.

Senator GLENN. By very shortly, what, 2 weeks, 3 weeks, what?

Mr. JEHN. I hope so.

Senator GLENN. All right, good.

Senator GLENN. Do you have any idea how much funding you will have in the 1992–1993 legislative contingency account for these proposals?

Mr. JEHN. No, sir.

Senator GLENN. No estimate on it?

Mr. JEHN. Not yet.

Senator GLENN. Any of the rest of you at the table there? General Reno, Admiral Boorda, General Hickey, General Smith? Are there any legislative initiatives in addition to those mentioned—or, Mr. Jehn did not give us any list, but do you have any legislative initiatives you could point out to us today that you would like us to pursue this year? Give us any estimates on those?

General Smith?

General SMITH. I have nothing at this time, sir.

Senator GLENN. General Hickey?

General HICKEY. No, sir.

Senator GLENN. Admiral Boorda?

Admiral BOORDA. No. When DOD gives you their list there will be some things in there that we would like to get and I would be happy to talk to them.

Senator GLENN. We would like to get those. We have asked for several different bits of information here this morning, and time is short on most of them if they are going to have an impact this year.

General Reno, do you have any suggestions?

General RENO. Yes, sir. In my written submission for the record I address the Warrant Officer Management Act. That is important to us because as we draw the Army down we will have to involuntarily separate warrant officers. I need badly to involuntarily separate and SERB Regular Army warrant officers. If I cannot do that, we will have to concentrate our involuntary losses on Reserve warrant officers, which includes 56 percent of our pilots, because they are young. It will affect our aviator fill of our helicopter units. That is important.

The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act is important to us, and that is in my written statement. It is important to us so that we not only reshape and optimize the readiness of the active Army, but similarly, the Reserve components.

I mentioned in my written statement and my verbal statement the importance of clarifying the language of the end strength of the military academy in 1995. Other legislation we will be working through the Department of Defense.

Senator GLENN. Are the costs of what you are talking about now, would those be in the budget?

General RENO. Sir, the WOMA and the ROPMA and the USMA really will not drive a cost. Those are tools we need to reshape. We will be bringing people out of the Army. It is a function of who we bring out. And we need the legislation so we can shape it correctly.

Senator GLENN. In the Desert Storm supplemental we authorized those increases in death gratuity/imminent danger pay and family separation allowance. Those are three that should be made permanent. Do you know of others that should be made permanent, other proposals? Because those are the three we are prepared to act on.

Mr. JEHN. I am searching my memory as you asked the question. We have just processed within the department a list of these things. And I think, with few exceptions, we proposed that most of those are things that ought to be made permanent. I might add, though, that as you I know are aware, we have under way the seventh quadrennial review of military compensation. And it too is looking at some of these. So we may come back and say perhaps we ought to adjust some of the numbers you came up with during the supplemental as well.

Senator GLENN. Okay. We are winding down here. I have about run out of questions. I would like to see if staff of any of the members here have any questions.

There are two other things that Fred points out here that I should mention too that we had in our original package. One was to equalize unemployment compensation for people getting out of the military. I do not have it right in front of me here, but as I recall it, as a civilian you get 26 weeks. It kicks in after the first week of unemployment. In the military you get 13 weeks of unemployment. It does not kick in until a month after you have been out, as I recall. We did not feel that was fair. We thought they should be equalized.

That had to get referred to the finance committee and so was not available as part of our package. It went to the finance committee and they are still running out some of the figures on it.

Another one that was referred to them also was tax exemption relief for officers, $500 to $2,000 that we had in our original package. We had to take it out because they were still running figures on that one also.

So these are two additional things that would apply to people that were deployed over there in Desert Storm.

Mr. JEHN. And we are looking at both of those, sir.

Senator GLENN. You are looking at those, I know. And we may still have legislation on that this year if we can get it out, depending on the cost of it and so on.

All right, thank you, gentlemen. It has been good. We have covered a lot of ground here this morning. We may have additional questions from other members or from staff once we go through the committee record. We would appreciate your early reply if we need to get back into it.

Thank you for being here.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Could you provide a brief summary of all analysis done by each service studying the role of women in combat during the last 3 years, or that studied expanding the role women could play in given specialties?

Secretary JEHN. A brief summary follows.

1988

DOD Task Force on Women in the Military: This Task Force reviewed the statutes, Secretary of Defense policy guidance, and individual service policies regarding combat exclusion in order to insure consistency in application of these policies from one service to the other and consistency with Secretary of Defense policy.

The Task Force found that each of the services interpreted "combat mission" differently based on differences in mission, organization, and operational practice. In addition, differences existed concerning placing women at risk of exposure to hostile fire or capture. While the statutes do not mention such risks, their legislative histories supported the view that Congress intended the combat exclusion laws to protect women from the most serious risks of harm or capture.

In response to these inconsistencies, the Task Force developed the DOD Risk Rule, which was used as a new standard to evaluate positions within noncombat units for possible closure to women. This Risk Rule states that noncombat units can be closed to women on the grounds of risk of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture provided the type, degree, and duration of risk is equal to or greater than that experienced by associated combat units (of similar land, sea, or air type) in the theaters of operation. Using this new Risk Rule, along with existing statutes and policies, the Task Force reviewed all specialties within the services. Ultimately, nearly 31,000 previously closed positions were opened to women.

1989

Air Force Position Review: In December 1989, the Air Force conducted a position-by-position review evaluating the deployment mission of each position against existing policy. As a result of this review and the recommendation of the Military Airlift Command, the Secretary of the Air Force opened C-141 airdrop missions, C-130 aircraft (except Special Operations Low-Level), and the C-17 aircraft to women.

Army Career Branch Review: Beginning in May 1989, the Army began an in-depth career branch-by-branch review of female officer professional development. The purpose was to determine the impact of closed positions on the development and advancement of female officers. As of May 1991, 12 branches had been reviewed. Viable career opportunities—to include promotion to the general officer level—were available, and no impediments due to closed positions were found with the exception of Field Artillery. The elimination of the Pershing missile system removed a significant number of Field Artillery positions open to women.

1990

1990 Navy Women Study Group: This Study Group assessed the status and evaluated the implementation of recommendations from a similar study conducted in 1987. It reported that the introduction of women on Combat Logistics Fleet (CLF) ships had positive effects in many areas of career opportunity for both officer and enlisted women. However, it also reported that policies governing decisions on the assignment of women were inconsistent and ambiguous. The Study Group recommended that SECNAVINST 1300.12A be revised to ensure consistent and unambiguous application of the requirements of 10 U.S.C. 6015 and DOD policy guidance. In addition, it recommended the Secretary of Navy direct the review of all Navy units, ships, and aircraft to ensure women are not being necessarily excluded from permanent assignment to them. In particular, the Study Group mentioned the review

might begin with amphibious ships, mine countermeasures ships, helicopter squadrons, patrol hydrofoils, and VQ–5 and VQ–6.

1991

Army Diver Review: As a result of continuing review and recommendation from the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, the Deputy Chief of Staff for personnel opened the MOS 00B, Diver, to women effective April 1. This opened an additional 153 positions Army-wide to women.

Senator McCAIN. Please provide a table for each service showing those MOSs, ratings, and specialties where women are not allowed to serve. Please indicate the exact reasons for each case.

Secretary JEHN. The information follows:

Army

The Army's combat exclusion policy was developed based on the intent of current combat exclusion laws and the DOD Risk Rule. It is implemented through a Direct Combat Position Coding (DCPC) system which allows coding of individual positions as either open or closed to women based on the probability of that position being involved in direct combat. Direct combat is defined as engaging an enemy with individual- or crew-served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy, and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place when closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, and shock effect in order to destroy or capture the enemy, or while repelling enemy assault by fire, close combat, and or counter attack. The probability of exposure is determined by duties of the position and military occupational specialty, unit mission, and routine co-location. In addition, the DOD Risk Rule has been applied to all non-combat units to open as many positions to women as possible.

The following units are closed to women in the Army due to application of current Army policy:

Combat Arms Units:

Infantry at Brigade level or lower
Armor at Brigade level or lower
Field Artillery in Cannon Artillery, Lance Firing Batteries, MLRS, and TAB
Air Defense with Chaparral, Vulcan, and Stinger systems
Aviation Attack Companies, Air Calvary Squadrons, Air Recon Squadrons, and Division Cavalry Squadrons

Combat Support Units:

Engineer—Combat Units, Bridge Companies (Ribbon, Panel, Girder, and Float)
Signal—Special Forces Group Company, forward-deployed Platoon with Infantry Battalion
Military Police—Division Platoon—Support Maneuver Brigade
Military Intelligence—Special Forces Companies, Collection/Jamming Companies, and Ground Surveillance Radar Platoons
Chemical—ACR Companies and Division Companies (Smoke and Recon/Decon)
Forward Support Battalion—Infantry and Tank System Support Teams
Medical—Trauma Treatment TMS & Ambulance Squads
Maintenance—Forward Support Battalion—Infantry & Tank Systems Support Team
Ordnance—Division ADA Missile Support Company

Other Units:

Ranger Battalions
Special Forces Battalions
Headquarters Company Infantry Brigade, Armor Brigade, Armored Cavalry Regiment, or Ranger Regiment

The following skills are closed based on application of the DCPC system:

Officer:

11A Infantry Officer, General
11B Light Infantry Officer
11C Mechanized Infantry Officer
12A Armor Officer, General
12B Armor Unit Officer
12C Cavalry Unit Officer
13E Cannon Field Artillery Officer
14B Short Range Air Defense Officer

18A Special Operations Officer

Warrant:

140B Chaparral Vulcan System Technician
152B OH-58AIC Scout Pilot
152C OH-6 Scout Pilot
152D OH-58D Scout Pilot
152F AH-64 Pilot
152G AH-I Pilot
180A Special Operations Technician

Enlisted:

11B Infantryman
11C Indirect Fire Infantry
11H HV Anti-Armor Weapons Infantryman
11M FV Infantryman
11Z Infantry Senior Sergeant
12B Combat Engineer
12C Bridge Crewman
12F Engineer Tracked Vehicle Crewman
12Z Combat Engineer Senior Sergeant
13B Cannon Crewman
13C Tacfire Operations Sergeant
13E Cannon Fire Direction Specialist
13F Fire Support Specialist
13M MLRS Crewmembers
13R Firefinder Radar Operator
15J MLRS, Lance Fire Direction Specialist
16F Light Air Defense Artillery Crewman
16J Defense Acquisition Radar Operations
16P CHAPARRAL crewmember
16R VULCAN crewmember
165 MANPADS or PMS crewmember
18B Special Forces Weapons Sergeant
18C Special Forces Engineer Sergeant
18D Special Forces Medical Sergeant
18E Special Forces Communications Sergeant
18F Special Forces Assistance Operations and Intelligence Sergeant
18Z Special Forces Senior Sergeant
19D Cavalry Scout
19E M48/M60 Armor Crewman
19K Armor Crewman
19Z Armor Senior Sergeant
24M VULCAN System Mechanic
24N CHAPARRAL System Mechanic
45D Self-Propelled Field Artillery Mechanic/Turret Mechanic
45E M1 ABRAMS Tank Turret Mechanic
45N M60A1/A3 Mechanic
45T Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Turret Mechanic
63D Self-Propelled Field Artillery Mechanic
63E MI ABRAMS Tank System Mechanic
63N M6OA1/A3 Tank Systems Mechanic
63T Bradley Fighting Vehicle/Cavalry Fighting Vehicle System
82C Field Artillery Surveyor
96R Ground Surveillance Radar System Operator

Navy

Female members of the Navy may be permanently assigned to duty on hospital ships, oilers, ammunition ships, refrigerated stores ships, transports, training ships, and vessels of similar classification not expected to be assigned a combat mission. They may also be assigned to permanent duty in squadrons where such assignment would not require them to participate as crew members on a combat mission or embark, other than on temporary duty, aboard a vessel that may be assigned a combat mission. They may be assigned to aircrew and support positions in squadrons that do not have combat missions. Women may also be assigned to non-aircrew support positions in land-based squadrons with combat missions.

The following vessels are closed to women because they have a combat mission. Their primary objective is to seek out, reconnoiter, and engage the enemy or they are regularly assigned to a task organization that does.

CV Multi-purpose Aircraft barrier
CVA Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVN Multi-purpose Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear-Propulsion)
BB Battleship
CG Guided Missile Cruiser
CGN Guided Missile Cruiser (Nuclear-Propulsion)
DD Destroyer
DDG Guided Missile Destroyer
FF Frigate
FFG Guided Missile Destroyer
SSN Submarine (Nuclear-Propulsion)
SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine (Nuclear-Propulsion)
PHM Guided Missile Patrol Combatant (Hydrofoil)
LHA Amphibious Assault Ship (General Purpose)
LHD Amphibious Assault Ship (Multipurpose)
LPH Amphibious Assault Ship (Helicopter)
LPD Amphibious Transport Dock
LHA Amphibious Cargo Ship
LSD Dock Landing Ship
LST Tank Landing Ship
LCC Amphibious Command Ship
AOE Fast Combat Support Ship
AOR Replenishment Oiler
MSO Minesweeper-Ocean
MCM Mine Countermeasures Ship
MHC Minehunter, Coastal

Officer: These two designators are closed due to their use on combatant vessels.

112X/117X Submarine Warfare
113X/118X Special Warfare

Enlisted: These ratings are closed because the billets associated with them are either found exclusively on combatants or there is a limited number of billets to which women can be assigned such that a viable career path does not exist in- the rating:

ABE Aviation Boatswain's Mate (Launching and Recovery Equipment)
AQ Aviation Fire Control Technician
AW Aviation Antisubmarine Warfare Operator
EW Electronics Warfare Technician
STG Sonar Technician (Surface)
STS Sonar Technician (Submarine)
GS Gas Turbine System Technician*
GSE Gas Turbine System Technician (Electrical)
GSM Gas Turbine System Technician (Mechanical)
FC Fire Controlman
FT Fire Control Technician*
FTB Fire Control Technician (Ballistic Missile Fire Control)
FTG Fire Control Technician (Gun Fire Control)
FTG Fire Control Technician (Gun Fire Control)
GM Gunner's Mate*
GMG Gunner's Mate (Guns)
GMM Gunner's Mate (Missiles)
MT Missile Technician

* Compressed rating, available only at E-9.

Air Force

Positions on the following aircraft are closed to women due to their combatant missions:

A-7	F/RF-4	F-117
A-10	F-5	MH-60
B-1	F-15	CH/HH-3
B-52	F-16	MH-53
B-2	F-106	OV-10
C-130/C-141 SOLL *	F/FB/EF-111	OA-37
HC/MC/AC-130		

* Special Operations Low-Level

There are positions within open career fields which are closed to women because their designated deployment missions do not meet the requirements of the DOD Risk Rule. For example, Civil Engineering Red Horse teams are open to women, but there are certain units/positions that are closed because their mission statements place them on the front lines during combat. In addition, the following units are completely closed to women due to application of the DOD Risk Rule:

Tactical Air Control Parties
Air Support Radar Teams
Weather Units in direct support of Special Forces for Army Combat Units *

* Personnel in these units also fly on Special Forces/Army combatant aircraft as a part of their mission.

Officer: None. Some skills are partially closed due to the aircraft or unit mission, as outlined above.

Enlisted: Both the Aerial Gunner and Sensor Operator specialties are closed since these positions are on combat aircraft. The remaining specialties are closed due to application of the DOD Risk Rule.

111X0 Aerial Gunner
SDI 99602 Sensor Operator
115X0 Pararescue and Recovery
273X0 Combat Control
275X0 Tactical Air Command and Control

Marine Corps

Women Marines may not be assigned to 03 (infantry), 08 (artillery), 18 (tank and assault amphibian vehicles), or 75 (pilot/naval flight officer) positions due to application of the DOD Risk Rule or combat exclusion law in the case of the 75 occupational field. In addition, assignment to the following units is not allowed due to law (normal deployment on combatant ships or part of a crew on a combatant aircraft) and/or application of the DOD definition of combat and the Risk Rule:

Fleet Marine Force (FMF): Women Marines will not be assigned to the following units or any subelement thereof:

Infantry Regiment	LAAD Battalion
Artillery Battalion	Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
Reconnaissance Battalion	Combat Engineer Battalion
Force Reconnaissance Company	Marine Air Support Squadron
Tank Battalion	Counterintelligence Teams
Assault Amphibian Battalion	Interrogation-Translation Teams
LAV Battalion	Helicopter Squadron (Tactical)
Communications Company, Marine Division	AV-8 Squadron (Tactical)
Assault Fire Unit/Firing Battery, LAAM Battalion	Sensor Control & Mgt Platoon

FMF organizations will be provided at least the number of male Marines needed, by grade and MOS, to deploy two all-male Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) per Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) if sufficient personnel assets exist. This requirement will be based on the deployment of a notional amphibious and prepositioned MEB. In addition to this requirement, the MEF will be provided a sufficient male inventory, by grade and MOS, to establish a 25-percent combat replacement

factor, internal to the MEF, for the ground combat and combat service support elements of both MEBs.

Women, by law, may not be assigned as members of the flight crew of any tactical aircraft.

Women Marines will not be assigned to any of the standing (MEB) staffs, but may augment that staff if the operational situation permits. They are also restricted from assignment to the ground combat element or combat service support element of the MEB. Both these restrictions are based on application of the DOD definition of combat and the Risk Rule.

Women Marines will not normally be assigned to any of the elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit based on law and both the DOD definition of combat and the Risk Rule. In addition, the following occupational fields are closed to women based on application of the DOD Risk Rule or combat exclusion law in the case of aircrew members:

Officer:

0201 Counterintelligence Officer
0250 Interrogation - Translation Officer
0430 Embarkation Officer (Suitable as secondary MOS)
1302 Engineer Officer
2110 Ordnance Vehicle Maintenance Officer
2305 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer
5720 Ground Nuclear Weapons Assembly Officer
5907 Ground Launched Missile System Maintenance Officer
7204 Antiair Warfare Officer
7207 Forward Air Controller (Additional MOS only)
7208 Air Support Control Officer
0211 Counterintelligence Specialist
0251 Interrogation - Translation Specialist
0451 Air Delivery Specialist
0481 Landing Support Specialist
1371 Combat Engineer
2131 Artillery Weapons/Turret Repairer
2141 Assault Amphibian Vehicle Repairer/Technician
2143 Self-Propelled Artillery Repairer/Technician
2145 Tracked Vehicle Repairer/Technician
2147 LAV Repairer
2149 Ordnance Vehicle Technician
2336 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician
2362 Ground Nuclear Weapons Assembly Technician
2671 Cryptologic Linguist, Middle-East
5921-29 Improved HAWK Missile Repairers & Technicians
5943 Aviation Fire Control Repairer
5947 Aviation Fire Control Technician
6015 Aircraft Mechanic, AV-8
6031-32 Aircraft Flight Engineer, KC-130
6038 Maintenance Specialist, AV-8B
6112-15 Helicopter Mechanic
6172-76 Helicopter Crew Chief
7212 LAAD Missile Gunner
7222 HAWK Missile Gunner
7242 Air Support Operations Operator
7371 Aerial Navigator Trainee
7372 First Navigator

Senator McCAIN. Where the law currently restricts these categories in ways that prevent women from serving, please indicate whether the service would recommend admitting women if the law were changed. If the service would not recommend admitting women, please provide a detailed rationale by MOS, rating, and specialty of the reason why.

Secretary JEHN. If current combat exclusion laws were repealed, the Department of Defense would be obligated to allow women to enter any career area for which they qualify. Conversely, in time of need the Department could utilize women in any career area for which they qualified.

Senator McCAIN. Please indicate in each case whether the reason for denial does or does not affect the risk of serving in combat.

Secretary JEHN. This request is not answered.

Senator McCAIN. Please provide a table for each service showing the total number of men and women that will be subject to involuntary separation by year for fiscal

year 1991, fiscal year 1992, fiscal year 1993. Please indicate the estimated number of minority separations by sex. Please also indicate the number of single parents subject to separation, showing the number that are minorities by sex. Finally, please show the number separated with dependents, showing the number that are minorities by sex.

Secretary JEHN. Seventy-nine percent of the fiscal years 1991–1993 end strength reduction will be achieved through reduced accessions and increased voluntary separations. Of the involuntary separations required, over half will be from initial term or retirement eligible inventories. The following shows increased involuntary separations planned by service:

	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993	Percent of fiscal years 1991–1993 ES reduction
ARMY Total	0	14,373	13,440	
Officer	0	5,873	4,840	
Enlisted	0	8,500	8,600	
NAVY Total	[1] 442	400	400	
Officer	442	400	400	
Enlisted	0	0	0	
USMC Total	[1] 376	1,200	1,050	
Officer	215	200	200	
Enlisted	161	1,000	850	
USAF Total	[1] 4,041	7,613	9,030	
Officer	511	2,252	2,160	
Enlisted	3,530	5,361	6,870	
DOD Total	4,859	23,586	23,920	21
Officer	1,168	8,725	7,600	51
Enlisted	3,691	14,861	16,320	16

[1] With two exceptions, the fiscal year 1991 involuntary separations are early retirements. The exceptions are (1) an estimated 1,500 enlisted airmen who will be separated under the lower high year of tenure policy for grade E4 announced by the Air Force in May 1990, and (2) an estimated 100 additional Reserve Marine Corps officers on the active duty list who will not be selected for a Regular commission.

These figures do not include those involuntary separations which occur under existing strength management programs. For example, not included are approximately 2,000 officers and 2,000 enlisted members who are separated annually for promotion nonselection. However, where service promotion or tenure policies are being changed to achieve the strength reductions, the resulting increases in promotion nonselection separations are included in the above figures.

The service plans reflect how end strengths will be reduced, but do not identify by sex, minority, single parent status, or number of dependents who will be separated. Except where prohibited by statute, any member can be considered and selected for involuntary separation. The Department does not plan to protect service members based on their sex, race, martial status, or number of dependents, and consequently has not required the services to establish reduction plans by these characteristics. The services will, however, be required to comply with the Department's equal opportunity policies as these plans are implemented and are sensitive to the impact of their plans on specific populations.

Senator MCCAIN. In your letter to Admiral Busey of April 9, 1991, you state that the Department is "unavailable to participate in your Blue Ribbon Panel on the pilot and aviation maintenance technician shortage. I believe our participation would be inappropriate since the issues center more on transportation than defense."

It is not clear why you feel that an issue of such critical importance to the Nation's retention of military pilots is not a defense issue, and it is not clear that the statement in this letter tracks with your testimony, particularly your statements regarding the cost of the study being a key factor. Could you clarify your position in detail?

Secretary JEHN. The purpose of the Blue Ribbon Panel is to address the issue of the national shortage of pilots and aviation maintenance technicians. Although not in conflict with the goals of the Department of Defense, this issue is certainly centered more on transportation than defense. Further, as the commercial industry continues to grow and large numbers of commercial pilots reach mandatory retirement age, the demand for experienced military pilots will no doubt continue despite

efforts to alleviate the national shortage of pilots. The Department's goal is to retain as many pilots as required to meet the needs of the services. As we reduce the size of the military, resulting reductions in training resources will require us to train and experience fewer pilots. Our efforts are directed toward retaining our aviators, while the Department of Transportation efforts are directed at maximizing the quality and quantity of pilots and aviation maintenance technicians in the transportation industry. The Defense Department is better served by continuing to dedicate its efforts and resources to retaining our pilot force and manning the weapons systems critical to our national defense.

Senator MCCAIN. So that the committee can understand your rationale regarding the priority and cost of this study, would you provide a list of all studies the Department has conducted affecting military manpower by service over the last 2 years, and of all studies where decisions regarding contract awards are currently pending, and show the cost of each study?

Secretary JEHN. We will provide this information when it is compiled.

Senator MCCAIN. Will the force structure cuts in each service fall proportionally or disproportionally on minorities?

Secretary JEHN. The Department and the services' leadership are sensitive and responsive to the possible disproportionate impact of the drawdown on minority members. Presently and in the foreseeable future, force structure reductions are creating no apparent disproportionate effect on minorities and women. The population percentages of these groups have remained constant.

Senator MCCAIN. Will a higher percentage of minority males and females be cut from the services?

Secretary JEHN. We do not believe there will be any significant change in the current proportion of minority males and females who are separated annually from the services. Programs such as reducing accessions, early retirement, and voluntary release (early out) are succeeding in minimizing involuntary separations, and consequently have not created a higher percentage of minority member releases. The Department does not intend to target minority overrepresentation for reduction.

Senator MCCAIN. If so, is this a result of higher concentrations of minorities in specific skill areas, and if this is the case, why are these skill areas targeted for cuts?

Secretary JEHN. Members are being encouraged to switch to and retrain for job specialties where requirements do exist. Though they are not targeted, involuntary separations will affect some members of various race/ethnic and gender groups. Transition assistance programs are in place and others are being developed to assist these members.

Senator MCCAIN. How many minority service men and women are single parents?

Secretary JEHN. Based on a 1990 survey of active duty personnel, there are 66,000 single parents within the Department. Their distribution by race and ethnicity is as follows:

	Percent of single parents	Percent of total force
MALE:		
White	36.9	73.32
Black	13.6	11.48
Hispanic	3.7	1.20
Other	5.5	3.01
Total	59.7	89.00
FEMALE:		
White	19.1	7.54
Black	18.3	2.87
Hispanic	0.6	0.14
Other	2.3	0.45
Total	40.3	11.00
TOTAL:		
White	56.0	80.81
Black	31.9	14.35
Hispanic	4.3	1.38
Other	7.8	3.45

	Percent of single parents	Percent of total force
Total	100.0	100.0

Senator McCain. What effect will the drawdown have on them?

Secretary Jehn. We cannot predict at this time. The drawdown will not be conducted on the basis of sex, race, or marital status. Instead, it will be conducted in terms of military occupational specialty and grade as related to revised Service requirements.

Senator McCain. Is it possible to distinguish between those who have custody of the child or children and those who do not have custody, but are classified as single parents?

Secretary Jehn. At the present time, we can make this distinction only for the mid-1990 force because of a survey conducted for our Single Parents Study. One recommendation of the Single Parents Study is that each service require parents and dual member couples to certify on an annual basis the custodial status of their children in conjunction with the housing allowance certification; this procedure would distinguish between single parents with their children residing with them and single parents (for purposes of medical or housing entitlements) who only pay child support. This recommendation is being adopted.

The GAO also started a review entitled, "Impact of Force Reductions on Minorities and Women," in August 1990. The objectives of this review are to identify the Services' approaches to mandated end strength reductions and the impact of those procedures on minorities and women. We expect the GAO to brief the House on this subject by September.

Question Submitted by Senator John Glenn

LIMITED DUTY OFFICER MANAGEMENT

Senator Glenn. Admiral Boorda, I understand that you are making changes to the management of Navy Limited Duty Officers. Please provide background information on Navy's proposal.

Admiral Boorda. We are seeking changes to sections 633 and 634 of 10 U.S.C. that would authorize the involuntary retirement of certain Regular Navy Limited Duty Officers (LDOs) serving in the grade of captain or commander. Under this proposal, a LDO commander not on a promotion list for captain, would be required to retire upon completion of 35 years total active naval service or after a second failure of selection to captain, whichever occurs first. A LDO captain would be required to retire upon the completion of 38 years total active naval service.

Under current retirement laws, Navy LDO commanders and captains are not required to retire until after completing 28 or 30 years active commissioned service respectively. Commanders may remain on active duty to 28 years active commissioned service even after failing of selection to captain two or more times. Navy LDOs are accessed only from the senior enlisted ranks. Since they average 13 years active service upon commissioning, LDO commanders and captains may now remain on active duty an average of 41 or 43 years before mandatory retirement.

The more Junior LDOs, on the other hand, must rehire after completing 30 years of combined enlisted and commissioned service or after a second failure of selection to the next higher grade, which ever occurs first. The result is an 11 to 13 year difference between the service points at which commanders and captains must retire and those for the more Junior LDOs. The lower attrition at the senior officer level severely restricts LDO promotions. The proposed changes will significantly improve LDO promotion flow points and opportunity at all levels.

Senator Glenn. Why does the Army need WOMA?

General Reno. a. WOMA modernizes the outdated warrant officer (WO) management laws by establishment of a single promotion system, selective retirement authority, regular below zone promotions, more humane release requirements, selective continuation, and for the Army, provisions for a complete warrant officer career pattern. Many features of WOMA parallel those in the Defense Officer personnel Management Act (DOPMA) from which WO were excluded.

b. WOMA provides the service Secretaries authority to convene boards to recommend WO for involuntary selective retirement. This authority does not exist under current law.

c. WOMA also provides for retirement based on years of WO service (Army only). Mandatory retirement points for Regular Army CW4 will be 24 years of service as a WO; RA CW5 must retire at 30 years of WO service.

d. WOMA provides for a new grade, W5. Army WO in selected critical skills are leaving the service too early, causing a shortfall in meeting requirements for senior technical expertise. CW5 was determined by the Army to be more cost effective than a limited duty officer (LDO) program or targeting pay increases. CW5 pay will be about 12 percent higher than CW4 pay but remains cost effective, i.e., CW5 pay at 20 years of service equates approximately to that of a major at 14 years of service. WOMA would provide a combination of strength reduction and force retention management "tools" to be used in a coordinated effort to shape the WO Corps to meet future requirements.

e. In light of current force structure and personnel inventory reductions, it is essential Congress approve WOMA for implementation in fiscal year 1992. Without WOMA, the Army will be forced to reduce warrant officer accessions below the minimal level required to sustain the force and implement a reduction in force of other than Regular Army WO. The result would be a distorted force with critical grade and skill imbalances. Attaining the management flexibility required to build-down the force in a balanced manner 15 essential to matching personnel inventories with reduced force structure requirements. Only then can near and long-term readiness be assured. Without WOMA, required reductions will have a significant negative impact on the WO Corps.

Senator GLENN. Why does the Army need the tenure provisions of W0MA?

General RENO. a. These provisions provide equitable tenure for all officer personnel based on officer service as opposed to combined enlisted and officer service. This would parallel Defense Officer personnel Management Act (D0PMA) provisions that allow officers selected for the grade of LTC to remain on active duty for 28 years of Active Federal Commissioned Service (AFCS) and officers selected for the grade of COL to remain on active duty for 30 years of AFCS.

b. Under present law, WO can remain on active duty up to 30 years of AFCS. Many WO must separate prior to becoming eligible for promotion to the grades of CW3 and CW4. This statutory separation point denies the Army the needed expertise of experienced WO. Additionally, these WO may only have served 10 or less years of WO service.

c. Retention of all CW4 personnel for 30 years of Active Federal Warrant Officer Service (AFWOS) was not required and, therefore, tenure to 30 years was not requested. To provide a specified retention point for CW4 personnel, the grade of CW5, and the strength management associated with nonselection, was requested.

d. The Army is the only service requesting this provision. The other services do not require the extended service of WO personnel. They access WO as a continuation of enlisted service with accelerated promotions to the highest WO grade.

Senator GLENN. Why does the Army need the pay grade of CW5

General RENO. a. The current permanent promotion points for grades CW2, CW3 and CW4 are 3, 6, and 6 years in grade. There are no retention incentives beyond 15 years of WO service. Aviation WO, who have on the average 4 years of prior enlisted service, will attain the highest WO grade prior to completing 20 years of Active Federal Service (AFS).

b. Retention of experienced WO for a 30-year officer career requires additional incentives.

c. To operate a single promotion system, an additional strength management point is needed at 24 years of WO service. This strength management valve will be similar in nature to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) whereas it will require those CW4 nonselect for the next higher grade to separate at 24 years of WO service but allow those WO selected for CW5 to remain for 30 years of WO service.

d. To ensure that an excess of CW5 personnel are not created, the services have requested that a 5 percent budgeted end strength (BES) cap be approved. The current Army requirement for CW5 personnel is 3.4 percent of BES.

Senator GLENN. How was the cost of WOMA determined?

General RENO. a. *Costing methodology:* No structure increase is required. CW5s will come from internal structure realignment. Cost of CW5 is offset by decreased numbers of CW4s. Costing is based on the incremental difference in base pay, BAQ, and retired pay accrual. Differences in VHA, dislocation allowance, and household goods allowances upon PCS are not costed given the very small population. Costing is based on fiscal year 1991 pay scale. The grade/years of service used to compute pay differentials are CW4/20 years and CW5/26 years. All CW5s are assumed to be married. BAQ computation is the with dependent rate. Guard and Reserve costs are

based on 14 days of active duty training (basic pay and BAQ differentials) and 48 days of inactive duty training (basic pay differentials only).

Senator GLENN. What will be the monetary cost of WOMA?

General RENO. The cost will be $25.9 million spread from fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 1996.

Senator GLENN. Will more losses be attained with WOMA?

General RENO. Not in the long run. in a stable system, losses will always have to equal gains. The nature of the losses attained will be different. More importantly, in a downsizing Army, there will be significantly fewer forced losses (RIFs) necessary as WOMA will allow endstrength sizing with SERBs.

[Whereupon, at 11:53 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1992 AND 1993

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Glenn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Glenn, Exon, Levin, and McCain.

Professional staff members present: Frederick F.Y. Pang.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel; George W. Lauffer, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Phillip P. Upschulte, assistant to Senator Glenn; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator Levin; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain; and Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN GLENN, CHAIRMAN

Senator GLENN. The hearing will be in order.

Before we get into the substance of our hearing this morning, I want to note that today is Secretary's Day, a day on which we take time out to recognize those who help us with our day to day administrative work and keep us on our schedules, or try to, anyway. Without their help, which we often take for granted, we would be a whole lot less efficient in going about our business.

In keeping with this special day, I want to recognize the staff person on our subcommittee who keeps the wheels spinning and who cheerfully and efficiently goes about her work that is so important to what this subcommittee does to support our men and women in uniform and their families.

For those of you who might not know her, I want to introduce Debbi Rice, who is sitting over there in the corner, with the red jacket on. Debbi has been the staff assistant responsible for all the

administrative support for the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee ever since I became Chairman over 4 years ago.

Debbi, I want to thank you for doing such an outstanding job for us and for all of us here in the room. [Applause for Ms. Rice]

Senator GLENN. The Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel meets this morning to review the National Guard and Reserve component manpower programs in the Fiscal Years 1992–1993 Defense Authorization Request.

Before getting into the specifics of these programs, I want to say that there is no question that our National Guardsmen and Reservists played a crucial role in the success of Operation Desert Storm. Over 227,000 of these personnel were activated in connection with the operation, and over 106,000—not quite half that number—actually served in the Persian Gulf area of operations.

Operation Desert Storm could not have been executed as it was without our National Guard and Reserve forces working as full partners with our Active forces in combat and combat support roles.

Obviously, the operation called on our National Guardsmen and Reservists and their families to make major sacrifices. Our Active National Guardsmen and Reservists had to leave their civilian jobs, take substantial reductions in income, suffer the disruption and uncertainty of being placed in harm's way for an indeterminate period of time.

Now that comes with the territory. That comes with the job that they signed up for. We all realize that.

Risks come with being a National Guardsman or Reservist. But these are sacrifices that one cannot simply dismiss with that explanation.

That the call-up was executed as well as it was is a credit to the men and women serving in our National Guard and Reserve forces and their leaders. You gentlemen in particular, right here today, had your hands full, and you and your staffs did yeoman's work in doing your part in executing the call-up.

It is because our National Guard and Reserve forces are crucial to our military readiness that we must very carefully review the plans for these forces in the 1992–1993 Defense Authorization Request. Specifically, we authorized a Selected Reserve end-strength of 1,175,926 for fiscal year 1991. The 1992–1993 DOD Authorization Request proposes a fiscal year 1992 Selected Reserve end-strength level of 1,068,400, which is 107,562 below the 1991 level, and a fiscal year 1993 Selected Reserve end-strength level of 988,600. That is 79,764 below the 1992 level, and 187,326 below the fiscal year 1991 level.

I will be interested in hearing from our witnesses on the adequacy of these strength levels and whether or not they sustain the combat readiness, the combat support, the combat service support readiness of our National Guard and Reserve forces.

I will also have some questions on the long-term strength plan for the Selected Reserve, which stabilizes at about 905,600 in fiscal year 1995. That is about a 23 percent reduction from the current level. The reduction in percentage terms is larger than the 1995 Active component strength reduction of 19 percent from the current level.

I do not intend to get into the Active and Reserve force mix issues in any degree of detail at this hearing. We will do that later on in other hearings. I do plan to concentrate on understanding the contents of the National Guard and Reserve programs in the 1992–1993 Defense Authorization Request.

As our witnesses know, we had a hearing on Active component manpower last week. From the information we received in that hearing and the information I expect we will receive in this hearing, we will be in a better position to address the matter of the planned Active-Reserve force mix of the military services over the next 5 years.

The subcommittee will schedule a hearing on that subject next month, at which we will also address the Total Force Policy Report the Department of Defense has submitted in response to the requirement that we put on them last year.

Before we turn to our witnesses, I want to make a comment about Senator McCain. He and I worked very closely together on the personnel benefits package. He couldn't be here at the opening this morning. He hopes to be here a short time later. He had another commitment this morning that he could not change. But I am sure he joins me in congratulating our National Guardsmen and Reservists for their contribution and in recognizing their sacrifices in support of the Persian Gulf conflict.

I might add that the Personnel Benefits Act was signed into law on April 6, 1991, by the President.

Our witnesses this morning are the Hon. Stephen Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; Lt. Gen. John Conaway, National Guard Bureau; Maj. Gen. Donald Burdick, Director of Army National Guard; Maj. Gen. Philip Killey, Director of the Air National Guard; Maj. Gen. William Ward, Chief, Army Reserve; Rear Adm. James Taylor, Director of Navy Reserve; Maj. Gen. Hollis Davison, Marine Corps Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Maj. Gen. John Closner, Chief, Air Force Reserve; and Rear Adm. John Faigle, Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters.

Our witnesses have each submitted written statements. We will, without objection, include those in the record.

I will ask Mr. Duncan to give his statement or a summary thereof. As I understand it from Mr. Pang, our staff director, the rest of you have indicated that you would be happy to go directly to questions.

If anyone cares to make a statement or give a summary of your statement, I would be glad to entertain that after we hear from Mr. Duncan.

Mr. Duncan, welcome this morning. We look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN M. DUNCAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. JOHN B. CONAWAY, ANG, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU; MAJ. GEN. DONALD BURDICK, ARNGUS, DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD; MAJ. GEN. PHILIP KILLEY, ANG, DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD; MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. WARD, USAR, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE; REAR ADM. JAMES E. TAYLOR, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVY RESERVE; MAJ. GEN. HOLLIS E. DAVISON, USMC, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, MARINE CORPS RESERVE; MAJ. GEN. JOHN C. CLOSNER, USAFR, CHIEF, AIR FORCE RESERVE; AND REAR ADM. JOHN N. FAIGLE, CHIEF, OFFICE OF READINESS AND RESERVE, U.S. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will assume that the Chair's very warm comments about secretaries do not necessarily apply to Assistant Secretaries of Defense [Laughter.]

But I do appreciate the very warm comments about the performance of the Reserve forces.

Senator GLENN. And just in case you were expecting it, I won't send you a basket of flowers today, either. [Laughter.]

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, by my calculations, this is the fourth consecutive year I have had the honor to testify before the committee. As you pointed out, the circumstances this year are somewhat different. Before we discuss various aspects of the Total Force Policy—and I know the Chairman is going to have another hearing on that subject—suffice it to say that we now have recent experience, the magnificent victory in Operation Desert Storm, to suggest that the Total Force Policy has worked very, very well.

As you pointed out, not only were Reservists there in very large numbers—almost 228,000—but, more importantly, they were performing both combat and support missions and performing them very, very well.

The task, as I see it, in brief, is to profit from our experience in that conflict and, as we go about the very challenging business of designing the shape and the size of the Armed Forces for the future, to do it on the basis of that experience and with the full recognition that we have a dramatically changed strategic environment and some very real fiscal imperatives that are going to guide our force structure, our force mix, and our end-strength deliberations.

I might note parenthetically that, the budget which the administration has proposed this year is based on our evolving new military strategy, the changed geopolitical environment, which I mentioned, and the budgetary realities. I have seen as much effort and critical analysis go into the preparation of this budget as any in my experience within the Department of Defense.

I am sure that there will not be universal agreement with all aspects of the budget recommendations and the programs which it represents. But I can assure the Chair that this represents our best judgment and that we are going about this business on the merits.

I can also assure the Chair that everyone at this table will proceed on the basis of what is best for the United States.

We look forward to working with this committee. This committee has been very helpful in working with the Department of Defense over the years, and I think the committee, as well as the Department of Defense can take a great deal of pride in the success of the Reserve forces. You have been very helpful in helping us build the force that was demonstrated so ably in Operation Desert Storm.

So, with that, I will close my opening remarks and look forward to your questions, along with these gentlemen.

[The prepared statements of Mr. Duncan and the military witnesses follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. STEPHEN M. DUNCAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I welcome this opportunity to discuss the Reserve components of the Armed Forces. Developments of historical significance which either involve or affect the Reserve components have taken place during the last 18 months and it is timely for us to fix our current position as we chart the course for the future.

In my testimony to the Congress last year, I asserted that the Reserve forces of the United States are the best in the world. By way of illustration, I described the actual performance of four of the seven Reserve components in operation Just Cause in Panama. Little did I anticipate then, that today National Guardsmen and Reservists would be returning home after engaging in another armed conflict 8,000 miles from American shores.

Since August, 1990, the Nation's reliance on Reserve forces has been tested in ways that are unprecedented since the adoption of the Total Force Policy. As a consequence of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and of the first Presidential authorization to call up Reserve forces in over two decades, the Secretary of Defense authorized the military departments to call to active duty as many as 360,000 members of the Ready Reserve. Almost 228,000 of those Reservists have actually been ordered to active duty and 106,000 have served in the Kuwait Theater of Operations. Tens of thousands of additional Reservists have volunteered or have been called to active duty to serve at bases in the United States and in other parts of the world.

I was informed very recently that either the subcommittee or the full Armed Services Committee will conduct a hearing in early June on the subject of the Department of Defense Total Force Policy and that I will be asked to testify at that hearing. For that reason, and in an effort to economize, I have not incorporated here any general discussion of the Total Force Policy, or comments which relate to the training of Reserve forces, or our plans for future reliance on the Reserve components within the context of the evolving new defense strategy. Those subjects will be addressed in the statement which I will submit in connection with the next hearing. Any hearing on the status of the Reserve forces would be incomplete, however, without a discussion of our Nation's reliance on those forces in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

I would not presume to include in this statement a discussion of all of the many factors that contributed to the historic victory of our Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf war, but there can be no doubt that both the call to active duty and the performance of the National Guardsmen and Reservists who have served in connection with that conflict, have been marked by extraordinary success. In his address to the Congress and the Nation on March 6, the President declared that ". . . this victory belongs . . . to the Regulars, to the Reserves, to the National Guard. This victory belongs to the finest fighting force this Nation has ever known in its history." In testimony to the Congress on February 7, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff described the contributions of the Reserve components to Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm as "magnificent." On March 6, the Commander in Chief of Forces Command informed Congress that the performance of National Guardsmen and Reservists has been "one of the major success stories of the entire operation."

The anecdotal stories about the performance of both Reserve combat and support units are legion, but the stories of Company "B" of the 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division, a Reserve unit from Yakima, Washington, and of the Air Force Reserve's 926th Tactical Fighter Group from New Orleans, Louisiana, are illustrative. In December, Company "B" was ordered to active duty. Leaving its aging M60A1 tanks at home, the unit proceeded to Saudi Arabia after stopping for 18 days at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California to

train on modern M1A1 tanks. The training was completed on February 14. The unit deployed 3 days later. Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia on February 19 the unit picked up 13 M1A1s and took them into battle on February 24, 1991 with the 2nd Marine Division. In its first engagement shortly before dawn on February 25, Company "B" detected (using night vision devices) an Iraqi Mechanized Brigade. A formation of T72s (Iraq's most modern tank) was passing through another formation of Iraqi T55 tanks that were dug into revetments. In an action that lasted only a few minutes, Company "B" destroyed or stopped 34 of 35 enemy tanks. In a total of four engagements, Company "B" accounted for 59 enemy tanks, including 30 T72s. Elements of the 926th Tactical Fighter Group were the first to score an air-to-air kill in the A-10 fighter. The unit was credited with two air-to-air kills and in the last days of combat, one pair of pilots from the 926th destroyed 20 Scud launchers.

To fully understand the extent of the Nation's reliance on Reserve forces in the conflict, it is useful to focus first on its several stages.

OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

The Use of Reserve Volunteers

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. On August 8, the President announced the major deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia to take up defensive positions against an attack by Iraqi troops across the Kuwait border. The subsequent deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia was one of the most challenging deployments in our Nation's history. In the first 3 weeks of the operation, the United States deployed more military capability than it did during the first 3 months of the Korean conflict.

Even before the President authorized an involuntary call-up of Reserve forces, Reserve volunteers made major contributions to Operation Desert Shield. Over 500 Reservists volunteered for active duty on the first day of the deployment. As soon as the decision was made to deploy forces to Southwest Asia, volunteers from the Air Reserve components responded immediately to perform vital strategic airlift and tanker support missions with C-5, C-141, C-130 and KC-135 aircraft. In August 1990 alone, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard volunteers flew 42 percent of the strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of the aerial refueling missions. By the time that Operation Desert Storm commenced on January 16, 1991, over 188,000 personnel and 375,000 short tons of equipment had been airlifted by the Air Reserve components to Saudi Arabia. Air Reserve component volunteers also performed important maintenance, medical, civil engineering, aerial port, and security police operations.

Volunteers from the other Reserve components also provided critical skills. Army Reserve volunteers promptly addressed urgent water-purification, supply distribution and other support needs. Naval Reserve volunteers supported air operations with C-9 aircraft and performed important medical, logistics support, intelligence and cargo handling missions. Coast Guard Reserve volunteers provided port security and supervised and controlled the loading of explosives and other hazardous materials. Army National Guard volunteers also made important contributions by providing military police and movement control assistance. By August 22, the date on which the President authorized the involuntary activation of Selected Reserve units and individuals, over 10,000 volunteers from all of the Reserve components were serving on active duty. The challenge was to match the military skills of the volunteers to those skills which were needed.

TABLE I.—Reserve Component Volunteers Who Supported Operation Desert Shield

	August 8	August 15	August 22
Army National Guard	5	68	107
Army Reserve	0	200	392
Naval Reserve	0	26	183
Marine Corps Reserve	0	50	50
Air National Guard	216	2,700	3,737
Air Force Reserve	350	4,500	5,992
Coast Guard Reserve	24	131	197
Total	595	7,675	10,658

The Call to Active Duty of the Selected Reserve

On August 22, 1990, 20 days after the Iraqi invasion, and less than 2 weeks after the first U.S. forces arrived in Saudi Arabia, the President signed Executive Order No. 12727, exercising Title 10, Section 673b of the U.S. Code. By that action he authorized the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to order to active duty organized units and individual members of the Selected Reserve. The exercise of section 673b was the first involuntary call to active duty of Reserve forces since the adoption of the "Total Force" concept in the early 1970s. The next day, Secretary Cheney delegated authority to the Secretaries of the military departments to order to active duty as many as 48,800 members of the Selected Reserve. Ceilings of 25,000, 14,500, 6,300 and 3,000 were established for the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, respectively. The Secretary of Transportation authorized the Coast Guard to order to active duty as many as 1,250 Coast Guard Reservists.

On August 24, the first call to active duty of specific Selected Reserve units from the Air Reserve components was announced. Later the same day, the Army National Guard began giving advance notice to certain units, and within the next 2 days the first Army Guard and Army Reserve units were ordered to active duty. Selected Reservists from the Navy and Coast Guard were also called. Units from the Marine Corps Selected Reserve were not called until October 11 because the initial plans for Desert Shield did not contemplate their use.

By November 14, 1990, the Army had activated 235 National Guard and Reserve units including 24,000 personnel from 44 States and Puerto Rico. Medical, maintenance, terminal operations, and a variety of other critical combat support and combat service support units were called to fill shortfalls both in CONUS and Saudi Arabia. More than 285 Naval Reserve units from 39 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico were ordered to active duty. Many of the units called, especially those with medical skills, were used to backfill critical vacancies created by the deployment of active duty personnel from CONUS facilities. Other Naval Reservists were called to participate in cargo-handling, minesweeping, control of shipping, sealift, logistics and intelligence missions. Some 32 Selected Reserve units from the Air Reserve components were called, to perform the ongoing and urgent airlift, aeromedical, and related requirements. During the week of October 7, the Marine Corps activated the first 157 members of the Fourth Marine Division. A total of 44,847 Selected Reservists were called to active duty by November 18.

TABLE II.—Selected Reservists Called to Active Duty Pursuant to Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673b

	August 21	September 30	October 28	November 18
Army	4,300	18,035	23,485	33,461
Navy	1,179	4,030	4,494	4,617
Air Force	1,556	3,562	4,489	5,041
Marine Corps	0	0	157	1,138
Coast Guard	0	181	181	590
Total	7,035	25,808	32,806	44,847

On December 1, 1990, and once again pursuant to section 673b of title 10, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Secretaries of the military departments to order to active duty a total of 188,000 members of the Selected Reserve, including as many as 115,000 members of the Army Selected Reserve, 30,000 members of the Navy Selected Reserve, 23,000 members of the Marine Corps Selected Reserve, and 20,000 members of the Air Force Selected Reserve. By January 13, 1991, a total of 146,106 Selected Reservists had been called to active duty in accordance with section 673b and thousands of Reserve volunteers remained on active duty.

TABLE III.—Selected Reservists (Unit Personnel) Called Pursuant to Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673b

	November 18	November 25	December 2	December 9	December 23	January 13
Army	32,938	52,058	69,240	83,720	87,567	102,172
Navy	4,616	5,416	6,849	6,979	7,438	11,366
Air Force	4,733	4,730	5,639	6,895	10,492	14,328
Marine Corps	1,101	3,932	10,551	15,861	16,354	17,962

TABLE III.—Selected Reservists (Unit Personnel) Called Pursuant to Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673b—Continued

	November 18	November 25	December 2	December 9	December 23	January 13
Coast Guard	280	278	278	278	280	278
Total	43,668	66,414	92,557	113,733	122,131	146,106

As Table IV demonstrates, the Reservists were engaged in a wide range of activities and missions.

TABLE IV.—Use of Selected Reservists in Operation Desert Shield

Component usage	Personnel
Army:	979
Combat (Field Artillery)	13,708
Transportation	8,242
Military Police	13,716
Supply and Service	6,548
Maintenance	1,074
Command and Control	2,554
Engineer	420
Intelligence	18,036
Medical	25,138
CONUS (Augmentation)	20,181
CONUS (In Preparation/CS,CSS)	13,000
CONUS (In Preparation/Combat)	
Total	123,596
Navy:	7,731
Medical	197
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare	51
Mine Sweepers	373
Military Sealift Command (MSC)	80
Naval Control of Shipping (NCS)	245
Intelligence	2,173
Logistics Support	28
Combat SAR (HCS)	644
Cargo Handling Battalions/Staff	2,314
Seabees	1,112
Ship Augment	635
Other/Miscellaneous	
Total	15,583
Marine Corps:	5,189
CONUS (Augmentation/Training)	16,840
MEF (Augmenting/Reinforcing)	674
Command and Control	
Total	22,703
Air Force:	3,149
Strategic Airlift	1,359
Tactical Airlift	5,226
Medical	169
Combat Communications	1,582
Fighter	606
Security Police	94
Supply and Service	2,948
Refueling	19
Command and Control	67
Intelligence	124
Search and Rescue (SAR)	10,467
CONUS Augmentation/Training	

TABLE IV.—Use of Selected Reservists in Operation Desert Shield—Continued

Component usage	Personnel
Total	25,810
Coast Guard:	
Port Security (USA)	462
Port Security (Middle East)	281
CONUS Augmentation/Training	57
Total	800

It is important to note that even before the armed conflict began, various *combat* units from the Selected Reserve were called to active duty along with a wide range of support units from each of the services. The labeling distinction between "combat" and "support" units and personnel can be more artificial than real, but it is fact that by January 15, 1991, the following National Guard and Reserve units were already serving in the Kuwait Theater of Operations:

TABLE V.—Selected Reserve Combat Units Called Prior to Operation "Desert Storm"

Service/Unit	Number of personnel
Army:	
142nd Field Artillery Brigade	1,410
196th Field Artillery Brigade	1,490
Marine Corps:	
14th Artillery Regiment	1,150
4th Tank Battalion	400
8th Tank Battalion	950
2/24th Infantry Battalion	810
3/23rd Infantry Battalion	890
1/25th Infantry Battalion	760
3/24th Infantry Battalion	800
Air Force:	
152nd Tactical Reconnaissance Group	140
174th Tactical Fighter Wing	450
169th Tactical Fighter Group	580
926th Tactical Fighter Group	425
Navy:	
USS IMPERVIOUS (MSO)	30
USS ADROIT (MSO)	20

On November 5, 1990, Congress amended section 673b to permit the activation by the President (in connection with Operation Desert Shield only) of combat units of the Selected Reserve for an extended period of time, up to 360 days. Only 3 days later, three Army National Guard "roundout" combat brigades were notified of the Army's plans to activate them. I will say more about the "roundout" concept and those brigades in the forthcoming hearing on the Total Force Policy.

The Call to Active Duty of the Ready Reserve

On January 16, 1991, Operation Desert Storm commenced. On January 18, 1991, the President authorized the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation to order to active duty members of the Ready Reserve, including units and individuals of both the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve, pursuant to the provisions of Section 673 of Title 10, United States Code. The immediate impact of the authorization was twofold. First, it permitted retention on active duty of certain Reservists who had critically needed skills for a period longer than the cumulative total of the 180 days authorized by section 673b of title 10. Second, it permitted a call to active duty of a total number of Ready Reservists in excess of the 200,000 authorized by section 673b.

The following day, Secretary Cheney authorized the Secretaries of the military departments to order to active duty units and individuals of the Ready Reserve. The services were authorized to call as many as 360,000 members of the Ready Reserve,

including 220,000 members of the Army Ready Reserve, 44,000 members of the Naval Ready Reserve, 44,000 members of the Marine Corps Ready Reserve, and 52,000 members of the Air Force Ready Reserve. The subsequent call to active duty of members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) was the first such call since May 1968. Members of the IRR are not assigned to units, have usually served previously on active duty or in the Selected Reserve, and have a remaining military service obligation. When Operation Desert Shield commenced, the IRR (including the Inactive National Guard) constituted some 13 percent of the Total Force and 28.6 percent of the Ready Reserve.

When combat operations in Desert Storm ceased on February 28, a total of 222,614 members of the Ready Reserve had been called to active duty, including 202,337 Selected Reservists and 20,277 members of the IRR. Table VI summarizes the number of Ready Reservists who have been called to date, including those called subsequent to the cessation of hostilities to assist in the return of equipment and units to the United States or the process of demobilization.

TABLE VI.—Ready Reservists Called To Active Duty as of March 10, 1991

Service	Selected Reserve	IRR	Total
Army	126,037	13,170	139,207
Navy	19,948	15	19,963
Marine Corps	26,659	6,204	32,863
Air Force	33,792	842	34,634
Coast Guard	990		990
Total	207,426	20,231	227,657

Responsiveness to Orders to Active Duty

Subsequent to the adoption of the Total Force Policy in 1973, and until August 22, 1990, no unit or individual of the Ready Reserve had been involuntarily called to active duty. All available indicators reflected the high quality of Reserve personnel, but there was no historical experience upon which to base conclusions about their likely responsiveness to involuntary calls to active duty. While a test of the responsiveness of randomly selected units of the Selected Reserve was conducted on October 24–26, 1987, that test was limited in that it involved only 15,451 Selected Reservists from 120 units, and it did not involve personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve. I informed the Congress in early 1988 that over 92 percent of the Reservists contacted in that test reported to their Reserve Center or Armory (or were excused), but I could not inform the Congress of the readiness or capability of the units involved in the test since readiness and capability were not tested.

The fact that it had not been necessary for any President to call Reservists to active duty in over two decades caused some observers to believe that Reservists would not be called for any reason short of a global conflict. Two of the most impressive and rewarding aspects of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, however, have been the smoothness of the process by which Reservists have been activated, and the responsiveness of Reservists in every service to the Nation's call to arms in what the Commander in Chief of Forces Command has called "the largest, fastest mobilization since World War II."

Much of the success of the activation can be attributed to the recently improved understanding of sections 673 and 673b (of title 10) by senior DOD policymakers. Intense focus on these statutory provisions by the Total Force Policy Study Group in 1990 and by participants in wargaming exercises in 1989 and 1990, paid dividends when it became necessary to actually exercise the authority granted by those provisions.

The responsiveness to orders to active duty of units and individuals from the Ready Reserve was very impressive. They responded with alacrity and high motivation. No significant problems were encountered and with minor exceptions, the number of Ready Reservists who were unable to deploy was comparable to that of Active units. The fact that almost 228,000 Ready Reservists have responded in this way is, by itself, eloquent testimony to the quality of the modern American National Guardsman and Reservist.

THE MANPOWER OF THE READY RESERVE

The Selected Reserve

The year-end strength of the Selected Reserve (of all of the Reserve components) which is requested in the President's budget for fiscal year 1992–1993 will decrease by 14 percent between fiscal year 1990 and fiscal year 1993. At the end of fiscal year 1993, the Selected Reserve will total 988,600. This will be the first time since fiscal year 1982 that the Selected Reserve end-strength is less than 1 million. The end-strength for fiscal year 1991 is projected to be 21,713 above the fiscal year 1990 actual strength, primarily as a result of congressional action which restored previously planned reductions of nearly 20,000 in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. By comparison, the fiscal year 1993 end-strength for the Active forces will decline to 1,794,500, some 249,200 or 12 percent less than the fiscal year 1990 level.

The most substantial strength reductions will take place in the Army Reserve components. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard will incur a combined reduction of 133,500 between fiscal year 1990 and fiscal year 1993. The Air Force Reserve will be the least affected, with a reduction of 1,400 personnel. The Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve will have reductions of 25,700 and 5,600, respectively, during the same fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1993 timeframe.

The force structure reflected in the President's budget is based upon the new military strategy which continues to assign major responsibilities for the Nation's defense to the Reserve components. The composition of the Total Force will thus be determined by the requirements of the new strategy and will not be the result of an effort to reduce Active and Reserve forces equally. Despite the overall reduction in budgeted strength, the Selected Reserve will continue to constitute about 35 percent of the 2.8 million member Total Force in fiscal year 1993.

TABLE VII.—Selected Reserve Manpower

[End Strength in Thousands]

	Actual fiscal year 1990	Estimate fiscal year 1991	Budget fiscal year 1992	Budget fiscal year 1993
Army National Guard	444.2	457.3	410.9	366.3
Army Reserve	310.1	318.7	282.7	254.5
Naval Reserve	152.8	153.4	134.6	127.1
Marine Corps Reserve	44.5	43.9	40.9	38.9
Air National Guard	117.8	117.0	118.1	119.4
Air Force Reserve	83.8	85.6	81.2	82.4
DOD Total	1,153.2	1,175.9	1,068.4	988.6
Coast Guard Reserve	12.1	12.0	12.0	12.0

Recruiting for the Selected Reserve

During fiscal year 1990, enlistments for the Selected Reserve totalled 215,537, an increase of over 3,000 above fiscal year 1989 enlistments. Estimated enlistment accessions for fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993, respectively, are 208,700 and 206,000.

Demographic projections for the decade of the 1990s suggest a declining population of young, qualified candidates for military service. Improved training opportunities, incentive programs, and entitlements, such as the Montgomery GI bill, will continue to be imperative if we are to continue to succeed with our Reserve manpower programs. Prior service enlistments (58.8 percent of the total) exceeded non-prior service enlistments by nearly 38,000 during fiscal year 1990. Table VIII summarizes the recruiting of enlisted personnel in the Selected Reserve.

TABLE VIII.—DOD Selected Reserve Enlisted Accessions Summary

[Members in thousands]

Category	Fiscal year 1980	Fiscal year 1985	Fiscal year 1990
Army National Guard	97.1	83.0	76.6
Army Reserve	59.4	78.9	67.5
Naval Reserve	28.1	33.1	35.4

TABLE VIII.—DOD Selected Reserve Enlisted Accessions Summary—Continued

[Members in thousands]

Category	Fiscal year 1980	Fiscal year 1985	Fiscal year 1990
Marine Corps Reserve	9.3	9.7	11.8
Air National Guard	16.0	14.9	12.3
Air Force Reserve	12.1	13.2	11.9
Totals	222.1	232.8	215.5

The quality of enlisted Reserve personnel remains high. In 1990 more than 87 percent of non-prior service enlistees had a high school education or equivalent, and more than 93 percent tested in categories I–III on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. The overall improvement in the quality of non-prior service recruits since 1980 is substantial, as shown in Table IX.

TABLE IX.—Selected Reserve Enlistments (DOD) Quality Indicators

	Percent High School Diploma Graduates [1]	Percent in AFQT Categories I–III [2]	Total Non-Prior Service Accessions [3]
Fiscal year 1980	66	73	93,700
Fiscal year 1990	93	93	88,900

[1] Includes equivalency certificate and diploma graduates as well as high school students who enlisted prior to their graduation and were expected to graduate.
[2] AFQT Categories I–III include enlistees who score average or above on the enlistment test.
[3] Rounded to the nearest hundred.

The gains in quality and readiness are due to several factors. Perhaps the most important is the fact that Reservists are volunteers who make the sacrifices required of military service because they choose to do so. Another critical factor has been the assignment to the Reserve forces of broader peacetime operating responsibilities and wartime missions in the context of the Total Force Policy.

On the basis of recent discussions with senior Reserve leaders and manpower experts, I continue to believe that it is premature to reach even tentative conclusions about the short-term impact of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm on the recruiting and retention of Reservists. I continue to be confident, however, about long-term prospects. The first several chapters of what I have described as the book on Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm are well known. We are still writing the final chapter. If its is written as well as the first chapters, our future recruiting and retention challenges will likely be considerably less difficult than some observers have predicted.

The absence of clear trends in recruiting and retention is due in great part to the unique characteristics of Reserve recruiting. It also results from certain policy actions involving personnel that have been taken in connection with Desert Shield/Desert Storm and from certain other steps which have been taken to improve the readiness of Reserve units independent of the events in the Persian Gulf. Reserve recruiting is, for example, focused almost entirely on the requirements of particular units within relatively limited geographic areas. In the case of the Reserve components of the Army and Air Force, recruiting within particular units necessarily ceased when those units were activated. Recruiting to fill vacancies in a Reserve unit is very difficult when the unit has been activated along with all or most of its recruiting force.

The implementation of "stop-loss" policies within both the Active force and Reserve components has also played a role, since 6 of every 10 accessions into the Selected Reserve are individuals who have prior military service. The retention within the Active component of personnel who would otherwise have affiliated with a National Guard or Reserve unit upon being released from active duty has obviously had an impact on recruiting for Reserve units. This is particularly true for the Reserve components of the Army, since over one-third of all enlisted personnel who leave the active Army are eligible for or required to perform continued service affiliation with either the Army National Guard or the Army Reserve.

The Department of Defense has devoted considerable resources to the promotion of the Montgomery GI bill for the Selected Reserve. The Joint Recruiting Advertis-

ing Program (JRAP), responsible for communicating the benefits and opportunities common to all services to increase enlistments in the Armed Forces, funds a monthly mailing to 120,000 to 140,000 young men recently registered with the Selective Service. The documents received by this target group explain the opportunities which exist in the Active forces and Reserve components, and the benefits of the Montgomery GI bill. The funding of this program for fiscal year 1991 is $13.4 million. The JRAP also sends copies of the Futures magazine, featuring armed services advertising, to most high school seniors. Table X identifies Recruiting Resources by Reserve component for fiscal years 1990 through 1993.

TABLE X.—Recruiting Resources by Reserve Component

[Current dollars in millions]

Component	Actual fiscal year 1990	Programmed fiscal year 1991	Budget fiscal year 1992	Budget fiscal year 1993
Army National Guard	260.0	272.1	255.5	239.2
Army Reserve	214.2	237.8	224.5	200.0
Naval Reserve	90.4	90.4	82.7	81.9
Marine Corps Reserve [1]	20.6	20.8	20.6	21.0
Air National Guard	47.4	46.2	47.2	47.6
Air Force Reserve	33.7	32.2	33.5	35.2
Joint Advertising	2.1	1.0	.8	.6
Totals	668.4	700.5	664.8	625.5

[1] Does not include resources (estimated 30.2 million annually) reflected in Active budget for recruiting of approximately 7,800 NPS personnel.

Entitlement to educational assistance under the Montgomery GI bill requires an obligated term of service of at least 6 years in the Selected Reserve. One measure of the value of this legislation is its effect on the number of 6-year enlistments. Since the inception of the program, accessions committing to 6-year or greater terms of service have steadily increased. The proportion of new accessions (non-prior service) electing 6-year terms has increased from 39 percent in fiscal year 1985 to 68 percent in fiscal year 1990. While other enlistment bonuses and general economic conditions have contributed to this success, there is no doubt that the Montgomery GI bill is a significant factor. At the end of fiscal year 1990, 45 percent of all members eligible for educational assistance had actually applied for the benefits. This is up from 39 percent at the end of fiscal year 1989.

Because of the complexity of program administration associated with the provision of educational assistance to all National Guardsmen and Reservists, continued emphasis has been placed on improving administrative procedures and automated systems. While emphasis has been on accuracy and efficiency in providing benefits to members who are participating, satisfactorily, DOD has also developed initial procedures for implementing recoupment procedures for members who have not participated satisfactorily.

Table XI compares program eligibles to participants for fiscal years 1989 and 1990. The percentage of eligibles actually applying for educational assistance increased in all components during the past year.

TABLE XI.—Montgomery GI Bill—Selected Reserve Percentage of Applicants to Eligibles

[As of September 30, 1990]

Reserve component	Eligibles	Applicants	Percentage of participation	
			Fiscal year 1990	Fiscal year 1989
Army National Guard	196,031	78,287	40.0	34.5
Army Reserve	84,714	48,716	57.5	53.0
Naval Reserve	42,279	20,753	49.1	43.2
Marine Corps Reserve	23,709	14,116	59.5	55.2
Air National Guard	55,454	22,440	40.5	38.0
Air Force Reserve	39,236	13,284	33.9	29.8
Coast Guard Reserve	4,106	1,546	37.7	30.9

TABLE XI.—Montgomery GI Bill—Selected Reserve Percentage of Applicants to Eligibles—Continued

[As of September 30, 1990]

Reserve component	Eligibles	Applicants	Percentage of participation	
			Fiscal year 1990	Fiscal year 1989
Total Selected Reserve	445,529	199,142	44.7	39.7

The Montgomery GI bill has proven to be particularly attractive to high school graduates interested in pursuing their education. Eighty-eight percent of the enlisted participants are under age 30, while only 65 percent of all enlisted members are under age 30. Fifty-four percent of the participants are under age 22. Eighty-seven percent of the total Selected Reserve population is male and 13 percent female as compared to a Montgomery GI bill program distribution of 81 percent male and 19 percent female. Of the total female Selected Reserve population, 23 percent are applicants. Table XII identifies the benefit level of participants by Reserve component. At a White House ceremony on June 5, 1990, the enrollment of the 1-millionth individual to sign up for the Montgomery GI bill was celebrated.

TABLE XII.—Montgomery GI Bill—Selected Reserve Level of Individual Participation by Component

Reserve component	Full-time	¾ time	½ time	Percentage full or ¾
Army National Guard	37,703	6,113	6,752	86.6
Army Reserve	20,837	3,794	4,319	85.1
Naval Reserve	8,398	1,917	2,562	80.1
Marine Corps Reserve	7,657	1,420	1,173	88.6
Air National Guard	9,858	2,267	3,803	76.1
Air Force Reserve	4,422	1,437	2,425	70.7
Total Selected Reserve[1]	88,875	16,948	21,034	83.4

[1] Participants receiving benefits while attending on a less than half time basis are not shown. Eligibility for less than half time study began in November 1988. The Coast Guard Reserve is not included due to the extent of missing data on level of participants.

Assistance for vocational/technical programs was added to the Selected Reserve program on October 1, 1990. The programs which are eligible for assistance include: (a) apprenticeship training and other on-the-job training, (b) cooperative study programs, (c) approved correspondence courses, (d) refresher, remedial, and deficiency training, (e) work study assistance, and (f) a test flight training program. In order to receive assistance for these benefits, an individual must enlist, reenlist, or extend his service obligation for 6 years on or after October 1, 1990.

The annual cost of the GI bill program for fiscal years 1985 through fiscal year 1993, is reflected in Table XIII.

TABLE XIII.—Montgomery GI Bill—Selected Reserve Annual Obligations

	Dollars in millions
Actual:	
Fiscal year 1985	$19.9
Fiscal year 1989	81.6
Fiscal year 1990	78.1
Estimate:	
Fiscal year 1991	94.9
Budget:	
Fiscal year 1991	80.4
Fiscal year 1993	77.7

In July 1990, the DOD Education Benefits Board of Actuaries reevaluated the per capita normal costs charged to the services. Based upon a new population model and

revised participation rates, the estimated obligations to the Education Benefits Fund for fiscal year 1990 and beyond were adjusted.

The Montgomery GI bill for the Selected Reserve is unique for two reasons. First, it provides benefits to participants before their required service is completed so long as they have completed initial training. Second, the program is available to all Reservists who agree to serve for 6 years, and not just to new enlistees. Program administration is shared by the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMCC) acts as the central clearing house between DOD and DVA for service reports of eligibility. This information is passed weekly to the DVA which makes it available to their regional offices. Benefit payments are processed by the DVA in the same manner as any other entitlement program. The challenge of administrating and maintaining a functional educational benefits system encompassing all Reserve components, DMDC, and the DVA is being met and managed with fewer problems each year.

Employer/Community Support of Reservists

On August 16, 1990, the Secretary of Defense directed me to take the lead, working with other of his senior policy advisors, to ensure that the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR), an agency of my office, was fully prepared to perform its responsibilities in the event of a call-up of Reserve forces. I was further directed to ensure that units and individuals that might be called to active duty received the community support they would need in their States and localities.

To that end, I met immediately with senior officials of each military department to prepare and implement an action plan for employer and community support. A 24-hour telephone watch was established in the offices of NCESGR to handle the thousands of calls that might be expected regarding a wide range of employer-related issues once any call-up was announced. The 3,700 volunteer civilian members of NCESGR of each of the individual States and territories were asked to visit previously assigned Reserve units to answer questions about employer-related issues. They were also encouraged to contact local employers and to publicly convey appreciation for their support. NCESGR extended its operation to 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. New materials explaining the reemployment rights of veterans were prepared and immediately sent to the chairmen of the individual State committees. An intense media campaign was initiated. A new advertisement relating directly to Operation Desert Shield was prepared and was immediately aired in markets across the United States.

A broad national effort was also made to make known to the public the 800-toll free telephone number of NCESGR. National distribution of the 800 number was made to radio and television stations as public service advertising through the Advertising Council. Additional telephone lines were installed in the offices of NCESGR, and by the time the President signed the August 22, 1990 Executive order authorizing the call to active duty of members of the Selected Reserve, we were ready.

As expected, immediately after the announcement of the President's authorization, a huge volume of questions regarding employment and reemployment rights and obligations were raised by Reservists and employers around the country, as well as by industry groups and members of the media. Daily inquiries and complaints jumped from slightly over 200 a day to over 800 each day, on average. To ensure that deploying Reservists were informed about their reemployment rights upon their return, I asked members of our volunteer State committees to travel to the several mobilization sites to be available to answer questions and to distribute relevant materials. A similar effort is currently underway at the demobilization sites for returning Reservists. Work is also proceeding to address other problems that may arise during the demobilization process.

A separate effort has been made to protect the educational opportunities for Reservists who have been called. The Secretary of Defense has written to all State Governors to solicit their support of State legislation to protect the rights of Reservists to return to their college upon completion of active service, and for refunds of tuition and fees which have been paid by activated Reservists for semesters they are unable to complete. The Sense of Congress which was expressed in section 373 of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 and which relates to tuition refunds or credits for members of the Armed Forces on active duty will also be very helpful.

Our experience in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm demonstrated that when the Nation calls, America's employers generally respond with the kind of support that is needed. Although under no obligation to do so, many employers offered

significant pay and other benefits which are not provided to other employees on leave or furlough. Many employers also provided limited paid military leave or made up the difference between regular and military pay for specified periods of time for their employee-Reservists who were called to active duty. Some companies also continued health benefits and provided support to the families of their employee-Reservists.

Separately, special efforts were, made to assist the families of Reservists who were called to active duty. A detailed pamphlet for Reserve families entitled "Ordered to Active Duty—What Now?", was prepared, distributed widely, and was well received. It included important information on compensation, medical care, available services at military installations, family assistance, legal assistance, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, civilian reemployment rights, and other matters of concern to Reservists and their families. It also included a personal letter from Secretary Cheney to the families of Reservists who were called to active duty. Additionally, a second pamphlet entitled "Released from Active Duty—What Now?", has been produced. It is designed to assist Reservists and their families with the transition from active duty, back to Reserve and civilian status.

Special efforts were also made last fall after the commencement of Operation Desert Shield to present recommendations to the Congress for amendments to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. An area of particular concern which was, not previously covered by that act, involved professional liability protection for certain Reservists who were ordered to active duty. Another area of concern was the need for reimbursement or crediting of tuition of Reservists whose schooling was interrupted by their service in support of Operation Desert Shield. Certain other features of the act also required prompt attention. We have been very gratified by the passage of the legislative amendments to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act which the Department recommended.

Another major legislative proposal was submitted for your consideration on February 21. This proposal, entitled the "Uniformed Services Reemployment Rights Act of 1991," is the product of the work of an interagency task force. It will update, clarify and strengthen reemployment assistance for persons after service in the uniformed services and encourage active participation in the Reserve components. I strongly endorse and recommend passage of this piece of legislation which my office has worked on for almost 3 years.

I would also note that on February 19, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the government's *Petition for Certiorari* in the case of *King* v. *St. Vincent's Hospital*. The issue presented by the case is whether an employee-Reservist's right under Title 38, U.S. Code, Section 2024(d) to a leave of absence from employment to serve on active duty is conditional on the "reasonableness" of the employee-Reservist's request for leave. I am hopeful that the Court's future decision will clear current ambiguities which are the result of conflicts in the case law of certain of the Federal judicial circuits.

More routine work relating to the enhancement of support by employers of Reservists also took place during 1990. Using scheduled aircraft training missions, NCESGR transported some 2,900 employers on 79 separate "bosslifts" to observe field training of National Guardsmen and Reservists. The employers received briefings on the roles and mission capabilities of the various Reserve forces and visited a wide range of military training centers. A series of training workshops was also conducted to improve the competence of the State-level volunteer committees. Action was also taken on more than 9,000 inquiries or complaints, a 28 percent increase over 1989.

The Individual Ready Reserve

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is the principal source of trained individuals to fill wartime manpower shortages in Active and Reserve units. Plans call for the IRR to be used to fill shortages in existing units, as well as to replace combat casualties during the early stages of a full mobilization.

The IRR was used by all of the services in support of Operation Desert Storm. The Army placed the most reliance on the IRR, sending IRR members to the theater of operations to fill individual billets. Members of the Army IRR also filled specific billets in Europe and the United States as backfill for deployed active duty soldiers. The Navy called a few IRR language specialists to active duty. The members of the Marine Corps IRR formed combat replacement companies, provided support for bases and stations, served as members of casualty and family assistance teams and conducted mobilization processing. The Air Force called a small number of IRR medical personnel to active duty to fill specific shortfalls.

The use of the IRR in Desert Storm illustrates the importance of the Department's annual screen. The screen helps each service maintain current information on the location and availability for activation of members of the IRR. It reminds the Reservists of their remaining military obligations. It also provides encouragement for IRR members to upgrade their status and join a Selected Reserve unit. Over 10,000 IRR members per year indicate a desire to affiliate with a local unit. The results of the screening for fiscal year 1990 are reflected in Table XIV.

TABLE XIV.—IRR Muster Screening Results [1]

	Ordered to screen	Numbers screened	Show rate (percent)
Army	115,584	37,132	32.1
Navy	18,086	8,892	49.2
Air Force	25,671	23,088	89.9
Marine Corps	18,393	15,055	81.9

[1] In addition, the services conduct "by mail" screenings of IRR members not available for the active duty screening.

Table XV reflects the Individual Ready Reserve strength profile by Reserve component.

TABLE XV.—IRR End Strength

	Fiscal year 1990 actual	Fiscal year 1991 estimate	Fiscal year 1993 projected
Army National Guard [1]	11,036	10,507	10,507
Army Reserve	284,248	413,464	458,368
Naval Reserve	87,439	102,000	115,000
Marine Corps Reserve	36,825	54,800	69,900
Air Force Reserve	68,714	65,296	67,046
Totals	488,262	646,067	720,821

[1] Inactive National Guard (ING) is included in the Ready Reserve.

Full-Time Support Personnel

The full-time support program remains fundamental to the Reserve components. The four types of personnel who provide full time support are members of the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR), Military Technicians, members of the Active component, and Civil Service personnel. They contribute materially to Reserve unit readiness and deployability. They organize, train, recruit, and administer the Reserve component forces, as well as maintain equipment and perform other logistical activities.

The goal of the Department of Defense is to maintain a level of full-time support which is commensurate with the readiness requirements of specific Reserve units and program affordability. While the size of the Selected Reserve has increased by approximately 40 percent over the last decade, the full-time support force has increased by over 50 percent. The President's budget for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 requests reductions in both the Military Technician program and Active Guard/Reserve program, but the full-time support force will continue to grow slightly when considered as a percentage of the total Selected Reserve. This modest improvement is a step toward achieving our desire to attain adequate levels of full-time support during a period of significant change.

Our management of this important program continues to improve. We are currently working to develop staffing principles for full-time support personnel which will apply to all of the Reserve components and which will permit us to establish staffing priorities when shortfalls exist. We are also conducting a review of Military Technician compensation. These actions, coupled with last year's development of new accounting methods for the full-time support personnel, represent a continued improvement in the management of this critical program.

The fiscal year 1992 full-time support levels will closely approximate those requested in fiscal year 1991 with some changes in composition of the force as indicated above. As the Active forces reduce overhead end-strength in such areas as classroom training, unit training, base operating support, and other important functions

which also benefit the Selected Reserve, the Reserve components may well need to increase their full-time staff to provide that support. This requirement will tend to offset reductions associated with force level changes.

TABLE XVI.—Full-Time Support (End Strength) Active Guard and Reserve (AGR)

	Actual fiscal year 1990	Estimate fiscal year 1991	Budget fiscal year 1992	Budget fiscal year 1993
Army National Guard	25,788	26,199	23,341	21,580
Army Reserve	13,703	13,344	12,683	12,003
Naval Reserve	22,672	22,997	22,045	21,113
Marine Corps Reserve	2,305	2,401	2,170	2,130
Air National Guard	8,641	8,468	9,081	9,072
Air Force Reserve	688	655	643	618
Total	73,797	74,064	69,963	66,516

TABLE XVII.—Full-Time Support (End Strength) Active Component

	Actual fiscal year 1990	Estimate fiscal year 1991	Budget fiscal year 1992	Budget fiscal year 1993
Army National Guard	546	546	546	546
Army Reserve	1,163	1,163	1,163	1,163
Naval Reserve	8,490	7,866	6,377	5,967
Marine Corps Reserve	5,537	4,908	4,241	4,070
Air National Guard	569	617	627	630
Air Force Reserve	586	664	716	721
Total	16,891	15,764	13,670	13,097

TABLE XVIII.—Full-Time Support (End Strength) Civilian

	Actual fiscal year 1990	Estimate fiscal year 1991	Budget fiscal year 1992	Budget fiscal year 1993
Army National Guard	419	391	439	439
Army Reserve	1,724	1,880	1,775	1,722
Naval Reserve	2,980	2,974	2,804	2,708
Marine Corps Reserve	383	292	286	280
Air National Guard	1,839	2,034	1,886	1,887
Air Force Reserve	4,533	4,435	4,769	5,225
Total	11,878	12,006	11,959	12,261

TABLE XIX.—Full-Time Support (End Strength) Technicians

	Actual fiscal year 1990	Estimate fiscal year 1991	Budget fiscal year 1992	Budget fiscal year 1993
Army National Guard	28,550	28,521	27,138	25,146
Army Reserve	8,587	8,529	7,082	6,161
Air National Guard	24,119	24,460	24,639	25,422
Air Force Reserve	9,596	10,316	10,343	10,357
Total	70,852	71,826	69,202	67,086

The Reserve Officers Personnel Management Act

The Department of Defense submitted a major legislative proposal to revise the laws governing Reserve officer appointments, promotions, separations, and transfers to the Retired Reserve to the 99th, 100th, and 101st Congresses. The Reserve Officer

Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) proposal has been developed to closely parallel the provisions of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) which was enacted in 1980 to improve the management of Active force officers. To date, while legislation has not been enacted, the Department continues to strongly support the ROPMA proposal. If enacted, the legislation would provide a uniform and improved personnel management system for Reserve officers. It would help ensure equitable, cost-effective management of Reserve officers and enhance the readiness of the Reserve forces. The provisions of ROPMA are particularly important with respect to improved and more uniform management for officers serving in the health professions and in other competitive categories such as judge advocates and chaplains. It would stimulate long-range planning which is necessary to provide Reserve officers with attractive and meaningful careers.

We need to attract and retain officers of the proper age and grade, with the skills and experience needed by today's Reserve components. ROPMA is the means to that end, since it would provide flexible personnel management needed to react to changing roles, missions, and force structure. I urge you to act on this important management proposal as quickly as possible.

Equal Opportunity for Reservists

The Reserve components have been full partners in the DOD Equal Opportunity initiatives. Representatives of the Office of Reserve Affairs participate actively in the Defense Equal Opportunity Council, as well as on the working groups and subcommittees within the Council and the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the services. The recently published DOD Instruction establishing new Affirmative Action planning and reporting requirements requires Reserve components to track the same data as the Active components. Representatives of my office participate in the analysis of the affirmative action plan goals and achievements of both the Active and the Reserve components.

The overall racial and ethnic composition of the Reserve generally parallels that of the Active Forces, although there are many regional differences, particularly in the Army Guard, based upon the available manpower pool in specific geographic locations.

Minority accessions are increasing across all Reserve components. The assimilation of minorities into such technical categories as aviation, electronics, and certain maritime career fields has enhanced promotion opportunities. The leadership of each of the Reserve components remains active in advancing numerous programs aimed at assisting minority members.

The percentage of women in the Selected Reserve has increased for 9 consecutive years. At the end of fiscal year 1990, it was approximately 13.1 percent. Barely a decade ago women comprised less than 5 percent of the National Guard and Federal Reserve forces, and were serving in traditional functional areas such as administration, personnel, and medicine. They now serve in all military specialities, except those prohibited by legislation and associated service policies. Women now also serve in many career fields which historically have been staffed exclusively by men (e.g., operations, intelligence, and maintenance). Senior National Guard and Reserve leadership is ensuring that career and leadership opportunities are afforded to women. National Guard and Reserve women now comprise 40.3 percent of all women in the Armed Forces.

Reserve Family Member Identification Card

National Guard/Reserve Family Member Identification Cards are currently being produced at the service level. Distribution of the new DOD identification cards will begin as soon as the implementing DOD instruction is published. The new ID cards will replace current service-specific Reserve Dependent ID Cards on a phase-in basis.

The DOD Family member ID Card will provide an improved means of ensuring that only bonafide dependents of Reservists have access to commissary, exchange, and MWR privileges. The identification cards will also enhance the security on military installations by providing verification of an individual's relationship to a Reserve sponsor. I anticipate that by 1994, the only acceptable identification for a National Guard or Reserve dependent will be either the active duty dependent ID card or the DOD Guard/Reserve Family Member ID Card.

I am also pleased to report that the Armed Forces Commissary Privilege Card has been fully fielded to all eligible members of the Selected Reserve. Although the card will be issued mainly in the sponsor's name from a central source within each service and on an annual basis, units may request the issuance of a card at anytime during the year.

New Benefits for Reserve Retirees Entitled to Pay at Age 60 (But Not Yet Age 60), Other Reserve Members, and Their Dependents

I am pleased to report the significant gratitude of those Reservists who have earned their retirement, but who have not reached the retirement-pay age of 60, for the provision in the fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Act which authorizes as many as 12 commissary visits per calendar year, and which further provides unlimited exchange, and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) privileges for those Reservists and their authorized dependents. We are continuing to work energetically to issue to these members and their dependents, Armed Forces identification cards and commissary privilege cards and to move these communities into the Defense Enrollment and Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS). These new benefits will affect approximately 575,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen and 1.7 million eligible dependents.

THE EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT

Equipment Readiness

During fiscal year 1990, the Department of Defense and the services continued to improve the equipment status of the Reserve components. The effect of increased funding during the decade of the 1980s continues to be reflected in both improved capabilities and higher equipment fill-rates, as witnessed in Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

On the basis of a representative sampling of over 1,500 major line items, as reflected in my fiscal year 1992 report to Congress on the status of National Guard and Reserve equipment, I estimate that equipment valued at $9.7 billion was delivered to National Guard and Reserve forces in fiscal year 1990. This included fixed and rotary winged aircraft, ships, tanks, tactical and support vehicles, as well as engineering, communication, and other equipment. Future projections indicate a declining level of equipment deliveries to the Reserve components which will average approximately $5.8 billion annually over the next 4 years. This reduction is in direct correlation to the level of service procurement funding.

On the basis of this representative sample, it is my opinion that if the Reserve component forces were to be fully mobilized during the current fiscal year, they would be able to field overall, in terms of dollar value, almost 88 percent of the current requirements for the selected items in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report. To reach this percentage, they would have to make use of available substitutes. During fiscal year 1992, they would be able to field approximately 95 percent of their required equipment—in terms of dollar value. However, this 95 percent rate would be reduced to 86 percent if substitute items were not used. It should be kept in mind that any projections on equipment availability are subject to the effects of Operation Desert Storm.

The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report includes a 4 year projection of each service's plan to deliver new and redistributed equipment. As in past years, the services had varying degrees of success in the implementation of their equipment distribution and procurement plans. Variations occur because of fluctuations in contractor delivery schedules and quantities as well as changes in funding strategies. For instance, deliveries may be delayed beyond the fiscal year, or projected quantities may not be delivered as scheduled. The inverse of this situation also occurs; that is, sometimes equipment is produced and distributed ahead of schedule.

The data for fiscal year 1990 reflect a wide disparity in the program execution rates for the Reserve components. For example, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve executed 94 percent and 99 percent, respectively, of the programmed deliveries. These high rates are consistent with the rates of the previous year and are due primarily to the success of those components in the transitioning of aircraft from the Active to the Reserve components in accordance with programmed schedules.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve executed 61 percent and 23 percent, respectively, of programmed deliveries. The main reasons for these lower execution rates were threefold: (1) unprogrammed factory diversions of helicopters and tactical wheeled vehicles to Active component units in support of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm; (2) delayed deliveries of $71 million of 5-ton trucks because of pending product improvement modifications; and (3) canceled purchases of armored personnel carriers. It should be noted, however, that the Army Reserve rate has historically been the lowest of the Reserve components below 50 percent. This is due mainly to the large number of combat service support units which either do not deploy or are scheduled to deploy late in a conflict. Those units receive a lower priority of procurement funding when the budget becomes more constrained. Their resourcing

priority is low in accordance with the Department's "first-to-fight, first-to-be-equipped" policy.

Even if the Department of Defense achieves 100 percent execution of its current equipment redistribution and procurement plans, shortfalls will remain. The fiscal year 1992 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report projects a very impressive on-hand equipment fill-rate of 97 percent of mobilization requirements, counting available substitutes by the end of fiscal year 1994. The 97 percent rate would be reduced to 93 percent if substitutes were not used. This unprecedented fill-rate still leaves an equipment shortfall of approximately $6 billion, or $4 billion less than last year's shortfall forecast of $10 billion. This decrease in shortfall is due primarily to decreasing requirements resulting from force structure changes.

Service plans for fiscal year 1992 Reserve component equipment procurement are contained in the Department's P-1R report which accompanied the President's budget. It reflects the types, quantities, and costs of equipment to be procured for the Reserve components. The report identifies $1.45 billion for National Guard and Reserve equipment procurement in fiscal year 1992.

Fiscal year 1991 was the first year in which the Department submitted a specific request for $455 million in the President's budget for the funding of equipment for the Reserve component forces. For fiscal year 1992, overall budgetary constraints on investment preclude inclusion of a specific request beyond those requirements reflected in the services' procurement requests.

Table XX illustrates Reserve component procurement as a portion of the Department of Defense procurement totals for fiscal years 1989 through 1991, along with the fiscal year 1992 request. The total amount appropriated for the Guard and Reserve during fiscal years 1989 through 1991 includes the P-1R request, the DOD specific procurement request for Reserve components (fiscal year 1991 only), and congressional adds. The fiscal year 1992 request for the Guard and Reserve contains the (P-1R) request only.

TABLE XX.—Department of Defense Procurement

[Dollars in billions]

	Fiscal year 1989	Fiscal year 1990	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992 (Request)
Total DOD	79.70	81.29	64.29	63.40
Guard and Reserve	3.52	4.91	4.04	1.45

Table XXI shows the total procurement appropriation for fiscal year 1991 broken out by Reserve component. The total is further broken into its elements, namely the P-1R request, the DOD specific request for the Reserve components, and the congressional adds, including funding for drug interdiction equipment.

TABLE XXI.—Fiscal Year 1991 Procurement by Reserve Component

[Dollars in millions]

Component	P-1R	DOD	Congressional Adds	Drug Interdiction	Total
ARNG	633	133	663	16	1,445
USAR	193	61	10	4	268
USMCR	46	25	135	2	208
USNR	230	60	598	4	892
ANG	331	130	493	22	976
USAFR	91	46	109	4	250
Total	1,524	[1] 455	[1] 2,008	[2] 52	4,039

[1] The total fiscal year 1991 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation is $2,463 million.
[2] Congress subsequently specified $52 million of the $1,084 million fiscal year 1991 DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug account for the procurement of drug interdiction equipment for the Reserve components.

National Guard and Reserve Facilities

More than 33,000 Reserve component buildings at more than 5,400 locations in communities all across the country symbolize the importance of the Reserve forces

to our national security. The physical condition and appearance of these structures are very important to the readiness of Reserve component units.

The Department places a high priority on the stewardship of these facilities. Approximately $683 million has been requested for fiscal year 1992 for Real Property Maintenance Activity accounts. This is essentially the same as the $675 million spent in fiscal year 1990 for this purpose. Almost 40 percent of the requested funding will pay utility bills and leases. The remaining 60 percent will be directed to facility maintenance, repair, and improvement. Reflecting the general shortage of Repair and Maintenance Activity funds and the substantially higher costs for heating, lighting, and other utility services, the fiscal year 1992 funding level will not permit a reduction in the backlog of maintenance and repair (BMAR). We project an increase of $186 million above the fiscal year 1989 BMAR level of $471 million.

Our fiscal years 1992–1993 Guard and Reserve Military Construction budget requests $281 million in fiscal year 1992 and $186 million in fiscal year 1993. The fiscal year 1992 request is consistent with the level of our fiscal year 1991 request. As part of the effort to make further reductions in the Department's budget, the Secretary of Defense has recommended to the President that only critically essential military construction be programmed for fiscal year 1993. Included in the fiscal year 1993 request is $137 million for minor new construction and facility repair which previously had been in the operation and maintenance account.

We still have an enormous Reserve military construction backlog. It is currently valued at more than $8 billion. Some of that may disappear as units which need construction leave the force structure. But, a substantial National Guard and Reserve construction budget will be required for the foreseeable future. While we would like to do more sooner, the $281 million which is requested for fiscal year 1992 and the pause in fiscal year 1993, reflect a prudent use of very limited defense dollars.

The Fight Against Illegal Drugs

Acting in title 32 or "State" status and in accordance with plans submitted by the Governors of all 54 States and territories, the National Guard performed over 5,000 counternarcotics missions in fiscal year 1990 and devoted almost 450,000 mandays to those missions. This was almost three times the total of the year before. Every day spent by National Guard personnel on counternarcotics duty was entirely voluntary.

National Guard personnel were assigned duties in fiscal year 1990 that conformed as nearly as possible to individual military occupational specialties. The duties included special training programs for law enforcement officers and National Guard personnel, aerial and ground transportation of law enforcement officers and contraband, and numerous radar and imagery missions unique to National Guard capabilities. Other support missions included inspection of commercial cargo at land border entry points, seaports and international airports. During three major operations in fiscal year 1990, National Guard personnel manned surveillance posts along the southwest border, provided ground and aerial surveillance of remote, clandestine airstrips, and provided important communications support. Various types of equipment were used in the operations, including tactical ground transport and cargo vehicles, communications equipment, tactical radar, night vision devices, Army National Guard (ARNG) rotary wing aircraft (UH-1, OH-6, OH-58, and UH-60) and ARNG fixed wing aircraft (OV-1D, C-7, C-12 and U-21). Air National Guard aircraft used included RF-4C reconnaissance, F-16, C-12 and C-130 transport, and KC-135 tanker aircraft.

With assistance from the National Guard, the United States Customs Service was able to inspect 14 percent of all containers arriving from source or transit countries, up from 4 percent prior to the introduction of National Guard support. The containers inspected from all countries in fiscal year 1990 included 2,938,923 full and 507,212 empty. Customs Service seizures for fiscal year 1990 (included in seizure totals above) were supported by approximately 981 Guard personnel from 21 States. The Customs Service has informed the Department that this support by the National Guard was "invaluable."

National Guard personnel also helped eradicate over 6.7 million marijuana plants in fiscal year 1990. They assisted law enforcement agencies in the seizures and confiscations shown in Table XXII.

TABLE XXII.—National Guard Marijuana Eradication in Fiscal Year 1990

	Quantities	[1] Value
Cocaine	15,384 kg	$231-$615 million
Marijuana:		
Processed	27,021 lbs	8.1-54.0 million
Eradications	6.1 million plants	6.7-21.4 billion
Heroine	221 kg	14.4-53.0 million
Money		18.3 million
Vehicles (including air and water craft)		446
Weapons		614
Ammunition		63,480 rounds

[1] Wholesale Price Range, DEA Illicit Drugs Price Report, July-September 1990.

Included in the cash confiscated was one seizure on September 7, 1990 over $6 million which entered the country through the port at New York City. Counterdrug operations by the Kentucky National Guard, a State with one of the most aggressive eradication programs, resulted in the eradication of 550,000 marijuana plants and the arrest of 250 people in fiscal year 1990. Kentucky Guard personnel spent over 22,000 manhours in this effort.

The counternarcotics activities of the Federal Reserve forces have necessarily been limited by the restrictions of the *Posse Comitatus Act* of 1978 and a lack of authority for the appropriation of pay and allowances funding to the Reserve Forces. Fiscal year 1991 authorization and appropriations language resolved this issue. An increased use of Reserve forces is taking place this year. Reservists have made critical contributions to the efforts of the Commanders of Joint Task Force 4 (Key West, Florida), Joint Task Force 5 (Alameda, California), and Joint Task Force 6 (Fort Bliss, Texas) in their performance of their DOD mission. The support has involved and will continue to involve the use of Reserve forces as well as Active component forces. The Marine Corps Reserve, for example, has provided training and equipment support to law enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Border Patrol and U.S. Customs Service. The Naval Air Reserve has flown surveillance sorties in support of drug enforcement efforts while Naval Reserve ships provide individual support. The Air Force Reserve provides support in the form of aerial transportation and surveillance on training flights. Coast Guard Reservists contribute directly by performing such duties as port security, surface interdiction, investigations, boardings, and surveillance.

THE FISCAL YEAR 1992-1993 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE RESERVE COMPOMENT

Table XXIII summarizes the budget requests which have been submitted for the Reserve components for fiscal years 1992-1993.

TABLE XXIII.—Reserve Component Budget Requests February 4, 1991 Submission

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year 1991 estimate	Fiscal year 1992 budget	Fiscal year 1993 budget
Army National Guard:			
Military Personnel	3,466.9	3,201.7	3,038.6
Operation and Maintenance	2,024.9	2,080.7	2,083.7
Military Construction	313.2	50.4	54.1
Totals	5,805.0	5,332.8	5,176.4
Army Reserve:			
Military Personnel	2,368.7	2,192.8	2,076.1
Operation and Maintenance	935.8	937.2	973.1
Military Construction	77.4	57.5	28.2
Totals	3,381.9	3,187.5	3,077.4
Navy Reserve:			
Military Personnel	1,648.3	1,648.6	1,601.5
Operation and Maintenance	1,005.7	816.1	797.0

TABLE XXIII.—Reserve Component Budget Requests February 4, 1991 Submission—Continued

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year 1991 estimate	Fiscal year 1992 budget	Fiscal year 1993 budget
Military Construction	80.3	20.9	26.4
Total	2,734.3	2,485.6	2,424.9
Marine Corps Reserve:			
Military Personnel	337.4	326.9	329.8
Operation and Maintenance	84.8	75.9	75.4
Total	422.2	402.8	405.2
Air National Guard:			
Military Personnel	1,119.0	1,145.5	1,195.1
Operation and Maintenance	2,272.0	2,287.8	2,700.9
Military Construction	180.6	131.8	40.6
Total	3,571.6	3,565.1	3,936.6
Air Force Reserve:			
Military Personnel	688.5	705.3	727.3
Operation and Maintenance	1,086.0	1,075.4	1,232.5
Military Construction	38.6	20.8	36.7
Total	1,813.1	1,801.5	1,996.5
Total For All Reserve Components:			
Military Personnel	9,628.8	9,220.8	8,968.4
Operation and Maintenance	7,409.2	7,273.1	7,862.6
Military Construction	690.1	281.4	186.0
Total	17,728.1	16,775.3	17,017.0

CONCLUSION

The last 18 months have been a remarkable period for the Nation's Reserve forces. Volunteer National Guardsmen and Reservists and those who have been called to active duty have engaged in armed conflicts in Southwest Asia and Panama. Over 228,000 Reservists responded to the Nation's call to arms in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. They performed vital combat and support missions with high motivation and profession alism. They made great personal sacrifices to serve and 71 of them paid the ultimate sacrifice for freedom.

We will be studying our experiences in this most recent conflict for some time. We cannot yet predict with certainty what effect the conflict will have, if any, on our future ability to recruit and retain quality individuals in each of the Reserve components, but whatever the future holds, we are absolutely secure in our belief that the Reserve forces of the United States are, today, the best in the world.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. JOHN B. CONAWAY, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I welcome the opportunity to again appear before you in behalf of the more than one-half million men and women of the Army and Air National Guard. It has been a privilege to represent these individuals in my capacity as Chief of the National Guard Bureau since February 1990.

When I assumed my present duties, I made known my vision of a National Guard that is recognized as the world's most effective Reserve force and is committed to its people and to quality service for State and Nation. It is an organization of quality people, quality equipment, and quality systems capable of accomplishing all its peace and war-time missions. It is an organization that is eager and competent to meet the challenges of the emerging 21st Century.

With key congressional support, the Total Force Policy drafted in the seventies came to fruition in the eighties, bringing the National Guard in line with its Active component counterparts and giving the Guard the chance to prove its capability as a viable, credible, military force.

As the Nation's oldest military component (1636), the National Guard has risen from an ill-clad, poorly-equipped militia to become a highly-trained, well-equipped Reserve military force with missions to both Federal and State Governments. Its dual commitment to both State and Nation distinguishes the National Guard from all other services. In addition, the National Guard has matured and expanded its service to the Nation to include a third mission, a community mission, best described as "adding value to America", which I will discuss further.

Although our State mission is an important part of our constitutional origins and institutional identity, the modern Guard's first mission is to provide our Nation with an effective, reliable, credible military force capable of deterring aggression against our country and its allies. The most recent and illustrative example of the Guard's ability to bolster our national security posture is its performance in support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Last August, events in the Middle East required the rapid deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf to counter escalating threats to global peace, security and stability. Operation Desert Shield called thousands of Army and Air Guard members to perform missions critical to the quick movement of personnel and equipment into the Central Command theater. Within those crucial first hours of this largest military operation since the Vietnam war, more than 10,000 National Guard volunteers freely stepped forward, ready to assist their Active duty counterparts in a variety of support and service support missions. Although only a little over one-third of the initial 10,000 volunteers were actually employed in those first critical days, the Guard's support was key to getting equipment and personnel into the Central Command theater.

On August 22, 1990, President Bush exercised his authority to call thousands of National Guard and Reserve members to Federal active duty to augment U.S. forces in Operation Desert Shield. This historic call of the Guard occurred, ironically, as Americans across the Nation paused to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the largest peacetime mobilization of Guard forces in history: the mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces prior to America's entry into the Second World War.

As of February 3, 1991, 383 Army Guard units consisting of 57,857 personnel and 81 Air Guard units involving more than 7,973 people had been called to Federal active duty to support Operation Desert Shield as of the preparation date of this statement. In addition, over 2,500 individual Guard members have served on active duty in a volunteer status supporting ongoing operations in the Persian Gulf. An overwhelming majority of the units called are combat support or combat service support; however, many of the Air National Guard (ANG) units called are combat units. In fact, ANG F-16s participated in the first daylight bombing raids against Iraq and occupied Kuwait. There are also two Army National Guard (ARNG) field artillery brigades, the 196th from the Tennessee ARNG and the 142nd from the Arkansas ARNG serving in Saudi Arabia.

At the writing of this statement, three major combat units, roundout brigades to Active Army divisions, are currently on Federal active duty training here in the United States. Soldiers from the 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, the 155th Armor Brigade, Mississippi Army National Guard, and the 256th Infantry Brigade, Louisiana Army National Guard, are demonstrating their capabilities while training at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, and Fort Hood, Texas. Their performance further confirms their suitability and readiness for the mission should they be tasked.

Operation Desert Storm has fortuitously provided an excellent measurement of the credibility of the Total Force policy. To the extent it has been tested, in my view, the Total Force Policy has worked. Yet, if we are to look beyond Desert Storm, critical decisions have yet to be made concerning what the most viable, cost-effective force mix in the post Cold War era will be. Continuous, often unpredictable geopolitical change, coupled with the ever-present reality of limited resources, promises great uncertainty for the U.S. military in the coming years. Our military and national leaders today are challenged by numerous concerns, but none more demanding than to achieve more with less while, at the same time, providing a credible deterrent posture in an era of constrained resources.

In positioning our force for the nineties, I have outlined what I see as some of the key issues facing our National Guard in an emerging era of fiscal constraint and political uncertainty. These issues were of key importance when drafting 10 specific goals I often refer to as the "blueprint" from which we will build an even more capable Guard in the 21st century. Those goals are:

1. The Highest State of Readiness Commensurate With War-time Tasking.
2. Equal Opportunities for Career Development.
3. An Increased Role in Counter-Narcotics Operations.

4. Effective Response to Natural and Man-made State Emergencies.
5. A Cleaner Environment.
6. Strong Community Support for The National Guard.
7. Employers in Partnership With The National Guard.
8. Improved Quality of Life for National Guard Families.
9. Effective Management of All Resources.
10. Institutionalize Total Quality Management (TQM) Within The National Guard.

READINESS

Readiness, of course, must continue to be the overarching goal for everything we do in the National Guard. Operational readiness can only be achieved and maintained through quality equipped, trained, and motivated forces led by quality leaders. An important ingredient to sustaining force readiness in the nineties will be the increased emphasis on tough, realistic training in environments that task the individual Guard member's ability to perform under the most challenging of circumstances.

While the Directors of the Army and Air Guard will provide you more specific details on their respective readiness, training and equipment programs, I am pleased to offer you some significant major highlights.

During fiscal year 1990, in the Army National Guard, 84 of new and existing units report an overall ready status to perform their wartime mission. This excludes those units undergoing Headquarters, Department of the Army, directed reorganizations. For the Air Guard, over 99 of our units are mission capable. These are extraordinary readiness levels which represent great value to America as partners in the Total Force. Thanks to the continued support of Congress, the Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) report indicated that in July 1990, the Army Guard attained the highest levels (91.4 percent) ever in equipment on hand (EOH) readiness of reportable equipment in reporting units. Due to efforts to increase on hand equipment levels of units supporting Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the EOH posture of the ARNG fell to 85.5 percent as of January 1991.

Both the Army and Air Guard met their end strength levels for fiscal year 1990 and posted retention rates of 82 percent and 90 percent respectively, topping all other Reserve components. Our people are staying because they are trained effectively with good equipment. They are recognized for their service and have confidence in their leaders. Providing essential full-time manning to ensure early deploying units have 100 percent of requirements is a must. The Full-Time Support (FTS) program remains a key ingredient to our excellent readiness and performance rates. Our successful performance is due in part to the fact that over 75 percent of our officers and nearly 50 percent of our enlisted personnel have prior service with an Active component, and meet the Active component education standards.

Our greatest challenge in the history of the All-Volunteer Force will come after Operation Desert Storm when we reform and reconstitute our Army and Air National Guard. Since this will be a first for all of us, we are planning to restore our force to the congressionally directed levels as quickly as possible. The current package of benefits such as the Montgomery GI bill, enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, affiliation bonus, student loan repayment programs, and the VA home loan guarantee program will be needed and may have to be expanded to meet the military requirements.

Throughout all training programs, safety is an important concern. Fiscal year 1990 was a record year for our safety programs. The Army Guard had *no* Class A-accident in its aviation program while flying 437,690 hours! The Air Guard had the lowest Class "A" rate in our history, 1.38 per 100,000 flying hours.

The increased responsibility which came with the Total Force Policy demanded that Guardsmen be well versed in joint-military operations and doctrine, trained in peacetime to standards set by the Active components, to use the equipment provided and taught to sustain the force in unfamiliar and often hostile environments.

Training must be realistic. As recent world events have shown, Guardsmen must be trained in peacetime in those places they could one day be called to fight and at the level of organization at which they will be employed.

In view of this, the va ue of Army and Air Guard participation in varied locations, both here at home and overseas, contributes significantly to our ability to achieve wartime objectives. An important contributor to our readiness gains in the eighties was the continued focus on overseas deployment training. Overseas deployment training has enabled the Guard to visibly demonstrate its ability as a credible military force capable of deploying and bolstering our national security posture anywhere in the world.

Over the past decade, it was customary to find Army and Air Guard members training throughout the world, in virtually every theater of U.S. military operations. In 1990, over 34,000 Army and Air Guard members trained in 32 countries throughout Europe, Asia, the Caribbean, Central and South America and the Middle East.

Our past participation in such large-scale joint-training exercises like Reforger in Germany, Blazing Trails in Central America, or Team Spirit in Korea, coupled with the Guard's proven performance in real-world military operations like Grenada, Libya, Operation Just Cause in Panama, or most recently, in Operation Desert Storm, illustrates that when given the resources and the opportunity to serve, the Guard can accomplish the mission.

In light of the new realities in Eastern Europe, our military faces a massive restructuring to better meet the unique and uncertain challenges that lie ahead. New missions and new roles for the Guard could emerge. As our national and military leaders currently reexamine certain aspects of the force-mix question it is plausible.that more missions will be shifted to Guard and Reserve units if this proves more cost effective. This "burdenshifting" of missions from Active to the Guard and Reserve is already under review. Congress has directed that the Department of Defense look at how missions in Europe, for example, might be transferred to Guard and Reserve units.

Language in the fiscal year 1991 House Appropriations Committee Conference Report called for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to provide a plan to the committee by June 1, 1991 for either replacing or providing services in support of permanently deployed active Air Force and Army personnel and units in Europe with rotating Reserve component units. The concept has been successfully proven by our Army's Aviation Classification Repair Activity Depot (AVCRAD) facility in Brussels, Belgium, and Equipment Maintenance Center (EMC) located in Kaiserslautern, Germany.

It is possible that specific committees of the 102d Congress will also look at the issue "burdenshifting" or transferring more missions to Guard and Reserve forces within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and elsewhere. A few examples of types of missions to be considered are: transportation, medical, civil engineering, aerial port, air defense and airlift.

At this juncture, how Congress may respond to the Total Force Policy Study is uncertain. But what we do know is that in any force of the future, the National Guard will continue providing the American people a cost-effective, tested, capable force which has proven it can respond quickly and effectively in times of natural disaster or national emergency. I am proud to state that readiness in the Army and Air Nationals Guard has never been better, and our goal is to keep it that way. I must point out, however, that any restructuring of the force will affect virtually every State and territory and we must continue to plan the restructuring in relation to the desired state of readiness. I thank the Congress for its support in providing us the personnel, equipment, and training which contribute so significantly to our readiness status.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES

Each man and woman must have equal opportunity for entry into the National Guard. Once a member, each National Guard soldier and airman must have equal opportunity to plan and develop a productive and personally rewarding military career. To accomplish their goals, the National Guard made dramatic progress during the 1970s and 1980s in accessing minority and female members equal to the general population. However, in the 1990s, we plan to achieve greater "in force" equality in grade distribution, particularly at the senior grade level. Also, the ARNG has established an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Task Force that will produce an EEO Implementation Plan by the end of fiscal year 1991. The ANG has already developed a comprehensive statistical analysis program to provide equal opportunity guidelines for entry and career progression in all grade and career fields.

COUNTER-NARCOTICS PROGRAMS

My goal is to expand National Guard support of local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies in the interdiction and eradication of illegal drugs. I would like to point out that the National Guard, in 1977, was the first military component to seize the opportunity to become involved in this effort. You should know that the National Guard was able, through the efficient use of resources, to increase the number of mandays/workdays devoted to drug interdiction and counter-drug activi-

ties during fiscal year 1990 to 532,000. In addition, significant operational support was provided incidental to scheduled training. National Guard volunteer personnel performed over 5,000 counter-drug missions in fiscal year 1990, and they were assigned duties that conformed as nearly as possible to their individual military occupational specialties. Duties included special training programs, aerial and ground reconnaissance, surveillance and transportation of law enforcement officers and contraband and support of arrest operations. Other support missions included conducting commercial cargo inspections at land, sea and aerial ports of entry, and eradication of marijuana plants. Already, at the end of the 1st quarter, fiscal year 1991, the Guard has assisted law enforcement agencies in seizures of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, vehicles, weapons and cash with a total street value of $3.5 billion. This has been accomplished with an average of more than 2,000 daily volunteer Guardsmen and less than one-third the total Department of Defense (DOD) drug war budget.

Yet we recognize that in order to succeed in winning the war on drugs, we must attack it on two fronts: first, by limiting supply through broadened federal support to local and State drug interdiction and eradication efforts, as well as increased assistance to law enforcement agencies; and second, by diminishing demand through increased education, prevention and counseling. I am pleased to report that several States have begun instituting some innovative programs to begin tackling the drug problem from the demand side by working within the community to educate youth about the dangers of illegal drug use. Another innovative idea initiated by the Guard includes youth cadet programs in which several States, using National Guard (NG) volunteers as directors, emphasize the importance for our youth to remain drug-free. Other States opened their armories to community organizations for everything from coordination meeting places to recreation activity centers, ensuring armories remain "drug-free zones", and providing alternative activities for youth to keep them off the streets. Internally, States have increased random urinalysis testing, stressing to NG members the importance of being drug free role models in the community. Also, we have expanded the Family Support Program to reinforce drug abstention among soldiers and airmen, their friends, and their families. Effective use of the local media through public service announcements is another way several state Guard units have helped spread the message about the dangers of alcohol and drug use. Several States, such as Georgia and Maine, use video tapes and posters to spread the message. Furthermore, many States assigned Drug Prevention and Demand Reduction Program (DP&DRP) Coordinators and established Speaker Bureaus to educate our Guard members and be actively involved in existing drug prevention and demand reduction efforts. In conclusion, the National Guard is industrious and innovative in answering the call to wage war against drugs in America through the Drug Prevention and Demand Reduction Program.

We are also working closely with other Federal agencies to increase understanding and facilitate coordination between the many different agencies supporting the President's National Drug Control Strategy.

In September 1990, we kicked off the first Inter-agency Counternarcotics Manager's Course located at Camp San Luis Obispo, California. This first-of-its-kind initiative brings together representatives from a wide range of law enforcement and governmental agencies for a 1-week course focusing on intergovernmental counter-drug operations, coordination, liaison, and development of mid-to-upper-level managers for counter-drug operations.

We expect that drug use in America will continue to dominate the American agenda well into the next century. The Guard will continue serving on the front lines of this battle, as we have for over a decade. We appreciate your continued support and hope you'll agree that our program results provide a significant return on resources committed.

STATE MISSIONS

State and community service are important commitments Guardsmen make when taking the dual oath to protect and preserve both State and Nation. On any given day, National Guard men and women can be found throughout the community, working hand in hand with their neighbors in order to strengthen and unite those who must often overcome insurmountable odds. 1989-1990 will go down in history as record years in terms of disaster. Whether responding to natural disasters like Hurricane Hugo or the California earthquake, or tragedies like the Sioux City DC-10 airline crash or the crippling Alaskan Oil Spill, Guardsmen responded swiftly and effectively, often in the face of great danger.

In fiscal year 1990, more than 22,000 Army and Air National Guard personnel from 49 States and territories expended more than 207,000 workdays responding to 77 natural disasters, 6 civil disorders, and 209 other domestic emergencies. The

Guard participated in evacuation, security, and recovery missions following tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, snowstorms, and other natural disasters; and provided humanitarian assistance such as conducting search and rescue operations; evacuating critically ill or injured persons; supplying emergency power, communications, and potable water to stricken communities; providing emergency shelter and temporary housing for the homeless; providing security assistance; and supporting ground and airborne fire fighting operations. The citizen-soldiers, of the National Guard stand ready to continue this proud tradition into the 1990s and the 21st century.

The temporary expansion of the scope of law enforcement leave for Federal and District of Columbia employees to encompass such activities as fire fighting and other duty to protect or save life or property or prevent injury, included in the Fiscal Year 1991 Defense Appropriations Act, provides needed relief for these Guard members from loss of pay or leave when they perform these important functions. We support enactment of this temporary measure into permanent law if personnel are required to use military leave for these functions.

Often overlooked is the value of State mission service to the enhancement of Federal mission capability. The skill training, discipline, coordination and cohesion demonstrated during performance of State missions directly contributes to the Guard's wartime mission capability. The past era of 48 unit training assemblies (drill periods) per year and 2 weeks "in the summer" have been largely overtaken by expanded State and Federal missions requirements resulting in a better trained, highly motivated, fully capable National Guard.

ENVIRONMENT

Present and future damage to the environment has been identified in many public opinion polls as a prime issue facing the United States in the 21st century. As responsible and caring partners of the national community, the Guard will aggressively pursue the goal of a cleaner, safer environment for all Americans. We have taken our first steps in order to accomplish this goal, through mandating strict compliance with State and Federal laws, to include the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). I have stated publicly that the National Guard of the nineties will pursue the goal of a cleaner environment by identifying and correcting damage resulting from past practices and by establishing preventive procedures and programs to offset future environmental problems. In fiscal year 1990, the Guard conducted its first in a series of Executive Environmental Leadership Seminars. Over 600 Army and Air Guard Senior Commanders have attended these seminars. From this leadership, we established a national level Environmental Advisory Council. Over $1 million was obligated for Environmental Assessment/Environmental Impacts Statement work associated with 19 aircraft conversions, 10 Special Use Airspace actions, and several real estate investigations. $1.2 million was issued to ANG units for Hazardous Waste Disposal and Analysis costs. A new Airspace Management Branch was developed to provide long-range airspace planning and to work related environmental issues. The Installation Restoration Program (IRP) obligated $16 million for survey and clean-up of past practices waste sites. In fiscal year 1991, plans are to continue design of Underground Storage Tank (UST) removal projects, priority replacement of tanks found to be leaking, removal of tanks not required, and continue replacement of all single walled USTs with double walled tanks. A centrally managed contract will be used to develop Spill Prevention and Response Plans at 10 bases. There will be a 2-day seminar to present environmental issues to Base Civil Engineer and Deputy Chiefs of Support Services and an environmental session will be developed for our annual Commanders Conference. The ANG supported the Alaska oil spill clean-up in 1990 by providing over 20 light weight decontamination systems. ANG units have received training regarding the recognition and reporting of hazardous materials, especially asbestos materials. The ARNG assured environmental documentation accompanied completed construction justification documents and conducted a quarterly review of appropriate ARNG proposals and plans to ensure compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations. The ARNG has established an ARNG Environmental Resources Management Office and is planning to establish one regional office by the end of fiscal year 1991. The ARNG has procured funding for state-of-the-art art aircraft paint removal systems to be located at four sites Total environmental/cost savings per year is over $1 million.

It is my vision that the National Guard will build an environmental ethic into everything it does. But we also recognize that it will take time, money, and commitment to preserve this most precious resource to our Nation, and to our world.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Operation Desert Storm has generated strong community support for Guardsmen and their families as many of our members were called to Federal service and left a concerned community network of family and friends.

We recognize a need to increase the public's knowledge and support of the purpose, goals, missions, and capabilities of their National Guard through increased emphasis on Public Affairs. This goal is very important as, without strong community support, the National Guard would lose much of its effectiveness. The Guard is a part of, and contributes much to, the communities in which we serve. This is where the citizen-soldiers and airmen live and work and many opportunities arise to give substance to the idea of "adding value to America". During ANG Installations Management negotiations in 1990, many of the local representatives were enlightened as to what the ANG is all about when the ANG is based on municipal or international airports. Many local civic actions projects were accomplished by Engineering and Services units to enhance public support. Each State has a Public Affairs Officer who shares knowledge of the Guard with local authorities and the concerned public. We will continue to encourage public awareness of the significant role the Guard plays in the community, State, and Nation.

EMPLOYERS IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL GUARD

This "full-partner" relationship provides stability and continuity between the dual roles of citizen-soldiers and airmen, and enhances retention. The importance of this relationship must not be underestimated. It is imperative for the job security of our Guard members as well as the operation and management aspects of the employer. Its importance was noted in Operation Just Cause, but Operation Desert Storm has added new emphasis to this relationship.

In fiscal year 1991, the ANG Contingency Support Staff (CSS) and ARNG mobilization personnel worked to provide as much advance notification as possible within security guidelines to units prior to Operation Desert Shield activation. This early notification helped traditional Guardsmen and employers plan for work interruptions. Additionally, the ANG CSS provided guidance to units regarding an individual's participation in a volunteer status to avoid conflict with employers. Also, employers have supported employee absences from 2 to 5 months for school training for individuals requiring trainup in ARNG Apache helicopter battalions as well as for Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm. Employer recognition awards are an important element in maintaining an effective Guard-Employer relationship and two-way communication is the key.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Operation Desert Storm has resulted in strong family and community support for Guard members and their families.

Through the office of the State Family Assistance Coordinator in each of the Guard's 54 States, territories and District of Columbia, and together with many volunteers, the National Guard's family assistance program has been an unqualified success. Although principally developed by the Guard to support families of mobilized Guard members, it has provided a wide range of family assistance to family members of all Reserve and some Active component members, over 80,000 in all. While financial, medical and legal assistance and information are provided, referrals and coordination is also made with other community support organizations and activities. The Guard is proud to provide this invaluable service to America.

To improve the quality of life, the ARNG is proposing to reduce civilian health costs to the lowest possible levels commensurate with acceptable standards of care. The ARNG also plans to achieve an 80 percent participation rate in the ARNG Communities of Excellence program. The ARNG has exempted Family Day meals from any surcharges. The ANG uses every Safety Office to promote off-the-job safety as well as on duty. Seatbelt use, motorcycle training and designated driver campaigns are some examples of efforts to prevent mishaps and improve quality of life.

Finally, we want to express our appreciation for your help in expanding the accessibility of commissary, post exchange, and morale, welfare and recreation facilities to current and retired members of the Guard. These initiatives provide a tangible expression of service parity to Guard members while enhancing quality of life for their families.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

During the 1990s we have optimized the use of National Guard resources through comprehensive planning and analysis linked to programming. During the 1980s, our planners focused their energies on supporting the Army and Air Force near and mid-term program objectives. For the 1990s, our planning focus is more strategic in nature. Joint National Guard long-range planning provides our planners a mechanism to support national security objectives in the near, mid, and long-term. Our long-range planning efforts are the link between today's programs and our future. These efforts have resulted in a strategic vision of where we want to be, have fostered innovation in our people, and have supported creativity. Because we have recognized the need for long-range planning guidance to ensure success in the management of all our resources, the first Chief, National Guard Bureau Planning Guidance Memorandum will be published in fiscal year 1991. This document is needed because of the changing world and domestic political, economic and demographic scene; the changing military focus caused by U.S. fiscal constraints, a changing threat, and emergence of a new world order; and a recognized need to keep the National Guard forward thinking and adaptable. This memorandum will include a view of the current state of the National Guard, looking out to the year 2010; my 10 goals and how they relate to our missions; and prioritize the basis for establishing strategies and alternatives for achieving National Guard objectives. At this time, both the Army and Air Guard have completed and issued their Long Range Planning Guidance. The ARNG plans to implement the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System process in all of the states and territories to increase the linkage between planning and programming through the Force Structure Support System as part of its long range plan. The ARNG plans to maintain a budget execution rate that ensures all activities and resources are directed toward achieving the highest state of mobilization readiness. For fiscal year 1990, the ANG established a new Directorate of Personnel Field Activities Branch and began a refinement effort in the areas of planning and programming by linking the planning effort to programming in the execution of the myriad of military personnel programs at our 92 ANG Consolidated Base Personnel Offices. With the help of Congress and the Department of Defense, we were able to start the upgrade of our F-15A/B fleet through the Multi-Staged-Improvement-Program (MSIP). It is hoped MSIP will continue in the future. This year, the ANG will field a self protection capability for our RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft. Off-the-shelf technologies and capabilities have come to us through Congressionally added funds for the improvement of defensive systems for our F-16 fleet; hopefully, these upgrades will continue. A massive internal redistribution of equipment assets among Air National Guard units was completed in 1990; the value of re-utilized equipment is between $20 and $30 million. Implementation of the DOD Inventory Reduction Plan (IRP) was started in mid-1990. By the end of 1990, the ANG was able to reduce spares levels resulting in a cost avoidance of $35 million. During the 1990s, throughout the National Guard "working smarter" initiatives will continue to be emphasized.

TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT (TQM)

TQM highlights teamwork and team structure. Teamwork aligns personal and organizational goals, objectives, and thought. Team activities build communication and cooperation, stimulate creative thinking, and provide an infrastructure or improving all National Guard processes. TQM also focuses on doing things right the first time—an effort that increases unit effectiveness and stop the waste of resources. During the 1970s and 1980s, America's management focus was on the "bottom line", on up-front costs per unit of production. The emphasis was on productivity. For the 1990s and beyond, the National Guard is dedicated to the concept and philosophy of quality—quality in the way we think, in the way we act, and in what we expect of each other. We have subscribed to Total Quality Management (TQM), which uses qualitative methods to continuously improve an organization's processes. To institutionalize TQM within the National Guard requires a strong foundation of TQM philosophy and concepts. To accomplish this, NGB has developed a NGB TQM Master Plan, and has conducted TQM Awareness Education for all Senior Executives including NGB military and civilian leadership. Four specific Quality Improvements Boards have been established—Education and Training; Command, Control, and Communications; Drug Demand Reduction; and the Environmental Quality Board. These Boards use TQM methodologies to identify critical processes and analyze specific actions. Results are evident. Increased visibility of QM processes is planned for the future. I am convinced the teamwork approach will pay big dividends.

ADDING VALUE TO AMERICA

Through their dual status as both citizens and as members of the U.S. Armed Forces, Guardsman are giving back to the Nation, adding value to America in a number of tangible and meaningful ways.

Located in more than 3,000 communities across the United States, the Guard represents a unique and diverse cross-section of America. And it is that diversity of experience which will be the Guard's greatest strength in preparing for the uncertainties of tomorrow.

Guardmembers pride themselves on sharing a unique partnership in the community—they are the Nation's educators, legislators, administrators, medics, students, tradesmen and laborers, each contributing to the economic growth and strength of the Nation. In many ways, this unique partnership presents what I see as a "third mission" for the Guard of the nineties, adding value to America through extended service to the community, both within the United States and with our neighbors overseas, particularly third world countries.

Through our Counter-Narcotics Programs, Environmental Initiatives, Equal Opportunity efforts and programs to improve Quality of Life for Guard families, we will continue our efforts of extended service to the communities of America. Likewise, we also anticipate that increased international assistance programs such as engineering activities and medical support will be performed by the Guard throughout the 1990s. These international initiatives will continue to enrich the lives of the peoples and countries served as well as the lives of the performing Guard members.

In summary, I have tried to present the many accomplishments of the National Guard as well as our plans for improvement in the future. We believe our goals will greatly assist our efforts. We are well aware of our missions, Federal, State, and our extended focus to community level, and are always conscious of the faith and trust placed in us by the Congress and our Nation. I know I speak for each member of the Army and Air National Guard in thanking each of you for your past support, and we are grateful for your assistance in making our National Guard, "Americans at their best", able to "add value to America".

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. DONALD BURDICK, DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

POSTURE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear today to represent the Army National Guard as you review our fiscal year 1992/1993 manpower and personnel programs. I am pleased to report that the Army National Guard (ARNG) is manned with high quality soldiers, trained and equipped to the highest readiness levels in its 355 year history and modernized to a greater extent than ever before. Our fiscal year 1992/1993 budget submission is tailored to support an ARNG end strength of 410,000 for fiscal year 1992 and meets the minimum essential requirements to support assigned missions.

I would like to make special mention of the approximately 62,000 Army Guard soldiers who were called to support Operation Desert Shield/Storm. These men and women, from 395 ready units in 48 States, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico, left families, friends and civilian jobs to serve as citizen-soldiers when needed by their country. I am proud to report that these Guard soldiers performed their duties in an outstanding manner.

The readiness of today's ARNG is directly related to the Total Force Policy and the resources provided by Congress. Let me highlight some of the areas where this support has enabled us to achieve success.

— On September 30,1989, the ARNG end strength reached an all time high of 456,860. However, during 1990 the ARNG was directed by Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) to reduce end strength to 447,300. The Army Guard ended fiscal year 1990 with an end strength of 444,224. The composition of this force included 24 percent (106,921) minorities. At the close of fiscal year 1990 there were 3,076 black officers, 68,258 black enlisted soldiers and 31,465 women in the ARNG.

— With implementation of the Total Force Policy, the ARNG has become an important part of the Total Army's war fighting capability with the number of early deploying units now standing at 325. As an integral part of the Total Force, the ARNG provides 44 percent of the combat units, 31 percent of the Combat Support, and 25 percent of the Combat Service Support units of the Total Army. This includes 36 percent of the Army's combat divisions (10 out of 28); 26 percent of the Air Defense Battalions; 51 percent of the Field Artillery Battalions; 33 percent of the

Aviation units; 41 percent of the Engineer Battalions and 25 percent of the Special Forces Groups.

— Currently, 85 percent of ARNG units report an overall Combat Ready status. Excluded are those units undergoing HQDA directed reorganizations. This is an overall improvement of 6 percent during the past fiscal year. Overall readiness in the ARNG should be further enhanced as we strive to meet HQDA's requirement to restructure the force. These reductions will leave States with a force structure that will be recruitable and sustainable.

— High priority units are being equipped with modern equipment such as M-1 Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, UH-60s Blackhawk, AH-64s Apache, Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT) and the M-916 truck tractor.

— Training opportunities have been greatly expanded to include the use of local, regional, national and joint training areas and centers. Two ARNG combat brigades federalized to support Operation Desert Storm, as well as 20 individual companies employed as the opposing forces, will rotate through the National Training Center this fiscal year. The ARNG will also send one battalion through the Joint Regional Training Center in fiscal year 1991 and two battalions in fiscal year 1992. During fiscal year 1991 and fiscal year 1992 Army Guard units will participate in 16 Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises alongside elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines.

— High technology has reduced the need for large troop and equipment intensive exercises. These technologies include the Battle Command Training Program for Reserve Component (BCTP-RC) and aircraft flight simulators. The BCTP is a command post exercise developed to fulfill the training needs of Corps and Division commanders and their staffs without the need for an entire Division participating in field exercises. In fiscal year 1992 five ARNG Divisions will participate in BCTP-RC at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Fielding will be complete this fiscal year for the Vulcan/Stinger troop proficiency training (VSTPT) which will allow Vulcan and Stinger teams to conduct gunner proficiency inside armories or at local training areas. The fielding of Simulation Networking (SIMNET) and the Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT) will provide battalion level combined Arms Training against an interactive threat. At the unit level the Squad Engagement Systems (SETS) prototype currently being evaluated will provide marksmanship training as well as infantry squad collective training on fire control, fire distribution, and junior leader training in an Armory environment.

— Worldwide training opportunities have enhanced combat readiness of Army Guard soldiers, leaders and units. During fiscal year 1991 over 25,500 Guardsmen and women from 53 States and territories will participate in Overseas Deployment Training (ODT). Approximately 33,000 soldiers are programmed for ODT training in fiscal year 1992. Additional training opportunities have been made available for overseas training in the area of aviation and ground maintenance. During, fiscal year 1991, the States of California, Connecticut and Missouri will send a combined total of 340 individuals to the Aviation Classification and Repair Activity Depot in Brussels, Belgium. The Reserve Component Equipment Maintenance Center, collocated with the General Support Center in Kaiserslautern, Germany, is scheduled to train 1,986 soldiers from 10 units on vehicle maintenance during this same period. Both facilities will provide hands-on maintenance of equipment fielded to U.S. Army units in Europe.

The ARNG continued to increase its support to civil authorities during State emergencies and counter-drugs operations. Army Guard units provided support to 52 States and territories during 248 separate emergencies including both civil disturbance and recovery operations following the earthquake in northern California, Hurricane Hugo in the southeastern United States and the Virgin Islands, floods, tornadoes and other natural disasters. Support provided to State and Federal Agencies in counter-drug operations resulted in the eradication of 6,730,064 marijuana plants, confiscation of 18,314,373, 33,816 pounds of cocaine, 27,021 pounds of processed marijuana, 486.6 pounds of heroin, 466 vehicles, 614 weapons and 63,480 rounds of ammunition.

I would like to point out that all these achievements and opportunities to improve readiness are consistent with the Army National Guard's two distinctly different missions. The first mission is to provide properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization in the event of a national emergency or war. The second mission is to provide support to civil authorities during emergencies such as natural disaster, civil disorder and, most recently, counter-drug activity.

The Army National Guard must now prepare to move forward into an uncertain future. Three major forces work to increase that uncertainty: the build down of

Active and Reserve component forces; the continued reduction in available resources to support national defense; and the ambiguous and changing nature of threats to national security. Each of these forces may potentially impact on the Army Guard's readiness and our future missions as an integral part of the Total Force.

To insure that these forces work to improve the posture of the ARNG, the ARNG has developed a strategic long-range planning system that can, if supported, enable the ARNG to continue to participate across the spectrum of missions and conflicts. This spectrum spans missions as diverse as sustained contingencies in remote parts of the globe to environmental conservation and counter-drug. The key to our success is the continued support of the Army and Congress to resource modernization, training, quality personnel recruitment and retention and full-time support.

Let me cover some of these areas in more detail. As I have mentioned the Army Guard is receiving modern equipment at an ever increasing pace. As a result our equipment inventory has increased to over 29 billion at the end of fiscal year 1990. Receipt of equipment from programed Army procurement and congressionally dedicated procurement appropriations have improved the ARNG posture to an all time high. We now have 74 percent of the peacetime requirements for equipment on hand. Despite these gains there is a shortfall of $10.5 billion in equipment with critical shortages in combat support equipment. These critical shortages include tactical vehicles, tactical radios and test measuring and diagnostic equipment.

Modernization also includes our ability to provide facilities and ranges in support of training and maintenance. The ARNG currently has 71 major training areas which support training. The fiscal year 1992 budget request of $50 million for 25 projects addresses only the most critical construction needs. These funds will be used for Equipment Maintenance Shops to support new combat vehicles, ranges and training site facilities, maintenance hangars for the AH-64 and VH-60 aircraft and armories for new units. This will leave a backlog of $3.1 billion in construction that will be required for 455 new or replacement armories, 186 vehicle maintenance shops, 57 aircraft maintenance and operations facilities, 189 troop support complexes at training sites, 99 ranges and 133 other support facilities.

To maintain readiness, training is required at the individual soldier, leader and unit level. It is my objective to attain and maintain 85 percent Duty Military Occupational Specialty qualification for Army Guard soldiers for fiscal year 1992 and beyond. To maintain these skills the ARNG has developed special training programs and training centers. The Key Personnel Upgrade Program deploys individual soldiers to work with Active component units within their Capstone alignment. In fiscal year 1992, over 5,500 ARNG soldiers will train under this program in 34 countries and the continental United States at a total of 92 locations.

Specialized training is provided at Regional Training Site-Maintenance (RTS-Maint), Regional Training Site Medical (RTS-Med) locations, the New Jersey High Technology Training Center (NJHTTC) and a fourth type, the Maintenance Unit Training Site (MUTS) is in the planning stage. There are 13 ARNG RTS-Maint sites providing individual transitional level training and training on force modernization equipment, and sustainment training for designated military occupational specialties. The RTS-Med sites provide medical units with new equipment and sustainment training on modernized medical equipment such as the Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS). During Operation Desert Storm five Active component units and one contractor were provided training at these locations before deployment to Southwest Asia. Additionally, a total of eight ARNG DEPMEDS equipped hospital units were deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm. The NJHTTC located at Fort Dix, New Jersey specializes in providing a training environment that conducts individual, small unit, and battle staff training using simulations, training devices and equipment to enhance proficiency in modern weapons systems and Airland Battle doctrine. The planned Maintenance Unit Training Site will provide an environment where maintenance units can train on individual and collective skills needed upon mobilization.

To support training requirements the ARNG must effectively manage our training environment in compliance with Federal, State, and local environmental laws and regulations. The $44 million programmed for fiscal year 1992 will allow the ARNG to focus only on underground fuel storage tanks, hazardous waste disposal, waste water discharge and meet the basic compliance requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. We are pursuing an active role in protecting our national resource heritage while maintaining an aggressive and realistic training environment. To this end, we have funded for State environmentalists to monitor compliance at State owned mobilization sites at Camp Ripley, Minnesota, Camp Grayling, Michigan, and Camp Shelby, Mississippi. Attention is being directed to environmen-

tal awareness and training of ARNG leaders and soldiers to ensure compliance with environmental laws and regulations.

The professionalism and dedication given to improving readiness with realistic, demanding and safe training is reflected by the best safety record ever in fiscal year 1990. Our Aviation safety program reached a milestone with zero Class A accidents while ground accidents declined 38 percent from fiscal year 1989. This achievement provided a cost avoidance of $7 million between fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year 1990.

Programmed future force structure and end strength reduction will present new challenges for the ARNG. The Full-Time Recruiting Force must continue to recruit soldiers on the basis of critical Military Occupational Specialties and key unit vacancies. Our In-Service Recruiting Program, in conjunction with the Active component reduction in force, will transition soldiers who will bring excellent Active component experience and knowledge into the ARNG. During fiscal year 1992, we will continue to access approximately 50 percent of our new members as non-prior service and 50 percent from prior service members into the ARNG.

To contribute to the readiness and retention of Army Guard soldiers, the National Guard has established a National Guard Family Program. This program provides infrastructure to support a partnership between the family and the ARNG. The use of family program member volunteers were key in the establishment of family support groups during Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

The Full-Time Support (FTS) program provides a valuable asset in maintaining the readiness of ARNG units and their equipment. These personnel are the backbone for organization, administration, maintenance of equipment, recruiting and retention, instructing and training in the Army National Guard. The program for fiscal year 1991 encompasses primarily 26,199 ARNG Active Guard/Reserve soldiers and 28,457 Military Technicians. The FTS program is faced with several challenges in the near future. Congressional language for fiscal year 1991 directs implementation of the first phase of a program to replace a third of our AGR positions with Active component soldiers in fiscal year 1992. In addition, programed reductions in end strength due to budget constraints will cause a reduction of 2,858 AGR and 1,319 Military Technician positions from fiscal year 1991 levels. This reduction in Military Technicians will severely limit our ability to perform to expected standards for increased work load demands as force structure changes and force modernization intensifies maintenance and logistical requirements. The reduction in AGR positions will impact on the ability to maintain training maintenance and administrative readiness at the unit level.

To sustain readiness, the ARNG must continue to maintain a adequate level of Organizational Clothing and Equipment (OCE) and repair parts. We are currently engaged in efforts to upgrade OCE to include Extended Cold Weather Clothing, Individual Multi-Purpose Shelters, Multi-Purpose rain/snow Combat Overboots, and a Extreme Cold Weather Sleep System. These items are needed to improve survivability for the individual soldier on the modern battlefield. However, due to funding constraints fielding has been restricted to early deploying units causing the OCE backlog to increase to $338.4 million in fiscal year 1992.

ARNG equipment readiness for most items of equipment will continue to meet or exceed HQDA material readiness goals. Funding profiles ensure that the minimum amount of repair parts are available to support day-to-day maintenance. However, as the level of on hand equipment continues to increase, the backlog to provide for authorized stockage of repair parts will increase to $140.2 million in fiscal year 1992.

In closing, I would like to mention that the future holds both challenges and opportunities for the Army National Guard. With constrained budgets and the reevaluation of national military strategy, the Army Guard will continue to change and adapt. A combat-ready ARNG is an essential element of this strategy, therefore it is our goal to continue to improve and maintain a cost effective and ready "Army on Call".

Thank you Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to appear before your committee. I welcome any questions you may have at this time.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. PHILIP G. KILLEY, DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE

POSTURE OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am grateful for this opportunity to again share with you the many accomplishments of the Air National Guard in the past year and to reaffirm our commitment to meeting the challenges in the year ahead.

Throughout our history, dedicated men and women from mainstream America have eagerly answered our country's call as members of the militia. Over 117,000 men and women in today's Air National Guard continue the time-honored tradition of readiness, responsiveness, and responsibility, effectively applied whenever and wherever needed.

Since August 2, more than 15,000 Air National Guard men and women have proudly served their Nation in support of Operation Desert Storm. At home, their families, employers, and communities have mobilized in demonstrations of support for their troops the likes of which a generation of Americans has not seen. Patriotism and pride are on peoples' faces everywhere! They are proud to be Americans, and it shows!

ver the decades, the ability of the Air National Guard to perform both its State and Federal missions has been tested and proven in combat and catastrophe. We have shown, each and every time, by any measure, that we are a most combat-ready, cost-effective Reserve component. As part of the State militia, Air National Guard citizen-airmen have eagerly and readily responded to their communities' call.

Today, the Air National Guard is an active and essential partner with the United States Air Force and Air Force Reserve in nearly all segments of the Total Air Force mission. We stand side-by-side with our comrades in arms on the front line of freedom, and we worked hard every step of the way. We have earned the bragging rights and are proud to say we are truly Americans at their best!

But there is a bigger story to be told: The Total Force Policy has paid off, for the Air National Guard, the Air Force, and the Nation. A payoff of our investment in the men and women of the Guard and Reserve who have modern missions, modern equipment, and the resources to train. And the payoff is ever-increasing! For example, the Air National Guard has accepted an important role in training future pilots of friendly foreign nations. Currently, we're hosting training in Tucson, AZ, for pilots from the Royal Netherlands Air Force, and other countries have shown interest in our training. Truly, we are modern warriors performing modern missions for the Total Air Force in a dynamic, and sometimes dangerous, world.

As the Air National Guard celebrates 44 years of service, I am proud to report that our units and our people are at their highest level of readiness in history. Looking back to August 2, 1990, within hours of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait we responded. Our KC-135 aerial refuelers, C-130 tactical airlifters, C-5 and C-141 strategic airlifters were pressed into immediate service. The first few hours and days of Operation Desert Shield demonstrated the Air National Guard's readiness, capability, and flexibility as tankers and airlifters participated in "volunteer" status.

As the crisis unfolded, we added RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft with special capabilities. Then, we added F-16 and F/A-16 fighter units. We deployed personnel for support functions including medical, services, civil engineering, fire fighting, combat communications, disaster preparedness, security police, and other such elements.

Our success in supporting Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm is a direct result of good leadership, intense training, and total commitment. It is a direct result of quality people working together as proud members of the Total Air Force Team.

The Air Force has been a Total Force leader, and Air Force leadership has kept the faith with the Air National Guard. They have followed the direction and sense of the Congress in placing more reliance on Guard and Reserve forces. They have organized, trained, and equipped us to be an effective fighting force as part of the Total Air Force Team. Our units have been maintained, our equipment modernized. We have been included in every mission area, and we can expect our share of mission areas to grow.

Ours is a good news story, one of sound policies, proper planning, complete cooperation, and responsible resourcing.

America's investment in the Air National Guard is an investment in quality, and the rate of return has been extraordinary. In every way fiscal 1990 was a quality year for us and for America:

— Quality participation in two major conflicts (Operation Just Cause and Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm)!
— World-wide gunnery competition champions (Gunsmoke '90)!
— World-wide reconnaissance champions (RAM '90)
— Best airlift team in the United States (Volant Rodeo)!
— Highest strength and retention levels ever!
— Best ground and flying safety record ever!
— Best inspection record ever!

The Air National Guard enjoys its highest state of readiness ever. We attribute our success, in large part, to the many dedicated men and women who are committed to excellence. Their response and contributions to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm have thrust the Air National Guard and the Total Air Force Team into the forefront of national awareness. We could not miss the sight of "South Carolina" emblazoned on the tails of the 169th Tactical Fighter Group's F-16 Fighting Falcons, or the larger-than-life "NY" on the 174th Tactical Fighter Wing's F/A-16s as they were supporting the coalition forces. At the foundation of it all are the fine men and women who have trained and labored—and trained some more—to take their rightful places on the Total Air Force Team. But as our citizen-airmen return to their homes, we are very much concerned about them, their families, their jobs, and their units. Treating our troops properly as they return home from Operation Desert Storm is our greatest near-term challenge. We anticipated demobilization would have a sweeping impact throughout our force. We prepared to meet this challenge head-on, and we are!

We are not so quick to conclude that mobilization will have little or no affect on readiness. We are optimistic, however, that our recruiting and retention programs will focus on the "right stuff."

We expect some temporary turbulence with recruiting and retention; however we do not expect significant problems and we will lean forward to absorb qualified active duty members who will separate due to the overall military force drawdown. In fact, we've initiated several actions aimed at improving our chances of attracting these valuable assets. This optimism must be tempered, however, with two concerns which could negatively impact our expectations. First, forces and missions being assigned to the Air National Guard in fiscal years 1992/1993 will require greater numbers of drill status, Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), and technician personnel. As the AGR program continues to grow, we need to emphasize the importance of increasing grade ceilings for our AGR force. AGRs are part of the Air National Guard's future leadership. If their pay and promotions are limited, we will not be able to retain all of them. Second, it's been proposed that 30 percent of the AGR personnel be replaced with Active component personnel. We believe this action will be disruptive, costly, and add little to Air National Guard readiness. Overall, we will work harder in the area of recruiting and retention. In spite of the turbulence confronting us, we will be as ready, capable, and accessible as we were on the second of August and are today. We will be able to assume an even more prominent role in the future.

Last year I reported to you the emphasis we place on ensuring our people are well-trained and our weapon systems are mission-capable. I stated then as I do now that continuing to increase our warfighting capability at an affordable price is essential. I am pleased to report to you that your support and confidence in a strong and capable Air National Guard have met all expectations. First-class people need first-class equipment. Modernization of the Air National Guard force continues at a rapid pace, and for this we are appreciative.

Aircraft modernization has kept us busy. In fiscal year 1990 we completed 21 conversions, and this fiscal year we will have a combination of 53 unit conversions and new activations in progress. In fiscal year 1990 we took delivery of 160 F-16s, 18 F-15s, 24 RF-4Cs, 8 KC-135s, 16 HC/C-130Hs, 14 MH-60G rescue helicopters, and 3 C-26 operational support aircraft. Improvements to our training capability were realized when two Air Combat Maneuverability Instrumentation (ACMI) subsystems were brought on line. In fiscal years 1991 and 1992, we expect to field an additional 216 F-16s, 18 F-15s, 24 A/OA-10s, 30 KC-135s, 4 C-141s, 23 HC/C-130Hs, 9 MH-60Gs, 9 C-26s, and 2 more ACMI ranges.

The upgrading of our F-15A/B fleet began through the Multi-Staged Improvement Program (MSIP), which, with continued funding, will proceed into fiscal year 1991 and fiscal year 1992. A self-protection capability for our RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft will be completed. Off-the-shelf technologies and capabilities for defensive systems improvements to our F-16s, which we hope will continue during the next two years, were provided by congressionally-added funding. Additionally, our air refueling capabilities are being upgraded with the reengining of our older KC-135 tankers. We strongly support the Air Force initiative to upgrade the engines on our

older model F-16s with the 220E engine. We have provided some funding to this program to ensure that Air National Guard F-16s are among the first aircraft equipped with the 220E.

Our mission support units were partially modernized in fiscal year 1990. New communications equipment, essential to vital command and control and used in Operation Desert Storm, was delivered to our units. I ask for your continued support in ensuring our future needs can be met with the latest technology available.

Fiscal year 1990 witnessed the dynamics of progress, and with progress has come change. While we have experienced no changes in the number of units under the Air National Guard umbrella, we have undergone a change in mix. Force structure modifications, such as conversions from fighters to tankers, have caused turmoil. While we fully recognize the myriad factors necessitating changes, we ask only for a shared appreciation of the difficult decisions we're having to make. Whether a conversion is driven by major fighter force reductions in the Active Force, a plan to prevent a unit from closing, or any other decision predicated on fostering a stronger Total Force, we will continue to undertake all conversions with equal fervor. As with past conversions, our resources of both tangible and intangible kinds are pressed into service with only one goal in mind: to achieve mission-ready status in minimum time with maximum efficiency.

Progress causes other problems, too. Modernization of the force comes not without a price. Obtaining and maintaining our capability depends on functional facilities. Many of our facility requirements for aircraft conversions, for example, are late to need. We are diverting scarce O&M funds to accomplish temporary workarounds until military construction projects are completed. Reduced budgets have placed emphasis on support of force structure modernization, environmental compliance, and those few current mission projects with the greatest impact on training and readiness.

Last year we spent nearly $190 million for real property operations, maintenance, repair, and minor upgrades, and disposed of more than 38,000 square feet of deteriorating structures of World War II and prior vintage. This year we would prefer to anticipate a like dollar amount to protect and enhance our physical plant and the demolition of another 11,000 square feet of old facilities. However, in keeping with the decreasing budgets throughout the Department of Defense, we have an fiscal year 1992 MILCON request ($131.8 million) that represents the minimum essential requirements to successfully accomplish conversions and critical facility replacement.

Our Constitution reminds us of the militia's dual-mission responsibility to the State and to the Nation. It is this dual commitment to both State and Nation that distinguishes us from all other services. Lt. Gen. John B. Conaway, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, recalls that the National Guard has matured and expanded its service to the Nation to include a third mission—a community mission—best described as "adding value to America." The Air National Guard is adding value to America through its participation in these three areas: the environment, the war on drugs, and minority representation.

One of the greatest long-term threats to our health and well-being is the effect we all have on our environment. I can say with conviction that the Air National Guard is on the front lines in the battle for a safer, healthier environment.

Strict adherence with Federal and State laws and a commonsense, total compliance approach to safe and sound business practices are what we can do to help preserve our precious environment. Our participation in National Guard Executive Environmental Leadership Seminars and Environmental Advisory Councils has helped us to focus on additional efforts. We have devoted funding to conduct first-rate environmental impact assessments for aircraft conversions. Hazardous waste disposal analyses and similar environmentally sensitive actions have been taken. Airspace management and long-range planning, installation restoration programs, and underground storage tank removal projects are ongoing.

Educating and training our Air National Guard members on ways to promote environmentally-safe practices have become high priorities in the everyday management of our units. Education and training are continuing processes. Managing our resources for a healthier environment is a national priority. The health and well-being of our human resources are also a national priority for the Air National Guard.

Another message is clear. The Air National Guard is committed to helping make—and keep—America drug free. In 1990 we expended nearly 53,000 mandays and close to 1,200 flying hours in support of the war on drugs. Thirty-one Air National Guard units and nearly 500 citizen-airmen participated in counter-drug operations at a cost of over $14.2 million.

Our efforts to combat illegal drug use focus on three elements: supply, interdiction, and demand. Our goal, with anti-drug coalition partners, is to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. We are mobilizing our troops to wage this war, to develop and publicize an effective anti-drug education and awareness program. We will provide whatever assets possible to help in this nationwide effort.

Last year we initiated procurement of a modified C-26 to assist us in our counter-narcotics role. This aircraft will serve as a testbed for our developing concept for counter-narcotics operations. We are considering the utility of a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system on our C-130s as well as assessing a FLIR for our MH-60G helicopters to bring them to a common configuration with the Air Force's MH-60G SOF aircraft.

We have also very successfully used our F-15, F-16 and RF-4 aircraft and Tactical Control Radars in our Nation's counter-narcotics efforts. Working in close coordination with other State and Federal agencies, we have identified and intercepted suspected drug smuggling aircraft as well as detected marijuana crops, border crossings, drug laboratories, and other suspected illegal activities.

Reducing the supply of drugs is just one way we're fighting this war. Our joint Army/Air National Guard Drug Demand Reduction Board works closely with the 54 States and territories to identify and initiate opportunities to reduce substance abuse. In this way, we are making a contribution to tackling the other side of the drug problem.

Victory will not come easily, nor will it come cheaply. But through innovative programs at all levels of our community, and with the firm commitment by our people, we will win this war. We are adding value to America!

Fact: 85 percent of the net additions to the labor force between 1985 and the year 2000 will be minorities and women. The Air National Guard's grass-roots foundation and hometown heritage are natural reasons why we are committed to increasing minority participation in our programs to reflect the ethnic and racial makeup of our local communities. This Air National Guard goal for the 1990s is both a challenge and ban opportunity we are determined to achieve.

Support for increasing minority representation spans all strata within the military community, but none is stronger than in the Air National Guard. We have the means and the mettle to make it happen. The opportunity is apparent, and so is the need. Reaching our goal will require action at all levels of command, but none more important than at the grass roots level. Already action plans are being developed and the forces mobilized to meet this opportunity head-on.

Leading our initiative is the Air National Guard Human Resources Advisory Council (HRAC) which was established this year. Its charter is simple and forthright: "Review and make recommendations for improvement of policies, plans, and practices to assure fair and equitable participation for all, with emphasis on minorities, in all phases of the Air National Guard." Further, the HRAC is charged to "educate, facilitate, and provide tools to units for improvement of their equal opportunity programs." We are encouraged by the enthusiasm and ideas the Council is generating.

We will achieve minority representation throughout our force. We are institutionalizing our efforts and our mind-set to ensure our viability as a combat ready force. We are adding value to America!

Mr. Chairman, last year I reported to you the Air National Guard's commitment to its State mission, and cited for the committee some of the calamities that befell our Nation: the Alaska oil spill, United Airlines Flight 232, Hurricane Hugo, and the San Francisco earthquake. While this year we're fortunate to have not been called, we remain prepared nonetheless—trained and organized should the call come. Our ability to perform our State mission was enhanced by the activation of Alaska's new air rescue unit, the 210th Air Rescue Service, equipped with new HC-130N airplanes and MH-60G helicopters. Last year the 210th was called upon five times by the Alaskan Rescue Coordination Center to assist in rescue missions.

Our New York-based 106th Air Rescue Group was credited with saving eight lives, and California's 129th Air Rescue Group saved five. (The rescue capability of these units will be significantly upgraded with the new MH-60G helicopters.) Three Air National Guard units with the Modular Airborne Fire-Fighting System (MAFFS) capability participated in fighting forest fires in the Pacific Northwest.

Underlying our aggressive approach to the challenges of an austere yet dynamic environment is our overriding commitment to quality—Quality Through Teamwork. Simply, it is a no-nonsense, commonsense approach to how we do business, a management system that introduces "quality" into everything we do. "Quality" is doing the right thing at the right time, the first time and every time. The Air National Guard is committed to quality—quality in the way we think, the way we act, and in

what we expect of each other. We have clarified and aligned our organization's purpose, mission, values, visions, goals, and programs. We have established procedures that use collaborative team efforts and quantitative evaluation to continually improve our processes. Quality Through Teamwork is becoming a reality throughout the Air National Guard.

Mr. Chairman, ours is a good news story, a story of cooperation with our Active component colleagues to properly shape, train, and equip our Total Force. As we move forward in an ever-changing world and grapple with the realities of the budget, I see a bright future for airpower, a bright future for the Air Force, a bright future for the Air National Guard, and a bright future for our country. The past year has shown without doubt that Guard and Reserve units properly trained and equipped can and will respond when called.

They can and will do the job if backed up by sound policies and leadership that truly include them on the first team. Air Force leadership has done just that.

117,000 proud professionals of the Air National Guard.

Quality people working together as proud members of the Total Air Force Team.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM P. WARD, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, it is a pleasure to be here today, representing the more than 600,000 men and women citizen-soldiers of the Army Reserve and the over 124,000 retirees with hip pocket orders, around the world and serving our Nation in the Persian Gulf, to present the fiscal years 1992 and 1993 Reserve Personnel, Army, and Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve, appropriation requests.

This year, as we discuss the President's budget request, thousands of the men and women of the Army Reserve are serving with their brothers and sisters in the Total Force and America's coalition allies half way around the globe. I share the pride of our leaders, and I am sure, the members of this committee in the patriotism and courage of the men and women of the Armed Forces who served in the Persian Gulf. As General Powell has noted, while we may discuss equipment, training, and strategy, "it all comes down to dedicated men and women willing to put their lives on the line for our country—men and women such as those . . . in the Gulf today."

The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf and the unprecedented rush of change in the 1990s confront both the Army Reserve and the Total Army, of which it is an integral part, with significant challenges in meeting strategic defense requirements. Consequently, we are continually analyzing the size, structure, mix, mission, and stationing of defense forces across the world. After this analysis is complete, and our forces return from the Middle East, we will doubtless see a smaller Army with more of its force found in American territory and new outposts. This clearly will mandate corresponding changes in the Army Reserve and the key role it plays in the Total Force, especially in rounding out the Active force and in providing support units. The superb performance of reservists in the Persian Gulf proves how particularly well suited they are to meeting contingencies and augmenting Active component units. Both President Bush and Secretary Cheney have stated that the American forces could not perform their mission without the contributions made by the Reserves. The essentiality of keeping our Reserve force highly trained and effective is beyond dispute.

America faces unique political and strategic challenges, and the agendas of both the Army Reserve and the Total Army will be dominated by the need to deal with this turbulence and uncertainty over the years ahead. The Army Reserve looks forward to playing an essential role in any planning for future contingencies.

The Reserve personnel, Army, budget requests for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 are $2.2 billion and $2.1 billion respectively. This is a decrease of over $170.5 million from fiscal year 1991 and reflects Selected Reserve end strength reductions from 291,300 at the end of fiscal year 1991 to totals of 282,700 in fiscal year 1992 and 254,50 in fiscal bear 1993. Special Training and Mobilization Training suffer reductions disproportionate to strength decreases. While these decreases leave sufficient funding for minimum training, they will force us to make some very hard choices on the relative priority of various essential training opportunities.

Beginning now, we must make difficult choices between retaining existing structure and activating programmed structure. We will base our decisions upon an objective analysis that leads to the force best suited to facing contingencies and warfighting requirements of the foreseeable future.

Given the recent unprecedented events in Europe, Central America, and the Persian Gulf, foretelling everything that might affect the Army is virtually impossible.

However, this uncertainty makes maintaining the readiness of the Army Reserve all the more essential. In the case of Desert Storm, the Army Reserve was called upon and responded well. However, this response would not have been nearly so successful had it not been for the full-time support personnel, who, by administrating, planning, and maintaining equipment, allow drilling reservists to spend more of their limited drill time actually training. Fulltime support personnel enable Reserve units to effectively replace more expensive Active component units. This makes Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) soldiers and military technicians a particularly prudent investment in an era of constrained budgets.

The fiscal year 1992 budget shows a decrease in full-time support of 2,541. This decrement keeps the level for the Army Reserve at 9.5 percent (which remains the lowest of any Reserve component and well below the congressionally recommended level of 14 percent). Retaining the fiscal year 1990 full-time manning level will solve part of the problem. The remainder of our fulltime support needs can be met by increasing the transition of highly qualified active duty soldiers into the Army Reserve's Full-Time Support Program. However, this will only be true if these active duty soldiers are added to the program rather than merely being substituted for already qualified AGR soldiers. For example, we expect that reductions in the Active component will permit the transfer of much needed equipment to the Army Reserve. Adequate maintenance of this modern equipment can best be promoted by availing ourselves of the opportunity to transfer as many fully trained and experienced Active component maintenance personnel as possible to Army Reserve full-time support positions. maintenance personnel transfer with the equipment they maintain, neglect and deterioration of sophisticated and expensive items is minimized, training costs drop, and unit readiness is significantly enhanced. No other factor is more essential in determining Reserve readiness.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRA) is the Army's principal source of trained military personnel to serve as replacements or fillers for both Active and Reserve component units. Supporting the Total Army, the IRR constitutes the Nation's largest pool of deployable and trained individual manpower. Its strength has grown from 213,000 in fiscal year 1981 to a fiscal year 1990 end strength of over 284,000. However, as the result of downsizing the Active Army and the effects of the 8-year military obligation, the IRA is expected to grow to 433,170 by the end of fiscal year 1992. Twenty thousand IRA soldiers were activated to support Operation Desert Storm and did a superb job of demonstrating how well the IRR can perform its mission.

During the last fiscal year, Army Reserve units and soldiers participated in a wide variety of training exercises that not only improved readiness, but also demonstrated our ability to perform augmentation and contingency operations. Several years of outstanding training have been a key to this success.

One very important program is overseas deployment training (ODT), which offers Reserve soldiers the opportunity to mobilize, deploy to an overseas theater of operations, and train with their Active component counterparts. Over the past 5 years, an annual average of between 19,000 and 20,000 Army Reserve soldiers from about 1,400 units participated in ODT. This training takes place in over 50 different countries and includes over 20 major overseas exercises a year. ODT has proved to be particularly beneficial to Army Reserve participation in the Gulf. Last year the Army Reserve was a key player in Exercise Bright Star, one of the Southwest Asia's most valuable exercises. Our soldiers also took part in several smaller deployments in the region to train in a wide variety of skills. These have included water management, engineering projects, medical support, and humanitarian programs.

During the past 5 years, the Army Reserve has also expanded its mobilization exercise program. This greatly contributed to the smooth call-up of USAR units for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Along with ODT, the mobilization exercise program has paid big "dividends' in Desert Storm. These exercises have been largely responsible achieving two important wartime goals: accomplishing the military mission and preserving the lives of our soldiers.

The U.S. Army Reserve participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm from the very beginning. Army Reserve transportation corps units already on annual training, along with volunteers from units that were not, were responsible for the timely loading of tanks and other vehicles of the 24th Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), and the 1st Cavalry Division. This occurred prior to presidential authorization of a Selected Reserve call-up under 10 U.S.C. 673b.

Since the presidential call-up in August, 1990, nearly 650 units, over 800 Individual Mobilization Augmentees, over 1,250 retirees, and 20,000 members of the IRR plus over 1,150 IRA volunteers have been activated. As of this date, over 80,000

Army reservists have been called to active duty in support of Operation Desert Storm. Over 45,000 personnel were assigned to more than 430 Army Reserve units in Saudi Arabia. Twenty-two units performed important duties in Europe f reeing component units for deployment to Saudi Arabia, and nearly 200 additional units, with nearly 6,000 personnel, expanded the training, support, and medical base in the United States.

Army Reserve participation in Desert Storm includes the whole range of combat, combat support, and combat service support missions. Central Command, which directed Desert Storm, could not operate without the military police, legal, transportation, chemical, petroleum, water production, medical, dental, personnel, postal, ammunition management, supply, and maintenance services provided by our Army Reserve units.

Operation Desert Storm has dramatically affected the equipment posture of units of the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve supported Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm with units and equipment valued at over $6 billion. Deploying Army Reserve units cross-leveled equipment to the Army standard for deployment. The Army Reserve also provided support to the National Guard units that had been activated for Desert Storm by providing 42 high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles one laundry unit, and 13 5-ton trucks.

The Army accelerated deliveries of material acquired through the Dedicated Procurement Program (DPP) rushing 1,055 5-ton trucks to deploying units ahead of schedule. DPP funding provided a significant influence in equipping Army Reserve units. Twenty-six 5-ton trucks, 150 tractors and semi-trailers, and 300 M-60 machine guns were sent directly to the theater to expedite equipping of Reserve units.

Here in the United States, Army Reserve hospitals and other medical units have been key to maintaining health care for the hundred of thousands of dependents who were left behind as soldiers deployed to the Persian Gulf. They were also absolutely critical to ensuring that the finest medical care would be provided to casualties evacuated from the theater.

Also participating in the continental United States' support of Desert Storm were the Army Reserve training divisions. For the first time they performed their mission of expanding the training base. Approximately 25 training battalions, with required command and control headquarters and support units; provided refresher and military occupational specialty training to Individual Ready Reservists called-up for Desert Storm service.

The fiscal year 1992 request also includes $60.2 million for incentives and $23.0 million for education benefits. For fiscal year 1993, $51.1 million is requested for incentives and $21.9 million for education benefits. Although there are some decreases associated with declining end strength, there is a significant increase in incentives for health professionals, i.e., the extension of a recruitment bonus test through the end of fiscal year 1992. These incentives and educational entitlements serve as an extraordinary measure to assist the Army Reserve in meeting and sustaining manpower requirements in a post Desert Storm environment. The incentive program pays a variable bonus to Army Reserve enlistees who will acquire critically needed skills or who will fill vacancies in high priority units. The education benefit program helps build a stronger and better educated Army Reserve. These education and incentive programs are complementary and both are essential to meeting our strength goals. Of particular value is the Montgomery GI bill and its "2 x 4" option, which provides a $300 per month benefit to soldiers serving on 2 years of active duty followed by 4 years of service in the Selected Reserve. It attracts both civilians and soldiers leaving the Active component, and the education it provides serves both the Army and the national economy well.

The Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve budget requests for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 are $937 million and $973 million respectively. These figures do not include Special Operations Forces operation and maintenance funds that are in the Defense operation and maintenance account for fiscal year 1992 and out. In accord with Army Reserve strength and force structure decreases, we are also reducing our civilian end strength: from 12,693 in fiscal year 1991, to 10,813 in fiscal year 1992, to 9,775 in fiscal year 1993.

The level of Army Reserve equipment on hand continues to improve. Since fiscal year 1981, the Army Reserve has received roughly $1.5 billion of equipment from a combination of the Dedicated Procurement Program and normal Army procurement. We are very grateful for the congressional funding that supported these equipment purchases, which have improved both training the ability of the Army Reserve to perform its vital mission. This ability paid big dividends in the Persian Gulf.

We remain concerned about our $72.7 million dollar fiscal year 1991 maintenance and repair backlog, which reflects the widening gap between our need for facilities and our ability to pay for them. Accordingly, continued support for our facilities budgets is essential to prevent an increase in an Army Reserve construction backlog of nearly $2.4 billion.

In summary, while the uncertainties of the years ahead present many challenges, I remain entirely confident that the men and women of the Reserve components, when they are properly resourced and trained, can and will continue to do jobs and accomplish the missions assigned to them. In these times of tight budgets, our citizen-soldiers; by virtue of their being part-time, are the best bargain in DOD. Their superb performance and sacrifices in the Persian Gulf are a source of pride to us all, and Congress has our gratitude for the support it has given and continues to give them.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY REAR ADM. J.E. TAYLOR, USN, DIRECTOR OF NAVAL RESERVE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today. I could not think of a better time to discuss the Naval Reserve and its role in our Total Force. And I cannot imagine a more appropriate place to discuss our status and future than here on Capitol Hill, where the Naval Reserve has enjoyed such strong support.

Let me describe the current state of the Naval Reserve as measured by our performance in Operation Desert Storm. This, Mr. Chairman, will be what I proudly call a "good news" story.

Congress has invested heavily in our program and, while we don't as yet have a complete scorecard from Desert Storm, I can tell you with confidence that your investment of the past decade has paid off.

A common Navy hallmark is captured by the phrase "hit the deck running;" that is, to come aboard a ship or other command and assume your billet completely ready to do your job with little, or no, additional training required. That, ladies and gentlemen, has been the story of the Naval Reserve in Operation Desert Storm.

The Naval Reserve literally hit the deck running. As of March 19, we have activated approximately 20,000 Ready Reservists from our force of about 130,000 drilling reservists.

More than 6,500 of the men and women we have recalled to date are serving in the Persian Gulf. They are helping in the massive logistics effort for Desert Storm. They are manning minesweepers, harbor defense units and providing medical support, to mention only a few of the many—and varied—jobs they are holding. But, wherever they are serving, they are bonded by a common theme—*"Ready to Go!"*

They were ready to go when they were needed. And when called, they went quickly, cheerfully and willingly. When they arrived at their duty stations, they literally rolled up their sleeves and went to work—almost immediately. For example, a Cargo Handling Unit from Charleston, SC, was on the job on the piers in Rota, Spain, helping load a fast sealift ship within 72 hours of recall notification and only 90 minutes after their arrival in country!

Thanks to having a system of clearly identified mobilization billets for each of our 130,000 drilling reservists, every man and woman in a drill pay status knew what they would be expected to do on being activated. Their training, their drills and their 2-weeks of active duty, were all focused on assuring their fully qualified status. I don't mean to suggest we were 100 percent geared up for the specific type of war fought in the Gulf, but we have long attempted to marry the needs of the Active force with the skills of our individual members and units. That maximized our performance and made possible the best use of our personnel.

I am pleased to tell you, the system worked. Yes, there were factors we had not foreseen or anticipated—that is to be expected. But we had the flexibility to adapt, improvise and overcome. The recall imposed some hardships on some of our members. Mobilization is not a happy prospect for anyone. No one likes being called to duty because of armed conflict.

But our members, almost to an individual, quickly put aside their civilian lives. They left what, in many cases, were higher-paying civilian jobs and well-established careers. They left their families, friends and sometimes their own businesses and employees, for the common good.

That high level of enthusiastic response did not surprise me. Long before Desert Shield, I had visited numerous Reserve centers around the country where I was im-

pressed by the patriotism and professionalism of our Reserve force. I knew our reservists would be ready, if needed.

What impressed me even more since this operation began is how our Naval reservists performed on active duty. Quietly, professionally, they got the job done—and more. They validated the policy of "Total Force."To date, we have called up only 15 percent of the Selected Reserve. More than half of those activated were in our medical program. These were critically needed medical specialists, required in most cases to replace active duty personnel who had deployed to the Gulf from Stateside medical treatment facilities. In all, we activated approximately 10,000 health-care professionals who deserve special recognition. Many are physicians who left well-established medical practices to serve. Others are nurses and other health care providers who occupied vital-roles in their home communities and today are ensuring that our military men and women—and their dependents—receive the best health care possible.

A second major component of our mobilized force is our logistics support personnel. We activated approximately 2,500 reservists in this category, including four aviation squadrons which fly the C-9 aircraft. Others are weapons handlers and support personnel at air stations and other bases that are in the long chain directly supporting operations in the Gulf. In addition, we called about 800 others in cargo handling units, 89 in our Naval Control of Shipping Program and almost 400 more to assist the Military Sealift Command. As you know, the Naval Reserve contains a high percentage of the Navy's Construction Battalions: about two-thirds of the famous Navy Seabees are reservists. We recalled two Reserve battalions, about 2,500 people, to active duty.We provided two Naval Reserve Force minesweepers with their Reserve crews to the fleet for service in the Gulf and more than 1,800 reservists augmented other ships. Our Intelligence Program brought nearly 400 people on active duty and we supplied 900 others in various support roles, from public affairs specialists to chaplains.The result has been to place our personnel in a wide variety of Navy jobs. Once on active duty, of course, they report to their gaining commands—not to me. But the reports I have received from their Active Force commanders have been overwhelmingly positive. They appreciate the quality of our people, their attitude, their knowledge, their professionalism and their state of training. In short, the Naval Reserve quickly became an integral part of our Total Force team in the Gulf and elsewhere. This is exactly the role we envisioned for our reservists and, I think, illustrates the value of the policy you have so strongly supported.Having said that, please let me add that we have den constantly monitoring this mobilization to discover new and better ways to recall our personnel. As I mentioned, activation of personnel during times of uncertainty is inherently stressful and disruptive. We want to make certain that when we interrupt our reservists' lives, that we do our best to make the sudden transition to military life as smooth as possible.In that regard, we learned early on that we needed to provide our reservists with adequate lead-time to plan for their activation. No amount of planning can help us anticipate all the problems that 23,000 individuals might encounter. Consequently, we now give Naval reservists being recalled 10 days lead-time in which to arrange their personal and business affairs before they report for duty. We have discovered that many individuals often need this much time, and providing them a reasonable period of time makes them much more focused and productive on active duty.This is, of course, the first major mobilization of Reserve assets the Nation has seen in 20 years. Indeed, it appears likely to be the most prolonged mobilization of reservists since the Korean War. Congress has already begun to address many of the problems reservists face through the revision of the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act as well as other initiatives. On behalf of our reservists, I thank you for your consideration and support of these issues.As anyone who has gone to sea for a prolonged tour can tell you, leaving home is only one trauma that active military service can entail. Upon returning, after the happy homecomings are over, the related readjustment problems that confront military personnel and their previously separated family members are frequently even more difficult.

Aware that we have disrupted the lives of many families, in some cases separating mothers from their children, I want to assure you that the Naval Reserve has gone "all out" to ensure that demobilization is as easy as possible for our members. It is my basic conviction that we owe it to our members to go the extra Ale, if you will, and do as much as we can to help ease their transition back to civilian life.As a result, in early February I established a special task force to craft a plan both to look out for the' families of our recalled reservists while they are away and, when they return, facilitate their transition back to civilian life. "Project RESTAR"—Reserve Transition and Recognition—is a Naval Reserve effort to coordinate and focus programs which already exist from the Department of Veterans Affairs, Navy and

Marine Corps Relief Society, Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, Navy Family Service Centers and others to assure that our reservists and their families receive the widest possible levels of support upon their return. We know that it is important for the Naval Reserve to demonstrate tangibly to our people our concern for their wellbeing and we want their employers, family members and the general public to know how proud and grateful we are for their contributions.

We also want to assure their ability to successfully meet any financial, family or job-related problems they may encounter. While we cannot hope to help resolve every problem of every Naval reservist, we can do our best to ensure that their patriotism and dedication to duty are acknowledged and appreciated and that they are not penalized by society or "the system." They did the right thing for their country. *And the Naval Reserve intends to do the right thing for them!*

This is a case where an ounce of compassion will go a long way toward preventing the chasm of alienation that could exist if our people returned with the perception that no one cared about their plight. I have directed each Naval Reserve center and Naval Reserve air site commanding officer to implement this initiative—a "people" oriented program—to help our returning personnel.

As a member of the Navy's leadership team, I can assure you that we will be monitoring all the after-action reports for ways we can improve the Naval Reserve. As much as I personally hope that there never will be another Desert Storm, history suggests that there will come another time when the Naval Reserve will again be called to go in harm's way.

Our present goal is to learn the lessons of this war to refine and hone our skills. I know that we will emerge from this experience as a validated player in the Total Force, having proven 0ur value as a vital team member.As we look for ways to improve our force, one important goal will be to maintain our ability to respond quickly with pre-trained manpower, one of the key elements to our success in Desert Storm. I believe we can do this best by continuing our strong program of mutual support and training with the regular components of the active Navy. We want to make certain that any new missions which maybe assigned to the Naval Reserve are those we can handle well. It would be false security to give the Naval Reserve a mission that cannot be adequately supported merely to say that the program remains in the Navy inventory.

More specifically, we will continue to modernize the force during fiscal year 1992. Our final F/A-18 squadron will be in transition and we will have three maritime patrol squadrons in transition to the P-3C aircraft. We will also upgrade the SH-2F helicopters in our inventory with improved ASW gear.

On the surface side, two of our ASW frigates will receive the SQQ-89 ASW systems. The Innovative Naval Reserve Concept will result in the designation of eight FF-1052 class frigates in the Naval Reserve Force as FFTs in fiscal year 1992. Four ships will be decommissioned and laid up in a 180 day ready-for-sea status in fiscal year 1991. By fiscal year 1993, a total of 32 ships will be in a laid up status to complete the program.

Important as these hardware items are, though, they will be for naught if we mishandle our most important asset, our people. Whatever the shape of our program, our people will be *Priority One!*

I will be happy to respond to your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. HOLLIS E. DAVISON, USMC, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, USMC

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to address you this year in my first annual report to you concerning the current posture and future programs of the Marine Corps Reserve and the successful mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in support of Operation Desert Storm. This is indeed an honor and a particularly meaningful occasion for me.

For the first time since the Korean War, Marine reservists from all corners of the Nation have been mobilized to support our Active Forces. Under authority of Section 673b of Title 10, United States Code, the call-up of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) began last fall. The mobilization of most of the remainder of the SMCR and a significant portion of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) commenced in February under authority of Section 673 of Title 10, United States Code. In February under authority of Section 688 of Title 10, United States Code, the recall of part of the Retired Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve also started.

At the peak of our mobilization, 24,324 Marines from the SMCR and 6,262 Marines from the IRR had reported for duty after receiving orders to take their places

alongside Marines from the Active component. Marine Corps Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve retirees recalled to duty totaled 586.

Mobilization of the Ready Reserve included significant portions of the 4th Division-Wing Team (4th DWT); i.e., the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing and the 4th Force Service Support Group.

The call-up of the Marine Corps Reserve affirms the Commandant's Total Force concept. The ability to respond to several crises simultaneously while maintaining a worldwide presence would require a Marine Corps of three active Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). While not required for initial crisis response, the Reserve component is necessary to provide a critical sustainment and reinforcement base for extended operations beyond 60 days.

Operational requirements of Operation Desert Storm saw just such a utilization unfold. Within 8 days of the invasion of Kuwait, the first active duty Marine elements deployed to Southwest Asia. Mobilization of the SMCR commenced 60 days later on October 10, 1990.

The successful integration with the Active component also validates the roles long anticipated for use of the Marine Corps Reserve within the Total Force. Two such roles were to selectively augment or reinforce the Active force with SMCR units. In Southwest Asia with I MEF, in the Western Pacific with III MEF, and on many bases and stations here in the United States and abroad, the unit integrity of the mobilized Reserve units was maintained concurrently while meeting operational requirements. Reserve units were deployed to augment Active forces or to reinforce Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) units needing additional combat capability to meet operational requirements.

Task organization is a way of life in the Marine Corps. Just as we task organize our MAGTFs in the Active component to tailor combat power for the mission, so did we task organize and mobilize elements of the 4th DWT to augment and reinforce our Active component for Operation Desert Storm. Examples, besides the deployment of combat units, include task organizing Reserve combat service support detachments to repair, maintain, and store equipment left behind by deploying active MAGTFs.

From our 4th Marine Division (4th MarDiv), we called up units and detachments from the three infantry regiments, the artillery regiment, and all separate battalions and companies; (e.g., two tank battalions, assault amphibious vehicle battalion, light armored infantry battalion, combat engineer battalion, communications battalion, the reconnaissance battalion, and force reconnaissance companies). The vast majority of battalions, batteries and companies that constitute the warfighting elements of these units and the Division were mobilized intact. A total of 16,005 Marines from the 4th MarDiv reported for duty before March 20, 1991.

From our 4th Marine Aircraft Wing (4th MAW), the call-up plan included portions of four Marine Aircraft Groups, the Marine Air Control Group and the Marine Wing Support Group. Many of these units were also mobilized intact for duty with the Active component. A total of 3,471 Marines from the Wing were on active duty on March 20, 1991.

The Marine Wing Control Group provided units for air command and control, communications, and air defense including our light anti-aircraft missile and low altitude air defense systems. The Marine Wing Support Group provided four Marine Wing Support Squadrons and all the applicable support associated with tee squadrons such as refuelers, engineers, crash/fire and rescue, military police and messing.

From the 4th Force Service Support Group (4th FSSG), as of March 20, 1991, a total of 4,020 Marines had reported for duty. The medical, dental, supply, maintenance, engineer support, motor transport and landing support battalions, as well as the headquarters and service battalion, were called up. The combat service support duties performed by these units include many functions such as bridging operations, bulk fuel transport, beach and port operations, and shore party support.

It was originally planned that the headquarters of the 4th MarDiv and the 4th FSSG would be moved to Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and the headquarters of the 4th MAW would be moved to Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California to form contingency forces. Due to the dramatic success of Operation Desert Storm, these moves will not be executed at this time.

The Total Force concept of employment of the SMCR is based on task organization to augment and reinforce the active component. We activated SMCR detachments in some cases that were specifically task organized to meet an augmentation or reinforcing mission. Although these detachments were not complete SMCR units, their use in this manner is consistent with the Total Force concept. Specific examples include Combat Service Support Detachments 40 and 41.

Individual Ready Reservists with critical military occupational specialty skills were also called to fill existing or projected specific billet vacancies. These Marines allow the Marine Corps to sustain itself to meet a variety of missions and contingencies during periods of prolonged deployment or conflict.

The infusion of reservists has also permitted us to reconstitute II MEF on the east coast and form V MEF on the west coast. These forces were created to provide ready MAGTFs for worldwide contingencies and unit or individual replacements in Southwest Asia.

In summary, the call-up represents 66 percent of the 4th DWT, 18 percent of the IRA and 6 percent of the Retired Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. If needed to meet future operational requirements, the remaining qualified members of the Reserve component would be assigned as units or individuals as required by the Marine Corps.

I am sure the members of the committee and the American people share our pride in the performance and responsiveness of the unit and individual Reserve mobilizations for Operation Desert Storm. Our Marine reservists were well prepared and eager to be called. Hundreds of reservists have written and called to volunteer including a 71 year old retiree. Those not called have been disappointed.

The ability to respond in this superlative manner was rooted in the Marine Corps' focus on Total Force. The leadership, training, and resource management resident in the SMCR and IRE, together with the active duty Marines and Reserve Marines in the Full-Time Support Program manning headquarters elements, and the Inspector-Instructor (I-I) staffs, made this superb Total Force performance possible. The fact that reservists are now serving capably in the roles envisioned for them is proof of their combat readiness.

Many of the Reserve units augmenting or reinforcing our Marine Expeditionary Forces deployed only a matter of days following mobilization. As of March 20, 1991, 13,066 reservists were serving in the Kuwait Theater of Operations with I MEF; 3,003 with II MEF at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina and in Norway, 2,326 with III MEF in the Western Pacific; and 2,577 with V MEF at Camp Pendleton, California.

Of all the units and individuals mobilized, one regimental headquarters, four infantry battalions, one reinforced tank battalion, six artillery batteries, five aviation squadrons and numerous other units eventually saw combat with I MEF during Operation Desert Storm. The Marine Corps Reserve was assigned an array of missions. Those missions ranged from close air support for aviation forces to offensive operations for ground forces. The reservists were major participants and contributors throughout Operation Desert Storm. In a recent message to the Commandant, Lt. Gen. W.E. Boomer, Commanding General I MEF, commented on the superb combat performance of the Marine Corps Reserve units by writing "Quite frankly, from the MEF perspective, we couldn't have done it without them."

It is obvious from the experiences we have gained from Operation Desert Storm that the Marine Corps Reserve plays a crucial role in the Total Force. Funding of the Marine Corps Reserve budget request will provide the resources necessary to fulfill all roles assigned to the Marine Corps Reserve within this Total Force.

The remainder of my remarks today provide more information on the current status of the Marine Corps Reserve and particularly on resources required to maintain its readiness to perform all assigned missions. This information is consistent with the assumptions and positions we have taken for the Marine Corps Reserve in the President's budget.

MANPOWER

On September 30, 1990, the Marine Corps Reserve numbered 95,543 Marines. The Reserve is organized into four categories as provided by law; i.e., the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, the Retired Reserve and the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. Additional support is rendered by active duty personnel in support of the 4th DWT within the Ready Reserve, to include critical Navy and civilian employees of the Marine Corps.

READY RESERVE

The largest category of the Marine Corps Reserve is the Ready Reserve, consisting of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). As demonstrated by Reserve employment during Operation Desert Storm; the Ready Reserve is the most likely Reserve category for early activation in case of war or national emergency.

Selected Marine Corps Reserve

The SMCR consists of the 4th DWT, the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program and the Full-Time Support (FTS) program. The 4th DWT comprises the bulk of the SMCR. The overall ground and aviation structure of the 4th DWT is designed to parallel that of the Active component and is organized specifically to anticipate mobilization roles. The 4th DWT, when fully mobilized, represents about 25 percent of the Marine Corps' combat power available to Fleet Marine Force commanders. At the beginning of this fiscal year there were 37,609 drilling reservists assigned to the 4th DWT.

Our IMAs are drilling reservists who are members of the SMCR but not members of the 4th DWT. These Marines are pre-assigned to mobilization billets which require them to report within 24 hours of notification. A significant portion of Marines in this program are assigned to the 47 Marine Corps Mobilization Stations located throughout the country. During fiscal year 1990, these stations completed the routine annual screening of 11,985 members of the IRR representing 95 percent of those ordered to be screened. This training was critical since these were the same stations responsible for the initial reception, processing, and further transfer to stations of initial assignment of the Individual Ready Reservists mobilized for Operation Desert Storm. IMAs are also assigned to many key billets throughout the supporting establishment where they train side-by-side with their Active counterparts at all bases, stations, and major headquarters.

At the beginning of fiscal year 1991, the number of IMAs totaled 1,330. As of March 20, 1991, 871 of these reservists have been recalled to active duty to support Operation Desert Storm. Gaining commands represent almost all of the major bases and stations in the Marine Corps, U.S. Central Command, and the Fleet Marine Force headquarters for the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.

The third part of the SMCR are the men and women on active duty in the Full-Time Support (FTS) program to support our Reserve forces. Duties range from development of policy, administration and recruiting, to training and logistical support for our Reserve. FTS personnel are additional members of the staff on which they serve. The integration of reservists on active duty with their Active component counterparts contributes significantly to keeping the Marine Corps Total Force up to date and in touch with all of its parts. This type of integration greatly enhances the Marine Corps' ability to look at issues from a complete Total Force perspective.

Our fiscal year 1992 Reserve Personnel Marine Corps request of $326.9 million is intended to support an SMCR end strength of 40,900, a decrease of 3,000 Marines from fiscal year 1991. This budget conforms with planned reductions in our Total Force end strength and will allow us to shape the Reserve component to meet validated Active component requirements, while preserving our readiness and qualitative edge.

The Marine Corps Reserve proposed end strength reduction for fiscal year 1992 is 3,000. This consists of 231 FTS personnel, 243 IMAs, 474 Non-Prior Service (NPS) accessions, and 2,052 SMCR structure spaces.

The majority of the SMCR reductions will come in the area of aviation. These planned reductions are the result of cutbacks within the active duty structure, which encompasses approximately 30 percent of the Reserve aviation unit's total structure, and the identified requirements for augmenting and reinforcing the Active forces. The units being reduced are spread throughout the United States with possible reductions at Whidbey Island, WA, Willow Grove, PA, South Weymouth, MA, Alameda, CA, and Glenview, IL.

The prominent reductions in the 4th MarDiv come in the area of one tank battalion. This reduction is founded on the Marine Corps acquisition of M1A1 tanks. The exact locations of the remaining tank battalion are yet to be determined.

Individual Ready Reserve

At the start of fiscal year 1991, the IRR represented over 44 percent of the Ready Reserve. The IRR is a pre-trained manpower pool of ready reservists who are not in the SMCR. Though not drilling, the IRR is a valuable and experienced manpower asset. It consists of individuals who have served and have been trained previously in the Active component or in the SMCR and have some period of obligated military service remaining, or individuals who have completed their military service obligation and are in the IRA by choice. The IRR is managed by our Marine Corps Reserve Support Center in Overland Park, Kansas. Strength estimates for the IRR are 69,800 by fiscal year 1992.

The importance of the IRR as a source of manpower for augmenting the Active component and as a combat replacement pool has been shown by Operation Desert Storm. Many of these Marines were assigned to various bases and stations through-

out the Corps to assist with base operations, training, maintenance and other critical needs to support our deployed forces. Marines from the IRR are also performing important and sensitive assignments in family and casualty assistance services.

STANDBY RESERVE

The Standby Reserve is that part of the Marine Corps Reserve consisting of reservists who may be ordered involuntarily to active duty only in time of war or national emergency as declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law. It is composed of an active status list and an inactive status list. These Marines may be called only when there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve in a specific skill category to fulfill requirements. Our estimated Standby Reserve end strength for fiscal year 1992 is 1,400 Marines, the same as during fiscal year 1991. We did not involuntarily mobilize members of the Standby Reserve for Operation Desert Storm.

RETIRED RESERVE

Members of the Retired Reserve are those reservists who have transferred to the retired list pursuant to Federal law having completed 20 qualifying years of creditable service for retirement pay. We currently have approximately 4,200 Marines in the Retired Reserve. We do not expect a substantial increase in this population during fiscal year 1992.

FLEET MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The Fleet Marine Corps Reserve consists of enlisted members of the Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve who retire for reasons other than physical disability after completion of 20-30 years active service in the Armed Forces. We project that there will 8,050 Marines in this category at the end of fiscal year 1991.

ACTIVE DUTY SUPPORT

The number of active duty Marines in support of the 4th Division-Wing Team budgeted for fiscal year 1991 totaled 4,908 Marine officers and enlisted personnel. These Marines are primarily assigned to I-I staffs and 4th MAW units. They also serve on the headquarters staffs of the 4th Marine Division, Wing and FSSG. The number of active Marines supporting our Reserve component is a major reason for the Marine Corps Total Force mobilization success. Support to our Reserve Component is approximately 66 percent Active component, 30 percent Reserve component on active duty and 4 percent civilian. Active duty Marines in support of the Reserve constitute about 2.5 percent of the total active duty end strength.

Following activation of the SMCR, we left in place the vast majority of the active duty Marines assigned to our I-I staffs to continue plerforming necessary maintenance, service support and local service duties. Only 89 of these Marines, or less than 5 percent, were reassigned to fill Reserve unit billets vacant at the time of mobilization. Almost 100 percent of leadership billets were filled by reservists. This limited use of the I-I personnel to augment activated Reserve units is further evidence of Reserve readiness.

Since the active duty Marines assigned to 4th MAW billets are on the Reserve unit tables of organization, these Marines deployed with their Reserve unit.

U.S. NAVY SUPPORT

The U.S. Navy furnishes the 4th MAW with aircraft, air operations and maintenance funding, and the 4th DWT with medical, dental, religious, and Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO) support. This support is similar to the support provided to our active duty Navy-Marine Corps team.

At the beginning of fiscal year 1991, there were 1,886 medical officer and corpsman Selected Reserve billets established to support the Marine Corps Reserve. Additionally, there are 79 dentist and 150 dental technician billets in the 4th Dental Battalion, 4th FSSG. The 4th DWT is further supported by 339 Reserve chaplain and religious program specialist billets and 30 NGLOs. Active duty Navy corpsmen also serve with our I-I staffs and with 4th MAW units.

The Naval Reserve officers and enlisted personnel filling Reserve billets ordinarily train side-by-side with their assigned Reserve units both on drill weekends and during annual training. I can unequivocally state that the mission of the Marine Corps Reserve could not be executed without the cooperation and direct support of these Navy officers and enlisted personnel. Over 1,400 of these Navy Reserve per-

sonnel were activated for Operation Desert Storm. Approximately 640 were deployed to Southwest Asia.

The Navy Reserve has requested $22.2 million for fiscal year 1992 personnel support for the Marine Corps Reserve. We enthusiastically endorse this request. This funding will enable the Navy to provide the support necessary for us to maintain the level of readiness that this committee and the American people expect of the Marine Corps Reserve.

CIVILIAN SUPPORT

We are requesting 286 civilian billets for fiscal year 1992 in direct support of the Marine Corps Reserve which equates to a reduction of 97 positions from fiscal year 1991. Ninety-one of these positions have been transferred to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service due to the consolidation of financial support services provided by the Defense Business Operations Fund. The positions we are requesting are in administration, data processing, and personnel management and are located at the major Reserve headquarters sites. These civilians perform the same functions for the Marine Corps Reserve that are accomplished for the Active component on our bases and stations.

RECRUITING

Our prior service (PS) and non-prior service (NPS) recruiting programs continue to provide high quality men and women needed to meet manning requirements of the SMCR. The majority of PS recruiting is performed by reservists working under our Full-Time Support program. NPS recruiting is accomplished by the active duty Recruiting Service in the same manner this mission is accomplished for our Active component. This Total Force approach to NPS recruiting ensures the same quality exists in both our Active and Reserve components. The SMCR consists of approximately 67 percent NPS and 33 percent PS reservists.

During fiscal year 1990, we recruited 7,818 NPS Reserve Marines representing 100 percent of our goal for the year. The quality of these recruits is reflected in their overall profile. Tier 1 high school graduates comprised 97 percent of the NPS accessions, with 79 percent scoring in the upper mental group categories of I-IIIA on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Less than 0.1 percent scored in the mental group category IV on this same test. The average NPS Reserve accession was from AFQT mental group category II with a score of 110. Approximately 21 percent of these accessions were certified college students. This profile is similar to that of our NPS accessions during fiscal year 1989.

We also recruited 4,696 PS Marines for the SMCR during fiscal year 1990. This represented over 100 percent of our goal for the year.

Our requirements for fiscal years 1991 and 1992 are 7,400 and 6,600 NPS recruits, and 4,388 and 4,025 PS accessions, respectively. Fewer Marines are required in each category because of the decrease in budgeted end strength beginning with fiscal year 1992 for the SMCR and factors related to improved retention of the Reserve Marines currently serving. These factors include innovative, stimulating training opportunities and incentives inherent in Reserve participation, among them various base and commissary privileges and the Montgomery GI bill for educational assistance. It remains to be seen what impact the mobilization under Operation Desert Storm will have on our recruiting effort in the remainder of fiscal year 1991 and beyond. All we can say at this point is we are ahead of last year.

TRAINING AND READINESS

For the past few years my predecessors have described to this committee in detail the intensive and aggressive training program developed for the 4th DWT. They indicated priority was placed on warfighting skills and participation in Total Force exercises. They pointed out that although the Reserve component does not have the same amount of time to train as the Active component, the realistic and meaningful training provided does ensure a combat capable force upon mobilization.

Our NPS enlisted Marine reservists participate in the same Marine Battle Skills Training as the Active component. This training involves Basic Warrior Training conducted during boot camp and subsequent Marine Combat Training conducted at the Schools of Infantry. Additionally, all Marines, Active or Reserve, attend the same full length formal schools to obtain their military occupational specialty (MOS) qualification after completing Marine Combat Training.

My predecessors discussed our policy to recruit PS Marines for specific unit openings and military occupational specialties. Marines leaving active duty who do not have an MOS compatible with the Reserve unit in their local area are offered the

opportunity to obtain a compatible MOS through formal school, vocational/technical training, or On-the-Job Training (OJT).

We have an SMCR where all of our NPS recruits and officers receive the same initial training as our Active component. Nearly all of the officers in the SMCR have more than 3 years active duty: 93 percent as officers and the vast majority of the remaining 7 percent as enlisted Marines. Our PS Marines recruited for SMCR units bring with them current FMF experience that further enhances unit readiness.

My predecessors further stressed the importance of the multi-unit exercises held each year in conjunction with the Active component as a means to enhance warfighting skills in areas such as command and control, night fighting, and fire support planning and coordination. Specific mention was made of the overseas exercises and the combined arms exercises held at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California. These types of realistic training opportunities significantly aid in recruiting and retention of our Marine Corps reservist.

Other training highlighted previously for the committee included aggressive use of training simulators to enhance individual and collective training such as the Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer (ISMT), the tank trainer, and the 25mm gunnery trainer for our light armored vehicles. Also discussed was the Commandant's vigorous Professional Military Education program, the Reserve Counterpart Training program, and the Exercise Support program.

Any discussion of our training must include several programs we have developed over the years to measure our readiness. We believe the importance we have placed in these programs has contributed substantially to the success we observed during the mobilization of the SMCR for Operation Desert Storm. Essentially, these programs tell us what we are doing right as well as identify areas for corrective action.

For example, we knew our units were prepared for Operation Desert Storm because the results of our evaluations under the Marine Corps Combat Readiness and Evaluation System consistently indicated a status of operationally ready. These evaluations are conducted using realistic scenarios and the same grading criteria and performance standards as the Active component.

We also knew our units were administratively and logistically ready for mobilization. During fiscal year 1990 we evaluated 122 units within the 4th DWT under our Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Test. All but seven units were found substantially ready or fully ready on the initial evaluation. Corrective action was taken in units not passing the first test. These units were subsequently retested and found capable.

Finally, the 4th DWT is regularly assessed with the same criteria as the Active component concerning compliance with accounting and equipment maintenance procedures. Based on results of assistance visits, we knew our units were exercising the same level of sound supply accounting practices and maintenance procedures as the Active component.

We will continue all of these training policies and programs following the release of our reservists from active duty after the completion of their Operation Desert Storm mission. It is this type of aggressive training that allows the Marine Corps to mobilize and deploy Reserve combat units as part of the Total Force with minimal pre-deployment training. The level of readiness attained prior to mobilization and the results we have observed and enjoyed following mobilization, involving both the SMCR and the IRR, confirm the value and quality of our training and the accuracy of our inspection results. The additional training and combat experience gained during Operation Desert Storm will serve to heighten our readiness and provide a better basis for future mission-oriented training.

The deployment of such a large part of the Total Force Marine Corps in Operation Desert Storm has necessitated that the Reserve component assume some Active component missions. Activated Marine Corps Reserve units as part of the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, commanded by a Reserve brigadier general, represent nearly all of the Marine force participating in Exercise Battle Griffin 1991, a major Northern NATO exercise. Reserve units will provide significant forces to participate in other major exercises such as Team Spirit, Solid Shield, and LOGEX-91.

In addition, under authority of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989, the 4th DWT has assumed the I Marine Expeditionary Force mission to support Joint Task Force 6 in its efforts to stem the flow of drugs across the Southwest U.S. border. This mission includes aerial observation, manning radar sites, plus listening and observation posts, training U.S. Border Patrol agents in reconnaissance and ground maneuver techniques, and installation and management of personnel sensing intrusion devices (ground sensor strings). We anticipate Reserve forces will con-

tinue to participate in counternarcotics operations for as long as this mission is assigned to the Marine Corps.

STRUCTURE

The structural composition of units within the 4th DWT closely parallels that of the Active component. Similarity of the Reserve and Active forces greatly improves and simplifies the process of integrating Reserve units with Active duty units upon mobilization. Similarity of structure at appropriate levels also enhances readiness and helps to minimize training costs. Remembering that MAGTFs are task organized, the structural similarity between our Active and Reserve components lends itself to the successful Total Force deployment demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm.

Structural changes to support our warfighting initiatives during fiscal year 1991 are few. Transitioning of the 4th Light Anti-Air Missile Battalion and VMA-142 will cause organizational and equipment changes but net structure to the 4th MAW will essentially be unaffected. Our decision to convert the Weapons Company of the 4th Light Armored Vehicle Battalion to a fourth line company of the 4th Light Armored Infantry Battalion will have little effect on the 4th MarDiv structure. The anti-tank variance capability of the Weapons Company was dispersed throughout the battalion.

EQUIPMENT

The policy guiding the acquisition of equipment for the Marine Corps Reserve seeks to achieve benefits from the single acquisition and horizontal integration of commodities in consonance with the Active component. The achievement of these benefits is considered paramount to maintaining the ongoing modernization of the Reserve force and interoperability of the Total Force from an operational, training, and maintenance perspective. congressional support of the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation is appreciated.

Aviation

During fiscal year 1991, Reserve aviation procurement included acquisition of two KC-130T aircraft. These aircraft were funded from the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation. With these aircraft we now have 18 KC-130Ts in service. Funding for four additional aircraft has also been approved. Two of these aircraft are under construction and contract negotiations are underway for the other two.

We are in the process of procuring the AH-1W attack helicopter for the Reserve forces. The AH-1W is our premier attack helicopter. The existing Reserve AH-1Js cannot be modified to achieve the capability of the AH-1W. Fourteen accuracy AH-1Ws have been appropriated and authorized. Contract negotiations and follow-on construction are expected to begin soon. Once received, the additional AH-1W capacity will truly improve our Reserve combined arms capability.

A number of modernization initiatives are underway this fiscal year. Our 4th Light Anti-Air Missile Battalion has begun transitioning to the new and improved phase three Hawk missile system and VMA-142 is transitioning from A-4Ms to F/A-18As. VMO-4 at Naval Air Station, Atlanta, GA is transitioning from the OV-10A to the OV-10D. First aircraft delivery is scheduled for February 1991. Efforts have also commenced to transition our EA-6As at Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, WA to the EA-6B.

We need continued congressional support to complete procurement requirements for both the KC-130T aircraft and AH-1W helicopters, and modernization plans to transition a squadron of F-4s to F/A-18As. We also request your support for the fiscal year 1992 Operation and Maintenance, Naval Reserve budget that funds the flight hour program which, in the Reserve, is based on the minimum number of hours required to maintain pilot proficiency. Funds from this program are critical if our Reserve pilots are to remain tactically proficient to meet Total Force requirements.

Finally, I should mention the Marine Corps Reserve continues to operate below its inventory requirement of medium lift helicopters. The CH-46s were procured in large quantities over 20 years ago, and we will confront a significant block obsolescence problem later this decade. Most importantly, modern combat environments push the CH-46 to its operating limits. The need for a medium assault lift capability to replace the CH-46 is essential for the Total Force Marine Corps.

Ground

Our fiscal year 1991 Procurement, Marine Corps budget in support of the Reserve enabled us to continue the Assault Amphibious Vehicle Product Improvement

Project program, and to purchase the MK-19 40mm machine gun. This budget will allow us to complete the modernization of our vehicle mounted radios and equipment and the procurement of the shelters started in fiscal year 1990. The budget will also permit continuation of the topographic and survey equipment purchase initiated in fiscal year 1991. In addition, it provides for buying spares and repair parts. The budget, however, does not address requirements to replace lost or damaged equipment owned by the SMCR in support of Operation Desert Storm. Following completion of our mission and demobilization of the Reserve, the full capability of the 4th DWT must be reconstituted at historic levels to ensure sustainability of our forces for the next crisis.

FACILITIES

When both mobilized, the 4th DWT occupies 167 ground and 26 aviation sites dispersed geographically over 46 States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. These sites contain training facilities, and space for equipment storage, maintenance, logistical and administrative support. The Marine Corps Reserve owns facilities at 20 of these sites and manages 34. The remaining sites are occupied jointly with Reserve components from the Navy, Army National Guard or Air Guard, or collocated with other Marine Corps active duty units. Eight Marine Corps Reserve units are tenants aboard Marine Corps bases and Marine Corps air stations.

The Marine Corps receives a portion of its Naval support from the Military Construction Naval Reserve program for the construction of Marine Corps Reserve projects. For fiscal year 1992, two major projects are budgeted at a cost of $4.8 million. The projects include a new Reserve center at Puerto Rico and a logistical support facility at Naval Air Station, Memphis, TN.

CONCLUSION

The Marine Corps Reserve has proven itself during Operation Desert Storm as an indispensable element of the Total Force. The mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve, to fulfill its mission to selectively augment or reinforce our Active component, has contributed significantly to the national defense in this time of crisis.

In its augmentation role, many Reserve units were called to deploy with Active forces not operating at full strength. In its reinforcing role, SMCR units are deployed to provide additional combat capability to Fleet Marine Force commanders. Many individuals with critical military occupational specialty skills were also called to fill specific billet vacancies or as combat replacements. Regardless of the specific mobilization role or assignment, the integration of highly motivated and dedicated reservists is the critical element that makes the Total Force concept work. The Marine Corps, America's force in readiness, is truly a Total Force made up of Active and Reserve personnel performing in a way only Marines can. We look to the Congress to continue its support of the Total Force Marine Corps.

Total Support of the Marine Corps Reserve

(in millions of dollars)

Marine Corps Appropriations	Fiscal year 1990	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993
Reserve Personnel Marine Corps (RPMC)	314.4	337.4	326.9	329.8
Military Personnel Marine Corps (MPMC) [1]	154.8	151.6	139.8	132.5
Operation and Maintenance Marine Corps Reserve (O&MMCR)	78.4	84.8	75.9	75.4
Procurement Marine Corps (PMC)	40.9	45.6	33.8	19.9
Operation and Maintenance Marine Corps (O&MMC) [2]	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.2
Total Marine Corps	591.4	622.4	579.6	560.8
Operation and Maintenance Naval Reserve (O&MNR) [3]	60.8	56.3	64.6	62.0
Reserve Personnel Navy (RPN) [4]	12.3	13.5	22.2	22.8
Military Construction Naval Reserve (MCNR)	16.3	8.9	5.0	3.2
National Guard Reserve Equipment, Defense Appropriation (NGREA)	118.6	160.0	0.0	0.0
Total Navy/Other Support	208.0	238.7	91.8	88.0
Total Support of USMCR	799.4	861.1	671.4	648.8

[1] Inspector-Instructor, Active duty support
[2] HQMC civilian personnel
[3] Flight hours
[4] Physicians, dentists, chaplains, nurses

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN J. CLOSNER, CHIEF OF AIR FORCE RESERVE, U.S. AIR FORCE

Mr Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to share with you the current status of the Air Force Reserve and my views on a few of the challenges we face.

Our units are able to perform their wartime missions. In fiscal year 1990, we sustained improvements in the quality of our training to obtain the highest level of readiness in our history, with 99 percent of our units (excluding those in conversion) assessed as able to accomplish their wartime mission. We have proven the claim that Air Force Reserve units can be promptly mobilized. Since fiscal year 1985, we have increased our readiness assessment by 28 percent, up from the 71 percent of just 6 years ago. I emphasize with pride that the Active Air Force measures Air Force Reserve capability using the same standards as Active units. The measurements were proven by recent events in the Persian Gulf. Our high readiness is the result of a continued team effort by the Congress, Office of Secretary of Defense, the Air Force, each reservist and the employers of those reservists.

OPERRATION DESERT STORM

Our reservists responded without hesitation to defend our country's vital interests in the Persian Gulf. The Air Force Reserve played a significant role in Operation Desert Storm by providing over 23,000 coat and support personnel from 215 separate units, and we will continue to make a significant contribution during the redeployment and demobilization phases. Most reservists reported for active duty within 24 hours, and all were present and prepared to deploy, or did deploy, within 72 hours of notification. With unsurpassed professionalism, our personnel flew tactical fighter, tactical airlift, strategic airlift, and aerial refueling missions, as well as providing medical support, aeromedical evacuation, air base operation and ground defense, and special operations. Our forces were poised to assume additional responsibilities had that become necessary.

In the 7 months from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the cease fire, Military Airlift Command gained Air Force reservists moved 199,712 passengers and 408,054 tons of freight, 41 percent of air passengers and 76 percent of air cargo to the Gulf. Reserve tankers and crews, augmenting the Strategic Air Command, flew over 17,000 hours and transferred 74 million pounds (11 million gallons) of fuel to 6,267 receiving aircraft. The 2,690 Air Force Reserve aeromedical evacuation crew members, 60 percent of the total Air Force medivac capability, assisted in moving 3,861 patients in theater and an additional 6,112 patients to facilities in Europe. More than 5,000 mobilized Air Force Reserve medical specialists manned clinics, hospitals and aeromedical staging facilities in Europe, Southwest Asia, and the continental United States. Reservists are still performing vital functions in strategic and tactical airlift, air refueling, logistics and maintenance, security police, fire protection and crash rescue, aerial ports, and intelligence.

Between August 2 and 25, and prior to Presidential recall or mobilization, nearly 35 percent of Reserve flying personnel in strategic airlift and refueling units responded on a voluntary basis in support of Operation Desert Shield. Voluntary participation peaked in late August with 5,992 personnel, in all specialties, on active duty orders and offers to report from over 10,000 additional personnel. This clearly indicates the level of dedication, patriotism and professionalism found in the Air Force Reserve.

All three Air Force Reserve unit equipped strategic airlift and all three tanker squadrons were mobilized for Desert Storm. For Associate units that provide aircrews only to operate active duty aircraft, 9 of 12 strategic airlift and one of three strategic tanker squadrons were mobilized. We also called upon dive tactical airlift squadrons, and single A-10, HH-3, and AC-130 squadrons. Westover Air Force Base, MA, a Reserve-operated base, was activated as a stage for departing and returning airlifters, as were 8 of 9 strategic airlift maintenance organizations, 19 aerial ports, 15 security police units, 21 civil engineering squadrons (fire fighters) and 32 air base support and services organizations. The majority of medical units in the Air Force Reserve contributed some or all of its personnel.

Reserve unit personnel were the major source of the overseas aeromedical evacuation mission, providing aeromedical evacuation crews, ground communication and support, and aeromedical patient staging facilities. This mission moved patients within theater and to Europe. Other unit personnel supported Air Transportable Hospitals and Contingency Hospitals in Europe and' the Persian Gulf.

Also in the medical arena, unit personnel, Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), Individual Ready Reserve and retired personnel provided backfill to all U.S.

Air Force Commands supporting Desert Storm. This backfill was needed to ensure patient services are maintained at a safe, operational level.

Operation Desert Storm confirmed our assumptions regarding the use of Reserve forces. Our decision to train units to full wartime readiness has proven correct and allowed us to quickly recall and deploy forces that are indistinguishable from active duty units.

Desert Storm has provided a clearer view of the future kinds of contingencies the military may be called upon to support. As a result of the Presidential 673b call-up, several legal and personnel issues concerning volunteerism and recall surfaced. A review of the authority available is warranted to provide a solid foundation for future planning.

It is too early to predict Desert Storm's long term impact on recruiting and retention. Because of the personal and financial hardships our reservists are experiencing, we expect some increased attrition at the end of Desert Storm. However, our decisive victory may play a key role in retention and public receptiveness to Reserve service.

Air Force Reserve responsiveness in meeting Desert Storm tasking was a direct result of realistic training with first line equipment. Air Force Reserve units must continue to receive modern equipment and to train aggressively for wartime missions.

COUNTER-NARCOTICS

We have aggressively responded to every tasking to support the National Drug Control Strategy. This support has taken many forms. First was air transportation. Law enforcement teams used our helicopters to travel to and from suspected drug activity locations and to transport prisoners from remote areas. We also used fixed wing strategic and tactical airlift to transport law enforcement teams and prisoners over long distances which included flights between the continental US and off-shore locations. The second area of support was detection of illegal drug activities using airborne sensor capabilities of some of our aircraft. Air Force reservists provided a third, area of support through technical training to law enforcement agencies. Last of all, we provided material storage and use of Reserve installations in temporarily housing prisoners.

The Air Force Reserve strongly supports all initiatives to provide support to civil law enforcement agencies and will continue to pursue every opportunity to participate in these activities to the extent allowed by law. Significant expansion of our activities within the continental United States would require a change in the law allowing direct involvement in law enforcement activities.

TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT

In fiscal year 1989, the Air Force Reserve began implementing Total Quality Management (TQM). We are convinced the quality approach will produce meaningful improvements and healthy cultural change for the Air Force Reserve.

One of our first quality directed actions was to study our organizational structure to streamline and eliminate non-value added activities. We found that Reserve Numbered Air Forces were no longer needed in their current configuration to effectively supervise subordinate organizations. By combining essential activities with our headquarters at Robins AFB, Georgia, we will eliminate an unnecessary layer and speed processes critical to our mission: Projected annual savings will be approximately 57 million.

Even in a less austere environment, Total Quality Management would indeed be an intelligent way to do business. However, with today's deficit reduction priorities, fundamental improvements using quality principles are essential for the Air Force Reserve to maintain our high degree of combat capability in spite of anticipated fiscal reductions.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY

Our level of readiness demonstrates Air Force success in implementing the Total Force Policy. A key factor in obtaining this readiness, in our opinion, is the fact that Air Force Reserve units are placed under the control of Reserve commanders. With this system, the gaining commands establish operational readiness standards for our units and validate that readiness through periodic inspections. Reserve personnel administer day-to-day activities to ensure the attainment of required standards. The Air Force Reserve performance in Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm have demonstrated the effectiveness of this relationship. The system's only exception is in our Special Operations units. The legislation creating the U.S. Special Operations Com-

mand gave them broader authority over assigned forces, including budgetary control. This authority has generally been interpreted to include peacetime operational command.

The management of our forces by reservists is essential to maintaining our lofty readiness levels and in avoiding the creation of a "second-rate" Air Force Reserve.

PROGRAM CHANGES

The effect of the Base Closure Commission recommendations and subsequent DOD actions on our people is location dependent. The Air Force Reserve is working to minimize Reserve personnel turbulence and adverse impact on unit mission readiness. The bases where Air Force reservists will be most prominently effected are Norton AFB and March AFB in the Los Angeles basin.

We will continue to address any base closings with the utmost sensitivity toward our people and mission. We do feel that, in most cases, keeping a Reserve unit at a base which is selected for closure, but will operate as a municipal airport, benefits the local community, generates good will for the Air Force, and preserves a valuable recruiting area for the Total Force.

WEAPON SYSTEM UPGRADES/REQUIREMENTS

Training and maintaining the highest wartime capable Reserve force continues to be our number one goal. To achieve this, we strive to provide the newest, state-of-the-art equipment to our units: We must continue upgrading our aircraft while coordinating our efforts with the Active Air Force, Air National Guard and our allies. We also work diligently to ensure our personnel are trained to fully exploit the capabilities of these weapon systems.

Continued congressional support has contributed immensely in such achievements as the Air Force-wide upgrade and improvement of the F-100-220E engines soon to be placed in the AF Reserve's older F-16 aircraft. Funds appropriated for the Air Force Reserve have accelerated this high priority program.

Heavier involvement in fighting illegal drug traffickers and increased exposure to various hostile environments make aircraft defensive systems critical to the survival of crews and equipment. Equipment funds in prior years have allowed us to be the forerunners in an extremely important airlift defensive systems modification project. These funds also allow us to continue equipping our C-130 fleet of aircraft with AAR-47 missile warning receivers and ALE-40 chaff/flare dispensers. Future airlift defensive system plans for airlift aircraft include modifying a total of 180 Air Force Reserve C-130, C-141, and C-5 aircraft and expanding the system with a radar warning device.

In the fighter arena, we have received Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) pods for some of our aircraft. As a contributing member of the Total Force, it is critical that each Air Force Reserve fighter aircraft be equipped with state-of-the-art ECM equipment. Therefore, we will continue a concerted effort to provide our crews the protection needed for peacetime training and wartime survivability.

We are in a partnership with the Air National Guard to improve airlift simulator capabilities. We will bring a C-5A/B simulator on line at Westover AFB, MA in July 1992. Construction for the simulator enclosure is scheduled to start April 15, 1991. This simulator will provide full visual capability to train AF Reserve and Air National Guard crews from Westover AFB, MA and Stewart ANGB, NY. In addition, as part of the Regional Training Center Concept, we are seeking to expand our simulator training capabilities with C-130H2 and C-141B simulators. This capability is badly needed, since the Air Reserve component operates the only C-130H2 aircraft in the Air Force inventory and our C-141 fleet will be increased in the near future.

Furthermore, the AF Reserve, Air National Guard and Tactical Air Command (TAC) are all currently involved in updating the F-16 Part Task Trainers (PTT), as part of the overall effort to modernize and improve the effectiveness of our in-unit aircrew training.

We have continued our modernization effort. The MH-60G helicopters Congress funded in fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year 1990 allow us to accelerate the conversion of our three air rescue units and our SOF helicopter unit. The authorization and appropriation of funds in fiscal year 1991 for four new C-130H aircraft to start the modernization of the 914th Tactical Airlift Group, Niagara Falls International Airport, NY. This group deployed to Southwest Asia in the early stages of Desert Shield and has shown itself worthy and deserving of the new airplanes.

In keeping with our mission to improve wartime and peacetime capabilities, we are pursuing a variety of modification and off-the-shelf equipment initiatives. One of

these opportunities to pursue advanced technology involves projects which will enhance the AF Reserve's night operations capabilities. We believe that night warfighting capability will give our military the "upper hand" over our adversaries. To that end, under the auspices of a Joint Staff Working Group, we have worked diligently to procure night vision goggles and other devices for Reserve units deployed in Operation Desert Storm.

Another concern is the modernization of our Reserve F-16 aircraft fleet. Because our F-16s are the earliest models manufactured, they must be upgraded with the latest technology available in order for us to have a truly viable fighter capability to meet the anticipated threat of the 21st century. These upgrades are critical for us because Reserve forces are the only U.S. operators of some F-16 models. While mid-life upgrades to the aircraft remain at the forefront of our endeavors, we are already working several F-16 fighter component improvements. These include replacing all unreliable defensive system Sequencer switches with Terma Sequencer switches, giving the pilot the capability to deploy chaff and flares without moving his hands from the stick and throttle, and integrating a Ring Laser Gyro (RLG) for more accurate and reliable navigation capability. We are pursuing the development of an expanded data cartridge for added memory and Digital Terrain System integration. This computer upgrade has numerous growth applications for passive terrain following, onboard electronic warfare (EW) training and recording, and in-depth debriefings.

Future A-10 aircraft upgrades include managing airframes so that all Air Force Reserve A-10s will be equipped with a modern radar warning system, the ALR-69, and the Low Altitude Safety and Targeting Enhancement (LASTE). Future efforts could include compatible night-vision-device lighting in the cockpit, integration of the Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) pod, and automatic target handoff.

More than ever before, we are now faced with having to anticipate our force needs and plan smartly to meet the challenges of the future as a viable member of the Total Force. Despite the fact that the Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard and the Active duty Air Force compete for resources in this constrained fiscal environment, the components' relationship has never been stronger or closer. In light of our ever changing world, continued improvements in combat capability will continue to ensure the viability of our weapon systems through the upcoming years.

PERSONNEL/MANPOWER

As the members of this committee are aware, the Air Force Reserve has experienced significant mission growth over the past decade and a half. You have made this possible by providing the end-strength authorizations and funding required to meet the associated wartime and contingency tasking responsibilities.

Today, Air Force Reserve pilot manning stands at 100 percent. Yet, we expect above average losses in the mid 1990s due to the retirement of the Vietnam era year group. This will expand our need to hire new pilots precisely when the Active force is trying to retain theirs. To solve this dilemma, we have to build manning options that are responsive and flexible for meeting our pilot inventory requirements across a broad range of factors: age, skill levels, geographic locale, lead time and cost. With our Active counterparts, we will pursue creative ideas that can have a mutually beneficial effect on our pilot populations, such as pilot crossflow and new levels for Reserve undergraduate pilot production, to name just a few. We will leave no stone unturned to ensure the Air Force Reserve continues to field a strong, combat-ready force for the 21st century.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank you for the many benefits and entitlements approved for reservists by the fiscal year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act. Specifically, in the area of monetary compensation such as the variable housing allowance for recalled reservists and especially for the recent entitlements and benefits afforded to our "Gray Area" reservists. The increase in benefits to this category will provide a viable retirement benefit package that allows the retiree to continue to enjoy certain military benefits they had before transferring to the Retired Reserve and would maintain their sense of continuity with the Armed Forces.

Much of the progress we've made in recruiting and retention is owed to the benefits provided by the Montgomery GI bill (MGIB). Nearly 10,000 of our currently assigned Air Force reservists are participating or have participated in this program. Our members have expressed a great deal of interest in the expanded educational benefits that are now available. While it is too early to determine the full effect of the new program, it will improve recruiting and retention in our units. We appreciate the efforts made by the Congress in expanding the MGIB and other entitlement programs.

We are also appreciative of the new personnel benefits enacted in the 102d Congress. This support for our Desert Storm participants will never be forgotten.

Table I portrays our current fiscal year 1991 end strength estimate and our requests for fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993.

TABLE I.—Air Force Reserve End Strength, Fiscal Year 1991 to 1993

	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993
Selected Reserve	85,591	81,200	82,400
Drill	84,936	80,557	81,782
Full-Time	655	643	618
Civilian	14,751	15,112	15,582
Technicians	10,316	10,343	10,357
Non-Technician	4,435	4,769	5,225

By congressional direction, Air Force Selected Reserve end-strength consistently grew over the past 17 years. Total growth was approximately 65 percent between 1970 and 1990. We will be recruiting to an end strength of 81,200 in fiscal year 1992, down 4,391 from 1991. This downward trend may well continue. Our full-time work force of civilians, Air Reserve Technicians, regular Air Force assigned to the Air Force Reserve, and reservists on statutory tours of active duty finds itself increasingly stretched to meet the management requirements of our units, especially with regard to readiness. The size of the full-time force necessary to support the Air Force Reserve declined from 25 to 18 percent of the Selected Reserve during the 1970 to 1990 timeframe. As wartime requirements continue to grow, the size of the peacetime structure must continue to be supported.

APPROPRIATIONS

Appropriations for the Air Force Reserve (USAFR) finance operating expenses, personnel pay for civilians (including Air Reserve Technicians) and military members, and facility construction. Table II depicts our current fiscal year 1991 estimate and budget requests for fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993:

TABLE II.—Total Program Amounts, Fiscal Year 1991 to 1993 by Appropriations

[Dollars in millions]

	Fiscal year 1991	Fiscal year 1992	Fiscal year 1993
Reserve Personnel, Air Force (RP, AF)	$688.5	$705.3	$727.3
MilCon, USAFR	38.6	20.8	36.7
O&M, USAFR	1,086.0	1,075.4	1,232.5
Reserve Equipment, USAFR	154.6	0	0
Total	1,967.7	1,801.5	1,996.5

The Reserve Personnel, Air Force (RP, AF) appropriation finances the military personnel costs of the Air Force Reserve. It provides for pay and allowances to train our force during regular training, special tours of active duty, and while in school. Funds also support full-time reservists, the Junior and Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and the Armed Forces, Health Professions Scholarship Program. This appropriation grows $16.8 million in fiscal year 1992 and $22.0 million in fiscal year 1993, but real program growth is negative (-1.2 percent fiscal year 1992, -0.8 percent fiscal year 1993).

Several requirements bare a continuation of fiscal year 1991 actions, conversion to F-16 aircraft from F-4 aircraft, expansion of Medical Readiness squadrons and the restructure of Aeromedical Evacuation squadrons to two Aeromedical groups (+$1,157,000). Modernization of weapons systems during fiscal year 1992 include the conversions to MH-60G helicopters from HH-3E helicopters and to C-141B and KC-135R aircraft from C-130E aircraft. The Air Force will also establish the first C-17 Associate unit at Charleston AFB, SC (+$5,087,000). Due to budget constraints, the Air Force Reserve will experience a reduction of 4,098 end strength at a savings of

$17,295,000. The reductions will take place in the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA), civil engineering, Aerial Port and Numbered Air Force (NAF) programs.

Modernization of units continues during fiscal year 1993 at C-141, C-17, OA-10, KC-135 and F-16 units (+$462,000). A Ground Combat Support unit will also be activated during fiscal year 1993. In addition, we have annualized savings to the fiscal year 1992 end strength reductions in the IMA, civil engineering, Aerial Port, and NAF programs of $8,739,000.

The Military Construction, Air Force Reserve (MILCON, USAFR) appropriation provides for acquisition, design construction, expansion, rehabilitation and conversion of facilities for the training and administration of the Air Force Reserve. The fiscal year 1992 request totals $20.8 million. It includes $13.8 million for major construction projects in 10 States, $2.2 million for minor construction, and $4.8 million in planning and design funds. This request represents a level 46 percent less than our 1991 appropriation, and 55 percent less than our 1990 appropriation. We understand the uncertainties of base closure options, force structure changes, and fiscal constraints that lead to this lower request, but we are concerned with the potential long term impacts on our readiness, training, and morale if this low level of funding were to continue.

The fiscal year 1993 request of $36.7 million actually contains no major military construction projects in either "baseline" or "new mission" MILCON. The request contains $4.4 million for minor construction, $2.5 million for planning and design, and $29.8 million for Real Property Maintenance (RPM). The RPM is contained in the military construction account request this year.

Due to the Secretary of Defense's MILCON prohibition, no military construction projects have been awarded by the Air Force Reserve since January 1990. To date, no missions have failed due to lack of facility support, however, it remains to be seen what impact the construction prohibition might have on the cost of those projects that have been delayed.

The Operation and Maintenance Air Force Reserve (O&M, USAFR) appropriation finances the day-to-day operating expenses of Reserve units and supports the primary mission of the Air Force Reserve which is to develop, train, and maintain combat ready units and individuals required to augment the active forces during wartime and other emergencies. The major portion of this appropriation is for "must pay" requirements such as pay of civilian personnel and military technicians and aviation fuel and supplies which support the approved flying hour program. Also financed from this appropriation is the depot-level equipment maintenance program which has enhanced the serviceability of our aircraft and engines at a fraction of their original acquisition cost. Overall, this O&M appropriation has financed the accomplishment of our primary mission while conserving and improving our combat readiness.

Fiscal year 1992 increases in the O&M appropriation are primarily related to price growth (+$51.2 million); the annualization of fiscal year 1991 F-16 tactical fighter conversions (+$12.7 million); conversion to KC-135R aircraft coupled with a manpower increase for KC-135 security ($10.6 million); the activation of the first Air Force Reserve C-17 associate unit at Charleston AFB, SC (+$3.0 million); the conversion at Rickenbacker ANGB, OH to our second C-141 equipped unit (+$2.5 million); and the full year impact of the Air Force Reserve's assumption of the entire WC-130 weather reconnaissance mission, effective the third quarter of fiscal year 1991 (+$1.9 million). Major fiscal year 1992 program reductions included the annualized effect of the fiscal year 1991 F-4 conversions to F-16 aircraft (-$24.5 million); the functional transfer of Special Operations Forces funding to a Defense Agency account (-$22.1 million); C-130 conversions during fiscal year 1992 to KC-135R and C-141 equipped aircraft (-$9.8 million); and the start of the elimination and consolidation of Air Force Reserve Numbered Air Forces (-$2.7 million).

O&M increases identified for fiscal year 1993 include price growth (+$52.3 million); the transfer of depot Level Reparables (DLRs) to the Stock Fund (+$98.8 million); the full year impact of the fiscal year 1992 conversion to KC-135R aircraft plus a programmed change in fiscal year 1993 to KC-135E aircraft (+$18.5 million); additional base operation support funding as the Air Force Reserve assumes responsibilities at locations affected by base closure actions (+$11.0 million); a tactical fighter conversion to F-16C/D aircraft (+$12.2 million); expansion at the C-141 equipped unit converted during fiscal year 1992 and the third quarter fiscal year 1993 conversion to our third C-141 unit (+$9.4 million); and the addition of five aircraft at the newly activated C-17 associate unit (+$2.4 million). These increases are partially offset by reductions in C-130 funding caused by the fiscal year 1992 conversions to C-141 and KC-135 aircraft plus the fiscal year 1993 conversion to the third C-141 unit (-$11.1 million); two A-10A unit conversions to F-16C/D and KC-

135 aircraft (-$11.5 million); the fiscal year 1993 impact of elimination and consolidating the Reserve Numbered Air Forces (-$3.9 million); and the Air Force Reserve Personnel Center (-$1.0 million). A final major change in fiscal year 1993 is the transfer of O&M maintenance repair and minor construction funding to the Military Construction appropriation (-$29.8 million).

CONCLUSION

In summary, the combat readiness and war fighting capability of the Air Force Reserve are vital elements within the Total Force as proven in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Modernization and readiness training continue to be our primary concerns as we strive to maximize our ability to defend this Nation during a time of reduced defense spending.

We are pleased with what we accomplished in 1990 and are proud to be a part of the best Air Force in the world. We owe a special vote of thanks to the families and employers who support the men and women of the Air Force Reserve and make their achievements possible. We heartily acknowledge the combined efforts of the reservist, family, and civilian employer which enable us to provide our services to the Air Force and to our country. Without this teamwork, the absences from home and office, attendance at frequent training activities, and all-hour availability would be impossible to endure. Finally the superb support Congress has seen fit to provide to reservists, their families and employers is essential, reassuring, and gratifying. We remain confident this momentum will prevail in the 102d Congress.

This concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I am ready to respond to your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JOHN N. FAGLE, CHIEF, OFFICE OF READINESS AND RESERVE, U.S. COAST GUARD

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.

I am Rear Adm. John N. Fagle, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief of the Office of Readiness and Reserve. I am pleased to have this opportunity to present you with a brief overview of the Coast Guard Reserve. It is with some regret, due to my pending reassignment, that I must tell you this will be my last opportunity to come before you in my capacity as Chief of the Coast Guard Reserve. I would be remiss if I did not express the significant impact this assignment has made on me. Not only have I had the opportunity to work closely with our reservists, but I am especially appreciative of the manner in which this committee has supported our "citizen sailors" in the work they perform, both for their communities and for the Nation. I am honored to have been a part of this great team effort.

During 1990, the Coast Guard successfully completed 200 years of service to this country. coincidentally, the Coast Guard reserve, which had its birth in the hostile environs of the Second World War, enjoys its 50th anniversary in 1991. Together we comprise this Nation's most diverse sea service organization performing a broad spectrum of defense missions and important statutory peacetime functions, as well as a significant role in our country's national security. This duality enables us to fulfill our peacetime missions while simultaneously maintaining our specialized military capabilities.

The Coast Guard uses the concept of augmentation to train its reservists. What is augmentation? It is a process whereby our reservists receive the predominant amount of their training directly from the Active duty Coast Guard.

There are four benefits of note that flow from augmentation. First, by using current operational doctrine and methodologies, and by working with standard equipment, training is always compatible with that of our Active duty counterparts. Second, the ratio of benefit to cost is significantly high since the operational tools used daily by the Coast Guard also double as a platform for Reserve training. Moreover, since reservists are collocated with their Active duty counterparts, the Coast Guard is able to substantially reduce overhead costs and capital outlay. The third benefit that accrues from our augmentation training program is the achievement of a greater operational cohesiveness as a total force and a more unified service. Lastly, our augmentation training program provides the skills necessary for Coast Guard reservists to fulfill their mobilization responsibilities and, in the process, provides valuable support and a surge capacity in times of man-made or natural disaster.

Since the inception of augmentation training some 20 years ago and to an even greater degree during the last half decade—the results have consistently been positive. Our men and women have demonstrated their readiness and proficiency not

only in the recent Middle East crisis but in numerous joint operations with our Active duty component. I am firmly convinced this mode of training is a primary contributor in enabling the Coast Guard to meet its varied mission objectives.

The reasons for my conviction are readily apparent when one reviews the role of Coast Guard reservists in many significant operations throughout the world. Each instance serves as an example of how the Nation benefits directly from this augmentation training program.

The Coast Guard reserve provides surge capacity in a broad range of contingency responses, as evidenced by:

— Participation in Narragansett Bay and Huntington Beach oil spills

— Continued involvement with the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska

— Assistance to State and local governments following the San Francisco earthquake and hurricane Hugo

— Support to special Coast Guard operations such as waterside security for space shuttle launches, and

— Work with foreign governments in support of U.S. nation-building (port security training)

Nearly 15 percent of the Coast Guard Selected Reserve has participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and that support continues today. In early August 1990, within hours of the initial call, 82 percent of the Reserve positions needed in the continental United States for loading of critical war material for Operation Desert Shield were filled with fully qualified Coast Guard Reserve volunteers. All of the positions were activated in less than 24 hours. This same spirited response was noted in numerous simultaneous call-ups for military equipment loadouts in 11 different ports encompassing all three coasts. Reservists, working with their Active counterparts, provided oversight for the safe movement of over 4 million tons of military equipment necessary to conduct operations in the Middle East.

In each of these evolutions, reservists provided additional harbor and shoreside port security personnel, explosives handling supervisors, and varied support personnel required for round-the-clock operations. With responses from over 1,600 qualified reservists as part of the Coast Guard total force, we were able to successfully support Operation Desert Shield loadouts with no degradation of normal peacetime missions.

Coast Guard participation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm outside the continental United States occurred in three different venues. First, Active duty law enforcement teams were provided for in-theater maritime interdiction enforcement of United Nations sanctions in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Of 1,148 total multi-national boardings in these interdiction operations, Coast Guard law enforcement detachment (LEDET) personnel, operating from U.S. Navy vessels, led 551, and participated in many more.

Second, the Saudi Government requested U.S. assistance with the massive oil spill off the coasts of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. At presidential direction, and through our maritime environmental response program, the Coast Guard headed an interagency oil pollution response advisory team. In further support, we have dispatched Coast Guard aircraft with oil spill surveillance/mapping capabilities to the affected area.

Last, and certainly not least, the Coast Guard Reserve deployed three Port Security Units (PSUs) to the Gulf to assist the Navy Harbor Defense Command. These units provided waterside protection for ships' offloading essential military cargo intheater, as well as overall security of the port complex and adjacent navigable waters. A special training detachment was established to prepare relief personnel for the deployed PSUs. Three complete relief units have been trained and outfitted; two have already been sent to the Persian Gulf in relief of originally deployed PSUs.

Reserve recruiting is inextricably tied to our Active duty program and is the responsibility of our Chief, Office of Personnel and Training. Perhaps the best introduction to our recruiting program is a paragraph from the Coast Guard's vision statement by Admiral Kime.

"We strive to be the armed force offering the most challenging and rewarding career for the young men and women of our Nation while preserving and honoring those customs and traditions that have served the country so well in peace and war."

As a service, we have been able to maintain 1990 recruiting levels, and have seen a continued introduction of highly qualified and motivated young men and women into our service. Particular emphasis has been placed on the recruitment of women and minorities, and I am pleased to say, Mr. Chairman, that over the past year the

Coast Guard Reserve has achieved some notable success in this area. Our annual recruitment of minorities for 1989 and 1990 was 11 and 18 percent, respectively, of the total Reserve accessions for those years. The percentage of women recruited, for the same period, stayed steady at 12 percent. This is during a time of markedly increased competition among industry, government and defense for qualified recruiting prospects. We will continue to be aggressive in ensuring diversity in the workforce.

Since the presidential call-up for Operation Desert Shield, the Coast Guard Reserve has not observed any significant decreases in recruiting. Quite to the contrary, in recent months we have noted a substantial increase in applicants. However, due to Desert Shield and Desert Storm mobilization, family and employer considerations may impact on retention. Thus far, we have not observed any negative trends. The next 6 to 9 months will provide a better indication of possible retention problems.

As of January 31 of this year, our Coast Guard Selected Reserve strength was 12,143. The Coast Guard Reserve training appropriation for fiscal year 1991 is million. This appropriation supports a strength level of 12,000 personnel and 711 Reserve administrative and training support billets. As you are aware, in 1988 a 10-year growth plan for the Coast Guard Reserve was approved by the Department of Transportation and submitted to Congress. Based on that plan, this year would have called for a force level of 15,000 reservists. Although the current level of 12,000 suggests a shortage of 3,000 personnel, I hasten to add that we are presently engaged in the process of assessing the Reserve strength level needed to support mobilization requirements as well as operational augmentation training support. This ongoing assessment considers changes in global geopolitical conditions and is substantially driven by DOD threat and capability studies. It should be noted we are progressive in continuing to size force structure and training requirements predicated on changing operational environments as well as comprehensive analysis of lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, we provided a substantial level of legal, administrative and family support service to our reservists and their families. This callup afforded an opportunity to validate those traditional support services. The commandant has clearly identified support of our personnel and their families as one of his major objectives. Significant effort has been expended across the broad spectrum of family services to reduce the trauma resulting from mobilization of our reservists. Even now, we are examining more expeditious methods for delivery of existing benefits and identifying potential new services and assistance that may be required by our members and their families.

I am quite confident we are providing our Coast Guard family with a comprehensive level of support that is consistent with our tradition of "taking care of our own."

I hope that this has given you some indication of our service-wide emphasis regarding support of our people, balance in our many mission areas and pursuit of excellence in all that we do.

In closing, I thank you for your continued support of both the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve. I will be happy to take any questions you may have.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much.

Does anyone else want to make comments about your individual situations or services? Any of you?

[No response.]

Okay. Good. Thank you.

I want to pass out a chart which shows the Selected Reserve strengths for the fiscal years 1992-1993 Defense Authorization Request for each component, and I will also include the chart in the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

SELECTED RESERVE END STRENGTHS

	Fiscal year 1991 authorized	Fiscal year 1992 request	Fiscal year 1993 request	Fiscal year 1995 plan
Total Selected Reserve:				
ARNG	457,300	410,900	366,300	321,000
USAR	318,700	282,700	254,500	229,800

SELECTED RESERVE END STRENGTHS—Continued

	Fiscal year 1991 authorized	Fiscal year 1992 request	Fiscal year 1993 request	Fiscal year 1995 plan
USNR	153,400	134,600	127,100	118,200
USMCR	43,900	40,900	38,900	34,900
ANG	117,035	118,100	119,400	119,100
USAFR	85,591	81,200	82,400	82,600
USCGR (not in DOD total)	12,700	12,000	12,000	12,000
DOD Total	1,175,926	1,068,400	988,600	905,600
Full-Time AGR (included above):				
ARNG	26,199	23,341	21,580	19,344
USAR	13,344	12,683	12,003	10,395
USNR	22,997	22,045	21,113	20,339
USMCR	2,401	2,170	2,130	2,050
ANG	8,468	9,081	9,072	9,422
USAFR	655	643	618	689
DOD Total	74,064	69,963	66,516	62,239
Paid Drill (included above):				
ARNG	431,101	387,559	344,720	301,656
USAR	305,356	270,017	242,497	219,405
USNR	130,403	112,555	105,987	97,861
USMCR	41,499	38,730	36,770	32,850
ANG	108,567	109,019	110,328	109,678
USAFR	84,936	80,557	81,782	81,911
USCGR (not in DOD total)	12,700	12,000	12,000	12,000
DOD Total	1,101,862	998,437	922,084	843,361

Senator GLENN. Mr. Duncan, in the Desert Storm Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act, we authorized the military departments to exceed their respective Selected Reserve end-strengths for 1991. Will any of the military departments exercise this authority? If so, which components will be affected and what would be their revised 1991 end strengths?

Mr. DUNCAN. I think Mr. Jehn answered your question here in recent days from the standpoint of the Active forces.

There was a period of time in the middle of the conflict when we were asking ourselves whether we could still meet the end-strength goals which the Secretary had set out. We are satisfied that we can.

So we are going to be coming down at the rate that we previously projected. I might note that it is not very helpful, as we look at these end-strength numbers, to focus on a 1-year period, 2-year period, or any particular 3-year period, and take a slice at that point. It looks much different than if you look at larger periods of time.

For example, if you look at the end-strengths from, say, 1987 to 1997, you will note, roughly a 25 percent cut in the Active forces and a 20 percent cut in the Reserve forces. If you look at any given year, however, the slice may look differently because the ramp would be steeper for Actives or Reserves.

But, over a 10 year period, they are going to be coming down roughly proportionally. But the difference is that we have insisted this year that the services avoid taking a broad cut and saying that people will come down to share the pain equally, or whatever. Such an approach bears no relationship—and I was rather outspoken

last year about this—no relationship to a military rationale or a warfighting strategy. We have tried to base this budget on warfighting strategies to the extent that we can predict warfighting strategies for the kind of conflicts that we see in the future.

If you look at that over a long period of time, the forces will be coming down about the same. It's slightly greater for Actives, depending on which years you look at.

Senator GLENN. But as you see it now, you will not have to exceed those end-strengths for fiscal year 1991?

Mr. DUNCAN. No, sir.

Senator GLENN. How about any of you in the services? Do you disagree with that?

Does everyone agree? [No response]

Okay. Everyone will be able to meet those end-strengths.

General CONAWAY. Sir, on the Guard program, we will probably meet our end-strengths. Last year Congress put back 10,000 in the Army Guard which raised the end strength from 447,000 to 457,000. They are almost back to the 447,000 and will probably meet 457,000. General Burdick is working that with Army and General Ward is, too, if you want them to comment.

Senator GLENN. Does anyone want to comment on that?

General WARD. We are going to make our end-strength this year. We, indeed, will have no problem with that. We'll have to look at deactivations next year. We will be cutting many people, around 20,000 in fiscal year 1992.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

General BURDICK. Actually, sir, for the Army National Guard. During the last 2 months, our net gain exceeds our program. So we are driving toward that end-strength of 457,300.

Now, in 1992, in accordance with the program, we would decrement the Army National Guard some 46,000. That is a little difficult to do in a 1-year period.

We are following the program.

Senator GLENN. All right.

Mr. Duncan, Selected Reserve end-strengths in the 1992–1993 Defense Authorization request is reduced by 9 percent in 1992 and by 7 percent in 1993.

In fact, your Selected Reserve end-strength plan proposes a 23 percent reduction from the 1991 level by the end of 1995, compared to a 19 percent reduction for the Active component.

What was the basis for approving those reductions?

Mr. DUNCAN. Again, Mr. Chairman, if you look at a particular slice, you can point that out. You might note, however, if you look at, say, the years 1990 to 1997, which are not reflected on the chart we just received, over that 7 year period, there are different numbers. And if it is 1987 to 1997, it is yet different numbers.

Basically, we just simply asked the services, as we normally do, to make their recommendations. We reviewed it in the light of what kinds of forces do we see that we will need under the new military strategy.

Now, there is reasonable room for disagreement about what is needed there. But this is our best judgment and we feel confident about it.

Senator GLENN. And this fits in with what we will be getting into later on Total Force Policy? Does it fit in as part of that?

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Under this, would any National Guardsmen or Reservists have to be given a pink slip because of these reductions, involuntarily separated?

Mr. DUNCAN. Involuntarily separated from the Ready Reserve? We hope very much not, sir. I don't anticipate that being required.

Senator GLENN. General Ward, did you wish to say something?

General WARD. Yes, sir. There is no question about it.

Senator GLENN. Anybody else?

General WARD. We will have significant numbers of involuntary separations, to include doctors and nurses.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Does anybody else think they will have to boot people out?

General BURDICK. Sir, we would have a problem with our AGR force and our military technicians.

Senator GLENN. I couldn't hear you. I'm sorry.

General BURDICK. We would have a problem with our AGR force and military technician force as we follow the program and take the force down.

Senator GLENN. What numbers would you have a problem with? Do you know?

General BURDICK. Well, sir, it would be the difference in your figures, between 26,199—that's the AGR for 1991—and the request which is for 23,341. So we've approximately a 3,000 loss there.

Those are full-time AGR personnel. We have the same thing with the military technicians. On the military technician side, we would drop in 1991 from 28,521 authorized to 27,138. That's a Delta of over 1,000 or a loss of 1,383.

Senator GLENN. Your numbers come down. But you feel you cannot take care of that by attrition? The question was will anybody actually have to be "pink slipped?" Will they actually have to be involuntarily separated? Do you feel that you cannot absorb that 3,000 change?

General BURDICK. I think that would be a little difficult in the AGR force.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

General WARD. Sir, we will find it difficult to cut military technicians. The two programs are not the same. In the AGR program we may be able to reduce end strength by attrition, but in the case of the technicians, clearly not. To achieve reductions in drill strength, we envision significant numbers of involuntary transfers to the IRR or in some cases, to not allow people to reenlist.

Senator GLENN. Well, it would be a change of status, then. But they would not be clear out to where they did not have any military connection at all, is that right?

General WARD. For a large number of them, if they are not able to drill very much, they will tend to wander off and lose interest. Historically, if they are not near the flag pole, I don't believe that reveille can help in the morning.

Mr. DUNCAN. You do understand, Mr. Chairman, that much of this is speculation. We really don't know. We can't even tell you

precisely what the recruiting and the retention is going to be like for the next year.

I mean, when we get all the Reserve forces home, I will have a little better handle on that. But this is educated guess-work right now.

Senator GLENN. I know reductions make for a time of turmoil. But what effect would you expect these reductions to have on combat readiness? After all, that is the bottom line of everything we are doing, combat readiness.

Does anybody want to comment on that?

Mr. Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, obviously we will have smaller forces, but they will still be combat ready. The imperative from the Secretary, the guidance from the Secretary is that we have no choice but to cut force structure. This is not something we are doing because we thought it was something that was neat to do. We are doing it because of budgetary imperatives and changes in the strategic environment.

But we also have very clear guidance to retain warfighting capability. So we are going to have smaller forces. No doubt about that. But we are doing everything we can to retain maximum readiness and warfighting capability for those who remain.

Senator GLENN. General Burdick, that plan for the 1995 Selected Reserve end-strength for the Army National Guard is 30 percent below the current level. The reduction is 10 percent in 1992, 11 percent in 1993, and so on.

On what Army National Guard force structure reductions are these manpower reductions based? Are you just overhauling the whole Guard? How are you doing this?

General BURDICK. Sir, those reductions, as you know, have been directed and are in accordance with the program. We are following that program.

Now, in some instances, units were identified. For example, the Armored Cavalry Regiment, that I know you are aware of, located in Ohio and West Virginia. We only have two Armored Cavalry Regiments in our Army National Guard. We were directed to take out one of those, and did this strictly on the basis of readiness. We retained the more ready unit.

In the combat arms, these units were directed, for the most part, and the combat support/combat service support type units were also directed. But then we had the ability to take a look across the force, across the Army National Guard force, and select units. This, again, was done on the basis of readiness.

As Mr. Duncan pointed out, we are going to have a smaller Army, we hope still a combat capable Army. But as we cross-level across these 54 States and territories, there will be some turbulence. But we expect to be able to achieve readiness and will continue to strive toward that.

Senator GLENN. You wear two hats in some respects. You have the Federal role and also the State role with the Guard, which you do with regard to working with State Governors and so on.

Were these concerns about the relationship of Federal and State missions taken into account on this?

General BURDICK. Sir, that's correct. We did take those into account. That is why we are trying to cross-level across the States.

For example, engineer units are very much in demand. What we try to do is insure that we have engineer capability in all the States. So this creates some turbulence and will affect some of our combat readiness for a period of time.

Senator GLENN. Everybody is concerned about this, obviously.

I have several letters that I would like to enter into the record right now from different Senators concerned about different aspects of some of these cutbacks. I will not go through them or try to read them to you now. They are concerned at different levels, as I am about our situation in Ohio, also, which we have addressed with some of you separately.

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, April 17, 1991.

Hon. SAM NUNN,
Chair, Senate Armed Services Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to raise several concerns related to proposed personnel cutbacks. I strongly support defense spending cuts and acknowledge that significant force reductions are necessary, but I question the Army's plan to focus its cuts on the National Guard.

It seems to me that our experience in Desert Storm resolved any doubts about the effectiveness of our Guard and Reserve units in wartime. The Total Force concept works. Yet the Army proposes to cut 37 percent of the current Guard strength. In downsizing the Guard, the Army plans to cut combat support and combat service support units, just the type of units that have done so well in the Persian Gulf. For example, Maryland would lose two units; one of them, the 1229th Transportation Company, headquartered in Crisfield, has served, and is still serving, in Saudi Arabia and has done an exceptional job.

I urge you to resist *any* cuts in the Army National Guard. The Guard can fulfill its military mission, as we have seen, and it is cost effective.

A second issue that alarms me is the Army's proposal to replace thirty percent of the National Guard and Reserves with active Army personnel. According to Maryland's Adjutant General, this would be a catastrophe. As he points out, the disruption of replacing current Guard members with active personnel will hurt our readiness, and the plan to rotate the active personnel every two to three years will cause turmoil, instability and prove quite costly. Further, the AG will not be able to call up the active duty soldiers in a state emergency. Finally, the cohesion and esprit de corps of today's Guard units would be diminished by replacing members who have roots in the community with outsiders.

As your committee addresses the critical issue of force levels, I hope you will consider the concerns I have forwarded from the Maryland National Guard.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI,
United States Senator.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC, February 28, 1991.

Hon. SAM NUNN,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am seriously concerned about the proposed cutbacks in the Army National Guard units located in West Virginia. Last year, I wrote to you about my opposition to the proposals of the Department of Defense to close or realign by Fiscal Year 1993, the 1st Squadron, 150th Armored Cavalry (a squadron of the 107th Army Cavalry Regiment, Ohio Army National Guard), which has units

located in nine West Virginia counties. Recently, I have been advised that two additional West Virginia Army National Guard units have been added to the list of units proposed to be inactivated. The 193rd Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) of Oak Hill is listed for inactivation in Fiscal Year 1992 and the 146th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) of Parkersburg, which served in the Persian Gulf conflict, is listed for inactivation in Fiscal Year 1993. The loss of these units would have a significantly adverse effect on the West Virginia National Guard and the State of West Virginia at a time when West Virginia can ill afford an economic impact of this magnitude.

The loss of the above-identified units would represent a twenty-six percent cut in authorized strength for the Army National Guard of West Virginia (1,051 out of 4,024) and would significantly impact on the economy of the entire southern half of the State (estimated economic loss will be approximately $10 million).

More importantly, it is difficult to see the logic of cutbacks in National Guard forces, at a time when proposals are being made for significant reductions in active duty forces. It is clear that if the United States is to maintain a strong defense posture, that simultaneous reductions cannot be made in National Guard and Reserve forces as well as active forces.

The purpose of this letter is to advise you of my concern and to request whatever assistance you may be able to provide to assure that no action will be taken in Fiscal Year 1992 or in subsequent years to reduce West Virginia National Guard or Reserve units.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Your continuing support of National Guard and Reserve programs in West Virginia is genuinely appreciated.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT C. BYRD,
Chairman.

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, April 17, 1991.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: As part of its downsizing efforts, the Army has proposed significant cuts in National Guard units throughout the country. Though it is clear that some cuts will be required, the Army's plan does not appear to take into account the cost-effectiveness of Guard units or the important role they play, not only in our nation's defense, but also in local, state and national emergencies.

If the cuts go forward as proposed, it will mean elimination of almost one-third of the Army National Guard strength and the closure of more than 3,000 armories. This will have a great impact on our communities. For your information, we have enclosed a list of units that are slated for elimination in your state. Also included is a list of Army Reserve units slated for elimination. You should be aware that these are only the initial cuts and that the Guard Bureau is planning a second round of cuts which will eliminate an additional 60,000 personnel.

We believe these cuts are unwise and excessive. We intend to send the attached letter to Secretary Cheney expressing our concern about the DOD plan. We hope you will join us in signing it. Please have your staff call Jane Matthias in Senator Ford's office, 224-1151 or Brent Franzel in Senator Bond's office, 224-5721 if you wish to sign on.

Sincerely,

WENDELL H. FORD
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, April 17, 1991.

Hon. RICHARD B. CHENEY,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In the early 1970's, our nation was faced with severe budget constraints, reductions in our defense forces and the acknowledgement of the need for political consensus and public support for involvement in any large regional conflict. Those conditions led to development and implementation of the Total Force Policy as we know it today. Conditions today are strikingly similar to those of the early 1970s, with one exception—we have proven that we can obtain political consensus and public support for military action through use of the Total Force Policy.

We have recently seen the fruition of that policy during the call-up and deployment of National Guard and Reserve forces in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Based on the reports of their performance, the Total Force Policy has been an outstanding success. The only controversy centered around leadership is failure to follow the planned integration of active and Guard units in rounding out active division. Lessons learned from the experience must lead to better integration of such units in the future.

Our concern is not related to operations in Desert Shield/Desert Storm; indeed, execution of that operation can only be applauded. Our concern centers around three aspects of the proposed DOD force structure reductions. First, the plan initiates a significant drawdown of Army National Guard and Reserve forces. Second, that reduction is at an even greater rate than reductions in the active Army. Finally, the cuts represent a continuation of the trend away from the basic philosophy of this country's founding fathers and the historical precedent of a small standing army and a reliance on the "militia."

In each of the past two years, the National Guard Caucus has urged that you maintain the National Guard and Reserve structure until the long-term needs and a cost-effective mix of the force could be determined. Also, in each of the past two years the Congress has reinstated the resources necessary to restore DOD proposed structure reductions. With the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, the Caucus believed that the nation would need to rely even more on the Guard and Reserve as active forces were withdrawn from overseas and budget constraints led to force reductions. Desert Shield/Desert Storm has not lessened that conviction; if anything it has reaffirmed it.

The cost effectiveness and mission capability of our Guard and Reserve forces are proven facts. Although wide media coverage was given to the National Guard roundout brigades which were not deployed with their parent divisions, those brigades met their active Army readiness requirements and could have completed post-mobilization training and been ready for deployment by the time lift was available. After applying lessons learned from that recent experience, and given sufficient resources, deployment delays should not be a factor in future force structure decisions except for specific quick reacting light units.

The newly emerging defense strategy appears to relegate the National Guard to a deep reserve force planned for use only in a large land operation in Europe, for which we now anticipate a long warning period and lower likelihood of occurrence. That strategy fails to recognize the cost effectiveness of the Guard, and, in effect, discards the Total Force Policy at the precise time that it has been proven successful.

Pursuing such a strategy could also seriously erode the benefits the National Guard provides in community support and consensus building for our defense efforts. Elimination of more than one third of National Guard structure, and a large number of Guard armories throughout our nation, would quickly reverse the public support generated by the call-up and successful performance of Guard and Reserve members in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Reduction of hundreds of home town units and facilities will undoubtedly have a broader and more visible negative impact than active force reductions and even the recently announced base closures.

The Caucus remains convinced that Guard and Reserve forces can be maintained in peacetime at a significantly lower cost. They can be used to retain the high quality military personnel who have been trained over the past decade, thus preserving the maximum capability at the least cost. They can easily perform the conventional missions currently identified by the active components if given the necessary resources, particularly proper equipment, in a timely fashion. Finally, the National Guard can provide multiple benefits to the nation, including support during national emergencies and local disasters, support to law enforcement agencies in the counternarcotics effort, nation building services both at home and abroad and public support for our defense establishment during periods of competition for limited resources or military conflict.

Our founding fathers believed that there should be a system of checks and balances in a democracy. One such check was to constrain the size of the regular military force, while balancing that defense capability with an organized militia. We believe our defense planning should continue to follow that basic philosophy and we urge you to rethink the cuts that have been proposed in our reserve forces.

Sincerely,

THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE
NATIONAL GUARD CAUCUS.
WENDELL H. FORD
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

Enclosure.

GEORGIA

Army National Guard:					
WV94AA	0205Det Frt Cons/Distr	2GA	0	10	0	0
WQVRAA	0166Co Maint Non-Div	2GA	0	7	0	0
Total		2GA	0	17	0	0

GEORGIA

Army Reserve:					
GA	Athens	0656 TM Bakery	18	92	
GA	Augusta	0478 Det Cen Den Lab	30	92	10
GA	Ft. Stewart	0370 TM Utilities (4000)	56	92	01
GA	Savannah	0411 Co Ambulance	38	92	01
GA	Rome	0363 Co Postal (GS)	49	93	07
GA	TBD	0321 Det Real Estate	16	93	05
GA	Atlanta	0097 HHD Chem En	47	94	
GA	Augusta	0319 Co Mdm Trk 5k Gal Tan	150	94	10
GA	TBD	0310 Co Clearing	127	94	
Total State			531		

But, just as an example, in Ohio, if we go through with this the way it is, the governor will lose some 80 percent of the helicopters available to him for whatever State functions and emergencies might be necessary.

Maybe that leaves enough to still do what has to be done. But I hope the considerations like that, in whatever State—because I don't want to make this into just an Ohio issue—but whatever the State, I hope those considerations were taken into account.

General BURDICK. Sir, we are going to balance across the force and cross level.

Senator GLENN. General Conaway.

General CONAWAY. Sir, that is a very tough one. General Burdick is working closely with me and the Army. As they have to pull out certain units to balance the force, readiness will be hurt a little because we are going to have to do some cross-leveling to make sure that the balance of hurt, to the best of our ability, is as equitable as we can get it between States.

At the moment, the initial plan is not as equal as we would like it to be. The Army is aware of that, so is the Department of Defense, and we are, too. We are working on a ramp-down. We are going to have to try and provide some backfill to the States where they have to pull out a unit or have an undue amount of hurt. Whatever you all decide our final ramp is, then we will try to balance from there.

General WARD. Mr. Chairman, we expect that even with a 28 percent reduction in drill strength, we will improve our overall readiness. Nevertheless, we do have a concern or two. We would be

reducing our full-time support at greater rate than 28 percent. Our AGR strength comes down by 30 percent; the military technicians by 33 percent. This full time support has been extraordinarily significant in the more than doubling of Reserve readiness over the last several years.

That is going to be a significant challenge. However, with the extraordinarily large number of people whom we have out there—roughly 600,000 Army Reservists today, plus an additional 200,000 involuntarily leaving the Active force, we will have an available force approaching 850,000, allowing for a very, very liberal expectation that some people coming off will not reenlist at the end of their term of service.

So we will have well over 800,000 troops in the total available Reserve to accomplish the drill strength of 208,000. Therefore, readiness should come up.

I do have the caveat, though, that it is going to be a challenge to meet it with significantly lower full-time support, because that has truly been the method of ensuring that training on a Saturday morning starts at 7 o'clock and goes for 2 full days. It does not drift in at 1 o'clock in the afternoon.

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, let me follow up on that because it relates to your question of readiness.

Over a period, if you look at the period which is the decade of the 1980s, I think the numbers reflect that as the end strength of the Reserve forces grew, the rate of growth of the full-time support was higher, was faster, than the rate of growth of the end-strength of the Reserve components.

We see a tie-in between full-time support and the readiness of those units. As we are coming down in size, you will also note that, even though full-time support is coming down along with the end-strength, it is coming down at a slower rate. So, from the stand point of proportionality, we are very sensitive to the importance of the full-time support. But all of it has to come down, given the budgetary imperatives that we have.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

The Desert Storm Supplemental Personnel Benefits Act contains a provision that authorizes the Secretaries of the military departments to exceed the prescribed Reserve full-time active duty end-strengths in 1991.

General Burdick and General Ward, do you expect this authority to be exercised with regard to your components? If so, what will be your full-time active duty end-strengths for 1991?

General WARD. We are not allowed to exceed this. We are not going to exceed it. We will be able to meet it easily. We are, therefore, going to hold off the assignment of people to ensure we do not exceed it.

Senator GLENN. General Burdick.

General BURDICK. I concur with that, sir.

Senator GLENN. Very good.

The planned 1995 Selected Reserve end-strength for the Army Reserve is 27 percent below the current level, with a reduction of 11 percent in 1992 and 10 percent in 1993.

General Ward, what Army Reserve force structure reductions result in these manpower reductions?

General WARD. We have, of course, effected some changes in fiscal year 1991. They are already in effect. We had a 9,500 cut. All but two of those units have already been cut, one of them from your State, Senator. It is the 660th Heavy Truck Company, which is in the desert and working hard. As we speak, we are reworking the list of units affected in the out years. The force will be tailored to a series of criteria: What does the Army need to fulfill its operation plans? What does it need to fulfill the strategy that goes behind those operation plans? What units are we unable to fix because of demographic changes?

We selected most of those units for inactivation early in 1992, and this is really not as much as occurred several years ago.

Senator GLENN. Do you have a tentative list of those things already selected?

General WARD. We have a tentative list that has been circulated in the field and is being staffed today.

Senator GLENN. When will that be available?

General WARD. It's not "blessed" yet and probably won't be for another 2 or 3 weeks, at least.

Senator GLENN. Then we could expect that when, in another couple of weeks?

General WARD. That is up to the Army leadership. But I would expect that it would be finished somewhere between 2 and 6 weeks. Many of these cuts are going to become effective October 1.

Senator GLENN. Well, I would hope we could get it within 2 weeks and not 6 weeks, because we have to complete our work on the subcommittee and make our recommendations to the full committee. So we need that information and we need it sooner than in that 6-week period.

General WARD. A great deal of it is being bumped against the lessons learned and is going back to the CINCs to make sure that our requirements, gross numbers, and various kinds of units will fully meet any revision in war plans based on our experiences in Southwest Asia.

It's not an uncomplicated problem. I do not expect that we will have major changes, but two dozen units or more may move on and off the entire list.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

As soon as we can get any information or even a partial list on that, we would like to have it so that we know what we are doing when we make our recommendations to the full committee.

I will ask staff to keep on top of that one.

Are there any missions that the Army Reserve now performs that are being transferred back into the Active Army, such as certain combat support or combat service support functions, or infantry combat units as such? Is that being contemplated?

General WARD. The Army's Active component is buying back certain combat service and combat service support missions and units, and functions. Of course, that is one of the aspects that causes our inability to firm up the list. We want to see what they are buying back and what substitute Reserve units will go out.

Many of those units may be put notionally, into the contingency corps. The concept of that corps at one time envisioned that there would be no Reserve units ever required for it. That has been modi-

fied by the cold breath of reality, which indicates that there are substantial shortfalls in the contingent corps that may not be overcome without filling it with highly Ready Reserve units, as we did in the Gulf. We had many units that were called to the Gulf and arrived there in 8 to 10 days. Those are the kinds of units that will probably be restored to us so we can meet our requirement to support the Active force.

Senator GLENN. Well, we will be getting into some of these roles, missions and assignments, though we do not plan to get into all of it this morning. We will get into it a little bit later in our testimony today, such as some of the concepts of what is available in 30 days, in 60 days and 90 days and so on. So maybe I will just save my questions until we get to that.

General Closner and General Killey, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard essentially maintain the current manpower strength level through 1995. In terms of the Active-Reserve mix, the Air Force is the only service in which the Reserve components increase in relation to the Active component.

What major force structure changes are being made in your respective components and what new missions do you pick up as the Active component is reduced?

General KILLEY. As the Air Force draws down in size, one of the main changes is they go from 36 TAC Fighter Wing equivalents today, down to 26.5 TAC Fighter Wing equivalents by the end of 1995. There is going to be some shifting of missions. The Air National Guard is not losing any of our flying flags. We are retaining every one of them. But we are converting some of our fighter units into tanker aircraft. As you are very much aware, your unit at Rickenbacker is one of those units. The unit at Pittsburgh and also the unit at McGuire, New Jersey, is also converting from fighters to tankers.

The reason for that conversion is, as we draw down Active component general purpose TAC Fighter Wings, the balance becomes too heavy on the Reserve component side, and to keep a balanced force, we need to shift some of the fighter assets that are in the Reserve components back toward the Active component.

That is based principally on a CONUS/OCONUS overseas ratio. For every TAC Fighter Wing equivalent that is based overseas, it takes approximately one TAC Fighter Wing equivalent in the United States to support that overseas location with rotation, et cetera. If the ratio is lower than that, then it becomes too turbulent in the Active component to be able to sustain their strength, and they'll start losing their people.

So that is the principle reason for that shift of those approximately one wing's worth of fighter units in the Guard into the tanker mission, which is, as proven in Operation Desert Storm, a superb mission, a vital mission that we need in the Air National Guard. Of our 13 units in the Air National Guard with KC-135E aircraft, 12 were mobilized. Before they were mobilized, they were used fully in a volunteer status from the very beginning. This shows that we need the requirement for the tanker force structure. It is very valid and it is an absolutely superb mission for us, as well as all the other missions.

But that is the principal shift in force structure.

We are gaining a new mission area that was recently announced in the latest public announcements. We are picking up the F-4G Wild Weasel Mission in the Air National Guard, which was originally programmed to phase out. There was going to be a gap of no capability in that mission, before the F-16 replacement aircraft came on line that would replace the F-4G. It was determined by Operation Desert Storm that that was a vital weapon system that we could not let phase out, and it was determined to put that weapons area in the Air National Guard. So two of our units in the Air National Guard, Boise and Reno, are converting from reconnaissance to the Wild Weasel Mission very shortly.

Senator GLENN. You point out and I think most people are probably not aware that the Reserves and Guard have had about 80 percent of the tanker missions, through the years. Isn't that so?

General KILLEY. No, sir. If you consider the Air Guard and Reserve together, in air refueling capability, I think we are approximately 33 percent of the KC-135s.

I think our numbers were about 26 percent, in the Air National Guard, of the KC-135 mission. General Closner I believe is about another 7 percent KC-135s.

Senator GLENN. General Closner, do you have comments?

General CLOSNER. Mr. Chairman, the Air Force Reserve is taking a cut from 1991 to 1992 of about 5 percent of our end-strength, approximately 4,400 people. This has been a conscious decision.

We worked with the administration on that. We certainly think that it would be nice if we could capture the great talent that will be leaving the Active force as a result of its drawdown. But we understand the fiscal realities of life. We have a bill to be paid, too.

We have initiated some cost saving measures of our own. We are taking down our numbered Air Force structure, which is a layer of management that we think we can do without in this time of change and the push toward quality. In this new quality revolution, we think that we can do our mission with less overhead.

As far as your specific question on changes, we are picking up the weather mission in total this year. We have C-130 units that are going to C-141s. As you know, in your State, at Rickenbacker, we will be putting in C-141s there. And we have some improvements of equipment, mainly in the Special Operations area.

We are fortunate, I guess you would say, in that the primary emphasis of the Air Force Reserve as far as total mission percentages, is in the airlift business, particularly strategic and tactical airlift. That is a fairly stable area, where we are making some improvements. Eventually, there will be an associate squadron of C-17 at Charleston AFB, SC.

Senator GLENN. About 5 weeks ago this past weekend, I was over in the Gulf. A small group of Senators met with General Schwarzkopf for about a 2 hour meeting. My question to him was this. I said we've seen all the things that worked well in Desert Storm. I have been through a couple of wars in the past myself and I know that everything does not work quite as advertised, like it comes out in the magazines and the news reports. I want to know what did not work well.

He laughed and said, "How many hours do you have to spend?" He then went ahead and outlined some of the things. But the appli-

cability of that to this morning is not to tell war stories. When he talked about how the Reserves and the Guard and everybody had worked out coming over there, he particularly pointed out that where there is a civilian counterpart job, such as airline pilots who are in the Reserve and fly tankers and things like that, these worked with no problem whatsoever. In the combat functions, the infantry combat function, obviously we had some problems. We will get into that a little bit later here.

Just as a guide to all of you, I think some of those functions that can be put over into the Guard and Reserve, I fully support those. Those people went over there and, as you already pointed out, they fit right in and did the job that had to be done. There wasn't any problem about it, all the combat support/combat service support roles.

So I think in those areas I want to investigate as much as we can with the committee and the staff, when we examine the Total Force Policy, whether there are more things we sort of want to push in that direction where there is a civilian counterpart, where it can be done just as well for combat purposes and can be done at a cheaper cost. We want to keep our eye out to do exactly those things. That is how we get the best bang for the buck and will still have just as good bottom line combat capability, which is what we are striving for here.

Go ahead, Mr. Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. I have just one comment in reaction to that, Mr. Chairman. I certainly subscribe to the notion that to the extent we can assign missions to Reserve forces, where civilian skills come into play in the performance of military missions, that is very useful and desirable. I would not want then to leap to the next step of logic and suggest that that is a limiting factor, that because a person is not engaged currently in a skill that is required militarily in their civilian occupation, that should be a limiting factor.

Obviously, we have experience levels for some fighter pilots that fly F-16s that relate not at all to their civilian skills. I could go on with different kinds of forces. But, as a starting point, I agree with that, Senator.

Senator GLENN. Please don't anybody read into my statement of 2 minutes ago that I mean this should be the sole criteria by which we judge what gets assigned. I don't mean to suggest that at all. But it is one of the major things to be considered, of course.

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. You have another factor, too. You mentioned F-16s and things like that. You still have pilots in some of the Reserve units who are people from the Vietnam era. Those people obviously had more combat experience. They know what it's like to get shot at, which concentrates your mind wonderfully and has an impact on your background and training, and on how you are able to perform in the future. People like that will be phasing out. They are probably beginning to get a little old for some of that. So we'll go to a new type of person perhaps in some of those units in the future, with different kinds of training.

That will mean some different training levels that are needed. There are a lot of things to be considered in this area.

General Closner, you mentioned the Reserve Numbered Air Forces. We have had some complaints regarding that kind of reorganization from a number of people. I understand the functions performed at these Numbered Air Forces would be absorbed at Headquarters Air Force level.

I guess one question would be are you going to need more people to do that at Headquarters or can that be absorbed with your current manpower level?

Let me just list a number of things here. How do you respond to the concerns that former Chief of the Air Force Reserve, Maj. Gen. Sloane Gill has raised about the elimination of the Reserve Numbered Air Forces, the downgrade of Chief of Air Force Reserve to Director of Air Force Reserve, the downgrade of Deputy Chief of Air Force Reserve to Director of Operations on the staff, the downgrade of the status of the Headquarters Air Reserve from a separate operating agency to field operating agency, actions he indicates are a giant step backward that would result in a weakened, less ready Air Force Reserve? What is the status of this organization? Have you consulted with the other former Air Force Reserve Chiefs, such as General Sheer and General Gill, on the reorganization?

General CLOSNER. Yes, sir.

To answer your last question, I have consulted with them. We have talked about this.

Going back to the first part, about taking away the title of the Chief and the Commander of the Air Force Reserve. That was in a brief memo that went through the Pentagon on the staff reorganization of the Pentagon, where I was listed as the Director of Air Force Reserve. I think it was a pure typographical problem. As you know, there is a Director of the Air National Guard, and I think this caused some confusion. This was cleared up within about 3 days.

I will still be the Chief of Air Force Reserve. I am presently the Commander of the Air Force Reserve. That also will not be changing.

It is a mere nuance, I think, as far as a separate operating agency versus a field operating agency. A lot of the units, previous SOA's and major commands are going to be called field operating agencies. It is purely grammatical and has nothing to do with their stature going up or down in the pecking order of priority.

More importantly, when I look at the value added of the Numbered Air Force and the fact that we are leading the way, very aggressively, in our attempts to get on-board with a more streamlined way of management, I reflect about what the Numbered Air Forces do. Having been a Numbered Air Force Commander myself, I found that our biggest value added primarily had to do with assisting our units in the field with readiness—as well as helping in their conversion to other weapon systems.

The vast majority of paperwork functions if you will, had to do with military construction or changes to regulations with other major commands. These had to be worked through Headquarters Air Force Reserve. It was not something that could be closed out at the numbered Air Force level.

This was a conscious decision. When we looked back in full retrospect to see where we can get the biggest bang for the buck—just as you used the term before, Mr. Chairman—we found that we could take some of the horsepower that we have at the Numbered Air Force and put it at the Air Force Reserve Headquarters, which is under-represented as far as rank. We have colonels dealing with two-star generals from the gaining commands.

So it was very, very difficult. As far as training future leaders of the Air Force Reserve, quite frankly, we didn't feel that the Numbered Air Force senior billets were that big a stepping stone. We thought they could get better training at the Headquarters.

There is a lot of discord, particularly from the Numbered Air Force people, and rightly so. I mean, if you had to move from Sacramento and Austin and Atlanta, in Senator Nunn's great State, down to, say, Macon, Georgia, you might say I rather like my quality of life where I am.

Senator GLENN. I'd better caution you there to be careful on whose State you are going to compare it with as being bad.

General CLOSNER. That's true. [Laughter.]

It's a good State, but I think a lot of people are very happy with Northern California and Texas.

When I really boil it all down, sir, I come to the conclusion that the Air Force Reserve will not lose command and control of the Air Force by drawing down the Numbered Air Forces. They will be more efficient in their operation.

To get to your final question, do we anticipate adding to the force structure, no, we do not. I think, quite frankly, that we have probably cut too much out of the residual of the Reserve Numbered Air Force which accomplishes that very basic bedrock requirement—the staff assistance requirement to our units. I think that some of that should be added back, and I will be going for restoration in this one area.

Senator GLENN. My bottom line for everything we do on the full committee and this subcommittee is I try to judge everything against what it does to combat effectiveness, whether it is reorganization or equipment or whatever it is. That is the only reason we have for being.

What effect will this have on combat effectiveness? Any?

General CLOSNER. It should enhance it, in that I believe the units can operate without this extra layer of oversight. Like I say, I speak from experience, having been a Commander of one of these Numbered Air Forces.

I really do think that when we decentralize—although it may appear like we are centralizing at Headquarters AFRES, we will be cutting out a complete layer that our units have to coordinate, work with, and the time it takes to go between. I really believe it is going to help combat readiness.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Duncan, what are your views on it? Do you favor this reorganization?

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I have not taken a personal position on it, but as a general proposition, I try to defer it to the Reserve components as much as we can, to give them flexibility.

I don't think we ought to treat them all alike, and I have no reason to disagree with anything the General has said.

Senator GLENN. You have General Sheer, who now works for you as a civilian Deputy assistant Secretary. I wonder if you could have him provide his personal views for our record on the reorganization. He had some experience in this area. May we get his testimony?

Mr. DUNCAN. Sure.

[The information follows:]

Major General Scheer has provided me with his personal views on this issue as follows:

I thank the Chairman for the opportunity to provide my personal views on the reorganization of the U.S. Air Force Reserve, a reorganization that, in my opinion, is long overdue. It is a structure that will afford a more effective capability to respond to the readiness demands of the future and is only the beginning of what can be done to provide the most efficient use of diminishing resources. My comments follow:

Several years ago the Air Force Reserve began an effort to relieve the growing administrative burdens being placed on its units; administrative burdens that were and are detracting from unit commanders' on-going efforts to increase combat readiness. A major portion of these are generated from outside sources over which the Air Force Reserve has little or no control, but many are "self generated." A primary contribution to the ones that are "self generated" is the current management structure. Therefore, no significant reduction in administrative requirements can be achieved without a corresponding streamlining of this structure.

The first piece of this structure to be examined was the Numbered Air Force (NAF) headquarters. Unlike the Active Air Force NAFs, the Reserve NAFs do not go to war. The individuals making up the NAFs have war-time mobilization assignments, but the organizations perform peace-time management functions only; the most important being command and control of, and staff assistance to, Air Force Reserve units nation-wide. However, the activities that consume the greatest amount of the NAF staff's time comprise "staffing" the correspondence that flows from the units, through the NAFs, to Air Force Reserve (AFRES) headquarters. This "staffing" function is not dissimilar to that performed by the restriction in an hour glass, in that it merely slows the communicative process between those seeking and those needing information. Eliminating this burden obviously requires eliminating the NAF headquarters. Eliminating the headquarters requires divestiture of the command and control and staff assistance visit functions. Staff assistance can be absorbed by AFRES headquarters while the command and control function can be divided between the Unit Commanders and AFRES headquarters. The resultant organization would provide the field commander more timely headquarters support, increased authority and responsibility, and a reduced administrative load. The downside is that several hundred full and part-time employees may lose their positions.

Opponents of this streamlining see it only as an attempt by the Active Air Force to erode the authority of the Air Force Reserve to manage itself in peace time. Quite the opposite is true, as this was entirely a Reserve initiative. Perhaps the confusion is due to the fact that, at about the same time that the Air Force Reserve was working its initiative, a totally separate proposal was presented to the Air Staff that would have eliminated the Reserve NAFs and incorporated their functions into the Active Numbered Air Force headquarters. This would have eroded Reserve management authority and was quickly discarded.

I do not believe that we can afford the status quo if we are to meet the demands of the future. The elimination of the Air Force Reserve Numbered Air Force headquarters, and the accompanying reassignment of a portion of the personnel to AFRES headquarters will afford AFRES the assets necessary to be more proactive and effective in the Total Quality Management of the future. At the same time, it will allow the real heroes of the meteoric rise in combat readiness over the past decades, the Unit Commanders, more authority and flexibility to meet the readiness demands of the future.

Senator GLENN. Admiral Taylor, the planned 1995 Selected Reserve end-strength for the Naval Reserve is 23 percent below the current level. The reduction in 1992 is 12 percent; the reduction in 1993 is 6 percent; it goes on up to in 1995 a total of 23 percent.

What Naval Reserve force structure reductions drive these manpower reductions?

Admiral TAYLOR. Our reductions will occur primarily in the ship area. We will be reducing down in 1993 by 10 frigates, 6 minesweepers, and 1 salvage ship. I would hasten to add at this point, however, that the frigate reduction is a part of our overall plan to restructure our Naval Reserve force frigate program. We will also have in 1992 an FFT program, which will allow us to maintain force structure and use 8 frigates as training ships, while retaining 32 frigates as ready for service in 180 days.

Senator GLENN. Do you agree with these reductions?

Admiral TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I do.

There is one other area where we are losing a capability within the reduction of 2 airborne mine countermeasure squadrons. Those squadrons were reduced based on old aircraft and also on the inability to get quality people out of the active duty side, long training cycles and overall low readiness.

Senator GLENN. Let me add a comment.

I mentioned our meeting with General Schwarzkopf a few weeks ago over there. One of the other areas that he mentioned was our minesweeping capability, which we have not done much original work or research on, I believe since World War I. Yet you are telling me that we are going to cut back on some of our minesweeping now? Are we transferring that to different types of aircraft, or what? That capability was severely lacking in the Persian Gulf. Everything did not go well with minesweeping.

Admiral TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

We are decommissioning 2 airborne mine countermeasure squadrons, 2 HM squadrons. They are flying older type aircraft, not compatible with the Active side.

Senator GLENN. Who will do that function, then?

Admiral TAYLOR. The Active side will. They will still retain that.

Senator GLENN. So that is being transferred from the Reserve back into the regular military, then?

Admiral TAYLOR. Yes, sir. They will have full responsibility for the aviation minesweeping.

Senator GLENN. The same quantity, or are we expanding that role for the future?

Admiral TAYLOR. It's the same quantity now. However, the Active side does have a request in for additional minesweeping aircraft.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

General Davison, the planned 1995 Selected Reserve End-Strength for the Marine Corps Reserve is 21 percent below the current level; the reduction in 1992 is 12 percent; the reduction in 1993 is 6 percent; and it ramps on up to a 21 percent total.

What force structure reductions in the Marine Corps Reserve drive these manpower reductions?

General DAVISON. Sir, obviously that end-strength going out in fiscal year 1995, as you just presented to me, would drive us to a position of low readiness of around 75 percent manning of current structure.

We have a plan to take structural reductions in fiscal year 1992.

Senator GLENN. Wait a minute. Would you repeat what you said a minute ago. It would require what—less readiness?

General DAVISON. Given the present structure that we have, sir, taking that end-strength reduction would man our present structure at about 75 percent, which would obviously impact on our readiness.

Senator GLENN. Overall strength, now, or readiness of the units specifically?

General DAVISON. That is personnel readiness of the units at their present structure.

So we have a plan to reduce structure in fiscal year 1992 by the 3,000. Most of that will be on the aviation side of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. We have not yet developed a plan to take structural reductions on out through the out years which would bring in line the end-strength and structure of the units for optimum combat readiness.

Senator GLENN. Do you agree with these reductions?

General DAVISON. I support the President's budget, sir.

Senator GLENN. But do you support the reductions?

You support the President's budget. We always get into this here. [Laughter.]

General DAVISON. My personal belief is it is important for us to keep ourselves integrated with the Active structure in a Total Force way and to do the things that we need to do to support the worldwide deployment and expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps. Our Reserve, in my opinion, manned at 41,000 or so is a comfortable level to keep a good readiness manning for the Reserve structure.

Senator GLENN. All right.

Admiral Faigle, the planned Selected Reserve end-strength for the Coast Guard for 1992 and 1993 is 12,000, or 700 less than authorized last year.

I understand the 1995 plan for the Coast Guard Reserve is level at 12,000.

Is a Selected Reserve strength level at 12,000 sufficient to sustain the mission of the Coast Guard Reserve?

Admiral FAIGLE. I would have to say, Mr. Chairman, yes, predicated on lessons learned from Desert Shield and Desert Storm and also in the assessment of a total strength that we are engaged in at present.

For me to come out and say definitely, 100 percent, that that is a figure we could live with entirely in the future, I am not prepared to say that. But, with the present crisis in the Middle East and the 15 percent of our Reserve that was called up, plus the changes in the global and the geopolitical environment, our assessment will give us more indication of whether we can, indeed, live with that 12,000 figure or not.

As you may recall, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 actually instituted a program of a build-up of our Reserve. We have, over the past 4 years, remained constant at a 12,000 figure.

I might add that our Coast Guard Reserve obviously provides for the national security interest. They also provide for a surge capacity or capability for our active duty people. I am referring now specifically to situations such as the Valdez oil-spill. We had approximately 30,000 man-days of reserve time that contributed to the

clean-up. For the earthquake out in San Francisco, and for Hurricane Hugo, our reserves were very active in providing a surge capacity, a backup to our Active duty forces if you will, during these man-made and natural disasters.

So, in our assessment, we are looking at not only the national security impact of our Reserves, but also at the impact or the benefits that they provide to our active duty people.

Senator GLENN. Well, you are questioning the Reserve strength a little bit there. If you find that this Reserve strength is not going to be adequate, please let us know as soon as possible so that we can start working with you on whatever alterations need to be made on that.

Admiral FAIGLE. Thank you, sir.

Senator GLENN. Just one other question.

Mr. Duncan, just to close out this particular section, how did you go about making these Reserve end-strengths? Did you set the role and mission first and then decide okay, this totals up to a certain military capability? Or did you say we're going to whack this off by one-forth and that's it, and everybody gets their assignments, and that's that?

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, the answer is, as the Chairman knows, that when we started the preparation of the budget that the President has just submitted, it was the beginning of 1990. We were in the middle of Operation Just Cause. The world was changing. Germany had not yet been unified. The Berlin Wall had just come down 60 days earlier. There were geopolitical changes all over the world.

So, we developed the new military strategy that the Secretary described in his testimony on February 7 and February 21. We did our best to draft this new military strategy, with the recognition that, as circumstances change, we have to be prepared to rethink everything. But as we went about it, instead of asking all of the services to cut a certain percentage, we asked them to submit their POMs and their budgets and their program recommendations in the context of the overall philosophical imprint the Secretary was giving, recognizing that that military strategy would be evolving all through calendar year 1990.

But the recommended end strengths represent our best judgment, based on the new military strategy. We left it up to the individual military departments to make recommendations as to what forces they need to carry out this military strategy. Those recommendations were debated at great length within the Defense Planning and Resources Board. Eventually, the Secretary made decisions on what force levels, end-strengths, and force structure he thought gave us the best capability of carrying out our new strategy. It represents our best judgment along those lines.

It is a constant give and take involving the recommendations of the military departments and the independent assessment of those recommendations by OSD looking at it from different perspectives.

Senator GLENN. Well, I know that this is changing very, very rapidly, so rapidly that it is difficult to keep up with, when you are dealing with hundreds of thousands of people and all that. I am fully cognizant of that and appreciate it.

But you and I have had discussions about the Total Force Policy Study that we mandated. I think that is absolutely vital. We

cannot just say okay, we're cutting back, so everybody take a percent cut and that will take care of our needs for the future. We can't say that because the threat is changing. It is no longer in Central Europe, although we have to be able to go back in there if we have to. There are different places around the world where you can see potential hot spots.

That means, if anything, that we need more mobility. We have to reflect that in the equipment. We have to reflect it in the organization. We have to reflect it across the board.

One of the things General Schwarzkopf talked about in our meeting with him—and I will keep alluding back to this meeting because I think some of the things he said are right on target—is we were out, apparently trying to lease ships from all over the world, trying to get anybody out there, someplace, who had a fast boat to help get things over there. We needed fast sealift and we just didn't have it. We were held up some in the initial phases because of that. There were also a number of other things. Some of the tactical air reconnaissance for the battlefield was just terrible, awful.

There was one Guard F-4 RECCE outfit out in Nevada, I believe it was, that was the only outfit that we had out there. That was not much good for tactical air intelligence for this hour to the next hour. It was taking 2 or 3 days to get their pictures back and up. The pilots were relying on briefing each other because the pilots were flying three to five missions a day. So they were relying on each other more than on anything else. We need some improvements in areas like that.

The point is that we need to better define, I believe, our overall roles and missions that we see out there for the future. And not just assign percentage cuts, which I keep having a nagging question mark in my mind as possibly is the way we may be going at some of this, just for expediency. I hate to see that. We are trying to get the best combat capability for the dollars spent.

Mr. DUNCAN. No, sir. I can assure the Chair that we are not going about it that way at all.

Senator GLENN. All right.

I am really looking forward to the hearing that we are going to have on Total Force Policy. Because we really do need to get into this, and I hope we get a good definition of it at that time. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am not a member of this subcommittee, but I do appreciate the opportunity to ask a few questions of Mr. Duncan, and I welcome him and all of the other witnesses that we have with us today.

The Army has a proposed reduction in its Guard and Reserve personnel by the end of fiscal year 1993 of about 18 percent. The way we compute these statistics, about 134,000 Guard and Reserve personnel would be cut from 1990 to 1993; 3,000 armories would be closed across the country.

Mr. Duncan, you have indicated in your testimony just a few moments ago that the new military strategy continues to assign major responsibilities for the Nation's defense to the Reserve components.

You have looked at, I believe, and made reference to the new military strategy in terms of their use.

In preparing this force reduction plan, would it not also have been appropriate to take into account the importance of Guard units in our individual States for the role that they play in emergencies and national disasters and drug interdiction, and not just what their role would be in the new military strategy?

Mr. DUNCAN. The answer, of course, is yes. The answer also is that it was taken into account. But, obviously, our ultimate responsibilities are to prepare and to recommend to the Congress the Armed Forces that we think are needed for national security purposes.

But I am very sensitive to that. In my other hat, as the Drug Coordinator for the Department, I know as well as anybody just how much we rely upon the National Guard and the Federal Reserve components in the counter-narcotics fight, to say nothing of the other important missions the Guard performs.

So I am very sensitive to that and am a great champion of the use of the Reserve forces in those kinds of roles.

Senator LEVIN. Is there some kind of written analysis of the impact of these cuts in the Army on those other roles and missions?

Mr. DUNCAN. I am not aware if there is within the Department of the Army. There is no written analysis by State, if that is what you are implying.

Senator LEVIN. No, overall or by State, of the impact on those other functions of these cuts in the Army.

Mr. DUNCAN. Within the Army? There is not in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that I am aware of. We discussed it. But I am not aware of a specific analysis.

There may be in the Army, but I would defer to General Burdick and General Ward on that. Once we define missions that are going to be performed by specific kinds of forces, then it becomes a matter of where we obtain those forces. It is up to General Burdick, General Ward, and others to make recommendations about where those forces should come from.

Senator LEVIN. I have just a very quick question.

General Ward, is there a written analysis in the Army of the impact of these major cuts on those other functions that I have described?

General WARD. We have attempted to factor in retention of those units in the Army Reserve that support the drug-fighting involvement.

Senator LEVIN. And other emergencies?

General WARD. Well, the Army Reserve is the court of last resort in emergencies. Our brothers and sisters in the Guard handle that role first.

Senator LEVIN. Just to cut this short——

General WARD. We have looked at it. Yes.

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. Is there a written analysis of the impact?

General WARD. If you are speaking of a single written analysis, I have never seen one; however, I have seen others analyze the aviation issue.

Senator LEVIN. In some analysis there is then a few paragraphs of the impact of these cuts on the drug interdiction effort?

General WARD. It has been done in my shop. I have not seen it in the Army product.

Senator LEVIN. Okay.

General Burdick, do you know of anything?

General BURDICK. Senator, I don't know of a written analysis at DA level, the directed cuts and the force structure that will be retained, mandated by the CINCs—and what they need for warfighting. However, in regard to our Army National Guard, we are quite cognizant of this. We are going to take steps to try to cross-level among the States so that we have a balanced force structure to take care of any of the military support to civil authority type of missions that we do have.

So we would be attempting to do that.

Senator LEVIN. But as of this point, you don't know of a written analysis of the impact of these cuts on that other function?

General BURDICK. Not as a written analysis. No.

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator Levin, if I could, I might volunteer that I have talked—and I am sure General Burdick has, too—constantly to the Adjutants General of the States about the effect on the performance of our counterdrug missions. As the Senator is aware, the people that we use from the Guard are volunteers who volunteer to perform that mission, that counter-narcotics mission, over and above all of the training that is required for the performance of their Federal missions. I have a vested interest in ensuring that we are receiving enough volunteers.

The answer continually comes back yes. So we have had no manpower problems.

Senator LEVIN. At least in my home State of Michigan, if these cuts are approved, we are going to lose a significant combat element in the Army National Guard. In fact, one of the brigades that would be lost has been rated as the best Reserve component brigade.

Secretary Duncan, if the Army Guard and Reserve manpower reductions are approved, how many of these components would lose many of their combat, as opposed to combat support, units?

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I am not prepared to tell you precisely this morning. But as a general objective, what I look for is balance in both the Reserve components and in the Active components.

One of the steps that we are taking is to bring more combat support/combat service support into the Active forces. To the extent that the Reserve components can perform combat missions—and they have demonstrated pretty dramatically that they can in Desert Storm—I also look for ways to do that. We are looking for balance.

I cannot answer your question with precision.

Senator LEVIN. Is that available elsewhere? You say that you cannot tell us here today. But you could provide that for the record?

Mr. DUNCAN. On which units are going into combat?

Senator LEVIN. On which combat units would be lost if these cuts are approved.

Mr. DUNCAN. I'm not sure there is a summary. If there is, I am not aware of it because some of these decisions are still in the process of being made.

Senator LEVIN. Okay.

Finally, the Chairman made reference to the Total Force Policy and indicated there is going to be a subsequent hearing on that issue.

Has there been a revision in the Total Force Policy following the adoption of this revised military strategy? Do we have a revised written Total Force Policy yet?

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, the answer is yes. But one must understand that the Total Force Policy is not a scientific formula. It is a policy.

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have both testified to the Congress at some length about how successfully that policy has been implemented in Desert Storm, and, while we continue to believe in it, we are going to continue to implement it. But as circumstances change in the world, the nuances may change.

Obviously, what we are looking for is the integration of the strengths and capabilities of Actives and Reserve components. From time to time, as circumstances change, so will the relative force structure or the relative end-strength change. It is a constant evaluation process involving the question of how we best integrate these capabilities.

So, it is not a firm, rigid thing that is accurate for all time. It is something that we constantly reevaluate in the context of the preparation of the budget that we submit to the President each year.

Senator LEVIN. Is the written Total Force Policy being reevaluated in light of our new strategy that has been announced?

Mr. DUNCAN. It has been evaluated and the Secretary has said it will continue to be the policy of the Department.

Senator LEVIN. So that the policy itself does not have to be amended to reflect the new strategy? The policy itself states principles generally enough so that you believe they can implement the new strategy and can be adapted to the new strategy without revision?

Mr. DUNCAN. Maybe we are talking past each other here. I think we are.

Senator LEVIN. Is there a written Total Force Policy? Is it in writing, something called "Total Force Policy," in writing?

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, it is a series of principles that managers within the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense apply——

Senator LEVIN. I understand that.

Mr. DUNCAN [continuing]. So that we can construct forces.

Senator LEVIN. Are those principles in writing?

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes. They are set forth in the report that was submitted to the Congress this last December.

Senator LEVIN. Do those principles need revision?

Mr. DUNCAN. The general principles do not need revision. The way in which they are applied as circumstances change may need to be revised.

Senator LEVIN. I understand.

So you do not contemplate revision in those written principles which constitute the Total Force Policy?

Mr. DUNCAN. I guess I feel a little uneasy ever in talking in terms of absolutes and broad generalities. But I am not aware of

any principle, Senator, that needs to be revised. What needs to be rethought is how we implement it in changing circumstances. But the principles are still good principles.

Senator LEVIN. That's fine.

Senator GLENN. The best answer is yes.

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Thank you, too, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

Senator GLENN. Thank you all.

For everyone's information today, this issue of the Total Force Policy and how detailed it should be and how written down it is and so on has been something that we have fussed back and forth on for about 4 years now. We did not get satisfaction on what the committee wanted. We finally wrote it in law last year that required it to be written down. That also has been the subject of continuing negotiation back and forth.

I think we are finally getting around to a better version. We will know more about that when we have our hearing and we are going to be doing a lot of spade work getting ready for that hearing on what the Total Force Policy does.

The Total Force Policy is supposed to include all of the reanalysis of threats, how those change, what our military posture is going to be to cope with these—in other words, it comes down to combat effectiveness, combat readiness. This is so fundamental. We have had an awful time of trying to get information back and forth, more than just the glittering generalities that we have had in the past.

We are going to get into that in some detail later on, as Mr. Duncan is well aware. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Gentlemen, I want to welcome you all here and I want to salute the Guard and the Reserve for the tremendously outstanding job which was done with regard to our recent hostilities in the Persian Gulf area. As near as I can tell, things went extremely well, indeed. The Total Force Concept, though, needs some fine-tuning, I guess, from time to time.

What I think our overall lesson was was that things worked out pretty much along the lines that we had envisioned. So that is a salute to the Guard and Reserve people in the United States, who have done an outstanding job in the past and will continue to do an outstanding job in the future, I am convinced, if called upon and when called upon, as they were recently.

Let's get down to some of the nitty gritty things that I think are on the minds of some of the Guard and Reserve people today.

First, Secretary Duncan, it is my understanding that the administration does not intend to make any change in the policy with regard to single parents and on the 1,200 cases of married parents who were both called up during the recent emergency.

Is it true that the policy of your administration is to not make any changes at all in the matter of leaving children at home when either they are in the single parent families or, in those 1,200 cases, where both mother and father had to leave to serve their country?

It seems to me that is a very human problem that we cannot just push aside by saying let the chips fall where they may.

What is your feeling on that, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. DUNCAN. I would be very reluctant to characterize it as no willingness to reevaluate that. As far as this assistant Secretary is concerned, I am willing to reevaluate any policies that I set down from time to time. I think that is generally the attitude of the Department.

When the issue arose in the middle of the conflict, our position was that Total Force means that we have to be able to rely upon the forces that have been trained to go to war, and that that was simply not an appropriate time to start passing legislation that had a broad impact and which would require us to handle military units that might be going to the conflict in a certain way.

We did, however, establish by departmental policy, a practice that permitted the individual military departments to implement as necessary to their unique needs, exemptions for the call-up of certain kinds of Reservists if certain hardships could be demonstrated.

But that was handled on a case-by-case, service-by-service basis. We felt much more comfortable with that approach than establishing a broad Department of Defense policy or agreeing to legislation which would mandate the management of personnel in the middle of a conflict in a certain way.

So we will be sensitive to those concerns. Our people are our most important asset, and, believe me, we are sensitive to their needs as much as anyone—moreso, we hope.

Senator EXON. Having said that, I agree with what you have said, and I understand your position during this recent emergency.

While our memories sometimes are very short, with both parents both being gone from the children for a 6 month period of time, although I recognize that is a long, long time when children are involved, we could find ourselves in the future gone from home for 2, 3 or 4 years, as maybe in times in the past. There may be some of you sitting at the witness table who remember the days when 6 months would have been considered a relatively short period of time. Fortunately, this was all over rather soon.

What are you saying, Mr. Secretary, that we should make no policy changes at the present time but should continue to handle this on a case-by-case, individual basis in the future?

Mr. DUNCAN. I'm saying a couple of things.

First, that it is very important to remember, in my opinion, that the people we are talking about in the context of the Reserve forces and the Active force are all volunteers. They chose to serve.

Now, we want to support those volunteers in every way we can. But it seems to me that we do not necessarily support them or support the Armed Forces' ability to rely upon individuals who have skills that may be badly needed and play important parts in important units that may be badly needed, if we mandate through broad legislation or broad policies that everyone has to be treated the same way.

What I look for is flexibility and fairness, individual fairness and flexibility. I think that is what we had during the conflict.

Senator EXON. Are there any comments on that from any other members of the broad panel that we have assembled here? I am sure that all of you have wrestled with this in one way or another during the last 6 months?

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator, excuse me for interrupting, but I might add that I understand we are looking at that again. We have not said that we are not going to look at it. I understand that we are.

Senator GLENN. Would you yield for just a second on this?

Senator EXON. Yes.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Jehn, who is head of manpower over there, has been charged with following up on the sense of the Senate resolution that we passed. One of the main difficulties was that there were different appeals procedures for the different services. You are right, it was all volunteer and we didn't want to restrict people, keep them out. They were supposed to keep their data sheets up to date on who the care givers were going to be if they were assigned overseas and things like that. Some of that was not done.

One of the biggest things we received most of the complaints on was that somebody had an appeals procedure through the Air Force and that was taken care of in one way, for the Marine Corps it was another way, and somebody else's was another way.

We passed a sense of the Senate resolution. Mr. Jehn, at the hearing a couple of weeks ago, told us that he is working on that right now, and we expect to have a policy out on that that is uniform for DOD.

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. What about the rest of you sitting at the table? Do you have anything to say, or do you all agree?

General CONAWAY. Basically, we agree.

We had a lot of situations where both spouses were called up or single parents with children. We tried to keep this as current as we could. They all had to document that they had someone to take care of the children before we'd let them stay in the unit or reenlist. You have a lot of cases where they are together, and then they will split, be separated, or get divorced. So in our different communities out there, we have a lot of things that are changing rapidly. We try to stay up with it, but it is an all volunteer force.

I think for the next few years, with it fresh in everybody's mind, it is going to command a little work.

Senator EXON. General, pardon me. I am a little weary of hearing the phrase that it is an "all volunteer force." "It's an all volunteer force." It would have been different if it were a drafted force, I guess.

It seems to me that, when we have an all volunteer force, we are saying if mother and father agreed to leave the kids when they sign up at a time when they didn't think they were going to leave, that that should solve the problem.

Well, I don't think that that does solve the problem. I appreciate the fact, Mr. Secretary, that you said these were individual cases. Maybe that is the best way to handle it, in other words, not to have a policy other than saying individual cases of hardship will be looked at.

Are you telling me, General Conaway, that when a young man or a young woman signs up, they are told that in volunteering for this

job they have to realize that little or no consideration will be given to their parental obligations when called? Are they told or warned about that particular proposition that might face them in the future? Or is that just one of the things that they signed, as we all signed forms when we were either enlisted or were drafted into the service?

General CONAWAY. No.

They must have a plan and they have to define who is going to take care of the children if they are mobilized. All of our people in the Guard, are mobilizable and deployable. In the Army and Air Guard, they are all Category A drilling Guard men and women and they have to be able to go. We are trying to be as equal opportunity a force as we can be without the draft. That is what our military has evolved to.

Now if that is wrong, that is being looked at, and we will abide by whatever the policy is determined to be.

Senator EXON. General Ward.

General WARD. Senator Exon, I would like to echo what my confrere, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, said.

In the troop program units, the procedure exists, and the command inspections look at this all the time. We ask whether there is a valid plan for each affected soldier. In all but a very few cases, the plans were valid.

Where plans were not valid, frequently there was a change in fact or understanding that even the soldier did not comprehend. Those cases, in most instances, were dealt with a "Thank you very much, you are non-deployable. You are under no obligation. Thank you very much for serving, goodbye."

We did find some problems in the Individual Ready Reserve, where people who left active duty with a nonviable family support plan were, nevertheless, recommended to remain in the IRR. Nevertheless, a number of those people had fixed their nonviable plans, were deployable, and deployed. Many others had not.

Those people are today being eliminated from the force, based upon a service that has been honorable. However, as they were nondeployable and with no prospect of their nondeployability being fixed, we thank them very much for serving. We recognize that they are not a deployable asset and will not be allowed the opportunity to reenlist or to stay in the Individual Ready Reserve.

In the troop program units, it worked pretty much according to plan.

Senator EXON. Gentlemen, there were about 228,000 Guard and Reserve personnel ordered to active duty, who had their lives interrupted and who served. Most of them understood the situation. Most of them understood it when they went in.

Now they are returning. Some have returned and there are many still to come on back.

These 228,000 Guard and Reserve people, after their experience, are now looking back to their employers to see whether or not they are being properly protected.

In your view, are employers well informed when it comes to these reemployment and promotion protections? Do we have any figures as to how well employers are complying?

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator, perhaps I should answer that initially. We just hosted, coincidentally, this last weekend, in St. Louis, a National Conference for the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves.

Secretary Cheney came out to speak, as did General Burba, the Commander in Chief of Forces Command.

We had representatives of our some 3,700 volunteers who work for that committee in the 54 States and territories. We engaged in a constant discussion about how is it going and so forth.

Our experience to date, with Desert Shield and Desert Storm is that yes, employers are aware. We put up phone banks. We were receiving thousands of calls from both employers and employees, asking about what the statutory protections were.

The good news is that American employers have, in many cases, gone beyond what the law requires in the way of supporting their employees who are Guardsmen and Reservists.

Now, I am sure that there are still perhaps some smaller employers who may not fully understand the implications of the law. But we have resources, both through the Department of Labor and through the Department of Defense in local communities, and there are committees in every single State that are there to provide information to employers. It is as simple as making a local phone call to find out.

We have published a great deal of information. We have spent a great deal of effort to try to get that word out. We even have an 800 telephone number so that people can call and find out those kinds of things.

We think we have done a pretty comprehensive job of helping everyone understand what the law requires.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

We will be following that. I was not aware of that meeting in St. Louis.

My last question, Mr. Chairman, has to do with the return of Reservists and Guards.

Our office has been inundated with calls from friends and relatives and from some Guard and Reserve personnel about the slow pace of returning.

Having returned from a war of yesteryear myself, I remember how everybody wants to get back. That is natural.

How good a job do you think we are doing in this? We are not going to be able to get these people back as fast as we got them over there. I understand that.

But are you satisfied, all of you, with the pace, with the way things are going right now? Have the Guardsmen and the Reservists whose lives were most interrupted been given any consideration about who is mustered out and returned home first?

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, as a broad proposition, I understand there is a very healthy discussion going on even with our field commander, General Pagonis, who is over there now, about the rate of return.

As a starting proposition, it is important for people to understand that because we transported so much military strength over there, first, it takes time to bring it back, and, second, those same Reservists that were important as support forces—combat support/

combat service support forces—in the projection of all of that force, are important to us as we bring it all back.

Some of those Reservists have military skills that are needed in the logistical end of bringing all of that force strength back. That happens to be their missions, their assignments.

Within that, we are trying to be as fair and equitable as we can to everyone involved, and we are very sensitive to the fact that these Reservists are citizen soldiers. We are attempting to manage that as best we can.

Let me assure the Senator that we are following it on a daily basis.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Was it your understanding, Secretary Duncan, that the policy was first over/first back?

Mr. DUNCAN. That's a general policy. I have encouraged the services, however, to take into account that the Reservists are citizen-soldiers, and also to take into account such things as employment relationships, and also to take into account to make sure that first in/first out is a fair principle, but for starters, only for starters. We need to look at what the operational needs are and to balance those operational needs against the fact that citizen soldiers are different than full-time soldiers.

Senator MCCAIN. I agree with you 100 percent. We have in Arizona a case of a Guard unit that remains mobilized, was the 1404th Transportation Company. They have been told that Active duty units that came over at the same time they did will be returning before them.

The task that they are performing at this time is basically one of cleaning vehicles. It is a transportation company. It doesn't require a great amount of skill to clean a vehicle. I think even a Senator might be able to do it. [Laughter.]

I think that we have got to look at this and other cases where people are clearly experiencing significant hardship. I am not asking that this unit or any other Guard or Reserve unit be given priority, although I certainly subscribe to your statement that these things have to be considered. But certainly we should not be placing them behind an Active duty unit unless they have some particularly unique skill that is absolutely required.

I would be very pleased, General Ward, if you would respond, because this is a very serious situation in my State and with my people.

General WARD. Senator, I would say that this is a serious issue across the country. It is one that our brothers in the Active component are very much aware. We deal with it every day. I get about 30 letters a day, from commanders in the desert, from soldiers, and from members of the IRR who we called to active duty. Some portion of those letters deal with these issues.

They all seem to understand that mission accomplishment is the first thing they have to do. There is clearly frustration, however, in Reserve component units that are not fully utilized.

I will make you the observation in the medical community that doctors, particularly surgeons—and I find very few surgeons in my life to be other than Type A people—get extraordinarily frustrated sitting over there, with it having been 6 weeks without seeing a patient. Their skills keep declining.

We are working on this issue with great energy, and we are attempting to get an early placement for redeployment for those people. It is not only clobbering their civilian skills; it provides no great value in theater, to have people who are being held only against a future contingency.

It is not an easy problem. We are working with the commanders to try to get some understanding from both the folks in theater serving with the Reserve units and the theater leadership structure, to change, reapply, and reexecute their priorities based on these things.

Yesterday a desk officer of the Army, who is a North Dakota farmer, said we have to get him back for the spring planting, and it may even be too late for some of these people.

So he is very cognizant of it. We are working that issue very, very hard, though not always as successfully as we would like.

Senator McCain. I am glad that you are working on it very, very hard. But, frankly, the response that I have gotten so far from the Army is unsatisfactory.

General Burdick. Senator McCain, if I could just comment on that, I have to agree with my colleagues here. We are all working it. We are working it closely with the Army.

Certainly, units that have to remain in country, that are critical, are being identified.

But to give you an example, sir, we have a schedule, and I can tell you down to the unit—I can even tell you in your State—for example, the 221st Quartermaster Company within the next 7 days will be released from active duty.

We have had to date in the Army National Guard 9,513 soldiers released. Of that, less than 2,000 were from Southwest Asia, with most from CONUS and even from Europe, that were called up in support of Desert Storm.

In the next 7 days, we are going to have almost 4,000 soldiers released. I think we are going to see this increasing now.

The Army plans to get all the soldiers back, certainly by the Fourth of July, except for a residual force. We are working that. I even have the list here of National Guard units that are in that residual force.

Senator Glenn. Would you say that again. You plan to have everybody out by when, the Reserve and Guard?

General Burdick. The Department of Defense DA, except for a residual force that is being identified now and will have to remain in country, is attempting to have everyone out, certainly by the Fourth of July, except for this residual force.

Now, we are working the residual force and trying to identify volunteers, people that would like to remain or that we can even replace. So we are working that issue quite consistently right now.

Admittedly, it has been a little slow in the beginning. But I think the tempo is going to pick up now.

Senator MCCAIN. You say that you do have a schedule for the return of some of these units?

General BURDICK. I have, sir, a schedule right now for the next 7 days, and that continues to roll on. I know the units that are coming out within the next 7 days. We work closely with Army on that.

Senator MCCAIN. May I suggest that you inform the Secretary of the Army, because he says, in a letter written to me yesterday, "Presently, there are no long-range announcements being provided. These announcements, which are being released, cannot be made any sooner than 72 hours before the estimated arrival time at home station."

You might want to tell the Secretary of the Army that we can have as long as a week lead-time on these announcements.

That does not sound like a lot, but it sure is an improvement over 72 hours.

Just let me make sure this is clear, General. You are telling me that you anticipate that everyone, except volunteers, would be back by the Fourth of July?

General BURDICK. No, I am not telling you that, Senator. What I am telling you is that there is an Army plan to attempt to return to the CONUS all units except those that are actually going to be needed, which are termed the "residual force." In that residual force, we, in the Army National Guard, are trying to identify individual soldiers positions where it is so critical that when they come back that we can replace those with volunteers.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have any idea of the size of that "residual force?"

General BURDICK. I have an idea of it. Yes.

Senator MCCAIN. Can you give us an idea?

General BURDICK. I cannot give you an idea except for a planning factor here that I have for the Army National Guard. I have nothing for the other Reserve components.

Senator MCCAIN. You have an idea of it but you don't have an idea of it? Is that it?

General BURDICK. Well, I have an idea for the Army National Guard. I am just the Director of the Army National Guard.

General WARD. Senator, I think we could do it in closed session. I have the number, and it has a stamp on it. As far as I know, it is still classified.

Senator MCCAIN. Okay.

Do you both agree with me that unless it is a critical skill, Guard and Reserve units should not be held longer than their counterparts in the Active duty force.

General BURDICK. Sir, I think if it is a key or critical skill, yes. I believe this is what the Department of the Army is trying to accomplish also.

Senator MCCAIN. I'm sure mine is not an isolated case. Here is a transportation unit that is cleaning trucks. I don't think it requires a unique and critical skill to do that. They have now been told that Active duty units that were deployed at the same time will come home before them.

Now I don't think that's fair. Do you?

General BURDICK. If there is a unit over there that can accomplish the same mission, then no, I wouldn't think it were fair.

General WARD. Senator, I would say that life is very unfair. But I think it is kind of dumb to leave a Reserve unit sitting there where you are attriting out their ability to participate in Total Force where there is an Active unit that has the same ability, to accomplish it, and that may not be required to reconstitute for a contingency package. When we find those Active units—and we find them almost daily—we are working, tweaking the system as little as a "staff weenie" can do on the Army staff, to get this great structure to pay some attention to what others of us would consider to be common sense.

Of course, once this is raised to the attention of the operators, they say, "great idea; we hadn't thought of it."

There are a lot of people out there, Senator, in both the Active and Reserve components, who would be very pleased to continue to serve their country by volunteering for TDY tour in Southwest Asia. The support is still immense.

Senator MCCAIN. That's wonderful news.

Let me recommend to you that you look at all of the Guard and Reserve units that are there and when they are scheduled to return. Then make sure that none of them is in the situation that I just described to you. The sweet taste of victory is turning to ashes in the mouths of many people in Arizona.

I cannot believe that this is an isolated case.

General WARD. It's not. It's not. It's from Maine to California, and Washington to Florida.

General CONAWAY. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Yes, sir.

General CONAWAY. I talked just yesterday to General Gus Pagonis on the telephone on this very issue. He is very aware of it, has great empathy for it, and he is working hard on the list. He is working with Army and all of the other services to get a list that will give a date so that the maximum number of units possible in the Guard and Reserve will have a date that they can hang their hat on. That is working as we are sitting here, and I hope is making great progress.

We will be in direct contact with him and you are right on.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have an idea of when we might get that?

General CONAWAY. They are supposed to be working the details and should be able to give us something this week for the Army; it should be imminent.

General WARD. I want to say that one of the issues that complicates this is that the agricultural standards for bringing back equipment are extraordinarily high. It's mind boggling. We are attempting to get some civilian contractors to pick that function up. That is a key ingredient as to how quickly this process can work.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to have taken so much time on this issue. I hope that I don't sound parochial when I discuss it. But as I said three or four times, I think if it is happening in my State, it may be happening in other places.

Senator GLENN. I don't think there is a Senator on Capitol Hill that has not had a lot of letters along the same line. We have had

a whole batch of mail from Ohio questioning exactly the same thing.

This is not just a parochial matter. It is something that is of concern all over the country.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

Senator GLENN. Picking up on Senator Exon's comments and concerns about children having to be left by people who were sent over and things like that, can you give us a number on how many appeals they were out of the total force that was over there? We had over half a million people over there, how many appeals were there from individuals? Do you know?

Mr. DUNCAN. I don't know, Senator. I don't have the number. I don't think I have even seen the number.

Senator GLENN. We had been told that there were between 50 and 60. I don't know whether that was correct or not.

If you could give us a figure on that, I would like to have it.

[The information follows:]

All the Service components, both Active and Reserve require that single parents and military couples have a child care plan that will ensure that the child/children are cared for in the event that the parent(s) are ordered to an area where dependents are not authorized. Most of the cases where the child care plan was inadequate or did not work were handled by local commanders and it is not possible to provide an exact number for those that did appeal to be released from their orders to Operations Desert Shield/Storm.

I want to move now to Reserve full-time manning, a subject near and dear to the heart of this subcommittee for a long time.

The 1991 Defense Authorization Act contained a provision that would reduce by 30 percent over a 7 year period the full-time active duty end-strengths of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve that are authorized for purposes of the full-time manning.

Second, it would provide that no serving full-time active duty member would be involuntarily separated as a result of these reductions.

Third, it would provide that accessions of members of the Reserve components into the full-time active duty program would be guaranteed at 2 percent of authorized Selected Reserve end-strength of the affected components for a given year.

Fourth, and most importantly, it would require the assignment of Active component members to fill the vacated requirements in the affected National Guard and Reserve components.

The purpose of this provision was to require greater interaction between Active and Reserve component personnel in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The conference report on this provision noted that there were only 547 Active component personnel assigned to the Army National Guard that had a strength of 450,000, and that there were only 1,119 Active component personnel assigned to the Army Reserve that had a strength of 318,000.

Mr. Duncan, the provision I have just summarized requires the Secretary of Defense to assign Active component personnel to vacated positions, and that remains valid.

Yet table 17, on page 34 of your written statement, indicates there will be no change in the number of Active component personnel that will be assigned to the Army National Guard and the

Army Reserve. So it looks like the Guard and the Reserve are being short-changed, which is certainly not our intent.

Why haven't you made the substitutions as required?

Mr. DUNCAN. Is page 34 what you are referring to, Mr. Chairman?

Senator GLENN. Page 34, table 17.

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir. These are projections.

Senator GLENN. This is table 17, the one at the bottom of the page.

Mr. DUNCAN. All right.

As a general proposition, we are not only not trying to evade what Congress required, we are obviously doing all that we can to comply with the law. But it is a fact that, as we come down in end-strength and as we come down in the number of full-time support positions, things are changing, for example, we were in the middle of a conflict. As we are going about this process, our broad objective is to retain as much full-time support as possible because we do see a connection between that and readiness. I have taken the general position that we don't want to automatically take active duty personnel and force people who are currently AGR's or technicians out of the structure per se. We want the best people. We want to compete them to the extent that we can.

Now, there are advantages for using active duty people, things such as current doctrine, current training techniques, a lot of those things.

It is also true that some Reserve units require the unique skills that you find in the full-time support called AGR's and technicians. Basically, we are trying to balance all of this, to comply with the intent of Congress, but leave it as much as we can to the individual Reserve components to meet their particular needs because the needs of the Army Reserve are considerably different from those of the Marine Corps Reserve.

As a broad philosophy, we are not trying to evade what the Congress directed, but we are trying to manage the situation in a way that does not quickly lock us into a position as we wait to see what happens with the composition of the force in the next year.

Senator GLENN. Well, I just summarized the provision that is in law.

Does the DOD legislative program include any proposal to modify that in any way?

Mr. DUNCAN. I don't believe that it does. I am not aware that it does.

Senator GLENN. Well, I am not aware that there is any, either, because we have not heard about it over here if there is one. That is the reason we are a little disappointed that there has not been more expeditious movement.

No one wants to hurt the combat capability, but one of the reasons we did this, after much consultation back and forth with the Pentagon, was because we felt it made a better bottom line combat capability, for more interaction between the Regulars and the Reserves.

Mr. DUNCAN. I would just suggest, Mr. Chairman, that there is so much turbulence right now as we come out of an armed conflict, a major armed conflict, as we go about designing a new force struc-

ture and new forces for new kinds of threats in the world, there is so much turbulence that nobody is trying to evade what the Congress requires. That is not our business. We carry out the law. That is our job.

On the other hand, it is also true that it is very difficult to leap to broad conclusions about what ought to apply from week to week. Circumstances are changing so quickly that I cannot tell you exactly what we are going to have available out of the Active force available for full-time support.

But what I can say is that when circumstances are changing so quickly and the turbulence is what it is, I look for flexibility. I seek to leave the individual services as much flexibility to obtain the full-time support that they need for their unique Reserve component as possible.

General CONAWAY. Mr. Chairman, may I add to that?

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General CONAWAY. I understand the plan, and we would like to have some additional active duty support for us in the Army National Guard. It would probably be less turbulent if you could consider doing that. We could work with the Army on putting more advisors into our units than we now have. The 546 we now have is low. We would like to have more working closely with us, interfacing with us at the armories and at the units.

Right now, with the changing world, and with the AGR cut that we currently have from 1991 to 1992, it is going to put an additional load on all the States to take additional AGR's out to be replaced.

We would rather try to ramp up first with advisers—we do need more—until we see where this ramp is going to go and how many AGR's are going to be cut in the actual budget, separate from the replacement of 5 percent a year, if you would consider that.

Senator GLENN. Well, there was a pretty simple formula that we outlined here. We made it very simple. I think it could be implemented.

I know that we have a lot of turbulence, Mr. Duncan. But I don't think we can blame everything on turbulence. The need for combat efficiency and combat mission readiness still goes on. There may be some other fracas break out, somewhere around the world, to which we may have to respond immediately. We had better be having our forces organized on a combat basis and ready to go.

I know that that is an objective of all of you and I am not accusing anybody of anything.

But let's not fall back on turbulence as something that says that we are not going to be ready to do what we have to do for the next X number years, whatever it is.

Mr. DUNCAN. We'll do whatever we have to do, Mr. Chairman.

As a practical matter, I hope that you recognize that we are managing the full-time support force far better than the Department was even 2 or 3 years ago. We have a much better handle on full-time support than we did then. We have identified for the first time what each of the Reserve components has in the way of full-time support. We are developing principles that we hope will apply, principles that will guide management decisions in the future about how we use full-time support.

Having said that, it is very difficult to conclude that all of the Reserve components should be treated the same way for full-time support. They do have unique needs, unique challenges.

Senator GLENN. General Burdick, I note in your written statement that you do not indicate any policy disagreement with the provision that I read a moment ago, although you do indicate that, "The reduction of AGR positions will impact on the ability to maintain training, maintenance, and administrative readiness at the unit level."

I would agree with you if DOD does not carry out the Active component personnel substitution that is required. I think that is required. That is what I am getting at.

What actions have you initiated within the Army to work out a plan for the assignment of top quality Active component personnel to the Army National Guard, as required?

General BURDICK. Senator Glenn, let me comment on that.

In the 1970s—and I want to agree with the Chief, NGB on the Army advisers. Let me just go back and explain something for a minute.

In the 1970s, at battalion level, and brigade and division level, we had Active component Army advisers. At the battalion, we had an officer-adviser as well as a noncommissioned officer-adviser. That worked quite well.

A decision was made to consolidate these advisers as what we termed the "readiness groups." And so, today, with the CONUSA's, the Continental United States Army commanders, and the readiness groups, they provide advisory capacity to the Guard and also to the Reserve. That has worked out pretty well.

But it would be best if we had the Active component advisers at battalion and higher level. Again, there are budget considerations to concern ourselves with here.

What I would like to do, and I think it would work out fine in the Guard, is this. If Active component personnel coming off active duty would come into the program as Active Guard Reservists, we can build on that expertise that they have, sir.

Right now, they would be rotated out of the unit every 3 years, and there is discontinuity. There is never an overlap in that rotation. There would be discontinuity, and there would be a period of several months before we got a new adviser in.

So let's bring them into the AGR program. This would help the people coming off active duty and also help us to build on that expertise.

Now, I went back and looked at the personnel that I have in the program right now, and at the enlisted level. 56.8 percent of our AGR enlisted soldiers have had prior active duty, and 45.5 percent of the officers in the AGR program have had active duty experience. By this, I do not mean just attending a school of 3, 6 or 12 months duration. They have been on active duty for several years.

So I think it would really enhance our program if we could bring them into the AGR program, where we could keep them, in the State of Ohio, in the State of Nebraska, and build on that expertise.

Senator GLENN. That might solve the problem for the next 3 or 4 years, as you have experienced people. But once they are sort of

out of touch with some of the mainstream of what is going on with the newest of equipment, the newest of training, the newest of everything, then they are just as out of date beyond that time as some of the AGR's are now. My time has expired.

General BURDICK. Sir, all of our AGR soldiers, all of our M Day soldiers, have to attend the Active component schools and go through the same courses to be promoted today. As I just pointed out, over 50 percent of the people that we have in the force and that we'll continue to have in the force, and I expect that would even increase, will have Active component experience.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much again.

General Burdick, may I have and may the committee receive a copy of that 7 day program that you have there. I don't have a copy of that. Can you give us a copy of that 7 day proposition?

General BURDICK. We can provide that. Yes. It is not classified. The data I have are not classified.

Now, again, this is subject to change. I do have that, sir, and I would be glad to come up and talk to you afterwards about it.

Senator EXON. Well, I would like to have a copy of it and I would like to have that submitted for the record, so that we can all have a copy of it.

[The information follows:]

OPERATION DESERT STORM

NGB-ARR-EOC
240700R APR 91
C+260 D+97
G+59 R+45

BRIEFING NOTES

1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:
--142 FA BDE to redeploy 16 May, per LTC Hathcock
--USAREUR announced RC redeployments to be completed by July 91
--145 MD CO missioned to Incirlik, Turkey. ETA 22 Apr 91
--155 AR BDE units are scheduled to REFRAD by 14 May 91
--256 IN BDE units are scheduled to REFRAD by 7 May 91
--2 soldiers 162 MP CO (MS) rec'd Bronze Star w/V device
--20SFG augmenting 10SFG w/24 medics in Turkey or Iraq
--RC Demob Review Panel scheduled 241400 Apr 91
--Planned REFRAD for 20SFG is 23 May 91

2. UNITS REDEPLOYED SINCE LAST REPORT (220700R Apr):

UNIT	ST	INC	P	DATE	DMS	PAX	ASG
290 MP CO	MD	3D	C	22 APR	FT MEADE	116	118
547 TC CO	DC	2C	C	23 APR	FT LEE	92	119
162 MP CO	MS	2D	C	23 APR	FT BENNING	94	133
1544 TC CO	IL	2D	C	23 APR	FT CAMPBELL	128	134
1137 MP CO	MO	6C	C	23 APR	FT LEONARD WD	124	169
1138 MP CO	MO	3D	C	23 APR	FT LEONARD WD	130	131
						684	804

6 UNITS

3. UNITS SCHEDULED TO REDEPLOY NEXT THREE DAYS:

UNIT	ST	INC	P	DATE	DMS	PAX	ASG
328 TC DET	NJ	2D	C	23 APR	FT DIX	4	4
460 CS CO	MI	2C	C	24 APR	FT KNOX	100	171
212 EN CO	TN	3A	C	24 APR	FT CAMPBELL	28	147
204 MED DET	AR	4E	E	24 APR	FT POLK		69
2221 QM CO	AZ	2C	C	25 APR	FT SILL	174	205
NONE				26 APR			
						306	596

5 UNITS

4. UNITS RELEASED FROM ACTIVE DUTY (REFRAD) SINCE LAST REPORT:

UNIT	ST	INC	P	DATE	DMS	PAX	ASG
1-141 FA BN	LA	5A	7	20 APR	FT POLK	680	680
256 AR TRP E	LA	5A	7	20 APR	FT POLK	124	124
244 MD HHD	NY	4B	C	20 APR	FT MEADE	56	56
10 TC DET	NY	01	C	22 APR	FT DEVENS	4	10
3-141 IN BN	TX	5C	7	22 APR	FT HOOD	863	870
221 OD DET	FL	4B	C	22 APR	FT STEWART	9	9
265 QM DET	SC	01	C	22 APR	FT STEWART	14	14
704 TC DET	MA	2B	C	22 APR	FT DEVENS	4	4
8 UNITS						1,754	1,767

5. UNITS SCHEDULED TO REFRAD DURING THE NEXT SEVEN DAYS:

UNIT	ST	INC	P	DATE	DMS	PAX	ASG
120 QM DET	UT	1	C	23 APR	FT CARSON		14
132 MP CO	SC	2B	C	23 APR	FT JACKSON		158
228 TC DET	PA	2C	C	23 APR	FT BRAGG		5
265 EN CO	GA	4B	C	23 APR	FT STEWART		78
328 TC DET	NJ	2D	C	24 APR	FT DIX		4
24 MD CO	NE	4A	C	24 APR	FT RILEY		112
1030 EN DET	VA	4B	C	24 APR	FT AP HILL		31
2221 QM CO	AZ	2C	C	24 APR	FT SILL		205
166 CS CO	GA	5B	1	25 APR	FT STEWART		253
144 MP CO	MI	6C	C	26 APR	FT KNOX		132
193 TC DET	MS	2C	C	26 APR	FT RUCKER		15
742 CS CO	SC	5B	1	26 APR	FT JACKSON		178
743 CS CO	FL	3A	C	26 APR	FT STEWART		211
778 CS CO	AL	2D	C	26 APR	FT RUCKER		252
1659 TC DET	AL	2B	C	26 APR	FT RUCKER		18
838 TC DET	IN	2D	C	27 APR	FT KNOX		4
1015 AG CO	IN	3C	C	27 APR	FT BEN HARRISON		120
219 QM DET	PR	2D	C	28 APR	FT BUJCHANAN		18
224 TC DET	CA	2C	C	28 APR	FT ORD		8
2668 TC CO	CA	2C	C	28 APR	FT ORD		129
3-156 IN BN	LA	5A	7	29 APR	FT POLK		806
212 EN CO	TN	3A	C	29 APR	FT CAMPBELL		147
2-156 IN BN	LA	5A	7	30 APR	FT POLK		815
1120 CS CO	OK	6K	1	30 APR	FT		185
24 UNITS							3,898

PACKAGE (P): C = CENTCOM, E = EUROPE, 1 = CONUS SPT, 7 = ROUND-OUT

Data as of 231800R APR 1991
LTC SINCLAIR/70018

NGB-ARR-EOC
24 APR 1991
C+260 D+97
G+59 R+45

OPERATION DESERT STORM
FEDERALIZED AND REFRAD STATUS OF UNITS

1. SUMMARY

	TOTAL FEDERALIZED	CURRENTLY FEDERALIZED	
REFRAD	297	278	19
SWA	15	12	3
EUROPE	86	51	35
CONUS	398	341	57
UNITS	37,848	36,193	1,655
SWA	3,365	3,012	353
EUROPE	21,198	13,693	7,505
CONUS	62,411	52,898	9,513
SOLDIERS			

2. Data as of 251800R Apr 1991

Senator EXON. Is there a similar 7 day plan, or longer or shorter, in the Reserve component?

General BURDICK. Sir, this is a moving plan right now. This will be increased, I'm sure. I mean, I'm speaking here for the Guard.

Senator EXON. Don't be defensive about it, General.

General BURDICK. Oh, I'm not.

Senator EXON. We just would like to see something down of at least what units are scheduled as of now, subject to change, to come home within the next 7 days. Isn't that what you have?

General BURDICK. That's what I have, yes.

General WARD. Senator, we get a little print-out about every second day that goes out roughly 7 days in advance. That is subject to a significant amount of change.

Senator EXON. Why?

General WARD. Well, one of the reasons is that we are still evacuating a great deal of equipment from the northern parts of Iraq and further down south. Some of these units, particularly transportation units, are unable to finish the job assigned in 3 days, and it may take them 7 days. It's pure mission-accomplishment.

Senator EXON. But if a unit is scheduled to come out within the next 7 days, it is reasonable to assume that they would come out on average, that most of them would come out in the next 2 or 3 weeks, is that right?

General WARD. On balance, the bulk of the units do move out on that schedule. But there is a significant number, 25 percent that will miss that date. It's usually because they don't have their own gear packed, turned in, or inspected, or there is a shortfall in transportation for them.

On balance, it's met.

For example, we have one engineer command that was scheduled to come out last night and, indeed, hit the window last night. The whole command is now on airplanes heading for the Midwest and

Chicago. But we'll miss other unit departure schedules by a day or two or three or four.

I don't think this is an area where we are finding great concern because we talk to the theater all the time about this and have a group over there that is coordinating those discussions. It is in the area where they are not on the reverse time-phased deployment plan, and they see an Active unit that arrived at the same time going back that causes consternation.

We also have that for individuals. We are trying to work every one of these cases and get sanity and sensible action coming out of a situation that is clearly not so much unfair as it is something simply unwise.

Senator EXON. General Closner.

General CLOSNER. Senator Exon, General Ward is right on target. I think it is not a matter of the advance notice. It is having a date. That is what has been the most destabilizing in the Air Force Reserve, as I'm sure most of the letters show, that we don't have a date.

I will tell you that there has been a vast improvement in this, particularly in the Military Airlift Command. They have really leaned forward. They've declared dates that we are going to be demobilizing our airlift units.

That is really the key. Secretary Duncan hit it right on when he alluded to the fact that if we don't write this last chapter in demobilization correctly the Total Force is going to take a very significant hit.

I think, from the Secretary on down, all of the services are paying a lot more attention to this than they did, perhaps as they should have done earlier.

For the unique skills, our people understand that if you are a one-of-a-kind type person, flying a particular airplane where there is no other unmobilized assets, meaning they are all mobilized, that you may remain on active duty a little bit longer.

As I said, the Military Airlift Command has put a line in the sand and said this is the date that we are going to shoot for and, hopefully, prior to this date, you will be off active duty.

Senator EXON. My question was, General Closner, do you have a list, as the Guard has, of 2 days, 7 days, or 7 weeks when the individual units are scheduled to come home?

General CLOSNER. The answer to your specific question is I do not for every single Reservist or every single unit.

Senator EXON. Do you have anything?

General CLOSNER. I do. It is partial. By "partial," I mean that I have some units that I know all the way up through the end of June that they have a specific date at which time they will be back on or before a particular date. I also have some units where they do not. It is yet to be determined. I have two units right now that we are trying to get dates for.

Senator EXON. I would think of all of our units, the Airlift Command is one that we would maybe expect to be the last to come back. In other words, they have to bring the people back. I can understand that you would have a special problem there.

I don't think we are trying to be unreasonable. We are just trying to get information. As I said a few moments ago, if you

think that a unit is likely to be there for a month or 6 weeks yet, I think it is better to say that up-front, so that some people won't get their hopes up too high.

This brings up a general policy that I think needs some attention and some thought. That is this. While we do have a Total Force concept, where the Guard and the Reserve could be called up and have specific duties to perform, the Guard and Reservists are civilian soldiers, marines, sailors, airmen, call them what you will. It seems to me that the lives of those people who are citizen volunteers should be given the earliest possible consideration for return.

When I heard that the President said first in/first out, I thought I cannot think of anything that may hurt Guard and Reserve enlistments in the future more than the fact that Guard and Reservists expect—maybe I am wrong, but I think they expect—that they are ready to serve on very short notice, but they are the ones whose lives are very definitely interrupted, as opposed to regular volunteer forces who do not have to be concerned about getting back to a job, about having a significant reduction in the monthly income to meet the expenses of the family back home because they are already in the service. They are in for a specific length of time and they know how much money they are going to get.

All that I am trying to say is that I do believe that we should have a policy, where possible, to return the Guardsmen and Reservists, our citizen volunteers, as a priority matter over full-time volunteers that are in the standing forces.

Let me ask this question.

Are there any Guard or Reserve units of any kind involved in the current operations to assist the Kurdish people or other refugees, Shiites in the southern part of Iraq? Are any of your forces involved now or likely to be involved in those activities that are now going on and that, as I understand it, are expanding?

General WARD. The answer for the Army Reserve side, and I know for the Guard side it's the same thing, is yes. We have some civil affairs units. We have an aviation unit. The Guard can speak about its unit. We have some engineer people who are working in that area, though not units.

We have some quartermaster people from both Guard and Reserve. It is a growing task force. It is not run out of Southwest Asia, but, rather, out of EUCOM, although some of the units were units that moved from Saudi Arabia up into Turkey or into the area where the Kurds are located.

Senator EXON. So it is safe to say that this new problem we have is likely to delay their return?

General WARD. Oh, that has had a major effect on it. I am pleased to say to Senator Glenn that we have a number of troops there—and they are not all Marines, sir—but they are happy to be with the Marines.

Senator EXON. How about the Reserve?

General CLOSNER. Sir, on the Air Force Reserve side, we are involved with the tactical resupply as well.

We have some depth, though, in that some of our units have not been recalled. We will be working to make sure that we don't keep people over there when we have the capability to either fill their

positions with volunteers, which I think will be quite a number. But yes, we are involved.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

General BURDICK. Sir, as far as the Guard is concerned, we have some medical units and medical personnel from one of our Special Forces groups that are involved in humanitarian assistance to the Kurds.

Senator EXON. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

The medical area, which you mentioned, is one that we will have to get into later, probably with a separate hearing. That has been one of our really touchy areas. As you know, 80 percent of combat medical is assigned to Reserves, and we have had an awful time in keeping those levels up through the years, as you are all aware. I think we are 71 percent short of doctors out of that 80 percent; 67 percent short of nurses, something like that, in spite of the additional incentives we have put in.

That is going to be the subject of a separate hearing one of these days.

General WARD. Senator, before we went to Desert Shield, we had made our doctor and nurse end-strength; however, we were not totally fixed in the right specialties. We have great concern that we will lose some part of that accomplishment, and we are working very assiduously to make sure that we do not lose the surgeons whom we picked up.

Senator GLENN. We will be addressing that in a separate hearing. We look forward to your testimony or whoever comes over on that.

Back to the subject now of full-time manning. General Burdick, how would you respond to the assertion that one of the reasons that the round-out brigades were not activated earlier for the Persian Gulf was because Active component personnel had practically no hands-on readiness knowledge of the Army National Guard?

General BURDICK. Sir, I would have to disagree with that completely. We report readiness on a quarterly basis, in accordance with Army Regulation 220–1. That readiness is reviewed monthly, and Forces Command and DA have up-to-date knowledge as to readiness of Guard units.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

General Ward, with regard to the full-time manning issue, let me read a quote out of your written statement. "The fiscal year 1992 budget shows a decrease in full-time support of 2,541. This decrement keeps the level for the Army Reserve at 9.5 percent, which remains the lowest of any Reserve component and well below the congressionally recommended level" of 14 percent. "Retaining the fiscal year 1990 full-time manning level will solve part of the problem. The remainder of our full-time support needs can be met by increasing the transition of highly qualified active duty soldiers into the Army Reserve's full-time support program. However, this will only be true if these active duty soldiers are added to the program, rather than merely being substituted for already qualified AGR soldiers."

Does your statement mean that you disagree with the full-time active duty strength levels requested for the Army Reserve in the 1992–1993 Authorization Request? What actions have you initiated to amend the request?

General WARD. We fully support the President's budget. This was a statement with regard to what the direction would have to be to bring us up close to the congressionally recommended level of full time support of 14 percent.

We are the lowest by far. We have had from the Active component significant numbers of people who want to come either into the AGR program or who, having served with Reserve units, find they are good units with which to serve. The amended request (I don't know where it stands now) clearly did not come from my office over here. It died somewhere in between.

Senator GLENN. What actions have you initiated within the Army to work out a plan for the assignment of top quality Active component personnel to the Army Reserve, as required?

General WARD. We have identified positions and units that would be available for augmentees who would come in both on a rotation basis in and upon departure, as well as places in the AGR program. Just about every space in the AGR program is available to anybody who wants to leave the Active component and become an AGR soldier.

Everybody must be boarded into the AGR program, as you know, and also be boarded at the end of 3 years to see if we'll keep them. We have had a significant increase, to the tune of 300 percent to 500 percent, of Active component soldiers who have requested assignment into the AGR program.

How have we done that? To a large extent, we help recruit them. They are people who have been good for our requirements.

Senator GLENN. This list you referred to, could you provide that for the record?

General WARD. Sir?

Senator GLENN. The list that you referred to.

General WARD. Of the numbers of people?

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General WARD. I would be happy to give you the names, if you like. But it goes on for 700 or 800.

I can give you a statement on it for the record. I'm not sure that you really want the individual names of all the people who have applied from the program coming from the Active component. It is beginning to become very popular.

Senator GLENN. It's the list of positions.

General WARD. We will give you that, sir.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

[The information follows:]

ACTIVE COMPONENT AGR APPLICANTS

In the normal course of events, positions change daily. Individual positions change as functions change. Our turnover of personnel to fill vacancies annually averages approximately 1,100 personnel (25 percent officers and warrant officers and 75 percent enlisted). This turnover is based on the following personnel actions: retirements; mandatory removal of officers; deaths; leaving the program due to no promotion potential in specialities; leaving the program to pursue other interests or to join Active component; medical; obligation completed and released from active duty

when an individual does not want to reenlist; and involuntary release based on disciplinary action or noncompliance with regulations. Among these, the two primary reasons for turnover are retirements and completion of obligations.

Senator GLENN. I want to close out this section of questioning, though there are still other things that we want to discuss.

Let me just say this. The law requires this substitution. It is not a matter of choice. We worked that out over about a 3 year or 4 year period in which we were concerned about this, both the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. So it is not a matter of whether we are still debating this or not. I hope you are working to comply with the law. That means that we are going to do this substitution. It is that simple.

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir, as long as the Senator also understands that, as we come down in end-strength and as the number of full-time support comes down along with the end-strength——

Senator GLENN. Oh, sure. You are going to have it proportional. I agree with that, with not putting all the active duty people over and reducing the Guard and Reserve and having the same number of full-time manning people out of the active service go over there and remain the same. That would not be sensible at all. I agree with that.

But we should be implementing this the way it was outlined. I think everyone understands what was intended and we ought to be working to do it.

General WARD. Sir, so there is no confusion here, we are really implementing it already. The stop-loss required, however, that we not move people from the Active component to the Reserve. Now that is off, we are bringing in significant numbers of Active component people into the AGR program. Many of them are going to be people who will have held key spots in the Active component, such as recruiters.

That's simply because they see their own recruiting requirements declining more rapidly than that of the Reserve.

So that is being implemented right now. The numbers might even exceed these because we have such a significant number of people who want to get into the program.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

Let's get into some of the future roles of the Guard and Reserve components.

Mr. Duncan, DOD's recent Report on Total Force Policy indicates different roles in the future for our Active and Reserve components under the new concept of Atlantic Force, Pacific Force, Contingency Force and Strategic Force, as is the case today. The report outlines the following force planning assumptions: contingency of less than 30 days, no Reserve force is activated; contingencies of less than 60 days, no Reserve combat forces would be used; contingencies of over 60 days, National Guard and Reserve forces would be used.

Included in these forces would be round-out combat units for later deploying Active forces, as well as forces needed to maintain a rotation base.

Are these force planning assumptions the basis for the National Guard and Reserve component programs in the 1992-1993 DOD budget request?

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, as a practical matter, the Total Force Policy Study Report, which was not submitted to the Congress until December 1990, was being engaged in at the same time that the budget was being prepared. I suspect that this report will be even more influential in the preparation of future budgets than it practically could have been during the preparation of this one.

Now I might also hasten to say that the language that you quoted from the report is pretty broad stuff. That language was pointed out to me recently, about the combat forces and 30 days and so forth. That is pretty broad principled stuff, and I would be the first to say that that was probably intended to apply to large ground combat forces, as opposed to all combat forces. We do have some combat forces in the Reserve components that are instantly available for the performance of their missions.

If the question is how much did the Total Force Policy Study influence the preparation of this budget, the answer is that influenced it indirectly because we were constantly talking to the Secretary as we were engaging in the study. But the study was not completed until December.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

This outlines the different categories—30, 60, and over 60 days—three different categories, basically. The obvious next question is are the National Guard and Army Reserve components losing their existing early deploying combat role, which we have had as round-out functions and so on? Is that going to be changed now as a result of this new policy?

Mr. DUNCAN. There is a great deal of misunderstanding and confusion, in my opinion, about early deployment. If we are talking about rapid deployment forces, forces that have to be deployed in the first hours of a conflict, I don't believe that anyone—well, I hesitate to say "anyone"—I don't believe that it was ever the intent or the plan to talk about large, brigade-sized maneuver elements in the same context as other kinds of rapid deployment forces, as opposed to early reinforcing forces. Early reinforcing forces—yes. Rapid deployment forces, no.

I know those are words that do not mean a lot to different people, but by "rapid deployment" I mean in the sense of forces that would go literally in the first minutes and hours of a conflict, as opposed to early reinforcement forces that would go perhaps 30 to 90 days into a conflict, and then later follow-on reinforcement forces that would go weeks later, after some train-up period.

Senator GLENN. What I am referring to is exactly what happened in this case. You are familiar with the 48th and the round-out that that was supposed to provide for the 24th Infantry Division, the 155th that rounded out First Cavalry, the 256th rounded out the 5th Infantry, and the 48th in particular, which was not combat ready. They had to be sent off, and they were still being trained. They had just completed that out in the desert. And yet, they were a round-out brigade, supposedly ready to go—if you look at the plan—to feed right in over there.

Now I have heard various disagreements with that. But a lot of us thought the round-out brigade idea of thinking that people could be plugged in immediately, without additional training was just not realistic. That is exactly what proved to be the case here.

Does this 30/60/plus-60 thing alter the assignment of round-out brigades like that?

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, this is a subject that is still being discussed in depth within the councils of the Army as well as within OSD. I talked to the Commander in Chief of Forces Command about it just recently. It is a subject which he has testified on.

There is reasonable room for disagreement among well informed people about how long it takes particular units to train up. We are talking now specifically about large, brigade sized, division sized units, as opposed to battalion sized units, maneuver elements that require combined arms training and so forth. That subject is still being debated within the councils of the Army. But the round-out concept has not been rejected.

What the Secretary of Defense has suggested is that we need to take a good, hard, look and be realistic about what kind of post-call-up training is required for these large maneuver units. That is exactly what is going on right now.

Senator GLENN. Are we still organized, then, right now, with round-out brigades, Reserve round-out brigades being assigned to units that are going to be immediately deployed, then?

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I suspect that as we continue to evolve the force structure and make the changes that the Secretary is talking about in the context of the new military strategy, we are going to find that there may well be early reinforcing roles for round-out units. But we have to be very candid about how quickly they can deploy.

Senator GLENN. Early reinforcing is not what you are sending over there in the initial wave of people being deployed. That has been the problem. I thought that had already been resolved by your definition in the Total Force Policy Study that we have of this 30/60/plus-60 analysis. Now you tell me that that is not what we are doing, that we are still on the old organization and the round-out brigades are still assigned; and if we get into another fracas one of these days, we are going to go through the same thing again, in all probability. Is that right?

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, all of this is undergoing study right now.

Senator GLENN. Then the 30/60/plus-60 thing, then, is not valid in the Total Force Policy Report that we have, is that right?

Mr. DUNCAN. The Total Force Policy Study report was nothing more and nothing less than the advice of the people that were appointed by the Secretary of Defense, advice to the Secretary of Defense. He is going to accept some of that advice, I am sure, and I am sure he is going to reject some of that advice. To the extent that he accepts it, it will color his preparation of budgets that he prepares in the future. But one cannot look at the final report of the Total Force Policy Study and say this is a formula that you can read to predict with certainty what kind of forces we are going to have next year.

It is not that. It is simply the recommendations of a particular group of his advisers.

Senator GLENN. But, you see, we are starting to reorganize this year, not in some future year. That is our problem. We have to address this when we go to markup shortly, what money we provide,

what the organization is going to be, and all of that. I thought this was the guidance we were getting here. Now I believe that we aren't.

And so, we are still organized along the old lines which did not work well in this case.

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, I know we have had long discussions about that. But let me, at the risk of boring the Chairman, just state once again that this Total Force Policy Study—and I know this will be the subject of a future hearing—involved enormous effort. Good faith effort went into it. But, as a practical matter, the report that evolved out of the Total Force Policy Study represented advice to the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense was not required, and he certainly should not have been required, to accept all of that advice. He is going to make his own independent judgment, based on advice of all of his advisers, about what kind of forces we will have in the future.

These broad principles were the recommendations that were signed off to by the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Study Group. But they may or may not be applied in the preparation of future force structures.

General BURDICK. Senator Glenn, maybe I could just comment on that from the round-out brigade standpoint.

We have definitions, and I think maybe we are undergoing a little change in those definitions. But we are coming down from a 28 division Army to a 20 division Army. This Army will consist of forces that are forward deployed, a forward presence force, a power projection force, rapid deployable, as well as reinforement, and then a reconstitution type of force.

Now, heretofore, for each one of the Guard round-out brigades—and let me use the 48th, sir, as an example—that was termed "rapid deployment," but certainly not in the same sense as the 101st or the 82nd Airborne Divisions are.

You mentioned sealift before. The 24th Infantry Division required sealift. It took several months to move that division. Every one of our round-out brigades, in accordance with Army plans, were to undergo post-mobilization training. They were not deployable like that.

Now, as the division minus moves to the port and is deployed by sealift—these are heavy divisions—the round-out brigades would train up at that mobilization station and follow on.

So there is, I think, a little bit of disconnect here in terms of what we really meant by rapid deployment at that time.

Now, in accordance with, you asked about the readiness of the brigades. Each one of the three brigades—and I'm talking here about the 48th, the 155th, and the 256th—two of those brigades, in accordance with the readiness procedures and all, were ready to go. A decision was made that they needed additional training. That was consistent with our plans for post-mobilization training.

Because of the National Training Center and its availability a decision was made to send the forces out to the National Training Center, where I think they did an admirable job in train-up.

Another facet of this is that under 673(b) the IRR is not called up. All of our plans heretofore considered fillers coming into the

units from the IRR, and that there would be time during that post-mobilization train-up to accept these fillers.

Under 673(b) that is precluded. So it wasn't until the partial MOB was declared that fillers could be brought in.

All of this has to enter into that picture. But the round-out concept is still a viable concept, sir.

Senator GLENN. The President had the authority to call those people up. Why didn't he do that? Do you know?

General BURDICK. Sir, he had the authority to call up the—what people now, the round-out units?

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General BURDICK. Eventually they were called up.

Senator GLENN. At the IRR and the fill-ins. He had authority to do everything that had to be done at that time. Why was that not done, do you know?

General BURDICK. I think General Ward can comment on this, but under 673(b), I do not believe that is a provision in the law, to call the IRR under that.

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, I would make a couple of comments.

The President early-on gave guidance to the Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That guidance colored very strongly what we did. He could have said to them: "Mr. Secretary and General Powell, I want to win this conflict in the fewest number of days possible and the fewest hours." But he didn't. He chose another alternative and said "I want to win this conflict with the least casualties to the American Armed Forces."

That meant that the Secretary—and he probably would have felt the same way anyway—was not about to send to the Persian Gulf forces that were not ready for that kind of conflict.

We had lots of units that were ready for other kinds of conflicts. But for that kind of conflict, we wanted to be cautious. We felt we owed it to the individual soldiers to make sure that they were ready. That is precisely what we did. We trained them until the best military judgment said they were ready to go, and we would not have hesitated to send them if the conflict had proceeded further than it did.

But the conflict fortunately ended 100 hours after the ground war started.

Senator GLENN. There was an article in the Baltimore Sun one day this week. I don't know whether you have seen it or not. It talks about the Army restructuring to avoid sending Reserve units in to early combat. It quotes quite a number of people.

I don't know whether you have had a chance to read that or not, but I would suggest you read it. It was in the Baltimore Sun on April 21, which I believe was Sunday.

Mr. DUNCAN. One of the points that can be made about much of the media comment on this issue is that it is uninformed in many cases, in my opinion. There is great confusion between the Total Force Policy, as applied by each of the Reserve components and the Department of Defense, generally, and the round-out concept, which is a concept that is rather unique to the Army and rather unique to particular kinds of units within the Army. Whatever we did with the round-out concept in my opinion says very little about

the Total Force Policy. Even those three brigades that performed so well after they were called up constituted only something like 7 percent of all of the Reservists that were activated.

Senator GLENN. Okay. We are going to have to move along today. We are going to want to contact you more on that because I had thought the new definitions of time periods had pretty well taken care of this problem. I guess not.

We are going to have to talk some more about this. I don't know whether we will have to have another hearing on this specific subject or not. But this is one that we really need to have before we know what we can approve in the subcommittee and in the full committee in order to go ahead. We cannot budget and we cannot authorize something that is this vague right now when we are coming back and pulling our forces down by a fourth over the next 5 years.

We are going to have to do a lot more work on this one, obviously, than we are able to get out of the way this morning.

Mr. Duncan, the Persian Gulf conflict involved the use for the first time of the Reserve call-up authority provided under Section 673(b) of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. That part provides that the President may order to active duty, other than during war or national emergency, members of the Selected Reserve for 90 days, and then extend them for another 90 days to augment Active forces for any operational mission. No more than 200,000 of such Reservists or National Guardsmen may be activated under this authority at any one time.

Was this authority adequate for you to activate the Selected Reserve, according to your order of force employment?

Mr. DUNCAN. Of course, some difficulties were posed at the beginning in connection with the large combat units.

One of the reasons that caused a problem for the Commander in Chief in the field of conflict was simply that he was concerned that after we engaged in this post-call-up training for some of the large maneuver units that we have been talking about and sent them over there, by the time they were there, they might have to come home sooner than would be the case if he had them longer.

Of course, the statute was amended, as the Chairman knows. Shortly after the statute was amended, the Secretary announced the call-up of those large combat units.

The Secretary also is on record as supporting an amendment of the statute to 180 days plus 180 days for all forces. I guess my starting proposition is that I like to give decisionmakers as much flexibility as possible. We are still in the "lessons learned" category on evaluating precisely what we might recommend, if anything different than what we have already, to the Congress.

Senator GLENN. What constrained the President from exercising the broader authority that he has under this title to activate under declaration of a national emergency up to 1 million Ready Reservists?

Was there any reason why he did not do that? We just didn't need them, or what?

Mr. DUNCAN. I would not presume to give an opinion as to what entered into the President's thinking. I can tell you that within the debate in the Department of Defense, one of the things that went

into play there—and this is one of many factors that was being considered—was simply the equity issue. This is to say that we wanted to have the flexibility to give the Commander in Chief whatever forces he needed to carry out his mission. At the same time, we had lots of Selected Reservists that had received pay for drills, and told that they were going to be the first forces to go. To the extent that we could solve the problem with Selected Reservists before calling the Individual Ready Reservists—who admittedly had a military obligation but perhaps had not been recently trained, who might have been a little uncertain about their skill retention, even perhaps how to reach them—we were anxious to use the Selected Reserve to the extent we could before going to the IRR.

Senator GLENN. In this authority, for the 90 days and the 90 day extension and the broader authority that he has under a national emergency, are there any of these authorities that need to be altered or changed by legislation to make this work better in the future? Or is the current law adequate?

Mr. DUNCAN. I am not prepared to say absolutely today, but we are discussing it. I can assure the Chair that that is one of the "lessons learned" that we are debating within the Department right now.

We will make a recommendation, and if we have a recommendation to make, we will try to do it as soon as possible.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Do you have any time period on that, as to when you might have that finished?

Mr. DUNCAN. No, sir.

As you probably know, all of the agencies in the Department submitted to the Secretary of Defense just in recent days an initial cut, preliminary views of some of the lessons that we have learned. We are now evaluating that.

General CONAWAY. Mr. Chairman, I agree with what Secretary Duncan has said. You increased the call-up to use more of the total force—and this committee did that a few years ago—from 100,000 to 200,000, and went from 90 days to 90 plus 90. Personally, from the Guard standpoint, I think the Presidential call should go to 180 days, like Secretary Duncan mentioned. That 90 days was upon us before we knew it, and then the bureaucracy gets involved as the second 90 has to get approved by everybody and the President has to declare it as necessary. I think Secretary Duncan will agree that that was there before we knew it.

Senator GLENN. And you are reviewing that now?

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. I hope you can get that to us because it is important that we include, if there are to be any changes in the authorization the President needs it in this year's authorization bill, if at all possible.

I think when that 90 plus 90 was put in, what was really envisioned—and I did not go back and review the legislative history, so I am just trying to recall—I think it was intended for a much smaller operation than this turned out to be. It was going to be a sort of thing where we are sending forces somewhere and you need some Reserves that were called up for a special purpose, and they had a special qualification of some kind that you might need to

help out in a situation. It was not envisioned that you were going to have a 500,000 buildup, a fourth of our people, with everybody else over there in the desert, and building up month after month after month. It was envisioned that that authority was probably going to be used for much smaller sized requirements than this turned out to be, as I recall.

General CONAWAY. You raise a good point, sir. Secretary Duncan and I talked about it extensively. You only want to go so far with that. You do not want to preclude getting to partial mobilization in a big operation, and if you make this too long, you can. But yet, we have to handle the administrative end and get to the bigger units if you need to call them up and train them before you go to partial mobilization.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

Let's go to recruiting and retention in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf call-up.

We had a large call-up. It obviously tested the ability of these components to respond. They responded exceptionally well. It also resulted in considerable turbulence for family members, and so on, as we have talked about a little bit this morning.

What do you look forward to with regard to long-term retention and recruitment of the Guard and Reserve? Have you done any surveys? Do you have any idea whether we are going to have a problem in getting people to sign up with the Guard and Reserve after having seen a couple of hundred thousand people have their lives disrupted, as they signed up to do? I am not letting anybody out from under here. They knew what they were getting into.

But do you think you are going to have problems now in getting people to come in?

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, my colleagues may want to venture a guess on that. My personal opinion is that it is still a little premature to make any long-term judgments. I will tell you why.

General Closner chuckled about my "last chapter" story, but I really believe this. We know what the first several chapters of the book on Desert Shield and Desert Storm say. It is a very positive story about the Reserve components. The last chapter is still being written. I am convinced that if we write that correctly—one, help the Reservists to see the direct connection between the sacrifices they made and the service to the country; two, bring them home as heroes, and make sure that they understand they are heroes; and, three, do all of the other kinds of things that we have been doing and are trying to do to support their families and so forth—if we write that chapter correctly, I don't believe that some of the initial, gloomy scenarios about the long-term recruiting and retention are going to come into play. But if we foul it up, they could.

How we manage the demobilization is going to be very, very important. I know all the people at this table are working awfully hard to manage it well.

Having said that, I am not sure that we can draw any solace from short-term numbers and make long-term projections. I am not willing to do that.

Senator GLENN. We mentioned the medical situation a little while ago.

We passed a number of initiatives over the last 4 years to improve medical manning in the Reserves. There have been improvements.

This came out of the Armed Forces Reserve Policy Board report. The last figures I saw indicated that we still had some shortages, which continue to be a problem. The report indicates that only 65 percent of general surgeon requirements are filled; 66 percent of crthopedic surgeon requirements; 66 percent of nurse anesthetist requirements are filled; 74 percent of licensed practical nurse requirements are filled.

Now we assign 80 percent of combat medical to the Reserves. Would you comment on this. What effect will it have? Are we going to be able to recruit people or not? We had all sorts of letters from doctors who had signed up in the Reserve and then did not want to go. We heard all sorts of "my community cannot afford to lose me" complaints, and letters from mayors, councils, and everybody else about how they knew they had signed up for the Reserve but did not want to go. I don't know how you are going to recruit medical personnel, in particular, who don't want their careers interrupted. They may have a big practice and don't want to go.

How are you going to handle that?

Mr. DUNCAN. I have one initial comment.

We have a lot of those stories. We also have some stories where people who were activated in the medical fields are now exploring going on active duty perhaps full-time.

We don't know how it is all going to flesh out. The bottom line is that we just completed a major war and we had all the medical people that we needed and the equipment that we needed. Our people were there to take care of the casualties, which could have been very large.

Senator GLENN. Well, the jury is still out on whether or not it would have been adequate. The death predictions went as high, I understand, now, as 40,000 in the Pentagon. The lowest estimate was 5,000 deaths. You usually figure about a ratio of 3 to 1 or 5 to 1 wounded to deaths, something like that.

You actually sent to the Persian Gulf, I understand, 16,092 body bags. Those are not used for wounded.

So whether or not it would have been adequate, I don't know. We put an enormous effort into it. We scavenged people out of all the regular establishments and hospitals I know replaced them. We even had authority to contract locally to give military medical service through local physicians under special contracts. So we were straining to get the people over there because we were scared of what was going to happen.

I was scared. I was holding my own breath. I am glad we only came out with, 100-or so people killed. It turned out to be the least lethal combat of any effort we have made in a war in the course of history, I believe. So I don't know whether the medical thing would have been adequate or not.

It still requires some looking at. We assigned 80 percent of this to the Reserves in the past. I don't know whether it is time to say that we only require half of that in the Reserves and the rest in the regulars, or whether we can still stick with the 80 percent. I think we have to assess that.

I am not sure that Desert Storm and Desert Shield, with the lack of casualties and lack of requirement for medical personnel, are good examples to judge by necessarily. I think we have to talk about this some more. General Ward.

General WARD. Senator, this is one of these areas where I hate to use the term "volunteer force." The AMEDD community, as a general rule, because of the basic shortage in society as a whole, all the way from licensed practical nurses to neurosurgeons, is one that can find gainful employment anywhere very easily.

We really have not seen that. I have seen the letters and have responded to letters like "I'm the only doctor left in my town." But in all candor, I can count those on the fingers of two hands.

Senator GLENN. Well, we received more than two hands' worth here. But it was not a major problem. I will say that.

General WARD. One particular small town in Mississippi had three doctors when this started, and all went into service. Then two of the partners were killed. The one left ended up being the only doctor in the whole town.

He did not want to go home.

When we started sorting these cases out, we had 25,000 Reserve and Guard (that 80 percent you are talking about), medical people mobilized and deployed. We met every requirement for all of the specialties, except the one that we have always had problems with, which is 91C (practical nurse).

We tapped into the IRR and sought out retirees requesting their return, and in some cases we involuntarily recalled retirees. So we met the targeted requirement for this particular operation.

My concern over it is similar to that of Secretary Duncan, that if we don't do the withdrawal, the retrograde, cleverly, we will end up losing some of the doctors and some of the nurses.

I was with a group of nurses last week in some units that came back. I don't think we are going to lose very many of them. If we handle the economic issues with the doctors fairly well, we can probably mitigate that potential problem to a very low level.

But many of them have paid extremely high economic penalties, much higher than they expected.

Senator GLENN. That's right.

General WARD. If they can reconstitute their practice, we may have them back in a year or two.

I noted with great pleasure an ad I saw in the San Antonio Light the other day. It said Doctor So-and-so, noted orthopedic surgeon, who has just returned from Desert Shield, has reopened his practice. The results of that, I understand, were very satisfactory. He got almost all his patients back plus he attracted a number of new people.

So we are able to handle that economic issue. We will probably keep them all in the short run, or keep a large number of them. I know some we will not keep because they have literally lost income in seven figures and will have to reconstitute a practice and meet all kinds of obligations for debt that they had, heretofore, thought they had under control.

Senator GLENN. So you went through, the whole Pentagon, everybody connected with the medical thing, went through some real scrubbing of lists in really trying to get people. I know that was

one of your biggest concerns. It was one of our biggest concerns over here.

There was not a whole lot in the paper about it. But some of the preparation, when casualties were supposed to be much higher than they turned out to be, made me really fearful of what might happen. I think this is one that we want to look at very closely.

I am not trying to get more functions back in the regulars, where we have medical people sitting around, not needed in peacetime. I don't know whether or not we need another study on this thing. Most of these things we have studied to death in years past. But it is something we have to look at very carefully.

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator, you might be aware—and I am sure you are—that we had policy guidance to make sure that the quality of medical care at CONUS hospitals, the medical facilities, did not drop as a result, and we did our best to do that. I think to a very great extent we succeeded. So we were not just throwing everything we had over to Southwest Asia. A lot of the Naval Reserve medical forces played a very significant role in just assisting in stateside medical facilities.

Senator GLENN. My next comment, Admiral Taylor, was going to be that many of the activated Naval Reserve medical personnel were used as backfill for deployed Active component personnel.

Have you received any feedback from these personnel that you can share with us about their role and what long-term effect this may have on recruitment?

Admiral TAYLOR. Again, Mr. Chairman, I think it is a little too soon to say, although we have seen no increase, if you will, in any applications for resignation. The people who have returned on the hospital ships and the people who have served in the CONUS hospitals have all been enthusiastic and have been pleased with their effort. I think the retention in the medical area is going to be much higher than at first most people anticipated.

Senator GLENN. How about recruitment?

Admiral TAYLOR. Recruiting would lead you a little bit astray. We are not recruiting very many doctors and nurses now, but that is because we are recruiting to specific, specialized skills.

We are currently manned at 138 percent medicine in positions and 123 percent in nurses. So we are afforded the luxury of looking for those specialized skills. We are not recruiting many, but we are still recruiting.

Senator GLENN. General Burdick, three Army national Guard round-out brigades, as we mentioned earlier, were activated but not deployed. What effect do you expect this experience will have on retention and recruitment in the Guard?

General BURDICK. Sir, you mentioned a survey. I just completed a survey only yesterday of all the, of three brigades, sir, and three battalions. I think we lose sight of the fact that we also had three round-out battalions along with those three round-out brigades.

We have a very low attrition rate annually in the Guard. It is about 18 percent. My survey showed that this would be a little bit higher in the round-out units by maybe 3 percent or 4 percent. But I think in time we are not going to have a problem there either. I do not think it will have a long-term effect on recruiting.

The remainder of the force, they feel good about their service. I visited a medical unit at Walter Reed and talked with medical personnel from Connecticut. They were all proud of their service and in no way thought that because they served CONUS and not OCONUS did this take anything away from the service.

Senator GLENN. I was referring here more to the round-out combat brigades and so on that were not deployed.

General BURDICK. Sir, I don't think there is going to be any long-standing problem there, either.

Senator GLENN. There was a lot of adverse publicity about that and about some of the command getting fired, and so on.

General BURDICK. As I said, this is where I took the survey. From about 18 percent maybe up to 23 percent or 24 percent attrition was in those units. But I think in time that will pass, but we should not have a problem, or a long-standing problem there.

Senator GLENN. Admiral Faigle, what role did the Coast Guard Reserve play in the Gulf conflict and what effect do you expect that experience to have on retention and recruitment?

Admiral FAIGLE. Mr. Chairman, there were two areas in which our Reserve responded to the crisis, one in-CONUS and one out-CONUS. We had approximately 1,000 of our Reservists, working in two phases, to support the in-CONUS operation. One was volunteer. Before the Presidential call-up was enacted, we had approximately 300 volunteers working at various ports, primarily along the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Coast, to insure that the supplies were loaded out. This is bulk cargo that I am referring to.

Later on, under the call-up, we had another approximately 600 Reserves that responded.

During this period, they oversaw movement of about 4 million tons of bulk cargo. This was for in-CONUS operations.

In the out-CONUS, or OCONUS operations, we provided three port security units which totaled approximately 300 men and women who were sent in theater. They have all returned. In fact, the last unit arrived home yesterday. Those three units, though, have been replaced by two other units, comprised of all volunteers, and they number about 230.

I would suspect, Mr. Chairman, that because of the nature of our work and our employment, we would not see any dramatic impact on our retention. Thus far, we have seen no signs at all.

I think the sentiments here, as mentioned by the other witnesses, have indicated that it may be too early to tell what the overall effects might be, and I think only time will give us a final indication on that.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

As any of you get information on what impact this is having on retention and recruitment, we'd like to know it at the earliest possible time.

General Davison, the Marine Corps Reserve played a significant combat and combat support role in the Persian Gulf Conflict. What effect do you expect the experience to have on retention and recruitment in the Marine Corps Reserve?

General DAVISON. Sir, on the recruitment side, we have found that our recruiters are having to work harder, make more calls, travel more miles, and conduct more interviews. Many of the in-

fluencers such as the parents, counselors, and teachers are more hesitant to push or to support going into the Marine Corps. But, nevertheless, results have been remarkably good lately.

As of the 31st of March, we had recruited in the non-prior service arena for the Selected Marine Corps Reserve 101.9 percent of our annual requirement for recruits shipped to training or placed into the delayed entry pool.

That is almost 3 percent ahead of the same period a year ago.

We believe our recruiting is going along well, albeit with more effort.

On the retention side, the 4th Marine Division took a look during October, November, and December at what their losses of personnel eligible to separate from the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. They normally experience about 500 a month. But during that period of time losses were much reduced. I regret that I don't have the exact numbers with me from that study, but I can provide them for the record, if you would like.

So even with Desert Shield and a build-up of the 4th Marine Division and the FSSG, the impact was minimal on retention.

In keeping with our Total Force Policy, we believe the close integration of our Reserve force with our Regular force will enhance retention. Of the Reserves deployed, 91 percent deployed with the operating forces, and 68 percent were deployed overseas. Of those deployed overseas, 54 percent were deployed to Southwest Asia.

The close integration of Reserves and Actives as a total force will make the Reserves feel good about their operational usefulness and combat deployment. Combined with a good welcome home, transitional assistance, and those things we talked about earlier today, along with a very sensitive, quick demobilization once their missions are finished, I believe that retention will be enhanced. But time will tell of course.

Senator GLENN. What is the total number of Marine Reserves that went over? What was the total Marine force over there at its maximum? How many Reserves are we looking at?

General DAVISON. We had about 90,000 Marines in the Southwest Asian theater, sir, of which, roughly 13,000 were Reserves.

Senator GLENN. Did you integrate them into existing units, or did you send them over as Reserve units that fed in?

General DAVISON. Sir, they went over as units, and integrated with our Active forces under our Total Force Policy.

We deployed an Infantry Regimental Headquarters, four infantry battalions, six artillery batteries, and a tank battalion plus extra tank companies. We also deployed five squadrons out of the aviation side of the Reserves. All of those units integrated into the I Marine Expeditionary Force and supported the 2nd Marine Division, 1st Marine Division, the 1st Force Service Support Group, and the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing.

Senator GLENN. General Killey and General Closner, the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve contributed substantially to the success of the air campaign, of course. What effect is this going to have? Many people had to leave airline jobs, for instance, and lost qualification because of the call-up, perhaps, if their companies do not treat them right when they come back. What is this going to do to future retention and recruitment in the Reserve?

General KILLEY. Sir, right now we are not anticipating any significant problem in any mission area. As the war got underway and we got more and more involved, we did think we might have problems with the pilot area and our medical mission area.

But as the people are coming back, as our units are coming back and we keep in continual touch with our commanders, with the States, with the adjutants general, we're finding that we have no significant problem in any mission area, and particularly those areas that we are most concerned about, the pilot area and the medical. But we still have a significant number of people that are mobilized, that are still on active duty. So the story is not totally told yet. But we continue to communicate on a daily basis. And, as we unwind, if we bring the rest of those folks back properly, I do not anticipate any problem.

I will tell you that we do have a schedule for most of those people returning. Some of those still over in the AOR are tied to an L Day, when the U.N. forces will take over. Once that L Day is determined, then we can start bringing the rest of our units back. We've got still four flying units over in AOR, two fighter units and two C-130 units. We do not have firm dates on those. But they fully understand that.

Certainly they are anxious. But we do not anticipate problems with those people as long as we do it right.

Senator GLENN. General Closner.

General CLOSNER. Mr. Chairman, it's pretty much the same story in the Air Force Reserve side.

We probably have less of a problem because we have a force drawdown between 1991 and 1992. So our problems are more in being able to absorb the rich resource that is available off active duty.

The one area that I think we are still going to have challenges in, as we talked about earlier, is the medical area. One suggestion I think that most of my colleagues at the table would agree upon is that we could do some good for our medical community if we made permanent the legislation on your personal benefits package.

In many cases specific to Desert Storm and Desert Shield, and for any conflict in the future where we ask Reservists to go in harm's way, particularly this group of people, it would probably be beneficial for our retention and recruiting.

Senator GLENN. We planned to do that. That was going to be my next subject here and our closing subject today, the personnel benefits and how they are being implemented.

But before I get to that, General Davison, the Marines are up north there now, with some of this refugee business. Are any of the Reserves involved with that, with the Kurds? How long are they going to be deployed up there, or is that being taken care of all by the regular Marine establishment?

General DAVISON. Sir, my understanding is that we do have eight volunteers from the Third Civil Affairs Group up there at the present time. I do not have a forecast on whether the number of Reserve participants may increase.

Senator GLENN. Is that mainly civil affairs people as opposed to infantry combat people?

General DAVISON. For the Reserve side, yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. On the Reserve side. Okay. So there are not many people involved?

General DAVISON. No, sir. Not at the present time.

Senator GLENN. How about the rest of you. Do you have Reserves involved with any of the reserve or transportation of equipment, or up in Turkey, feeding people in there? Are the Reserves involved with that?

General KILLEY. Sir, on the operation in northern Iraq and Turkey, as General Ward indicated, is handled through the European Command. We have tactical airlift units or aircraft and personnel in Europe that are picking up that mission from the Active component. We call that a Volant Pines mission with their C–130s. They are involved in that mission to some degree, though I cannot tell you to what extent.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Here is the wind-down subject, and I appreciate your patience, gentlemen. You have been here for a long time.

There were a number of benefits authorized for military personnel and their families. Senator McCain and I headed up on our respective political sides and coordinated with all the committees. We got it together in one bill on the floor.

I have some questions about that.

What procedures have you established to insure that the retroactive increase in imminent danger pay is paid to all eligible members? When can they expect this pay?

Anybody can answer.

General WARD. Let me jump in and tell you how the plan is operating.

We have an internal review bunch out looking at that right now in theater. That applies even with larger dollar amounts per soldier with medical professional people who get the special efficiency pay. The execution rate of that has been less than 100 percent so far.

We have the gate closed at the mobilization station. So they should all get all that money at the mobilization stations as they come back out. With some areas it's worked very well. With others there have been some communications problems with the units, and it has worked less well than we would have liked to have seen it. However, the mobilization stations are charged with that function. We have some people at the mobilization stations to ensure that indeed all the pay categories for the people are checked, because, once they get off active duty, the computer tends to forget about them.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Duncan, have you set up standard procedures for everybody coming back, all the services? It would seem to me that that would be the way to do it?

Mr. DUNCAN. I'm not aware that we've got anything in writing that requires them all to handle it the same way.

Senator GLENN. We had quite a number of benefits under this and things that people should be aware of—the government life insurance, the imminent danger pay, the increase in death gratuity that applies to some people, only a few, thankfully. Medical personnel who were activated expect to receive special pay and that's there. That implies several different directions here.

It would seem to me that that should come out of DOD, so that we have a standard procedure for how we are going to handle this, so that we don't start getting letters one of these days that somebody got theirs in the Navy and they didn't get it in the Marine Corps and they didn't get it in the Air Force.

Unless there is a standard procedure for how we are going to do this, we are going to have a mess.

Mr. DUNCAN. I will inquire, Mr. Chairman. My understanding of this is that the individual military departments are handling that. I will inquire and find out the status for you.

Senator GLENN. Would you do that? Because this applies across the board to all people over there. I think if somebody is not doing that, it should be done. Mr. Jehn's office should be doing that.

[The information follows:]

In a March 28, 1991, memorandum, Deputy Secretary Atwood designated the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) as the responsible official for overseeing the implementation of the military compensation and benefits entitlements enacted in Title III of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991. The Force Management and Personnel staff has been working with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to ensure uniformity in payment of these pays and benefits by including them in the Military Department of Defense Pay and Entitlements Manual.

The current status of standardization of the benefits provided by the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 is as follows:

Sections 301, 302, 307, 308, and 336 have been implemented by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.

Section 303 has been incorporated in the Joint Federal Travel Regulations.

Sections 304, 305, 312, and 313 and being staffed by Health Affairs and policy will be promulgated shortly.

Section 306 is already in place and the provisions of the act are being complied with.

Sections 309, 310, and 310A are being incorporated into the Military Pay and Allowances Entitlements Manual.

The benefits and services added by the act are important to Reservists and their families. To make sure that Reservists are aware of the benefits for which they may qualify, what services are available, and how to obtain help if needed, my office published a pamphlet which includes a comprehensive overview available benefits, including those added by the act. The services are distributing the pamphlet to Reservists and their families.

General CONAWAY. It is, sir. The Air Force is doing it for all of our people. That is being looked at right now.

General WARD. I don't think the question, Mr. Chairman, is lack of procedures. It is ensuring that they are adequately executed in every instance.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Good. I agree with that.

Does anybody else have comments on that? Do you have any problem with it, General Davison?

General DAVISON. Sir, I would just comment.

Our Reserves on active duty are in the Marine Corps integrated pay and manpower system. Those units that have received Reserve units or individuals will make the necessary entries to trigger the pay and various other benefit entitlements. However, similar to General Ward's comment, we have a stop gate, if you will, on that process, prior to demobilization. Those records are screened with the individual marine to ensure that the appropriate entities have been made.

If there is something there that is lacking in the way of documentation, then our Marines at the home training centers on the Instructor-Inspector staff and the Reserve commanders will follow-up to ensure the recruits are properly paid.

Senator GLENN. It is particularly critical for you folks right here, I think, because the regular establishment might have a little more time. People who come back are still assigned to different bases, and, of course, some people get out. So it does affect them.

But all your people will be coming back and then going out. I hope that we can arrange to get these benefits to them as intended at the earliest time possible.

Are there any other initiatives that you know of that we missed? We canvassed everybody in sight to make sure that we had as many of the benefits that were justified in the package that we passed. Some of the benefits originated over in the House. We still have some things yet to do such as originate tax legislation, and we could not do that over here in the Senate.

But are there any suggestions you have on personnel benefits that not only should be continued in the future, but is there anything we missed?

Mr. DUNCAN. Perhaps one of the most emotional for the physicians, the medical community, of course, we took care of with the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act. That was the malpractice liability insurance. That was just something that was unfair, that we could not live with, and the Congress was very helpful. I think we worked together to pay the debt.

Senator GLENN. That was very unfair. I agree with you.

Anybody else?

General DAVISON. I would just add that I have heard from some who were in business for themselves. The call-up was an extreme hardship on them financially, and so on. Of course, there is always the old issue that those who are employed do lose certain benefits, such as dental, and so on, that they have in the private sector which exceeds what we are able to offer once they are called up, and that works a little hardship.

Senator GLENN. They did. But I'll tell you that that was one we considered. There was an amendment on the floor concerning that, that the Small Business Administration take care of losses for a business while you are away. Nobody even had an estimate of how many billions that might or might not be.

It came down to the fact that when people signed up, they knew what they were getting into and they had to make their own arrangements for their business or whatever. We could not guarantee every business across the length and breadth of the country. So that one failed over on the Senate floor, as you may recall.

I see that there is a vote going on, so it is a good thing we are winding down.

Mr. Duncan, we have not received any legislative proposals from DOD so far this year on any Reserve component personnel benefits or personnel management initiatives. Are there any proposals that you are going to want us to consider in our markup? When will we receive them?

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I hate to go back to an old horse, but one that I have been pushing for 3 years is the ROPMA legislation. It

sounds like there is just not going to be enough time this year. But we are coming off of a war and we have our minds focused on a lot of things. The ROPMA legislation is still one that, at some point, I am very anxious to have the Senate conduct hearings on so that we can proceed with that.

It is a managerial tool, and I think it becomes increasingly important as the years go by. So it is something I would appreciate help on.

Senator GLENN. All right.

Can our staffs get together on that and we'll see if we can work something out to be included in the legislation this year, if we can work it out.

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Good.

Are there any legislative initiatives that any of the rest of you know about that you want to suggest to help you in your administration of the Reserve components? Anybody?

General WARD. Mr. Chairman, I want to chime in support of ROPMA. As a management tool, ROPMA would be very, very useful to us. I cannot emphasize that too much.

Senator GLENN. All right.

Mr. Duncan, just one last question.

We authorized temporary increases—they had to be temporary—in death gratuity pay, imminent danger pay, family separation allowance. Do you support making those temporary authorities permanent, as we have suggested?

Mr. DUNCAN. I honestly don't know—perhaps I should—but I don't know what the Secretary's position on that is. I will get back to the Chairman as soon as I can. I'll find out.

Senator GLENN. All right, good.

[The information follows:]

The Department of Defense supports making permanent the temporary increases in death gratuity pay, imminent danger pay, and family separation allowance authorized in the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, gentlemen. I am going to have to go. We have covered a lot of ground here this morning in different directions. We may have follow-up questions by other members of the committee who could not be here this morning and appreciate your bearing with us here. It's been a rather long hearing and we appreciate it.

Thank you much.

This hearing will stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. The Total Force Policy Report to he Congress is a much improved document over the interim report. The report, however, does not address the rather thorny issue of a complete appraisal of roles and missions. One of the criticisms of the report has come from the reserve community in that the reserve community claims that there was no reserve representation on the study.

Secretary Duncan, were you not the vice-chairman of the study, and do you consider yourself to be an adequate spokesman for the Reserve components?

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, I was vice-chairman of the Total Force Policy Study. I consider myself an adequate spokesman for the Department of Defense and for the Reserve

components. I would like to add that among the 24 members of the Total Force Policy Study Group were the Chief, Army Reserve, the Director, Naval Reserve, the Chief, Air Force Reserve, the Director, Army National Guard, and the Director, Air National Guard.

Senator McCAIN. Secretary Duncan, the notional end strengths outlined in the study for the Active and Reserve components are very close to those directed by Secretary Cheney. Do you support those end strengths for the Reserve components?

Mr. DUNCAN. The end strengths outlined in the Total Force Policy Study are based on meeting the force structure requirements of the Department's new military strategy which continues to assign major responsibilities for the Nation's defense to the Reserve components. The overall goal of that strategy is to streamline and restructure the Armed Forces in order to provide needed capabilities within projected fiscal constraints. The end strengths reflected in the President's budget for fiscal years 1992–1993 are generally consistent with those in the study. The end strengths and associated force structure in the President's budget are the result of a 10 month program and budget review in which I participated along with other senior policy advisors to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator McCAIN. Secretary Duncan, there has been a great deal of criticism by the National Guard of the failure to send the roundout brigades to Saudi Arabia early on in the crisis. Instead they were mobilized and trained extensively in the United States. The conflict ended before they completed their training. Many claims have been made publicly by the National Guard community, even from a former head of the National Guard Bureau, about their high state of readiness and the unnecessary training program they were subjected to.

Secretary Duncan, were these three brigades capable of being deployed with their Active components given the lessons learned from their mobilization and training?

Mr. DUNCAN. No; we had always insisted on at least 30 days' post-mobilization training for these brigades, even for the primary scenario in central Europe. After reviewing the training readiness of these brigades, the military leadership became convinced that they needed more than 30 days of training. A major consideration was the direction from the President to minimize casualties. I visited each brigade. I talked with the soldiers, with the sergeants, with junior officers and the commanders. They all told me that the training they were receiving was necessary. Based on these discussions I am convinced that the military judgment was correct and that for organizations as large as maneuver brigades, they may need post-mobilization training up to 90 days. Smaller units should require less.

Senator McCAIN. Secretary Duncan, one of the issues that plagued the round out brigades was the high average age and lack of physical fitness. In some instances there were company grade noncommissioned officers who were well over 50 years of age. Do you think this is acceptable for ground combat units? If not, how do you intend to correct the problem?

Mr. DUNCAN. Most military analysts would agree that age is a significant variable in physical fitness, and that physical fitness correlates to combat capability, especially for ground units. There are many jobs where older members can and do perform effectively, however, this varies greatly by Reserve component. In addressing the problem, each of the Reserve components has instituted a high year of tenure program, which should also help reduce the unprogrammed attrition of younger enlisted National Guardsmen and reservists, and hopefully encourage more personnel released from active duty to continue to participate as members of the Reserve components. I would caution against making too broad a generalization from individual cases, but a study supported by my office, which compared Active and Reserve force age distribution by occupation group, found that "wherever youth and vigor are prime requisites for military assignments, the services have managed their Reserve components to achieve reasonable current age distributions."

Senator McCAIN. Secretary Duncan, if age and physical fitness causes serious manning and readiness problems for mechanized units, the problem could be much worse for a light infantry unit in the National Guard.

What are your plans to relook the issue of light infantry divisions in the National Guard?

Mr. DUNCAN. The Department of the Army continuously assesses its balance of heavy and light forces, and its Active/Reserve component mix, in light of current and anticipated threats around the world. Strict adherence to existing (published) physical fitness standards will ensure that light infantry units of all components remain ready to perform their mission. I do not believe that we should attempt to accommodate our force structure decisions to assumptions pertaining to physical fitness.

Senator McCAIN. Secretary Duncan, two of the round out brigades required about 600 Reserve and Active component fillers in one case and more than 500 Reserve and Active component fillers in the other case because to fill in for shortages resulting from personnel being nondeployable for physical, medical or lack of MOS training. Do you consider this acceptable?

Mr. DUNCAN. Crossleveling of personnel to fill unit shortages prior to deployment occurs within the Active as well as the Reserve components. This is particularly true within the Army. While every effort should be made to minimize the need for fillers, crossleveling is an integral part of mobilization planning. The largest number of nondeployables consisted of those personnel, who, for a variety of reasons, have not yet completed initial active duty for training. Currently, such individuals are assigned against mobilization billets. By law, however, they are not deployable. The only real solution to this problem would appear to be to develop an individuals account in the Reserve components, similar to the practice in the Active components. We are exploring alternatives in this area.

With respect to personnel declared nondeployable for medical or physical reasons, Operation Desert Shield/Storm have made it clear that even greater effort is needed to identify these individuals on a regular basis, and to remove them from Selected Reserve units that are subject to deployment and replace them with mobilizable assets.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY

Senator McCAIN. General Conaway, do you feel that the Reserve components were adequately represented during the study process by Secretary Duncan?

General CONAWAY. Yes, I am satisfied with the representation that Secretary Duncan provided for the Reserve components during the Total Force Policy Study.

Senator McCAIN. General Conaway, do you support Secretary Cheney's 5 year end-strength goals for the Guard?

General CONAWAY. Yes, the end-strength goals that have been directed for the National Guard are reasonable and achievable.

Senator McCAIN. General Burdick, do you support the 5 year end-strength goal for the Army Guard?

General BURDICK. Certainly, I echo General Conaway's comments in this regard.

NATIONAL GUARD GENERAL OFFICERS

Senator McCAIN. General Conaway, please provide for the record a list of all Army National Guard and Air Guard general officers who have been in any active duty status for a total of more than 180 days during fiscal year 1990 and an explanation of why they were in that status for that period of time. Please note that the period of more than 180 days does not mean continuous days.

General CONAWAY. There have been no general officers in the ARNG authorized to exceed 180 days active duty. We authorized 45-60 special training Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) days to each general officer. Any exception to this must be approved by NGB. This is in addition to their required AT, IDT and approved schools. We have nine special assistant general officers at various DA headquarters and major commands that are authorized 139 days special training ADSW but are excused from AT and IDT.

Per our NGB regulation guidance to all States, no general officer will exceed 180 cumulative days of ADSW. Only one special assistant at Fifth Army requested to exceed 180 days in fiscal year 1990, because he was coordinating the Fifth Army Drug Program. He was denied the extension as this would count against the general officer end strength authorization of the ARNG.

The Air National Guard had a total of three general officers on active duty, continuous or cumulative, in excess of 180 days in fiscal year 1990.

Lt. Gen. John B. Conaway was on continuous active duty during fiscal year 1990 as the Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau and the Chief, National Guard Bureau as authorized by 10 USC 672(d) 8496, 3040 and Air Force Regulation 45–17.

Maj. Gen. Philip G. Killey was on continuous active duty during fiscal year 1990 as the Director, Air National Guard as authorized by 10 USC 672(d) 8496 and Air Force Regulation 45–17.

Brig. Gen. Donald W. Shepperd was on continuous active duty during fiscal year 1990 as the Assistant Director, Plans, Programs, and Policy as authorized by 10 USC 672(d) 8496 and Air Force Regulation 45–17.

GUARD ARTICLE

Senator MCCAIN. There has been circulated on Capitol Hill, a document purported to be an article about the National Guard and the Total Force Policy. It becomes obvious that it is an effort to mitigate reductions in Reserve component end strength supported by the Total Force Policy Study and directed by Secretary Cheney. One of the disturbing allegations made in this document is that a volunteer active military force may in some way be a threat to our country because it runs the risk of becoming an "all powerful political force." General Conaway, are you familiar with this document, and if you are not, would you please read it and provide a response for the record as to whether or not this is the policy of the National Guard Bureau?

General CONAWAY.

THE CHANGING FOCUS OF THE ACTIVE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Even as DESERT STORM unfolded, the Department of Defense (DoD) made and continues to make significant changes that will have long term ramifications for the American people. These changes involve a broad range of issues that many American's don't understand but involves billions of tax dollars. It is our intent herein to set forth a perspective of what is being orchestrated and why Congress and the American people must be mindful of these issues.

Most Americans hold it self-evident that the most important responsibility of the Federation is the protection of our society, its institutions and our way of life. Since World War II, particularly after the Korean War, as our foreign policy began to be defined, the Congress and the American people have rightly supported a large standing force even though in peacetime the nation traditionally maintained a small standing active military. After the anti-draft furor during the Vietnam War, an all volunteer military integrated with a highly trained reserve replaced the conscript system for providing manpower needs.

The method by which policymakers determined the size of the force was to consider the threat, the time required to react to that threat and the degree of prudent risk the nation could accept. Using this bedrock for strategy making and force structuring, the resulting Total Force Policy has allowed the American people to enjoy significant military capabilities at reasonable cost and at considerably less expense than a similar defense based on a full-time professional army. That total force encompasses the active forces, the United States Army Reserve, Reserves of the other services, the National Guard, the DoD Civilian workforce and the contractors. Without the reserve forces, one would be describing the military industrial complex about which Presidents Washington and Eisenhower warned us during their administrations. The abandonment of the Total Force Concept would create justifiable concern that an all volunteer force may evolve into an all powerful political force as it has historically in other nations which have relied on a large professional standing armed force.

The Department of Defense, along with the remainder of the western world, was caught completely off-guard in December of 1989 as the Berlin Wall came crashing down. Congress hastily reacted by calling for a reduced defense budget-"the peace dividend." This reduced budget could only lead to a much smaller active military force. Congress tasked the Department of Defense to undertake a study of the Total Force Policy.

Given this background, what are the issues the nation faces in planning its defense forces? In our view, the most important issue, the one driving many of the others, continues to be the threat. There is little debate that the only real military threat remains the Soviet ICBMs, and that our triad (bombers, missiles and submarines) must remain arrayed against them. Military leaders have used quantitative systems approach to defense management which was developed during the post WWII era to justify a large standing force - rightly so. The active forces were justified to the Congress based on the analysis of the threat and the time required to react to it.

This "threat and time needed to react" approach came crashing down around Pentagon planners like the Berlin Wall because it could no longer be used to justify a large standing force. Strategic forces could be justified to the Congress with little difficulty but conventional forces could not. At the Pentagon, "Threat Procurement" became the buzz word. Pentagon planners frantically searched for a new strategy, one that would somehow justify maintaining a large standing force.

During the last year there were three interrelated developments that will have long term significance for the American taxpayer and the active military establishment. The issues surrounding the developments relate to the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact (the Threat), reevaluation of the Total Force Policy and the war in Southwest Asia.

The first issue is very clear. With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the threat was dismantled and the warning time greatly expanded. It is very difficult to justify a large standing force to the Congress in the absence of a short-warning threat.

Second, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, with direction from Congress, appointed a committee made up of Senior DoD officials to study the Total Force Policy. The committee consisting exclusively of DoD officials, had no Reserve Component representation, but input was permitted by senior Reserve Component leadership after some arm-twisting. Even after this obvious effort to exclude the Reserve Component Senior Leadership, the initial draft report recommended a heavy reliance on the Reserve Components with a shift of missions and resources to the Reserve Components. The initial report was rejected outright by I. Lewis Libby, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. It is our belief that the initial draft report had its basis in the strategy of threat and warning time. This strategy had been used to posture forces in a forward deployed-forward defense with forces earmarked for each region of interest (Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and Europe). The purpose of these forces was to provide deterrence and warfighting capabilities.

In rejecting the report, Mr. Libby outlined a new strategy. This new strategy has been defined by Secretary Cheney and General Colin Powell as follows:

1. A forward deployed-forward presence force;
2. An Atlantic force;
3. A Pacific force;
4. A contingency force;
5. A strategic force.

The first four are not based on threat or warning time and it is not clear what the rationale is for justifying these forces. Reserve Component involvement was envisioned only for large operations lasting more than 60 days. It appears there is shifting of responsibility from Reserve to Active forces simply to support the use of additional active duty soldiers. Already Pentagon planners are telling the Congress that they have underestimated the need for Active Component Army forces. This new strategy was the best the Pentagon intellect could produce without a threat with a short warning time. The final task force policy report submitted to Congress reflected this strategy.

Incredibly, the third development occurred as the threat in Europe subsided and the new strategy for justifying forces to the Congress was being orchestrated; Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Hussein provided the Army with an opportunity to test its Total Force Policy. Initially, the Senior Leadership of the Army had no desire whatsoever to mobilize the Reserve Component units for

service in DESERT SHIELD. The Army could not let the Total Force Policy work because, if it was successful, it would lead to an even smaller active force. But as the Army began to deploy its forces, it recognized early on that it could not do the mission without Reserve Component support and involvement, especially in the Combat Support and Combat Service Support areas. The Army Leadership set parameters early in the call-up. Though unannounced and unpublicized, their actions cannot be refuted. These parameters were:

1. There would be no senior reserve component units or reserve component senior leadership involved.

2. There would be no reserve component combat elements involved.

To justify these actions, the Army only needed to change the rules and pronounce these Reserve elements "not ready." However, in our view, there is absolutely no justifiable reason as to why Reserve Component senior units with senior leadership in such commands as the 377th TAACOM, New Orleans, Louisiana, the 143d Transportation Command, Orlando, Florida; the 335th Signal Command, Atlanta, Georgia; the 416th Engineer Command, Chicago, Illinois; were not called. All of these commands, CAPSTONE aligned to CENTCOM, have proven their worth and met every readiness standard set by the Army during BRIGHT STAR in Egypt on numerous occasions, GALLANT EAGLE and GALLANT KNIGHT, CENTCOM exercises conducted in California and Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

RC Combat elements were mobilized only after considerable political pressure exerted by the Reserve Component Leadership. The three (3) roundout brigades were finally activated but were pronounced "NOT COMBAT READY" even though they had met every readiness measure established by the Army. These brigades, under the roundout concept of the Total Force Policy, were integral parts of Active divisions.

During a recent briefing at the National Training Center on the training program for the 48th Brigade, Brigadier General Wesley K. Clark, the National Training Center (NTC) Commander, was asked to relate the NTC Training Program to readiness. He could make no correlation. He was then asked to define "just where was the goal line?" His response was that he did not know.

While the Commander of the 48th Brigade had some input at FORSCOM, the training programs for the 48th Brigade and the other Reserve Component Brigades were identical and were developed without the benefit of a proper assessment as outlined by Army training doctrine. (Lessons learned cover a broad range of problems and the National Guard is not without fault. This will be the subject of a future article.)

Clearly there is a significant gap between readiness reporting and a unit's ability to conduct combat operations as a part of a larger organization such as in DESERT STORM/SHIELD. This is not a problem unique to the Reserve Components. The Army took five (5) months to train up in the Saudi Desert before it was ready to conduct combat operations on the scale of DESERT STORM. In Mid-February, Major General Paul Funk, Commander 3d Armored Division, expressed concerns for his division's ability to conduct large scale operations. One of his battalion commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Pat Eagen stated "this is like the first day of spring practice." We firmly believe that had the Reserve Component Roundout Brigades been mobilized with their divisions and deployed to Southwest Asia within the first 30 to 45 days, these units would have been just as ready as any active component

unit. There is clear evidence to support this position. The 8th Tank Battalion, United States Marine Corp (Reserve), was mobilized, deployed and, in fact, successfully participated in the attack on Kuwait City.

There has been nothing but praise for the ability, professionalism and readiness of those RC units and personnel that were deployed to SWA in support of DESERT SHIELD/STORM. On a higher plane, and of much more importance, mobilization of the reserve component soldiers was vital in marshalling the support of the American people, a phenomenon not seen since World War II.

It is not our intent to downplay the need or the value of our Active forces. They are essential. However, we strongly believe the Total Force Policy currently in use is sound and should be continued. Further, we believe the need and justification for forces, all forces, should be balanced against the threat and the warning time to react to that threat, and not a strategy to mask an unjustified large-standing force. We know of no reserve component leadership that is not committed to a sound total force policy in which our defense capabilities are enhanced and the taxpayers burden is lessened.

There are many lessons learned resulting from the DESERT STORM mobilization. All the blame does not reside with the Active Component. These lessons will be the subject of a subsequent article. Briefly, they are:

- When a roundout division is deployed in a contingency operation, the appropriate level of mobilization must be used to ensure an adequate length of mobilization time or the law must exempt roundout units from the 180-day rule.

- We must fully integrate our systems. Currently, AC and RC personnel, pay, maintenance and supply systems are not fully compatible.

- We must revise the readiness reporting system so it accurately reflects unit status.

- Training focus must change. Prior to mobilization, the basics of gunnery, maintenance, squad and crew, platoon and company level maneuver must be mastered. Task Force and Brigade level maneuver should be trained primarily through STAFFEXs and battle simulation exercises. Upon mobilization, the integration of the combat systems and large unit maneuver will be much easier to master and will fit into current post-mobilization training time allocations.

NATIONAL GUARD

AMERICA
AT ITS BEST

CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES

- TOTAL FORCE POLICY
- FORCE STRUCTURE
- FULLTIME MANNING
- READINESS REPORTING

TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY REPORT

RECOMMENDATIONS:

* Congress undertake an unbiased Total Force Policy Study - because I. Lewis Libby directed rewrite.

* Congress ensure the study committee consists of representatives from DoD, the services and Reserve Components to include the National Guard.

* Congress make the study based on the threat and warning time as provided by DIA.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY
STUDY REPORT

FACTS:

- The active establishment is changing its strategy on forces structure justification.
- NEW STRATEGY: (1) Forward deployed-forward presence force; (2) Atlantic force; (3) Pacific force; (4) Contingency force; (5) Strategic force.
- OLD STRATEGY: Threat-Warning time-Acceptible risk = Force Requirements.

WE CHALLENGE:

- The new strategy is based on retention of AC spaces.
- Army's mission is changing from deterrence and warfighting to "projection of land combat power:" GEN JOHN W. FOSS, CDR, TRADOC

TOTAL FORCE POLICY
STUDY REPORT

WE CHALLENGE:(Cont)

* New strategy is identified as all AC. I. Lewis Libby, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 12 Sep 90.

* RC involvement for large operations lasting longer than 60 days.

OUR POSITION:

* This new strategy will return the US Military to status of being capable of prosecuting a war - as Vietnam - without Reserve Component involvement - an Executive War.

* Threat - Warning, acceptible risk time proven system for justification of force structure needs.

FORCE STRUCTURE

RECOMMENDATIONS:

* CONGRESS REQUIRE DoD TO PROVIDE FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS BASED ON THREAT AND WARNING TIME AND COMPARE THESE REQUIREMENTS WITH ANY NEW STRATEGY USED TO JUSTIFY FORCES.

* CONGRESS FREEZE DOWNSIZING AND DE-ACTIVATION OF ANY RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS UNTIL ABOVE IS ACCOMPLISHED.

FORCE STRUCTURE

FACTS:

- Army has plans based on the new strategy to downsize the National Guard to 321K from 457K▪30% reduction.
- RC can field three personnel (minimum) for each AC soldier: we can field 500K with same resources required for 166K AC soldiers.
- AC taking RC missions based on postulation that RC lacks readiness. Resources to be justified later.

WE CHALLENGE:

- RC combat units not called for DS/DS pronounced "NOT READY"
- Army forces trained in Saudi Arabia for over five months.

FORCE STRUCTURE

WE CHALLENGE:

* Army's mission remain deterrence not projection of land combat power.
* Ongoing force structure planning being based on the new strategy.

OUR POSITION:

* Sizing of the force AC/RC should be based on threat/warning strategy.
* RC can perform mobilization mission with combat units in the 30-45 days subsequent to mobilization.
* RC CS/CSS units can perform mobilization mission as a part of short notice mobilization two-three weeks.
* Why have all these forces on Active Duty, when we perform the mission at a much reduced cost?

FULL-TIME MANNING

Recommendations:

* Congress provide resourcing to fill RC units with 100% of authorized full-time manning.

* Oppose any AC manning of Reserve Component full-time. If required, then authorizations be done under USC 32.

FULL-TIME MANNING

FACTS:

* Level of full-time manning is the most critical issue for RC readiness.

* Manning currently based on Force Activity Designator (FAD):

  65% of authorized - FAD IV/V
  90% of authorized - FAD II

* We need 100% of authorized manning.

READINESS REPORTING

RECOMMENDATION:

Congress require DoD to report a true readiness picture based on current readiness reporting regulations without exceptions.

READINESS REPORTING

OUR POSITION:

* CURRENT SYSTEM IS BROKEN- REFLECTS A DISTORTED PICTURE TO CONGRESS

* NON-REPORTABLE LINES

* GAP BETWEEN READINESS REPORTING AND THE ABILITY FOR A UNIT TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS AS A PART OF LARGER OPERATIONS, I.E., CORPS/FIELD ARMY

DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310-2500

16 AUG

Office of Policy and Liaison

Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510-6050

Dear Senator McCain:

I have reviewed the article "The Changing Focus of the Active Military Establishment", as you requested at the April 24, 1991, Armed Services Committee Hearing. Your staff provided me with a copy of the document on July 19, 1991.

The document addresses itself to a number of issues -- The Total Force Study, Constitutional checks and balances, the changing threat and force mix. The following are my responses for the record on each of these areas.

The Congressionally directed Total Force Policy Study has been submitted by the Department of Defense (DoD) to the Congress. The National Guard Bureau was a member of the study group and was permitted to provide comments to the DoD on the study. The decisions contained in the study were made by the Defense Program Resource Board (DPRB). The National Guard Bureau is not a member of the DPRB and did not participate in the discussion process. Congressional committees have held hearings on the study and have raised a number of issues, concerns, and questions resulting from the study.

At the April 24th hearing, you invited my attention to the specific passage concerning an "all powerful political force". Upon review of the text, it appears that the essence of what the author said was the basis for the great militia debates among the framers at the state constitutional conventions and in the Congress. The Federalist reports this, and related issues provided the impetus for the system of checks and balances that exist today and the framers' conclusion, as articulated in the Militia Clauses and the 2nd Amendment to the Constitution.

The threat and the capabilities of potential aggressors continue to be debated in many quarters. The National Guard Bureau has neither the capability nor charter to adequately assess the threat.

Force mix is a function of the threat, requirements, and capabilities. Clearly, capability to meet a specific threat is the overarching concern when examining readiness. When cost is not an issue, the mission could be assigned to any component that demonstrates the capability. When cost is a factor, the decision to assign mission and force structure to a component is first dictated by a component's capability to perform the mission and then determined by cost. This approach was clearly demonstrated during DESERT STORM.

Approximately 75,000 Army and Air National Guard members were mobilized for Operation DESERT STORM. The first [illegible]

More than 97% (366 of 377) of the Army National Guard (ARNG) units called for DESERT STORM met deployability criteria on the first day of mobilization. Sixty-seven percent of the units deployed in less than 45 days, and 41% deployed in less than 30 days. More than 20,000 ARNG soldiers actually flowed with the two U. S. Corps during the actual conflict.

The efficacy of the decisions of the Congress, the DoD, and Administration made over the past 10 years concerning the Total Force Policy and national defense were affirmed. The National Guard is proud and privileged to have performed so well, to have exceeded expectations, and contributed to the victory.

I have provided the document to the Adjutants General as you requested and will provide their comments to you upon receipt. A copy of my letter to them is enclosed.

I appreciate the opportunity to review the document and trust my comments address the issues you raised.

Sincerely,

John B. Conaway

John B. Conaway
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Chief, National Guard Bureau

Enclosure

DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-2500

16 AUG 1991

NGB-PO

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANTS GENERAL OF ALL STATES, GUAM, PUERTO RICO, VIRGIN ISLANDS, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SUBJECT: (All States Log Number 191-0276) The National Guard and the Total Force Policy

1. The enclosed document is forwarded for your review and comment. I have been asked to provide the Senate Armed Services Committee with your views and will do so upon receipt.

2. Your response should be sent by FAX transmission to the Office of Policy and Liaison (NGB-PO), Attention: Mrs. Joyce Conlee, at FAX No. DSN: 223-5029, or commercial (703) 693-5029, NLT 28 August 1991.

JOHN B. CONAWAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Chief, National Guard Bureau

Enclosure

STATE OF MINNESOTA, DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS
MINNESOTA ARMY AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
Veterans Service Building
Saint Paul, Minnesota 55155-2098

August 28, 1991

Office of The Adjutant General

Lieutenant General John B. Conaway
Chief, National Guard Bureau
Washington, D. C. 20310-2500

Dear General Conaway:

Thank you for the opportunity to review the document titled "The Changing Focus of the Active Military Establishment." I endorse the article and trust you will find my additional comments helpful and constructive.

I share the concern of the author that an inordinate reliance on the Active Component for military power projection "...would create justifiable concern..." that the Army "...may evolve into an all powerful political force..." The Total Force Concept has been the cornernstone of our military planning and has served the nation well. As our recent experiences demonstrated, the Total Force Concept insured the early involvement of "Hometown America" in support of our nation's military operations. The resultant demonstration of "national will" was certainly instrumental in the success of "Operation Desert Storm."

The root of the problem lies in the Department of the Army's plan for force deployment as depicted in the enclosed Force Generation Model. This plan, coupled with the philosophy of "first to fight, first to be resourced," and the placement of Cadre Divisions in the Reserve Components, insures the Army National Guard will be inadequately resourced and will not contribute significantly to any contingency short of a major war.

I am enclosing an Alternative Force Generation Model that, when adopted, will make the Army National Guard an essential element of any significant military deployment. Deploying Army National Guard divisions as part of an early reinforcing package is consistent with the Total Force Policy and is cost effective. In addition, this alternative provides force expansion flexibility and is feasible within the constraints of our strategic lift capabilities. Most importantly, the early involvement of "Hometown America" insures future military actions reflect the will of the nation.

Thank you again for the opportunity to share my views.

Sincerely,

Eugene R. Andreotti
Major General, MN Air National Guard
The Adjutant General

Encls
as

GENERATING THE FORCE



National Guard Bureau Chart

ALTERNATIVE: FORCE GENERATION MODEL



ROUND OUT BRIGADES

Senator MCCAIN. General Burdick, how important to readiness are tank and Bradley gunnery proficiency?

General BURDICK. Both tank and Bradley gunnery are critical military occupational specialty (MOS) requirements for Armor and Mechanized Infantry units in accomplishment of mission. An example, to be assigned to an Armor unit as a tank or Bradley crewmember, the individual must have the Armor MOS, Career Management Field (CMF) 19 or Bradley MOS (11M). Gunnery proficiency is a product of crew skills training, preliminary gunnery exercises and firing tables, and ultimately qualification firing. "Crew qualification" is one of several factors a commander considers in determining training levels. These skills, however, are only a part of training level requirements. The standard to determine overall training status is a measurement of the units mission essential task list (METL). The METL is derived from assigned wartime mission determined by CAPSTONE (wartime) commander. A secondary purpose of unit training levels is to show resource shortfalls that prevent achievement of training objectives.

Senator MCCAIN. How long did it take the roundout brigades to qualify on Tank Table VIII?

General BURDICK. It varied with each brigade.

The 48th Brigade spent about 4 days in gunnery training at Fort Stewart, Georgia and about 7 additional gunnery days at Fort Irwin, CA, all culminating in Tank/Bradley Table VIII qualification. Although the crews that qualified at Fort Irwin were validated, they were not considered as trained to standard due to the lack of adequate Tank/Bradley Table VIII range facilities at Fort Irwin.

The 256th Brigade spent about 35 days in gunnery training at Fort Polk, LA and Fort Hood, TX, which culminated in Tank/Bradley Table VIII qualification at both installations. This included time for the two infantry battalions to transition to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (New Equipment Training).

The 155th Brigade spent about 32 days in gunnery training at Fort Hood, TX which culminated in Tank/Bradley Table VIII qualification.

Senator MCCAIN. In your opinion, how much longer would it have taken them to qualify on Tank Table XII?

General BURDICK. Both the 256th and 155th Brigades in fact went through Tank/Bradley Table XII during their active duty since it was part of their training plan and the range facilities at Fort Hood could accommodate them. It took approximately 3 weeks to put the brigades through Table XII on the extensive Fort Hood range facilities.

The 48th Brigade could not shoot Table XII at Fort Irwin as that post does not have a Table XII range. In order to conduct a Table XII firing, the 48th Brigade's equipment would have had to have been shipped from Fort Irwin, California to an installation that had range facilities to allow Tank/Bradley Table XII (Fort Carson, or Gowen Field, ID). After shipment time, it would take about 3 weeks to rotate the entire brigade through Bradley/Tank Table XII based on the other brigades' experience at Fort Hood and assuming that no other units were competing for range use.

Senator MCCAIN. General Burdick, another issue that surfaced with the roundout brigades was the lack of proficiency on the various combat systems. Should the training program for the Army National Guard ground combat units be reevaluated?

General BURDICK. The Army National Guard has developed an Integrated Training System that dove tails with the Army's Combined Training Strategy (CATS). The purpose of these strategies is to provide the training structure and support that will allow the units to train to the level organized. There are plans in place and others being finalized that will provide the roundout units (and the rest of the Army National Guard) with the needed training aids, training ranges, training land, training ammunition and operating resources. Reevaluation occurs constantly. Some of these plans will be implemented in the short term while others will not be fully implemented until the late 1990s. Some are fully resourced and some are not resourced very well at all. CATS is intended to help alleviate the funding problems. These plans are not new. They were envisioned long before Desert Shield/Storm. They are still viable and we plan to execute them as soon as resources are available.

Senator MCCAIN. Two of the roundout brigades required about 600 Reserve and Active component fillers in one case and more than 500 Reserve and Active component fillers in the other case because to fill in for shortages resulting from personnel being nondeployable for physical, medical or lack of MOS training. Do you consider this acceptable?

General BURDICK. All three brigades, the 40th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), the 155th Armor Brigade, and the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) were deployable assets as established by deployment criteria specified in Army Mobilization and Operations Planning Systems (AMOPS).

Shortages are not peculiar to the roundout brigades. The 197th Separate Infantry Brigade (AC), selected to roundout the 24th Infantry Division had military occupational specialty (MOS) shortages prior to crossleveling MOS qualified personnel into the division and before being deployed.

Senator MCCAIN. The Total Force Policy Report to the Congress is a much improved document over the interim report. The report, however, does not address the rather thorny issue of a complete appraisal of roles and missions. One of the criticisms of the report has come from the reserve community in that the reserve community claims that there was no reserve representation on the study.

I would like to hear from the rest of the witnesses whether or not they support the stated end-strength goal for their component.

Admiral FAIGLE. The fiscal year 1995 end-strength goal stated in the Total Policy Report for the Coast Guard Selected Reserve is 12,000. This represents no change from the current funded size of our component. The Coast Guard is in the process of applying new joint planning criteria reflecting the changing world environment and the lessons learned during the recent Persian Gulf conflict to determine our mobilization requirements. During this planning phase, we do not anticipate any changes to our end strength.

NOTE: The remainder of the witnesses responded to this question in their oral testimony.

[Additional prepared statement for the hearing record follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY REAR ADM. LESTER ROBERT SMITH, USNR (RET.), PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to have this opportunity to present the views of the Naval Reserve Association to the committee for your consideration.

The Naval Reserve Association's legislative program this year addresses a Defense Budget Submission for fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993 that was developed in response to a changing world of lessening superpower confrontations, a collapsing Warsaw Pact, a reunited Germany, glasnost, perestroika, and an anticipated "peace dividend."

At a recent unclassified Navy intelligence briefing, it was emphasized that the Soviet Navy shipbuilding and modernization program continues at a brisk rate substantially unabated by world events, fiscal restraints, and Soviet internal political turmoil. Soviet new ship starts and commissionings last year were greater than any year since 1982 and in almost every category, especially submarines, the new vessel's capability exceeds their predecessors by as much as a factor of *five*. The new submarines are quieter and have much more offensive and defensive capability. To substantially reduce our ASW forces, particularly the P-3 long range maritime patrol forces, in the face of the continued Soviet submarine threat of increasing capabilities, is a questionable strategy at best. Temporary changes in deployment patterns of Soviet submarines certainly don't lessen the threat. Soviet Naval Aviation is growing substantially with the transfer of first line fighter and attack aircraft to the Navy in large numbers, coupled with the introduction of two new aircraft carriers that can handle the Soviet high performance aircraft.

The U.S. Navy will reduce the number of battle force ships from 545 to 464 by fiscal year 1993 including a reduction of carrier battle groups and their carrier air wings from 13 to 11, and active personnel from 569,721 in fiscal year 1991 to 536,000 in fiscal year 1993. Nearly 50 Navy programs were terminated in fiscal years 1992-1993, the largest number of program cuts in recent years. Naval aviation has had almost all its new aircraft programs canceled.

Rather than compensating for decreased active forces by augmenting the Naval Reserve as Congress strongly recommended last year, the Naval Reserve in fiscal year 1992 is programmed for proportionately larger cuts than the active force. Hopefully, this policy will once again be changed or tempered by Congress, but this year with the Defense budget cap, the infighting over shares of greatly reduced resources is more intense than in past years.

Operation Desert Shield/Storm has certainly validated the readiness, capabilities and worth of the Naval Reserve. Stories of the outstanding accomplishments and

selfless sacrifices of our Naval Reservists continue to emanate from their gaining commands. The Naval Reserve Association believes a well equipped and combat ready Naval Reserve will be even more important in the turbulent years ahead.

Two recent quotes should be noted:

General Colin Powell, USA, Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, states: "The success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance, and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last 10 years to strengthen the total force concept."

Admiral Frank B. Kelso, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, states: "We appreciate the great contribution that our Naval Reserve has made in this conflict. Desert Storm was truly the proof of the total force concept."

The Naval Reserve Association will address the following key issues affecting the Naval Reserve Force combat readiness and capability:

- Force Structure
- Naval Reserve Manpower
- Military Construction/Base Closures
- Anti Submarine Warfare
  - — LAMPS MK-1 Helicopter Programs
  - — LAMPS MK-1 SH-2G Upgrade Program
  - — Frigate Upgrade Programs
  - — P-3 Maritime Patrol Squadrons
  - — AN/AQA-7B(V) 18/19 (IPADS) ASW Upgrade
- Airlift Support Aircraft
  - — C-130 Aircraft
  - — C-9 (MD87) Aircraft
  - — C-20 Aircraft
- Reserve Carrier Air Wings
  - — S-3B Aircraft
  - — F-14D Remanufactured Aircraft
- Mine Warfare
  - — Harbor Mine Hunters (HMH) and COOP
  - — HM Squadrons
  - — MIUW Equipment
- Additional Requested National Guard and Reserve Equipment Items

FORCE STRUCTURE

The fiscal year 1992 Defense budget request reflects the elimination of valuable Naval reserve programs such as:

2 Aerial Minesweeping Squadrons (HM-18, HM-19),
1 LAMPS MK-1 SH-2 ASW Helicopter Squadron (HSL-74),
Craft of Opportunity Program (COOP),
All Aviation Squadron Augmentation Units (except S-3 units),
Ship Augmentation Units (for USN Ships going out of service),
4 FF-1052 Frigates, and
1 Construction Battalion,

for a reduction of 18,800 SELRES personnel in fiscal year 1992. In fiscal year 1993 an additional cut of 7,000 SELRES personnel includes the deletion of 4 P-3 VP ASW maritime patrol squadrons. The major individual program cuts will be addressed in detail later in this testimony.

The squadron augmentation units were apparently deleted solely for fiscal savings. These units have proven to be valuable force extenders for their assigned active squadrons in the mutual support role, and provided a vital source of trained personnel for the fleet in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The squadron augmentation units are the type Naval Air Reserve assets most likely to be needed and utilized in Third World contingencies.

Recommendation: It is strongly recommended that the squadron augmentation units be retained in fiscal year 1992 and beyond. It is further recommended that the present Naval Reserve force structure (except ship reinforcing units for USN ships leaving the fleet) be retained in fiscal year 1992 and until the post Desert Shield/Storm Total Force structure is reexamined.

NAVAL RESERVE MANPOWER

The 18,800 personnel reduction planned in fiscal year 1992 is broken down as follows:

Reduction in Squadron augmentation units, and ship reinforcing units, 12,819.
Construction Battalion personnel (1 Battalion), 703.
Ship changes (SELRES Crews and Augment units), 1,148.
HM and HSL helicopter squadron deletions, 572.
Sea Aid Mariner (SAM) decrease in direct accessions, 1,902.
TAR, direct support personnel, 952.
COOP program termination, and misc., 677.

Those trained and ready personnel of the ship augmentation units for the deleted active Navy ships should be retained to man the 32 class III FF-1052 frigate nucleus crews and other vacancies in the Naval Reserve Surface force. The Desert Shield/Storm recalled Construction Battalions (CBs) certainly proved their readiness and worth by a distinguished record of essential construction projects both in the Persian Gulf and as replacements for active CBs throughout the Pacific. It seems that the CBs are always on the leading edge of periodic budget driven force cuts, and as in the Korean conflict, Vietnam, and now in Desert Shield/Storm they are the first forces to be activated to perform essential projects in a contingency. A variation of the Sea Air Mariner (SAM) program will be required to complete the manning of the FFT-1052 Innovative Naval Reserve Program. The Full Time Support (TAR) strength needs to be maintained to support a Naval Reserve Force of the present size. The HM, HSL, and COOP personnel reduction will be addressed individually.

Recommendation: It is strongly recommended that Naval Selected Reserve personnel strength be maintained at the fiscal year 1991 level of 153,400 for fiscal year 1992 pending the examination of total force requirements after Desert Storm.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

The fiscal year 1992 Military Construction Naval Reserve (MCNR) DOD budget request of $20.9 million and the fiscal year 1993 budget request of $26.4 million are allocated to high priority construction projects that are essential to the continued modernization and viability of the Naval Reserve. These requests are extremely modest indeed, particularly in view of the over $1 billion back-log of essential Naval Reserve construction and rehabilitation projects that continues to grow as the bow-wave of deficiencies extends for year to year. The requested amount for fiscal year 1992 is only one fourth that of a year ago, and fiscal year 1991 certainly did not see a construction boom of Naval Reserve Projects. These small budget requests were almost certainly driven solely by fiscal considerations rather than requirements. With fixed assets valued in excess of $2.5 billion and a 50 year service life assumption, a minimum of $50 million should be allocated in MILCON each year. The average age of Naval Reserve installations is over 40 years, so the $50 million figure is conservative without factoring in the recent DOD construction moratorium.

Recommendation: The addition in fiscal year 1992 of $25.3 million in MCNR funds for additional high priority construction/installation projects, and that the special sensitivity of Reserve component basing stability be considered in based closure decisions.

BASE CLOSURES

Base closures are of critical concern to the Naval Reserve, and all the Reserve components, because reservists are basically geographically anchored in a particular area and are not fungible as may be career military personnel who can transfer across country with the movement of their units. The Naval Reserve Association is most appreciative of the support given by Congress in preventing the premature closure in fiscal year 1991 of two critical Naval Reserve installations: Naval Air Station South Weymouth and Naval Air Facility Detroit.

Relocation of units from bases contiguous to large population centers to distant sites near smaller population areas has a very detrimental effect on the manning and readiness of those units and the Naval Reserve. Loss of such strategically located facilities greatly diminishes the ability of the Naval Reserve to attract and retain its most valuable assets, i.e. the drilling reservists. Historically, such losses have not been recouped at the new drill site for many years, if at all.

NRA accepts that with lessening superpower tensions and a burgeoning national deficit, there must and will be military base closings and consolidations. However, the special sensitivity of Reserve component basing stability cannot be overemphasized.

The recently announced Department of Defense base closure recommendations include several Naval bases that host major Naval Reserve units. While all these proposed closures such as: Naval Stations Long Beach, CA; Philadelphia, PA; Pudget Sound (Sand Point); and Naval Air Station Moffett Field will disrupt and degrade

Naval Reserve readiness and manning; the proposed closure of Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA will have calamitous consequences for the Naval Air Reserve. This closure will essentially deprive our Nation of accessibility to the substantial number of veteran trained and skilled Naval Air Reservists who live in the Pacific Northwest. The closest remaining Naval Air base, NAS Alameda, CA, will be almost 1,000 miles from the Seattle area. While the active Navy squadrons can be moved to Naval Air Station Lemore, CA or elsewhere, the Naval Reserve squadrons do not enjoy such mobility.

The Navy/Marine Corps Air Reserve Programs have been a part of the Northwest since World War II. All Navy/Marine Corps Air Reserve Squadron and Sustaining Units were moved form NAS Seattle to NAS Whidbey Island in 1970.

There are presently over 2,300 personnel involved in 4 Reserve Force Squadrons, 2 Squadron Augment Units and more than 18 Sustaining Units. More than 300 of these dedicated Navy and Marine Corps men and women were recalled for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Over half are still on active duty. The demographics of Seattle have been very favorable to recruiting qualified Air Reservists in the past few years. NAVAIRES Whidbey is no longer considered a remote training site due to the high percentage of new affiliates recently released from active duty at NAS Whidbey Island. Current manning level indicates Naval Air Reserve Whidbey (NAR) could support additional Reserve units as well as another Reserve Force Squadron. The aerospace industry's growth in this area has brought new talents to many of the Air Reserve Programs. The majority of these Navy and Marine Corps Reservists commute from the greater Seattle area. Additionally, there are monthly airlifts from Spokane, WA, and from Portland and Eugene, Oregon. Naval Air Reserve Whidbey Island Marine Air Group 42, Detachment C is the only Navy and Marine Air Reserve site north of Alameda, CA, and west of Denver, CO.

The Navy/Marine Corps Air Reserve as NAS Whidbey Island operate the newest and most modern Naval Air Reserve facilities in the Nation with an average age of 6 to 7 years and a plant value of $36 million ($29 million in Reserve dollars). Most recently constructed is a 40,000 plus square foot Naval Reserve training/administration building which includes the only highly Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facility (SCIF) available in the Northwest to support the current Reserve Intelligence Units. Due to state-of-the-art design features, this SCIF is considered the best in the Nation.

The Reserve Squadrons (VP-69, VR-61, VAQ-309 and VMAQ-4) on board NAS Whidbey are currently well manned and high in their readiness levels. If moved, many, if not most, of these talented Selected Reservists would be lost from these Reserve Squadrons if NAS Whidbey Island is closed.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the Navy/Marine Corps Air Reserve units remain at their present site on Whidbey Island, WA irrespective of the disposition of the active forces at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island.

ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE

While antisubmarine warfare may have slipped slightly from the number one priority of the U.S. Navy that it has held for several years, recent evaluations of the growing Soviet submarine threat brought about by a continuing aggressive modernization program, confirm that ASW remains a necessary high priority mission. ASW is a mission for which the Naval Reserve forces has a proven track record of excellence, and their long term crew integrity provides a uniquely competent cost effective force for this mission.

Lamps Mark I Helicopter Programs

The fiscal year 1992 budget implements the previously planned deletion of one Naval Reserve LAMPS MK-1 ASW helicopter squadron, HSL-74 based at NAS South Weymouth, MA. This unit cut originated when NAS South Weymouth was on the base closure list, and all the Naval Reserve FF-1052 frigates were going away. Both of these actions have been reversed, i.e. NAS South Weymouth remains and 8 FFT-1052s needing LAMPS MK-1 helicopters remain in the Naval Reserve force. The U.S. Navy and our Nation cannot afford the loss of this trained and ready ASW squadron that is an essential part with the frigates of the Sea-Air LAMPs MK-1 ASW team. Without HSL-74, the 8 FFT-1052 frigates will have no assigned LAMPS MK-1 helicopters, and the 16 Naval Reserve Force FFG-7 frigates now only have 1 of 2 required helicopters assigned per ship. HSL-74s proximity to the Naval Station Newport, RI based NRF frigates has greatly enhanced that force's training opportunities.

Recommendation: It is recommended that HSL-74 be funded in fiscal year 1992 and continued as an essential component of the Naval Reserve Force.

Lamps MK-1 SH-2G Upgrade Program

Since fiscal year 1987, Congress has annually authorized and appropriated funds to transform SH-2s from a "F" to "G" configuration. With the incorporation of T-700 engines, an on-board acoustic processor, a data link, and the 1553B data bus, the SH-2G met a congressionally mandated Navy study that sought the best ASW solution for the small deck helicopter-ship weapon system that would not accommodate LAMPS MK III SH-60B assets. Under last year's Navy plan, the Reserve's minimum requirement was 18 SH-2Gs if the Navy followed through and withdrew all 1052s from the fleet and removed 2 FFG-7s from the Reserve forces. The Reserve requirement has been increased over the Navy's 1991 guidance due to the addition of 8 FFT-1052s in the fiscal year 1992 budget request. Hence, 8 SH-2s would need to be added to the Reserve equipment package to cover this FFT-1052 requirement. SH-2s have not been addressed for the FFG-7s, either for the two ships mentioned above, or to meet the issue of 2 SH-2Gs per deck.

Recommendation: This fiscal year 1992 funding for the SH-2G program is altered by the inclusion of installation costs as a base for costing the program. Hence, the $45 million for 6 SH-2Gs for the Reserve is now $52.2 million. An incremental request for 6 SH-2G kits is submitted for fiscal year 1992 at a cost of $52.2 million plus $7.8 million for mission recorders for a total of $60 million.

Frigate ASW Combat Systems Upgrade (FFT-1052, FFG-7)

The subject program has been developed by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to provide a low-cost, effective ASW upgrade for Naval Reserve and active frigates not receiving the AN/SQQ-89 system. The 8 FFT-1052 class frigates are not scheduled to receive the AN/SQQ-89, and of the 14 FFG-7s, 4 are not scheduled for the AN/SQQ-89 and the remainder are at the end of the delivering schedule with installation late this decade, if at all. The upgrade will provide a major improvement in SW capability by providing two key ASW elements; a towed array and ASW combat system integration.

The key features of the program are:

The AN/SQR-18A(V)3 Towed Array;

An integrated Tactical System (FFIST); and

(ASW On Board Trainer (separate Budget Item)).

These equipments provide the integrated ASW capability needed by Reserve frigates. This upgrade will make Naval Reserve frigates effective training platforms for ASW, and make the ships front line ASW assets in time of need.

The program builds logically on these ships' existing equipment and improvement programs currently under way or already developed.

Needed in fiscal year 1992 is $68 million. This will provide $20 million to complete development and/or productionize the elements currently funded for development. With these funds, initial production can also begin in fiscal year 1992, with four units. With a reasonable production rate of 3-10 systems per year, total production, installation, and support costs, per system, will be $11.8 million.

Recommendation: In order to provide the Reserve frigates with a very capable ASW training and combat system, it is recommended that the following funds be provided:

Fiscal year 1992—$68 million for completion of development and four production systems.

AN/SQQ-T1 ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) TRAINERS FOR THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE

In fiscal year 1990, the Navy evaluated the performance of the AN/SQQ-T1 Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) trainer and reported that it is an "excellent trainer to fill the training void." Further, when installed on a Naval Reserve Force ship, the SQQ-T1 ASW trainer is integral to the onboard ASW system, thus allowing the technical ratings to enhance their operational skills and gain hands-on systems proficiency while their ships are at pierside, in transit or on patrol. Accordingly, this training device should be acquired to enhance the ASW mission proficiency skills of Naval Reservists assigned to Naval Reserve Force frigates and land based ASW sensors stations.

Recommendation: That $10 million be provided in the NG&RE account to acquire 12 additional SQQ-T1 ASW trainers to enhance the operational skills of ASW system operators. This system has been fully developed and favorably evaluated and is now ready to be installed in all Naval Reserve Force ships and land based centers that support the Navy's ASW mission.

P-3 Maritime Patrol Squadrons

While the Soviet and Third World submarine capability continues to improve and remains a major threat, the Navy plans to reduce the active Navy land based maritime patrol force (P-3s) from 24 to 18 squadrons and to reduce the Naval Reserve P-3 squadrons from 13 to 9 squadrons in fiscal year 1993. This drastic cut is apparently fiscally driven in spite of the threat.

In consonance with congressional direction in the fiscal year 1991 Defense bill, the Navy plans to transfer 28 P-3Cs (non Update III aircraft) to the Naval Reserve which will eventually result in a reduced Naval Reserve all P-3C force of only 9 squadrons. The P-3Bs would be retired by fiscal year 1996.

In the view of the Naval Reserve Association, a total P-3 force of 18 active squadrons and 9 reserve squadrons is inadequate to meet the threat, and well short of the force structure that recent studies have validated.

To maintain an adequate force structure, at least 50 of the P-3Bs need to be retained well past 1996. A substantial number of the P-3Bs are relatively low time/low cycle aircraft that are in better condition than many of the high-time P-3Cs and have years of useful airframe life remaining.

The congressional mandated fiscal year 1996 limitation on P-3B operations was based on the planned introduction of the P-7 into the active force, and as an inducement for the Navy to transfer modern P-3Cs, to the Naval Reserve. With the P-7 canceled and no P-3C replacement aircraft program probable in the near term, extension of the P-3Bs becomes an imperative if an adequate MPA force structure is to be maintained.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the Naval Reserve Force be maintained at 13 squadrons, and that the P-3B fiscal year 1996 operational limit be deleted.

AN/AQA-7B(V) 18/19 (IPADS) P-3 ASW Processor and Display Upgrade

The Improved Processing and Display AN/AQA-7B(V) 18/19 Upgrade System (IPADS) has been under development for the Navy for several years to give P-3Bs the equivalent acoustic processing capabilities of the P-3C Update III aircraft. Operational testing is almost complete and the performance of the AQA-7B(V) 18/19 (IPADS) equipment during the final NTE flights demonstrated the capability to effectively augment the P-3C Update III fleet and meet the future submarine threats. This system is applicable to the 92 P-3B, and 109 P-3Cs (non-Update IIIs) now in the inventory.

Recommendation: It is recommended that $59.7 million in fiscal year 1992 NG&RE funds be provided to complete development, and supply 16 aircraft units.

AIRLIFT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT

C-130T Aircraft and Support Equipment

The Naval Air Reserve has a shortfall of 22 medium heavy lift aircraft to adequately meet the Navy's CONUS airlift requirements. The Navy currently has 7 old C-130s that are operated outside of CONUS. Two C-130T aircraft for the Naval Reserve were funded in the fiscal year 1990 DOD Appropriations bill and six were appropriated in the fiscal year 1991 DOD bill. The aircraft will be delivered to NAS New Orleans and Martinsburg, WV respectively.

Based on CINC's requirements and a 1986 Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Organic Airlift Study, the Navy has a wartime requirement for a total of 29 C-130 type aircraft for medium heavy lift capability of pallets and oversize items. Currently, the Navy Air Logistics Office (NALO) rejects approximately 20 percent of all requests due to lack of available assets. Since 1983, the transport of passengers and cargo has increased 320 percent and 445 percent respectively. The C-130 is uniquely suited to handle the increase in cargo. Wartime logistic requirements greatly exceed peacetime requirements, as evident in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The Naval Reserve has had to activate 4 C-9 squadrons in support of logistics requirements for Desert Shield/Storm.

Recommendation: For fiscal year 1992, it is requested that 2 C-130T aircraft and support equipment be authorized and funded at a total cost of $68.0 million.

C-9 (MD-ST) Aircraft and Support Equipment

The Naval Reserve operates 27 C-9 (DC-9-32) transport aircraft supporting the Navy world-wide. These aircraft provide logistic support between the west coast and Hawaii and other foreign locations when required as well as active Navy and Naval Reserve support in CONUS. The Center for Naval Analysis airlift study validated wartime dedicated intra-theatre medium lift requirements for approximately 50 C-9 type aircraft. Four Naval Reserve C-9 Squadrons have been activated and are supporting Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean.

Many of the current aircraft were purchased new from Douglas Aircraft in 1973, and additional (used) aircraft were purchased as recently as 1990. The oldest aircraft in the fleet has flown over 48,200 hours while the next 7 oldest aircraft average in excess of 40,000 hours. Recently a number of these aircraft reached their 300 month service life and were subsequently extended for an additional 150 months or 12 years.

It is clear that utilization and demand, together with material condition and cost of operation, points to new, additional, and replacement aircraft.

SUMMARY

The MD–87 represents the latest off-the-shelf mid-range transport that incorporates the latest technology, provides greater payload range capability at a lower cost, while permitting the U.S. Navy to take advantage of the commonality between the C–9B and the MD–87. This commonality will reduce the need for peculiar spares, allow for common support equipment, negate the need for new capital investment, keep training and maintenance training costs at/near present levels while substantially reducing life cycle costs.

Recommendation: That NG&RE funding be provided to purchase 2 MD–87 versions of the C–9 at a cost of $66.0 million.

C–20F Aircraft and Support Equipment

The U.S. Naval Reserve formerly operated C–131H aircraft at Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 48 (VR–48) at Naval Air Facility, Andrews Air Force Base, MD. The last remaining aircraft was retired in August 1990. VR–48 currently has no aircraft assigned to it. In fiscal year 1991 Congress provided appropriations through the NG&RE account for the purchase of the first of three cargo door-equipped C–20F Gulfstreams as replacement aircraft for the three obsolete C–131s originally assigned to VR–48. In addition, the Center for Naval Analyses study of Navy wartime organic airlift requirements identified a shortfall of 31 medium-lift aircraft needed to support the high-priority logistics demands of a fleet deployed world-wide. The recent experience of Desert Storm, and its intense airlift demand, has further validated the findings of that study, and high-lighted the urgent need in the medium-lift category.

The replacement C–20s will be based with Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 28 (VR–48) at the Naval Air Facility, Andrews AFB and will be co-located with existing U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Army C–20 aircraft for economies of operation and use of an existing support structure. The one-for-one replacement of the three Naval Reserve C–131H aircraft with the cargo door-equipped Gulfstream C–20F aircraft in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment account is consistent with congressional guidance, would address a pressing requirement, and will initiate the program to fill the 31 medium-lift aircraft shortfall.

Recommendation: Recommended $65.8 million be provided in the fiscal year 1992 budget for the acquisition of the two remaining C–20F aircraft for VR–48.

RESERVE CARRIER AIRWINGS

S–3B ASW Upgrades

The two Naval Air Reserve carrier air wings, CVWR–20 and CVWR–30 lack S–3 ASW squadrons to complete their wing complement and mirror their active Navy counterpart wings. The fleet S–3 aircraft are being upgraded from the S–3A to the S–3B configuration providing much improved capability and performance.

With the planned reduction in active Navy airwings from 13 to 11 and the planned reduction of one S–3 training squadron, there should be excess S–3A aircraft available to be converted to S–3Bs and assignment to the Naval Reserve Force.

Fiscal year 1992 estimated unit costs for the S–3B modification kits is $5 million each unit for the 18 aircraft needed for both carrier wings.

Recommendation: It is requested that $30 million be provided for the initial increment of 6 S–3B Upgrade kits.

F–14D Remanufactured Aircraft

The Naval Air Reserve is an integral part of overall Naval Aviation organization. As such, the Naval Air Reserve Airwings must be capable of deploying weapon systems of similar capabilities and configuration as those being currently utilized by the active airwings. The viability of rapid reserve mobilization requires the continuous modernization of the F–14 Fighter Squadrons in the Selected Reserve apace with the modernization of the active Naval fighter squadrons. This is being done through the concept of horizontal integration into the total force. Modernized fleet-compatible F–14 aircraft flown and maintained by Selected Reserve crews, qualified

according to fleet standards, ensure the mobilization readiness and deployability of the Naval Air Reserve F-14 squadrons. The focus of Naval Air Reserve planning is the upgrade and maintenance of these vital assets of the total force in a coordinated/concurrent manner.

Currently, and for the foreseeable future there are four reserve F-14 squadrons. As the active Navy F-14 squadrons are being upgraded to the F-14D from the F-14A it is necessary to accomplish parallel and coordinated modernization of the Reserves. This will ensure that the Reserves are capable of accomplishing the multimission tasking assigned to the F-14D to meet the threats envisioned for the next decade and beyond. The F-14D provides this capability through its enhanced avionics, sensors, data links, digital computers, and engines.

Recommendation: That $234 million in NG&RE funds be provided in the fiscal year 1992 Defense budget to purchase 6 remanufactured F-14DS to initiate the modernization of the 4 Naval Air Reserve F-14A squadrons.

MINE WARFARE

Harbor Mine Hunter (HMH)/COOP—Harbor Mine Hunter

The U.S. Navy has an urgent need for mine countermeasures vessels that can perform the mine detection, classification, and neutralization mission in the shallow waters of harbors and adjacent coastal waterways. The existing MCM Avenger class and the MHC Osprey class ships are deep water platforms. Although the MHC is classified as a coastal minehunter, it is not suitable for shallow waters because of its draft, its combat suite, and the fact it has no inherent minesweeping capability. Furthermore, neither the MCM nor the MHC can effectively support a Marine amphibious landing where shallow water mines could present significant hazards to a successful landing.

Rather than the deep water scenarios of the Cold War years, the more likely mining threats in the future will be those generated by terrorist activities and regional conflicts, such as Desert Storm. These operations will take place in the shallow waters of vitally needed and other restricted coastal waterways where mines are most effective. The small, but effective, HMH craft could be quickly transported as deck cargo to anywhere in the world to prevent such costly incidents as recently occurred with *Princeton* and *Tripoli* in the Persian Gulf.

To meet this threat the Navy needs to acquire a small, low cost, shallow draft vessel, complete with off-the-shelf, state-of-the-art mine countermeasures equipment. This would include a forward-looking, hull-mounted sonar capable of bottom surveying and mine detection to perform the coastal and harbor mine countermeasures mission. These vessels would be crewed with Selected Reservists whose accumulated knowledge of the harbor complex and expertise on the local waters would provide a stable, high level of mission readiness. The present Naval Reserve COOP program, highlighted below, should be retained with its present assets for transition to the proposed Harbor Mine Hunter (HMH) when it becomes available.

Recommendation: It is recommended that a $50 million program be initiated for the fiscal year 1992 National Guard and Reserve account to acquire the first three ships in the Harbor Mine Hunter (HMH) class.

COOP

The missions of the Naval Reserve COOP program are:

• *In Peacetime:* Gather and maintain Q-Route data for designated ports and sea lines of communication and to attain and maintain the capability to carry out its mission in wartime.

• *In Wartime:* To provide port reconnaissance and breakout capability from U.S. ports against enemy mine threats and to locate, classify and neutralize enemy mines.

The Navy is planning to disestablish the COOP units by the end of fiscal year 1991. If this is permitted to happen, the trained cadre of 425 professionals in 22 U.S. port detachments, not otherwise assigned MCM assets, will be lost to the Navy and the country.

The mission to protect our ports from the mine threat and our marines from that same threat during an amphibious assault has not diminished. However, this vitally necessary and largely ignored requirement can be fully satisfied for comparatively few dollars by retaining the COOP cadre and providing its units with Harbor Mine Hunters (HMH).

Recommendation: To retain the COOP program in fiscal year 1992 it is recommended that $6.02 million in Reserve Personnel Navy (RPN) and $2.05 million in Operations and Maintenance, Naval Reserve (O&MNR) be provided in the fiscal year 1992 budget.

Reserve Helicopter Minesweeping Squadrons

Proposed Elimination in Fiscal Year 1992 of the Reserve Minesweeping Squadrons

Two squadrons are involved: HM-18, NAS Norfolk, VA and HM-19, NAS Alameda, CA with 349 personnel each. They represent 40 percent of total U.S. Navy airborne mine countermeasures (AMCM) capability (2 of 5 AMCM squadrons). Total personnel involved is 230 (full time) TARs and 470 Selected Reservists in two squadrons. Each squadron has 5 RH-53D Sikorsky Sea Stallions in its inventory plus 2 pipeline aircraft. HN-18 (estimated October 1986) is presently mission capable to carry out all assigned minesweeping missions (except AQS-14 or AQS-141 [no equipment]) and has *never* missed an annual flight hour target; HM-19 (estimated June 1989) is on schedule to achieve full mission capability.

Active squadrons (HM-12 [FRS], HM-14 and HM-15) have 12 MH-53E aircraft each with a minimum of 650 full-time personnel each. HM-14 deployed a detachment of six aircraft to Operation Desert Storm aboard U.S.S. *Tripoli* to clear mines in Persian Gulf shipping channels. Just before the initiation of the ground phase, both the amphibious ship *Tripoli* and the U.S.S. *Princeton* (a Ticonderoga class *Aegis* AAW cruiser [cost over $500 million]) were damaged by sea mines so severely that they had to be pulled off the line just prior to an anticipated major amphibious landing. This damage to two key vessels, and the perceived lack of Coalition mine countermeasures capabilities, may have, in fact, led to the cancellation of the touted amphibious landing on Kuwaiti shores in conjunction with CINCCENT's western pincer movement to the Euphrates River. Oil tankers, merchantmen, and U.S. naval vessels, i.e., U.S.S. *Roberts*, sustained major damage from mines during the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf escort operations.

Although it is not a new state-of-the-art helicopter, the venerable RH-53D remains capable of performing the AMCM mission but the new MH-53E is a much more effective and reliable aircraft.

Congress authorized $336.0 million and appropriated $281.9 million in NG&RE for 12 MH-53E Sikorsky Super Stallions in fiscal year 1991 to replace the 12 Reserve RH-53D Sikorsky Sea Stallions previously transferred to the Reserves when the Regular forces procured new MH-53Es in the mid-1980s. DOD has now requested to rescind or reprogram these funds and deny the Naval Reserve these aircraft. The more powerful MH-53E helicopter was developed to tow the much heavier proposed LN-166 (ALQ-166) magnetic influence sled. The LN-166 was to have replaced the current inventory MK-105 magnetic influence sled and would have given airborne (helicopter) minesweeping a capability comparable to the surface minesweepers (MSOs) to neutralize magnetic influence mines (but at a much safer distance from any potential explosions than what would have been experienced by the MSOs). LN-166 encountered development problems and has not been procured. Acquisition of the MH-53E airframe for the Reserve Helicopter Minesweeping Squadrons will make the Reserve squadrons fleet compatible, logistically sustainable and operationally integrated for the purpose of worldwide AMCM operations and maintenance.

Recommendation: Retain both HM squadrons in the Naval Reserve and, disapprove DOD rescission request and direct procurement of 12 MH-53E helicopters in NG&RE for the Navy Reserve helicopter minesweeping squadrons.

Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Equipment

The requirement for this item was initiated during Operation Desert Storm. A request for initial funding to provide thermal imaging sensors and visual imaging sensors (TIS/VIS) for the Naval Reserve Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units currently deployed to Operation Desert Storm, was included in the Desert Shield supplemental. The Desert Storm deployed Naval Reserve MIUW units and those MIUW units remaining in the United States provide shallow water ASW, swimmer and swimmer delivery vehicle detection and command, control and communication to protect coastal, port and ship channel operational areas.

The requested funds will provide thermal imaging sensors and visual imaging sensors (TIS/VIS) to the Naval Reserve MIUW units not currently deployed to Operation Desert Storm. The TIS/VIS sensors will provide enhanced detection capabilities to the MIUW units for protection of the United States and forward deployed coastal and harbor areas. The Naval Reserve has the sole MIUW capability in the Navy.

Recommendation: To ensure that the Navy's Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare (MIUW) units are capable of performing their small surface target detection/surveillance mission, it is recommended that $10.2 million be provided in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment account for the acquisition of thermal imaging and visual sensors.

ADDITIONAL NG&RE EQUIPMENT

In addition to the above programs, the Naval Reserve Association recommends to the Congress the addition of the following items to the fiscal year 1992 National Guard and Reserve Equipment appropriations:

	Millions
HH-60H Self Defense Helicopter Upgrades (12)	$45.0
SH-2G Self Defense Upgrades (12)	35.7
P-3B DATA LINK, SATCOM, DIGITAL MAD, & GPS Upgrades	30.2
A-6 Flight Simulator (1)	20.0
F/A-18 Simulator/Trainers (2)	20.0

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1992 AND 1993

WEDNESDAY, MAY 15, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

MEDICAL PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., Senator John Glenn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Glenn and McCain.

Professional staff member present: Frederick F.Y. Pang.

Minority staff members present: George K. Johnson, Jr., professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Julie W. Kemp and Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Phillip P. Upschulte, assistant to Senator Glenn; and Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN GLENN, CHAIRMAN

Senator GLENN. The committee will be in order.

The Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel meets this morning to review the medical programs in the fiscal 1992/1993 defense authorization request and to follow up on certain issues that the committee raised last year.

One of the things I would like to get into, and I bring up at almost every hearing that we have—and that is, that my main concern on every vote in the Armed Services Committee and every meeting of this subcommittee is, what impact are we having on two words: combat readiness.

We too often get bogged down to some extent, good as they may be, in things like Goldwater-Nichols and all the big theories of how we do things. But my bottom line is, does what we are doing here contribute to combat readiness, or does it not? And that is a pretty firm bottom line, and we bring it up almost every hearing. And you gentlemen—some of you are smiling here—you have heard that so many times before that it is getting almost humorous. But to me, that is the bottom line.

Now, we have something to base some of these judgments on this year. It has turned into a giant maneuver in the desert. It was war, although not as lethal as some wars in the past, but it could have

been. And in your area, that would have been a major change in how this whole thing came out. Reports came out of the Pentagon that they expected deaths on the order—the highest I heard was 40,000; the lowest I heard was 5,000. Now, if you figure—basically, combat normally results in about 3 wounded for every person that is killed, that would have meant somewhere between 15,000 and 120,000 wounded if some of those other ratios were correct.

One report in the news that I did not see any denial of was the fact that we shipped 16,092 body bags to the Gulf. You do not use body bags for the wounded. You use them for the dead. Now, even if we were shipping some extras over there—let us say 2 to 1 on what we thought we might need—that still is 8,000 or 9,000 people killed.

Now, it did not work out that that many were killed, but I would like your comments about what the estimates were with each year's services, now that this operation is over; how well you feel you would have been able to cope with this if it had gone a worse route than it did. In other words, what I would like to pose to you is the question I posed about 7 weeks ago to General Schwarzkopf over in Saudi Arabia when a few of us met with him for a couple of hours one morning.

And my question to him was: General, we have seen all the things that work good. We have seen all the pictures. I want to know what went wrong. What can we do to improve on this operation if we ever have to do it again?

And he laughed, and he said no one had asked him that before. And then he talked for about 20 minutes and gave me quite a list of things that did not go well and things where we need improvement. And we are circulating some ideas to the committee at the present time, as a matter of fact, to try and remedy some of the things that General Schwarzkopf brought up.

Now, I would like for you to address what you expected in each of your services. Were we prepared? What do we need to do to be better prepared next time if, God forbid, we get into a next time, as well as the more detailed things of CHAMPUS that we will also get into with this hearing. So I just want to tell you that in advance so you can be thinking about it.

Now, back to some of the specific details. The medical benefits program that we have talked about for a long time is an important part of the overall compensation and benefits package that we provide for our men and women in uniform and their families. At the same time, military medical support is vital to the combat readiness—I keep repeating that—to the combat readiness of our forces; 80 percent of that is assigned to the reserves, I might add. I should have added that a moment ago. Combat medical is 80 percent in the Reserves. And I will address that a little bit later, also.

In peacetime, the wartime mission of the military medical system tends to take a back seat in the services when it comes to competition for scarce resources. As our witnesses know, I have pressed this issue at every hearing since I became chairman of this subcommittee over 4 years ago. In this regard, I think our focus in this area helped to break the log jam and the funding of much-needed DEPMEDS, deployable medical systems, the units that used to always be deferred for funding, somehow, into out-year programs

of the services because we did not think that they were needed immediately, so we put them off.

As our witnesses know, these DEPMED units were crucial to the medical support of the Operation Desert Storm. And I will be interested to hear from our witnesses on the current inventory of DEPMEDS against wartime requirements.

I want to note the crucial role that our reserve medical personnel played in supporting the Persian Gulf conflict. Many of these personnel had to make substantial financial sacrifices when they were activated, and many communities had to contend with the loss of their services.

Many had the unglamorous task—comparatively so, anyway—of backfilling active component personnel who were deployed to the Gulf. And these personnel not only kept our hospitals and clinics back home up and running, but brought with them some new ideas and procedures from the private sector that perhaps can be applied in the military, and aid in the efficiency of health care delivery in the long run. I know the call-up was inconvenient on some of them, but they answered the call, and I want to say that we appreciate their important contribution.

For our part, I believe that we have been sensitive to the equitable treatment of our activated medical personnel by passing a number of provisions in the Persian Gulf Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act that ensure their compensation and benefits equal those received by active component personnel. We also passed legislation to ensure certain medical liability insurance protections, and I will be interested to hear from our witnesses if there are further legislative actions that we need to take.

Now, with regard to medical programs delineated in the 1992/1993 DOD authorization request, I want to note that although the number of personnel eligible for care under the military medical system is projected to decline by 150,000 in fiscal 1992 and by another 167,000 in fiscal 1993, the cost to DOD associated with the delivery of medical care increases by $413 million in 1992 and another $384 million in 1993.

I also note that only two hospitals fall out of the inventory in 1992, and another three in 1993, and that no clinics fall out over the same period. Now, this seems to be at odds with base closure and realignments that DOD has proposed. So I will be asking about that and other matters when we turn to our witnesses.

I know that our military structure will be undergoing substantial change over the next few years. And as these changes take place, I believe that we need to be very sensitive to the effect of these changes on our men and women in uniform and their families. Specifically, we need to ensure that the quality and access to medical care is not eroded in the process. At the same time, we need to ensure that medical combat readiness is sustained, and that is a daunting challenge that we all share, and we need to obviously work together on it.

As our witnesses know, we have worked very hard on this subcommittee to bring about improvements in military medical care. For example, we authorized a number of retention and recruiting bonuses to improve medical manning in both the Active and Reserve components. We provided targeted education and education

loan repayment authorities to improve the recruitment of medical personnel in critical wartime specialties in both the Active and Reserve components.

We enhanced and restructured medical special pays to more equitably compensate medical personnel on the basis of specialty and career commitment. We provided greater flexibility in age limits for recruiting and retaining medical personnel. We moved to fully fund CHAMPUS funding shortfalls, and we moved to improve health management programs such as the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative, the CRI, in the composite health care system.

So I think the track record should give confidence to those who will be working on medical issues that they do have supportive friends in this subcommittee.

Senator McCain was not able to be here this early this morning—he had another commitment and will be along later, as I understand it. But I want to say at the outset that we have worked together on a bipartisan basis. Our efforts have not been Republican on one side, Democrat on the other. We have worked on a bipartisan basis, as well as the staffs working together on this, because our biggest concern is to ensure the welfare of our men and women in uniform and their families. And so I look forward to working with John in this same spirit, as we tackle these issues before us.

I want to welcome our witnesses today. They are: Dr. Enrique Mendez, Jr., assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; Lt. Gen. Frank F. Ledford, Surgeon General, U.S. Army; Vice Adm. James A. Zimble, Surgeon General, U.S. Navy; Lt. Gen. Monte Miller, Surgeon General, U.S. Air Force.

We also have additional witnesses who will be available to address any questions that the subcommittee may have on the CHAMPUS mental health benefit, in particular. They are: Dr. David Baine, Director of Federal Health Care Delivery Issues of GAO, General Accounting Office; Mr. Stephen Backus, assistant Director, Defense Health, General Accounting Office; Mr. Michael Zieman, chief executive officer and administrator, Charter Hospital of Savannah of the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals—a representative of that group; and Ms. Joy Midman, executive director, National Association of Psychiatric Treatment Centers for Children.

I also want to note that the Armed Services Committee has received the nominations of Admiral Zimble and General Miller for retirement in the 3-star grade. And gentlemen, I want to thank you for your cooperation with this subcommittee during the time you have served as Surgeons Generals of your respective services. You can be justly proud of your achievements over the course of your very outstanding careers, and on behalf of this subcommittee I want to wish you the very best of luck in all your future endeavors.

At this time, I also want to note that Rear Adm. Donald F. Hagen has been nominated for a promotion to succeed Admiral Zimble as Surgeon General of the Navy. And Maj. Gen. Alexander Sloan has been nominated for a promotion to succeed General Miller as surgeon general of the Air Force. I believe Admiral Hagen is in the audience. He was going to be here this morning.

Admiral, you want to stand up, sir, so we can see what you look like? You are going to be at the witness table in the future.

Each of our witnesses has submitted written statements that we will include in the record. And I will ask each witness to briefly summarize their statement.

Dr. Mendez, we will start with you. Welcome, again, to our hearing.

STATEMENT OF ENRIQUE MENDEZ, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, HEALTH AFFAIRS

Dr. MENDEZ. Thank you, sir. Good morning to you, Senator Glenn. I am delighted to be before you today.

It has been slightly over a year since I came to the Department of Defense, and in that year we have seen in action the full spectrum of activities in military medicine. I have learned much and I have tried to be responsive to those with a keen interest in military medicine. This committee, in particular, has provided me with tangible support and with careful guidance, particularly with compensation and retention issues. I appreciate the assistance of the committee and its staff over the past year.

More than that, I appreciate the concern and assistance that the committee has provided over the past decade to enhance the readiness posture of military medicine. There were significant strides in military medical preparedness, Senator, over the last 7 years particularly, and we witnessed the worth of those efforts during Operation Desert Storm.

Desert Storm showed us that many of the systems, programs, and projects to which we have dedicated our efforts over the past several years did, in fact, work, and worked very well. There are, however, two important points I would like to stress to you in terms of the questions that you have already included within your statement.

First, following Desert Storm the Department faces the reconstitution and modernization of our hospital assemblages and medical equipment. Rebuilding the medical capability expended to support combat deployment necessitates applications of resources to regain that readiness posture that we talked about.

Second, Operation Desert Storm highlighted again, and very strongly, our reliance on Reserve medical personnel. The presidential call-up activated thousands of Reserve medical personnel to participate in the desert and also to backfill stateside military hospitals, as well as to participate also in the communication zone. This operation demonstrates the importance of ensuring that Reserve units be staffed, equipped, and trained to carry out their medical missions. It reinforces, sir, the importance that you personally have always placed on our Reserve forces.

Today in the shadow of Operation Desert Storm there are concerns being voiced both in the Congress and in the Department about our ability to recruit and retain members of the Reserve components. Reserve health care personnel recruitment is something we will watch closely for the next several months. Retention of these personnel is another important thrust for us again over the next several months.

Another topic I believe of interest to the committee is the statement of medical requirements for our Armed Forces. You have heard from many departmental representatives that detailed defense strategy is being developed. Hopefully, there will be a period of fiscal policy stability in which this strategy can then fully emerge. As a support slice to the forces that will comprise that strategy, we of course will determine the requirements for us in terms of the medical forces.

Additionally, we have the responsibility to factor in the medical requirements deriving from our mission to provide care to family members and retirees. This is the so-called peacetime mission of military medicine, but our care for families and retirees does not exist solely in peacetime. And certainly, Desert Storm was an excellent example of that. Our plans and projected requirements must incorporate our ability to care for all of our beneficiaries, our fighting forces, their families, and retirees.

Let me, if I may, focus on the Department's plans for the future of military health care for a moment. We are continuing to measure efforts on the part of the service medical departments to improve the way that we provide peacetime medical care while preserving the proven gains that we have made in the wartime area.

Just as for Operation Desert Storm where the services have been involved in joint action to produce the necessary result, there has been extensive cooperative effort on the Coordinated Care Program between the services and my office. The Department's aim is to form a more comprehensive, accountable, high-quality and cost-effective health care delivery system, and we all want the same thing. Experiences gained through the Department's several managed care demonstrations are helping shape the Coordinated Care design.

I wish to make clear that Coordinated Care is not just another demonstration project. The Military Health Services System needs a fundamental change in business practices, and that is what we intend to achieve over a 3-year transition period for our worldwide system of over 9 million beneficiaries.

The centerpiece of Coordinated Care is the local health care delivery system based on arrangements between military and civilian health care organizations. These delivery systems will be locally managed with military commanders responsible for the delivery, cost, and quality of health services provided to enrolled beneficiaries in their area. It will involved local accountability with centralized monitoring at the senior service and OSD level.

Innovations will include reforms of CHAMPUS provider payment methodologies, the establishment of specialized treatment facilities to provide high-cost health care services in the most effective manner, and new approaches to contracting for health care services. The establishment of participation agreements with civilian providers to accept CHAMPUS assignments and improvements in the efficiency and accuracy of a centralized claims processing system will enhance services that are provided to our beneficiaries.

There are certain major principles, sir, that guide the design and the implementation of Coordinated Care. The program must assure that enrolled beneficiaries have easy access to care, that the program is understandable, and that it provides high-quality and cost-

effective services. The program must be based on the concept that health care is a personal service that is always delivered or referred locally. Consequently, local military commanders must have the flexibility to deal with the reality of that demand.

We must indeed have local accountability for the cost, quality, and access, with good centralized monitoring. We must achieve equity among beneficiaries by eliminating, to the degree possible, geographical differences in access, quality, cost, and benefits, and be flexible enough for local managers to have the latitude to make management decisions about the delivery of health care services in local Coordinated Care systems and be easy to administer.

Quality assurance will remain an essential element of the Military Health Services System under the Coordinated Care concept. Successful impact of programs for continuing quality improvement have recently received unprecedented validation, sir, from external sources. I am happy to report to you that the Joint Commission on accreditation of Health Care Organizations was one of those; 117 DOD hospitals were surveyed, with the mean score in their grid being 84.4. This is higher than the 77.2 mean score for non-DOD facilities, and serves as objective documentation to the success of efforts made to achieve a constantly high caliber of patient care.

I am sincerely committed to including goal-oriented health promotion and disease prevention as part of Coordinated Care. The goal of health promotion is the prevention of the avoidable occurrences of illnesses and injuries. This year the Department enters a new phase in its health promotion effort. We will implement a measurable, scientifically based program which views health promotion as the systematic diagnosis and treatment of the health status and health needs of specific populations within our overall community.

As part of this process we have reviewed and adopted a set of Healthy People 2000: National Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Objectives that were published by the Department of Health and Human Services. Our initiative, Defending Health 2000, is led by the DOD Health Promotion Coordinating Committee representing the four military services and the defense agencies.

We have also pursued a plan to slow the transmission of the Hepatitis B virus. Several of the members of your committee have particular interest in this area, sir. And currently, the Surgeons General and I are working together to continue with full screening of pregnant women and immunization of infants for HBV, individuals in areas of high endemnicity, and susceptible health care workers. We will also move forward to mirror the Centers of Disease Control national program of universal immunization of infants. This program further demonstrates the Defense Department's dedication to the matter of total quality health.

It is important now to look at the matter of enrollment. The initial information our beneficiaries receive about the Coordinated Care Program will inform them of their need to decide whether or not to enroll in the program. The beneficiary who enrolls will be ensured of access to high-quality medical care through the medical treatment facility and health care networks in the Military Health Care System. Their care will be under the direction of the commander of their local military treatment facilities. Enrollment will

be phased in as local health care networks are developed by the MTF commanders.

Like this committee, the Department is concerned with the growing cost in CHAMPUS, and in particular with those trends in the cost of mental health care. Regarding mental health, the Department has undertaken several initiatives, and these efforts include establishment of a national mental health utilization management program, the adoption of certain payment reforms, and a number of important demonstrations. Additional effort to ensure appropriate high-quality mental health care must be focused on the identification of areas and provider groups that demonstrate significantly different behavior in one area from another area.

Another equally important principle in developing and implementing the mental health cost containment program within the framework of Coordinated Care is the need to assure accessibility to appropriate high-quality services for our beneficiaries. Therefore, as directed, the Department has developed the CHAMPUS Mental Health Cost Action Plan. To be undertaken within the framework of our Coordinated Care Program, elements to the plan include utilization management enhancement, benefit modifications, and other management initiatives.

Let me take a moment also to lay out the CRI and the CAM projects and how they are integrated and how they differ from Coordinated Care. I think it is an important effort to try to bring these demonstrations together. The CHAMPUS Reform Initiative is a refinement of traditional CHAMPUS in which a regional contractor shares the risk for health care delivered under CHAMPUS and has the ability to share resources with the direct care system. Beneficiary program options range from traditional CHAMPUS to a managed care model.

Catchment Area Management projects a medical treatment facility based and focused on providing the MTF commander the resources to deliver all of the care to enrolled beneficiaries. The MTF commander is responsible for the care provided enrolled beneficiaries in the catchment area whether the care is delivered in the MTF or by the civilian sector.

Coordinated Care goes farther than either one of these. It represents a fundamental change in the way health care will be provided. Importantly, however, it incorporates the lessons that have been learned from both CRI and from CAM models, as well as some other demonstrations that the Department has conducted. Its cornerstone is enrollment of the active duty and CHAMPUS-eligible population in a managed care program under the direction of the MTF commander. Additional refinements include quality assurance, health promotion, and significant utilization management in both the direct care and CHAMPUS portions of the program.

Together, these refinements will improve access, maintain high quality, and control the cost of delivering health care, while preserving the benefit that I know concerns you.

The Composite Health Care System is a mission-critical, fully-integrated information system that puts patient information at our providers' fingertips and eliminates labor-intensive, repetitive data. It is currently in the operational testing and evaluation phase at 12

of our medical treatment facilities, and it is required for our Coordinated Care to be successful.

We are now conducting the final detailed assessment of our MTFs' immediate automation needs, and tailoring CHCS to meet each of their needs. Our strategy is to deploy the patient administration, appointment, and scheduling modules, together with laboratory, pharmacy, radiology, and outpatient, as rapidly as possible after a successful Milestone III, which is scheduled for March of 1992. In a follow-on effort, we will deploy the additional modules of inpatient entry for dietetics, and for nursing, to our larger facilities to bring them to full functionality in CHCS. After we achieve Milestone III, we will provide the Congress, then, with the information and justification on the Department's plans for deployment of the system.

We continue to look, and we have been looking, at physician special pay options for several years now. And I want to take the opportunity, sir, to thank you for the permanent authority that was provided in last year's National Defense Authorization Act. The Multi-Year Special Pay Authority has allowed us to offer physician specialists an added incentive to remain within the military. Moreover, and significantly, with the new pay's focus on force management, now we can take extra measures to try and relieve the problems in experience as well as numbers.

We have known for some time that it is not just numbers of health care providers that are important, but also how much experience and expertise is required for specific responsibilities. That certainly came to light again in our recent conflict in the Middle East.

In the final analysis, I believe that we are in a much better state today with respect to physician incentives when we compare it with the situation just a few years ago. Although we are still only able to provide compensation for certain specialties, particularly the surgical ones, at a lower percentage than it is on the average civilian rate, the overall competitiveness of the military pay program is greater, significantly, than 3 years ago when declining retention was our greatest concern in developing the physician force.

I know that the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences is also of concern to this committee. I will address that situation for a few moments. The Department has moved quickly to respond to concerns set out by Congress and the Department of Defense Inspector General. The significant managerial and personnel problems identified at the Uniformed Services University have been tackled. A major administrative reorganization of the University resulted in changes that include making the Board of Regents for the University advisory to the Secretary of Defense and the delegation of the responsibility for the management of the University to my office.

I also wish to note that a search is underway for a new president, and almost completed. Policy has been issued defining the business relationship between the University and the Henry M. Jackson Foundation. And despite the many corrections and changes in management, the University continues in its mission of producing high-quality career-oriented health professionals for the uniformed services.

If I may conclude, sir, since taking the helm of military medicine early in 1990, the spectrum of events and activities has been kaleidoscopic. We have proven the readiness of the medical component of DOD to support U.S. forces with the rapid and comprehensive deployment to the Middle East. We met the initial challenge to minimize disruption and stateside medical care. We have created the environment in which Coordinated Care will emerge and expand throughout the Military Health Services System.

I urge you to understand the complexity and magnitude of implementing, over a 3-year period, the changes in policy and behavior and in systems that are required to support this health care system. We continue to provide quality health care while enhancing our ability to generate quality improvement.

Sir, I request you permission to submit my full written statement for the record.

Senator GLENN. Without objection your entire statement, as well as those of the other witnesses, will be entered in the record.

Dr. MENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mendez follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ENRIQUE MENDEZ, JR., M.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to be before you today. It has been over a year since I came to the Department of Defense as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, and in that year we have seen in action the full spectrum of activities in military medicine. I have learned much and I have tried to be responsive to those with a keen interest in military medicine. This committee, in particular, has provided me with tangible support and careful guidance, particularly with compensation and retention issues. I appreciate the assistance of this committee and its staff over the past year in working toward creating a Military Health Services System that is more coordinated, responsive and efficient.

More than that, I appreciate the concern and assistance this committee has provided over the past decade to enhance the readiness posture of military medicine. In the early years following the Vietnam conflict, the military was occupied with recovery efforts and a reorientation to peacetime operations. Those were years in which military medicine concentrated on the delivery of high quality health care to all beneficiaries.

Significant strides in military medical preparedness have occurred over the last 7 years. We witnessed the worth of these endeavors during Operation Desert Storm. Our health care capability amassed in the Persian Gulf region was without parallel. We had a full and sophisticated health care delivery system. By this I mean hospitals, preventive medicine, dental care, veterinary, laboratory and radiology services, medical supply and maintenance, optical fabrication, ground and air evacuation, automated systems for communication and reporting, and integrated command and control of all these various unit capabilities. Tri-service cooperation has never been more evident, nor more successful.

In support of Desert Storm we deployed over 50,000 active duty and reserve medical personnel to both the Middle East and Europe. Such a deployment impacted on the beneficiary population here at home. It has been a time of turbulence, and one of considerable concern that the families of our deployed forces receive the health care they need. We had nearly restored pre-Operation Desert Shield capability when Desert Storm deployments took place. Additional reserves and retirees have restored lost stateside capability. We continue to monitor the staffing posture at affected facilities to ensure the health care needs of our beneficiary population are met during the re-deployment as well as throughout the post-Desert Storm period.

Operation Desert Storm presented military medicine with several policy challenges which we worked hard to resolve. Let me give you some examples:

— The need to protect our forces from the spectre of potential chemical and biological warfare led to the rapid establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU) between our Department and the Food and Drug Administration. This MOU will serve as the vehicle for future transactions concerning use of investigational new drugs in times of national emergency. The overwhelming number of health care professionals wishing to help us provide care to our patients here in the United States led to a speedy closure of a long awaited MOU with Department of Justice, which provided malpractice coverage for volunteers working in our hospitals under the auspices of the American Red Cross.

Additionally, Desert Storm showed us that many of the systems, programs and projects we have dedicated our efforts to over the past several years did in fact work, and worked very well. Our preventive medicine programs, in concert with command emphasis, kept heat related casualties far below estimates; Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) brought modern medical technology to the combat zone; the Defense Enrollment and Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) was capable of handling the registration of our mobilized reservists and their families; our demonstration projects with civilian provider groups improved access to health care and provided continuity of care for our patients as we awaited backfill from the Reserve community for our deploying hospital staffs.

I understand that Operation Desert Storm is not the focus for this hearing. There are, however, two important points I would like to stress. First, following Desert Storm the Department faces the reconstitution and modernization of our hospital assemblages and medical equipment. Rebuilding the medical capability expended to support combat deployment necessitates application of resources to regain the readiness posture achieved prior to Desert Shield, incorporating the lessons learned from this Operation.

Second, Operation Desert Storm highlighted our reliance on reserve medical personnel. The Presidential call up activated thousands of reserve medical personnel to participate in the desert and to backfill stateside military hospitals. This operation demonstrates the importance of ensuring that reserve units be staffed, equipped, and trained to carry out their medical missions. Mr. Chairman, it reinforces the importance that you, personally, have always placed on our Reserve forces.

Today in the shadow of Operation Desert Storm there are concerns being voiced here in the Congress and in the Department about our ability to recruit and retain members of the Reserve components. We know that recruitment of health care personnel for the Army and Air Force Reserve is down considerably from what it was last year; yet the Air National Guard was up in medical officer recruitment. The Navy, at the onset of Operation Desert Shield, was overmanned in commissioned reserve medical personnel, consequently, recruiting quotas were lowered and no adverse impact was experienced.

Having said this, I must point out that major recruiting efforts are made by the units themselves. So, the recruiting effort by those units called to active duty has been suspended. As they return and demobilize, we would expect to see those percentages begin to turn around. Reserve health care personnel recruitment is something we will watch closely for the next several months.

Retention of these personnel is another important thrust for us over the next several months. Loss of these reserve health care individuals is loss of expertise, certainly not what we want to see. As you are well aware, several initiatives have been taken by the Department and by the Congress to help overcome some of the personal hardships and perceived inequities experienced by reservists. Examples of the health care specific initiatives are the professional liability insurance suspension and the offering of professional special pays. At this time, we have no hard evidence as to what the retention of our health care reservists will be, or not be. Clearly it is a matter of considerable concern for us.

A topic I believe of interest to this committee is the statement of medical requirements for our Armed Forces. You have heard from many Departmental representatives that detailed Defense strategy is in development. Hopefully there will be a period of geopolitical, fiscal and policy stability in which this strategy can fully emerge. As a support slice to the forces that will comprise that strategy, we must determine requirements based upon those forces. Additionally, we have the responsibility to factor in the medical requirements deriving from our mission to provide care to family members and retirees. This is the so-called Peacetime mission of military medicine, yet our care for families and retirees does not exist solely in peacetime. Our plans and projected requirements must incorporate our ability to care for all of our beneficiaries, our fighting forces, their families and our retirees.

STATESIDE SYSTEM

Let me now focus on the Department's plans for the future of military health care. One of the most important projects at the beginning of my tenure was a report

to Congress laying out how the Department and the services together would develop centralized accountability to assure the firm management of the medical programs, and laying out a plan for the future with an emphasis on effectively controlling costs. I submitted that report to you in June 1990.

Most of you are aware that I brought in new staff members to head up my team—bright minds whose backgrounds and expertise brought similar philosophies and goals to the organization, but which were sufficiently different to assure a thorough analysis and dissection of each issue as we formulated our plans for the future. You know that I restructured my immediate office to reflect better the important functions and interrelationships which must occur in an efficient oversight of a medical system.

In that June report, I also first set out the essential elements of the Department's Coordinated Care Program. Its primary goal is to make more effective use of the full capacity of military treatment facilities through managing health care utilization and coordinating its supply among various sources of care.

I reported on our new policy of closer coordination among the services, CHAMPUS, and alternative civilian provider networks, supported by enhanced data systems.

New direction was given to establish networks of efficient civilian doctors and hospitals of proven quality, linked to our military hospitals, to hold down CHAMPUS costs for the beneficiary and the government.

A new enrollment system was outlined. The urgency of rising CHAMPUS mental health costs was recognized and a movement was begun to establish new standards to judge our effectiveness and efficiency in delivering health care in military facilities, and the need to do a better job at patient education.

The Department's Coordinated Care Program was created to build a Military Health Services System with order, a defined population, more certainty of cost and demand, and predictability and accountability as a basis of health care operations.

I recount this report to you because it establishes the baseline for progress. I am here to report that progress and show you the continuum along which that progress will proceed.

COORDINATED CARE

As the Military Health Services System stretched to respond to its first deployment under the all-volunteer military force, so too, is our peacetime mission stretching to respond to its demands.

We are continuing the major efforts on the part of the service medical departments to improve the way we provide peacetime medical care.

Just as for Operation Desert Storm where the services have been involved in joint action to produce the necessary result, there has been extensive cooperative effort on the Coordinated Care Program. We are working with the medical departments of the military services and the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Public Health Service, and the Coast Guard to come to grips with the military impact of spiralling costs of health care delivery in this country.

We have thoroughly reviewed the Department's initiatives and activities and sought to learn lessons from the civilian community. Based on an annual survey of almost 3,000 employers, the average American corporation spent 21.6 percent more in 1990 than in 1989 to provide doctor and hospital care to its employees. The Department cannot afford such an increase.

The Department's aim is to form a more comprehensive, accountable, high quality and cost effective health care delivery system. We mean to preserve the benefit and its unsurpassed quality while instituting changes to manage utilization of health care and coordinate its supply. Experiences gained through the Department's several managed care demonstrations helped shape the Coordinated Care design.

I wish to make clear today that Coordinated Care is not just another "demonstration project." The Military Health Services System needs a fundamental change in business practices, and that is what coordinated Care will achieve over a 3 year period for our world-wide system of over 9 million beneficiaries.

The centerpiece of Coordinated Care is the local health care delivery system based on arrangements between military and civilian health care organizations. These delivery systems will be locally managed with military commanders responsible for the delivery, cost, and quality of health services provided to enrolled beneficiaries in their area. The Coordinated Care Program will have local accountability with centralized monitoring at the senior service and OSD level.

A key component is improved education of beneficiaries and health service providers. Other system-wide innovations support and complement the local health care delivery systems. Innovations will include reforms of CHAMPUS provider payment

methodologies, establishment of Specialized Treatment Facilities to provide high cost health care services in the most cost-effective manner, and new approaches to contracting for health care services. The establishment of participation agreements with civilian providers to accept CHAMPUS assignment and improvements in the efficiency and accuracy of a centralized claims processing system will enhance services provided to beneficiaries.

There are five major principles which guide the design and implementation of the Coordinated Care Program. This program must:

— Assure that enrolled beneficiaries have easy access to care, that the program is understandable, and that it provides high quality, cost effective services.

— Be based on the concept that health care is a personal service that is always delivered or referred locally. Consequently, local military commanders must have the flexibility to make decisions about the delivery of care.

— Have local accountability for the costs, quality, and access with centralized monitoring.

— Achieve equity among beneficiaries by eliminating, to the degree possible, geographical differences in access, quality, cost, and benefits.

— Be flexible enough for local managers to have the latitude to make management decisions about the delivery of health care services in local Coordinated Care systems and be easy to administer.

The environment for Coordinated Care has been created.

The key features of Coordinated Care and their status follow.

QUALITY ASSURANCE

Quality Assurance will remain an essential element of the Military Health Services System under the Coordinated Care Program.

We have been actively involved in structuring medical quality assurance and risk management programs since 1982. These programs emphasize a positive, non-punitive philosophy that fosters the value of professionalism. Successful impact of programs for continuing quality improvement have received unprecedented validation from external sources. One is the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. One hundred and seventeen DOD hospitals were surveyed with the mean score being 84.4. This is higher than the 77.2 mean score for non-DOD facilities and serves as objective documentation to the success of efforts made to achieve a consistently high caliber of patient care.

The Joint Commission findings are substantiated further by the results reported by the DOD Civilian External Peer Review Program. Our ongoing goal to eliminate or minimize untoward or preventable occurrences has been strengthened by this program which has provided hard data that help us identify opportunities for improvement.

When I look back on the recent progress made in quality assurance programs, I am struck by one of the major benefits to come out of our efforts: the development of an information resource that, from individual case review and retrospective quality verification, provides a mechanism supportive of quality assurance and health services improvement. Civilian peer review provides the Department an independent assessment of its inpatient health care, verifying that DOD health care practices meet or exceed desired standards and outcomes.

Further, our "lessons learned" have given us educational tools not only for the military facility, but also for the entire national medical community in development of national health care policy. For example, results of occurrences in postoperative mastectomy and lumpectomy patients were compared to findings presented in the medical literature, and it is most reassuring that our occurrence rates fall well below the rates cited in the literature. We have several significant figures related to DOD obstetrical activities based on over 98 thousand births. Our neonatal death rate of less than 4.3/1000 falls well below the national year 2000 goal of 7/1000.

In our pursuit of quality, we continue to identify and pursue opportunities for improved care. Our Coordinated Care Program will support resource acquisition, allocation and utilization decisions that are designed to enhance the quality of our health care.

PATIENT EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION

I am sincerely committed to goal-oriented health promotion and disease prevention. The Department launched its initial health promotion program in 1986 with the issuance of a directive to enhance the quality of life of DOD personnel and other beneficiaries. This new program focused on six key areas: smoking prevention and

cessation, physical fitness, nutrition, stress management, alcohol and drug abuse prevention, and early identification of hypertension.

To date, the Department has made progress in these health promotion efforts. Each of the services has implemented physical fitness programs that ensure a specified level of fitness among service members. Nutrition related programs have resulted in reductions of saturated fat in the standard ration to 36 percent. Also, most DOD food service facilities display nutritional information about their menus and offer healthy diet choices at each meal.

The goal of health promotion is the prevention of the avoidable occurrences of illness and injury. Health promotion programs need to demonstrate the actual ability to reduce the burden of diseases, injuries and disabilities within the community. This year the Department enters a new phase in its health promotion effort. We will implement a measurable, scientifically based program which views health promotion as the systematic diagnosis and treatment of the health status and health needs of specific populations within our overall community.

This approach views the course of an illness as passing from wellness to disability and death through a series of phases. The onset of disease is caused by exposure of a healthy person in the susceptible phase to one or several risk factors for the disease. The individual will then pass through preclinical, clinical and disability phases. Transitions between phases are marked by the development of symptoms and the diagnosis of the illness. Within this framework of the spectrum of illness, the task of health promotion is the reduction of the impact of disease and injury on the population by eliminating an individual's exposure to the risk factors for illness.

The scientific diagnosis and treatment of the DOD community will begin with epidemiologic studies of the incidence of illnesses within the community. DOD's health promotion initiatives will expand from a concentration on a few diseases to programs directed toward the most detrimental population-specific risk factors. We will target our efforts at those illnesses which pose the greatest reduction in productivity and place the largest demands on our available resources.

As a part of this process, the Department has reviewed and adopted a set of the HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000: National Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Objectives for the year 2000 published by the Department of Health and Human Services in September 1990. Our initiative, DEFENDING HEALTH 2000, is led by the DOD Health Promotion Coordinating Committee representing the four military services and the Defense agencies.

It is noteworthy that while 39 percent of our objectives relate to providing appropriate clinical preventive services, 49 percent are concerned with occupational health, safety, environmental health, nutrition, physical fitness and substance abuse. At this time, the Department has initiated programs that begin to address 90 percent of the objectives laid out by the Coordinating Committee. We will continue to work to ensure complete implementation of the DEFENDING HEALTH 2000 program.

We also have pursued a plan to slow the transmission of the Hepatitis B virus in the United States. Several of you have particular interest in this area. Currently, the Surgeons General and I are working together to continue with full screening of pregnant women and immunization of infants of HBV carriers, individuals in areas of high endemnicity, and susceptible health care workers. We will also move forward to mirror the Centers for Disease Control national program of universal immunization of infants. This program further demonstrates the Defense Department's dedication to total quality health.

ENROLLMENT

The enrollment process of the Coordinated Care Program is designed to allow each Military Treatment Facility (MTF) Commander to manage the utilization of health care services for the enrolled population. This will improve the MTF Commander's ability to plan and budget for a defined population. The enrollment process will also let beneficiaries know that the MTF Commander is responsible for ensuring that they receive access to high quality care.

The initial information our beneficiaries receive about the Coordinated Care Program will inform them of their need to decide whether or not to enroll in the program. The beneficiary who enrolls will be ensured ot access to high quality medical care through the Medical Treatment Facility and health care networks in the Military Health Care System. Their care will be under the direction of the Commander of their local MTF. Enrollment will be phased in as local health care networks are developed by MTF Commanders.

CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries who choose not to enroll will continue to receive their care from civilian providers under the CHAMPUS benefit package.

SPECIALIZED TREATMENT FACILITIES (STF)

Another feature of the Coordinated Care Program will be the establishment of specialized treatment and referral centers for high cost, high technology procedures that require a minimum volume of care by a highly trained medical team for quality outcomes at acceptable costs.

Types of care that lend themselves to this specialized treatment concept include open heart surgery, major burn care, neonatal intensive care units, bone marrow and organ transplantation, and HIV centers.

These centers will concentrate specialty expertise in either regional or national centers for use by eligible beneficiaries. Any cost required to establish a support center must be more than offset by the economies of scale, minimized duplication and reduced morbidity and mortality. These facilities will be designated in direct care facilities and under CHAMPUS.

CATCHMENT AREA MANAGEMENT (CAM)

We are pursuing the Catchment Area Management (CAM) concept in conjunction with Coordinated Care.

The Department and services are reviewing their CAM programs. The existing CAMs will be absorbed into the Coordinated Care Program. We are assessing the successful aspects of each of the CAM programs and incorporating the lessons learned into the design of Coordinated Care Program. We also have begun development of our first tri-service project in the Tidewater, Virginia area. The Navy is lead service for the project.

As we proliferate Coordinated Care Models, we are evaluating the data systems available or under development. We have learned that accurate and detailed data are critical to our ability to negotiate cost effective agreements with civilian health care providers. We will also rely on the enrollment incentives of our Coordinated Care Program rather than enhanced benefits as a method to encourage enrollment in future projects.

MENTAL HEALTH BENEFIT

Since 1966, when CHAMPUS coverage was legislatively expanded to include mental health services, the cost and utilization of these benefits have grown steadily—and at rates exceeding those of all other types of care. Between fiscal years 1986 and 1989, more than 37 percent of the increase in CHAMPUS cost was attributable to mental health care. In fiscal year 1989 alone, CHAMPUS mental health expenditures exceeded $600 million, the major portion of which was for care of children and adolescents (ages 10 to 19 years).

Like this committee, the Department is very concerned with the growing costs in CHAMPUS, and in particular, with the alarming trends in the cost of mental health care. Thus, as part of the overall effort to reorganize the Military Health Services System, DOD will be implementing its Coordinated Care Program to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of health care delivery. Specifically, regarding mental health, the Department has undertaken several initiatives. These efforts include establishment of a national mental health utilization management program, adoption of certain payment reforms, and a number of important demonstrations.

Current information on utilization suggests that there are significant differences in rates of admissions and lengths of stay in certain states, catchment areas, and provider institutions. Thus, additional effort to assure appropriate high-quality mental health care must be focused on the identification of areas and provider groups that demonstrate significantly different behavior in contrast with the majority of mental health professionals providing care to our beneficiaries. Because the CHAMPUS mental health benefit remains generous, additional efforts also must be directed toward system-wide enhancements to utilization and cost management.

Another equally important principle in developing and implementing the mental health cost containment program within the framework of coordinated care is the need to assure that accessibility to appropriate high quality services for our beneficiaries is provided. While it is clear that utilization management is needed due to current unnecessary admissions and excessive lengths of stay, we will focus not only on assuring that the requirements for appropriate care are met but also on oversight mechanisms to independently assess quality and proper utilization management approaches.

Therefore, as directed, the Department has developed a CHAMPUS Mental Health Cost Action Plan. To be undertaken within the framework of our Coordinated Care Program, elements to the plan include utilization management enhance-

ments, benefit modifications, changes to provider reimbursement methodologies, and other management initiatives.

CHAMPUS FINANCING

There are several changes to CHAMPUS financing in the works. First, we have proceeded with the implementation of the increased CHAMPUS deductible which was enacted by Congress last year and then modified by recent Desert Storm legislation. Beneficiaries have been notified of this change and the transition to the increased deductible will be smooth. We approached the change with one underlying principle—that there would be simplicity to the transition. Care received prior to April 1 will be subject to the old deductible; care received after April 1 will be subject to the new one. Beneficiaries get credit toward meeting the deductible for care received anytime during the year. Of course, for families of those personnel involved in Desert Shield/Storm, the deductible increase will be delayed until October 1, 1991—consistent with the Desert Storm Supplemental Authorization.

Professional services payment limits under CHAMPUS have been frozen effective January 1, 1991. We are conducting analyses to determine appropriate reductions in payment limits for certain procedures and increases in limits for other procedures. A formal rulemaking action on the latter changes has commenced and seeks public comment prior to implementation.

We are all interested in the CHAMPUS budget. The current President's budget of $3.5 billion reflects an amount adequate to fund the CHAMPUS estimated requirement for fiscal year 1992. While these estimates do not include any increases as a result of Desert Storm, adequate additional resources were appropriated for CHAMPUS in the fiscal year 1991 Desert Storm Supplemental.

We must all recognize that the role of the CHAMPUS program in the Military Health Services System has changed since its inception. What was designed as a protection and overflow program for a limited portion of the beneficiary population has changed to be not the financer of that care, but, instead a major program for provision of care. Under CHAMPUS the individual beneficiaries have been independent contractors for their care. DOD has only recently gained limited control over cost, quality, and appropriate utilization. By marrying the direct care and CHAMPUS systems through Coordinated Care, DOD can improve access to care, control costs of providing that care, and have control over utilization.

CHAMPUS REFORM INITIATIVE

The CHAMPUS Reform Initiative has been a program of high visibility over the last several years. CRI appears to be controlling CHAMPUS costs both for the government and military families. The CRI has balanced cost containment with, improved access and high quality care and is improving our military treatment facilities' ability to meet their vital missions. According to a preliminary RAND analysis, total CHAMPUS costs in the CRI area increased by 2 percent between 1987 and 1989 while CHAMPUS costs in the other 48 States increased 16 percent.

It is the Department's assessment that the CRI contractor appears to be meeting, and in some instances, exceeding, the requirements of the contract. To date, the actual cost of the CRI contract to the government is approximately 95 percent of the original bid price. Also the CRI program has demonstrated its flexibility to provide continuity of care during national deployments like Operation Desert Storm by a timely augmentation of depleted stateside military resources with civilian resources.

The current contract is scheduled to end on January 31, 1993. The Department has begun planning for procurement of a modified version of this managed care initiative. Any new contract will bring the revised program more in line with the Coordinated Care Program. The Department plans to have the Request for Proposal available for prospective offerors within the next 6 months.

The Department will not exercise an option to expand the CRI into Arizona, Nevada and New Mexico during the current contract. This decision is consistent with the Department's commitment to expand the CRI only when, and if it will avoid health care cost for the government and our military families. Our decision not to extend the contract to Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada was based on the determination that, after excluding the populations in the Phoenix, Arizona and Albuquerque, New Mexico areas because of Air Force demonstration projects there, inadequate time and numbers of beneficiaries remain under the current contract to implement and recover the cost of expansion. The decision in no way reflects a lack of confidence in the CRI, its cost avoidance potential, or the CRI contractor. It is based on the economics of a specific marketplace during a specific period in time.

UNIFORMED SERVICES TREATMENT FACILITIES (USTFS)

We have focused a great deal of attention on instituting a managed health care model for the Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities (USTFs). We hope to implement this plan by the fall. The model embodies standard HMO features including enrollment, capitation payment, utilization review, quality assurance and preventive care. The model works to align USTFs with the Coordinated Care Program, including the enrollment design. The managed care model has great potential for improving the cost effectiveness and management of the USTF program.

OTHER FEATURES OF COORDINATED CARE

Coordinated Care is the program that will help tie together a variety of exciting health care demonstrations into a coordinated system. There are other program elements I would like to address, some, I believe, are of particular interest to this committee.

VA/DOD SHARING

As I have mentioned, the Department of Veterans Affairs is the primary backup to the military medical system in an emergency. Also, VA/DOD sharing will continue and, in fact, be integral to the Coordinated Care Program that emphasizes the provision of the most cost-effective care.

Opportunities for sharing resources between these two agencies and saving Federal dollars appear to be significant. The VA and DOD have wholeheartedly endorsed the spirit of sharing. Over 150 VA facilities have operating agreements with 199 military medical facilities and other military commands. There are also about 180 Reserve component units involved in sharing agreements during fiscal year 1990. All VA medical centers within 50 miles of a military facility have sharing agreements. In fiscal year 1990 there were an estimated 3,000 services shared. The types of services covered by sharing agreements range from major medical and surgical services, laundry, blood, and laboratory services, to unusual specialty care services.

The law now allows the use of CHAMPUS money to reimburse VA Medical Centers for services provided to CHAMPUS beneficiaries. Significant intra-agency effort and coordination are occurring in both the VA and DOD in analyzing the administrative, programmatic, and fiscal issues involved. There has also been interagency coordination identifying issues and exploring a mutually acceptable methodology under which, the agencies might enter an agreement.

A major area of VA/DOD sharing is joint venture construction of health care facilities. Where it is in the best interest of the government, the VA and DOD have been working closely together to develop joint ventures. The first operational joint venture is the facility at Kirtland AFB, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. I visited this facility recently and can verify its success firsthand. The Air Force is operating a wing in the newly built VA hospital. A comprehensive health care clinic was completed in August 1989 adjacent to the VA hospital. Construction of a new dental clinic has been completed. Through this sharing effort, the Air Force has avoided approximately $10 million in construction costs and is producing additional savings through multiple sharing agreements within the facility.

Another first is a new 128-bed hospital under design at Nellis AFB. This is the first joint venture planned from the ground up to accommodate both VA and DOD beneficiaries. Joint ventures are being evaluated at nine other sites around the country.

Congress has expressed concern in the past for enhanced tracking of expenditures and savings from VA/DOD sharing programs. We are putting administrative procedures into place to assess more fully the impact of the savings throughout DOD attributable to VA/DOD sharing. The emphasis on local administration and program flexibility built into the VA/DOD sharing programs, combined with central monitoring and tracking, parallel the DOD's Coordinated Care Program—local accountability with centralized monitoring.

I am sure that sharing between VA and DOD will become an even more significant element in the comprehensive array of care available to DOD beneficiaries. Fiscal responsibility demands that we save Federal dollars where possible and where there is no adverse impact on the quality and availability of care to beneficiaries of either agency. I also expect sharing to increase because it is a priority of mine and of my colleague, Dr. Jim Holsinger, Chief Medical Director for the Department of Veterans Affairs. I believe that sharing with the VA is a DOD mandate for today and the future.

COMPOSITE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

The Composite Health Care System is a mission critical, fully integrated information system that puts patient information at our providers fingertips and eliminates labor intensive, repetitive data entry requirements. It is currently in the operational testing and evaluation phase at 12 of our medical treatment facilities (MTF). CHCS is required for our Coordinated Care Program to be successful.

We are now conducting a detailed assessment of our MTFs immediate automation needs and tailoring CHCS to meet each of their needs. Our strategy is to deploy the patient administration, appointment and scheduling, laboratory, pharmacy, radiology and out patient order entry modules to all of our facilities as rapidly as possible after a successful Milestone III, scheduled for March 1992. In a follow-on effort, we will deploy tne additional modules of inpatient order entry, Dietetics and Nursing to our largest facilities to bring them to full function CHCS. After we achieve Milestone III, we will provide the Congress with the information and justification on the Departments plans for deployment of the system.

MEDICAL OFFICER INCENTIVES

We have been looking at physician special pay options for several years now, and I want to take this opportunity to thank you for the permanent authority provided in last year's National Defense Authorization Act. The Multi-year Special Pay (MSP) authority has allowed us to offer physician specialists an added incentive to remain with the military over the long term. Moreover—and significantly, with the new pay's focus on force management, now we can take extra measures to relieve problems in experience as well as numbers.

We have known for some time that it is not just numbers of health care providers that is important, but also how much experience and expertise is required for specific responsibilities. That issue came to light in our recent conflict in the Middle East. Acknowledged traits of leadership, well refined skills, and clinical judgment based on experience and a wide base of knowledge were important factors in making assignment decisions for our physicians.

Likewise, there are many judgment and experience-dependent skills required in our medical treatment facilities. Being able to target incentives in specialties where we are short of experience, is a significant help to us, and will ultimately result in a force best fitted to the needs of the military.

I am very encouraged with the result of the physician force analysis conducted last year. We developed objective experience profiles for each of our physician specialties, based on the needs in our various clinical environments. We then compared the experience profile of our existing force with the objective experience profile to determine where there were inconsistencies. Using some sophisticated computer modeling techniques, we were able to identify how far some of our specialty communities were from reaching the objective standards. This allowed us to assign relative levels of incentives, based on the amounts authorized in the special pay legislation, providing more ability to develop just the right organization for our medical positions.

In the final analysis, I believe we are in a much better state today with respect to physician incentives, when compared with the situation just several years ago. We have taken your guidance in generally setting Incentive Special Pay amounts as a function of comparably employed civilian physicians in the same specialties. This allows us to focus an important incentive device at the issue most on the mind of a physician thinking of leaving the military service; comparable civilian pay. Although we are still only able to provide compensation at 56 percent of the average civilian rate for surgical subspecialties, the overall competitiveness of the military pay program is dramatically greater today than 3 years ago when declining retention was our greatest concern in developing the physician force.

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (FAP)

The Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1990 and 1991 substantially modified the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program by creating the new Financial Assistance Program (FAP). This program authorizes grants and stipends for health professionals in advanced specialty training, such as residencies and fellowships, in return for military service.

Frankly, the Department has experienced mixed effects from the FAP during the new program's first year of implementation. The Air Force obtained excellent early results, enrolling 83 physicians during the portion of fiscal year 1990 remaining after the FAP's enactment in late November 1989, and its implementation by the Department the following month.

During the FAP's initial implementation phase, the Air Force enjoyed a special advantage, compared to the other services, because it had a unique, longstanding recruitment program targeted to the same physician resident population as the FAP. Therefore, necessary recruitment contact networks and marketing arrangements were largely in place, and recruiters were experienced in effective techniques, when the Air Force first implemented the FAP.

This was not the case with the Army and the Navy; they were required to accomplish the full range of tasks and arrangements common to the introduction of any new accession program. Unfortunately, the time involved in program start-up requirements resulted in few FAP enrollees (only two enrolled by the Navy) during the short period between the program's initial implementation and the onset of the Persian Gulf crisis. Given the normal implementation and startup factors associated with new accession programs, the Department views the Air Force's accomplishments as a valid indicator of the FAP's excellent potential.

The Department has strong concerns about existing legislation which would adversely affect the longwithstanding success of the scholarship program. The provisions of section 712 of the fiscal years 1988/1989 Defense Authorization Act would require the Department to earmark at least 2,500 scholarships for 3rd and 4th year medical students who agree to accept residency training in a critically needed wartime skill. Unless Congress provides relief this year, the earmarking provisions will take effect on October 1, 1991.

It is clear that Congress intended to improve medical readiness through this legislation. Unfortunately, there are serious difficulties with the earmarking restrictions. The Department believes the restrictions would adversely affect recruiting for the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program (AFHPSP) as well as the services' effective management of the physician force.

The adverse recruitment effects of the earmarking restrictions can be expected to worsen already disturbing trends in AFHPSP applications. Five-year trends show increasing difficulty in obtaining adequate numbers of quality applicants for scholarships. The numbers of scholarship applicants have dropped steadily, from 3.8 to 2.2 applicants per new scholarship awarded over a 5 year span beginning in 1984. Moreover, these ratios represent a substantial overstatement of applicant interest, since the available data contains numerous instances where one individual submits scholarship applications to two or three services. That individual applicant would, therefore, be counted more than once in the collective data recorded by the services.

UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH SCIENCES (USUHS)

I know the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences is of concern to this committee. Let me take a few minutes to address the current situation at USUHS. As you know, the USUHS is this year a new responsibility of my office.

The Department has moved quickly to respond to concerns set out by Congress and the Department of Defense Inspector General.

The significant managerial and personnel problems identified at the USUHS have been tackled. A major administrative reorganization of the University resulted. That includes making the Board of Regents for the University advisory to the Secretary of Defense and the delegation of the responsibility for the management of the University to my office.

I also wish to note that a search is underway for a new President. A new DOD directive is about to be issued that establishes new rules for operating the University as a fully accredited medical school. Also policy has been issued defining the business relationship between the University and the Henry M. Jackson Foundation. Management of the personnel office has been transferred to Washington Headquarters Services of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to allow use of the full personnel expertise of DOD to correct past practices. Senior management changes have occurred. The Public Affairs Office has been closed. The functions of the Military Medical Education Institute (MMEI) have been transferred back to the U.S. Army.

Despite the many corrections and changes in management, the University continues in its mission of producing high quality, career-oriented health professionals for the Uniformed Services.

CONCLUSION

Since taking the helm of military medicine early in 1990 the spectrum of events and activities has been kaleidoscopic. We have proven the readiness of the medical component of DOD to support U.S. forces with the rapid and comprehensive deployment to the Middle East. We met the initial challenge to minimize disruption in stateside medical care. We have created the environment in which Coordinated Care

will emerge and expand throughout the Military Health Services System. This is a comprehensive plan to change the fundamental way care is provided to our entitled beneficiaries. I urge your understanding of the complexity and magnitude of implementing, over a 3 year period, the changes in policy, behavior, and systems required to support the $13 billion of health care provided to over 9 million beneficiaries. We continue to provide quality health care while enhancing our ability to generate quality improvements.

I will be pleased to answer any of your questions.

Senator GLENN. General Ledford?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. FRANK F. LEDFORD, JR., SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. ARMY

General LEDFORD. Sir, if I may, may I summarize my formal statement which I will submit for the record?

You have got a great team here, sir. Dr. Mendez has led us very well. He talked to you about our future endeavor, coordinated care, and I want to tell you we had coordinated care in the Persian Gulf. We did it very well, I think. And we did it because you supported us well in the past. And I am glad you mentioned DEPMEDS, because we rang it out and it worked. And we will tell you more about it later on.

My chief, General Vuono, talks about the three vectors that the Army has embarked on. Desert Storm and Desert Shield is one vector, and we are winding it down. Another vector is to maintain and sustain the Army that could go elsewhere at the same time. And for us medics, that was to take care of 60,000 outpatients every day and admit 1100 people to the hospital every day while Desert Storm was going on.

And then the third vector that the Army has embarked on is designing an Army of the future that is going to be smaller but still has to be lethal and flexible and deployable. And for us medics, that means it has got to be counter-lethal but flexible and deployable. And the terrible challenge for General Vuono and all the leaders of the Army was to try to get those three vectors somewhere in the same quadrant, because they pulled at each other in different ways.

Let me expand just a moment on the first vector, that is, Desert Storm/Desert Shield. The Army expanded to our largest fielded force since World War II. We had 44 hospitals in the desert; we had 25,000 Army medics over there; we had 13,500 hospital beds. About half those medics were from the Reserve components, sir. We also expanded our medical forces rather significantly in Europe and here in the United States.

We did a lot more work than maybe the American public knows. In the desert, we admitted about 18,000 soldiers to our hospitals over there. We returned about two-thirds of them to duty within the theater. The rest of them were evacuated to Europe and many of them then on to CONUS. We recorded over 190,000 outpatient visits, and I assure you we probably only recorded about half of them.

We had the lowest incidence of disease and nonbattle injury in the history of warfare over there. We treated a lot of war wounds. People do not know about that. Thank God, we did not treat too many war wounds of Americans. But we treated a lot of injured

prisoners of war. I know that at one time, in Army hospitals alone we had about 820 injured, wounded prisoners of war.

We paid a price in this war. We lost 16 medical personnel. We lost three doctors out of that group. One of our doctors—Maj. Rhonda Cornham—is a nationally known hero. She was a prisoner of war, seriously wounded—a great American.

Second vector, the maintenance of the ready force. We did not drop a stitch back home and in Europe. We took care of the families of those deploying soldiers. And as I say, some 60,000 clinic visits a day and 1100 admissions a day went on while we supported that war. We did not break the CHAMPUS bank either, sir.

And obviously, we could not have carried on this medical war on two fronts without a transfusion—without an infusion of strength. And that is where the Reserves came in and the guard and the volunteers; 25,000 Reserve and guard folks were called up in the Army, and we had about 1,700 folks to volunteer. About 12,000 of those Reserve folks went to the Gulf, and the rest were stationed elsewhere.

And the last vector that the Army is working on is designing the force of the future. And we are designing the medical portion of that future, as well. We are going to finish fielding DEPMEDS. Thank God, we had gotten about halfway through it when the war started, so that we had enough DEPMEDS equipment to equip those hospitals in the field.

We are going to continue to redesign our doctrine to go along with this new equipment. We are going to take advantage of the lessons learned in Desert Storm, because you are right—there were some lessons. We are going to take care of our medical people. We have got to take care of them so that they can take care of the greater force. And I would enlist your support, sir, and the support of this committee in commissioning physician assistance this year and in continuing the great initiatives that you have already given us to retain and recruit good people. And we are going to ask you for several more initiatives, especially in the Reserve arena.

And finally, I would tell you in accord with my colleagues that we are going to, over the next several years, work together and redefine our peacetime health care system under Dr. Mendez's Coordinated Care system.

I thank you for your attention, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Ledford follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. FRANK F. LEDFORD, JR., DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE SURGEON GENERAL

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Lt. Gen. Frank F. Ledford, Jr., the Army Surgeon General. It is an honor to have this opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss Army Medical programs. This subcommittee has played a valuable role in helping the Army not only to achieve goals aimed at increasing our wartime capability, but also to achieve goals aimed at ensuring that eligible beneficiaries have access to quality health care. And for that I thank the committee.

More specifically, I would like to acknowledge the committee's support for the initiatives designed to minimize the impact of mobilization on individual members of the Reserve components.

DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE WORLD

Before I proceed, it is important that I acknowledge the dramatic changes that are occurring throughout the world, and as best that I can, describe to you the role that the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) will play in support of the Army as the Army meets new challenges brought on by these dramatic changes.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, and the unity of effort in the freeing of Kuwait are but a few examples of the international changes that are occurring. These are positive changes, but they will heighten the domestic pressure to reduce military expenditures and to reduce U.S. presence abroad. These events are happening almost faster than we can react. The rapidity of change dictates the need for a clear vision of where the Army is heading. To guide us through this period of unprecedented change, the Army has identified three vectors. These vectors are Operation Desert Storm, maintaining readiness worldwide, and shaping the Army for the future. As Army leaders have stated, executing these vectors will present numerous challenges. Thus, these vectors provide an excellent framework from which to discuss the AMEDD's role in support of the Army as it tackles each challenge.

AMEDD MISSION

The Army Medical Department is the Nation's largest comprehensive health care system and is responsible for caring for our soldiers, and retirees and their families. This single mission, however, is divided into two complementary but sometimes competitive parts: health care in wartime and in peacetime, each with its own rules and requirements. Each part is all consuming, and each could easily use 100 percent of our time, resources and energy. We are becoming more adept at balancing both parts in light of constrained resources and the unprecedented changes that are likely to reshape the Army radically over the next decade. Failure to ensure anything less than complete success in either mission is unacceptable.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

Beginning in early August, the AMEDD deployed the best-trained, best-equipped and best-prepared medical support system in this country's history. It was the largest medical force on active duty since World War II. We are providing comprehensive health care from the most forward line of troops through rehabilitative care in Europe and the United States. Provisions for that care required expansion of our facilities in both Europe and here in the Continental United States (CONUS). Simultaneously, we are maintaining care to all non-deployed soldiers and to all other eligible beneficiaries.

At the outset of Operation Desert Shield, we were specifically directed not to reduce the care to other beneficiaries. We were also told not to increase the funds expended on CHAMPUS. That guidance was a first. During World War II and Korea, dependent medical care at Army expense or at Army facilities was offered only on an emergency basis and then at the discretion of the facility commander. It wasn't until 1956 that the Congress established the right by law of military dependents to medical care. Maintenance of care to all beneficiaries was a challenge. There was some disruption of care, but overall it has gone well.

While simultaneously providing peacetime healthcare we manned and equipped our deploying units and planned for the expansion of our fixed hospital system to receive casualties. We also trained and readied ourselves and all other soldiers for deployment. Operation Desert Shield/Storm occurred during a period of planned turbulence for the AMEDD. Ten years of planning were coming to fruition. We were in the midst of modernizing our combat hospitals with the new Deployable Medical Systems or DEPMEDS equipment. We were also on the verge of implementing a new force structure and doctrine, called Medical Force 2000. And, we were looking at the personnel adjustments required by the planned downsizing of the Army. We took the best of each. We sped up the conversions of the hospitals to DEPMEDS and we implemented pieces of the new doctrine, specifically the Forward Surgical Teams and the Combat Stress Teams.

Although not unique to the AMEDD, our most demanding challenge was manning our force. In mid-August we had preventive medicine and veterinary personnel, as well as forward surgical teams on the ground in Saudi Arabia. In addition, twelve UH60 medical evacuation aircraft self-deployed to Saudi Arabia from Europe. Simultaneously, an impressive blood banking capability was established. Our capabilities continued to expand in accordance with the CINCs plan. At the beginning of the ground war we had 44 hospitals with over 13,000 beds available. At all times

there have been adequate medical facilities available for the number of troops deployed and the anticipated level of conflict.

We immediately provided staff to the combat hospitals that deployed and moved around the staff remaining in the United States to cover the shortages. At the height of this redistribution process, we had over 200 personnel assigned at other than their homestations. We also established a volunteer program where retired and Reserve component members of the AMEDD could volunteer to come on active duty for up to 139 days. The outpouring of support for the volunteer program was amazing—we had over 1,700 volunteers, mostly physicians and nurses, in the first few weeks. At one point we had 803 volunteers serving with us.

At the time of the Presidential call-up of the Selected Reserve our need was for individuals to replace the Active component members who were preparing to or had deployed. To meet that need we called up our augmentation hospitals rather than our combat hospitals. Had we used the combat hospitals, they would not be available for deployment when we needed them. The augmentation hospitals each have up to 800 personnel. They are designed to expand the capability of our medical centers in the event of hostilities. To avoid activating any unneeded personnel, we only activated portions of those hospitals. Despite this action, the match of specialties to requirements was not perfect. To support the hospital's role, the medical corps members of those units are largely surgeons and sub-specialists. Some of those subspecialists were asked to return to their roots and provide primary medical care. Also, because of the mix of specialists, we also had to cross-level the reservists. This reassignment of personnel did cause some turbulence. Also, the members of the augmentation hospitals always thought they would be the last called—not the first! Because of all of this, there initially were a few surprised people and some disruption of care. However, overall the total force has done an outstanding job.

Beginning in December, we deployed Reserve component hospitals to the theater. With the expansion of the number of beds in both Europe and the United States, personnel from all three components moved to meet those needs. We also involuntarily recalled retirees, principally physicians and physician assistants.

We also met the challenge of equipping all of our deployed hospitals with the newer DEPMEDS equipment. Early deployers, some of which were equipped with M.U.S.T. (Medical Unit Self-Contained Transportable) and conventional hospital equipment, were taxed by the harsh desert conditions. This limited and delayed their full operational capability. By January, however, all of the hospitals in the theater had either arrived with DEPMEDS equipment or had been converted to the new equipment. We also accelerated the purchasing and use of new field equipment, including two CAT scanners. The use of our liquid oxygen production system is another success. We also surged the industrial base—ours and private industry's. Our optical labs made over 35,000 pairs of optical lenses in the first 3 weeks and over 400,000 since. There is now an in-country optical fabrication capability.

The daily logistical needs of the theater have been equally well met. At the peak, the medical logistics structure included a theater depot composed of two medical supply, optical and maintenance units (MEDSOM) organized into the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Center, Saudi Arabia (USAMMCSA). Three additional MEDSOMs were deployed with one supporting each corps and one providing support to the echelons above corps (EAC) units in the Riyadh area. This structure performed the single integrated medical logistics mission for the theater and supported more than 60 Army, Air Force and Navy Hospitals as well as division level medical units and separate medical support units. The USAMMCSA stocked over 4,000 lines of medical supplies and, at its peak of operation, processed more than 50,000 requests per month.

In the training arena, we developed packages that emphasized the problems unique to that portion of the world. By early September, my medical consultants had published a primer on the Diagnosis and Treatment of Diseases of Tactical Importance to USCENTCOM Forces. It was so popular it had a second edition by January.

The Academy of Health Sciences at Fort Sam Houston, TX developed an accelerated basic officer training program for members of the Reserve components. It credited those officers with training received in their professional educational programs, while ensuring they have the soldiering skills they need. We trained over 2,000 Reserve component soldiers.

We also deployed new equipment training teams to the theater and to various unit home stations to introduce the staff to the DEPMEDS and other new equipment.

We ensured everyone's continued readiness by the early deployment of veterinary personnel to oversee the food sources. The early deployment of Veterinary Service

personnel has been invaluable in ensuring that foodborne illnesses among U.S. forces have been kept to a minimum. The development of a Directory of Sanitarily Approved Food Establishments for Armed Forces Procurement within the theater enabled U.S. Forces to access more than 200 commercial food establishments as safe sources of subsistence. These approved sources include fresh dairy products, shell egg, fresh fruits and vegetables, fish, red meats and poultry, as well as bakeries and wholesale distributors. Veterinary clinical activities include examinations and treatment of military working dogs in the theater, policies relative to indigenous animals, consultations regarding diseases transmissable between animal and man such as rabies, and provision of advice and establishment of ARCENT and CENTCOM policies regarding animals. The Army is the DOD Executive Agent for Veterinary Services.

Preventive Medicine personnel were also deployed early to investigate diseases common to the area. In addition, soldiers were inoculated against infectious hazards in the area. They also received training on heat injuries. Our low numbers of admissions for disease and heat injury are a credit to these programs and command emphasis.

We further ensured everyone's health by doing dental screening exams and taking corrective actions before they deployed. Over 30,000 Reserve component soldiers received dental treatment to bring them to combat ready status. In addition, the dentists in theater have provided care to over 220 patients a day.

In the medical chemical and biological warfare defense area, we provided training in the treatment of chemical casualties and biological casualties to over 1,450 medical personnel in the theatre. We also trained and deployed medical personnel from Europe and the United States. Also we accelerated the fielding of new medical equipment and drugs for chemical defense, and procured antibiotics to treat the total force against potential biological warfare agent use. All medications were approved by the Food and Drug Administration. We accelerated collective protection shelter development and procurement efforts to permit treatment of soldiers in a chemical and biological warfare environment. There has also been significant AMEDD involvement in the development of chemical defense prevention and treatment modalities, as well as in the provision of training for soldiers in biological and chemical defense procedures. Projects have involved the development of toxoids and antitoxins, as well as vaccines.

Within the theater, we are providing care from basic first aid through recusitative surgery. We have both dedicated ground and air ambulances to evacuate the patients to the facility best prepared to care for them. We had 50 percent more medevac aircraft in country than was available at the peak of Viet Nam. For definitive care and rehabilitation the patients are evacuated using Air Force assets to Europe and the United States. Since August we have admitted over 16,000 patients, ranging from relatively minor illness to severe trauma. All have received the finest health care.

In Europe and in CONUS we expanded our hospitals to almost double our overall capacity. The Burn Center at Fort Sam Houston tripled its capacity. The wartime flow of patients was planned to distribute patients from the east to the west coast to account for the distribution of the units deployed. Patients would then be further evacuated to secondary hospitals near their family members as their medical condition permitted. Our goal was to return as many personnel to duty as possible. To date almost 75 percent have returned to duty either in the theater, in Europe or in CONUS.

Army medical units are currently being utilized to support ongoing military recovery operations. These operations include providing care to enemy prisoners of war and humanitarian assistance to injured Iraqi citizens. Both activities are in keeping with the Geneva Conventions of 1947. As soon as military medical support is no longer required, the medical units will return to the United States. The medical units employed are both Active and Reserve component. This corresponds with the total force policy which has all components fully participating in meeting the national security objectives and support of the forces.

With the cease fire now accepted by the Government of Iraq, Central Command's staffs are completing the redeployment activity for all units currently participating in Operation Desert Storm. More than 70 non-divisional medical units have returned already. It is hoped this will be completed shortly for a majority of the units and they will be home before July 4, 1991. This will, however, depend on the situation in the Gulf and the Theater Commander's plan. We know it is General Schwarzkopf's desire to have all of his personnel home as soon as possible. This is in support of President Bush's instruction.

We are equally concerned about the demobilization of Reserve component personnel serving in Europe and the United States. Those medical units were used to replace the health care providers that deployed in support of the U.S. Army VII Corps and to expand our hospitalization capabilities in preparation for the return of large numbers of casualties. The demobilization of those health care providers is dependent upon the return to duty of the providers deployed to Southwest Asia.

This committee, and the Congress as a whole, worked hard to minimize the impact on individuals of this mobilization and I thank you. Passage of the authority for recalled retirees to serve in the highest grade previously held, health professionals' pay, malpractice tail insurance and the other components of P.L. 102-12 and P.L. 102-25 addressed many of the concerns. We are hopeful that the Small Business Administration Loan Assistance initiative will also be favorable considered. Some of our solo practitioners may, in fact, return to business crises due to their absences.

We have already begun to look at the long-term effects of this mobilization and deployment. I have commissioned task forces to look at both our redeployment and our recruitment and retention strategies. Despite the overwhelmingly positive service that the total force has provided, we expect to be challenged in both the recruitment and retention arenas.

MAINTAINING READINESS WORLDWIDE

The second vector, maintaining readiness worldwide, is at the heart of the competitive but complementary notion I mentioned earlier. Readiness worldwide is what we strive for on a daily basis. By performing the peacetime component of our mission, we ensure that our soldiers are trained and ready to accomplish their wartime mission. The bulk of my prepared remarks today focuses on maintaining readiness.

The readiness of our combat medical units has dramatically increased over the past few years. Numerous initiatives are ongoing to further increase our capability. As I mentioned earlier, we are procuring the Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS). DEPMEDS, as you know, is a tri-service effort to standardize equipment used by all field type combat hospitals. On September 28, 1987, the first unit was DEPMEDS equipped. As of February 1, a total of 125 hospital sets have been procured and 58 DEPMEDS sets have been fielded. The fielding of DEPMEDS to these hospitals equate to a total of 20,360 beds which is 40 percent of the total number of beds to be procured. At the end of fiscal year 1991, the Army will have procured another 4 DEPMEDS sets which completes our current procurement plans for DEPMEDS. The fiscal year 1992-1993 budget request includes sustainment funding for the 129 sets procured.

Reserve component units have also benefited as a result of the DEPMEDS acquisition program. In addition to hospital sets, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve units have also received a total of 48 minimum essential equipment for training (MEET) sets. These sets will enable those units to train at their home station. The 48 MEET sets are 44 percent of the total number of sets to be fielded under this vital program.

Training on this new DEPMEDS equipment has been provided to 24 Active component and 65 Reserve component units. Operator training and doctrine and tactics training for the Active component units stationed in CONUS, Europe, and Korea were conducted by a team from the Academy of Health Sciences at the units home station or in the Desert Shield area of operations. Training for Reserve component units was conducted at the new equipment training site located at Camp Bullis, TX. The remaining Reserve component units, were trained at our newly established regional training sites at Camp Shelby, MS or at Fort Indiantown Gap, PA.

Another area in which progress has been made is in the acquisition of critical items of medical materiel for battalion and division level medical units. This program has been under way for several years now and is essential to the provision of care within the combat zone. For example, some of the items that we have procured include medical aid bags, dental x-ray sets, lab sets and medical clearing station sets. We also plan to purchase defibrillators and low capacity x-ray units. I might add that this acquisition program is for both Active and Reserve component units.

Training is another area in which we have made progress. As I mentioned earlier, we are training Reserve component (RC) units to use DEPMEDS equipment at Regional Training Sites-Medical. The Army plans to activate seven RTS-MEDs by 1993. Each RTS-NED will consist of a standard 5-acre training site and building complete with classrooms, biomedical equipment maintenance facilities, administrative offices, and warehouse space. Each site will be equipped with a full hospital set

to allow for new equipment and sustainment training. These facilities are the key to unit level Reserve component training and combat readiness.

Another way to maximize readiness and decrease dependence on the medical care system is through the modification of personal life-style habits. This is the goal of the Army Health promotion program. One of the major features of this program is the health risk appraisal (HRA). Since full implementation worldwide in 1988, over 250,000 soldiers have been screened and counseled regarding life-style habits. To determine if the objectives of the HRA program were being met, questions were added to the U.S. Army Personnel Integration Command's worldwide survey in 1989 and 1990. Results of the 1989 survey revealed that of the total population surveyed 37 percent had taken the HRA. Of those, 60 percent had considered making behavior changes as a result of participating in the program. The primary areas they considered changing were diet (28 percent), weight control (12 percent), and tobacco use (24 percent). Analysis of the 1990 survey data has not been completed. There are also positive results from our drug testing program. For example, the drug positive rates over-the past 6 years have declined significantly. The rates for Active Army, USAR, and civilians have gone from 10.24 percent in fiscal year 1983 to 1.39 percent in fiscal year 1989. The health promotion program has far reaching consequences for ensuring the medical readiness of our forces. Fitness equals combat readiness. Fitness ensures our soldiers can meet the challenging demands that our nation will face in the future.

The spread of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) continues to adversely impact the complete spectrum of military activities. Recognizing that HIV infection is of significant military importance, the Army program stresses prevention, education, early diagnosis, and development of an effective vaccine or prophylactic drugs. These elements have formed the framework upon which DOD policies from recruit screening to staging have been built.

The Army is in the forefront of our Nation's effort to find a means of fighting AIDS. The military research effort is on prevention and treatment of early disease. In contrast, the Department of Health and Human Services emphasis is on the treatment (prolonging of life) of late' stage disease. Hence, the programs are not duplicative, but complementary.

Operating a peacetime health care delivery system is not the primary AMEDD mission, but it is a mission that we take great pride in performing. In recent years the cost of performing that mission has risen, but the AMEDD's cost growth is less than the cost growth experienced in the civilian sector. We recognize that resources are limited and we accept the challenge to seek innovative managed care initiatives which will slow that rate of growth. Regarding the peacetime care operation, I would like to comment on its operation, highlight some of our managed care initiatives and present some of my most pressing concerns.

The AMEDD operates 50 hospitals and 290 dental clinics along with numerous health clinics world-wide. The average age of our hospitals is just over 30 years and maintenance is becoming an increasing problem. The projections for construction funding will aggravate this situation. In recent years, with your support, we have been able to start new hospital construction projects at Fort Lewis, Fort Sill, and Fort Sam Houston. Unfortunately, we are replacing our inventory of hospitals at a rate of less than one-half a hospital a year, which translates to a replacement cycle of over 100 years. The AMEDD will need your continued support to replace the aging facilities and to properly maintain what we have.

We point with pride to the peacetime health care services provided in our medical treatment facilities. Over the past several years, workload accomplished by these AMEDD facilities has remained relatively constant. On an average day, we admit 1,100 patients, have 5,471 beds occupied, assist with the birth of 106 children, and handle approximately 61,369 clinic visits. Since 1989, the number of admissions has remained relatively stable; whereas, clinic visits have risen slightly. In addition, Army hospitals continue to experience a decline in the average length of patient stay which decreased from 5.8 days to 4.97 days between fiscal years 1986–1990. This decrease is reflective of the national trend which results in part, from technological advancement, such as the use of lithotripters to non-surgically destroy kidney stones, along with changing treatment practices, like ambulatory surgery.

The fiscal year 1992–1993 budget request reflects a continuation of this stable workload trend. The budget request ($3,204M) includes $2,059M for the direct care component and $1,145M for CHAMPUS. The growth in the direct care component reflects the nominal growth required to extend the fiscal year 1991 level of care into fiscal year 1992. The budget request also includes funds for the direct care system to accommodate the beneficiary population which we estimate to be increasing at the

rate of 1/2 of 1 percent per year. We have also fully funded the CHAMPUS program.

Training of AMEDD personnel is extremely important if we are to accomplish our mission. Our educational programs are nationally recognized as a valuable asset. These programs ensure that trained health care personnel are available to treat the medical needs of our patients. In Graduate Medical Education, the largest source of physicians entering the Army is from the Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP) and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS). These physicians are not specialty trained when they enter active duty. While they are undergoing residency training they are at the same time delivering care to DOD beneficiaries. The graduate medical education environment provides a solid basis to sharpen and challenge the skills of all participants in the training process, as well as to provide daily experiences that ensure readiness on the battlefield.

Opportunities to share health resources and thereby utilize excess capacity in either VA or DOD facilities are being pursued under the framework of the Health Resources and Sharing Act. VA and DOD cooperative ventures to maximize the use of Federal health facilities afford mutually beneficial opportunities to expand service availability while promoting cost containment. In December 1990, the Army had approximately 60 VA/DOD sharing agreements in effect covering all aspects of hospital services. Examples of services currently shared include inpatient and outpatient care, as well as neurosurgery, open heart surgery, specialty consultations and procedures, procurement of medical supplies and equipment, dental services, and CT Scans and other radiology services. During the period October 1, 1989 through December 31, 1990, the Army paid the VA $5.5M for services rendered that would have otherwise cost the Army $14M.

One of our most successful peacetime health care initiatives of recent years is the Primary Care for the Uniformed Services Program (PRIMUS). It was developed and implemented by the Army in response to congressional directives to improve access and convenience for the beneficiary, to increase workload accomplished in military medical facilities, and to provide an alternative to CHAMPUS. The concept utilized contractor operated primary care clinics as satellite facilities to existing military hospitals. The first PRIMUS clinic opened in Fairfax, VA, in 1985. The Army currently has 10 PRIMUS clinics in operation. The fiscal year 1992–1993 budget supports an additional 6 clinics. The PRIMUS concept has been extremely well received within the Army as well as by the other services (NAVCARE and Air Force PRIMUS clinic initiatives). Patients have been pleased and excited with these primary care clinics.

The AMEDD is also involved in a demonstration project in Europe to obtain 'urgent medical care for soldiers and their families stationed in small communities where 24-hour-a-day clinic operations is uneconomical in terms off staffing. Under this arrangement, the local clinic operates at full staff during normal duty hours to accommodate the needs of the community, while we have negotiated agreements with local German hospitals to provide care to our beneficiaries when the military clinic is closed. CHAMPUS makes reimbursement without patient co-payment. We expect the project to improve the morale of active duty members and their families in Europe and to ensure that quality health care is available to them without additional cost. There are 31 European communities participating in the project. Because of the high level of satisfaction with this project, efforts are underway to adopt this project's demonstration procedures as standard practice.

The Catchment Area Management (CAM) demonstrations, required by the 1988 Authorization Act, began on June 1, 1989. Under this concept, the local MTF Commander has responsibility for providing all health care services to eligible beneficiaries through either the direct care system or under CHAMPUS. The objectives of this demonstration are to provide the local commander with the resources and authority to develop the most cost-effective sources of care within his catchment area, to pursue alternative delivery mechanisms to augment the services available from the direct care system, and to improve beneficiary access to care by exploring all available options to meet their health care demand. The concept is being tested at Fort Sill and Fort Carson. The effectiveness of this project will be evaluated by RAND Corporation during fiscal year 1992.

The information demands required to manage demonstration projects and to ensure quality care is rendered to our patients in today's complex medical environment make automation an integral component of the health care delivery process. The AMEDD has and is continuing to work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to include the Corporate Information Management (CIM) Medical Functional Group, in an attempt to avoid duplication of effort and attain uniformity whenever possible.

Two complementary systems are particularly critical today. The first is the Composite Health Care System (CHCS). CHCS continues to be tested at five Army sites while the Department of Defense furthers its development. CHCS has achieved a high level of acceptance from ancillary staff and is gaining increased support from providers as improvements to the system are made. Hospital commanders at CHCS sites designated to receive casualties from Operation Desert Storm consider CHCS to be essential to successful management. Additional CHCS activations cannot take place until a favorable Milestone III decision is made. The decision is currently scheduled for July 1992.

The Theater Army Medical Management Information System (TAMMIS) is an automated medical information system designed to support field medical units. TAMMIS ability to deploy rapidly and respond to a dynamic environment has been crucial to medical support of Operation Desert Storm.

AMEDD Quality Assurance (QA) division continues to monitor our program to ensure that all our beneficiaries receive quality care. Our program is based on rigid enforcement of confidential peer review at each military medical treatment facility under the explicit and direct oversight of the Medical Corps Commander. The overall quality assurance program entails patient care assessment, provider credentialing, utilization review, and risk management.

We have received the results from the 1988 DOD contract to the Forensic Medical Advisory Service (FMAS), Rockville, MD, for external civilian peer review from December 1987 through December 1989. I'm pleased to report that this agency reviewed 77,000 cases and only 745 have been reported to date to represent opportunities to improve care. Ninety-six of the 745 cases were identified by the medical treatment facility (MTF) under their ongoing QA program. In addition, 70 percent of 745 cases did not involve injury to the patient. Although we would prefer not to have any such cases, the fact that the number is small and some of these cases had previously been identified by our internal review process attests to the efficacy of our QA program.

The Army Medical Research and Development Command, has five research programs which focus on the health and safety of soldiers. Validated research efforts focus on medical, biological and chemical warfare defense, infectious diseases of military significance, combat casualty care, including combat dentistry, and military systems health hazard. The Army has been designated by DOD as the Executive Agent for Medical, Biological and Chemical Warfare Defense and by Congress as the lead agency for infectious disease and combat dentistry research.

The research programs seek to improve ways to protect soldiers from infectious diseases they might encounter through deployment to endemic areas or exposure to biological weapons; to improve medical care on the battlefield by placing the best tools and techniques in the hands of the combat medic; to protect our soldiers from military environmental health hazards and from the health hazards posed by our own weapons, equipment, and vehicles. Other important areas include maxillofacial surgery and wound infection control; medical protection of soldiers from the effects of chemical weapons, and improved medical management of chemical casualties.

As you can see, Army Medical Research and Development Command plays an important role for the Army as the medical materiel developer. It provides the technology, technical information, and medical materiel to resolve unique military medical deficiencies, prevent casualties, enhance the return to duty rate and lighten the logistical burden of U.S. forces.

Critical to the research and development mission is the proposed replacement for the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR). WRAIR's replacement, which would enable research to be performed without the impediment of cramped laboratories and failing building systems inherent in a 60-year old structure, continues to be one of my highest priorities.

The most pressing issue in the Army Medical Department is the recruitment and retention of health care personnel. Generally, AMEDD officer strengths have remained relatively stable since fiscal year 1990 with slight increases in total inventory noted for the Army Medical Corps and Army Nurse Corps. These increases can be attributed primarily to enhanced special pays and recruitment bonuses authorized for these branches, although all AMEDD corps end strengths were affected by the "Stop Loss" measures initiated in September 1990 to support Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

The growing demand for healthcare personnel in the civilian sector continues to negatively influence the AMEDD officer personnel inventory in certain specialties. The following specialties experienced shortages through 1990: nurse anesthesia, selected physician and dental specialties (primarily surgical and primary care), occupational therapy, veterinary lab animal medicine officers, optometry, pharmacy and

clinical psychology. The Active component enlisted personnel strength level is very favorable with shortages only in the more advanced specialties. The Reserve component, on the other hand, continues to have shortages in nine critical specialties. Of these specialties, only the Biomedical Equipment Specialist, Emergency Medical Technician, Practical Nurse, and Respiratory Specialist career fields are below the Army goal of 85 percent fill.

To remedy the enlisted personnel shortfall problem, the Army has the Specialized Training for Army Readiness (STAR) program and the Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program (ACASP). Both programs are quite valuable. The STAR program for fiscal year 1990 could support 400 participants, and over 350 soldiers were recruited. The ACASP, potentially, can provide the Army with qualified soldiers quicker than any other program.

Civilian employment levels remain constant. Despite hiring of almost 6,000 employees under exceptions to the DOD hiring freeze through January 1991, AMEDD on-board employment continues to hover around 30,000. This situation exists largely because of the inability of the federal sector to keep pace with wages and incentives that are offered by the private sector. The Department is working in concert with the Office of Personnel Management to resolve this issue.

Another issue that I am particularly interested in is the Commissioning of Physician Assistants. They are valuable members of our health care delivery team and commissioning will indeed provide for the alignment of the rank, the responsibility, and the professional recognition of the Army's military Pas with their counterparts in the other uniformed services. I urge each of you to support this most important initiative.

SHAPING THE ARMY FOR THE FUTURE

The final vector is in direct response to the changing international environment and the diminishing resources allocated to national defense. The Army is committed to reducing significantly the size of the force. The Army, also, believes that this is an excellent opportunity to tailor change to make the AMEDD an even more effective organization.

Medical Force 2000 (MF2K) is a major comprehensive reorganization of the Health Service Support concept/organization, modernization effort for Echelons Above Division. It will provide organizational designs which are modular and will support operations throughout the full spectrum of conflict. Fiscal year 1992 marks the first year of the multiyear conversion effort.

The "Gateway to Care" program is the Army's vital new long-term commitment to shaping the future of the delivery of care to soldiers, families and the retired community while controlling rising costs and enhancing our readiness for possible military conflicts. "Gateway to Care" is a health care delivery concept approved by the Secretary of the Army in May 1990. This phased commitment is the Army's blueprint for a better, more responsive health care system at a time of unprecedented change. Just as Medical Force 2000 (MF2K) is the AMEDD's new organization and doctrine-for wartime medical readiness, so too is "Gateway" the Army's new concept for the delivery of peacetime health care.

For those beneficiaries who choose to participate in the "Gateway to Care" system, the concept shifts responsibility for finding and coordinating care from the patient to a comprehensive health care delivery system under control of the local military hospital commander. Under this system, the Army commits to providing all enrolled beneficiaries with timely access to basic health services through designated primary care clinics. The Army will also be responsible for providing or arranging for more specialized or inpatient services in a coordinated fashion from resources available either in military or other Federal facilities or in the local civilian medical community. Membership in the "Gateway" program will be strongly encouraged. The major difference for our beneficiaries will be that they will come to our direct care system first for treatment rather than going directly to a civilian facility which is not part of the "Gateway" alliance.

In conclusion, the Army Medical Department is proud of its service to the Nation in peace and war. We are committed to providing quality health care to the soldiers and their families that we serve. The challenge that we face is going to be that of balancing our efforts. We must balance the resources we get and use, and balance the efforts we make in day-to-day care with those we make in readiness. The positive side of balancing our daily mission and the readiness mission is the fact that our most sophisticated mission in wartime is the same as our most sophisticated mission in peacetime. It's the care of real patients. We learn how to take care of wartime wounded, not by reading about it, but by taking care of the peacetime injured and sick.

As I have noted, the AMEDD has several initiatives to accomplish both missions. I am committed to maintaining the momentum of those initiatives and also achieving a balance between the two missions.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any of your questions.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. Admiral Zimble?

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JAMES A. ZIMBLE, SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. NAVY

Admiral ZIMBLE. Thank you, sir, for the opportunity to appear before you today and to discuss Navy medicine and our fiscal year 1992 budget request. I certainly appreciate your support over the last 4 years.

There is great evidence of progress in both the readiness and in the benefit areas. Desert Shield/Desert Storm showed a deployment of 11,850 medical department personnel, which included 9,700 personnel from the Active side, and another 2,000 plus in the Reserves. There were an additional 6,400 reservists that backfilled our hospitals.

Navy medicine was on line and on time. We sent our very best to meet a worst-case scenario, and we demonstrated that we were ready. There is no question that we have lessons to learn, and my office is aggregating and assessing those lessons so that we can benefit from the extremely valuable medical exercise that we went through in the Desert Storm/Desert Shield.

Our health care services have demonstrated that access is up. We believe we have reached a turning point in CHAMPUS. We think Coordinated Care is the single way to go in the future. We are continuing to improve quality and value of services to our Navy and Marine Corps personnel and their families.

Our future is in our strength. The interactions that occur daily between providers, supporting staff, and our patients, and the essence of Coordinated Care, are moving management decisions as close as possible to the level of their transaction. We need to empower the local commanders to plan, to organize, and to direct health care services in the communities. They know best. The Navy fully supports Dr. Mendez's Coordinated Care Program, and we expect to be a full partner in its development and implementation.

I hasten to add that empowerment does not mean leaving local commanders out there on their own. We should not confuse the need for local autonomy, flexibility, and responsiveness with abrogating management responsibilities at the headquarter levels. I have serious reservations about moving all of the funds to the local catchment area, especially in the early phases of that development.

Now, you have supported a wide variety of tools for the Coordinated Care laboratory, and we need your help to expand the application of some of those tools in support of the other legislative bodies' desire to make other tools permanent. We hope you will work with us to design and implement a workable system based upon informed risks. I do not think a sudden redistribution of hard-to-get assets is necessarily an informed risk.

Manpower is military service's most precious asset. We certainly recognize that in the medical community, and we recognize the end

strength will be the currency of our immediate future. Navy leadership understands our role in both peace and war and fully appreciates the value of Navy medicine and the dedicated medical department people who serve her.

End-strength fences are not necessary, and may even result in a less effective Navy in the long run. Now, we need to have the flexibility to work with the Chief of Naval Personnel to design a balanced force for the future.

I am delighted and thank you for introducing Rear Admiral Hagen, my relief, to this committee, and would ask your indulgence if I receive any hard questions, to be able to pass them off to my relief.

Thank you very much.

Senator GLENN. Chicken. [Laughter.]

[The prepared statement of Admiral Zimble follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY VICE ADM. JAMES A. ZIMBLE, MEDICAL CORPS, U.S. NAVY, SURGEON GENERAL AND CHIEF, BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Mister Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to come before you and your colleagues to tell you about the challenges your Navy Medical Department has met over the last year, and to give you a look at those which remain.

I have never felt better about what I do and the people with whom I serve, than I do today.

You have invested heavily in Military Medicine. Those have proven to be prudent investments. I have repeatedly assured you that Navy Medicine was standing by, ready to assist—in nautical terms, Charlie Golf One! Mister Chairman, when called, Navy Medicine was there. Our people and systems were on line, on time!

After briefly reviewing our organization I will bring you up to date on Navy health care operations, and the status of our personnel programs. In the last part of the statement I discuss in detail Navy's response to Operations Desert Shield/Storm and highlight some Navy medical items in the President's fiscal year 1992 Department of Defense budget.

ORGANIZATION

The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery is responsible for the operation of 35 hospitals in the United States and overseas (four of which are multi-disciplinary teaching hospitals and five of which are family practice teaching hospitals), 180 medical clinics, and 174 dental treatment facilities. These are exclusive of facilities on U.S. Navy ships and in Marine Corps units.

The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery also oversees medical research, investigating issues which will keep naval forces healthy and able to carry out their mission. This is accomplished through the Naval Medical Research and Development Command in Bethesda, Maryland, which has responsibility for the Naval Medical Research Institute, Naval Health Research Center, Naval Dental Research Institute, and the Naval Medical Research Units in Cairo, Jakarta, and Peru, the Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory, and the Naval Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory.

Also under the aegis of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery are the Naval Aerospace Medical Institute, the Navy Ophthalmic Support and Training Activity, the Naval Medical Data Services Center, the Naval Medical Logistics Command, the Navy Environmental Health Center, and the Naval Health Sciences Education and Training Command.

The Naval Aerospace Medical Institute is the locus of all of our aerospace medicine related activities including graduate medical education, research, and clinical consultation to the Fleet and Fleet Marine Force.

The Navy Ophthalmic Support and Training Activity provides prescription eye wear and gas mask optical inserts for all Navy and Marine Corps personnel and trains Hospital Corpsmen in Optician skills. During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the Activity increased production by over 90 percent. They produced 12 months of work in 6. This extraordinary performance reflected personal sacrifice, deferred leave, and long hours for everyone. The Activity adopted a 24 hour production

schedule and its personnel are truly leading examples of our many "unsung heroes" of the Gulf operation.

All of our data processing systems are developed and coordinated by the Naval Medical Data Services Center. The Center served as the central clearinghouse for Desert Shield/Storm data gathering and analysis, developed the tri-service protocols for capturing Desert Storm casualty data; developed the frozen blood inventory system; and adapted the Automated Quality of Care Evaluation Support System (AQCESS) Mass Casualty Module to assist in tracking Desert Storm casualties.

The Naval Medical Logistics Command provides medical logistic and materiel management support to the Fleet, Fleet Marine Forces, and ashore medical and dental treatment facilities. The Medical Logistics Command provided significant medical logistics support for USNS *Mercy*, USNS *Comfort*, and our three 500 bed fleet hospitals in theater, enabling these medical platforms to perform their Operation Desert Storm support missions.

The Navy Environmental Health Center (NEHC) is Navy's equivalent of the Public Health Service Centers for Disease Control. It is responsible for tracking infectious disease, for preventive medicine measures, and for environmental and occupational health. During the early phases of Operation Desert Shield, NEHC coordinated the assignment of 12 Navy preventive medicine and vector control personnel to augment the U.S. Navy Central Command and the U.S. Marine Corps Central Command. During hostilities NEHC provided two 12 member teams to provide public health and disaster relief assessment in support of Civil Action Groups responsible for refugee and prisoner of war functions.

The Naval Health Sciences Education and Training Command (HSETC) operates the Naval Schools of Health Sciences and Hospital Corps schools. HSETC trains medical personnel and oversees all outservice and inservice education and training programs for both officer and enlisted Medical Department personnel.

These activities and the functions they perform are an integral and vital part of Navy medicine. While we talk of our direct health care operations and the costs of that element of our mission, I would ask that we remain vigilant in maintaining the capabilities I have just outlined. These functions are absolutely essential to our combat support capability and to our ability to affect the readiness of our fighting forces in peacetime.

HEALTH CARE OPERATIONS

Since 1988, when given the responsibility, the Navy has undertaken an aggressive Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) management program. While working with you and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), to overcome perceived legislative and policy constraints, we are progressing toward an integrated system of health care management.

As the recently enacted increases in CHAMPUS deductibles encourage users to return to the direct care system, they will find the system more responsive and attractive than they recall from their past experiences. By assessing local beneficiaries' health care needs, evaluating the staffing and capabilities of our treatment facilities, and considering alternative health care resources available in the communities in which the facilities are located, we have developed a composite picture of health care delivery. Overall analysis of fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year 1990 in-house productivity as compared to CHAMPUS support indicates a return of the beneficiary to our facilities. Catchment area statistics for inpatient and outpatient care signify that in-house treatment has increased while CHAMPUS has decreased 15.6 and 35.9 percent respectfully. This shift is momentous when compared to figures of fiscal year 1987 which indicated the diametric effect. The return of patients from CHAMPUS includes specialty care and therefore are resource intensive. Leveling of resources will certainly reduce our ability to continue our achievements in this area. The beneficiary population does not show a parallel decline directly related to troop reductions; therefore, our patient base will be maintained and could continue to rise in time as our retired population increases in both age and size. The commanding officers of our military treatment facilities are looking beyond the walls of their hospitals; they are sensitive and responsive to the needs of all the beneficiaries within their catchment areas.

HEALTH CARE CONTRACTING

In 1984, Congress directed the armed services to conduct demonstration projects to improve access, quality, efficiency and cost effectiveness in delivering health care services. The NAVCARE program was one of those demonstration projects that has been an undeniable success. In 1986, the first four NAVCARE clinics were opened

in our largest beneficiary catchment areas and the remaining six clinics opened in 1988. By the end of fiscal year 1990, those 10 NAVCARE clinics had generated 2,189,209 outpatient visits since opening in 1986. Each clinic averages 251 visits per day—an increase of 20 percent over fiscal year 1989. A similar increase in visits is expected for fiscal year 1991 over 1990. NAVCARE clinic care has proven to be a cost effective method of providing health care—the average cost per visit for fiscal year 1990 was $45.31, reduced from $53.43 in fiscal year 1989. The first NAVCARE PRIME clinic was opened at Cecil Field, FL, on April 1, 1991. NAVCARE PRIME contracts provide services similar to the original NAVCARE clinics, including some occupational services, however, these clinics are located in government-owned facilities rather than contractor-owned (leased) facilities. The cost of our NAVCARE contracts is based on a fixed price per patient visit and visit type. New contract awards in fiscal year 1992 (including the NAVCARE PRIME contract) will not allow for an incentive award available to the contractor since workload has been leveled by budget reductions. To ensure quality and performance standards are met, contracts are monitored by government Contract Officer Technical Representatives (COTR) who report to the contracting officer but support the referral Naval Hospitals for each contract. In a recent survey, 90 percent of our customers rated our services at the clinics as "satisfactory" to "outstanding." We are continually looking for ways to improve both the perception of and actual quality of services provided at these clinics.

Other centrally managed contracting initiatives include 24 emergency medicine/acute ambulatory care contracts; 7 obstetrics/gynecology contracts, 19 nursing service contracts. We also have contracts for general surgery, orthopedics, radiology, pharmacy and laboratory support. Contracting for health care has helped reduce many of the earlier problems we faced with increased workload and inadequate staffing.

CATCHMENT AREA MANAGEMENT

We are committed to the Department of Defense's program for coordinated health care management. My strong personal preference is to fully develop the Catchment Area Management concept.

Catchment Area Management (CAM) is an innovative concept in which the local commanding officer (Charleston as a starter) can more economically and effectively manage the financial resources allocated for health care within that geographic region. CAM is a managed care system with the following characteristics:

— Available to all CHAMPUS beneficiaries;

— Voluntary beneficiary enrollment;

— Fee-for-service (usually discounted) civilian health care provider network;

— Health Care Finder System designed to get the patient to the correct active duty or CAM provider in a timely way, reduces the "hasslefactor" in seeking care in our system while helping people gain access to the care and care givers they need;

— Improved claims management to pay claims quickly, minimize rework and keep our suppliers happy.

Working with our fiscal intermediary for the Charleston, SC, area, we built a preferred provider organization (PPO) network of over 230 health care providers based on negotiated, discounted, fee-for-service agreements.

The centerpiece of this system is the Health Care Finder program that makes appointments at medical treatment facilities (MTFs) and in the CAM PPO network. At the intake site, the patient is screened for care needed, providers are identified from which the patient may choose, and the appointment is made and confirmed—one stop shopping. All CHAMPUS beneficiaries are encouraged to use this system. Enrolled beneficiaries are required to use the Health Care Finder System. Enrollment began in the summer of 1990, and service delivery started September 1. As of January 1, 1991, over 2,000 beneficiaries were enrolled. As required by current legislative language, enrollment is voluntary. For the moment, monetary incentives are available to encourage beneficiaries to enroll in the system (decreased co-payment charges and waivers of annual deductible). However, disincentives, for those who choose not to enroll, are not permitted, and the report accompanying the House of Representatives version of the Fiscal Year 1991 Department of Defense Appropriations bill prohibits the use of reduced co-payments or deductibles as program enrollment incentives. Beneficiaries have the option of using CHAMPUS if the care is not available within the military treatment facility (MTF). The beneficiary population is turning to the 11 full time Health Care Finders for appointments and information as evidenced by the number of telephone calls—50 per day in September 1990, to 440 per day in March 1991. The Health Care Finders service has been expanded to 6 days per week. We are eager to reach the point where we have sufficient data to

evaluate the total savings and the potential for system wide deployment of CAM. First quarter fiscal year 1991, MTF non-active duty admissions increased by 7 percent. First quarter fiscal year 1991, MTF non-active duty outpatient visits increased by 11 percent.

A second more ambitious tri-service CAM project is planned for the Tidewater area. This is an area " ripe" for such a project. A total of the other five CAM demonstration projects together would not equal the potential magnitude of the Tidewater CAM. In fiscal year 1990, Tidewater CHAMPUS claims totaled $110 million. Three MTFs—one from each military department—overlap catchment areas, and there is an excess of private sector health delivery capacity in that area. There is line support from Navy, Army, Air Force and Coast Guard for this initiative. A Board of Directors, consisting of the three MTF commanding officers, will oversee the health care outside the MTFs. Finally, short of designating each of our MTFs as a CAM, we have initiated the development of hospital specific "Business Plans." Each MTF submitted a managed care charter describing how it would satisfy the health care requirements for beneficiaries within its market (or catchment) area. Individual clinical specialty plans were formulated and merged at the headquarters level to match requirements with available manpower resources. From these business plans we derive our training and recruitment objectives. The plans provide the critical information we need to plan health care service levels in each different market area.

CIVILIAN HEALTH AND MEDICAL PROGRAM OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES (CHAMPUS)

While the cost growth in this indemnity insurance program is somewhat less than similar health insurance plans in the civilian community, we are intent on making it as cost effective as possible. To the 25 percent of our beneficiaries residing outside of MTF catchment areas, it is the only government provided safety net available for covering health care expenses. We are continuously working to improve management of this costly program. We are now examining the potential value of requiring providers to bill the fiscal intermediary directly, irrespective of their participation status. This would bring the program in line with Medicare practices. We are also addressing the issue of administrative turmoil created by the need to rebid the contracts for fiscal intermediaries every 5 years. At the very least we assure ourselves of a loss of administrative efficiency during the transition period from one intermediary to another. Here again there is a Medicare program analog. The Health Care Finance Administration has at least one fiscal intermediary contract that it has continuously renewed since the 1960s.

I mentioned earlier our "market area" approach to managing health care around our military treatment facilities. The authority the Congress granted for using CHAMPUS funds to pay for alternative health care arrangements has opened the door for innovative thinking and planning at the facility level. As we become more aggressive in our management strategies we are finding the language somewhat limiting in that it, apparently, restricts us to care provided "in military treatment facilities." In today's complex health care environment the "facility" has become just one component of a system of service providers and agencies in each catchment area. We need to be able to look outside the walls of the facility and work within the entire decision space if we are to influence meaningfully, the demand, supply, cost and quality of services provided to our beneficiaries.

PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

We are also investing heavily in military/civilian health services partnerships. Combining military and civilian health care resources to improve cost-effectiveness to the Department of Defense increases availability of health care services in MTFs to beneficiaries and helps control CHAMPUS expenses. We are aggressively negotiating lower rates of reimbursement as existing agreements are renewed, as well as when new ones are started. Under partnership agreements, the beneficiary is a definite participant in cost savings. In internal agreements, care is provided by CHAMPUS authorized civilian health care practitioners at the MTF, and CHAMPUS deductible/cost share is not applicable. In external agreements, care is provided in the civilian facility by military health care practitioners. Normal CHAMPUS rules apply, but there is no cost to the patient for the professional services of the military provider. This initiative has much potential at older, deteriorating MTFs without facility replacement funds.

OTHER MANAGED CARE INITIATIVES

Department of Defense/Veterans Affairs Resource Sharing Agreements

Under our managed care initiatives, we now have 497 Navy/Veterans Affairs sharing agreements in effect. Public Law 97-174 in 1982 which authorized this effort, allows local reimbursement at negotiated rates for services shared between VA and DOD treatment facilities. This encourages combining of workloads to exploit the full potential of equipment, expanded services and staff. A broader array of health services are provided for both VA and DOD beneficiary populations. The net effect of sharing is improved access, managed savings or cost avoidance, and enhanced quality.

Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities (USTF)

We are working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to develop managed care models incorporating the USTFs which should bring the same cost effectiveness to this health care option as our other initiatives.

Family Practice Hospitals

Further chapters are being written in Navy medicine's Family Practice Hospital Program success story. The existing models at Rota, Spain, and Newport, Rhode Island, effectively use trained family practice physicians. The "case management" of all empaneled families, with monitoring of demand, costs, utilization and productivity will improve patient satisfaction and help control CHAMPUS costs. Naval Hospital Lemoore, CA, was slated for replacement in fiscal year 1995, and the new facility will be designed to facilitate an expanded family practice program. Our family practice residency programs at Naval Hospitals Bremerton, WA, Charleston, SC, Jacksonville, FL, Camp Pendleton, CA, and Pensacola, FL, are being emphasized and will increase the number of family physicians available.

QUALITY IMPROVEMENT

Maryland Hospital Association Quality Assurance Project

Nobody does it better! And now we can prove it!! By every meaningful measurable standard the quality of military health care services predictably, and reliably, equals or exceeds that available from similarly evaluated non-military hospitals and clinics. Since January 1989, 33 Navy hospitals have participated in the Maryland Hospital Association's Quality Assurance Project. The project monitors and quantifies problem prone aspects of patient care using clinically relevant quality of care indicators. Based on patient care outcomes, the project permits us to compare similar hospitals for outcome trends and to demonstrate appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of our medical services. Navy hospitals consistently outperform their peer facilities. The project has not yet fully matured as a quality indicator, but so far—I am proud of what I see!

Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations

Navy Hospitals are accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO). One product of a JCAHO survey is an accumulation score on its Accreditation Decision Grid. High scores are good—low scores are not so good. The graph below tells the Navy medical quality story quite convincingly. The average grid score for all inspected Navy treatment facilities was 86.7. This compares to an average score for non-DOD facilities of 77.2.



Note that not only is the average Navy score higher, but, the entire range of Navy scores is shifted to the right. You would be hard pressed to find a higher level of quality in any other health care system in the world.

External Civilian Peer Review Program

The acid test of every professional's performance is an assessment by one's peers. The Department of Defense contracts with an external peer review organization to examine the records of patients treated in military treatment facilities. I am pleased to report that after examining 12,364 treatment records the peer review organization found only 337 records in which they had some question about the documented care. Please note that their exceptions are with the documentation of care, not necessarily the care itself. Nonetheless, we are not satisfied with 97.3 percent agreement with our record of performance. We will work hard to reduce the remaining 2.7 percent even further.

Strategic Planning

In addition to the above efforts which focus on immediate quality concerns, the Navy Medical Department over the past year began implementing quality improvement efforts with a longer term orientation. Our leadership and management training courses have been modified to include process improvement topics and have begun to emphasize identification and satisfaction of "customer requirements." We have taken initial steps to provide increased awareness of the importance of data-based problem solving utilizing the team approach, and we will shortly finalize our first 10 year strategic plan to help ensure that the Navy Medical Department of the 21st century will improve on its ability to provide responsive, effective, efficient, and timely health care to our Navy/Marine Corps team.

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

RESERVE PERSONNEL

I testified last year that the Selected Reserve is an integral part of your Navy health care delivery team. Let me rephrase that; as Operation Desert Shield/Storm has proven, the Selected Reserve is an essential part of your health care delivery

team. The Reserve doctors, dentists, nurses, allied health professionals, administrators, corpsmen and dental technicians represent the difference between what the Navy can afford for its peacetime mission and what it needs for its wartime responsibilities.

Early in Operation Desert Shield the Reserves were called to backfill for our forward deploying medical personnel at our continental United States (CONUS) treatment facilities. As we shifted from Desert Shield to Desert Storm, the Reserves were called upon to serve in the theater of operations. In the theater, two of the Navy's three 500 bed fleet hospitals were manned by Reserves. The Reserve medical personnel represented almost 25 percent of the full complement aboard the hospital ships *Mercy* and *Comfort*. Medical department reservists served with the Marine Corps in the field and provided additional capability on board several amphibious ships which would have served as Primary Casualty Receiving and Treatment Ships. At the beginning of the conflict we had over 19,000 health care professionals in our Selected Reserve programs, of which 10,220 are currently onboard. By February 6, 5,500 hospital corpsmen had been recalled, 10 times as many as any other Navy enlisted community called in support of Operation Desert Storm. Nurses and physicians were the number one and two officer communities recalled. These actions validate an important point, we must maintain a medical Reserve force that is trained and of sufficient numbers to meet mission objectives such as we faced in Operation Desert Storm. It is easy to forget during periods of prolonged peace why we have the Reserves. Medical reservists are difficult to recruit and retain, and they must be nurtured in our all volunteer force if they are to be available in times of crisis. To profit fully from the large numbers of reservists in peacetime, we need to expand their mission statement to include the contributory support mission that they have been performing in our medical and dental treatment facilities around the world. The reservists have been providing substantial amounts of clinical mutual support, to our beneficiaries, a program that pays a peacetime health care dividend while increasing mobilization readiness.

During peacetime we lived off the interest from your previous investments in our Reserve forces. During Desert Storm we were spending the principal. The call-up of large numbers of health care specialists for this conflict had the potential to wreak economic havoc on the lives of some of our Naval reservists. It is unclear at this time what the effect of implementing the call-up will be upon future recruiting and retention, especially among physician and dentist specialists. It may be necessary to implement innovative recruiting and retention programs to sustain the Reserve force. The inequities in special pays between the reservists and Active component personnel were troublesome to many reservists.

We have achieved one Navy, Active and Reserve working together to meet this latest challenge. The medical reserves have proven their worth in peace and war. I know you join me in saluting our care givers who are demonstrating what it means to be twice a citizen, a NAVAL RESERVIST.

MEDICAL CORPS

Medical Officer Retention Bonus

The Medical Officer Retention Bonus (MORB) authority expired on September 30, 1990 after 2 years in existence. After the first year of experience the Center for Naval Analyses found preliminary indications that the MORB had positive effects on the short-term retention in some medical specialties. More current analyses are not yet complete. Thorough analyses will take several years since the MORB is a 2 to 4 year retention program.

Mutyear Special Pay

Enough experience was available to warrant continuation of a long term retention program for Medical Corps officers. Effective January 1, 1991 a new Multiyear Special Pay (MSP), program was authorized by Congress and implemented by the Department. All specialties are included in the MSP, a decided improvement over MORB.

Total specialty compensation has remained constant since fiscal year 1989 when it peaked at $36,000 for certain specialties. This cap is authorized to increase should retention and other criteria warrant. Military/civilian pay gaps are approaching $100,000 in some specialties making significant pay increases necessary for pay alone to be an effective retention tool. The fiscal year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 101-510) has provided a pay structure not expected to change in the near term.

Physician Recruiting and Retention

Improved retention continues to be a significant concern. A Medical Department Officer Retention Group has been organized to develop retention initiatives aimed at emphasizing command involvement, e.g. retention/recruitment awards.

The Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program (AFHPSP) remains the primary accession source for the Navy Medical Corps accounting for over 70 percent of all accessions. AFHPSP recipients constitute over 95 percent of General Medical Officers, Flight Surgeons, and Undersea Medical Officers serving in support of operational units. The number of AFHPSP scholarship authorizations is 1,375 this year, and is planned to grow to 1,400 in fiscal year 1992. This is the minimum level of scholarships necessary to meet the requirements placed on Navy Medicine.

The Financial Assistance Program (FAP) has seen only minimal success. Insufficient financial incentive for residents in the targeted specialties is apparently the reason for the weak response to this program.

Recruiting initiatives have also contributed to our growing physician inventory. We have maintained an increased number of recruiters in the field dedicated to recruiting medical personnel. Also, once a physician prospect is identified, we have refined our "one-stop-shopping" program in which the candidate comes to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD, for a physical and professional interview. At the end of the second day the candidate is offered an appointment, or told why an appointment cannot be offered. We have obtained approval from the Secretary of the Navy to commission particularly desirable candidates at "one-stop-shopping." One important net result of all of the recruiting initiatives, including a Naval Recruiting Command contract for credentials verification, is that the average time for processing a new candidate has been reduced from 120 days in 1988 to a more responsive 47 days in this year.

DENTAL CORPS

Recruitment and retention of both general and specialty trained dentists continues to be a concern. First year enrollments in dental school persist at the lowest levels in the past 20 years. Reductions in operating dental schools, exorbitant educational indebtedness of recent graduates, increasing pay disparities (particularly among specialty trained dentists) and decreasing consideration for governmental service all serve as challenges to accession and retention of our dentists. The pool of applicants available to the Navy Dental Corps has gradually declined over the past few years as graduating seniors are demonstrating a tendency away from military service and toward civilian residency programs and group practices.

To attack these problems we have restored the opportunity for prospective dental students to participate in the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program (AFHPSP) by offering 20 positions to exemplary seniors in dental school. Additionally, using the Financial Assistance Program (FAP) we are offering five positions to oral and maxillofacial surgery residents entering their last years of residency training.

We have completed an exhaustive survey of our dental officers and determined that indebtedness levels exceed those published by the American Dental Association. Navy dental officers accessed in 1989 experienced an average indebtedness of over $48,000. Returned surveys from initial 1990 accessions report an average indebtedness of over $61,000.

The gap between military and civilian dental pay continues to expand. The medical department is participating with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the other Federal services in the development of special pay proposals to offset these disparities and resolve growing disincentives to military service for dentists.

Congressionally directed dental special pays established in 1980 were developed to approach comparability with the civilian sector. Adjustments initiated in 1985 by Congress allowed the services to realign dental special pays and add board certified pay without increasing the total authorization.

Raises in basic pay and special pays have not kept pace with inflation. Dental accessions to the Navy Dental Corps in 1991 will earn less in real terms over a career than their counterparts who entered in 1980. This results from loss of the 4 year longevity previously granted for the 4 years of dental school, increasing time-in-grade requirements for promotion opportunity, realignment of dollars favoring board certified pay and fixed rate of special pays without inflation or cost of living adjustments. At a time when civilian dentist's income is growing, the real dollar value of the military dentist's income is decreasing.

Current "dental saved pay" laws were developed by Congress to prevent active duty medical department officers from making less pay than previously authorized. But today a specialist who achieves board certification sees only a small raise due to the commensurate loss of "saved pay."

Efforts to offset unmet recruiting and retention goals through accession of established private practitioners have met with only minimal success, and then only within the generalist community. The predominant reason for this is the significant difference in military and civilian pay for the specialty communities.

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

The Medical Service Corps (MSC) continues to be a stable, healthy corps in the Navy Medical Department despite the broad diversity of administrative, clinical and research specialties. For most of our MSC specialties, retention rates over the last 5 years have consistently exceeded 90 percent. Notwithstanding the overall balance of the Medical Service Corps, certain specialty shortages continue to exist. These specialties remain the focus of aggressive accession and retention initiatives.

In an effort to increase the available pool of eligible applicants, we have expanded entry age waiver authority for clinical psychology, pharmacy, optometry, occupational therapy and physician assistants. In addition, we are again offering work experience credit to pharmacists. Our clinical psychology internship program was doubled in an effort to enhance our primary accession source. I am also looking toward our involvement with the Uniformed Service University of the Health Sciences clinical psychology Ph.D program and the Army post-doctoral psychotropic medication program. We have reinstituted the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program (AFHPSP) opportunity for highly qualified optometry students. This initiative will assist in meeting our staffing requirements for these primary eye care professionals.

Despite continued attention, we have been relatively unsuccessful in our ability to attract physician assistants through the direct accession program. Our in-house physician assistant training program remains vital to meeting our requirements. We have expanded the opportunity for this medical department inservice procurement commissioning opportunity to include dental technicians. Age waiver authority has also been approved.

Rapid changes in health care delivery and the increasingly key roles of nonphysician health care professionals will continue to challenge us in the Navy medical department to provide rewarding career opportunities. Competition will only become more keen for the services of these professionals. I am confident that our recruiting efforts in conjunction with expanded professional opportunities will help sustain a healthy Medical Service Corps.

NURSE CORPS

Although there have been improvements in Nurse Corps recruitment and retention in 1990, the impact of the national nursing shortage continues to challenge recruitment and retention programs. While national enrollment in nursing education programs rose 10.6 percent in 1990, as compared with a 5.8 percent rise in 1989, the demand for nurses and the resulting rise in starting salaries continues. In addition, the American Association of Colleges of Nursing reported in January 1991 that despite enrollment increases in nursing schools for the second straight year, significant numbers of qualified students could not be admitted due to faculty shortages and other budget constraints. A national nurse recruiter publication indicated that average salaries for staff nurses rose 13.2 percent in 1990. Increases in civilian sector salary impact on both military and civil service nurse recruitment and retention as well as increasing costs for nurse contracts. These issues have wide-spread implications for all nurse employers and those requiring nursing care.

Congressional authorization in fiscal year 1991 permits the services to extend special pay to critical nurse specialities, which provides an opportunity to improve some of the nurse salary imbalances. We need to ensure that there is a parity across all categories of nurse professionals as we develop the implementation proposal. The tri-service compensation task force is developing the criteria for this pay.

The ability to use the new Veterans Affairs wage scale to adjust civil service nurses' salaries will assist in alleviating some of the civilian personnel nurse shortages as well. We will monitor the effect our use of this new authority has on our ability to attract and retain nurse resources.

The recruitment initiatives, such as the $5,000 accession bonus, that were extended until September 30, 1992 will also keep us more competitive in the nursing personnel market place.

The nurse scholarship programs are highly effective. The Bachelor Degree Completion Program (BDCP) continues to draw active interest and is now authorized to have 250 students. We received 73 new Nurse Corps officers from this program in 1990, and we expect nearly 185 graduates this year. We have recommended over 625 applicants since its inception in April 1989.

While it is still a bit too early to draw significant conclusions, we are optimistic about participation in the nurse Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarship program. Expansion to a full 4 year program in June 1990 increased our ability to attract qualified students into a nursing career. We recently selected over 60 high school seniors for the 4 year program. We will continue to work closely with the Chief of Naval Education and Training to monitor and improve the program. Removal of the congressional limitation for the Nurse Corps Candidate Program in 1990 to allow recruiting on other than Navy ROTC campuses should aid recruitment into this program. Eligibility criteria for the Medical Enlisted Commissioning Program were expanded to accept applications from all enlisted ratings in 1990. This year we again were gratified to have a quality rich pool of applicants for the 50 annual positions available. We currently have over 130 participants in colleges of nursing, 31 of whom will graduate and become Nurse Corps officers in 1991.

Collectively, these programs constitute a powerful package of Navy nurse recruiting incentives which should be continued for they are the lifeline for future accessions. We expect to maximize participation in all of our scholarship programs to replace expected nurse personnel losses.

Retention remains our number one priority. Nurse Corps retention rose slightly in 1990. The Nurse Corps retention and recruitment task force is currently developing initiatives which include: a recruitment and retention award; a nursing publication award; an award for achieving facility accreditation from civilian agencies; and a streamlined recall to active duty process.

We continue to work with the Chief of Naval Personnel to alleviate the promotion disparity for nurses in legally controlled grades (O-4 through O-6). The Nurse Corps has had constrained promotion to Commander and Lieutenant Commander for several years, resulting in decreased career mobility and job satisfaction. Recent improvement in the promotion process for Nurse Corps officers brings both flow point and opportunity more "in line" with guidance for the control grades. These improvements have been possible only through compensation of control grade numbers from the unrestricted line community. Requiring large numbers of compensation from other communities will not be possible in the future due to decreased size of the military, so the Nurse Corps must continue to use additional community management strategies to address promotion issues.

Gaps between military and civilian salary continue to impact retention of nurse specialists in particular. Early evidence suggests that the incentive special pay (ISP) of up to $6,000 per year for certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) is working. We should reach end strength in the CRNA specialty in 1992 if all current initiatives are maintained. We continue to recruit specialists through our full-time outservice training program (FTOT) and have several nurses enrolled in both anesthesia and family nurse practitioner master's degree programs.

As part of our integrated provider specialty distribution plan we are increasing the use of midwives by expanding our authorized billets from only 4 to 20 over the next 4 years. This will enable us to improve access to care and reduce CHAMPUS costs. The opportunity for full-time duty under instruction to prepare for this expanded clinical role also is a retention incentive for nurses interested in a career in that specialty.

The use of associate degree nurses in the Navy includes a program in place since 1989 to access associate degree nurses, with a related bachelor's degree, as commissioned officers in the Active or Reserve Nurse Corps. Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy established the Technical Nurse Warrant Officer (TNWO) community in February 1990 to afford an opportunity for associate degree educated nurses to enter the Navy. There are over 33 nurse warrant officers assigned to our four large teaching hospitals—Portsmouth, San Diego, Oakland, and Bethesda. They provide direct patient care on the general medical and surgical units expanding our overall nursing capability. The program continues to grow and the reception of these new Medical Department personnel has been very positive.

To maintain the momentum for the Nurse Corps beyond this decade, the director of the Nurse Corps established a "Nursing 2000 Task Force" in August 1990. This group is addressing important questions about the nursing requirements and preparing for the new century. Some of the issues being considered include: increased community health focus; characteristics of patient population and health care re-

quirements; operational commitment; impact of technology; specialty education requirements; and use of case management.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Our civilian personnel represent nearly 27 percent of our total work force. These clinical and support services personnel are an indispensable part of the Navy health care team, providing the long-term continuity as our military personnel rotate to new career assignments.

The total number of civilian personnel we have onboard, 12,390, is the highest in years. This figure does not include RDT&E. However, as with our military health care professionals, we have had problems in recruiting and retaining clinical and clerical personnel in high-cost metropolitan areas. Job fairs, co-op programs, and special pay initiatives have helped recruit the traditionally more difficult to hire personnel such as nurses and pharmacists. The locality pay you authorized should greatly assist hiring in metropolitan areas. All of these efforts have been fairly successful in hiring the professional civilian personnel needed to support our treatment facilities. We have hired civilian nurses where we could successfully compete in local markets. These nurses comprise about one-fourth of the total nursing staff and are a vital part of our health care team. The additional resources Congress provided in fiscal years 1989 and 1990 for support and clerical staff have relieved our physicians and nurses from some of the routine administrative tasks, thereby increasing their productivity. Fiscal year 1990 personnel plans did not fully materialize, due in part to the administrative turbulence of the Department of Defense hiring freeze and as a result of Operation Desert Storm.

For fiscal year 1991, we have small growth to substitute for some military billets, but overall my personnel strength is level with what I had on board in September 1990. As we transition to the future force structure, we must be prepared to revisit the assumptions that we used in leveling medical strength and workload. We must have the flexibility to address the dynamics of optimal health care delivery in a timely, efficient manner.

I have never been prouder than I am today of the dedicated civilian professionals with whom it is my privilege to work. We were very successful at maintaining almost a constant level of workload in our facilities during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. This success is very much the result of the dedication and hard work of our civilian personnel who were the important stabilizing factor during the time when our active military personnel had deployed and reserve members were scaling the learning curves of their new duties.

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Dental Technician

The Dental Technician rating is the smaller of two enlisted health care provider communities of Navy Medicine. With an Enlisted Personnel Authorization (EPA) of 3,617, and 3,479 actually on board at the end of fiscal year 1990, it is the life blood of the dental community. With more and more emphasis placed on dental health and hygiene, a mandate for higher dental readiness in the Armed Forces, expanded care delivery to the dependent population and with increasingly sophisticated technological advances, it is imperative that we maintain our current level of manning.

Retention is high at 68.8 percent overall. We anticipate minimal impact from Operation Desert Storm. Approximately 201 Dental Technicians, 17 of which are women, were mobilized with the Fleet Marine Force. We believe retention will remain high because even a 6-year service obligation has not slowed recruitment in this community.

We have taken several actions to maintain the vitality of the Dental Technician community. The Dental Technician rating obligated service requirement was increased from 5 to 6 years effective June 1, 1990. The U.S. Department of Labor approved the trades Dental Prosthetics, Dental Equipment Installer/Servicer, and Dental Assistant for inclusion in the Navy's Apprenticeship Program. The program gives Navy members the opportunity to receive a National Certificate of Apprenticeship making them journeymen in their trades. A BUMED Attrition Task Force was developed to accurately identify reasons for attrition in our Dental Technician and Hospital Corpsman "A" and "C" schools and to improve the quality of the training provided.

Hospital Corpsmen

Hospital corps manning continued to improve in fiscal year 1990. End fiscal year 1990 figures were 27,925 authorized strength with 27,101 actually onboard.

To accomplish these manning levels we used various incentive programs such as selective reenlistment bonuses, special duty assignment pays and commissioning programs to achieve an impressive record in filling our technical specialty school quotas. To illustrate, in fiscal year 1987, 388 of 2,398 or 16 percent of our seats went unfilled. That percentage has steadily declined each year to 87 of 2,793 or 3 percent unfilled in fiscal year 1990. We continue to strive for a 100 percent fill rate.

Several training initiatives have contributed to our hospital corps manning success. A Follow-on Training Program was developed for Hospital Corpsman "A" School graduates in an attempt to provide the application and reinforcement of newly learned skills and concepts in the clinical environment. The Surface Force Independent Duty curriculum was increased by 140 hours to include OB/GYN training and additional clinical experience.

We also took several actions to increase training and support for Operation Desert Storm. Quotas were increased in many of our "C" schools including Operating Room Technician School which was accelerated from 26 to 18 weeks. Hospital Corpsman "A" School classes were front-loaded in an effort to rapidly increase the number of graduates.

Our main conference room at the Bureau—the place where we promote people and otherwise recognize superior performance—is named the Medal of Honor Hall. The walls are adorned with citations of the courageous performance of 27 Navy medical department heroes who were awarded the highest military award this Nation confers—the Medal of Honor. Twenty-one of those medals were awarded to Hospital Corpsmen. I wouldn't even venture a guess at the number of heroic acts recognized with other awards or those which have not been officially documented. What I can tell you is that the heritage of the past lives in the performance of our people today. While being treated for wounds he received on patrol with his Marine unit, Hospitalman Clarence Conner (awarded the first purple heart of Desert Storm) said, "Please, don't send me home. I've got to get back to my unit. They're depending on me."

We can neither teach nor buy that kind of commitment. Hospitalman Conner brought his values with him to this enterprise. I'm very proud of him for the way he performed his duty and the concern he demonstrated for his marines (and I assure you that's how he feels about them!). But—I'm surprised by this performance. Hospitalman Conner is representative of his corps, not an exception. His exceptional attitude is not unusual. It has been my great honor to be allowed to lead these wonderful men and women.

CONCLUSION

The manning levels needed to support the operating forces in peace and war are entirely a function of force structure and benefit level decisions you make in partnership with the executive branch. In the final analysis, the size and funding level of Navy medicine is determined by the size and distribution of the forces we support, in war and peace, and the health care benefit portion of the total compensation package needed to attract and retain the young women and men who performed so admirably in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman, as we chart a course through the turbulent budget years ahead, I must have the flexibility to work with the Chief of Naval Personnel to reach realistic manning level agreements. Only in this way will we achieve truly balanced programs and forces. Artificially established manpower fences or ceilings only work to make the Navy's task more difficult, and may lead to a less effective Navy in the long term.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Our greatest accomplishments during this year have been the support provided to Operation Desert Storm. During the early phases, we established a Navy Forward Laboratory in-theatre to provide state-of-the-art capabilities to diagnose and treat personnel exposed to biological and chemical agents, to infectious diseases endemic to the Middle East and to diarrheal agents. The support provided by this laboratory reduced significantly the incidence of illnesses and associated incapacitation which we usually see when an immunologically naive force is first introduced into a new area.

With the cooperation of the Food and Drug Administration, we provided our forces with drugs which reduced the lethality of all known Iraqi chemical agents and would allow our personnel to continue to function under chemical agent attack. We also forwarded a drug which would significantly reduce mortality from septic shock. Our medical facilities in country and our hospital ships were provided with a

newly synthesized chemical factor which would enhance bone marrow production and improve survival after mustard gas exposure.

Over 5,000 units of frozen blood were in theatre. This Navy-developed technology allows us to store indefinitely this blood supply, making it immediately available to our casualties. We are also accelerating the development and production of a capability to render potable water suitable for injection. This technology will significantly reduce the tremendous logistics burden of moving, storing, and distributing large volumes of sterile water. This capability will support the next step we plan to take. Through advanced technologies, we will freeze dry blood as well as all other solutions that would be needed for casualty care. We would still need water to reconstitute these solutions, but our capability to generate this injectable water on site will solve such logistics problems.

Research at one of our laboratories confirmed the value of an experimental cooling vest. Ten thousand such vests were provided to Navy and Marine Corps personnel to extend their ability to work in the hot summers of the desert environment. New devices which provide rapid, real-time monitoring of body core-temperature have been moved into the theater. These devices were to help our medical staff to quickly diagnose and treat heat stress injuries before they occur.

I'm most excited about a new procedure we're developing to reduce dependency on continuous water intake. This technique, called hyperhydration, will allow our Marine Corps personnel to load up on water before a mission with the body gradually using this water over the next several hours. This procedure will significantly extend the operational capability of our forces while reducing the need to carry large amounts of water.

The Defense budget before you contains funding for this exciting and vital Navy Medical research program which, as you can see, has been and continues to be very responsive to the operational forces. I earnestly solicit your continued funding support for this strong and aggressive Research and Development program. I also wish to point out that, as lead Agency, Army provides all funding for development of drugs to treat Infectious Diseases, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents. It is vital that Army be adequately funded so they can provide Navy, without delay, sufficient funds for these critically important Navy and Marine Corps operational research programs.

WARTIME MEDICAL SUPPORT

Last year I testified to the Navy Medical Department's readiness to support the Fleet and Fleet Marine Force in whatever contingency they might face. In fulfilling that pledge this year, over 11,500 Navy Medical Department personnel were deployed to the Middle East. The total medical capability deployed in support of our Navy/Marine Corps forces fully satisfied the requirements identified by the operational commanders in the combat theater. Our Hospital Ships and Fleet Hospitals, together with the medical personnel assigned directly to the Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces, provided the most sophisticated medical capability ever deployed, and afforded our casualties in the combat theater a level of care never approached in previous conflicts.

The Navy was able to deploy its medical capabilities swiftly for two reasons: first, our people were ready for their wartime mission; and second, our medical platforms were fully equipped and supplied, and were themselves rapidly deployable. The two Hospital Ships were en route to the Persian Gulf within 5 days after their activation, less than a month after the invasion of Kuwait, and the first Fleet Hospital we activated, Fleet Hospital Five, was pre-positioned in anticipation of requirements in the region. We were able to man these platforms promptly with fully-trained medical and non-medical personnel because of your investment in personnel readiness over the last decade. Likewise, our medical personnel were ready and trained to deploy on schedule with Fleet and Marine Corps elements.

Operation Desert Shield/Storm has proven the merits of Navy Medicine's total-force approach to wartime medical support. Navy medical reservists contributed to every aspect of medical support for Operation Desert Shield/Storm: providing direct operational support of deployed Navy and Marine Corps units; augmenting the active duty crews of the two hospital ships now deployed to the Persian GuN; and enabling the Navy to maintain the quantity and quality of care delivered to its beneficiaries here at home. In addition, they provided the staffs of two additional 500-bed fleet hospitals deployed in the Middle East.

The initial Navy medical deployments relied on active duty personnel. In August and September, the first elements of the crews for the two hospital ships (USNS *Comfort* [T-AH 20] and USNS *Mercy* [T-AH 19]) deployed directly from Navy hospitals, as did the personnel augmenting the Fleet and Fleet Marine Force and the

staff of Fleet Hospital Five. Following the President's decision in late August to call up members of the Selected Reserve, previously identified medical reservists were called to replace the deployed active duty personnel.

When the Operation Desert Shield force expansion began in November, the Navy was able to deploy reservists directly to the theater of operations. The missions of augmenting the hospital ships and of staffing the second and third 500-bed fleet hospitals were assigned to the Naval Reserves. Additional active duty personnel were also deployed from Navy hospitals, and were again replaced by reservists.

Successful integration of the Reserves into every aspect of its operations enabled the Navy Medical Department to support the most rapid large-scale force deployment in history without neglecting the care of its beneficiaries.

I am sure that my pride in Navy Medicine's performance during the past several months is clear to you all. The essential missions of military medicine are to maintain the health of our combat forces and to train and equip our personnel to support those forces in wartime. The Operation Desert Shield/Storm record shows clearly that the Navy Medical Department has recognized and acted on that moral imperative.

BUDGET OVERVIEW

In fiscal year 1991 our budget is based upon achieving medical workload which is essentially level with our fiscal year 1990 effort. I deeply appreciate the efforts by you in Congress to provide us the resource base to do our mission. Supplemental funding has been provided for support of the CHAMPUS program due to the impact of Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

The fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993 budget request for medical programs reflects fully funded CHAMPUS requirements which are consistent with our budgeted in-house workload expectations and current beneficiary population projections. Funding in the military treatment facilities has been adjusted to reflect a decline in active duty beneficiary population, savings associated with a more aggressive third party collection program, and the impact of burdensharing initiatives.

I have two matters on which to alert you. First, the Department of Defense budget you are reviewing is predicated, in part, on assumed savings due to other governments sharing the burden of U.S. forces being stationed in overseas operational areas. I agree in principle with your concerns about more burdensharing, and we have recognized these savings before the bilateral agreements with host governments have been worked out. With the full cooperation of the Congress, the Unified Commanders, and the State Department, the necessary changes in agreements can be negotiated. We need to fully coordinate our efforts, or the savings reflected in fiscal year 1992 may not be achievable.

Second, the budget reflects significant reductions in our base maintenance program due to the reduction in force levels and active duty personnel. Since the force draw down will be achieved primarily by limiting accessions we may not see proportional reductions in the medical workload requirement because our retired require more resource intensive medicine than our accessions. Reducing the base maintenance program due to down sizing the force infrastructure makes sense, but care must be exercised not to reduce medical facilities prematurely.

CONCLUSIONS

The men and women of your Navy Medical Department have been on the front lines continuing to practice the skills they learned, and then perfected in our military treatment facilities. Every major program area was tested during this operation and they all worked in an exemplary fashion. Your investments indeed paid off. Soon it will be necessary to reinvest so that we will be available when next needed.

We are committed to managing health care services in the entire market area surrounding our military treatment facilities. We have many of the tools we will need to do an effective job. Our health care business plans form the basis for our area specific strategies. Some clarification of congressional intent or additional flexibility in the alternate use of CHAMPUS authority may be required.

Mister Chairman, it has been a great honor and privilege to have had the opportunity to serve with the magnificent men and women of the U.S. Navy and especially with my colleagues in Navy Medicine. I know of no calling more rewarding. I thank you for your support. I am confident that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of this great country have been, and will continue to be, well served by you.

NAVY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT MISSION



WE ARE the Medical Department of the United States Navy

OUR MISSION is to ensure the health of our Sailors and Marines so that they are physically and mentally ready to carry out their worldwide mission.

WE WILL ACCOMPLISH this with a comprehensive health promotion program and, when illness or injury intervenes, restore optimal health.

WE WILL STRIVE CONTINUALLY to provide this same level of quality healthcare services to the families of active duty members and to all others entrusted to our care.

WE ARE STANDING BY AND ARE ALWAYS READY TO ASSIST.

NAVY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT VISION



WE ARE the Medical Department of the United States Navy.

WE ARE COMMITTED to providing an environment of healthcare excellence in which:

ALL ENTRUSTED TO OUR CARE proudly view Navy Medicine as their preferred source for healthcare.

HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS view Navy Medicine as a superior arena for realizing their professional growth and satisfaction.

HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS view the Navy Medical Department as a paradigm of excellence.

FLEET AND FIELD COMMANDERS view Navy Medicine as fully capable of providing optimal, timely, and comprehensive healthcare to their Sailors and Marines worldwide in peace and war.

OUR PEOPLE view themselves as empowered members of the world's finest healthcare team.

WE ARE STANDING BY AND WILL ALWAYS BE READY TO ASSIST

NAVY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT GUIDING PRINCIPLES



WE ARE the Medical Department of the United States Navy

WE EXIST to ensure the best physical and mental health of the men and women of the United States Navy and Marine Corps.

WE WILL Support the combat readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps

Care for all persons as unique human beings worthy of our courtesy, compassion and respect.

Earn the trust and confidence of our patients by enthusiastically providing prompt access to quality healthcare.

Attend to the medical needs of the families of our active duty members, our retirees and their families, for just as the family supports the force, so must we support the family.

Teach, for it is through education that we build the foundation for our future.

Continuously improve in all aspects of our enterprise.

WE CARE for each other just as we care for our patients. This is the basis of the teamwork and trust that must exist for us to succeed.

WE ARE STANDING BY AND ARE ALWAYS READY TO ASSIST.

CHARLIE
GOLF
ONE



In the days before radio, seafarers devised a system of communication based upon flags and pennants. Warships on battle line received visual orders from their commander. Merchant vessels plying the oceans trade routes "spoke" by signal flag. Eventually, an international signal code evolved recognized by the navies and merchant fleets of all nations.

Almost any message that can be communicated by the human voice can be represented by a series of signal pennants. The four pennants seen proudly flying beneath the American flag at all Navy medical and dental facilities represent the motto of the Navy Medical Department. The topmost flag, the international answering pennant, signifies that the vessel has received a distress call–CHARLIE GOLF–"Stand by to Assist Me"–and is responding to that request. The remaining three pennants–CHARLIE GOLF ONE–say "I will stand by to assist you." These four pennants reflect a long maritime tradition.

We in the Medical Department also have a long medical tradition for we are standing by and are always ready to assist.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. General Miller?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MONTE B. MILLER, SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. AIR FORCE

General MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Same song, fourth verse. I will be very brief.

For the past 10 years, my predecessors and I have come to Capitol Hill to talk about our medical readiness program. This year, I am pleased to tell you that the plan paid off, that the investment was worth the price, and that we did save American lives.

Late last summer when we rapidly mobilized our medical personnel and equipment to support Desert Shield in a very short time, we arrayed the largest projection of medical personnel in our histo-

ry. Medical deployment to the Persian Gulf was five times faster than during the Vietnam conflict.

The first squadron medical elements of the Air Force and our air transportable clinics left on the 8th of August, just 6 days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The first of our 15 air transportable hospitals were in theater the following week and were ready to receive patients within 24 hours.

For several months over there the medical workload was relatively light, with the usual illnesses and injuries expected in a mass deployment. But that gave our people time to acclimate to the desert, to test their equipment, and to exercise their skills.

Our deployed air transportable hospitals and clinics were ready and provided excellent support to soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. At the same time, our theater air medical evacuation system was running successfully. I am especially proud of the professional teamwork of our Active and Reserve component personnel who mobilized, deployed, and worked hand-in-hand with active duty medics to meet the medical challenges of Desert Storm. Many reservists volunteered for duty even before their units were called up.

The substantial time and effort the Air Force expended in improving medical contingency assets, pre-positioning needed equipment and supplies, and increasing our emphasis on medical readiness training made possible this quick response and effective medical support to Operation Desert Storm.

Our performance confirms the value of investing in medical readiness. One anecdote that addresses one question in your mind, sir, as far as the deployable medical systems, the DEPMEDS—I am very pleased to tell you that those temper tents and those expandable shelters, with a little Yankee ingenuity and duct tape, were even able to keep that very fine sand out of our operating rooms, our laboratories, and our equipment.

The delivery of peacetime health services, as you know, enables us to practice many of the very skills required in wartime. Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm once more proved this very fundamental concept of military medicine.

With Desert Shield/Desert Storm behind us, our continuing long-term challenge in the Air Force is to meet the peacetime health care needs of active duty members, their families, and our retired military members with high-quality, affordable care. Peacetime health care delivery, as you have heard, we feel strongly to be a local matter, best managed by the people who know the unique needs of their patient population, are knowledgeable about local health care resources, and who know the local community well enough to gain its vital support under oversight provided at our level.

Containing costs while enhancing access to quality care is, of course, not just an Air Force concern. It is becoming a national issue. In the current fiscal year, direct care medical financial program represents negative real growth of 2.8 percent from fiscal year 1990. This is a severe management challenge that we are addressing in a variety of ways. Additional reductions in fiscal 1992 further this challenge.

We are studying alternatives and we are evaluating managed care options through our two catchment area demonstration projects in the Phoenix area and in the Austin, Texas area. At these locations, executive mangers do have the responsibility and authority for managing all military health care resources, including CHAMPUS money in their catchment areas.

Through a variety of programs and practices, our military treatment facility commanders are able to improve access and deliver health care resources and services based on local needs and local opportunities. Integral to that continued success are the flexibility and local management prerogatives that you have already heard addressed.

Health care quality continues to be a primary Air Force focus. During 1990 we monitored several established programs to assess the quality of care provided to our beneficiaries. Dr. Mendez highlighted the Joint Commission on Accreditation of health care organizations' statistics. When the DOD Civilian External Peer Review Panel last year reviewed over 35,000 Air Force cases from 1987 to 1989, they found only 2.7 percent of cases that presented an opportunity to improve care.

We are very appreciative of the Congress' continuing support in preserving medical manpower. Under the present system, however, medical service manpower is included in the overall Air Force end strength. When Congress mandates manpower end strength levels and/or reductions, medical spaces are, of course, included in the baseline.

When Congress passed the 1991 Authorization Act, it established a floor for medical manpower, while directing reduced Air Force end strength levels. To reach this level, the Air Force line has to bear a larger portion of the burden. Similarly, medical end strength is very officer intensive and skews the overall Air Force officer to enlisted ratio.

The Air Force medical service of tomorrow will build on today's accomplishments. We will serve a smaller Air Force, yet our retiree population will continue to grow. The lessons learned from Desert Storm will clearly shape our future readiness program refinements, while the effects of recruiting and retention will shape our peacetime health care system. Despite changes, one thing will remain the same, and that is dedication to caring for people.

The men and women of the Air Force medical service make me very proud. They are simply the best at what they do. They are dedicated to our mission, and they will meet the difficult days ahead with talent and professionalism. And my successor inherits a dedicated group of professionals, sir.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. MONTE B. MILLER, SURGEON GENERAL U.S. AIR FORCE

DOD MEDICAL PROGRAMS

Mister Chairman and members of the committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the performance of the Air Force Medical Service and the challenges we face in the 1990s.

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

For the past 10 years, my predecessors and I have come to Capitol Hill to talk about our medical readiness program. This year, I am pleased to tell you that planning paid off, the investment was worth the price, and we have saved American lives. Indeed, we have come a long way since the days when our capability was limited to a handful of ancient 24-bed air transportable hospitals, a small aeromedical evacuation system, limited airlift support, and sketchy plans to expand our peacetime hospitals.

Late last summer, we rapidly mobilized our medical personnel and equipment to support Operation Desert Shield. In a very short time, we arrayed the largest projection of medical personnel in our history. Deployment to the Persian Gulf was five times faster than deployment during the Vietnam conflict.

The first squadron medical elements and air transportable clinics left on August 8, 1990, just 6 days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The first of 15 air transportable hospitals arrived in the theater the following week and was ready to receive patients within 24 hours. By early October, most of the air transportable medical facilities were committed to the operation, and by November, air transportable hospitals from 10 CONUS air bases were in place. The Air Force was the first service to deploy surgical capability and medical decontamination teams to the theater.

The air transportable hospital (ATH) was the principal Air Force medical unit deployed. Each of these 50-bed hospitals has two operating rooms, x-ray, laboratory, and dental capability in hard-walled expandable shelters in addition to wards and administrative areas housed in TEMPER tents. They provide not only medical and surgical inpatient care, but also emergency medical care and outpatient "sick call."

An ATH is designed for rapid mobility. Six C-141s can transport a 50-bed ATH, and once on site, our people can assemble the facility and be fully operational within 24 hours.

In addition to these medical treatment facilities, the Air Force had several overseas contingency hospitals collocated with aeromedical staging facilities and blood transshipment centers. One of these contingency hospitals was a 250-bed facility located in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Several tactical fighter wing hospitals and prepositioned contingency hospitals in Germany and England were also staffed and ready to receive patients. These "turn-key" contingency hospitals were fully equipped, needing only the professional staff to begin operations. Four of these contingency hospitals—Zweibrucken in Germany, and RAF Bicester, Nocton Hall, and Little Rissington in the United Kingdom—were staffed. In fact, the Air Force had the largest bed capability for Desert Storm casualties in Europe.

For several months, medical workload was relatively light with the usual illnesses and injuries expected in a mass-deployment operation. But that gave our people time to acclimate to the desert, test their equipment, and exercise their skills. They made the most of the opportunity, and our deployed air transportable hospitals and clinics provided excellent support to soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. At the same time, our theater aeromedical evacuation system was running successfully.

We were ready to treat and evacuate casualties exposed to chemical warfare agents. Initial deployment was so rapid, that many units left for the Persian Gulf without a full set of biological/chemical warfare antidotes, but U.S. Central Command remedied the problem from in-theater stocks.

The few Desert Storm casualties, like the ill and injured during Desert Shield, were transported to the care they need by the worldwide aeromedical evacuation system. Within the Middle East, Air Force C-130 aircraft were the backbone of tactical aeromedical evacuation. Military Airlift Command C-141 Starlifters provided patient airlift from the theater to Europe and from Europe to CONUS. Within the CONUS, both C-9s and C-130s were available to redistribute arriving patients to facilities providing the care they needed.

I am especially proud of the professional teamwork of our Active and Reserve component personnel who mobilized, deployed, and worked hand-in-hand to meet the medical challenges of Desert Storm. Reservists volunteered for duty even before their units were called up. But we needed more help. In November, we began an involuntary recall of Reserve units and individual mobilization augmentees. The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard provided urgent support in CONUS facilities, and formed a significant part of the Medical Service cadre deployed to Europe and the Arabian Peninsula. Reserve forces also made up the largest part of our aeromedical evacuation system. In fact, on August 9, 2 days after Desert Shield began, 24 tactical aeromedical evacuation crews from the Air National Guard and 20 Air Force Reserve strategic aeromedical evacuation crews were at McGuire AFB, NJ,

awaiting airlift to the Persian Gulf. Their enthusiasm and professionalism assured that our forces were well cared for.

Desert Storm was the first operational test of the DOD frozen blood program, which began in 1984. Liquid blood lasts only 35 days, but frozen blood lasts 10 years or more. The high-tech but labor intensive frozen blood deglycerolization procedure allows two blood bank technicians with four cell-washing machines to thaw, wash and deglycerolize 90 units of frozen red blood cells in a 12-hour shift. Frozen assets gave donor centers the lead time they needed to prime and fill the liquid pipeline to replenish the theater's liquid blood supply. Each transshipment center in the Gulf had a staff of six and could store 7,200 units of fresh blood.

The substantial time and effort the Air Force expended in improving medical contingency assets, prepositioning needed equipment and supplies, and increasing the emphasis on medical readiness training made possible our quick response and effective medical support to Operation Desert Storm. Our performance confirms the value of investing in medical readiness activities.

THE PEACETIME CHALLENGE: REDUCING COSTS AND IMPROVING ACCESS

The delivery of peacetime health services enables us to practice the very skills required in wartime. Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm once more proved this fundamental concept of military medicine.

Our continuing long term challenge is to meet the peacetime health care needs of active duty members, their families, and our retired military members with quality, affordable care.

Peacetime health care delivery is a local matter, best managed by the people who know the unique needs of their patient population, who are knowledgeable about local health care resources, and who know the local community well enough to gain its vital support. Though basic policy guidance may come from headquarters, responsibility and accountability for health care service must be retained at the local level. Containing costs while enhancing access to quality care is not simply an Air Force concern, it is a national issue.

The current fiscal year 1991 direct care medical program represents a negative real growth of 2.8 percent from fiscal year 1990. This creates a severe management challenge which we are addressing in a variety of ways. Additional reductions in fiscal year 1992 further this challenge.

Health care costs have climbed so dramatically in the last 2 years that many American corporations now spend one-fourth of their net earnings on medical coverage for their employees. A nationwide benefits survey of 1,955 corporations found that the average company spent 21.6 percent more last year than the year before to provide physician and hospital care to their employees. The director of the survey said, "Controlling medical expenses through traditional health plans has become a losing proposition. Employers will now be forced to consider a managed care approach."

We are evaluating managed care options through our two catchment area demonstration projects at Luke/Williams in Phoenix, Arizona, and at Bergstrom AFB in Austin, Texas. At these locations, executive managers have the responsibility and authority for managing all military health care resources, including CHAMPUS money, in their catchment areas. Our demonstrations include 11 elements of managed care commonly used in civilian managed care plans: enrollment, case management, a referral system, accounting, evaluation, provider networks, utilization management, benefits review, data analysis, systems applications, and marketing. We feel our comprehensive approach will not only enhance the quality of care and contain costs, but also improve access to health services and enhance patient and provider satisfaction.

We are in the process of holding a series of working conferences to plan the future of managed care in the Air Force. With participants from the Major Air Commands and the Air Staff, our goal is to determine when, where, and how to expand managed care.

The CHAMPUS program also continued its growth in fiscal year 1990, increasing from $786 million in fiscal year 1989 to $962 million in fiscal year 1990. At this stage, the fiscal year 1991 CHAMPUS program appears to have been fully funded.

The fiscal year 1989 Defense Appropriations Act permitted DOD to utilize CHAMPUS funds for direct care projects "designed to produce more cost efficient" direct care operations. The Air Force added additional monies to our budget to expand our efforts to save CHAMPUS dollars. We have expanded our staff to help facilities increase the number of programs underway. These programs allow our local medical treatment facility commanders expanded flexibility and service options.

We are seeing tangible results. We have been able to increase this program substantially—from 18 to 51 programs—since 1989. More are in the process of development. The cost avoidance implications are very impressive. In fiscal year 1991, we expect to recapture over $54 million in CHAMPUS workload and generate an estimated $24 million in net savings. A DOD IG audit of just two programs at Eglin and Tinker validated a net savings of $1.3 million at Eglin for surgery and $1.3 million at Tinker for OB/GYN. Further, CHAMPUS nonavailability statements have decreased in these clinical areas—by over 65 and 70 percent respectively at these two bases.

Our successful Health Care Finder program continues to grow. We found high quality CHAMPUS providers for our patients through this program at reduced costs for the government and the patient. At last report, we had Health Care Finder agreements with approximately 13,000 providers, over 200 civilian hospitals, and 17 health maintenance organizations or preferred provider organizations.

The Partnership Program is another alternative which provides improved health care access for military family members. Through negotiated agreements with civilian providers, care is provided at discounted CHAMPUS rates, normally in Air Force hospitals and clinics. Services range from full-time clinic operations to emergency on-call services. An estimated 600 Partnership practitioners are part of our health care team under this program, and most see patients right in our Air Force facilities. We recently provided guidance to the field that these agreements should not exceed 70 percent of the CHAMPUS allowable rates.

Improved access to cost-effective health care is also accomplished through Air Force/VA Sharing arrangements. More than 60 percent of Air Force medical treatment facilities in CONUS have sharing agreements with the VA, and more than 100 locally negotiated sharing agreements between the Air Force and the VA are currently in effect. In fiscal year 1990, we avoided $2.6 million in costs because of these arrangements.

You are aware of our joint AF/VA Medical Center at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico; construction on another joint facility at Nellis AFB, Las Vegas, Nevada, should begin this summer. Other sites are in the planning stages: Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage, Alaska; Patrick AFB, Cocoa Beach, Florida; Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arizona; Fairchild AFB, Spokane, Washington; and Goodfellow AFB, San Angelo, Texas. This program works well, offering a wider range of services at lower cost for both Air Force and VA patients.

Three PRIMUS clinics, located in Papillion, Nebraska (near Offutt AFB); Riverside, California (near March AFB); and Tucson, Arizona (near Davis-Monthan AFB), have been seeing patients since 1988. Two additional clinics opened in June 1990—one in Sacramento, California (near Mather AFB), and the other in Brandon, Florida (near MacDill AFB). Patient satisfaction with these primary care clinics is high.

Through a variety of programs and practices, our military treatment facility commanders are able to improve access and deliver health care services based on local needs and opportunities. Integral to our continued success is flexibility and local management.

BASE CLOSURES

In 1989, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommended closing five major Air Force installations, including medical facilities, at Pease AFB, New Hampshire; Chanute AFB, Illinois; and Mather, George, and Norton AFBs in California. Pease has already closed, although we are providing medical services through a contract arrangement for the remainder of this fiscal year. The rest of these bases will close in 1993 and 1994.

The retired community will be hardest hit by the loss of military medical facilities in their communities. In the case of Pease, we worked very closely with the local community to provide care for as long as possible. However, by September 30, 1991, we plan to close the facility.

Last month Secretary Cheney announced the latest round of base closures and realignments proposed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The list of closures affects 12 medical facilities: Bergstrom and Carswell AFBs in Texas; Castle AFB, California; Eaker AFB, Arkansas; England AFB, Louisiana; Grissom AFB, Indiana; Loring AFB, Maine; Lowry AFB, Colorado; Moody AFB, Georgia; Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina; Williams AFB, Arizona and Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan. MacDill AFB, Florida, has been recommended for realignment and partial closure. A recommendation has been made to keep the Mather AFB, hospital open after the base closes as an annex to nearby McClellan AFB, California.

At realignment bases where additional personnel and functions will be relocated, more Air Force health care will be required. For example, while Norton and George

are scheduled to close, we have programmed additional medical manpower and a construction project at March to accommodate the base's increased workload. Construction projects programmed at the other realignment sites include Beale AFB, California; Cannon AFB, New Mexico; and Sheppard AFB, Texas.

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act significantly changes the procedures for closing/realigning CONUS installations. We will ensure that medical care is a factor in feasibility studies and economic analyses. Throughout the base closure process, our objective is to maintain as much service as possible for all beneficiaries. With the tremendous support of the Air Force Line, we hope to minimize the impact on our patients. Despite our best efforts, however, base closures will place additional pressure on service CHAMPUS budgets. We need to plan for this.

Many of our medical facilities are old and long past their expected life cycle. This makes it extremely difficult to adapt quickly to changing trends in demographics, technology, and medical practice. The life cycle of our medical facilities, now at 50-plus years, is far from the civilian norm of 30 years. Although we work with the Defense Medical Facilities Office (DMFO) to identify low cost health delivery alternatives to new construction, we need your help to fund the medical construction program to provide safe and functional medical facilities.

QUALITY CARE

Health care quality continues to be a primary Air Force focus. During 1990, we monitored several established programs to assess the quality of care provided to our beneficiaries.

The DOD Civilian External Peer Review panel reviewed over 35,000 Air Force cases from 1987 to 1989, and found only 2.7 percent of the cases presented an opportunity to improve care.

The standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) are nationally recognized benchmarks for excellence in health care. In the JCAHO accreditation rating framework, 100 is the highest possible score. During the period 1987 to 1989, the average score for Air Force hospitals surveyed was 85 versus 77.2 for their civilian counterparts. All Air Force hospitals seeking accreditation continue to be accredited.

We also added new programs to ensure our care is of the highest quality. Two of the new programs started in 1990 were the Maryland Hospital Association Quality Indicator Project (QIP) and the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).

The Maryland Hospital Association QIP is an outcome-oriented data collection program which gathers data on 10 quality indicators. The data for Air Force hospitals will be compared with 300 other hospitals in the Maryland Hospital Association data base. This comparison will provide a benchmark for how we measure up. Preliminary comparative QIP data should be available by mid-spring.

Studies have shown that patients judge the quality of their health care more on the interpersonal relationships with the medical staff than on its technical aspects. In an attempt to ensure that all patients are treated with courtesy and compassion in our facilities, we continue to promote our patient/staff sensitivity training program. The program uses videotapes, written materials, and locally assigned group leaders. All Air Force medical treatment facilities, major air commands, and training sites use it. Our goal is to make everyone who comes in contact with patients—from the appointment clerk to the surgical technician—more attentive to their "bedside manner."

NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND AUTOMATION

We are proud to be in the vanguard of medical progress with our Clinical Investigation Program. We began more than 300 new patient related protocols in 1990. These included important studies of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) involving AIDS patients and a prospective study on cholesterol at Wilford Hall USAF Medical Center. Our participation in these crucial studies, many of which are tri-service, is not only vital to the success of Air Force residency training programs, but also ensures our patients have access to state-of-the-art medicine.

We can now perform liver transplants at Wilford Hall. Because of its worldwide referral capability, it was selected as a DOD liver transplant center demonstration site. We estimate that Wilford Hall liver transplants cost one-third of what they would in a civilian facility—$80,000 as compared to $240,000.

Automated systems have improved our operations over the years. The outpatient functions of the Composite Health Care System (CHCS) were deployed to six of our medical treatment facilities for testing. At these facilities, CHCS automates the pharmacy, laboratory, radiology, admission and disposition, and patient appointing

and scheduling functions into a single, integrated system. With CHCS, we have reduced test result turnaround times, duplicate lab and radiology orders, and patient waiting times for medications. The system provides on-line patient profiles and drug interaction information. Health care providers now have patient care information right at their desks. The CHCS model for inpatient care needs further study and improvement prior to implementation.

Milestone III, the worldwide deployment decision point for CHCS, is now scheduled for March 1992. In the meantime, however, replacement of antiquated patient appointment systems is one of our most pressing problems. We have thoroughly examined the Patient Appointment and Scheduling (PAS) module of CHCS and found it to be a satisfactory solution. No deployment will be undertaken, however, until the Department of Defense completes the congressionally mandated certification.

HEALTH PROMOTION

We are expanding preventive medicine services to improve the health and quality of life of all our beneficiaries. Recent events in the Persian Gulf highlighted the important role health promotion plays in ensuring the physical and mental readiness of our troops entering combat. This includes providing support to those deployed, as well as to the active duty member at home.

Many of our health promotion coordinators were deployed to Operation Desert Storm to work in their wartime medical capacities. Those remaining in health promotion developed innovative programs. For example, working with Family Support Centers to augment family self-help groups for relatives of those deployed, preparing for the return of combatants by establishing veteran support networks, and developing a stress management videotape series.

We doubled the number of our installation wellness clinics and their services. Twenty-six wellness clinics offer health risk screening, assessment, and educational intervention measures to assist our beneficiaries with making positive lifestyle changes.

Smoking prevention and cessation programs continue to grow and gain strength. With approximately 1,000 Air Force stop-smoking clinics annually, we show a successful quit rate of approximately 32 percent, compared to the national average of 20 percent. Over 80,000 Air Force members have quit smoking since our anti-smoking efforts began in earnest in 1986. The percentage of smokers has dropped from 32 percent in 1986 to about 26 percent in 1990. This compares favorably to the 1989 Surgeon General's Report which found that 29 percent of Americans smoked.

We made enormous strides in increasing our patient population's knowledge about nutrition. We recently switched from a labor-intensive Air Force Commissary Service food labeling program to a civilian vendor program, NutriGuide, which saves over 1,500 medical manhours spent in hand-labeling items each year. Our policy is to ensure accurate dissemination of nutrition information and standardize healthy, low fat recipes in dining facilities Air Force wide.

We are integrating our preventive services programs with the Department of Defenses Year 2000 Health Objectives for the Nation. We will address the top 10 leading causes of morbidity and mortality in future initiatives. Over the next decade, we will track our progress in meeting some 100 health objectives.

Statistics show our active duty members miss fewer days of work due to illness or injury than ever before. As we move into the next century, we plan to increase the breadth and depth of our efforts in health promotion.

THE KEYS TO SUCCESS: OUR PEOPLE

With the support of the Congress and the Air Force Line, the Medical Service has grown larger. The former chief of staff of the Air Force directed that the Medical Service expand by 2000 spaces during fiscal year 1991 and fiscal year 1992 to improve primary care access for active duty personnel and their dependents. We defined these spaces as flight medicine, family practice, internal medicine, obstetrics/gynecology, mental health, pediatrics, and optometry. We identified 371 physician, 179 nonphysician provider, 140 medical support officer, 910 medical support technician, and 400 administrative support technician authorizations. We hope to improve access to care significantly after full implementation, barring programmatic manpower reductions or contingency rations.

We are very appreciative of the Congress' continuing support in preserving medical manpower. Under the present system, Medical Service manpower is included in the overall Air Force end strength. However, when Congress mandates Air Force wide manpower/end strength levels and/or reductions, medical spaces are included in the baseline. When Congress passed the fiscal year 1991 Authorization Act, it es-

tablished a "floor" for medical manpower, while directing a reduced Air Force end strength level. To reach this level, the Air Force line must bear a larger share of the burden. Similarly, medical end strength is officer-intensive and skews the overall Air Force officer-to-enlisted ratio.

We have seen a modest improvement in the overall Medical Service retention, including a slight improvement in physician retention for fiscal year 1990. Congressional emphasis on special pays and the $20 million provided for the Air Force to hire civilian support personnel has contributed to that. We are beginning to benefit from the revitalized physician special pay program authorized last year. Although optimistic about the impact of incentive Special Pay (ISP) on future retention, we remain concerned that, because of the consecutive nature of the obligation, the Multi-Year Special Pay authorized this year may not be well received by Air Force physicians. Of the physician specialists, we have seen improved retention in two areas where we have traditionally had problems: ophthalmology and ENT. We have also seen improvement in specialties such as family practice and pediatrics.

Recruiting and retaining dentists may become a problem in the future. While the American Dental Association reports that Americans are demanding more dental care, dental school enrollment is decreasing. Most graduating dentists are in debt for their education, and current compensation for military dental officers is not sufficient for them to begin loan repayment and support a comfortable lifestyle.

At the same time, more of the trained dental specialists, many trained in our own programs, are also leaving prior to retirement eligibility for higher paying private and group practices. Special pays for Dental Corps officers have not increased since 1985 resulting in a growing pay disparity between civilian and military dentists.

In the Nurse Corps, overall retention declined in fiscal year 1990. This may be the result of the national nursing shortage. On a positive note, we've taken steps within the Air Force to improve nurse promotion opportunities which should improve retention. The clinical career ladder to senior grades continues to be developed and refined. This will allow retention and promotion of experienced nurses who wish to remain in clinical roles and ensure their expertise is fully utilized in the delivery of quality patient care.

The $5,000 accession bonus authorized last year is instrumental in our ability to continue to attract the necessary number of new accessions into the Nurse Corps. We are optimistic that the recent expansion of incentive Special Pay authority to critical nursing specialties in addition to certified registered nurse anesthetists will improve retention.

Overall retention in the Biomedical Sciences Corps increased slightly in fiscal year 1990. However, we are still experiencing retention problems with psychologists, optometrists, physical therapists, and to a certain extent pharmacists. Implementing the authority in the fiscal year 1991 Authorization Act for optometry retention pay and for board certification pay for nonphysician providers should allow us to improve this picture. I appreciate congressional efforts on behalf of these professionals.

Retention and recruitment of health professionals especially in the Reserve component, is sure to be affected by Desert Storm. We may need additional incentives to maintain our strength in the Reserve programs.

A continuing area of concern is the legislation which earmarks 2,500 Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarships for 3rd and 4th year medical students who agree to train in critically needed specialties. While the intent is good, it will be difficult to achieve the desired result. Most students do not decide on their specialty until the 4th year of medical school or later. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the student will get into a training program or finish the program if accepted. On the other hand, the Financial Assistance Program which was authorized in the fiscal years 1990-1991 Defense Authorization Act allows us to target financial assistance to those specialties for which we have a requirement in the near term (2-3 years). It proved very successful last year as all 83 allocations were filled by August 1990.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

The Air Force Medical Service of tomorrow will build on today's accomplishments. We will serve a smaller Air Force, yet our retiree population will continue to grow. The lessons learned from Desert Storm will shape our future readiness program, while the effects on recruiting and retention will shape our peacetime health care system. Despite the changes, one thing will remain the same—caring for people.

The men and women of the Air Force Medical Service make me very proud. They are simply the best at what they do. They are dedicated to our mission, and they will meet the difficult days ahead with talent and professionalism.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, General Miller.

This morning, I would like to start off with what I previously indicated I would ask each one of you here. In Desert Storm, what were the casualties you were providing for, the killed and wounded in each of your services, and an assessment of your ability to handle all of that. I would also like, along with that, the same answer to the question we put to General Schwarzkopf over there in the desert 6 or 7 weeks ago.

And as I indicated earlier, I asked him—I did not want a recounting of what went right—improve things for the future if we ever needed to improve, and what went wrong. What can we improve? So if you would address that—the casualties anticipated, whether you were fully able to handle whatever those predictions were, and where can we improve this for the future. What did we learn? What went wrong? General Ledford?

General LEDFORD. Sir, the casualty estimation was the responsibility of the CINC over there. Sometimes, I began to think that everybody that had a computer was second guessing him. But you have got to understand what he was up against. He had the potential of the greatest tank war in the history of warfare. That is what he was looking up to. And so they came up with, for the Army, some casualty estimates that were in the 30,000 or 40,000 range possible.

Senator GLENN. That was dead, now, or was that wounded?

General LEDFORD. Those are wounded, sir.

Senator GLENN. That is wounded. Okay. Did you figure your ratio of about 3 to 1 was going to fit over there? That would have meant about 12,000 or 15,000 dead, then?

General LEDFORD. That is correct, sir. A few less than that. But these were worst-case scenarios. And our job on the Army staff was to support whatever the CINC needed. And so I think the American public cannot criticize us for being over prepared. They would have been really critical had we been under prepared.

So we placed—over a period of time, the Army fielded a force in that theater of 13,500 beds. We expanded our CONUS beds—by the time the ground war started, we had gone up in Health Services Command from about 6500-6700 beds up to about 10,000, give or take. And in Europe, we had expanded our Europe beds by about another 1800. We had actually added six additional hospital sets of people to Europe, plus a bunch of other personnel.

Senator GLENN. For 40,000—you would have had about 13,000 beds there, but you would have been evacuating a lot of those out?

General LEDFORD. Oh, yes.

Senator GLENN. What is the average length of stay, 2 or 3 days for wounded?

General LEDFORD. We were working on an evacuation policy of around 7 days in the theater, which means that people who could not have been returned to duty within 7 days would clearly have been evacuated as soon as they were stable.

And so the scenario we had designed within the Army structure could have indeed handled what we felt were the worst-case projections. And you see, we had a great backup in addition to that, sir—and that was the Veterans Administration, which had somewhere between 18,000 and 25,000 hospital beds available to the three serv-

ices. And then on top of that, had we really needed it, the civil national disaster medical system could have come into play. And there is another 100,000, give or take, hospital beds that have been committed to our need should we have required it.

And so we felt that we had within our own walls the capability to handle a worst-case projection. And by the time the ground war started, we, indeed, were up. We had 13,500 beds capable and ready to roll. They were staffed at essentially 100 percent strength.

Senator GLENN. Planning, equipment, and everything else for about 40,000 casualties, and that would have been total—that would have been wounded and killed if you had gotten a worst-case scenario?

General LEDFORD. Within that ballpark, sir. The exact numbers still remain highly classified.

Senator GLENN. Let me make one thing very clear. I did not mean to imply any criticism of the preparation over there—not at all. I was glad to see that, if anything, you were erring on the side of cautiousness in providing extra equipment, material, and people. I think that is exactly what you should do in a case like that.

Admiral Zimble?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Senator, I have to also reiterate what General Ledford said, and that is that those numbers for Marine Corps and Navy were part of the MARSANT and NAVSANT responsibility to put together.

Senator GLENN. Let me ask something. General Ledford, was the 40,000 theater-wide, or was that just Army?

General LEDFORD. Sir, I am giving you Army ballpark numbers. These are worst-case numbers, sir.

Senator GLENN. Your figures, Admiral Zimble, would not be part of that 40,000?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Okay. What were your figures?

Admiral ZIMBLE. I cannot give you the exact number. I will have to get it for the record for you. I can tell you that we were asked to provide a certain number of beds in theater, and a certain amount of staffing to provide for those beds that were sufficient to meet the needs of an amphibious assault—a potential surge from that, which is a very high casualty rate over a short period of time. We were prepared to meet those surges, because we had the beds that were requested there on time.

We sent two hospital ships. Each had 1,000 beds. They were put in a status where 5 days was required to bring them to a state of readiness and, in fact, we met the plan and in 5 days we had the hospital ships appropriately supplied and sailing. The order went out on the 6th of August, and by the 11th and 12th of August the two hospital ships were underway for the Gulf. It is a long way. Those ships are 17-knot ships, so they took some time. We had a staff on board to meet an immediate contingency and then we fleshed out that staff over a period of days.

By the time we were ready for Desert Storm, they were fully staffed for 1,000 beds each. They had about 70 percent of the crew from the Active side of Navy medicine, and another 30 percent came from the naval Reserves.

Because of the mobility of Navy and the planning, we had a fleet hospital—500-bed fleet hospital with the 2d MPS located in Diego Garcia. It moved very quickly. Its sailing time was about a week, and it was in the Gulf early on and ready for off-loading. We married our staff with that hospital and had it erected in very short order.

The other two fleet hospitals came later, and they were staffed with Reserves. They were up and ready to go by the onset of the ground conflict. By the onset of Desert Storm they were up and ready to go. And in addition, we had host nation hospital support in the Gulf. We had approximately 4,000 definitive care beds, total. We had additional beds organic to the Marine Corps in the Marine medical battalions. We had good communication networks established, and we had a single supplier, the Army, to give us our supply replenishment. That was the first time that that was tried, and it was successful.

There is no question that we have a lot of concerns, and luckily, we have a form in which to address those concerns. Those are being aggregated now, to make sure that we could have served as a full system in providing care and in taking care of the casualties. The casualties we saw—we took care of—readily, the fleet hospitals were the most sophisticated items that we have ever fielded, and they fully met our expectations.

The hospital ships brought, for the first time ever, CAT scan capability to the front. And each of those hospital ships carries a full CAT scan capability.

Senator GLENN. Do you have a figure that would match that 40,000 the General talked about as to what your worst-case planning figure was?

Admiral ZIMBLE. The planning figures come from theater, and I would have to defer to get that information and give it to you for the record.

Senator GLENN. Okay. I would appreciate having that. I thought that that was probably a bottom line that was the rationale for everything you were doing back here regarding what you were sending over there—the DEPMEDS and everything else—it has to be, because somebody has to make an estimate and then you have got prepare for it.

Admiral ZIMBLE. That's exactly right. There is no question about it. I just would like to be able to give you the right number and not the wrong number.

[The information follows:]

The planning figures came from theater. The projected casualty rates were developed by USCINCCENT command staff and were never provided to the Navy. The only data provided the Navy was a bed requirement figure.

Senator GLENN. Okay, fine. We would appreciate that. General Miller?

General MILLER. Yes, sir. I would make the same caveat, sir. The reason we are all being a little skittish about that is that those exact numbers, sir, have been classified, and we need clearance to provide them.

Senator GLENN. Well, I know. And I am just looking for some ballpark figures. I am not trying to pin you down to the exact

number here, just some ballpark figures as to what we are planning for, so when we get into our questions later on DEPMEDS and such and were we adequately staffed to look at what we thought the hazard was we will have an idea of the numbers involved.

General MILLER. I understand, sir, and I am sure that you do. I would take only another minute to point out there are some complexities involved. For instance, in looking at Air Force casualties, you plan or you anticipate that your air braces may get hit first or at least early, so that you have to have more facilities ready to go immediately. Consequently, we have the turnkey hospital concept for those contingency hospitals in Europe which worked very well to support this operation.

There are planning factors, sir, general planning factors such as in the ballpark of one per thousand wounded in action, and a disease, nonbattle injury rate planning factor. That depends a bit on the days deployed, your disease, nonbattle injury rates, as time stretches out, tend to go up. Air Force figures for wounded in action tend to go down after the first couple of weeks. And of course, intelligence estimates, force at risk, intensity of anticipated hostilities all enter into those kind of projections that have to be done by the supported CINC, and to which we respond.

Senator GLENN. My time is up, but I just wanted to follow up with one comment, and that is that I am complimentary to you, so we do not misunderstand, for planning the way you did.

General MILLER. I understand, sir.

Senator GLENN. I think the intelligence people did the best job they knew how to do. And they were assuming, I believe, that all that highly technologically capable equipment that was over there—Soviet tanks and MiG-29s and all that sort of thing—that there was going to be people fully qualified to use all that and maneuver with it and so on. That did not turn out to be quite the case. And thank goodness it was not the case. Had it been the case, and they would have been as trained as we thought they might be, then some of your estimates of casualties might well have been fairly accurate. That would have been very tragic.

Anyway, if you can get those figures—Admiral Zimble and General Miller, and get them back over here—I see no reason why the Pentagon should be antsy about their estimates at this point. We are not in the middle of a conflict now, and I think the American people and we on this committee deserve to know what the planning was, what the thoughts were, how well we were set to take care of it, because the next one may not be as easy as this one was. And we want to be ready for it.

The information follows:]

Casualty projections for Operation Desert Storm were determined by the supported CINC (CENTCOM) based upon such information as forces at risk, intelligence estimates of enemy capability, and intensity of anticipated hostilities. This information was not provided to us and remains highly classified.

Determination of Air Force medical support requirements, though aided by general planning factors for wounded in action and disease/non-battle injuries, was driven largely by deployed line operational units and troop configurations. Medical manpower and materiel requirements were levied by the CINC based on his overall assessment.

Senator GLENN. Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Mendez, in your testimony you state that more than 37 percent of the recent increases in CHAMPUS costs is attributable to mental health care. What portion of the CHAMPUS direct care budget goes for mental health services?

Dr. MENDEZ. Approximately 25 percent, Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Is it correct that over 75 percent of all medical services provided to CHAMPUS beneficiaries are provided on military bases and therefore not charged to the CHAMPUS programs, yet in contrast, some 62 percent of mental health services provided for CHAMPUS eligible are provided off base and thus CHAMPUS picks up the bill?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes. Approximately 70 percent of the other services are provided by the MTF. And in the case of mental health care, a greater proportion—I am not sure of the amount—but indeed, a greater proportion is provided outside the MTF.

Senator MCCAIN. So at first glance, perhaps unintentionally, those figures can be a little misleading due to the imbalance between amount of payment that is received on base as opposed to off base for mental health care.

Dr. MENDEZ. The figure may be misleading, and at the same time, it starts basically with the same substrate. In other words, the increase started with the same substrate as the other points forming the slope of the curve.

Senator MCCAIN. I understand. Do you have a hospice benefit available to terminally ill members of the military and their families?

Dr. MENDEZ. We do not at the present time. No, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Were you planning on contemplating such a program?

Dr. MENDEZ. That is being evaluated.

Senator MCCAIN. Did you want to say something, Admiral?

Admiral ZIMBLE. I believe that it currently is in the other legislative body's markup.

Senator MCCAIN. Let me just say that from our experience in nonmilitary situations, hospice is not only an incredibly important humanitarian program, but it also causes a reduction in medical expenses. I think that has been our experience with hospice, and I hope you will give it some very serious consideration.

Dr. MENDEZ. We will, indeed, sir.

General MILLER. Senator, it might be illuminating to point out that all of us, where we have space available, do provide some hospice-type care in our active duty facilities, and do so at considerable savings, because we do not have to provide the nursing care ratio that we ordinarily would for patients not in that kind of a setting. So all of us do capture some of that to some degree, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. You are saying you do have a hospice program?

General MILLER. I am saying, sir, in the active duty component at our medical facilities, particularly our medical centers where we have the space available, we do provide hospice-type care for many patients, because we can do so with less nursing staff than we normally staff the other wards.

Senator MCCAIN. Well I do not like to get into a dispute here, but I just asked Dr. Mendez if you had a hospice program and he said no.

General MILLER. I think he thought you were referring to CHAMPUS, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Okay. Dr. Mendez, do current medical shortages reflect war plans that are somewhat out of date or the projected requirements which are associated with a very significantly reduced force?

Dr. MENDEZ. Basically, the figures that have been used—the figures that were used from 1986 through 1990, particularly in medicine and nursing, have been figures that were based on a NATO scenario. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. So your requirements would be significantly impacted by our new scenarios as well as reductions in the size of the force; is that right?

Dr. MENDEZ. That is right. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. When can we expect—and by the way, I do not fault you for not having those plans at all. Obviously, you have to have time to react. But about what time would you expect us to be able to see——

Dr. MENDEZ. I do not have a specific time because our plans as medical people reflect basically the needs of the force. So as the new scenarios for the force are being developed, we will be participating in those and creating the plans on the numbers of personnel that would be necessary for the medical force.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I hope you can get those pretty soon, recognizing that you can only react to information that you receive.

General Ledford, when Senator Glenn and I were over in the Persian Gulf, which was very shortly after the fighting had ceased—we were very careful not to go while the fighting was going on—no sense in that at our age—we talked to several doctors. In fact, we were approached by several doctors, both Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, who had been called up on active duty. They were not only pleased and satisfied that they had been able to fulfill this commitment, but they were very proud of their work, their integration into the regular forces, and I think they found it an incredibly rewarding experience for a variety of reasons. None of them that I know of went without financial sacrifice, among other sacrifice.

But they also approached us and stated unequivocally—as you know, doctors have a tendency to do—that now that the war was over, they wanted to go home. They wanted to get back to their practice. In fact, you remember John that was a doctor from San Francisco who said, my practice is deteriorating. What I am worried about too is, one, are you able to get them back home and back to work quickly enough?

And number two is, has it had any effect on, in your view—or is it too early to say—on retention of these doctors in Reserve units because of the fact—not so much because of the fact the were called up, but because many of them, in their view, were not allowed to return to civilian life as quickly as perhaps they perceived they should have been? I know that is a tough question, but I think it is an important one if we want to retain these very highly paid, skilled professionals in the Reserves.

General LEDFORD. Since I am a doctor, too, I can answer this one from the heart. No one wants to bring these physicians home and

give them back to their communities any more than the Surgeons General want to. We understand exactly and in extraordinarily, painful detail what they are going through, what their communities are going through, and we are doing our very best to bring them back.

In general, I have pretty good news for you, sir. Although there have been a number of letters to you from doctors that say, I am not out, frequently, the letters get to you after the man has arrived home, thank goodness. Of the 44 hospitals that the Army had over there, all but 6 have redeployed. And there are a couple of those that are in the process, as we speak, of redeploying.

Senator MCCAIN. Redeployed means——

General LEDFORD. Redeployed means come back home, sir. I am sorry. Deployed means going over, and redeployed means coming back.

Senator MCCAIN. When you say "redeployed," does that mean the doctors have been released—those who were called up from Reserve—and sent back home?

General LEDFORD. No, sir, not all of them have gotten out yet. And in fact, I can give you the exact numbers as of yesterday, as best we can tell. I think I told you that we had called up 25,000 reservists. The actual number was 24,656.

Senator MCCAIN. That is doctors and nurses and——

General LEDFORD. That is all kinds of people. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Have you got a breakdown as to what their specialties—not specialties—whether they were doctors or nurses?

General LEDFORD. Yes. I can give you that. I have it somewhere else. I think the number of doctors was something like 1930. I will give you the exact number in a moment. But of the total 24,600-some, as of 2 days ago, 53 percent of them had been released from active duty. There are still 6800 reservists in the desert—Army reservists. And as I say, these are not just physicians.

And somewhere, I can give you also the number of physicians who have come back. We deployed 1460 physicians to the desert, and I believe now about 1100 of them have come back. We have tried to get the physicians back early. You do not need, of course, to leave a physician in the desert to pack up the boxes. And so what we try to do is, as we redeploy a unit we bring the health care providers, the doctors and nurses, out as early as possible, and leave behind what the Army calls a "trail party," a party of primarily enlisted folks to take care of the supplies and equipment and make sure that it gets back intact.

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Glenn has agreed to hold a hearing on this whole issue of guard and reservists and how quickly they have returned and what impact that it may possibly have on retention.

General LEDFORD. Sir, my sensing is that the vast majority of the Reserve and guard people that were deployed in this operation—in this war—are coming back proud Americans. Darn near every one of them was terribly inconvenienced, and especially the physicians who are in private practices. They were inconvenienced financially. There is no question about it.

But I have talked to a large number of these doctors, and nearly all of them say how proud they are that they can now say, hey, I served, I did it, I did take care of people, I was in a combat zone,

and I will carry this as a badge of pride for the rest of my life. I know I still carry as a badge of pride the fact that I did it.

Senator MCCAIN. General, I have no quarrel with your statement, and I totally agree with it. I have also encountered many, as well. But I also—we are beginning to encounter many who have said, now that it is over, let me get back to my business.

General LEDFORD. Absolutely.

Senator MCCAIN. And I would hope that you and the other Surgeons General here and Dr. Mendez would make as strong as possible input into the decisionmaking process that these people who are not necessarily there—the worst thing you can—my time has expired, I know, Mr. Chairman. But the worst thing you can do to these people to have this pride turn to ashes in their mouths is to keep them there unnecessarily.

General LEDFORD. Right.

Senator MCCAIN. And we are hearing from some of those people who had exactly the view that you described and now are becoming disillusioned. So I would hope you would give that a great priority not just because of the individual hardships, but the impact that it has on retention of these people who are vital to our ability to carry out our duties if called upon to enter into another conflict.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. I would just back up what John says about getting inquiries right when the combat stopped about how soon are they going to be home. We got calls the very next day, and obviously that was a little premature. But we are getting many calls a day now and many, many letters about this very issue.

Now, I appreciate the position that they are in and I am sympathetic to it, maybe less so a little bit than some people, because my colleague here had a little inconvenience in a wartime situation of his own years past, and spent some time up in North Vietnam and a few places that were inconvenient, too. And these people signed up for this. This was not something that they could not have thought about.

But nevertheless, the Reserves are supposed to come in to supplement the regulars. And when the emergency is done they go back, and go back as fast as is possible. And that is the basis of the Reserve program. And unless we treat it that way and get them back here as fast as possible, we are going to have one heck of a time getting people for the future. So what you are doing right now in getting people back is going to determine perhaps how successfully we can recruit people for the Reserves in the future.

That Reserve hearing is June 11th. That is the earliest we could schedule it.

I would like on my next round to ask you what—to follow up on my questioning in the first round—what went wrong? What needs to be changed? What did we learn?

Admiral Zimble, you want to start off?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Well, one of the things——

Senator GLENN. I am sure everything was not perfect. Tell us what did not go right.

Admiral ZIMBLE. Well, yes, there were some things that were not perfect. And they cover the mobilization and they cover the system in place. First, I think we did a knee jerk on moving our people out

to theater, and another knee jerk as we mobilized, with plans that were basically built around a different type of a conflict. And we need to better fine tune our ability to mobilize in a more humane manner. We gave some people some very short notice, when we could have given them a little bit more time.

So one of the things that we have to do is look at the fit between Active and Reserve and the fit between our people who work in our CONUS hospitals and clinics that have to be suddenly deployed out into wartime platforms. And we are working that diligently.

We need more connectivity between our various platforms. We have highly capable platforms with highly capable people aboard, but we have to make sure we have got some dedicated communications available, both voice communications and data links, so that we can transmit vital information in terms of movement of patients and movement of supplies. We felt that there was some softness there. It was never tested, but we thing it is something that needs to be attended to, and we are working that.

I am pulling things off the top of my head. But I will tell you that we are preparing—my doctrine center is preparing a tome which will list those items that we were concerned about; how we are going to effect their improvement and what recommendations we will make to the appropriate leadership to apply those.

Senator GLENN. Well, I presume you are all doing this. You are all putting together the lessons learned. And Dr. Mendez, are you coordinating this for a DOD position?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes.

Senator GLENN. When can we have that? Because we would like to have it to use in this year's markup—this year's authorization. Can we have that, say, within a month? Or can you have a preliminary for us within a month?

Dr. MENDEZ. I think I can have a preliminary for you with no problem, Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. By what, end of June?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes, sir. However, Secretary Cheney will need to approve it.

Senator GLENN. Good. We will look for that before the first of July, then, so we can perhaps use it.

I believe our markup does not start until after the 4th of July break. So if we can depend on you for that—and give us as much advance knowledge as you can on what is going to be in it, because we need to put it into this year's authorization. I do not want to wait another year to get the lessons learned taken care of.

Dr. MENDEZ. Are you interested also, Senator Glenn—even if the lessons learned do not require legislative change, you would like to see them?

Senator GLENN. Yes. We would like to see it because we would like to know what has worked well out of past efforts around here as well as what has not. Give us a general critique of it in this particular area if you can.

[The information follows:]

At the time the transcript was returned to the committee, the lessons learned from Desert Storm had not yet been compiled by the Department of Defense.

Senator GLENN. Admiral Zimble, were you finished yet?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. General Miller?

General MILLER. Yes, sir. Refinements, specialty codes—Army calls them MOSs. We may have a thoracic surgeon, for example, listed in our data banks as a flight surgeon. We might need his thoracic surgical skills more than we need to employ him as a flight surgeon when we call him up. So we need to redefine and set up secondary and tertiary specialty codes so we can identify those people a little better than we have in the past.

We are looking carefully at the rules of engagement regarding call-up. As you know, sir, Reserve forces prefer to be called up as a unit. When you get down toward the bottom of the barrel to fill your needs, that does not always work. And we need to build in some flexibility as far as the rules of engagement on calling up our people. We are working that one pretty hard.

It became very evident, sir, that the medical forces would be way ahead if we had our own dedicated air evac capability. The civilian Reserve air fleet offers that potential. We have worked to have some packages to convert those to carrying wounded and ill patients. That merits support. It offers the additional advantage of being able to bring medical supplies and respirators back when you reposition, as well as those air evac crews. I think we are dedicated to trying to refine that lesson.

Senator GLENN. You mean, now, just for med-evac for people who are wounded and coming out, or what? That you need a dedicated air system for that?

General MILLER. For strategic air evac, sir—bringing people back from a long distance. Having some of those civilian airplanes dedicated to air evacuation and configured to carry patients would be a great asset and it would relieve the competition for air lift, of course, as well.

Senator GLENN. It is more a configuration problem with the airplanes, then, because they are taking equipment and people over. And on coming back, they are bringing med-evac out.

General MILLER. We do that now, sir, in opportune fashion as far as the military planes are concerned. I am talking augmentation with civilian air fleet. If we could dedicate a few of those birds to hauling patients and medical supplies, we think it would be a big advantage and a boon for the future.

And finally, sir, I would offer up the fact that we have got to make a decision as to what level of medical supplies—war readiness material, medical supplies—we are going to keep stocked. As you know, WRM was cut severely, and we had to boost up those supplies for this. So some decision needs to be made as to what is a prudent level of WRM medical supplies.

Senator GLENN. General Ledford?

General LEDFORD. Could I finish answering Senator McCain's question real quickly, sir?

Senator GLENN. Sure.

General LEDFORD. You asked me about how many doctors we had brought home from the desert. I gave you one number correct. We had deployed 1460 physicians over there. We have brought back 1,063 as of 2 days ago. And as I say, there are six hospitals remaining and they are moving out very rapidly, and only one is going to

remain after another several weeks. So I think you are going to see nearly all the physicians back in a short time, which would please is all.

Senator MCCAIN. I would hope the remaining hospital could be staffed by active duty.

General LEDFORD. That is correct, sir. The remaining hospital may have to be there for another 6 months or so. And what we will do is staff that with an Active unit and replace the people that have been over there and served so well for 6 or 8 months.

Just like my colleagues, Senator Glenn, we had a lot of personnel issues that we have got to fix. For example, here in the United States, to backfill Health Services Command—we activated 24 augmentation hospitals to beef up health services command and to backfill our Active forces that had deployed immediately. And we found that we had to sometimes activate a unit with 700 or 800 people in it to get the 300 that we really needed because of the way the system is designed. And so we are going to redesign that system, I promise you.

We had to do a lot of cross leveling of people between Reserve units and also within the Active force. We did a tremendous amount of that. There was more personnel turbulence than we would have liked, and I think we can work that one out. That is a good lesson learned.

We had some other things. For example, there is a law that says that anybody that is deployed has to have 12 weeks of basic officer training. Well, maybe you do not need 12 weeks of basic officer training for a doctor. In fact, what we did is, in this emergency we designed a 2-week quick course which I think taught them what they needed. Those are some lessons learned.

I do not know whether the Army logistician would like me to say this, but I know darn well we need more sealift for America. Our DEPMEDS hospitals are huge. They are bulky. They are very heavy. And nearly all of them went over there by sea except for a few of the small facilities.

Senator GLENN. That was number one on General Schwarzkopf's list when we asked him about this, was that we need fast sealift.

General LEDFORD. Absolutely. Clearly, sir. And we are going to look at the way we used our DEPMEDS a little more. The people in the field were very ingenious. They took combat support hospitals, for example, carved out a smaller surgical hospital out of that, and moved it far forward in leap frog manners. We are gong to take advantage of the lessons that they learned of how to carve out little hospitals out of big ones, leap frog around. These are things that we are just learning that we can do with DEPMEDS. We think it is a very flexible basic tool.

And I think General Schwarzkopf may tell you that—and this may sound almost heretical—that the medics need some small fixed wing aircraft—short takeoff and landing aircraft. Because in the desert there, we had lots of patient movements—tactical movements of 200-300 miles beyond the range of a helicopter. And the helicopters are dreadfully expensive and fuel inefficient, as you well know. And so this is something that we might look at in the future, is a short takeoff and landing aircraft that holds 15-20 people cheap.

Senator GLENN. Can I put you down as an advocate of the V22 OSPREY?

General LEDFORD. Well, that would be one fix. [Laughter.]

General LEDFORD. Those are just a few of the lessons learned.

Senator GLENN. I could not miss that opportunity.

General LEDFORD. And we are going to have a very, very sophisticated way of analyzing lessons learned, I assure you, sir.

Senator GLENN. Dr. Mendez, my time is up, so if you would briefly please, go ahead.

Dr. MENDEZ. All right, sir. I just want to add a couple of things to that. As you know, there were some things that we fixed specifically in Desert Storm. Two that became very important were the ability to be able to pay people equally to what their active duty colleagues were making in terms of pay. And the second was, of course, the continuity in terms of malpractice claims from the practices that they had at home. So that difference in pay was very real, and it is necessary that that equity continue.

The other was a way of handling—specific ways of handling voluntary offers of assistance. All of us, in our offices, received every day a multiplicity of offers not only from individuals, but from private firms. And indeed there was a memoranda of agreement that came to pass with the Red Cross because of that. But I think retrospectively, that issue deserves even a greater look at it as far as how we should handle these voluntary offers.

And then finally, the ability, as a post receives a unit, to be able to provide for it. In some instances, when the unit did not deploy at the time that it was scheduled to and had to remain on the post, there was difficulty with being able to handle that unit in terms of housing and in terms of what the unit did while it was awaiting deployment.

So I agree with my colleagues in what they have stated to you, and just added those few things to round out the thought at this point.

Senator GLENN. My time is up. I notice that most of the things you have mentioned here have been people problems. I am just sitting here thinking, most of this is personnel and who volunteers, who does not, all this stuff. And I do not want to belabor this. But, I hope you are also going to include shortages of equipment and details on that.

We had some newspaper reports right in the middle of the operation—some doctors complaining that they did not have the right suture equipment. You remember that flurry in the papers that day. I do not know whether it was valid or not. But things like that or pieces of equipment that you wanted over there that you thought you were going to get. Or equipment you did not have or that there was a shortage of. Let us know what the equipment problems are, too. We can do something about that.

Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Mendez, of the $3.6 billion requested for CHAMPUS and the $4 billion for 1992, how much is projected to go for CHAMPUS mental health benefits, roughly?

Dr. MENDEZ. I do not have that exact figure, Senator, but I can provide it to you.

[The information follows:]


CHAMPUS BENEFITS COSTS
ALL CARE EXCEPT MH&SA
GOV'T COSTS (in millions)
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1500
1000
500
0
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
FISCAL YEAR
Total Inpatient
Total Outpatient
Total
(DoD and non-DoD except CHAMP-VA)


CHAMPUS BENEFITS COSTS:
TOTAL MH&SA VS. TOTAL ALL OTHER CARE
GOV'T COSTS (in millions)
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2000
1500
1000
500
0
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1981
1982
1983
1984
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1986
1987
1988
1989
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FISCAL YEAR
Total MH & SA
Total All other
(DoD and non-DoD except CHAMP-VA)



Senator McCain. Have you got a rough estimate?

Dr. Mendez. I do not have it in my mind. I would rather give you a good figure. You know, normally about 25 percent goes to the CHAMPUS cost, but I do not have the exact figure in my mind.

Senator McCain. I would also like, if you could for the record, how much CHAMPUS mental health costs have risen in the last 10 years and how much nonmental health related CHAMPUS costs have risen for the same period. I guess what I am getting at is, have mental health costs grown in excess of other CHAMPUS costs in the last few years, in your experience?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes. In my experience, the rise—the slope of the curve has been higher for mental health costs than for the costs at large.

Senator MCCAIN. What do you account this to, Doctor?

Dr. MENDEZ. I think there has been greater utilization. Besides utilization, I think some of the individual programs have also been costly. The methodology of payment perhaps can also stand improvement. I think that all of these matters are being addressed in the mental health plan that we have proposed.

Senator MCCAIN. You are taking some steps to alleviate some of the disparities between different areas and different utilization and different costs in different parts of the country?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes. But at the same time, Senator, I believe that it is important to be able to do that and still maintain accessibility for our patients. But the answer is yes, to your question.

Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Zimble, did you want to comment?

Admiral ZIMBLE. No. Everything that Dr. Mendez said is exactly right. One of the things that is a little bit of a problem is that we have changed some of the rules for CHAMPUS utilization for mental health. It is hard to project what effect that is going to have on the total cost, but we have some constraints now on the benefit. Some future constraints are contemplated on the benefit. Those will change the utilization patterns, and as that changes we will have to see how that controls the cost. We think it is going to be effective.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all very much.

Senator GLENN. Thanks, John.

Dr. Mendez, as you know, we passed a number of initiatives over the last 4 years to improve medical manning in the Reserves, and 80 percent of combat medical is assigned to Reserves normally. I think that is still the ratio. There have been improvements. I think some of the programs have obviously been successful.

The Armed Forces Reserve Policy Board report indicates that certain shortages, though, still continue to be a problem. The report indicates that only 65 percent of the general surgeon requirements are filled; 66 percent of orthopedic surgeon requirements are filled; 66 percent of nurse anesthetist requirements are filled; 74 percent of licensed practical nurse requirements are filled.

Now, that is a big switch from when those figures just used to be reversed as being the percentages we did not have. So something has worked well, but we still have shortages here. Do you have any plans you can share with us for improving the manning in these critical skills?

Dr. MENDEZ. There have been, as you know, sir, an extension of some of the bonus plans that have come in the acquisition of these officers. That has taken place specifically in medicine and also in the Reserve nursing personnel, specifically in nurse anesthesia. I believe that should continue, Senator Glenn, as well as the program that has to do with being able to have some of these dollars applied to debts that have been incurred because of training.

Right now, I believe that it is important, as the Reserve units return, to be able to make the broad diagnosis of our ability to recruit and retain, namely, how were recruitment and retention affected by essentially the type of story that you told a moment ago in terms of physicians. And then we can specifically address the matter of the bonus pay for the different specialties. I believe that the programs are working, and I believe the program should be extended.

Senator GLENN. Well, retention and recruitment—that was going to be my next question. Can you give us any estimate, or have there been any fast studies of people coming back so far as to what our retention and recruitment of medical personnel is going to be now that Desert Storm has ended?

Dr. MENDEZ. I can give you vignettes rather than statistics, if I may. I think it is still too early to be able to lay this out. I have personally, now, talked to several recruiters as I have gone to different parts of the country. And they specifically have told me that, indeed, the recruitment, particularly in the Reserves over the last 2 quarters, is slower.

This has been so in their efforts to recruit, for instance, at medical meetings and it has been so in their efforts in going to hospitals. However, they caution me that there is a lot of recruitment that goes on within the unit itself, and the effect on that recruitment is more difficult to be able to ascertain at this point.

The people that are on the Active side of the picture tell me that their recruitment appears more positive than what I am hearing from the Reserve people. But these are just very short-time type of vignettes from here and there, and I do not have figures. And the figures that I do have are so very short in their evaluation—they are quarter-type figures—that I do not know what the eventuality of that will be over the next, let us say, 6 months.

Senator GLENN. Any of the rest of you have a comment on that—retention, recruiting and keeping people in the Reserve?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Yes, sir. First, I would like to tell you that in Navy medical Reserves—in the SELRES this year our fill rate was 109 percent. And that includes some of those very difficult specialties. We have never been that well. But looking down the list, for general surgery we are authorized 142 general surgeons; we had 131 on board. And our authorization goes above that. I am sorry. As of December of 1990 we had 189 general surgeons on board, which was greater than our authorization.

So we are seeing some good retention. I do not know the effects of Desert Shield. We are looking at that. That is certainly part of the lessons learned. But we will tell you that, anecdotally, the Reserves I have talked with have all said no matter what their inconvenience, most of them are still planning to stay with the Reserves. I am not sanguine, but we just have to give it a little tincture of time to see what it is going to flesh out.

Senator GLENN. Yes. General Ledford, we have traditionally had some problems in the Army Reserve with regard to medical manpower. How do you see it right now? What is the outlook?

General LEDFORD. Well, sir, these are—like my colleagues, these are vignettes. And I think they represent a short-term trend, and I pray that is so. Our convention booth traffic, the recruiters say, in

the last month or so has been down about 75 percent. They say that active duty interest and accessions have been affected only minimally.

In fact, I have had some very interesting vignettes in which folks who have been called up are now asking to stay on and transfer back into the Active force—people who have has 12-14 years service and then got out. I think you are going to find a modest number of them. They actually want to stay on.

The Health Profession Scholarship Program—the applications dropped down about 20 percent behind the previous year, fiscal year 1990. But they tell me that that is beginning to recover now. Other student programs have been pretty heavily reduced, programs like the specialized training—the STRAP program and the Financial Assistance Program, programs that are designed for doctors and nurses in residency or other types of training. Those have fallen off rather dramatically, as you might expect, while the war was on. And I think we are going to have to really go out and sell Army medicine to these folks in the future. I think we can do it, but it is going to take us a while to recover, I am sure.

Senator GLENN. General Miller?

General MILLER. Air Force medicine is a little easier to sell, sir, and I am a little more sanguine. I sent some of my senior Reserve mobilization augmentees out to talk to the docs, and they are bringing back surprising reports. Satisfaction is high. Retention, we think, will be pretty good. We have a modest number wanting to stay on active duty. There will be a few who feel like that it is not in their best interest. Retention looks good.

Recruiting I think will be impaired short term, in summary, sir.

Senator GLENN. DEPMEDS has been mentioned several times here. I would be interested in hearing from you on the current inventory of DEPMEDS against our wartime requirements as we see them right now. How do you evaluate the current condition of the DEPMED units? And as we take them down over there and bring them back or do whatever we are going to do to them—refurbish them in some way, I guess—are they all going to be usable? How do they fit up against our future wartime requirements? Do you need any help from us to replenish medical perishables that were expended during the Gulf conflict? Is that coming under this fund that other people are providing? Are we going to take it out of that contingency fund? And are you authorized to do that now, or what help can we give you on replenishing what was expended over there? Anybody.

General LEDFORD. Well, I can speak for the Army a little bit. We are coming along pretty well on the program. We plan to procure 129 DEPMEDS hospitals, and we have actually, as of the 13th of February, which is the latest numbers I have—of the 129, which is our goal in procurement, we have actually obligated the monies for 125. So we are almost done. Now, we have fielded 58.

Senator GLENN. Well, now, is that brand new procurement?

General LEDFORD. Yes, sir. We have actually fielded 58 of them, sir.

Senator GLENN. Well, tell me about a DEPMED, now. I am not the world's most knowledgeable on DEPMED. But once you deploy

a DEPMED, then you fold it up—and can you put it back in the boxes and bring it back again and reuse what portion of it?

General LEDFORD. Yes. What you do—and I am hardly a logistician myself, sir. I would be the first to tell you. But the general plan is to carefully box the equipment back using the trail parties of people that know how to handle the equipment, ship it back to the depot in the United States, and it will go to Defense Depot, Ogden, Utah. And the equipment will be thoroughly gone over, replenished, refitted, repainted if necessary, put back in topnotch order, and then stored wherever it is necessary. It will either be fielded to the Active or Reserve forces, sent to a training site, or else placed in storage in CONUS.

Now, that is what is going to happen to the majority of the equipment. There will be several hospitals that will be taken down, refitted in the theater, and stored in the theater in Southwest Asia. And there will also be several hospitals that will be removed back to Europe, rebuilt, replenished in Europe, and placed in POMCUS in Europe. That is sort of the general plan.

So eventually, all of the equipment will have to be re-looked and re-fitted. I imagine they will find a modest amount of damage to semi-consumable items like tents. That type of material may have to be replaced. I do not know.

Senator GLENN. But you will have a new order in the budget for 129 new DEPMEDS; is that correct?

General LEDFORD. No, sir. Oh, no, sir.

Senator GLENN. You are talking about the refurbished—the total number?

General LEDFORD. We will only have to refurbish those that were fielded to the desert. There are actually 35 DEPMEDS hospitals——

Senator GLENN. I misunderstood you a minute ago, then. What is the 129 you used?

General LEDFORD. Sir, the 129 is the total number of DEPMEDS hospitals the Army planned to purchase over a period of a number of years. And we have actually obligated the monies for 125 of the 129 hospitals.

Senator GLENN. Now, those are replacements for, or in addition to, the older ones?

General LEDFORD. No, sir. That is the entire program.

Senator GLENN. The entire program. Okay.

General LEDFORD. Yes, sir. When the war started, we had actually—of the 129 hospitals, when last August came upon us we had—over 50 hospitals had been built and were fielded to units somewhere. So we had more than enough hospitals to support the desert operation. Of those 50-some hospitals that were already built, we sent 35 of them to the desert. Those that are in the desert will come back, be rebuilt—probably at no huge cost to the taxpayer—and the rest of the program has already been expended, essentially.

Senator GLENN. Let us go on to CRI, CHAMPUS Reform Initiative. Dr. Mendez, that had a rocky start. Now it seems to be working well. And in the demonstration areas, I understand—California and Hawaii—costs appear to have been contained, the contractor appears to be meeting or exceeding the requirements of the con-

tract, and the CRI has shown its flexibility in providing some continuity of care during major deployments such as Desert Storm.

Also, according to the NMFA, the National Military Family Association—military families are satisfied with this form of health care delivery. Let me quote from their statement they provided for the record:

"Military families rave about CHAMPUS Prime. Comments such as, we have our own doctor; we have someone we can call on the phone for advice; we can get appointments right away when our children are sick; we do not have to fill out CHAMPUS claim forms, are repeated over and over by families who are using or have used CHAMPUS Prime or Extra.

This gives the military family what they need most in terms of health care, that is, security. Parents know that if their children are sick they can pick up the phone and a qualified person will answer. If a determination is made that a sick child needs to be seen by the doctor right away, the child will be seen right away. Families are familiar with their provider and their provider is familiar with the family."

End of quote from NMFA.

That is a pretty good endorsement of the program, I would say. How do you rate the performance of CRI with regard to beneficiary satisfaction and cost effectiveness? Do you think it is that good?

Dr. MENDEZ. I believe that both efforts are good. The beneficiary satisfaction—all that I have seen and the feedback that I get not only from organizations but, indeed, from patients has been very good. I believe that the cost savings are real. And as a matter of fact, I believe that as we are moving toward Coordinated Care, Senator Glenn, we are incorporating into it some of the lessons that have been learned from CRI.

Let me also state that if you will look at the basis for Coordinated Care and if you look at the models of CAM, there is still a percentage of the population that is not within catchment areas, so that models like CRI are models that are applicable even if you were to continue in a mode of Coordinated Care. But my impression about CRI—and more importantly than just my impression, the impression of the hospital commanders from California and Hawaii about the CRI has been quite positive, sir.

Senator GLENN. Do all of you agree? Anybody take exception? Are there any corrections we need to make?

General MILLER. I agree totally, sir. One brief comment, and that is that although we think this should be an option under Coordinated Care within the catchment areas, we think it might be a mistake to give them the option to compete with catchment area care.

Senator GLENN. Dr. Mendez, what plans do you have to continue CRI? It appears to be working well. I think this comes up for rebidding—reconsideration on what date?

Dr. MENDEZ. On the first of January, 1993, sir.

Senator GLENN. What are your plans?

Dr. MENDEZ. The plan, of course, is to issue an RFP for a contract that will solicit bids on the continuance of CRI within the full context of Coordinated Care. I made a decision a short time ago not to expand in three states at this point. But the reason for that was the inability to recover costs between now and the time that the

contract will be up. It was not anything negative about either the function or satisfaction with CRI.

Senator GLENN. The DOD Authorization Act for 1991 contained a provision that CRI expansion may not proceed until after 90 days after the Secretary of Defense certifies: (1) that CRI has been shown to be more cost effective than CHAMPUS or any other health care demonstration project being conducted; (2) that the contractors selected to underwrite the CRI expansion would do so without disruption of services to CHAMPUS beneficiaries or delays in processing of claims; and (3) the contractor is financially able to underwrite CRI, which would be obvious.

What are your plans? Do you plan to expand CRI if any current or future proposals to expand CRI meet these conditions?

Dr. MENDEZ. The only proposal was the one that was contained in the initial contact, namely the expansion to Arizona and New Mexico and Nevada. That did not take place for the reasons that I have told you. We also had demonstration projects that were of another type in Phoenix, Arizona and Albuquerque, New Mexico.

But at this point, I do not have a plan that specifically speaks to CRI. But I do not negate the presence and continuity of CRI within the total context of Coordinated Care, not at all, sir.

Senator GLENN. How about individual services? Would you support the expansion of CRI as has been proposed by DOD in the past if the conditions we established are met?

General Miller?

General MILLER. If the conditions include not competing with local management, sir.

Senator GLENN. Admiral Zimble?

Admiral ZIMBLE. I have to echo my distinguished colleague to my left. We have a nice demonstration project in Charleston, which is Catchment Area Management. And I would prefer that, because it gives local autonomy and allows for local sensitivities. We are going to do more of that in the Tidewater area. And I would like—on a not-to-interfere basis, other CRI initiatives are fine.

Senator GLENN. General Ledford?

General LEDFORD. I would just echo the others, sir.

Senator GLENN. All right, good. We have already mentioned a little bit about Coordinated Care, and I have a number of areas to be covered yet this morning. And since we have mentioned it, I am going to skip over some of those. We will probably have some questions to be submitted to you for comment for the record, if you would respond to those, please.

General LEDFORD. Very well, sir.

Senator GLENN. Last year, Dr. Mendez, we extended the status of the Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities, the USTF's, as deemed military treatment facilities through December 31st, 1993. At the same time, we required you to complete negotiations with USTF's to implement by September 30th of 1991 a managed care delivery and reimbursement system that would make these facilities a part of the military health care delivery system.

What is the status of these negotiations, and will you implement a managed care system for the USTF's by September 30th, 1991, as required?

Dr. MENDEZ. The status is as follows: We have had people from the Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities, and the people from the uniformed services who have been in negotiations since September of 1990, sir. Major agreements have now been reached on all of the key issues central to the implementation and operation of the model.

Perhaps the most significant agreement reached to date is on the amount of capitation reimbursements to the Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities and the methodology that goes into that calculation. To me, it appears that the negotiations will indeed be completed on time. If so, we will begin, on September 30th of 1991, the first portion of the model which would go into the first open season for beneficiary enrollment. That beneficiary enrollment should start no later than about the middle of July of 1992. And the actual health care managed care model will begin, then, within the year for the original start, which would be October of 1992.

At this point, sir, all of that appears to be on track.

Senator GLENN. Now, the USTF funding for 1991 is capped at $154 million. What level of funding are you proposing, then, for fiscal years 1992 and 1993?

Dr. MENDEZ. Well, we support carrying through in 1991 the $154 million. The funding limitation for 1992 is increased to approximately $190 million, Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Will the managed care system cover all USTF's, including all satellite clinics?

Dr. MENDEZ. In my judgment, yes. There is one issue of contention that has to do with a particular satellite clinic, which I think has to be ironed out.

Senator GLENN. When will that be ironed out? That will not hold up the whole system, I presume, or will it?

Dr. MENDEZ. No, sir. I do not expect that it will.

Senator GLENN. Do you want to give us any more details on that one, or is that still in negotiation?

Dr. MENDEZ. Well, I think there were two major points, and that is whether satellite clinics really belong under the umbrella of the USTF, or if it is a separate entity. And further, whether the satellite clinics may come under the congressionally imposed funding limitation for 1991. And those are essentially the two issues.

Do I think that they can be resolved? The answer is, yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Did you have a comment?

Admiral ZIMBLE. No, sir. I agree. They can be resolved. I think when we go to the new negotiated type of capitation, that that will essentially go a long way towards resolving that issue.

Senator GLENN. Dental insurance for military dependents. Dr. Mendez, military dependents are authorized to enroll in the dental insurance plan, and the premium is not more than $10 per family per month. The benefit went into effect on August 1st of 1987. It covers preventive and routine dental care. I understand about 70 percent of those eligible are enrolled in this plan. How would you characterize this benefit in terms of adequacy and cost?

Dr. MENDEZ. I believe that the dependent dental insurance program has had really quite remarkable support from the uniformed services. That contract that went with the dental plan was effective in August. And the extended benefit of that included examination

and x-rays. The questions that I get about the dental plan are basically two—that I get from patients.

One is, will there be a possibility of expansion of the program in terms of coverage? And the second is, could the program cover other people that are beneficiaries besides those people that it is covering now, namely, retirees?

Senator GLENN. The National Military Family Association, again, has indicated to us that military families have told them overwhelmingly they would be willing to pay a higher premium for expanded dental coverage. I do not know whether that would require a change in law. I suppose it would.

Dr. MENDEZ. I believe it does.

Senator GLENN. And would you support such a change in law if it was a voluntary program?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes. We would have to see what it is and see how prudent it is to do that. But in general, I am certainly not against expansion of coverage of programs.

Senator GLENN. A supplemental option is what we——

Dr MENDEZ. I understand.

Senator GLENN. How about the rest of you? Any comment on that?

General MILLER. Yes, sir. Our feedback is just that. Most of our people want it. I think the amendment that the national family group has submitted is reasonable, and we certainly would support giving SECDEF the authority to define the benefit.

Senator GLENN. Admiral the same?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Same.

Senator GLENN. General, the same?

General LEDFORD. Yes. Clearly, sir, this is something the beneficiaries are willing to pay a little extra for, and it is very cost effective. And the Army would like to see it expanded. You do have right now a statutory $10 cap. That would have to be lifted, I am afraid.

Senator GLENN. Yes, that is right. And we would have to do that in law, I guess. Is that correct?

General MILLER. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. That is limited. Okay.

Maybe we can invite our GAO and Mental Health Association witnesses to come to the table also. You gentlemen can just stay there. I believe we have adequate spaces for them at the table. If they would come up now.

Mr. David Baine, of GAO, Director of Federal Health Care Delivery Issues; Stephen Backhus, assistant Director, Defense Health Issues of GAO; Mr. Michael Zieman, Chief Executive Office and Administrator, Charter Hospital of Savannah, National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals Representative; and Ms. Joy Midman, Executive Director, National Association of Psychiatric Treatment Centers for Children.

We welcome all of you to the hearing this morning.

Senator Nunn could not be here this morning. He had other commitments, and he asked if I would read this into the record, and I am glad to do it:

Dear Senator Glenn, I want to take the opportunity to thank you for holding these hearings on the military medical program I regret that a previous commitment has prevented me from being with you today.

I was especially pleased to learn that Michael Zieman, with Charter Medical Corporation, will testify on behalf of the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals. Charter Medical Corporation has been a good corporate citizen in my State.

I have know Bill Fickling, Charter's chief executive officer, for many years. The headquarters, located in Macon, Georgia, is near my hometown. I have observed Charter's strive to provide quality mental health care to both the civilian and military communities.

And he goes on to congratulate us on our attempts to strike an appropriate balance between the rising cost of CHAMPUS and the well-documented need of our citizens, especially our youth, for appropriate mental health care.

I look forward to reviewing the testimony from this distinguished group. And we will enter this entire letter in the record, also.

[The letter referred to follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, May 14, 1991.

Hon. JOHN GLENN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR GLENN: I wanted to take this opportunity to thank you for holding these hearings on the military medical program. I regret that a previous commitment has prevented me from being with you today.

I was especially pleased to learn that Michael A. Zieman with Charter Medical Corporation will testify on behalf of the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals. Charter Medical Corporation has been a good corporate citizen in my State. I have known Bill Fickling, Charter's Chief Executive Officer, for many years. The headquarters located in Macon, Georgia, is near my hometown and I have observed Charter strive to provide quality mental health care to both the civilian and military communities.

John, I congratulate you on your attempts to strike an appropriate balance between the rising costs of the CHAMPUS program, and the well documented need of our citizens, especially our youth, for appropriate mental health care. I look forward to reviewing the testimony from the distinguished group who will be before you.

Sincerely,

SAM NUNN.

Senator GLENN. Dr. Mendez, the DOD Authorization Act of 1991 contained a provision establishing certain limits on the CHAMPUS mental health benefit. The annual inpatient benefit was set at 30 days for adults, 45 days for patients under 19 years of age. And the annual residential treatment benefit was set at 150 days. Now, these limits were to go into effect on February 15, 1991. That date was extended to October 1st, 1991, in the Desert Storm Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act.

In your March 1991 report to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations on DOD's efforts to control the cost of CHAMPUS mental health care, you indicate that—and I quote:

"In general, even with enactment of the recent changes to the benefits, the CHAMPUS limitations on mental health care are generous when compared to typical private sector plans."

Would you elaborate on that statement?

Dr. MENDEZ. Basically that refers to in terms of the availability of residential treatment facility care—the averages of hospitalization for people that have acute care needs in mental health disease.

Senator GLENN. Are the CHAMPUS mental health limits on inpatient and residential treatment that take effect on October 1st—I guess I would question, are they fair to the taxpayer and CHAMPUS beneficiaries, or do you have a recommendation for change in either direction?

Dr. MENDEZ. Let me speak clinically first, because that is my first worry, if I may. And that is, if someone has the need, am I able to change the limit? Am I able to extend that as a physician? Yes, is the answer to that. There is a waiver of the limits in those cases where additional acute inpatient or residential care is medically or psychologically justified.

Second, our current National Utilization Management Program handles the preauthorization part of that so that we are able to make the evaluation. And all inpatient care, then, and its need at the beginning will be monitored for necessity and for appropriateness for admission. Currently, the care is being preauthorized on a voluntary basis.

And concurrent reviews are monitoring the appropriateness and continuing necessity. What they intend to do within that subject is not only to look at the matter of days, but to look at the appropriateness and make sure of the quality of that care in terms of the patient needs. And to that effect, I am comfortable with that.

Senator GLENN. CHAMPUS mental health care costs exceeded $600 million in fiscal 1989. I do not have the figures for 1990. Now, you have indicated you are undertaking some cost-containment initiatives in these areas. Could you elaborate on that and how you plan to implement them?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes, sir. I believe that, first of all, the expansion and the enhancement of our program of preadmission reviews assures us of the need before hospitalization. That in itself should prevent hospitalization for conditions that could basically be taken care of elsewhere.

The other is that implementation of the new congressional day limits for inpatient admissions also would help as far as economies are concerned. And there is also a projection for more cost-effective methods for reimbursing hospitals based on prospectively determined, per episode payment rate. That is similar to the methodology that is now used by Medicare.

So I think that all of these would favor, delivering the care more economically.

Senator GLENN. Let me ask each of the services—General Ledford, I will start off with you. Do you expect the CHAMPUS mental health limits that take effect on October 1 and the cost containment initiatives to negatively affect the families of military personnel?

General LEDFORD. Sir, I am not prepared to hazard that guess. I think that the waiver provisions allow us to clinically extend care where it is really professionally indicated. So in summary, I believe that we are going to still do right by our beneficiaries, but not have a totally open-ended program.

Senator GLENN. Admiral Zimble, how about you?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Exactly the same answer. I think we have to make sure that we have some controls. I do not think we have adequate controls today, and I think that some of the new limits will

help us. We do have to have a way of individualizing patient care. And the waiver opportunity allows us that individualization. What is that going to do to the total cost? I have no idea. But my first concerns and obligations are to the needs of the mental health of our patients.

Senator GLENN. General Miller, how about you?

General MILLER. I think controls are necessary, sir, and I think we do have added protection for our patients in our review process.

Senator GLENN. I do not know whether any of you have given me the definitive answer I was looking for here—whether cost containment and the limits that we are putting on them are going to really affect military personnel—it is hard for me to see how they would not affect people, but maybe you are right. I do not know. But maybe you can go back and look at this and give us a report for the record, if you would, on what you think the impact of this is going to be. I do not see how it can do anything but be a little bit negative—but maybe I am not looking at it correctly.

Dr. MENDEZ. I would be happy to give it to you for the record, sir.

[The information follows:]

IMPACT OF LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ON MENTAL HEALTH BENEFIT

The directed modifications included the following:

— a reduction in the inpatient day limit from 60 days to 30 days per year for adults, ages 19 years and older, and 45 days per year for children and adolescents ages 18 years and younger;

— establishment of an annual day limit of 150 days on residential treatment center care which previously has been unrestricted;

— establishment of mandatory preauthorization for all non-emergent inpatient mental health care; and,

— modification of the criteria forming the basis by which waivers of the day limits may be granted.

The specific financial impact of these changes, individually or collectively, cannot be satisfactorily quantified at this time. The data necessary to define the costs and resultant savings will come from a variety of sources (e.g., providers, the Health Care Financing Administration, our contractors, and other databases). As this information is collected, we will make every effort to estimate the dollar implications.

From the quality perspective, however, the legislated changes are expected to have a very positive effect. Historically, tools and approaches for ascertaining quality and appropriateness of mental health care have been less developed and more variable than in the medical-surgical areas. When operationalized on October 1, 1991, the utilization management measures recently enacted—in combination with policies and procedures already in place under our national mental health utilization management program—will provide a means by which the Department can more closely manage the provision of CHAMPUS mental health services.

Dr. MENDEZ. To me, the presence of limits of days—of numbers of days that are waiverable, in itself does not constitute a burden to the patient. If we are doing for the patient a preadmission certification and at the same time maintaining continuity in his evaluation by having that evaluation being done concurrently while he is hospitalized, I believe that we are able to maintain a good hold on that which is best for him clinically during hospitalization.

Senator GLENN. Well, that is good, and I hope it works out as you think it is going to work out. I would just put, let us say, a little yellow flag on that one at the moment, and it will be one that we want to watch very carefully. And if you find this not working correctly, why, let us know so we can work together on it, all of you.

Dr. MENDEZ. All right, sir.

Senator GLENN. The services are going to have to implement this thing, in particular.

Mr. Baine, the GAO has done work in comparing the CHAMPUS mental health benefits to medical insurance programs in the private sector. Your written statement of GAO's assessment has been included in the record. Would you summarize for us GAO's findings in this area?

Mr. BAINE. Mr. Chairman, our analysis of the comparison of benefits shows that even with the legislative changes that were made last year—as Dr. Mendez has said, the CHAMPUS benefit remains more generous than either the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program—most of the plans in the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program —and plans in private sector plans.

Senator GLENN. Do you feel that the CHAMPUS mental health limits that go in effect on October 1st are appropriate? Or if you do not, what would you recommend as limits?

Mr. BAINE. The limits that were established last year, Senator Glenn, seem to be appropriate. And I think the jury is still out as to whether they will be appropriate. As Dr. Mendez said, I do not think one should underestimate the importance of changing the waiver provision that CHAMPUS now must administer as a result of the legislation. That will enable either the utilization management contractor, or officials of CHAMPUS, to make decisions on a clinical basis, notwithstanding whether somebody has reached the limit that is now legislatively established.

Senator GLENN. What is your opinion or your evaluation of the DOD report on efforts to control CHAMPUS mental health care costs?

Mr. BAINE. We have looked at the report. We have talked it over with people in Dr. Mendez' office and Dr. Mendez himself. In short, I would say that we believe that, conceptually, this is on the right track. What remains to be done and remains to be seen is how it is going to be implemented; how the individual features are going to be implemented, and specifically how is it going to be incorporated into Dr. Mendez' Coordinated Care proposal?

Senator GLENN. Mr. Zieman, Ms. Midman, you represent two associations, the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals and the National Association of Psychiatric Treatment Centers for Children. I would like to get your perspective as a representative of institutions that provide CHAMPUS mental health care. As you are probably aware, we moderated the more stringent CHAMPUS mental health care limits that the House had proposed last year. And we also were responsible for delaying the effective date of those limits to October 1, 1991.

Our position on both matters was based on our concern for adequate coverage of our CHAMPUS beneficiaries and our concern that providers be given a fair transition period to accommodate the new limits. You both have submitted written statements on these and other matters, which have been included in the record. Would each of you please give us the views of your association with regard to the CHAMPUS mental health limits that take effect in October and on the DOD initiatives to contain health care costs—CHAMPUS health care costs?

Mr. Zieman?

Mr. ZIEMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. We believe that the new benefits should be allowed to go into effect on October 1st, 1991. Once the new benefit and waiver has been implemented, there should be a full evaluation of the changes to determine if additional modifications or further restructuring of the benefit is warranted. We believe it is critical to have an effective waiver process to assure that those persons who need additional care beyond the established stay limits are able to receive that care.

Senator GLENN. Ms. Midman?

Ms. MIDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do want to thank you for your efforts and your staff's efforts both last summer and this recent winter. Our concern, is the fact that this will be the first time limits will be imposed on the residential treatment community. We represent in excess of 90 percent of the CHAMPUS-approved residential treatment centers, so we are very familiar with the benefit, and about 25 percent of our patient population comes from the CHAMPUS program.

Our concern with the limits is not the limit, but the presumption that if care was deemed to be medically necessary and appropriate on either day 1 or day 40, that suddenly it is not necessary on day 151. And our concerns remain with the implementation of the waiver to assure that it be both timely and fair—that the process begin early enough in the treatment process to allow for appropriate planning beyond the 150, should discharge be necessary.

To discharge a child with 5 days or 10 days notice when you are either reintegrating them into the community or, more likely than not, you do not have a family—you are habilitating; you are not rehabilitating—remains a major concern to us. It is both the timeliness of the implementation of the process, notification of the disposition of the request for waiver and, after that point, whether there is an appropriate appeals mechanism built into 150 days which are the issues. In the treatment of children and adolescents needing longer-term care, 150 days is not very long.

We strongly support the implementation of the program and commend the national mental health utilization plan that is in place. We, of course, thought that that would suffice, rather than imposing an arbitrary limit.

Senator GLENN. Do you agree with the conclusion reached by DOD that even with the CHAMPUS mental health limits, the CHAMPUS mental health benefit is generous when compared to typical private sector plans, Mr. Zieman?

Mr. ZIEMAN. I believe the issue is not whether the benefits are comparable, but rather whether the CHAMPUS benefit is adequate to meet the needs of the military families. The goal should be to provide high quality care in the most appropriate and least costly setting.

Senator GLENN. I basically agree with you. You are looking for results, not comparison with another plan, necessarily. Ms. Midman, do you agree with that?

Ms. MIDMAN. I do.

Senator GLENN. This may mean we just have a very inadequate mental health plan, generally, across our whole country and other programs that we are comparing this with.

Ms. MIDMAN. Well, I would agree with you.

Senator GLENN. I do not know. Would that be your position?

Ms. MIDMAN. It is our position. Obviously, we feel that in treating, you cannot compare the CHAMPUS program to any other private sector program because you are dealing with not only a military preparedness issue, but an employee who does not have the benefit of either leaving or negotiating for themselves. And it is just a different system altogether.

Senator GLENN. Any other comments? Mr. Backhus, Mr. Baine, on this particular subject?

Mr. BACKHUS. The issue of whether the benefit is adequate or not needs to be addressed in the context of whether there is an adequate continuum of care that is available now. I think that there are, in fact I know that there are proposals in the department's plan, which are based on our assessment of that plan as well as talking to the other folks at the table here, that there are necessary changes or modifications that should be made.

I am speaking here of alternatives to costly inpatient care. It is not necessarily always the most appropriate setting to have people in. And there are options and things being experimented with called partial hospitalization, or home health care, case management, those kinds of techniques that are less costly, more appropriate for people, and I think ought to be implemented. To some extent, the plans in the department call for that. I am pretty sure that it has the support of most of the people at the table here.

Senator GLENN. Are those things going to be done, Dr. Mendez?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes, sir. We have not, as yet, been able to cost each one of these out. Some of these are taking place outside of the medical system. You know, daycare, and home care, and so on and so forth. But they are indeed the modes to try and prevent hospitalization for a host of conditions that could be treated outside the hospital. Not only on the basis of cost, but on the basis of maintaining a patient within his community structure and within his family structure.

Senator GLENN. Okay, good. Thank you all, the four that I have called up here. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statements of Dr. Baine, Mr. Zieman, and Ms. Midman follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DAVID P. BAINE, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL HEALTH CARE DELIVERY ISSUES, HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION

DOD'S MANAGEMENT OF BENEFICIARIES' MENTAL HEALTH CARE

SUMMARY

GAO's testimony focuses on (1) how mental health benefits under DOD's Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) compare with those under private sector and other governmental health plans and (2) DOD's efforts to manage the mental health care provided to its beneficiaries.

CHAMPUS mental health care benefits and beneficiary cost-sharing requirements—when viewed as a package—are more generous than those offered in the private sector and by other government plans, even considering last year's legislative changes, which imposed somewhat stricter limits on allowable mental health services.

Moreover, DOD's management of mental health care has improved since the 1980s, and GAO believes the Department is headed in the right direction. Last year's legislative changes and DOD's management initiatives enhance the prospects for

gaining control over mental health care costs while assuring that necessary care is available and affordable to beneficiaries.

However, several areas need further DOD attention. Among the most important of these is the need to improve its quality assurance program for mental health services. DOD's efforts to assure that beneficiaries receive quality mental health care have been insufficient. It has done little to assess the quality of care provided. Its recent efforts to use its utilization review contractor to begin monitoring quality of care, and its plans to contract for a continuing independent quality review of mental health care services, represent important steps that should result in better assurance that the quality of care will be sufficiently evaluated.

Finally, many questions remain as to how DOD will ultimately implement the plans set forth in its recent report to this subcommittee and others on mental health care. How and how well the Department and the military services implement DOD's mental health care plans will be key determinants of the success of their efforts.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss our evaluation of several key components of the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of beneficiaries' mental health care under its Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).[1] My testimony will focus on:

— how mental health benefits compare with private sector and other government program benefits and

— DOD's demonstration projects, utilization review activities, quality assurance programs, and future plans.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the management of mental health care in DOD has improved since the 1980s and that DOD is headed in the right direction. It now has in place what appear to be more effective controls over the utilization of mental health benefits. In addition, its managed care techniques being tested around the country seem to be working to contain costs and improve access. Last year's legislative changes and DOD's management initiatives enhance the prospects for gaining control over mental health care costs while assuring that necessary care is available and affordable to beneficiaries.

Nonetheless, there are areas that need further DOD attention. These include improving its quality assurance program, reducing beneficiaries' incentives to use inpatient care, and designing alternatives to costly inpatient care. We also want to caution that, while we support DOD's concept of Coordinated Care [2] and believe it offers significant potential in the mental health care arena, many key difficult operational decisions still need to be made. It is also crucial that the lessons learned from past initiatives be incorporated into DOD's implementation plans.

Mr. Chairman, before we elaborate on these matters, I will provide some background information on mental health care cost trends in DOD through fiscal year 1989, the most recent year of complete data.

Mental health costs in DOD have skyrocketed over the last several years. In fact, between 1985 and 1989 they have doubled to more than $600 million per year even though the number of eligible beneficiaries has remained relatively constant. Inpatient care comprised the largest and fastest growing component of CHAMPUS's mental health costs, having increased from about $200 million to almost $500 million over the 5-year period. Mental health care provided to children and adolescents in hospitals and residential treatment centers accounted for 3 out of every 4 days of inpatient mental health care and 73 percent of the total DOD spent for such care in fiscal year 1989.

While we view these data as a clear indication that mental health care costs need to be better controlled, we also believe that it is critical for DOD beneficiaries to have high-quality, affordable, and accessible, but necessary, mental health care benefits. Certainly the stresses caused by the recent Persian Gulf conflict have heightened everyone's concern that beneficiaries get the care they need and deserve. Obvi-

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[1] CHAMPUS pays for a substantial portion of the medical care provided to DOD beneficiaries by civilian hospitals, physicians, and other civilian providers. Retirees and their dependents, active duty dependents, and dependents of deceased members obtain care from these providers when they cannot obtain it from military facilities.

[2] DOD's Coordinated Care concept envisions that DOD will manage or regulate most of the health care received by CHAMPUS beneficiaries in an effort to reduce unnecessary and uneconomical services. See *The Military Health Services System—Prospects for: the Future*, Statement of David P. Baine, Director, Federal Health Care Delivery Issues, Human Resources Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate (GAO/T-HRD-91-11, March 14, 1991).

ously, only a well-managed program can achieve these goals. This hearing is an important part of the effort to improve the management and delivery of mental health benefits in DOD.

I would now like to turn to several specific topics related to these issues.

BENEFIT LEVELS

CHAMPUS mental health care benefits and beneficiary cost-sharing requirements—when viewed as a package—are more generous than those offered in the private sector and by other government plans, even considering last year's legislative changes. We believe, though, that the mental health benefit needs some additional modification so that beneficiaries are able to obtain more affordable and adequate care, when they need it.

The legislative changes enacted last year imposed somewhat stricter limits on acute inpatient and residential treatment center care. In most cases, coverage for inpatient acute care will be limited to 30 days per year for adults and 45 days per year for dependents under 19 years of age.[3] Care in residential treatment centers will be limited to 150 days per year rather than the current unlimited benefit. The legislation also requires that DOD establish procedures under which these limits can be waived in cases where care is determined to be medically or psychologically necessary. On April 1, 1991, annual deductibles for many beneficiaries (which apply to medical care as well) were raised from $50 to $150 per person and from $100 to $300 per family.

The vast majority of medium and large U.S. firms impose limits on mental health care coverage in the form of annual day limits on inpatient care and/or lifetime dollar limits on all types of mental health care. Several surveys of such firms show that about half of them impose annual day limits on inpatient care, most commonly 30 days. Also, about half of the firms impose lifetime dollar limits on mental health care, usually $50,000 or less (equivalent to about 100 days of inpatient care over a lifetime). CHAMPUS has no such lifetime limits.

CHAMPUS mental health benefits are more generous than those of most other plans in several other respects. For example, unlike most employer-sponsored health plans, DOD offers residential treatment care. In contrast to most private sector plans and plans in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, DOD requires no employee premiums, requires less enrollee cost sharing, and offers better annual catastrophic protection for dependents of active duty members. Moreover, the recent legislation allows for waivers to permit patients to exceed the limits it imposed; private firms' plans generally do not.

We believe the benefit package needs some additional modification to overcome an existing financial bias toward the provision of inpatient care to CHAMPUS beneficiaries. For example, dependents of active duty members now have substantial incentives to use expensive inpatient care rather than outpatient services because inpatient care is essentially free while both a deductible and a 20-percent copayment must be satisfied before DOD begins paying for outpatient services. DOD has stated in its recent report to your committee and others [4] that it intends to study how best to systematically correct this bias.

There is also a need for other mental health care options that may be less costly than inpatient care, such as coverage for partial hospitalization. Such a continuum of care option, which involves hospitalization and intensive treatment of patients for less than 24 hours at a time, could benefit both patients and DOD's efforts to control costs. It could also improve mental health care outcomes. Adult patients generally could return to their families and to an income-producing status sooner than if they were confined to hospitals. Adolescents and children could also be reunited with their families more quickly than they can now.

DOD has the legislative authority to establish these services as covered benefits, and it appears, based on our review of DOD's recently issued report, that it plans to do so.

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[3] Public Law 101-511, dated October 24, 1990, established new mental health care day limits. Public Law 102-28, dated April 10, 1991, specified that implementation of these limits would begin on October 1, 1991. Currently, 60 days of care per year are allowed unless more care is needed as a result of extraordinary circumstances.

[4] Report to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations: *DOD's Efforts to Control the Costs of CHAMPUS Mental Health Care*, March 1991.

MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES

In the last several years, DOD has initiated and is testing several managed care demonstration programs for the delivery of mental health services for CHAMPUS beneficiaries. In addition, DOD has contracted to help it establish a mental health utilization management program in those areas not covered by its demonstration projects. The techniques DOD is using in these initiatives are similar to those employed in the private sector, which is also wrestling with ways to control mental health care costs. Preliminary results of DOD's efforts indicate that savings are being achieved. However, we believe that the quality of care being provided needs to be more fully evaluated before DOD makes final decisions on implementing a nationwide approach. DOD recognizes this need and is planning to address the quality issues.

Savings of CHAMPUS funds are accruing as a result of reduced provider charges, shorter lengths of stay, and the use of less costly care settings. For example, the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative achieves savings primarily by negotiating provider discounts and conducting utilization management. The Contractor Provided Arrangement project in the Virginia Tidewater area has achieved its savings largely from provider discounts, individual case management, and the use of a wider range of alternative care settings, such as partial hospitalization, than are normally available under CHAMPUS. Health Management Strategies International, Inc. (HMS), DOD's utilization management contractor, is achieving results principally from preauthorization of admissions and concurrent review activities. Early data indicate that HMS is reducing lengths of stay both in inpatient acute care settings and in residential treatment centers. But not until later this year will sufficient information be available for a better assessment of the impact that its utilization review activities are having.

As for the future, DOD's plan does not specify which of its initiatives, if any, will become part of its Coordinated Care Program. The plan, however, does call for continued use of utilization management, increased use of provider discounts, and establishment of a partial hospitalization benefit, all of which we think are steps in the right direction. We believe, though, that DOD needs to assure that high-quality mental health care is provided to beneficiaries. I would now like to address this issue.

NEED FOR IMPROVED QUALITY ASSURANCE EFFORTS

DOD's efforts to assure that beneficiaries receive quality mental health care have been insufficient. It has done little to assess the quality of care provided. DOD's efforts over the past year to use its utilization review contractor to begin monitoring the quality of care, and its plans to contract for a continuing independent quality review of mental health care services provided to its beneficiaries, represent important improvement steps. These efforts should result in better assurance that the quality of care will be sufficiently evaluated.

DOD has for many years relied principally on the accreditation efforts of the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations to help it assure that hospitals and residential treatment centers providing mental health care to military beneficiaries demonstrate the capability to provide high-quality care. DOD requires mental health care providers to obtain Joint Commission reviews (and accreditation) every 3-years. However, DOD has not, until this past year, begun making independent assessments of the quality of care provided.

Only one of DOD's demonstration projects has been independently evaluated with respect to quality of care. A March 1990 report done under contract for DOD concerning its Contractor Provided Arrangement project in Tidewater concluded that there were serious quality-of-care problems related to the appropriateness of treatment, delays in treatment, and level of care provided. A follow-up analysis by the same contractor of 1990 cases resulted in similar findings. However, the contractor pointed out that it is not known how these results compare to those elsewhere under CHAMPUS. DOD is assessing the report to determine what actions it will take.

DOD-sponsored site visits to residential treatment centers have been infrequent. Before 1990, 20 of 88 approved facilities had never been site surveyed, and 27 others had not been reviewed for at least 8 years.

In the past year, HMS began conducting on-site surveys of residential treatment centers. This effort is separate from its role as DOD's utilization review contractor. As of March 1991, HMS had conducted 34 surveys, and by early 1992, it expects to visit every residential treatment center. Of the 34 facilities surveyed, 11 were CHAMPUS-approved centers and 23 were facilities seeking CHAMPUS certification.

None of the 11 CHAMPUS-approved facilities met all CHAMPUS certification standards. Although the degree of noncompliance varied, each facility was found to have problems serious enough to be required to submit corrective action plans to bring it into compliance. Seven plans had been submitted to DOD as of March 1991; four had not. Two of the 11 facilities are in the process of being decertified. One of these two facilities and an additional one were prohibited from admitting new patients pending the submission of satisfactory corrective action plans.

HMS's site surveys and its concurrent review activities have identified a number of systemic problems with the quality of care being provided to children and adolescents in established residential treatment centers. For example:

— Many facilities relied on staff who did not meet CHAMPUS's qualification requirements to provide most of the necessary services. For example, a majority of residential treatment centers surveyed were not following DOD's requirement that individual, group, and family therapy be provided by licensed professional staff. Facilities with less qualified staff tended to have longer lengths of stay, relied on rigid behavioral management techniques, and had poor documentation of treatment progress and the effectiveness of treatment interventions.

— In many residential treatment centers, restraint and seclusion were a major method of behavioral control. Staff ordering seclusion were neither properly trained nor clinically privileged to do so. Staff used "time out," "quiet room," and "holding" as control interventions without the necessary safeguards or clinical assessment and adequate professional involvement. Also, in some facilities registered nurses or physicians were not making assessments indicating the need for patients to remain in seclusion.

— Medication interventions at some facilities were not used for appropriate therapeutic purposes but, instead, for other purposes such as controlling patients' behaviors.

— Documentation problems existed at almost every facility. Medical records were incomplete, treatment plans lacked specificity, and progress notes lacked detail on patient responses to treatment interventions.

— Discharge criteria (the level of functioning that would be required to move the patient to a lesser level of care) usually lacked patient-specific goals and objectives. Discharge criteria not tailored to the condition or needs of each patient can lead to longer lengths of stay or the premature discharge of patients.

— Many facilities had inadequate staff-to-patient ratios, which can result in too few nurses to tend to patient medical needs, child care workers not available for 24-hour coverage, and shortages of staff on weekends.

Some of the facilities surveyed have responded positively to HMS's determinations. For example, unlicensed staff are in the process of obtaining licensure and, in some instances, unqualified staff have been replaced; facilities have improved documentation, including preparing more specific treatment plans and revising discharge criteria; and staff-to-patient ratios have been improved. These types of responses demonstrate the value of conducting on site surveys.

DOD's plan for improving its mental health care quality assurance program calls for awarding an independent quality monitoring contract in fiscal year 1992. The contractor will retroactively review mental health care provided to all CHAMPUS beneficiaries. This function will be similar to the external peer review process for medical and surgical scare that DOD now has in place. This action should help address what DOD itself recognizes as an area needing attention.

CONCLUSIONS

As I stated at the outset, we believe the recent changes in DOD's management of beneficiaries' mental health care, and those expected in the near future, represent positive steps that will help the Department improve this important element of the military health care benefit. Nevertheless, many questions remain as to how DOD will ultimately implement the plans set forth in its recent report on mental health care. Moreover, as is the case with its Coordinated Care plans, how and how well the Department and the military services implement DOD's mental health care plans will be key determinants of the success of their efforts. Because of their importance to millions of military beneficiaries, these are matters that warrant the subcommittee's continued attention. We, of course, would be glad to assist you in your authorization and oversight efforts.

This concludes my prepared statement. We would be happy to respond to your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MICHAEL A. ZIEMAN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND ADMINISTRATOR, CHARTER HOSPITAL OF SAVANNAH

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Michael A. Zieman; I am the Chief Executive Officer and Administrator of Charter Hospital of Savannah in Savannah, Georgia. My hospital is a major CHAMPUS provider. I am also a member of the Board of Trustees of the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals (NAPPH). I am here today representing the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals, which represents over 325 private psychiatric hospitals nationwide.

On behalf of NAPPH, I want to deeply thank the Chairman, Senator Glenn, the ranking Republican member, Senator McCain, and the entire committee for your strong support last year in ensuring that CHAMPUS beneficiaries continued to have access to necessary psychiatric services. Without the support of this committee, many thousands of military families would have been unable to receive appropriate mental health care to meet their specific needs.

BACKGROUND ON NAPPH

The National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals was created in 1933 to represent the interests of the Nation's private psychiatric hospitals and the patients they serve. The Association works at both the national and local level to promote high quality care and treatment for the psychiatrically ill, and to foster the cost-effective and efficient operation of our member hospitals that provide these services.

Currently, the Association has 325 members located in all regions of the country. Member hospitals provide active treatment programs for the care of children, adolescents, adults, the elderly, and alcohol and substance abuse patients. NAPPH hospitals maintain active treatment programs along a full continuum of care, including inpatient, partial hospitalization, residential treatment, outpatient, and aftercare services.

Hospitals must be accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) and licensed in their State before joining the NAPPH. Most members of NAPPH are certified for participation in the CHAMPUS program, as well as certified for Medicare and Medicaid (where such services are covered by a State).

INPATIENT MENTAL HEALTH COVERAGE UNDER CHAMPUS

The Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) provides health services to both dependents (spouses and children) of active military personnel, and retired military personnel and their dependents. Of the over 6.5 million individuals eligible for CHAMPUS benefits, approximately half are adult women, and one-third are children under age 21.

Individuals eligible for CHAMPUS benefits are required to seek their medical care at a military health facility. If the military facility does not have the capability of providing that care, the beneficiary is authorized to obtain it at a private facility off-base. It is those off-base health care services that are paid for by the CHAMPUS program.

The current inpatient CHAMPUS mental health benefit provides 60 days of coverage for inpatient psychiatric hospital care for all ages and no limit on medically or psychologically necessary care in a residential treatment setting.

THE FISCAL YEAR 1991 DOD AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION ACT

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Fiscal Year 1991 Department of Defense Authorization Act and the Fiscal Year 1991 Department of Defense Appropriations Act reduced the inpatient psychiatric hospital benefit to 30 days per year for adults and 45 days for children and adolescents, with a waiver for extended care if deemed medically or psychologically necessary. Residential treatment was limited to 150 days annually with a waiver for extended care if deemed medically or psychologically necessary. This reduction in the inpatient benefit was scheduled to go into effect on February 15, 1991. However, with the active support of this committee, the Persian Gulf conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991, (P.L. 102-25) was recently enacted, which delayed the implementation of the inpatient mental health benefit reductions until October 1, 1991.

The Desert Storm legislation provided for a temporary safety net with respect to CHAMPUS mental health coverage for those brave men and women and their families who fought for our country in the Persian Gulf. Although many of the troops are now home and the others will hopefully be home very soon, it is important to

point out that research shows that reunion often causes more family stress than the deployment. Therefore, it is critical that those military families who were involved in the Persian Gulf conflict continue to have adequate mental health coverage under CHAMPUS in the months ahead. I would call to your attention an excellent publication recently released by the National Mental Health Association entitled, *When The Yellow Ribbon Comes Down—Guide To A Mentally Healthy Reunion.* I would request that this publication be included in the hearing record.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, NAPPH strongly opposed the cutbacks in the inpatient benefit last year because we believed that these reductions were ill timed, unnecessary and would limit access to medically or psychologically necessary care. We believe even more strongly now that these reductions were unnecessary because the preliminary results from the DOD national mental health utilization management program and the per diem caps on inpatient CHAMPUS mental health costs and inpatient utilization. We will discuss these programs and their impact on restraining costs and utilization of inpatient psychiatric services in more detail later in our testimony.

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE CHAMPUS PROGRAM

During last year's deliberations on the CHAMPUS mental health benefit reductions, three basic arguments were used in support of reducing the mental health benefit. They were: (1) mental health costs accounted for about one-quarter of CHAMPUS's total spending, which is far above the typical proportion in private employer's health plans; (2) the CHAMPUS mental health benefit is extremely generous; and (3) CHAMPUS mental health costs are out-of-control. Although the benefit cuts have been enacted into law, we believe that it is still important to address each of these arguments for future deliberations on the need for further changes in the mental health benefit.

First, the argument that mental health costs account for about one-quarter of CHAMPUS total spending is very misleading. CHAMPUS beneficiaries must first attempt to go to a military treatment facility for their care. If the military has the capability of treating them there, the cost of the care is not charged to the CHAMPUS program, but is absorbed by the overall military health care budget. For the majority of health services, military treatment facilities are able to provide direct care. However, because the military does not have adequate facilities for providing all needed medical services, including most of the necessary psychiatric care, CHAMPUS beneficiaries must seek treatment off-base. These services are covered by CHAMPUS and, as a result, mental health care costs as a percentage of the total CHAMPUS dollars spent necessarily comprise a higher proportion of the CHAMPUS dollar.

It should be noted, however, that mental health costs as a percentage of all health care costs provided to CHAMPUS eligibles—including direct military facility care and CHAMPUS care has been estimated to be between 7-12 percent, which is less or comparable to civilian sector mental health costs. For example, the 1989 Foster-Higgins Health Care Benefits survey found that mental health and substance abuse benefit costs for employers with over 5,000 employees averaged close to 11 percent of all health care costs.

Second, it has been stated that the CHAMPUS mental health benefit is extremely generous. There is not a standard civilian sector mental health benefit. Policies vary by the size of the business group, the underwriting techniques used, and the attitudes of the employer. Civilian sector policies vary from a low of no coverage to the same coverage as provided for other medical illnesses (unlimited). Some plans have a lifetime dollar limit; others have a combination of day limits and a lifetime dollar limit. Large businesses usually offer more comprehensive mental health coverage than plans offered by smaller businesses. For example, according to the Foster-Higgins 1989 Health Care Benefits Survey, some 55 percent of the 1,943 businesses surveyed provide coverage of more than 30 days per year, with nearly 20 percent covering 60 days or more. Moreover, over 30 percent of the businesses with more than 20,000 employees offered coverage of more than 60 days annually, according to the same Foster-Higgins survey. It is clear that many large businesses provide coverage that is comparable to the CHAMPUS mental health benefit, and in some cases offer a more comprehensive benefit than CHAMPUS. These large businesses provide comprehensive mental health coverage because they view it as an investment in their personnel. The military should also have a strong interest in investing in the men and woman that serve our country.

It is also important to point out that comparing the military to the civilian sector is in many ways not a fair comparison. Military men and women voluntarily enlist

for a period of time and cannot change employer (or insurance coverage) as can persons in the civilian sector. Moreover, it is in the interest of the military to retain their personnel because it is substantially less costly than continuously training new recruits. In this regard, it is very important for the military to offer a comprehensive fringe benefit package, including health care coverage.

Finally, military personnel and their families in many ways live a more stressful life than persons in the civilian sector. Military family members are often away for long periods of time and faced with the possibility of becoming involved in combat. Young people are often hit the hardest by the stress of military life. With parents working, or away from home in possibly dangerous situations for long periods of time, discipline, family problems, and emotional stress can become overwhelming as we have seen with the recent Gulf war. Frequent moving, either within the country or overseas, can add additional emotional strain on children. All of these factors, which are specific to the military, must be considered in determining benefit packages for our military men and women and their families.

Third, it has been stated that CHAMPUS mental health costs are out-of-control. This argument has been used as the underlying reason for reducing the mental health benefit. It is true that CHAMPUS mental health costs have increased during the last several years. It also should be pointed out that mental health costs in the civilian sector have also increased. According to the Foster-Higgins survey, psychiatric costs per employee rose 18 percent in just 1 year—from 1988 to 1989. There are many valid reasons why costs for providing mental health care may have increased over the past few years. They include:

- Increased incidence of mental illness and substance abuse.
- Reduction of stigma, so that people are more willing to seek treatment.
- More high quality, specialized services are now available.
- More effective treatment is available due to advances in research.
- Family stress, due to more single parent families, child abuse, substance abuse, has increased.

MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IS COST-EFFECTIVE

Studies have shown that effective, appropriate mental health treatment can be cost-effective, and can even, over time, reduce the overall cost of health care. The 1989 Foster-Higgins survey states that "serious mental illness can be every bit as financially catastrophic to a family as cancer, heart disease or physical trauma—and deferred treatment can lead to expensive medical conditions at a later date." A 1990 Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen report states that "people who suffer from mental illness and chemical dependency tend to be heavy users of medical care, so effective treatment of mental health/chemical dependency problems can save money on medical benefits." In addition, cost-benefit analysis of the Medicare Mental Health Demonstration showed that expansion of Medicare mental health benefits actually led to a reduction in the use of other Medicare medical benefits—representing a net saving to the Medicare program.

CURRENT COST AND UTILIZATION CONTROLS UNDER CHAMPUS

Although there are many justifiable reasons why mental health costs have increased in recent years, NAPPH recognizes the need to control costs. We are committed to working with all parties to ensure the delivery of high quality, cost-effective psychiatric services. NAPPH believes that the Department of Defense currently has the necessary cost and utilization controls to meet this goal of providing high quality care at an affordable price.

PER DIEM CAPS FOR INPATIENT PSYCHIATRIC PROVIDERS ARE IN PLACE

First, in January 1989, DOD changed its payment policies for inpatient psychiatric hospital providers from billed charges to per diem caps. Under the plan, high volume hospitals (25 admissions or more) are paid on a hospital-specific per diem rate up to a per diem cap at the 80th percentile of all hospital-specific rates (taking volume into account). Low volume hospitals are paid according to a regional average per diem corresponding to the nine census regions. These rates increase annually by the same percentage as the Medicare update factor (averaged close to 5 percent during the past 3 years). Residential treatment centers are paid provider-specific, all inclusive per diem rates for professional and institutional services. RTC rates are capped at the 75th percentile of all RTC-specific rates. RTC rates are increased annually based on the medical consumer price index.

NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IS IN EFFECT

Second, in January 1990, CHAMPUS implemented a national mental health utilization management program, which was designed to ensure that all inpatient psychiatric hospital care was medically or psychologically necessary. The utilization management program, which is conducted by Health Management Strategies, International, under contract by DOD, includes precertification for all non-emergency admissions and authorization within 48 hours of admission for emergencies, concurrent review, and discharge planning review.

PER DIEM CAPS AND UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT CONTROL UNIT PRICE AND PER DISCHARGE COSTS

NAPPH strongly believes that the combination of the per diem caps and the national mental health utilization management program creates a system that controls costs and assures that care is medically or psychologically necessary. The per diem caps limit the growth in unit costs, while the utilization management program reduces unnecessary admissions and restricts the growth in per discharge costs through controlling length of stay. NAPPH argued during last year's deliberations on the reductions in the CHAMPUS inpatient psychiatric benefit that reducing the benefit was not necessary in light of the current cost and utilization controls that were already in place. The March 1991, Department of Defense Report on "DOD's Efforts to Control the Costs of CHAMPUS Mental Health Care" states that, "While the data are preliminary and cover a transition period, there are indications in our experience for calendar year 1990 that this approach (utilization management program) is resulting in fewer admissions and shorter lengths of stay for patients admitted after January 1, 1990." The DOD report also concluded that the per diem caps can achieve control over the growth in per unit prices.

Based on the preliminary results of the per diem caps and the national mental health utilization management program, it seems clear to us that there are better methods—already in place—to control costs and utilization than arbitrarily reducing the benefit. Decisions to admit a patient and to continue treatment should be based on clinically accepted medical or psychological criteria—medical necessity.

The national mental health utilization management program assures that the services are medically or psychologically necessary, and that the appropriate level of care and intensity of services match the individual needs of each patient and his/her level of impairment. This is clearly preferable to arbitrary benefit limits that have no relationship to the medical or psychological necessity of the care.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH REDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED IN THE FISCAL YEAR 1991 DOD AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION ACTS

The Fiscal Year 1991 DOD Authorization and Appropriations Acts made a number of changes in the inpatient psychiatric benefit. These changes, which will go into effect on October 1, 1991, include: (1) reducing the inpatient psychiatric hospital benefit to 30 days per year for adults and 45 days for children and adolescents; (2) limiting residential treatment to 150 days per year; (3) allowing extended care beyond the day limits if the care is determined to be medically or psychologically necessary; (4) requiring mandatory pre-admission certification for non-emergencies and certification within 48 hours of admission for all emergencies; and (5) prohibiting a physician or other mental health professional from referring a patient to a facility in which he/she has an economic interest.

NAPPH is concerned about these changes for four reasons.

First, because DOD currently has adequate cost and utilization controls in place, NAPPH does not believe the reduction in benefits authorized in the legislation last year was necessary or in the best interest of CHAMPUS beneficiaries. NAPPH would urge the subcommittee to review this issue in light of the positive preliminary results from the utilization management program and the per diem caps to determine whether such initiatives are more preferable than limiting the benefit levels.

Second, in reducing the inpatient psychiatric benefit last year Congress also changed the waiver language from "extraordinary medical or psychological circumstances" to "medical or psychological circumstances." In changing the waiver language, we believe Congress intended to assure that all medically or psychologically necessary care be covered. The conference report stated, "With regard to the waiver authority provided, the conferees expect the Secretary of Defense to prescribe procedures for the prompt, efficient disposition of waiver requests and to ensure that persons determined to be in need of inpatient or residential treatment center mental

health care beyond the time limits prescribed are furnished appropriate care without interruption."

In implementing the new waiver language, NAPPH would strongly encourage the use of one set of clinically accepted criteria for admission, continued stay, and waiver reviews nationwide. This will assure that patients in need of inpatient or residential treatment beyond the established day limits will receive appropriate care without interruption. NAPPH would also strongly suggest that workable timeframes be established for the filing of waiver applications, processing of the applications, notification of decisions rendered, and the appeals process.

Third, the legislation requires mandatory precertification for all non-emergencies and authorization within 48 hours of admission for emergencies. Although NAPPH understands the intent of this provision, we are concerned that the timeframe established for purposes of notifying the utilization management firm of a potential admission could be unrealistic and could result in restricting access to needed services. DOD had proposed in its February 15, 1991 rule, which will be reissued later this spring, that notification must occur no later than 48 hours prior to admission. This would be clearly unworkable based on both utilization management and hospital industry standards. NAPPH would support same business day authorization, which is the generally accepted practice in the civilian sector.

Fourth, the Fiscal Year 1991 DOD Appropriations Act included a provision, which was not part of the DOD Authorization legislation, that prohibits physicians or other health professionals from referring a patient to a facility in which they have an economic interest. This provision is subject to the same waiver that applies to the extension of the day limits.

The referral provision, which is not defined, in statute, is so broad that it is impossible to measure the impact it would have on CHAMPUS beneficiaries and providers. Depending on how the term "economic interest" is defined, NAPPH strongly believes that in some areas of the country the referral prohibition could severely restrict access to needed mental health services.

Hospitals have a myriad of economic relationships with physicians and other health professionals who may be in a position to refer patients. For example, psychiatric hospitals employ medical directors and other physicians to perform administrative responsibilities within the hospital, which is necessary for accreditation, licensure, and even CHAMPUS certification. At times, these physicians may admit patients to the hospital for treatment. The "economic interest" provision could prohibit this type of arrangement.

It is also important to point out that this whole issue, at least with respect to Medicare and Medicaid, has been under review for quite some time, and it has proved extremely complex at best. We believe the Medicare/Medicaid experience in this area might be very instructive for CHAMPUS.

This issue is very complex and deserves much more review than it has clearly received up to this point. NAPPH believes that the current language regarding the "economic interest" provision is so vague that it should not be implemented until Congress further clarifies the intent of this provision or moves to repeal it. However, if the provision is implemented, NAPPH would urge that the same clinically accepted medical or psychological necessity criteria developed for precertification also be used to waive the "economic interest" provision. We believe this would be consistent with congressional intent.

DOD'S REPORT ON EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE COSTS OF CHAMPUS MENTAL HEALTH CARE

In March 1991, as authorized by Congress, the Department of Defense submitted a report to Congress entitled, "DOD's Efforts to Control the Costs of CHAMPUS Mental Health Care." This report reviewed the current mental health initiatives underway within the CHAMPUS program and offered several recommendations. The report clearly points out that the current cost and utilization control mechanisms are having a positive effect on slowing the growth of unit costs, admissions, and length of stay.

The report also calls for the inclusion of partial hospitalization in the CHAMPUS mental health benefit package. NAPPH strongly supports this effort because it will allow for the coverage of a full continuum of care. This approach will help reduce costs, while at the same time allowing patients to receive the most appropriate level of care for their specific needs.

Although NAPPH agrees with many aspects of the report, we are very concerned over a recommendation that calls for a major overhaul of the current inpatient psychiatric hospital reimbursement system. The DOD plan would change the current hospital-specific capped per diem system to a per discharge system based on diagno-

sis, case-mix severity, regional differences, and alternative treatment modalities. Major changes in the reimbursement system, as contemplated in the DOD proposal, should not be pursued at this time and only considered, if at all, after a thorough review of the current literature, an impact analysis, and discussions with experts in the reimbursement field, including providers who would be, affected by the changes.

Based on DOD's report, this work has not been done and the data needed for such an analysis are not readily available. The DOD report states that the "specific financial impact, of these efforts, individually or collectively, is difficult to quantify." Further, the report concludes that "because of the benefits expected to accrue from implementation of these initiatives, the Department will begin our efforts now, even though our data are not complete or specific as we would wish." It is NAPPH's view that it is premature at best to contemplate major changes to the current reimbursement system, for the following reasons:

First, the current capped per diem system has only been in place since January 1989, and its full impact is still unknown. However, preliminary results have shown a slowing in the growth of the inpatient psychiatric hospital unit costs.

Second, the national mental health utilization management program, which began in January 1990, had already shown positive results with respect to reducing the number of admissions and length of stay. The combination of the per diem caps and the utilization management program are already effectively addressing the issue of cost and utilization.

Third, there have been a number of studies conducted on whether DRGs or a DRG-related system would be appropriate for psychiatric inpatient care. All of these studies have concluded that DRGs or a DRG-related system do not adequately predict the allocation of resources for psychiatric patients and would cause a substantial disruption in the delivery of psychiatric inpatient services if implemented.

Fourth, it is clear that the DOD data base remains woefully inadequate. Therefore, DOD is presently unable to conduct the necessary analyses to establish the type of system being proposed.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE CHAMPUS MENTAL HEALTH BENEFIT

NAPPH suggests the following recommendations with respect to the CHAMPUS mental health benefit:

(1) The current national utilization management program should be thoroughly evaluated to determine if this approach can ensure cost-effective, medically necessary, high quality care without arbitrarily reducing the benefit levels. Utilization management is rapidly becoming the way most major businesses are attempting to control costs, while at the same time providing medically or psychologically necessary mental health services. Under a managed care approach limiting the benefit levels only serves to curtail medically necessary treatment for some patients.

(2) Partial hospitalization coverage should be added to the CHAMPUS mental health benefit and reimbursed fairly in order to assure that beneficiaries receive the most appropriate service in the least costly setting.

(3) Decisions on coverage of psychiatric services should be based solely on clinically accepted medical or psychological criteria.

(4) CHAMPUS mental health benefits and the management of those benefits should be uniform across the country.

(5) All demonstration projects should be fully evaluated, including assessment of clinical outcomes, and then phased-out. The successful aspects of these demonstrations should be used to help shape the overall system. The CHAMPUS program should not operate through many different demonstration sites; rather, the system should be uniform and consistent throughout the country.

(6) CHAMPUS should establish a single intermediary for psychiatric care in order to assure that the administration of the program and data gathering are consistent in all regions.

(7) CHAMPUS should not pursue a major overhaul of the inpatient psychiatric hospital reimbursement system at this time for the following reasons: (a) need to evaluate full impact of per diem caps and utilization management program; (b) need to evaluate demonstration projects; (c) need to review current literature on DRGs and DRG-related systems for inpatient psychiatric care; (d) need to conduct impact analysis; and (e) need to improve data collection capabilities.

(8) CHAMPUS should improve its overall data collection capabilities at the fiscal intermediary and claims payment level in order to prepare the necessary analyses for future policy directions.

(9) CHAMPUS should separately track data from inpatient psychiatric hospitals, general hospital psychiatric units, and residential treatment centers. Currently,

data is combined which makes it difficult to ascertain the specific impact that the current cost controls and utilization management procedures are having on psychiatric hospitals, psychiatric units in general hospitals and residential treatment centers respectively.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving us this opportunity to testify before the subcommittee today. We look forward to continuing to work with you and your staff in assuring that CHAMPUS beneficiaries receive the highest quality care in the most cost-effective manner.

I would be pleased to answer any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY JOY MIDMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT CENTERS FOR CHILDREN

Senator Nunn, members of the committee, my name is Joy Midman and I am Executive Director of the National Association of Psychiatric Treatment Centers for Children (NAPTCC).

I am privileged to be representing NAPTCC today and am pleased to have the opportunity to present testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel on the subject of the CHAMPUS mental health program and the overall reform of the military mental health system.

At the outset, I want to publicly thank Senator Glenn, Senator McCain, and the members of the committee for your enormous efforts during last summer's debate on the 1991 Defense Authorization Act. You demonstrated an understanding and appreciation of the magnitude of the issues, and, furthermore, matched your commitment with action to protect and maintain a uniform mental health benefit for our military families and their dependents.

NAPTCC has had a long and intense involvement with the Department of Defense and particularly OCHAMPUS, and is, therefore, delighted to have been asked to present its views and concerns here today.

NAPTCC represents 87 psychiatric residential treatment centers with 3,500 beds for emotionally ill children, adolescents and young adults. Our member facilities span 30 States. Only facillies licensed in their States and accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations are eligible for membership.

Our patient populations include the multiply handicapped, dual diagnosed, sexually and physically abused, chemically dependent, and emotionally disturbed. Our centers provide a total, therapeutically planned, 24-hour group living and learning situation where distinct and individualized interventions are planned and implemented. We believe that residential treatment, as a necessary part of the continuum of mental health treatment, provides an important part of the solution to escalating health care costs while providing a necessary intervention in helping children and adolescents toward their potential of leading productive lives.

While NAPTCC was formally incorporated in January 1985, the organization began approximately 10 years ago as a coalition of providers concerned with the trends within the CHAMPUS program. It is not by coincidence that NAPTCC's membership comprises the majority of the CHAMPUS approved residential treatment centers, with CHAMPUS comprising approximately 25 percent of our major funding. Our initial mission was to protect the integrity of the program while maintaining the benefit at a time of particular scrutiny and limitation. I am pleased to say that as our vision has expanded, so has our membership and intent.

In the mid 1980s, NAPTCC successfully negotiated an all inclusive payment system for residential treatment centers participating within the CHAMPUS program. The system has been in effect since December, 1988.

Everyone in this room is all too familiar with the history of the program. At the outset I want to state that we understand that the present Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and this administration have inherited a history of growth in both demand and providers within the CHAMPUS program. However, no discussion of that growth can take place without first putting it into the context of the entire military health care system, including the services provided in military treatment facilities.

The figure most often cited in last summer's debate was that CHAMPUS mental health costs had escalated 128 percent over the last 3 years. While not knowing ex-

actly where this figure originated, we do know that mental health care accounts for only about 4 percent of the Defense Department's total health care budget. This figure hardly seems out of line for an expenditure to meet the needs for CHAMPUS beneficiaries in this critical area. Furthermore, it represents the very context in which this subject should be debated, discussed, and resolved—the entire system including on and off-base services.

Additionally, approximately 5 years ago, there was a substantial reduction in mental health treatment personnel in the military treatment facilities. The absence of mental health professionals in the military treatment facilities and the lack of inpatient and partial hospitalization services within that system, drove care off the bases and into the civilian sector. Again, these factors must be taken into account when looking at the overall costs of the CHAMPUS program, and its mental health benefits in particular.

We commend you for having this hearing today and are most pleased that you afforded us the opportunity to present our views on mental health and the CHAMPUS program. We are particularly pleased that the atmosphere and attitude within the Department of Defense of the previous years has been replaced with an openness, dialogue and willingness with which to evaluate the present and the past and to plan for the future.

The lack of an open and unified approach to addressing overall mental health issued within the CHAMPUS and military treatment facilities, the consistent fragmenting of the mental health delivery system within the bureaucracy—in the standard CHAMPUS program and within the demonstration areas, the seeming disregard, to both beneficiaries and providers, with which the demonstration projects of the last few years have been both procured and implemented, the lack of sufficient and appropriate notification by the Department of changes in either policies or regulations, the constant searching for incomparable comparisons of the military health care system to that of the civilian sector, we believe led to the unfortunate congressional actions of last year—the arbitrary day limitations on care.

NAPTCC hopes that the recent passage of the Emergency Authorization and Appropriations Act for Operation Desert Storm delaying the implementation date of these changes will afford Congress the opportunity to reevaluate alternative mechanisms for controlling costs while assuring a uniform benefit of quality to the active duty dependents as well as retirees and their dependents.

I know and believe that we all share many common interests and values. Foremost, of course, is protecting the best interests of the beneficiary to have the necessary mental health care. Secondary, I believe is not the saving of moneys per se, but more importantly, the wise spending of moneys. Arbitrary limitations on services serve no purpose other than to prematurely disrupt care at the expense of the patient while also irreparably harming the entire therapeutic process. Invariably the provider is blamed for misguiding the treatment process or worse yet—depleting the patient's resources.

he most unfortunate effect of last year's congressional action was the presumption under which the legislation passed. The presumption that members of Congress (the body on whom we rely for policy) now have is that care is presumed to be inappropriate and must be proven to be necessary rather than managed in a professional and responsible manner.

While Congress acted responsibly to assure that all care be medically or psychologically necessary and appropriate to meet the needs of the patient and to ensure that if continued care is necessary, it be furnished without interruption, we are concerned that Congress is left with the overriding attitude that care is unnecessary and the benefit overutilized. This attitude, unfortunately, has dominated the policies of the recent past—the limitations of the 1991 Defense Authorization Act and the proliferation of demonstration projects.

Our specific concerns are:

DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

The widespread dominance of CHAMPUS demonstration projects has seriously affected the uniformity of the CHAMPUS health care benefit. Depending on where beneficiaries live or the location of the services provided, the CHAMPUS benefit may vary substantially. Critical issues are raised by the differences in benefits between demonstration projects and areas not covered by such projects. In fact, even within the same projects, differences in the administration of the program exist. This is most pronounced within the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative (CRI) where there exist three subcontractors to the primary contractor, Foundation Health Corporation (FHC).

These program changes have been instituted, at a considerable cost to the government and taxpayers, to reduce the cost of CHAMPUS health care to the Department of Defense without a diminution of the benefit. Not only has there been a diminution of the mental health benefit by virtue of how the benefit is administered, there no longer exists a uniform benefit because of the multiple demonstrations that have been established.

We find certain aspects of the way in which the demonstration projects have been operating to be very disturbing.

1. The individuals most affected by the demonstrations, the beneficiaries and those charged with the responsibility of furnishing care to them, the providers, have effectively been excluded from the decision making process governing the conceptualization, implementation and administration of the projects.

The benefit either changes or is redefined on an ongoing basis without notice or explanation. The contractors, and subcontractors, appear to be making decisions, and being allowed to make those decisions, for administrative and budgetary reasons, without regard to medical necessity and appropriateness of care criteria.

2. As with most specialized-governmental programs, Congress has delegated substantial responsibility to the Department of Defense and OCHAMPUS with respect to the administration of the CHAMPUS program. However, critical to our concern, is the extensive delegation of responsibility for running government programs from the agency to private contractors, and subsequently, their reliance and relationships with subcontractors.

This transfer of authority from governmental agencies to private parties through private contracts has eliminated any public input or awareness into the policy making and administration of government sponsored programs. Equally as important, it has removed Congress from a direct role in overseeing its statutorily mandated programs.

The project which, unfortunately, most clearly demonstrates the extent of our concerns is the CRI, the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative. The manner in which this program has been operated, administered and managed over these almost 3 years has caused tremendous disruption to the provider community and beneficiaries alike. The residential treatment benefit has become fragmented in its application and in its lack of definition to the extent that we understand some military families have requested special hardship transfers so as to be able to live outside of the project boundaries in order to obtain help for their dependents.

Ongoing concerns have repeatedly and collectively been expressed on the part of beneficiaries and representatives of the residential treatment community in the San Diego area to officials of both Foundation and Partners Health Plan, Foundation's subcontractor for Southern California. The following will give you an idea of the extent and gravity of the problems:

— Lack of admission and concurrent review criteria,
— Lack of clarity regarding standards for utilization review,
— Delays surrounding the pre-authorization process,
— Lack of protocol and extreme delays in processing appeals,
— Lack of explanation of benefits on denials of care,
— Systematic and chronic errors in claims processing and management,
— Lack of expertise among the peer review panels, and
— A general lack of understanding of residential care with respect to national and community standards.

3. Unlike the national contract for utilization review management awarded to a contractor without a fiduciary interest in the overall management of the contract, the demonstration projects have resulted in the selection of providers with clear economic incentives in the management of the programs. This coupled with the subcontracting of critical elements of the contract, we believe, has had a deleterious effect on patient care and the overall delivery system and beneficiary morale and confidence of the system.

4. Little has been reported on the effects of the demonstration projects—either their positive or negative effects. For example, studies due in 1990 regarding the effectiveness of the CHAMPUS Provider Arrangement (CPA) remain to be released. None of the demonstration evaluations are even considering the most critical element—the effects of the well-being of the beneficiary. Nonetheless expansion and/or continuation of the contracts is being considered.

COST CONTROLS

The recently released Defense Department's Report to Congress on Efforts to Control CHAMPUS Mental Health Costs does an excellent job of describing the history of the program and outlining an action plan. While we take exception to several of

the recommendations, the beginnings of coordinating the benefit and care within a system which recognizes the need for a continuum of care, controlling and managing the costs of such care, and providing for the clinical review for the appropriateness of care is long overdue and a welcome redirection.

The Department has grappled with the issues of cost and control since the late 1970s when it instituted a program of peer review conducted by the professions. Precertification and utilization review mechanisms bore strengthened and reinforced with the contract awarded in 1990 to Health Management Strategies International, Inc. (HMS) to provide for a national program of utilization management for preadmission, continued stay, retrospective, outpatient reviews beyond 23 visits, provider audits, and as of January 1991, on-site certification and recertification for institutional providers of care. We commend the Department for this direction and agree that the only restriction on care must be through the ongoing clinical management of the treatment process consonant with nationally recognized clinical criteria for such care and appropriate to the level, intensity and age of the patient.

NAPTCC remains unalterably opposed to certain provisions of last year's Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts. The broad purpose established with the creation of the CHAMPUS program was to "create and maintain high morale in the uniformed services by providing an improved and uniform program of medical and dental care for members and certain former members of those services, and for their dependents." (Public Law No. 569, 70 Stat. 250 (1956)). The Act created a statutory entitlement to medical care, on a uniform basis, for the spouses and children of members of the uniformed services and retirees and their eligible dependents.

Prior to the recent changes, coverage for residential treatment was limited only by reason of medical necessity and appropriateness of care criteria. Although specific criteria for preauthorization were never set forth in regulation, precertification has generally been obtained by providers prior to care being rendered. Additionally, continued care is reviewed on an ongoing and regular basis by independent healthcare professionals and is either authorized or denied upon the specific findings of the case. When approved, care is deemed to be sufficient and substantial to assure that treatment progress is being made and that medical or psychological necessity continue to exist.

While the legislation also provided for a waiver to the day limitations, NAPTCC remains concerned that the waiver criteria be consistent with nationally accepted clinical criteria. Furthermore, we are concerned that the process for action on such waivers be timely aid not disruptive to the patient's treatment. As importantly, any notification of denial for continued stay must be given with sufficient time to plan for discharge, should the beneficiary choose to discontinue treatment.

The CHAMPUS regulations consistently refer to "lower levels of care." In reality, though, CHAMPUS does not cover lower levels of care such as day treatment or in-home treatment services. The only lower level of care is outpatient therapy which is neither appropriate nor intensive enough to meet the needs of many beneficiaries. Compounding the situation is that presently many practioners will not accept CHAMPUS patients for outpatient care because it is not uncommon for there to be a delay of 3 to 8 months before payment is made.

To truly achieve a system of care, appropriately utilizing the continuum of care and available services, lower levels of care should be made available. For the residential treatment benefit to be maximized, the introduction of partial and/or day treatment would meet the goal of helping to lower lengths of stay.

Further attention must be paid to the Defense Department's practice of accepting CHAMPUS contractors respective definitions for standards of care. As has been made all to clear, patterns and practices of the CHAMPUS contractors are inconsistent and vary depending on the jurisdiction, catchment area, demonstration area, or fiscal intermediary responsible for administering the CHAMPUS benefit.

Should day limitations continue as policy, Congress must exercise its oversight authority to assure that the implementation of the waiver provision be consistent with congressional intent to "ensure that persons determined to be in need of inpatient or residential treatment center mental health care beyond the time limits prescribed are furnished appropriate care without interruption." (Conference Report Language, H.R. 4739), and that such care conform to a national and uniform standard.

We are also concerned with and opposed to the provision regarding the referral of a patient to a facility in which the referring health care professional has an "economic interest." The lack of clarity as to congressional intent and definition of "economic interest" potentially places all beneficiaries and providers at financial risk for any care. This would be a particular hardship for residential treatment facilities

which, under contract with OCHAMPUS, are reimbursed according to an all-inclusive payment rate for all providers of care.

Given that strong programs for precertification and concurrent review exist as part of the CHAMPUS program, and are performed by outside independent healthcare professionals not associated with either the Federal Government or the provider community, sufficient controls are well built into the program to assure that care is both appropriate and necessary—provided that there are no financial incentives accruing to the utilization management contractor(s).

CONCLUSION

Answers do exist. They involve the active participation of all parties involved—Congress, the Department, beneficiaries and providers. The benefit must be more appropriately designed, taking into account the unique needs and nature of the military family and the beneficiary to be served, utilizing the continuum of services available both publicly and privately, and developing the necessary services deemed clinically necessary and appropriate.

Elements may exist within the Catchment Area Management Demonstrations to build a sound model of care assuring and improving beneficiary access and participation and monitoring quality.

One note of caution must be kept in mind at all times—the nature of the CHAMPUS program and the responsibility the Congress has to the beneficiary. The program is designed to offer a uniform benefit to the beneficiary. Regardless of what demonstrations or new initiatives the Department undertakes, a national standard of care must be developed and maintained. The national utilization management contract with HMS is certainly a first step toward achieving a national standard of care.

The mental health service system has distinct benefits, separate requirements, and benefit limitations. The beneficiary, the provider community, military healthcare system, and ultimately the Defense budget could all benefit from a coordinated approach of management and control.

NAPTCC feels strongly that looking toward one utilization management firm for all mental health care should be coupled with one fiscal intermediary—both of whom are accountable and answerable to the Department of Defense, within one department.

The mental health benefit and parts thereof have been delegated and relegated to multiple offices within the Office of Health Affairs and OCHAMPUS. The confusion and frustration this has caused has been enormously disruptive to the daily operations of facilities and ultimately, morale.

The timeliness and appropriate notification of implementation of new approaches to the administration of the benefit must allow for sufficient beneficiary and provider input. If we have one plea for the Congress as you continue to refine, redirect, and possibly reform the military healthcare system, which protects our most basic and irreplaceable national treasure—our military personnel and their families, it is to proceed if not with caution then with sufficient proven data to support future activities. The demonstration projects and other contracts in place have not been operational long enough to adequately assess potential cost savings, program improvements, or other either positive or negative effects.

The all too recent past has seen the proliferation of projects which have reproduced without the benefit of a pattern. It has taken far too long, resulting in far too many denials and failed cases, for us to finally hear the phrase "coordinated care" and not proceed with deliberation, provider and beneficiary input, comment and participation, and appropriate review, accountability, and data to support future activities.

In summary, for the improvement of the CHAMPUS mental health benefit, we recommend and support the following concepts and improvements:

- The benefit for medically or psychologically necessary residential treatment must be maintained as a key element in the continuum of mental health care that is available to our uniformed personnel and their dependents.
- The concept of "coordinated care" must be pursued and implemented clinically and supported operationally.
- Management of the military healthcare system must be accomplished through the use of the combined resources available to the military—military and civilian.
- Controls on quality and cost should be achieved through the effective use of utilization enhancement mechanisms, not arbitrary day or dollar limitations.
- Sufficient and appropriate notification by the Department of changes in either policies or practices prior to implementation must be a standard practice of oper-

ation. Beneficiary and provider input to the process is integral to sound and successful patient care and outcome.

– Congress must exercise its policy formulation function to protect this valuable benefit for military families and to exercise its oversight function to assure that the program operates according to congressional intent.

We appreciate the opportunity to be here today and look forward to a collegial and working relationship with you.

Senator GLENN. Dr. Mendez, I noted in my opening statement that according to your budget documents, there are two hospitals that drop out of your facility inventory in 1992, another three in 1993, no clinics drop out over the same period. These numbers do not appear to be consistent with the base closure plans. Do you have any comment or could you provide for the record the—the reason for this?

Dr. MENDEZ. I do not know, Senator Glenn. Actually, Mr. Chairman, the closure of hospitals follows on the closure of the facilities that are projected for all of the services. All of those facilities, for instance, on the 1988 list project closure by 1995. So I really cannot answer your question on a year by year basis.

But I know of nothing different than to follow through on the projection for base closure. Perhaps one of my colleagues may know that. I know that there was a difference at Pease Air Force Base in a continuum of a clinic for 1 year as I recollect.

General MILLER. Only two minor exceptions, sir. The Secretary of the Air Force directed us to keep the clinic at Pease open for the rest of this fiscal year, which we have done by contract. And as you probably know, sir, there are currently negotiations going on as to whether to retain the hospital at Mather in California and hang a sign on it so it becomes the McClellan Hospital, sir.

But those are the only two exceptions. The Air Force's position has been that it does not make sense to support a freestanding medical facility if the base moves.

Senator GLENN. Can you give us the specific facilities that are planned to be closed over the next several years? Do you have a list of those?

Dr. MENDEZ. I think we certainly are able to get that for you.

Senator GLENN. If you would provide for the record, the specific facilities you plan to eliminate from your facility's inventory over the next 5 years, that would match the whole plan so we would know exactly what we are doing in the medical area, in particular. Can you do that?

General MILLER. No problem. There will be in Air Force, no deviations other than the two I have mentioned.

Senator GLENN. All right. Okay. Well, if we could just get those, Dr. Mendez, maybe you could coordinate that and give us a letter on that, I would appreciate it.

Dr. MENDEZ. Fine.

[The information follows:]

MEDICAL FACILITIES

CLOSURE DUE TO BRAC – 1988

Walson Army Community Hospital, Fort Dix, NJ
U.S. Army Health Clinic, Fort Sheridan, IL
Letterman Army Medical Center, San Francisco, CA
Naval Hospital Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA

Branch Medical Clinic Naval Station Kern York, (Brooklyn), NY
Branch Medical Clinic Naval Shipyard Puget Sound, (Sand Point), WA
USAF Hospital Chanute, Chanute Air Force Base, IL
831st Medical Group (Hospital), George Air Force Base, CA
USAF Hospital Mather, Mather Air Force Base, CA
USAF Clinic Norton, Norton Air Force Base, CA
509th Strategic Hospital, Pease Air Force Base, NH

MEDICAL FACILITIES

POTENTIAL CLOSURE DUE TO BRAC – 1991

Noble Army Hospital, Fort McClellan, AL
U.S. Army Clinic Fort Chaffee, Port Chaffee, AR
Hays Army Hospital, Fort Ord, CA
U.S. Army Health Clinic Sacramento Depot, Sacramento, CA
Hawley Army Hospital, Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN
Cutler Army Hospital, Fort Devons, HA
Naval Hospital Long Beach, Long Beach, CA
Branch Medical Clinic Naval Station Long Beach, Long Beach, CA
Branch Medical Clinic Moffet Field, Moffett Field, CA
Naval Hospital Orlando, Orlando, FL
Branch Medical Clinic Naval Training Center Orlando, Orlando, FL
Branch Medical Clinic Naval Shipyard Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA
Branch Medical Clinic Chase Field, Beeville, TX
Naval Hospital Oak Harbor, Oak Harbor,
Naval Medical Clinic San Francisco, San Francisco, CA
97th Strategic Hospital, Eaker Air Force Base, AZ
93d Strategic Hospital, Castle Air Force Base, CA
USAF Clinic Lowry, Lowry Air Force Base, CO
347th Medical Group (Hospital), Moody Air Force Base, GA
23d Medical Group (Hospital), England Air Force Base, LA
4lnd Strategic Hospital, Loring Air Force Base, ME
379th Strategic Hospital, Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI
USAF Hospital Williams, Williams Air Force Base, AZ
354th Medical Group (Hospital), Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC
67th Medical Group (Hospital), Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX
Robert Thompson Strategic Hospital, Carswell Air Force Base, TX

Please note the BRAC 1991 recommendations included *not closing* USAF Hospital Mather, Mather Air Force Base, CA

Senator GLENN. Drug manufacturer price increase, we enacted a program under Medicaid which requires prescription drug manufacturers to give rebates as a condition of coverage of their drug products by the program. It was estimated to save $1.9 billion over 5 years for the Government and $1.6 billion for the state Medicaid programs. Since enactment, certain drug manufacturers are reported to have raised prices to other purchasers of their drugs to recoup the rebates they had to give up under the Medicaid program.

Department of Defense and Department of Veteran Affairs have both experienced price increases on some products they buy for their hospitals and clinics. I believe these price increases could cost DOD $35 million to $40 million per year from what we have been told, and the Veterans Affairs, $150 million per year, while Medicaid would save $70 million per year. Now, that comes out as a net loss to the Government, if it is occurring the way we have been led to believe it is occurring. This comes out to a net loss to the Government of $120 million to $125 million per year.

Senator Pryor was sponsoring legislation in this regard. Are you familiar with the problem and do you agree that these are additional costs to DOD, and what is being done?

Dr. MENDEZ. I am familiar with the problems, yes, sir. At the same time, you have a figure that I do not have. And that is, what is the cost, at this point, for the Department of Defense? Senator Pryor did write to us asking for specific information, so we are collecting the data to be able to send to him. So, I do not have, as yet, sufficient information to tell you whether the price increases are comparable at this point with those identified by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

We are hearing reports from the military departments, and certainly the surgeon generals can speak for themselves, of pay hikes for some contracts. But I do not have, as yet, the final figure for the Department of Defense, Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Do we need legislative language to restore the prices that DOD was traditionally receiving from manufacturers. Are we going to have to legislate that?

Dr. MENDEZ. I believe that there are certain options, if you will, in terms of relief. And one method would be to exempt the Federal Supply's Schedule's drug contracts from the base price calculation. I would think that needs legislation.

Senator GLENN. If we need legislation, could you look at that and have your people give us any suggested legislative proposals, or even better yet, legislative language that would correct this situation?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes, sir. I would be happy to do that.

Senator GLENN. And then that will give us something we can work on.

[The information follows:]

At the time that the transcript was returned to the committee, the legislative proposal was not fully developed.

General LEDFORD. Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Yes. General Ledford.

General LEDFORD. Could I speak just a moment to this issue?

Senator GLENN. Certainly.

General LEDFORD. Now the Army buys about $200 million worth of pharmaceuticals a year. We do not know exactly what the effect this would have on us. It was initially estimated it might cost us about $25 to $35 million a year. Now we think it will be less.

But let me give you an idea. Let me read off a couple of numbers to you of what the cost increases really, really mean. I will just read off, these are for hundreds of pills. For example, if you buy 100 of this kind of pill, it costs $37, now it will be $70. $80 goes up to $118, $34 goes to $75, $160 to $365, and on, and on, and on. So there is a significant increase.

Senator GLENN. Well is this just their effort to get back what they are losing under the restrictions of the Medicaid program?

General LEDFORD. I suspect so, sir.

Senator GLENN. What reasons have they given you? You certainly must have questioned them on these huge increases. What do they tell you?

General LEDFORD. I have not personally questioned them, sir.

Senator GLENN. Okay. I wonder if it would be worthwhile for you to contact them at our request. I would be glad to have you do it at my request, if you want to, and find out why their increases are

going up that much. Their costs of doing business and making the pills has not gone up that much in a short period of time, I would not think. And maybe Dr. Mendez, maybe you could include that as part of your letter to us, if you could coordinate. And are the rest of you experiencing the same thing?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Well, my logistics command did a study. They took 39 specific drugs, which represents about 45 percent of all of our hospitals open purchase drugs, and they estimated that their increase in cost would be $10.4 million. So if you then multiply that appropriately, the total cost for our open purchase pharmaceuticals would be $23 million.

But that addition to open purchase, the Defense Logistic Agency through the DPSC in Philadelphia frequently buys bulk for us. And they suggest that there will be an increase in their administrative prices as well. So, whether we buy on open purchase or we buy through the Defense Personnel Support Activity in Philadelphia, the prices are going to go up.

Senator GLENN. Same thing, General Miller?

General MILLER. Essentially so, sir. The issue is a little bit complex. One needs to consider that more and more of the expensive drugs are being prescribed for the older population as well. And you know, right now about 18 percent of our prescriptions are written for those over 65 and Medicare does not pay for them. And so, we continually have to dip into our pocket.

Part of it is inflationary, part of it is the increased costs of developing new drugs. Defense Logistic Agency probably is the best source of figures on those increases, Senator.

Dr. MENDEZ. If I may, Senator Glenn, we have recently, from the Department of Defense together with the Department of Veterans Affairs, sent a letter to HCFA specifically requesting clarification in terms of the existing statutory exemptions for depot contracts and for single award contract that relates to what I said before in terms of Federal Supply Schedule. And that has been to see if further regulatory clarification is possible.

Senator GLENN. Well, I do not know whether we need to call for a whole other study on this of 6 months or so. I am loathe to call for additional studies, usually, because I know how many we call for all the time. But it seems to me, something like this where we could be talking about many, many 10s of millions of dollars, this is something we ought to be looking into and getting some answers.

Maybe you can query them and find out the reason for this astronomical rise in their prices all of a sudden. If it really was triggered by the cutback in Medicaid, which has been alleged at least, they are just making up on the peaches what they lost on the oranges and you are suffering for it in DOD. And there ought to be some way we could deal with that.

Dr. MENDEZ. All right, sir.

Senator GLENN. So, can you make some inquiry on that?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. And then you will get back to us with a letter on that?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes. Be happy to.

Senator GLENN. All right, good. Thank you.

Dr. Mendez, there is a provision in the 1989 Defense Appropriations Act that required DOD to conduct a test program to include appropriate training for military, clinical psychologists to prescribe certain psychotropic drugs to patients within the military health care system. We have been receiving many letters from psychiatrists who strongly oppose this project.

What is the status of the test and can you comment on that, or have you sought or do you need relief from this particular requirement? Do you think you should continue to work on it? What is the status of it?

Dr. MENDEZ. Basically, our department has been responding to congressional direction, Mr. Chairman. We have had direction to begin this program. The projection is that this program will begin this year. It will be in the Army, the didactic portion of it through the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences and the clinical practicum through Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

The projection is for the program to begin this academic year, and to comprise within it, two to four people in the initial evaluation. So basically, the task to my office has been one of going to the executive agent, which in this case is the Army, and two, doing the evaluation of the program as it proceeds. And third, to make sure that an external evaluation also takes place. Perhaps Dr. Ledford may have a comment about it because he is tasked with doing it.

Senator GLENN. Are you supposed to make a report to us under the previous test program? Do you know?

Dr. MENDEZ. I am sorry sir. I did not understand.

Senator GLENN. This was to be a test program.

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes, yes. I am supposed to report back to you.

Senator GLENN. Are you to report back to us on that?

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. When is that due? Do you know?

Dr. MENDEZ. Well, the program in itself is 2 years in duration.

Senator GLENN. General Ledford, that is under your aegis, right?

General LEDFORD. Yes, sir. It will be done exactly as Dr. Mendez has described. It will be a conjoint Walter Reed and Uniform Services University program. And we have four students, two Army and two Navy, ready to enroll this summer.

Senator GLENN. We had so many objections to this and I guess it would be normal that we would have a lot of objections to it. Do you think this is something you want to continue at this point? Do you think it is worthwhile?

Dr. MENDEZ. That is a difficult question. I have had the same objections, Mr. Chairman. We have had significant discussion between the four of us about this. I have had, I presume, some of the same letters that you have had. I have met with representatives, both from psychology associations as well as psychiatric associations. And basically, the position that I have taken is a position that responds to the direction from the Congress.

Senator GLENN. Batted that one back at me pretty fast. [Laughter.]

You want to comment over here, Admiral Zimble?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Senator Glenn, we have not articulated the requirement.

Senator GLENN. No.

Admiral ZIMBLE. We have been asked to do the study. I have two psychologists that will be reporting to the Uniform Services University in the 8th of July to go through the program. The program has yet to begin, so I cannot comment upon the efficacy of the program. But it was not a program for which I found the requirement.

Senator GLENN. General Miller?

General MILLER. I am already on record, sir, with the other side of the House, as to the fact that I personally feel that is an ill-founded program for which we have no requirement and I would like to see it expire.

Senator GLENN. We would have to take legislative action to do that, I gather. Is that correct?

General MILLER. I cannot comment, sir.

Senator GLENN. Dr. Mendez, in the 1991 Defense Authorization Act, we authorized substantial increases and enhancements to the system of medical special and incentive pays. So doing, we strengthened DOD's ability to target these pays on the basis of skill and career commitment. Because of the range of the changes we made and the flexibility we granted to you, we required a report on the implementation of the revised system in DOD.

We have your report and without objection, it will be included in the record at this point. I want to commend you for an excellent report. One issue, I believe, that is not addressed in your report is a related provision in the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm Act of 1991, that was passed after you submitted your report.

The provision would essentially waive the requirement that multi-year retention bonuses for medical officers be limited to officers below the flag and general officer grades, and allow flag or general officers serving as practicing physicians, to draw the multi-year retention bonus. Does DOD support this particular provision? If so, how would you define a flag or general medical officer serving as a practicing physician?

[The information referred to follows:]

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON D C 20301-1200

HEALTH AFFAIRS

05 FEB 1991

Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Section 611 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101-510) amended special pay authority for active duty physicians by adding a multi-year retention bonus. Based on two years of experience with the Medical Officer Retention Bonus (MORB), the Congress determined that a multi-year bonus is a cost effective approach to provide stability in managing the physician force. The new Multi-year Special Pay (MSP) is to be used in conjunction with existing Incentive Special Pay (ISP) authority to enhance physician force management.

The Act also required a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives describing the manner in which the authority was implemented and the process used to reassess the assignment of medical specialties to the various categories of multi-year bonuses. The attached report is provided in response to that requirement.

We have sent an identical letter to the Chairman, House Armed Services Committee. Thank you for your continued support of the Military Health Services System.

Sincerely,

Enrique Mendez, Jr., M.D.

Enclosure:
As Stated

cc: Honorable John Warner
Ranking Republican

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1200
HEALTH AFFAIRS

05 FEB 1991

Honorable Les Aspin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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Sincerely,

Enrique Mendez, Jr., M.D.

Enclosure:
As Stated

cc: Honorable William L. Dickinson
Ranking Republican

REPORT TO CONGRESS

PHYSICIAN MULTI-YEAR SPECIAL PAY

Implementation of Fiscal Year 1991
Amendments to Section 301d
Title 37, United States Code
"Multiyear retention bonus: medical officers
of the armed forces"

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health Affairs)

January, 1991

REPORT TO CONGRESS

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives describing implementation of section 301d of title 37, United States Code. The report is to include a description of the process that will be used to reassess the assignment of medical specialties to the various categories of multi-year bonuses under that section, and the means for ensuring that substantial changes to the total compensation of medical officers of the Armed Forces will be minimized. The following report responds to this requirement.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR MULTI-YEAR SPECIAL PAY (MSP)

The Department has issued Fiscal Year 1991 implementing guidance for administration of MSP to the Military Departments. The guidance is found at Appendix A, and provides specific direction for eligibility, dollar amounts and medical specialty criteria. The implementing document further defines the guidelines established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 as they have been applied in a rigorous, analytical process. The following sections describe the analyses and their application in developing the specialty categories and pays.

Multi-year Special Pay Category Criteria

As specifically recommended in the Conference Report of the Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, three medical specialty group categories were established for implementation of the new Multi-year Special Pay. Associated with each of the three categories are clear, objective criteria relating to the assignment of a specialty to a category. These criteria are the central mechanism for relating a medical specialty with an MSP category. How these criteria operate and what contributed to their development are described in the following pages. The following criteria determine a specialty's overall category assignment. (Criteria levels are shown in Table 1 on page 6, following.)

I. Priority retention or significant endstrength shortfall

Specialty fill rate between 75% and 89% and retention goal unattainable in five years or more; or specialty fill rate of less than 75%.

II. Retention or endstrength shortfall

Specialty fill rate between 75% and 89% and retention goal level requires two to four years for attainment; or specialty fill rate of 90% or more but retention goal unattainable in five years or more.

III. Adequate or normal retention manning

Specialty fill rate of 90% or more and retention goal level attainable in less than five years.

Methodology

With analytical assistance from the RAND Corporation, a panel-based modified Delphi approach was used to evaluate the experience needs of physicians in the Department's Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) environment. Ten panel series were conducted, following a course of prototype efforts. Prototype development included field testing of a measurement instrument with various physicians, and a full prototype modified Delphi panel series using two specialties: Family Practice and Emergency Medicine.

The measurement instruments used in the modified Delphi panel series were designed to provide arrays of physician specialist experience in four-year bands. These years-of-experience bands (0 - 4, 4 - 8, 8 - 12, and 12 +) represent the optimal level of disaggregation for analysis and execution of the modified Delphi approach, while also complying with the categories of junior and senior physicians specified in the Fiscal Year 1990 Conference Report.

The modified Delphi sessions were conducted in a formal research environment, facilitated by the Department's contract agent, McManis Associates, under guidelines consistent with RAND Corporation's recommendations for this type of examination. Following completion of all modified Delphi specialty panel series, results were arrayed and analyzed by McManis Associates, and specialty-specific results submitted to the Department by report. Medical Treatment Facility experience profiles were then added to experience profiles for non-MTF (field, operational, research, staff) physicians to form overall experience profiles for each military physician specialty group.

The illustration at Figure 1 displays a hypothetical specialty experience profile.



Figure 1

Evaluation

The primary purpose of multi-year special pay is to help bring a medical specialty to fully authorized strength and to align actual retention with an objective standard for physician retention. As stated in the Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act Conference Report, "retention needs vary by specialty." Accordingly, different levels of multi-year payments are needed to produce behavior changes and bring a specialty to the appropriate, objective size and shape.

The criteria associated with each multi-year pay category are designed to provide a range of values consistent with the congressionally recommended definitions for each category. For example, Fiscal Year 1991 Conference Report language states: "associating a specialty with the category *'priority retention'* would suggest that the specialty's recent historical and projected retention or end strength compared to projected requirements necessitates special compensation emphasis, or that the size or composition of the specialty is such that changes in a single year could have dramatic effects on the end strength or distribution of that specialty."

The objective criteria associated with the three MSP categories provide a simple, clear standard for evaluating a specialty's retention and inventory "health." Further, the criteria relate to standards established in a rigorous, multi-disciple study recently completed by the Department: "Retention Goals and Objective Experience Profiles for Military Physicians," described below.

Retention Goals

Background

Continuing from the Department's Fiscal Year 1989 Health Professionals Special Pays Study, a DoD working group focused on the need for objective specialty experience profiles for military physicians. Necessity for such a study, and its product, was then reinforced in the Conference Report of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990: "... establish desired retention goals for each specialty based on the inventory of that specialty for junior physicians (O-3/O-4) and senior physicians (O-5/O-6), and the requirement of that specialty for junior and senior physicians."

The retention goals effort was begun in Spring of 1989, and chaired by members of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD)(HA), with working group members from OASD (Force Management and Personnel), OASD (Program Analysis and Evaluation), and the three Military Departments. The goal of the group was to develop a set of specialty-specific retention goals, based on analytically derived experience profiles for each medical specialty. Achieving this goal would allow the Department to determine an objective "shape" for each specialty community, as a function of specialty experience needed to perform medical functions.

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Baseline Numbers

Important to developing specialty experience profiles is determination of the objective size of the specialty groups. The size of overall specialty manpower needs is an essential element in the experience profiles, and becomes the denominator for the equation used in the category criteria. While the manpower requirements determination process ideally would yield wartime and peacetime manpower goals, the present environment precludes the use of any previously developed requirements due to the rapidly changing geopolitical and budgetary situation. Consequently, the currently more usable measure of physician objectives for experience profiles was employed: congressional authorizations. Budgeted authorizations, currently representing more constrained quantities than the last accepted requirement numbers (FY 1986), now provide the best proxy for manpower requirements. Once a review of projected wartime and peacetime specialty needs is completed, it will allow the Department to base MSP on required numbers – the most accurate measure of physicians necessary to accomplish the military medical function.

Analysis

Specialty-specific physician inventory numbers were arrayed by the same years-of-experience categories as the objective experience profiles, for purpose of comparison. These inventory profiles were overlaid on the objective experience profiles to determine where variance between the actual force and the objective exists. Figure 2 displays an illustrative comparison.



Figure 2

Inventory Projection

In order to analytically project the influence of the multi-year special pay, a computer simulation model was developed by the Department. The model forecasts future physician inventory by specialty and years-of-experience under various retention and accession assumptions. The economic variable designed into the model allows the user to estimate the future effect of various pay levels on a specialty group, however, based on the derived pay elasticity for that group. Thus the study group was able to project the time necessary to bring the inventory into nexus with the objective profile established through the analysis. Figure 3 demonstrates projected inventory values for our illustration specialty.

Figure 3

Applying MSP Objective Criteria

Table 1 displays the application of the methodology described above, for Fiscal Year 1991 MSP categories. Physician specialties were aggregated across the three Military Departments, and in some cases also represent the aggregation of several subspecialties with small inventory and/or authorization numbers. Because inventory as a percentage of the specialty's budget authorization is the most critical function (i.e., having *enough* specialists is more important than having the *correct years of experience*), that variable was used as the primary category selection factor. The percentage category was then modified by the retention component resulting from the retention goals methodology to yield an overall MSP category for the specialty. The table below displays the results of the analysis, arrayed in order of the "healthiest" specialties - to those with the most problems in percent fill and retention.

MULTI-YEAR SPECIAL PAY CATEGORIES

Specialty	Percent Fill	Percentage Category	Retention Consonant	*SP Overall Category
IM/Med Subspecialties	119%	1	X	111
Pathology	97%	1	X	111
Pediatrics	133%	1	X	111
Gastroenterology	99%	1	X	11
Anesthesiology	94%	1	X	11
Otolaryngology	98%	1	X	11
Family Practice	91%	1	X	11
Prev/Occ Med	97%	1	X	11
Gen Surgery	103%	1	X	11
Interns, Med	111%	1	X	11
Neurology	99%	1	X	11
Aerospace Med	80%	2	X	11
Orthopedic Surgery	73%	1	X	1
Cardiology	71%	1	X	1
Surgical Subs	69%	1	X	1
Dermatology	94%	1	X	1
OB/GYN	87%	1	X	1
Psychiatry	91%	1	X	1
Ophthalmology	95%	1	X	1
Emergency Medicine	85%	1	X	1
Urology	91%	1	X	1
Radiology/Nuc M	73%	1	X	1
Undersea Medicine	80%	2	X	1

Table V

MSP Payment Amounts

The following payment amounts meet congressional guidelines to yield the most desirable contract incentive distribution. These amounts are listed in the implementing guidance for Fiscal Year 1991 Multi-year Special Pay (Appendix A):

	2-Year	3-Year	4-Year
Category I	$4,000	$8,000	$14,000
(Priority retention or endstrength shortfall)			
Category II	$3,000	$6,000	$10,000
(Retention or endstrength shortfall)			
Category III	$2,000	$4,000	$8,000
(Adequate or normal retention)			

Implementing the Pay Plan

The second requirement of this report is to "describe the means for ensuring that substantial changes to the total compensation of medical officers of the Armed Forces will be minimized." In order to demonstrate the arrangement made to do that, it is important to understand the relationship between the two specialty-based, contract special pays: MSP and ISP. The Department intends to use these two pays in an objective, complementary fashion, fully utilizing the effectiveness for which Congress designed them. To illustrate this, their functions must be made clear.

Multi-year Special Pay is unquestionably a force management tool, to be used to adjust the size and shape of each specialty community. As stated in the Fiscal Year 1991 Conference Report language describing this pay, "the primary purpose of multi-year special pay is to align actual retention with desired retention." The objective criteria defining MSP categories ensure that it is applied in this way.

Incentive Special Pay, on the other hand, is designed to provide a measure of competitive equity for specialists who are fully qualified in medical specialty disciplines. This was also made clear in the Fiscal Year 1991 Conference Report: "the conferees are concerned that the Department of Defense implement the new multi-year retention bonus in conjunction with incentive special pay in a way that protects the original intent of ISP as a payment for specialty training." The House Armed Services Committee report for the Fiscal Year 1991 Defense Authorization further stated that ISP should take into "consideration the pay differential between military and civilian physicians of the same specialty." With the new authority in Fiscal Year 1991, the Department has employed ISP to do exactly what

Congress suggests: renew its role as an external pay equity tool. This will enable the functions of MSP and ISP to complement each other, creating a balanced approach to physician special pays not heretofore available.

Identifying the Pay Gap

To establish ISP at amounts, and in a function, that fully complements MSP requires determination of the difference between military physician compensation and that of comparable civilian physicians – the pay gap. The question then becomes – against what standard should military pay be compared? As was found in the Fiscal Year 1989 Report to Congress on Health Professionals Special Pays, the compensation data base of employed physicians maintained by the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) is the most complete and statistically appropriate basis for comparison of employed physicians. It provides the nation's largest survey (approximately 50,000) of employed physicians, and covers all major specialty groups by various levels of seniority and status. Median AAMC specialty compensation values have been cross-checked with other civilian physician compensation surveys (including HMO, hospital based and other employed physicians), and found to be very representative of the employed civilian environment.

Beginning in Fiscal Year 1991, ISP rates are being set by directly comparing the total compensation available to a modal military medical specialist against the median compensation for a comparable civilian specialist in the AAMC data base.[1] The technique measures the pay gap after all pays *except* ISP are applied, and then extends ISP to reduce the gap to a practical level within budgetary and authorized limits. Table 2 displays the specialty ISP amounts determined in applying the technique. Because of budgetary and internal equity reasons, ISP was used to bring a specialty to a maximum of 95 percent of its civilian counterpart, although most specialties still remain with larger pay differentials.

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[1] While throughout the continuum of years-of-experience there will be relative differences in the comparison of military and civilian physicians pay, (i.e., the pay gap for an O-3 will be relatively more or less than the pay gap for an O-6), the single measure of a modal military physician is statistically sufficient to set the standard for the specialty.

Table 12

FY91 Special Pay Plan

Specialty	Military BAS +	3 Year MSP	Subtotal Mil $$	Civilian $$$	Pay Gap	% Civ Pay	FY 91 ISP	Total Pay	Total Pay Gap	% Civ Pay
Surgical Subspecialties	$87,500	$14,000	$101,500	$222,448	($120,948)	46%	$22,000	$123,500	($98,948)	56%
Orthoped Surgery	$87,500	$14,000	$101,500	$200,331	($98,831)	51%	$22,000	$123,500	($76,831)	62%
General Surgery	$87,500	$10,000	$97,500	$158,617	($61,117)	61%	$22,000	$119,500	($39,117)	75%
Ophthalmology	$87,500	$14,000	$101,500	$155,741	($54,241)	65%	$20,000	$121,500	($34,241)	78%
Urology	$87,500	$14,000	$101,500	$155,560	($54,060)	65%	$20,000	$121,500	($34,060)	78%
Anesthesiology	$87,500	$10,000	$97,500	$148,865	($51,365)	65%	$20,000	$117,500	($31,365)	79%
Otolaryngology	$87,500	$10,000	$97,500	$144,883	($47,383)	67%	$20,000	$117,500	($27,383)	81%
Radiology/Nuclear Med	$87,500	$14,000	$101,500	$146,944	($45,444)	69%	$20,000	$121,500	($25,444)	83%
OB/GYN	$87,500	$14,000	$101,500	$134,186	($32,686)	76%	$20,000	$121,500	($12,686)	91%
Cardiology	$87,500	$14,000	$101,500	$122,432	($20,932)	83%	$12,000	$113,500	($8,932)	93%
Gastroenterology	$87,500	$10,000	$97,500	$113,499	($15,999)	86%	$8,000	$105,500	($7,999)	93%
Internal Medicine	$87,500	$10,000	$97,500	$104,494	($6,994)	93%	$0	$97,500	($6,994)	93%
IM/Fgd Subspecialties	$87,500	$8,000	$95,500	$104,494	($8,994)	91%	$2,000	$97,500	($6,994)	93%
Emergency Medicine	$87,500	$14,000	$101,500	$108,260	($6,760)	94%	$0	$101,500	($6,760)	94%
Dermatology	$87,500	$14,000	$101,500	$115,915	($14,415)	88%	$8,000	$109,500	($6,415)	94%
Pathology	$87,500	$8,000	$95,500	$109,255	($13,755)	87%	$8,000	$103,500	($5,755)	95%
Neurology	$87,500	$10,000	$97,500	$99,120	($1,620)	98%	$0	$97,500	($1,620)	98%
Psychiatry	$87,500	$14,000	$101,500	$102,025	($525)	99%	$0	$101,500	($525)	99%
Pediatrics	$87,500	$8,000	$95,500	$91,050	$4,450	105%	$0	$95,500	$4,450	105%
Family Practice	$87,500	$10,000	$97,500	$85,200	$12,300	114%	$0	$97,500	$12,300	114%
Preventive/Occup/Phys M	$87,500	$10,000	$97,500	$83,620	$13,880	117%	$0	$97,500	$13,880	117%
Aerospace Medicine	$87,500	$10,000	$97,500				$0	$97,500		
Undersea Medicine	$87,500	$14,000	$101,500				$0	$101,500		

Mil Pay - Based on a modal military physician using weighted average for O4 - O6 with BMC + VSP + ASP + BCP

Civ Pay - Based on weighted average of the medians for assistant, associate, and full professors by specialty

Pay Gap - Civilian pay minus military pay

Percent - Percentage of military pay compared to civilian pay

Ensuring Against Substantial Changes

Several means exist to prevent military physicians from encountering substantial changes in overall compensation under this newly authorized program. First, every eligible physician approved by their Service Secretary may sign a multi-year contract of up to four years, "locking in" the combined amounts of MSP and ISP for that period. In Fiscal Year 1991, as in the previous two years, four-year totals equaling up to $36k per year can be secured for some specialties. Once signed, MSP contracts ensure the physician will receive the combined total throughout the life of the contract, although he or she may later renegotiate the contract to extend the commitment if it is advantageous to do so.

Second, the rigorous, objective means of determining MSP and ISP militate against significant swings in the compensation structure in the future. Because of the dual criteria of percent fill and retention of specialties in determining MSP, there will not be rapid movement between categories over time, other than the one-time shift that could potentially occur once a move to requirement-based analysis is accomplished. The lengthy period necessary for retention to affect a specialty experience profile dampens the motion generated by changing fill rates. In the same way, there will not be rapid variations in ISP rates because we currently see fairly small changes in the relative values of civilian median earnings.[2] The combined amounts available to physicians in the two complementary contract specialty pays will, therefore, not see significant movement over time - only small adjustments after the baseline year.

Lastly, the Department intends to begin reviewing specialty pay levels every two years, rather than annually. This extended review period will further dampen fluctuations in specialty-based pay, providing what our Report to Congress on Physician Special Pay last spring detailed as one of the most significant goals for physician retention - consistency and continuity. This year's MSP and ISP totals will achieve a measure of this objective, as demonstrated by the comparison with last year's totals for the MORB and ISP, shown in Table 3. Of course, 1991, will show the greatest variance from a previous pay level because of the effects of transitioning to the new, analytically-based special pay program. By 1993, when the majority of physicians with MORB contracts will be required to make another decision (over 80 percent of physicians taking the MORB in 1989 signed four-year contracts), degradations in any specialty's pay level may be reversed - depending on a specialty's manning, retention and pay comparability circumstance at that time.

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[2] Although new resource-based relative value scales are being applied to various civilian fee schedules, no radical changes are likely to occur in the civilian pay medians over the short term.

Table 3

Target Total Comparison - FY91/FY90

Specialty	4 Year MSP	FY91 ISP	FY91 Target Total	FY91/FY90 Difference	FY90 Target Total	FY90 ISP	FY90 4 YR MSMb
Surgical Subspecialties	$14,000	$22,000	$36,000	$0	$36,000	$16,000	$20,000
Orthopedic Surgery	$14,000	$22,000	$36,000	$0	$36,000	$16,000	$20,000
General Surgery	$10,000	$22,000	$32,000	($4,000)	$36,000	$16,000	$20,000
Ophthalmology	$14,000	$20,000	$34,000	$2,000	$32,000	$16,000	$16,000
Urology	$14,000	$20,000	$34,000	$2,000	$32,000	$16,000	$16,000
Anesthesiology	$10,000	$20,000	$30,000	($2,000)	$32,000	$16,000	$16,000
Otolaryngology	$10,000	$20,000	$30,000	($2,000)	$32,000	$16,000	$16,000
Radiology/Nuclear Med	$14,000	$20,000	$34,000	$6,000	$28,000	$8,000	$20,000
OB/GYN	$14,000	$20,000	$34,000	$6,000	$28,000	$16,000	$12,000
Cardiology	$14,000	$12,000	$26,000	$8,000	$18,000	$8,000	$10,000
Gastroenterology	$10,000	$8,000	$18,000	$3,000	$15,000	$8,000	$7,000
Pathology	$8,000	$8,000	$16,000	$8,000	$8,000	$0	$8,000
Dermatology	$14,000	$8,000	$22,000	$4,000	$18,000	$0	$18,000
IM/Ped Subspecialties	$8,000	$2,000	$10,000	($5,000)	$15,000	$0	$15,000
Internal Medicine	$10,000	$0	$10,000	$2,000	$8,000	$0	$8,000
Emergency Medicine	$14,000	$0	$14,000	($1,000)	$15,000	$8,000	$7,000
Neurology	$10,000	$0	$10,000	$2,000	$8,000	$0	$8,000
Psychiatry	$14,000	$0	$14,000	($2,000)	$16,000	$8,000	$8,000
Pediatrics	$8,000	$0	$8,000	$0	$8,000	$0	$8,000
Preventive/Occup/Phys M	$10,000	$0	$10,000	$2,000	$8,000	$0	$8,000
Family Practice	$10,000	$0	$10,000	$2,000	$8,000	$0	$8,000
Aerospace Medicine	$10,000	$0	$10,000	($1,000)	$11,000	$3,000	$8,000
Undersea Medicine	$14,000	$0	$14,000	$2,500	$11,500	$3,500	$8,000

Appendix A

FISCAL YEAR 1991 GUIDANCE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF MULTI-YEAR SPECIAL PAY AND INCENTIVE SPECIAL PAY FOR MEDICAL CORPS OFFICERS

A. PURPOSE

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101-510) substantially modified special pay authority for physicians on active duty in the Military Departments. Based on two years' experience with the Medical Officer Retention Bonus (MORB), the Congress determined that a multi-year bonus is a cost effective approach for providing a stable, well managed physician force. Therefore, a new multi-year special pay was authorized to be used in conjunction with existing Incentive Special Pay (ISP) authority to enhance physician force management. This guidance for administration of those pays should be used in conjunction with DoD Directive 1340.13, "Special Pay for Medical Corps Officers" and DoD Directive 6000.2, "Minimum Terms of Service and Active Duty Obligations for Health Services Officers," pending revision and update of those directives.

B. APPLICABILITY

The provisions of this implementing guidance apply to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Military Departments.

C. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. Medical Corps Officer. An officer of the medical corps of the Army or Navy, or an officer of the Air Force designated as a medical officer, who is on active duty under a call or order to active duty for a period of not less than one year.

2. Creditable Service. Includes all periods which the officer spent in graduate medical education while not on active duty and all periods of active duty as a medical corps officer as defined in section 302(g) of title 37, United States Code.

D. MULTI-YEAR SPECIAL PAY (MSP)

1. A medical corps officer who is below the grade of O-7 is eligible for MSP in the amounts specified below when he or she:

a. has at least eight years of creditable service or has completed any active duty service commitment incurred for medical education and training, and;

b. has completed specialty qualification (or is scheduled to complete initial residency training before October 1, 1991), and;

c. executes a written agreement to remain on active duty for two, three or four years, that is accepted by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned (or designee).

2. Annual payment amounts for multi-year contracts, beginning in Fiscal Year 1991, will be in the amounts indicated below. Subspecialties of a primary specialty are included with the primary specialty except for subspecialties of general surgery, internal medicine and pediatrics. Officers shall be paid at the rate for the specialty for which they are most highly trained (normally their primary specialty designation).

a. Amounts are computed based on a combination of staffing percentage to authorizations and the required experience level/force profile for the specialty (i.e., retention goals analysis).

b. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)), in consultation with the Military Departments, will reassess the assignment of specialties to each category every two years and direct changes as appropriate to support desired staffing levels.

Specialty	Annual Amounts by Contract Length		
	2 Year	3 Year	4 Year
Orthopedic Surgery General Surgery Subspecialties Ophthalmology Urology Radiology/Nuclear Medicine OB/GYN Cardiology Dermatology Emergency Medicine Psychiatry	$4,000	$8,000	$14,000
General Surgery Anesthesiology Otolaryngology Gastroenterology General Internal Medicine Family Practice Neurology Preventive Medicine Occupational Medicine Physical Medicine Aerospace Medicine	$3,000	$6,000	$10,000
Pathology Other Internal Medicine and Pediatric Subspecialties Pediatrics	$2,000	$4,000	$8,000

3. Subject to acceptance by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, or designee, a medical officer with an existing MORB or MSP contract may terminate that contract in order to enter into a new MSP contract, with an equal or longer obligation, at the MSP annual rate in effect at that time. Any unearned portion of the terminated contract shall be recouped. For contract administration purposes, those executed on or before February 28, 1991, may be considered effective as of January 1, 1991.

4. Active duty service obligations for MSP will be established as follows:

a. Obligation for medical education and training or previous multi-year pay agreements will be served prior to serving the obligation for MSP. MSP obligations are then served after any other existing obligations have been completed (i.e., the contract incurs a consecutive obligation).

b. Obligation for Additional Special Pay, Incentive Special Pay, promotion, PCS and other miscellaneous obligations may be paid back concurrently with the MSP obligation.

E. INCENTIVE SPECIAL PAY (ISP)

1. Incentive Special Pay discretionary authority was initially continued into Fiscal Year 1991 for the same specialties and at the identical rates as the Fiscal Year 1990 authority. That interim guidance was provided by ASD(HA) memorandum of September 28, 1990, pending the final outcome of the Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act.

2. Annual ISP payments for contracts beginning on or after January 1, 1991, will be in the amounts indicated below. Unless otherwise listed, subspecialties of the primary specialty are included with the primary specialty.

Specialty	Annual Amount
Orthopedic Surgery General Surgery and Subspecialties	$22,000
Ophthalmology Urology Anesthesiology Otolaryngology Radiology/Nuclear Medicine OB/GYN	$20,000
Cardiology	$12,000
Gastroenterology Pathology Dermatology	$ 8,000
Other Internal Medicine and Pediatric Subspecialties	$ 2,000

3. In addition to the specialties and amounts listed above, the ASD(HA) will consider, on a case-by-case basis, well-justified Service recommendations for ISP payments to fully qualified physicians assigned to positions requiring a substantial portion of time performing military unique duties under adverse conditions or in remote OCONUS locations.

4. Directors of graduate medical education programs who were eligible for ISP under previously existing authority will continue to be eligible for annual ISP payments until they are permanently reassigned from a training Director position. Newly assigned program directors will only be eligible for ISP in amounts specified above for their specialty.

5. Subject to acceptance by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, or designee, a medical officer with an existing ISP contract may terminate that contract, on or after January 1, 1991, in order to enter into a new one-year ISP contract. For contract administration purposes, those executed on or before February 28, 1991, may be considered effective as of January 1, 1991.

6. Medical Corps officers who enter into MSP contracts may enter ISP contracts during Fiscal Year 1991 at the amount listed above. The officer would continue ISP eligibility at that rate for each active year of the MSP contract. Should future reassessments cause an increase to the ISP rate for a specialty, the officer may take advantage of that increase only by signing a new MSP contract (at the annual rate in effect at that time) with an equal or longer obligation.

7. Section 1111 of the Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act provided special pay authority for certain reserve physicians called to active duty in support of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD. Separate implementation guidance has been provided for this authority which includes a provision for a monthly proportional payment of ISP based on the annual rate. For specialists covered by this authority, the following special provisions apply:

a. officers called or ordered to active duty effective prior to January 1, 1991, are eligible for monthly payments based on the annual ISP rate in effect for their specialty at the time they were called to active duty. The monthly amount may be amended, effective January 1, 1991, to reflect the new ISP rates listed in paragraph two, above (if that amount is greater);

b. officers called or ordered to active duty effective on or after January 1, 1991, are eligible for monthly payments based on the annual ISP rate for their specialty indicated above.

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F. RECOUPMENT

1. Recoupment of unearned portions of pay agreements under this guidance will be conducted in accordance with paragraph E.5 of DoDD 1340.13, "Special Pay for Medical Corps Officers," July 23, 1988.

2. The MSP payment of officers promoted to O-7 will be recouped based on the effective date of promotion to that grade.

G. REPORTING REQUIREMENT

The Military Departments will provide reports using the following format semi-annually, as of the last day of March and of September, and submitted not later than the fifteenth of the following month. Reports should be submitted to OASD(HA)(HSO), Room 1D511, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301.

Multi-Year Special Pay (MSP):

Fiscal Year 1991 contracts

Specialty	Eligible oblig/non-ob	Number of accepts 2YR	3YR	4YR	Accepts by YOS 0-10	11-15	16-20	20+	Obligated
Orthopedics	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX
Gen Surg Subs										
Ophthalmology										
etc.										

Access	Resident
New Accessions (less than 8 years creditable service)	Still in residency (when contract was signed)
XX	XX

Dr. MENDEZ. Senator Glenn, I am aware of the provisions of law where it states that the restriction of Title 37 may not apply to general officers serving as practicing physicians. I will, indeed, give you my opinion.

General officers that are physicians utilize their medical training experience and skills in all leadership positions that they fill. I believe that if we go at different monetary rewards for different officers when there are significant differences in the opportunity of seeing patients because of the nature of the position we have the opportunity of being divisive and that we may, indeed, make the assignments of these officers more difficult, or may create invidious comparisons between one and the other when such comparisons should not take place.

Medical general officers and flag officers received a pay increase of $6,000 in variable special pay in January of 1991. So at this point, sir, I do not particularly favor lifting the restriction in the way suggested. I believe that lifting the restriction should apply to all and to not just a segment of medical, general, or flag officers. That is my opinion, sir.

Senator GLENN. How about the services? Any comment, General Miller?

General MILLER. Well, sir, the basic problem is that the way it is currently structured, those in the fields in the specialties that are getting paid too much, in my judgment, cannot afford to become a general officer. And that is creating a concern for the future. We would look to medical generals in the future if they are concerned about income, sir, it would be limited to their lower paid specialties, family practitioners and general internists.

Senator GLENN. Would this not be a fairly small percentage of general officers that would still carry a patient load or would that be a common practice?

General MILLER. It becomes very difficult to define as we did before. If you are performing in the operating room one afternoon a week, is that practicing? If you see one clinician in internal medicine clinic one morning a week, is that "practice"? Where do you cut it off? How much is "seeing consults" counted as patient care, and on and on, Senator?

Senator GLENN. Okay. Admiral Zimble.

Admiral ZIMBLE. Well, I have to concur with my colleagues. We all share some strong concerns about the future in regard to the promotion to flag rank of some people who would have to see a change in their lifestyle in order to assume that honor. And therefore, we will restrict those who are best qualified for leadership.

But the phraseology in this particular statute is such that it becomes extremely divisive. None of the flag positions in the United States Navy are positions in which one has a singular role of patient care for the individual patient. Our positions call for large span of control and leadership roles. And it is very difficult to give a good operational definition of the term, practicing physician.

Senator GLENN. Different subject. General Ledford, over in the Veterinary Corps, the position of the Chief of Veterinary Corps in the Army has been filled at the brigadier general grade level up until recently. What is the grade requirement for this position? Do you know what it is?

General LEDFORD. Sir, I do not know. There is not a statutory grade requirement that that position be a general officer. Now, let me be candid with you and tell you what the real facts of life here are, that in an Army that is decreasing dramatically in size over the next several years, there will be a very significant decrease in the number of flag officers in the Army and in the other services.

The Army Medical Department is going to be reduced four flags, four general officers over the period of the next several years.

Senator GLENN. It is medical?

General LEDFORD. This is medical, veterinary, nurse, this is all our types of flags which include medical corps, nurse corps.

Senator GLENN. That is four out of what? You have 20?

General LEDFORD. We have either, I will have to count them up.

Senator GLENN. I believe it is 20.

General LEDFORD. It is either 20 or 21 general officers right now, sir. Fifteen are medical corps and we did, indeed, have one veterinary corps general officer.

The incumbent retired. The Army was hit for a number of stars this year. And the medical department's segment of that was two losses this year. And so that star was lost, at least temporarily. And that is where we are. There will be some other stars deleted, as I say, over the next several years. And that is part of the inescapable reduction in forces.

Senator GLENN. You have 20 positions total. Three of the 20 are deputy positions. Do all of the 20 positions have priority over the position of the chief of the veterinary corps?

General LEDFORD. The positions have not been prioritized in that manner, sir. I do not believe that we have prioritized a chief of a corps vis-a-vis a deputy position.

Senator GLENN. Dr. Mendez, DOD has the authority to require realignments within or between the military services of general and flag officer positions. We gave that authority back several years ago. Would you review the general and flag officer positions in the DOD medical community to determine if any realignments are appropriate, and provide for the record, the results of your review?

Dr. MENDEZ. I can, indeed, review. I am not certain that the reason I was not responsive immediately to you derived from wondering whether I have the authority to be able to lay that out in terms of my office. I realize that this is part of the whole picture of general officers.

Senator GLENN. If you could provide us the information and I would presume it also gets supplied up the line above you over there, because it is going to be part of the overall picture we have for all of DOD. That is where the authority lies not only within services but interservice also.

Dr. MENDEZ. All right, sir.

[The information follows:]

While the flag and general officer utilization in the services is established by the line personnel function, I have asked each of the services for information on its plan for general and flag officer positions. Not all of the information is yet in, but I will be glad to provide you with my comments just as soon as I have access to the full information.

Senator GLENN. Give me a little background, General Ledford, in the Veterinary Corps, has this traditionally been a colonel's position or a brigadier position? What has that been?

General LEDFORD. It has been a colonel's position up to a number of years ago, and I must confess I do not have the numbers in front of me. But for several decades now, the chief of the Veterinary Corps has been a general officer. The Corps has over, somewhat over 400 officers in it.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Commissioning physicians assistants in the Army, General Ledford, you indicate in your statement your interest in the appointment of physicians assistants, PA's in the Army, as commissioned officers.

As you also noted in your statement, such appointments would put Army physician assistants on equal par with their counterparts in the other Uniform Services. I am not aware of any restrictions in law that would prohibit the Army from appointing PA's as commissioned officers like other Uniform Services, unless you are concerned that this would just fit against what, your overall officer limits for the Army as a whole? Is that the concern?

General LEDFORD. No, sir. That is no longer a problem. That has been resolved and in point of fact, the physician assistants, the warrant officer position actually counted against the total overall officer strength. That is not the problem, sir.

Senator GLENN. You need statutory language? What would it do?

General LEDFORD. Yes, sir. We need language and we have presented the proposed legislation. There are several small and really rather housekeeping events that require statutory change. For example, we have to have congressional approval to commission PA's in the Army Medical Specialist Corps.

Senator GLENN. General Miller, do you have authority to do that now in the Air Force?

General MILLER. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. And Admiral Zimble, in the Navy?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. How come we left the Army out of that?

General LEDFORD. Sir, I do not know. Admiral Zimble was an extraordinarily effective proponent for his physician assistants and has had them commissioned early on in his tour. The Air Force has commissioned them for a number of years. The Army has totally a warrant officer force and we have, over the period of the last 3 years, gone through the necessary documentation to change this warrant force to a commission force.

The last bit of effort is one of congressional note now. And as I say, it is mostly housekeeping requirements, allowing them to be commissioned in a corps, allowing for certain transition benefits which would allow them, for example, to retire as a warrant officer if they cannot achieve 10 years of service, and several other really administrative manners. And that will be presented to you in the near future, I believe, sir.

Senator GLENN. Okay. I do not recall, but it must have happened before my watch or something here, I do not recall why that was done that way, where we provided for one service and not for another. Does anyone know?

Admiral ZIMBLE. No, sir.

Senator GLENN. Why we left the Army out of it. Well, that is one we can work with you to see if we cannot do something about it.

General LEDFORD. Oh, good. This one is a very important one for the Army Medical Department and we would be most appreciative if you would support it.

Senator GLENN. All right, good. We can have our staffs work together on that.

Proposal to commission chiropractors. Dr. Mendez, Senator Thurmond has introduced a bill, S. 68, that would provide for the appointment of chiropractors as commissioned officers in the Medical Corps of the military services. Does DOD support his proposal?

Dr. MENDEZ. At this point, sir, we have looked at the reasons for the composition of the Medical Departments, both in wartime and in peace time. It is clear, at least to us, in doing that evaluation, that we do not see a wartime utilization base for chiropractors. Second, the profession, that particular profession is predicated on a base that is different than that which is presently the base that is used within the Department. And to that effect, we do not support the commissioning of chiropractors at this point in time.

Senator GLENN. Do you all agree with that?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Yes, sir.

General LEDFORD. Yes.

Senator GLENN. Are there any impediments in law or regulations that would preclude the commissioning of chiropractors if you wanted to do so?

Dr. MENDEZ. I would imagine that there would have to be legislation to commission them. I honestly do not know, Senator Glenn.

General MILLER. I would presume they could be commissioned in the line of the Air Force, sir.

Senator GLENN. Not as chiropractors?

General MILLER. No, that would require legislation.

Senator GLENN. If you wanted to put in a provision that chiropractors could be commissioned to serve in the Medical Corps, you could do it now, is that correct, if you wanted to do it?

Admiral ZIMBLE. In the Medical Corps? No, sir.

Senator GLENN. You could not do that without legislation?

Admiral ZIMBLE. The Medical Corps requires an "MD", a doctor of medicine, or a doctor of osteopathy to commission.

Senator GLENN. All right. Dr. Mendez, is chiropractic care available in any form to beneficiaries of the military medical system?

Dr. MENDEZ. We are conducting at this time, a test to that effect. I do not have the results of that, that talks both to the clinical side and the costs. But it is not a generally available mode of therapy.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Technology for identification of remains—and we are winding down rapidly here. I know we are going over our time a little bit here, but bear with us for just a couple of minutes.

Dr. Mendez, the military services currently use dog tags, fingerprints, dental records, conventional blood typing to identify deceased personnel whose identity would otherwise be unknown. There are obvious shortcomings in these methods. We have had some of those after the Gander crash and the U.S.S. *Stark*, some others, I am sure, instances that you could give to me also.

I have been advised that the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology is looking into a process that would permit a more rapid, foolproof, and cost-effective method of identification using state-of-the-art DNA techniques involving storage of blood samples.

Is that something we should be going to? And as you see it now, is this going to be very expensive, and is this something that we ought to be incorporating into our requirements, and provision of people and money, and so on?

Dr. MENDEZ. I feel that we should evaluate that and as a matter of fact, the evaluation of the program development is indeed under way at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

Now, if you do the DNA testing in its full panoply of tests, indeed it is expensive at this time. If you are able, however, to collect a sample, keep that sample, and then utilize that sample if necessary, you know, like a spot of blood for instance. In the future, indeed that possibility exists. There are some quality assurance standards, some standards that have to do with legal parameters of it that are being worked out at the present time.

But do I think that it is a vibrant type of possibility, the answer is yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Do you all agree with that?

Admiral ZIMBLE. Yes, sir.

General MILLER. Yes, sir. Their enthusiasm was just a little bit premature. It needs a little study and that is progressing.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Good. Well, it is sort of a state of the art technique right now and that is fine and I want to get it incorporated as soon as we possibly can. Though I do not want to rush out here and require something that is going to cost us x-billion per year to do something that would be unnecessary for that kind of money. So we will watch it and keep us advised on that, if you will.

Do any of you have any additional comments you want to make this morning on where we are going with this? Dr. Mendez, we will start off with you. I am finished with my questioning this morning.

Although, let me add while I think of it, we may have other questions submitted to you by other members of the committee or I may submit some after we review the record of the hearing this morning. We would appreciate your early response to those questions so they can be included in the record.

Any comments, in addition, on things that you see that we should be looking into?

Dr. MENDEZ. Basically two things, Senator Glenn. We have discussed part of it already, and that is that we would appreciate your help in obtaining that which may be necessary that we may not have identified totally as yet, in terms of the reconstitution of the DEPMEDS assemblages that Dr. Ledford was pointing out to you. We are talking about the medical equipment side of it that also preoccupied you.

Likewise, we would appreciate your help in obtaining relief from the earmarking restrictions for the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program, to go ahead with our recommendations to that effect.

Third, to bring up again the matter of coordinated care, within coordinated care my office has identified the legislative initiatives that are necessary for the total implementation. However, we have

that whole program under coordination right now. It would be premature for me to lay that out for you at that point. It is still within the department and when the department has completed that review, sir, then I will by all means, submit that information to you in terms of the necessary parts of that.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Good. Keep us advised as you go along with that as much as you can because legislative surprises are not very popular around here and we would like to know what is going on so we can adapt future budgets and so on to what is needed for your proposal also. It is not just self-interest here. If we are cut in on the planning of some of these things so we know the general direction you are headed, why, we can be a big help here in trying to get the things passed at the earliest appropriate time.

Dr. MENDEZ. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Let us start across here. General Ledford, do you have any suggestions for us?

General LEDFORD. Senator, over the next few months, we are really going to be deeply involved in self-analysis over the lessons learned of Operation Desert Storm. And I cannot tell you what is going to come out of that. But I assure you, I know a lot of things are going to come out of it. And we are going to address the things to do with people, and equipment, and doctrine, and that sort of thing. And I know that we are going to ask for some support.

Already, I can tell you that we need some sort of small business loan type of capability for the reservists that are called up. And we will come to you and your staff with similar requests to that.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Now we had a proposal that we considered. Senator Mitchell asked me to chair that committee that considered all of that and I did. And we had a number of meetings and 16 senators were on the committee. We coordinated the work of the committee and then passed that on the Senate floor as one bill, even though it came out of a number of different committees.

Now that was one that was proposed in the euphoria of the Desert Shield starting out, it was proposed that where Reserves were called up, that we assume their business—make up the differences in what happened to their business while they were gone. That was a pretty giant size order. I do not know whether it was put in for press release purposes or not, but whatever it was, that one was not given very serious consideration around here just because of the implementations of it. We did not even know how many billion dollars would be involved in something like that.

Now, you are talking about a loan program or something that might be——

General LEDFORD. Yes, sir. A loan or insurance kind of program in which the Reserve member would participate. There might be some way that a program could be designed that there would be some sort of Federal insurance mechanisms that would support it.

Senator GLENN. We will look at it. I will guarantee that.

General LEDFORD. Thank you.

Admiral ZIMBLE. Senator, first let me thank you for the opportunity and the privilege to spend my last 4 years coming before this body and be able to provide input. It has been very helpful to us and we are very grateful for that support.

I strongly request your support for coordinated care and allowing us to have maximum flexibility in the use of all funds that are directed toward health care, where we can make the investment for the most prudent way of management. And we are not constrained.

Our staffs will work with your staff to try to show where we, in fact, do have some manacles still applied to us that do not allow us to fully utilize all health care dollars in a most cost effective way.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Be glad to look at those proposals.

Admiral ZIMBLE. Yes, sir. And also, I really ask that you look at one area that was not discussed today and that is the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. I think it is a remarkably fine institution from which we will get our career medical officers. And I would like to see that continue to get good congressional support.

Senator GLENN. General Miller.

General MILLER. I am prepared to say the same thing, sir. You know, it is a great opportunity as you walk out the door to say, please sir, we have got to preserve the military medical West Point and we do not need a defense health agency. [Laughter.]

Senator GLENN. Good luck to you, too, as I am sure you are not going to just retire to retire. You are going into other particular areas of endeavor. I am certain of that.

And let me just add one thing before we quit here that I did not add. And that is that I want to note that several organizations that have various interests in military health care have requested the opportunity to submit statements for the record. And those statements submitted to the subcommittee by the end of next week will be included into the record, subject to my approval.

We are not just opening this up for anybody that wants to put a Sears Roebuck catalogue-type dissertation in. So, we do exercise slight limits on it. But any serious statements addressing the subject we addressed today will be welcome and included in the record.

Gentlemen, thank you very much. We have gone a little overtime this morning here, but appreciate your bearing with us on this. And the committee will stand recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN GLENN

COORDINATED CARE PLAN

Senator GLENN. Dr. Mendez, you indicate you are developing what you term as a coordinated, care system of health care delivery. We have not seen the approved specifics on how the system would work; however, I believe it would be fair to say that the basic thrust of coordinated care is the decentralization of control of the management of medical resources to the commanders of military treatment facilities. I'm not prepared to say whether or not I support this concept at this point. Obviously, I'd like to see specifics before deciding one way or the other. However, I do think it is important to note that the coordinated care concept appears to be a reversal of the direction DOD has taken over the last several, years toward more centralization to achieve economies of scale, such as the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative.

When do you expect to have your coordinated care plan in a form that we can review?

Dr. MENDEZ. Once I have coordinated the plan within the Department and the administration, I will be free to share the specifics with you. If at all possible, I will provide you with a more complete description of the program prior to your markup

of the fiscal year 1992 authorization bill. In the meantime, you and your staff are welcome to inquire of me and my staff on any aspects of coordinated care that may confuse or concern you. A formal plan with an accompanying briefing, though, will need to await the proper coordination of the concept within the administration.

Senator GLENN. Would you outline your basic concept of coordinated care and its key elements?

Dr. MENDEZ. The Coordinated Care Program will provide Military Treatment Facility (MTF) Commanders the tools to better manage the delivery of health care to enrolled beneficiaries in their service areas and to ensure that enrolled Military Health Services System beneficiaries have access to high quality, cost effective care. The centerpiece of the Coordinated Care Program will be local health care delivery systems based on arrangements between military and civilian health care organizations. These delivery systems will be locally managed by MTF Commanders who will be responsible for the delivery, cost, and quality of health services provided to enrolled beneficiaries in their area. The Coordinated Care Program will have local accountability with centralized monitoring.

A key component of the Coordinated Care Program will be improved education of beneficiaries and health service providers. Beneficiary education will focus on informing beneficiaries of the options available in seeking health care, as well as assuring that beneficiaries understand how they can maintain and improve their own health status through family risk management, diet, exercise, and appropriate use of health services. Provider education will aim for increased feedback on the effectiveness of clinical practice patterns in meeting the health care needs of our beneficiary population.

Other system-wide innovations will support and complement the local health care delivery systems. Changes will include reforms of CHAMPUS provider payment methodologies, establishment of Specialized Treatment Facilities to provide high-cost health care services in the most cost-effective manner, and new approaches to contracting for health care services. The establishment of participation agreements with civilian providers to accept CHAMPUS assignment and improvements in the efficiency and accuracy of a centralized claims processing system will enhance services provided to beneficiaries.

The key elements of the Coordinated Care Program require that the program:

— *Serve beneficiaries so that DOD is able to retain a quality workforce.* In order to make the program attractive to beneficiaries DOD will assure that enrolled beneficiaries have easy access to care, that the program is understandable, and that it provides high quality services.

— *Be based on decentralized execution.* Health care is a personal service that is always delivered locally. Consequently, local MTF Commanders will have the flexibility to make decisions about the delivery of care.

— *Have local accountability with centralized monitoring.* Local MTF Commanders will be accountable for the costs, quality, and access in their local delivery area for enrolled beneficiaries. This accountability will span the entire MHSS—including CHAMPUS and the direct care system. The system's performance will be monitored centrally.

— *Achieve equity.* The program will ensure that high quality, cost-effective care and access to a uniform benefit are provided within beneficiary category to all enrolled MHSS beneficiaries. To the degree possible, differences in access, quality, cost, and benefits will be eliminated.

— *Be flexible, but easy to administer.* In order to have decentralized execution, MHSS managers will have the latitude to make management decisions about the delivery of health care services in local coordinated care systems. But these decisions will be made with an eye to simplifying administration of the system for beneficiaries, providers and MHSS managers.

— *Optimize use of MHSS resources.* Limited MHSS resources require that the program be cost effective while maintaining high levels of quality and access for beneficiaries. The program will ensure that the costs of the MHSS will be less than under current projections.

Senator GLENN. Do you have an evaluation plan that would measure the coordinated care system as you would implement it at various locations against other alternatives, such as CRI in terms of beneficiary satisfaction and cost?

Dr. MENDEZ. Evaluation of performance is a key element in managing the delivery of health services under the Coordinated Care Plan. Decentralized execution, which is the cornerstone of Coordinated Care, will be balanced against a centralized capability to monitor performance. I have approved an Outcome Matrix which provides the framework within which the evaluation strategy will be developed. However, significant work remains to be done to thoroughly define this matrix. The matrix

provides a comprehensive set of cost, quality, and access outcome measures that can be applied across the Military Health Services System. It will provide the capability to evaluate the performance of alternative health delivery strategies, such as CRI.

Senator GLENN. Dr. Mendez, your coordinated care concept which would make local commanders responsible for the delivery, cost, and quality of health care in a catchment area has appeal. However, I am uncertain about how you plan to oversee such a system to ensure more efficient health care delivery to beneficiaries. For example, what degree of standardization would you require so that beneficiaries can expect some degree of uniformity in how they are cared for as they move from one catchment area to another?

Dr. MENDEZ. To reduce beneficiary confusion, the services covered through the Coordinated Care Program will be uniform so that all enrolled beneficiaries are treated equally. This is particularly important at the local level, where it is important that an enrollee with a civilian primary care physician not have different benefits than an enrollee with an MTF primary care physician. A uniform set of covered services will be established for enrollees. The scope of services will include current CHAMPUS services as well as additional services such as immunizations. The uniform set of benefits will be defined by OSD(HA) and the services. The scope of covered services should also be uniform across all geographic areas so as to minimize beneficiary confusion, simplify program administration, and increase equity.

CHAMPUS FUNDING

Senator GLENN. Dr. Mendez, the fiscal year 1992/1993 Defense Authorization request funds CHAMPUS at $3.6 billion in fiscal year 1992 (a 5 percent increase over fiscal year 1991), and $4.0 billion in fiscal year 1993 (an 18 percent increase over fiscal year 1991). Over the same period (fiscal year 1991 to fiscal year 1993), the CHAMPUS eligible population according to your figures, drops by 2percent.

How do you account for the substantial increases in CHAMPUS costs over this period when the CHAMPUS beneficiary population is going in the other direction?

Dr. MENDEZ. While the CHAMPUS beneficiary population does indeed decline over the fiscal years 1992/1993 budget period, DOD Medical Personnel Authorizations also decline while the number of beneficiaries who actually use the CHAMPUS benefit (and thus create CHAMPUS costs) are increasing at nearly 15 percent annually.

Senator GLENN. How confident are you in the fiscal years 1992/1993 amounts budgeted for CHAMPUS, and should any adjustments be made to them?

Dr. MENDEZ. I am confident in our fiscal years 1992/1993 CHAMPUS budget estimates except for the unanticipated impact related to the effects of Operation Desert Storm on the CHAMPUS program.

COORDINATED CARE PLAN

Senator GLENN. How would your responsibilities change, if at all, under the coordinated care system? For example, how would you budget and allocate resources, and how would you ensure accountability?

What reservations, if any, do you have on the coordinated care system?

General LEDFORD. I expect that responsibilities under coordinated care will be somewhat expanded. Missions would remain the same but the scope of responsibility will be increased. Improved coordination of policy at service and Department of Defense levels will empower local medical commanders with new authorities and flexibility to tailor health care systems to the needs of the local community. Both military and civilian resources will be combined to accomplished this end.

As we change to coordinated care, Army will budget and allocate resources through use of marginal cost benefit analysis to determine care that is done most cost efficiently in the direct care system versus in the civilian sector. We will seek the optimal mix of military and civilian medical personnel to achieve both the peacetime and mobilization readiness missions of the department.

Accountability, I believe, will be best ensured by budgeting our facilities based on mission retirements and judging performance based on the cost effectiveness of benefit and services delivered. Close attention to maintaining the quality of the care is important. Army will not permit costs alone to serve as the only indicator of quality at either end of the price spectrum. Army will evaluate commanders over a phased three (3) year period. Shorter periods for indicated adjustments are also possible. Assessment will take into account both CHAMPUS expenditures and the costs of running our hospitals. performance trends will be monitored through improved data analysis with emphasis on keeping cost at or below established baselines or projections. This assumes a stable environment of staff and dollar resources.

I am fully supportive of the coordinated care concept of health care delivery. I think, given ample time to make the change, there is very real potential to control health care costs. I would use the word concerns rather than "reservations" when addressing the final portion of your question. My concerns are two:

(1) Receiving from the Congress the help needed to affect a stable business environment in which to operate, national emergencies or mobilization notwithstanding and,

(2) Assurance that adequate time to phase in what is viewed as a major change in the method of delivery of health care within the Military Health Services System.

We are up to the challenge, but unrealistic expectations of immediate full scale success must be avoided at levels above us. Give us the mission, support us, and let us operate. A Desert Shield/Storm type commitment is justified to win the fight against health care costs growth.

Admiral ZIMBLE. My responsibilities under the Coordinated Care Program (CCP) remain essentially the same as they are now. It is the method for meeting those responsibilities that would change.

Under Coordinated Care I remain responsible for providing health care for eligible beneficiaries (either via Military Treatment Facilities or CHAMPUS), but can provide commanding officers with more flexibility (resources and the means to use them effectively and expeditiously). There is also a very significant change in the method for allocating resources accompanied by an increase in the scope of accountability for the military treatment facility (MTF) commanding officer. This should result in a more cost effective health care delivery system that provides acceptable access and quality.

The actual method for budgeting and allocating resources under the CCP has not been determined. In the short term, we will probably develop projections based on historical obligational costs and workload in the catchment area. In the longer term, I will evaluate the potential for a capitation system with adjustment factors built in for mission requirements beyond normal health care delivery (GME, operational commitments, etc.).

Given an equitable method for allocating resources, accountability for costs will be easy to ensure—the commanding officer must meet requirements with funds provided. Accountability for maintaining access and quality will be more difficult and must be based on a system-wide set of performance measures. A performance matrix is currently under development by the services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) staff, and I will have to reserve comment on my ability to use it for accountability until I see the results of this effort.

I have no major reservations about the CCP. I support the concept of local management of catchment areas, and am confident that given the appropriate tools and flexibility, the CCP can provide a military health care system with the desired balance of cost, quality and access.

General MILLER. The most significant change in responsibility will be at the base level Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) where the MTF Commander will now be responsible and accountable for the delivery, cost, and quality of all health services provided to enrolled beneficiaries, both in the direct care system and by civilian providers/institutions. Presently, our MTF commanders are responsible and held accountable only for the cost and quality of the care provided within the MTF.

I anticipate that we will budget and allocate resources in the same manner as we currently do, only our budgets will include the CHAMPUS budget estimates for each of our catchment areas. We will ensure accountability under coordinated care just as we do now by holding the MTF commander to the budget allocation he has been provided for his catchment area.

I strongly support DOD's initiative to move toward a managed care environment within the Military Health Services System (MHSS). While I'm not sure "reservations" is the proper word, I do have concerns about some of the proposed procedural aspects and future implications associated with implementing the policy. My major concerns are with enrollment eligibility and the long term leveling of benefits.

Specifically, the Air Force supports automatic enrollment for the families of all active duty members, not just those families whose sponsor's pay grade is E4 and below. Active duty dependents represent our most costly group of beneficiaries in terms of benefit structure and copayment requirements, and we should be aggressive in seeking their enrollment. The exclusion of Medicare beneficiaries from enrollment also concerns me because of the significant questions of equity and fairness that such a policy raises. The Air Force supports the enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries.

My concern with the leveling of benefits is that there may be some desire on the part of DOD to implement "user fees" for health services received within the direct

care system. This concern is based on the statement in the draft policy that over the long term "an enrollee's out-of-pocket costs would be uniform regardless of whether care is received from a military or civilian provider."

I have identified my concerns to Dr. Mendez and I am confident that they will be addressed as we jointly work out the implementation details of the Coordinated Care Policy.

[Additional prepared statements for the hearing record follow:]

Prepared Statement of Col. Erik G. Johnson, Jr., USA Ret., Director of Legislative Affairs, Association of the U.S. Army

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide you with the Association of the United States Army evaluation of the Department of Defense medical care program as it relates to active duty dependents and retirees and their dependents. The evaluation is based on the medical treatment afforded these recipients in military treatment facilities (MTF) and/or the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).

Active component dependents and retirees often write to the Association with complaints about medical care available to them in the MTF. They decry the lack of a consistent or easy method of making an appointment to see a doctor. If they get to see a doctor they cannot count on seeing that same physician on a subsequent visit. This complaint is especially reoccurring when it is a mother dealing with the illness of a child.

After the patient has seen a doctor, and a subsequent appointment is necessary, the system is so cumbersome that setting up a return visit gets to be an exercise in futility. Persistence becomes a virtue and is rewarded with an appointment even if it is not with the same doctor who provided the initial treatment.

Inconsistencies in the medical care active duty dependents experience from one post to another is a common source of dissatisfaction. One post may be able to accept dependents at a local MTF but upon transfer the soldier finds that the spouse or children are forced to rely on CHAMPUS. Suddenly CHAMPUS cost sharing becomes a factor, and if the soldier does not have a CHAMPUS supplemental policy already in force the prospect of medical costs becomes a disturbing reality. Even if the active duty sponsor can buy a supplemental policy a problem could be caused by the requirement of a 2-year waiting period for pre-existing conditions. While our retiree population faces the same inconsistency they are less transient and understand the need for a CHAMPUS supplement before the fact.

We have had soldiers tell us that they were transferred or sent to school in an area with no MTF. In an actual case the soldier's wife was pregnant and the family was forced to use BUS. They had no supplemental and were unable to find a policy which would provide for the expense of delivery as it was a pre-existing condition. This same circumstance happened in an area where there was a military treatment facility unable to provide the needed care.

Although CHAMPUS care features more rapid access to the physician it has some drawbacks too. Families must pay the deductible portion of cost-sharing between the government and the insurance company. Some of our junior enlisted wives are unable to pay the up-front costs to civilian doctors while they wait for CHAMPUS reimbursement. A wife of one of our Desert Storm soldiers discontinued her high blood pressure medication because she could not afford the up-front payment to a doctor. More than that she stopped going in for subsequent check-ups. Some of these Desert Storm dependents have needed care which was not covered by CHAMPUS. When this happens the patient pays regardless of the financial impact on an already tight budget.

Beyond the complaints of CHAMPUS is the acceptance of the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative (CRI). We have not received one complaint from our membership about CRI. In fact, we have had calls expressing great satisfaction with the innovative method of care.

The Department of Defense dental care program has also been widely accepted by its beneficiaries. It must be expanded to provide greater levels of care even if the premium is raised. If medical care of dependents were as well defined as the dental program many of the shortcomings would not be held in such low regard today. The value of a defined benefit program can be seen in the satisfaction of the Active Duty Dependents Dental Plan.

AUSA believes that the answer to medical problems confronting the Department of Defense can be found in the concept of defined benefits. Our dependents and retirees need to know what their entitlements are and they must not differ between military treatment facilities. Additionally, we cannot continue to send our soldiers to assignments beyond the range of MTF care unless we are willing to accept the costs of treating them through a civilian medical facility. Most young enlisted soldiers are ill-equipped to handle the expense associated with such an assignment, and the subsequent bitterness of debt is detrimental to retention of these personnel.

Medical care costs are running rampant through the military and society in general. As a matter of extreme importance to the morale of our service men and women there is no greater challenge than that of medical care costs; AUSA has supported the cost sharing initiatives related to the use of VA hospitals, direct payments by medicare to military treatment facilities and coordinated care programs. Real monetary savings can be effected using the efficiencies of these systems.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS

My name is David R. Fletcher. I am a certified registered nurse anesthetist (CPNA) and the President of the American Association of Nurse, Anesthetists (AANA). I am currently an assistant professor and clinical director at the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, Graduate School of Nursing Program in Nurse Anesthesia Education. I am also a retired Air Force nurse anesthetist, having held the rank of lieutenant colonel.

As the professional association that represents over 24,000 CPNAs, the AANA appreciates the opportunity to provide testimony regarding the shortage of CPNAs in the military and civilian communities, and make recommendations that we believe will help recruit and retain CPNAs within the military services. We are also very appreciative to this committee for the help that you have given us in trying to assist the Department of Defense (DOD) and each of the military services to recruit and retain CRNAs. Our testimony will address the following issues: Operation Desert Shield/Storm, manpower, pay, promotions, practice, and education.

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM

The Persian Gulf conflict officially began on August 2, 1990, and soon after that both CPNAs and anesthesiologists in the military were involved. While all the military CPNAs were proud to serve their country, those who were in the categories of reserve, retained, or recalled became distressed when an inequity arose in relation to special pay. Last year's reauthorization of the DOD (P.L. 101-510), signed on November 5, 1990, included a provision that extended the active duty physician and dentist special pay to physician and dentist reservists. CRNA, optometrist, and podiatrist reservists were excluded from that special pay provision. In addition, all health care providers who were retained or recalled were excluded.

However, these inequities were remedied under P.L. 102-25 and P.L. 102-27 which included special pay for reserve, recalled, and retained health care providers, including CPNAs. These two laws stated that the special pay provision shall apply "during the period beginning on November 5, 1990, and ending on the first day of the first month beginning on or after the date 180 days after the end of the Persian Gulf conflict." The CRNA special pay is based on the current $6,000 a year active duty CPNA bonus, but payments are to be prorated on a monthly basis. Therefore, CPNAs will be eligible to receive $500 a month additional special pay for each month involved in Desert Shield/Storm.

Unfortunately, in working with DOD to implement the new CPNA special pay, AANA was informed by DOD that they interpreted the original physician and dentist reservist special pay provision to apply retroactively to August 2, 1990. This interpretation is contrary to congressional intent to have all special pays, including physician and dentist reservists, be effective on November 5, 1990. Based on their misinterpretation, the DOD has already allocated special pay monies to physician and dentist reservists who were called up in August of 1990. However, the DOD informs the AANA that it will only allocate special pay monies to CPNAs beginning on November 5, 1990. The AANA brought this information to the attention of the committee and appreciates the assurance by the committee that this inequity in special pay will be remedied. The committee will assess whether it will be necessary to pass legislation that will also allow special pay for reserve, recalled, and retained CPNAs and other health care providers to be retroactive to August 2, 1990.

Recommendations:

1. Legislation should be passed that would allow special pay for reserve, recalled, and retained CRNAs and other health care providers to be allocated retroactive to August 2, 1990, in order to provide equity with physicians and dentists.
2. Demobilization of military nurses, including CRNAs, should occur as expeditiously as possible.
3. In order to design effective future recruitment and retention incentives for CRNAs, data should be collected by DOD regarding the mobilization, deployment, and practice editions of CRNAs involved in Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

MANPOWER

A February, 1990 Health Economics Research study, mandated by the congressional appropriations committees, reported a total shortage of 6,000 CRNAs for 1990, or a 13.6 percent shortfall. It further reported the need for 30,000 CRNAs by the year 2000, and over 35,000 CRNAs by the year 2010. There is also a CRNA shortage in the military. The authorized levels in the three services for both active duty and reserve CRNA forces total about 1,630; the current actual levels for active duty and reserve CRNAs total about 1,040.

PAY

Approximately 7 years ago, once military CRNAs reached the grade of major with 12-14 years service, they could expect their salary and fringe benefits to match that of the average employed CRNA in the civilian workforce, who often had attained that level in 2-4 years. Due to significant increases in civilian CRNA income in the past few years, military pay and fringe benefits are no longer comparable to the average employed civilian CRNA. The mean gross annual salary for a civilian CRNA in calendar year 1988 was $61,432. The starting salary difference between a military and civilian CRNA is between $10,000 and $35,000 per year, depending ontime in the service and grade/rank.

Current reserve financial incentives for CRNAs include the testing of a $10,000 selected reserve recruitment bonus. The test has been conducted in certain geographic areas, not nationwide. While the above incentives help, the current $6,000 Incentive Special Pay for active duty CRNAs is insufficient, especially in light of the fact that anesthesiologists get up to $40,000 per year additional pay. In reality, increasing the CRNA Incentive Special Pay is much less expensive in the long run than contracting with civilian CRNAs for their services at a higher cost.

Recommendations:

1. The $6,000 Incentive Special Pay for CRNAs should be increased to $10,000 per year for CRNAs with less than 10 years service, $12,500 for 10-15 years service, and $15,000 for those with above 15 years service. Consideration should also be given to awarding a bonus to CRNAs to encourage them to not retire after their 20 years of service. Periodic examination of the effect of these bonuses should be undertaken.

PROMOTION

While the issue of giving constructive credit for nursing experience and advanced nursing education for purposes of initial grade appointment has improved, the slowness and limited potential for promotion is a major disincentive to remaining in the service. Promotion is not only a recognition of excellence, it is a pay issue as well. A significant number of CRNAs are considering leaving the military because of inadequate and inequitable promotions.

The Senate Appropriations Committee report accompanying the fiscal year 1991 Defense Appropriations Act requested that DOD examine promotion policies of nonphysician health care providers. A report to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees is due in June, 1991. An AANA representative attended the April 25, 1991 DOD promotion meeting. We have also provided recommendations to DOD on this matter that deal with the process of officer evaluations, criteria for promotion, and promotion board instruction, as well as with current grade constraints. Options offered to the DOD include:

1. Exemption from the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) grade constraints for all corps within the military medical departments.
2. Expansion of DOPMA exemptions to cover those nonphysician specialists whose practice overlap medicine.
3. Amend DOPMA to reflect two grade models: one for the line and one for the military medical departments based on unique needs.

4. Maintain DOPMA, but obtain an increase in 0–4 through 0–6 spaces from Congress for promoting nonphysician health professionals who remain in a clinical career track rather than moving into management.

5. Split the Nurse Corps Competitive Promotion Group into two subgroups for promotion selection, dividing promotion spaces equitably between the two groups. One group should include CRNAs, certified nurse midwives, nurse practitioners, and clinical nurse specialists and the other group should include all other nurses.

PRACTICE ISSUES

A March 1989 report to Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D–HI) by the General Accounting Office entitled "DOD Health Care: Issues Involving Military Nurse Specialists" included information on CRNA concerns about their scope of practice in military hospitals and the degree of anesthesiologist supervision required.

In April of 1990, the DOD submitted to the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services the congressionally mandated "Report on Military Use of Registered Nurse Anesthetists": The report described restrictions that DOD places on CRNAs. It noted that a 1983 DOD Directive 6025.2, "Nonphysician Health Care providers", that detailed requirements for physician supervision of CRNAs was rescinded in 1988. At the present time, the following three directives in the areas of quality assurance, licensure, and credentials provide the framework for health care policy in the DOD medical system: (1) DOD Directive 6025.13, "Medical Quality Assurance", (2) DOD Directive 6025.6, "Licensure of DOD Health Care Providers", and (3) DOD Directive 6025.11, "Health Care Provider Credentials Review and Clinical Privileging", which also specifies supervision and scope of practice requirements.

The report notes that DOD policy does not require direct supervision of CRNAs by anesthesiologists, nor does it restrict CRNA practice to selected procedures. Rather, it authorizes hospital commanders to make decisions about the level of independent care provided in military treatment facilities. AANA is concerned that in reality this often results in unnecessary supervision practice restrictions placed on CRNAs, as well as limited opportunities to maintain advanced clinical skills.

The report recognized that problems do exist by stating, "The Military Services have not revised CRNA guidelines to reflect current DOD policy as stated in DOD Directives 6025.11, 6025.13, and 6025.6. An effort to update policy, clarify scope of practice, and enhance communication must be undertaken to resolve nurse and physician concerns, many of which seem to result from outdated or erroneous information . . . Given the critical importance of this group of providers, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) will direct each Service to expedite a joint review of guidance to improve the critical and cooperative working relationship of these two categories of patient care professionals. Each service will be asked to address the concerns highlighted in this report: supervision, monitoring and evaluation, scope of practice, and the granting of clinical privileges."

Recommendations:

1. Encourage each service to expeditiously address the concerns highlighted in DOD's "Report on Military Use of Registered Nurse Anesthetists".

2. Require joint quality assurance reviews of anesthesia practice, utilizing both CRNAs and anesthesiologists.

EDUCATION

The Health Professions Scholarship Program for Anesthesia Nursing provides financial assistance to professional nurses who are pursuing a master's degree in anesthesia nursing. The services all sponsor two general categories of nurse anesthesia training: (1) in-house programs conducted by the services, and (2) programs which fully fund, or provide financial assistance to, participants in nurse anesthesia programs conducted by civilian educational institutions. The DOD report on military use of CRNAs found that the number of participants in both categories of nurse anesthesia education programs sponsored by the military departments was 180 in 1990. After providing an explanation of current in-house capabilities of the Services, the report recommended against expanding current in-house capabilities.

Recommendations:

1. The payback time for nurse anesthesia education scholarships should be calculated the same as it is for the training of anesthesiology residents, and nurse anesthesia education should have coequal priority for clinical teaching resources in major military medical centers.

2. Partnerships between the military and civilian nurse anesthesia educational programs should be encouraged, permitting students in civilian programs the opportunity to affiliate with a military hospital for a portion of their clinical anesthesia education.

3. Funding should be available for additional military schools of nurse anesthesia education.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DORSEY D. CHESCAVAGE, SENIOR SPECIALIST, THE NATIONAL MILITARY FAMILY ASSOCIATION, INC.

The National Military Family Association (NMFA) is a non-profit, primarily volunteer organization with membership from the seven uniformed services, active duty, retired, reserve component and their family members and survivors. NMFA is the only national organization whose sole focus is the military family and whose goal is to influence the development and implementation of policies which will improve the lives of those family members.

DENTAL CARE

Military families have expressed a strong desire for expanded coverage under the Active Duty Dependents Dental Plan. They have asked for help in paying for such things as periodontal disease, crowns, bridges, and braces. They are aware this will mean an increase in their premiums, but are more than willing to pay. In most areas of the country, families have been able to find quality providers who accept the dental plan. Families feel they are "getting their money's worth."

HEALTH CARE

This feeling of satisfaction does not carry over to military health care. Military beneficiaries are angry and confused. "What is the military medical benefit?" It is not defined. It does not guarantee access. Military members' annual Leave and Earnings Statements reflect a no-cost medical care program as part of their compensation—a dollar figure is actually given. There is no mention of CHAMPUS deductibles and co-payments. (Attachment 1)

ACCESS TO MTFS

Access to no-cost health care in a military treatment facility (MTF) varies from place to place and day by day. Some Army and Navy hospitals, for example, assign codes to each clinic. (Attachment 2)

An open clinic (code O) will provide appointments for 90 percent or more of non-active duty patients within 60 days.

A limited clinic (code L) will provide appointments for 50 percent of non-active duty patients within 60 days.

A severely limited clinic (code SL) will provide appointments for 20 percent or less of non-active duty patients within 60 days.

A closed clinic (code C) will provide appointments for only active duty members.

Access to these clinics is further restricted depending upon which priority category the beneficiary is in. A clinic could be Code O for active duty members, SL for active duty dependents and C for retirees and their dependents. These codes change frequently.

At one Navy installation beneficiaries are told if they enroll in Family Practice they will be taken care of 80 percent of the time.

At an Air Force installation supervisors were directed to evaluate the medical condition of active duty airmen in lieu of their seeing a health care professional. (Attachment 3) This directive was soon rescinded. (Attachment 4) A patient administrator at another Air Force hospital said releasing appointment procedures in writing was not in the best interest of the hospital although they are verbally given to beneficiaries every day. She suggested a member of Congress could request the information and then it would be provided in writing.

NMFA's increasing concern regarding the military health care benefit led us to request specific information on access to health care from our representatives in the field. The following statements were taken from NMFA representative reports. This sampling includes remarks from military families at the following installations: Aberdeen Proving Ground, Camp LeJeune, Fort Eustis, Fort Lee, Fort Rucker, Fort Stewart, Grand Forks Air Force Base, Hunter Army Air Field, Offut Air Force Base, Patuxent River Naval Air Station and Scott Air Force Base. It should be noted these reports were solicited prior to Desert Shield/Storm.

"After 30 minutes of constant dialing, I finally reach a computer telling me that all appointments are full for the day, call back tomorrow."

"If you are not home when the clinic calls back with your appointment, you're off the list, and back to calling for months again."

"I call to see a doctor between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., I finally get through on the phone lines and all appointments are taken for the day."

"We have to call in to Family Practice on the 20th for an appointment the next month. Appointments are taken beginning at 7:30 a.m. and are generally filled for the entire month within 2 days."

"It took 5 months of calling during the 'appropriate hours' to get an appointment at the dependent clinic."

"They won't even give you the time of day if you've called on the wrong day or at the wrong time."

"The longest I've waited for an appointment is 4 months. I called on the day the appointment book opened each month for 4 months."

"It took 3 months of calling the clinic, almost daily to get an appointment for my daughter."

"The waiting list for orthopedics is months long and they are no longer taking names."

"Every post seems to be different in how scheduling is done. The first trick is to get through on the appointment line."

"Optometry had a waiting list of 8 weeks and then the doctor left."

"If they tell you to call back on another day, by the time you get through, the appointments are all taken."

"I have 5 children and most of the time they do not get sick when there is an open slot in the appointment book."

"Call only on Fridays between 7:30 and 4 (however the clinic will advise you that they are booked by 9 a.m.) for appointments in the following week only."

"I have called Army hospitals at the wrong time for an appointment—that's the only time the phone rang."

PRIMUS and NAVCARE clinics were created to increase access to primary care. They were quickly operating at full capacity and accessing them is now another source of frustration for military beneficiaries. Waits at these clinics are now 2 to 6 hours. One beneficiary at a Marine Corps installation reports: "NAVCARE has a phone information line giving approximate waiting times; in the 14 months it has been open, I have never heard the report 'condition green' meaning patients can walk in and be seen in under 2 hours. The report is always 'condition red' which means over a 3 hour wait."

Retirees were promised health care in a military treatment facility. Until recently that promise was reinforced by the provision of such care. Retirees and survivors who are Medicare eligible have been particularly affected by denial of access.

WHY MILITARY FAMILIES USE CHAMPUS

Beneficiaries report the main reason they use CHAMPUS is denial of access in an MTF. Families may use CHAMPUS for certain medical services they can't access in a timely manner and use the MTF for those services which can grant access. This pattern can vary from day to day. Beneficiaries may use an MTF exclusively at one duty station and rely totally on CHAMPUS at the next duty station. Beneficiaries not living near an MTF have no choice but to use CHAMPUS. As one family member reported, "CHAMPUS is not more convenient than care in the MTFs. It is only more convenient than not being able to get into the MTF."

Many beneficiaries report they use CHAMPUS only for their children. They will not wait weeks and months to have their sick children seen at an MTF. Pediatrics clinics in MTFs rigidly enforce a rule that says parents may bring only a sick child into the clinic. Well siblings are not allowed in the waiting room. This rule forces many parents who have more than one young child to use CHAMPUS because they cannot find drop-in child care.

FIX THE SYSTEM

NMFA strongly agrees with the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Health Affairs that the entire military health care delivery system must be reformed. Beneficiaries are not satisfied with it and neither are military physicians. Medical professionals are not able to provide the scope of care they know is necessary. Beneficiaries report physicians ask over and over—"Why didn't you come in sooner?" or tell them, "You should not have waited so long." "You need to see a specialist but we don't have one here." "You need special treatment but we can't provide it, you will have to go out

on CHAMPUS." Because patients are in and out of the direct care system, physicians cannot confidently chart a course of treatment or follow an episode to its conclusion.

What can be done to reform this broken delivery system that leaves virtually no one satisfied?

CHAMPUS REFORM INITIATIVE

An important step has already been taken. The Champus Reform Initiative (CRI) in place in California and Hawaii has been operating for 2½ years. Substantial problems with claims processing initially developed but they appear to have been corrected.

Military families rave about CHAMPUS PRIME. Comments such as: "We have our own doctor. We have someone we can call on the phone for advice. We can get appointments right away when our children are sick. We don't have to fill out CHAMPUS claim forms;" are repeated over and over by families who are using or have used CHAMPUS PRIME or Extra. It gives the military family what they need most in terms of health care: security. Parents know that if their children are sick, they can pick up the phone and a qualified person will answer. If a determination is made that a sick child needs to be seen by the doctor right away, the child will be seen right away. The family is familiar with their provider and their provider is familiar with the family. Valuable time is not lost endlessly repeating the child's history to yet another doctor as is most often the case at an MTF or PRIMUS/NAVCARE clinic. The military family enrolled in CHAMPUS PRIME has 24 hour access, at least by phone, to their provider. The family using an MTF or PRIMUS/NAVCARE only has access to an emergency room when the MTF or PRIMUS/NAVCARE clinics are closed.

CRI appears to be doing what was mandated. It has successfully demonstrated enrollment; it has provided services through resource sharing to enable MTF commanders to fully utilize their staffs and increase their hospital workload capacity; through the Health Care Finder (HCF), it routes patients to the appropriate level and source of care. It is also reported to have contained CHAMPUS costs.

CATCHMENT AREA MANAGEMENT

The Catchment Area Management Demonstration Projects (CAMs) do not appear to have fared as well. Although these projects were authorized at the same time as CRI, they were very slow to get off the ground. For example, the Navy CAM in Charleston started service delivery September 1, 1990; the Air Force CAMs at Luke/Williams Air Force Bases in Phoenix, Arizona, and at Bergstrom Air Force Base in Austin, Texas, began seeing patients on March 1, 1990; and the Army CAMs at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, and Ft. Carson, Colorado, were fully operational on October 1, 1989. As a point of reference, CRI became fully operational on August 1, 1988. CRI has been evaluated by the RAND Corporation, the General Accounting Office (GAO) and thoroughly scrutinized by at least 4 congressional subcommittees. Unfortunately, at this time, the data from the CAM demonstrations is insufficient to provide beneficiary satisfaction or cost containment information. As the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) reported to the Military Coalition on February 27, 1991, "the data from the CAMs is immature."

COORDINATED CARE POLICY

NMFA has looked at DOD's Coordinated Care Policy (CCP). It appears to adopt a CAM model rather than a CRI model. Several facets of CCP are of concern. Under CCP, enrollment will not begin until local MTF commanders have organized a network of primary care case managers using MTF personnel, PRIMUS/NAVCARE and civilian providers. The GAO in its report to the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, March 14, 1991, entitled *The Military Health Services Systems—Prospects for the Future,* reports "Developing networks of private providers, including discounts, requires expertise and data that many hospital officials do not possess, as DOD's demonstrations have shown."

DOD's CCP plan contains various disincentives such as higher CHAMPUS deductibles and denial of access to MTFs for non-enroilees. The above mentioned GAO report also states, "Experience with the demonstration projects around the country has shown that beneficiaries need strong incentives to enroll . . . ." This approach has been successful in CRI.

The CCP plan states "Beneficiaries who enroll in the CCP will initially be subject to the same cost sharing requirements as they are today. Unfortunately, this may create inequities among beneficiaries in different local networks because of varying

MTF provider capacity." The GAO report states, "Under managed care, we believe that each category of enrolled beneficiary (dependents of active duty members, retirees and their dependents, etc.) should have uniform benefits and cost-sharing requirements. This should be the case without regard to where the beneficiaries receive their care or where they live."

A final area of concern involves Medicare eligible beneficiaries. They will not be allowed to enroll in DOD's coordinated care program. This category of beneficiaries has served the country long and well. Many retirees have served in three wars. Many are widows of those who served in three wars. They fully expected to be part of a military health care system. NMFA believes Medicare eligibles can be absorbed into a CRI model. An opportunity to test this theory may become available to DOD under the auspices of the San Francisco Medical Command Open Heart Surgery Project.

NMFA fully supports a managed care concept for delivering health care to military beneficiaries. NMFA leans towards a CRI model but recommends waiting for implementation of CCP until comprehensive data from the current CAM projects is fully developed and evaluated. While waiting for the CAM projects to fully develop, NMFA recommends CRI be allowed to continue and, in fact, expand where circumstances are favorable. The CRI feature of providing three options of care levels at different prices (a Health Maintenance Organization, a Preferred Provider Organization and a fee for service plan) appears to mirror many civilian health care plans and is extremely attractive to beneficiaries. NMFA suggests any future DOD provided benefit include these options.

MILITARY FAMILIES MUST HAVE A DEFINED HEALTH CARE BENEFIT. THE BENEFIT MUST GUARANTEE TIMELY ACCESS AS A *CONDITION* FOR ENROLLMENT.

ADDITIONAL/INDIRECT COMP...

Your direct compensation is supplemented by special allowance, retirement, health care, and other programs. These have a cash value to you in terms of spendable income. They are a real and important part of your compensation, and should be considered in adding up your real pay value.

	Monthly Rate	Annual Rate
A. ALLOWANCES. In addition to your Military Pay, certain special allowances may be authorized. These may include a cost of living allowance in certain overseas areas, family separation allowance, clothing replacement allowance, etc. These allowances are listed on your LES. (Note 1, page 1)		
TOTAL ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES	$	$
B. RETIREMENT. You can retire after 20 years of service and receive a monthly payment equal to 50% of your basic pay for the rest of your life. For each year after 20, another 2.5% is added, up to a maximum of 75% at 30 years of service. (If you first became a member of the uniformed service on or after 1 Aug 86, this percentage will be reduced by 1% for each year short of 30, i.e., 20 years = 40%, 29 years = 71.5% until you reach age 62. At age 62 your retired pay will be increased to the full percentage.) Civilians in Civil Service and many private companies have to pay into their retirement plan and most have to wait until age 55 or 65 to begin getting retired pay. These are current monthly retired pay amounts for typical retiring military people: E-6 (20 YOS) - $791.00; E-9 (26 YOS) - $1,754.00. Under a plan like the Civil Service system, you would have to pay in up to 7% of your pay every month toward your retirement. Compared to this, your military retirement means monthly savings as follows:		
7% X $ 2538.90 (basic pay)	$ 177.72	$ 2132.64
C. MEDICAL CARE. The worth of your medical coverage depends on how much you use it. However, since your major medical needs are provided for, there is no need for you to carry medical insurance available to civilians ranging from no cost to all cost for the employee. In Civil Service, one plan that gives about the same medical coverage costs the employee $84.48 every two weeks for a single person and $174.77 for a family. Compared with Civil Service health care, the military health care system saves you $2,196 (single) or $4,544 (family) each year (26 pay periods times $84.48 or $174.77).	$ 378.67	$ 4544.02
D. DEATH AND SURVIVOR PROGRAMS. If you die on active duty your survivors are eligible for life insurance and other payments. You may buy life insurance up to $50,000 at a very low cost. Also, your dependents would receive a death gratuity ($3,000) and monthly Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) payments, ranging from $539 for an E-1 to $735 for an E-9. Past studies have shown that the average military member would have to pay about 2.4% of his or her basic pay in extra insurance costs to get the same coverage.		
2.4% X $ 2538.90 (basic pay)	$ 60.93	$ 731.16
E. SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE. Military people are eligible for old age, retirement, and disability benefits on the same basis as civilians. The Government contributes to the member's Social Security Benefits. In 1989, this amounts to 7.51% of basic pay (maximum $3,604.80).	$ 190.67	$ 2288.04
INDIRECT COMPENSATION (A+B+C+D+E)	$ 807.99	$ 9695.86
DIRECT COMPENSATION (from page 1)	$ 3626.38	$ 43516.56
TOTAL	$ 4434.37	$ 53212.42

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

In adding up the total worth of your compensation package, you also need to consider the many other programs and privileges you have such as those shown on the next page. Their true worth will be different for each person, depending on use. You should think seriously about how much you may have saved by using these programs over the last year.

ATTACHMENT 1

ATTACHMENT I

BENEFICIARY INFORMATION SYSTEM FORMAT
McDonald Army Community Hospital
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604-5548

28 January 1991

Clinic	Appointment * (AV 927-XXXX)	Active Duty	Active Duty Dependents	All Others (Incl Ret)
Internal Medicine	878-3260/2598	O	L	L
Obstetrics		W	W	W
Gynecology	878-5525/4467	O	L	L
Pediatrics	878-4750/4758	W/A	O	O
Family Practice		W/A	W/A	W/A
Primary Care	878-4504/4505	O	L*	L*
General Surgery	878-3211/5002	O	O	O
Orthopedics	878-3042/4243	O	L*	L*
Cardiology	878-3260/2598	W/A	C	C
Nutrition Care	878-5988/5533	O	O	O
Optometry	878-5412/4244	O	O	L
Urology	878-3042/4243	O	O	O
Psychiatry	878-5418	O	SL	SL
Flight Medicine	878-4204	O	O	SL
Physical Therapy	878-5841	O	O	O
Dermatology	878-3260/2598	O	L	SL
Podiatry	878-2281/2666	L	O	O
ENT	878-5412/4244	O	O	O
Audiology	878-5 14/4244	O	C*	C*
Physical Exam	878-3539	O	O	SL
Allergy	878-5653/3935	O	O	L
Immunizations	878-3539/3304	O	O	L

* = Indicates change from last report
O = Open
L = Limited ((50% of the patients will be appointed within 60 days)
SL = Severely Limited ((20% will be appointed within 60 days)
C = Closed
W = Not Available at the present time
N/A= Not Applicable

LAFB PATIENT ADMIN 764-6437
PNH PATIENT REPRESENTATIVE 878-7717

Attachment 2

HEALTHC

Clinic	Appointments (AV)687-xxxx	Active Duty	Active Duty Dep	30Jan91 All Other (Inc Ret)
Audiology	734-1963	O	O	O
Dermatology	734-2865	L	N	N
ENT(1)	734-1963	O	O	O
General Surgery	734-2865	O	O	L
Gynecology(2)	734-4061	O	O	L
Immunizations	734-4065	O	O	O
Internal Medicine(3)	734-4065	O	L	SL
Laboratory	734-1943	O	O	O
Nutrition Care	734-2610	O	O	O
Obstetrics(4)		N	N	N
Ophthalmology	734-1963	O	O	O
Optometry	734-1963	O	O	O
Orthopedics(8)	734-4753	O	O	SL
Outpatient(5)	734-2041	O	O	L
Pediatrics	734-2648	N/A	O	O
Physical Exam(6)	734-5763	O	N	N
Physical Therapy	734-1663	O	O	O
Podiatry(1)	734-4753	O	O	O
Psychiatry	734-3051	O	O	SL
Radiology	734-2634	O	O	O
Social Work Service	734-4797	O	O	O
Urology(7)	734-2865	O	O	O

O-Open (active duty will be seen promptly; 90 percent or more of all other patients will be appointed within 60 days)
L-Limited (50 percent of the patients will be appointed within 60 days)
SL-Severely Limited (20 percent or less will be appointed within 60 days)
N/A-Not Applicable
N-Not Available
We will make every attempt to provide the medical services listed above. However, due to Operation Desert Storm requirements to process very large numbers of soldiers being activated and deployed, there may be days when our staff will be depleted and services interrupted.

Operating Hours Procedures
Outpatient Clinic: 7:30 a.m.-4:30 p.m. Mon-Fri.
Physical Exam Section: 7:30 a.m.-4 p.m. for active duty only.
Pediatric Clinic: 8 a.m.-5 p.m.; Walk-in: Mon-Thurs 8-9:30 a.m. and 1-2:30 p.m., and Fri 8-9:30 a.m. and 2-3 p.m. Well Baby Clinic by appt only; physicals by appointment only (under 17), schedule three to five days in advance; lab work and shots updated three days prior to appt. Immunization Clinic walk-in hours are 7:30-11:30 a.m. and 1-4 p.m. Mon-Thurs., 7:30-11:30 a.m. and 3-4 p.m. Fri. Yellow Fever first and third Fri 2-3 p.m. for active duty only.
GYN Clinic: Active duty sick call 7-9:30 a.m.
The remaining clinics are 7:30 a.m.-4:30 p.m. Mon-Fri.

Attachment 2

January 29, 1991

Here is some information for your report on Champus for dependents in the Camp Lejeune area.

The recent deployments from this area of almost all our active duty doctors has reduced the staff at the Naval Hospital. Though we have been sent reservists to assist, some of the clinics are now limited to active duty only; dependents have to seek medical care in the civilian community.

The "official" list of available clinics is as follows:

Clinic	A/D	D/AD	RET
Acute Care	O	O	O
Cardio	-	-	-
Derm	O	L	C
ENT	O	L	L
Surg	O	O	O
Neuro	O	L	C
OB/Gyn	O	L	L
Optometry	O	O	O
Orthopedics	O	C	C
Peds	N	O	O
Podiatry	O	O	O
Urology	O	L	L

(O = open; L = limited, C = closed)

Now for the reality:

Acute Care is the walk-in clinic. The minimum wait to be seen by a doctor or physician's assistant is 2 hours during the day. We have the option of seeking help at the NavCare off-base; there the wait is well over one hour just to have vitals taken, then another hour to see the doctor. NavCare has a phone info line giving approximate waiting time before leaving to visit; in the 14 months it has been open I have never heard the report "condition green" meaning patients can walk in and be seen in under two hours. The report is always "condition red" -- a long wait in a wating room full of coughing, screaming children.

Even though a number of the clinics are listed above as "open", a dependent cannot just walk in and request to be seen, we must be referred to that clinic by a health care

Attachment 2

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
EHRLING BERGQUIST STRATEGIC HOSPITAL (SAC)
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-5200

REPLY TO ATTN OF: SGHGE (4-7332) 8 Jan 91

SUBJECT: Supervisor's Role in Active Duty Medical Illnesses

TO: All OAFB Supervisors

1. In an era of doing less with less, EBSH is experiencing a severe shortage of Primary Care appointments for active duty and a deluge of Emergency Room patients due to the cold and flu season. Obviously, this trend prevents access to our Primary Care Outpatient Services for patients with more serious medical problems.

2. We have researched Air Force regulations to ascertain if supervisors have discretionary authority to relieve subordinates for brief periods of duty time in case of illness. Finding nothing that precludes such a process, I would like to encourage all supervisors to use common sense in dealing with ill personnel. Specifically, I would recommend that if an active duty member complains of physical symptoms that would prevent him/her from performing his/her duty satisfactorily and safely, the decision process start at the supervisor level in determining necessity for formal medical evaluation. Most patients with colds and flu (or similar minor medical problems) will respond to symptomatic care at home or in quarters without medical intervention and often require no more than 1-2 days off duty to recover. These members could easily be managed at the squadron level.

3. Of course, if there is any question by a supervisor regarding the seriousness of an illness or if the member is clearly displaying symptoms consistent with a significant medical problem, we stand ready, as always, to provide the most expeditious evaluation possible. We request judgment be exercised by a supervisor in dealing with a sick active duty member instead of automatically referring the individual for certification of illness and medical disposition.

4. Your consideration and cooperation with this initiative will be appreciated by our sicker health care beneficiaries.

JOHN A. WATTERS, JR., Colonel, USAF, MC, FS
Commander

1st Ind, 55 SRW/CC

TO: Supervisors

I strongly support Col Watters' request in this matter.

THOMAS F. ATKINSON, JR., Colonel, USAF
Wing Commander

War is our profession -- Peace is our product

Attachment 3

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
EHRLING BERGQUIST STRATEGIC HOSPITAL (SAC)
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-5300

REPLY TO ATTN OF: SG

14 Feb 91

SUBJECT: Re Guidance Letter, 8 Jan 91, "Supervisor's Role in Active Duty Illnesses"

TO: All OAFB Supervisors (Distrubution 2 & C)

1. The guidance letter referenced above (Atch 1) was a renewal of previous advice, but reconsideration suggests that it should be withdrawn.

2. Although well intended, the letter potentially places a supervisor in the position of making medical judgments of "how sick" a person may be. The entire thrust of the letter is to suggest that Ehrling Bergquist Strategic Hospital should only be seeing "sicker" patients and this is wrong. Our mission is to care for any illness or perceived illness and we should not suggest otherwise.

3. Please destroy the letter of 8 Jan 91 and ignore its advice.

JOHN A. WATTERS, JR., Col, USAF, MC, FS
Commander

1 Atch
EBSH/SGHGE Ltr, 8 Jan 91

Attachment 4

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR UNIFORMED SERVICES SOCIETY OF MILITARY WIDOWS

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR UNIFORMED SERVICES,
SOCIETY OF MILITARY WIDOWS,
Springfield, VA, May 16, 1991.

Hon. JOHN GLENN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel,
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Request the enclosed letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) be made part of the record of the hearing on DOD Medical Programs which you chaired on May 15, 1991.

NAUS/SMW very much appreciates the opportunity to provide this information to the Armed Services Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.

Sincerely,

J.C. PENNINGTON,
Major General, USA (Ret), President.

Enclosure.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR UNIFORMED SERVICES,
SOCIETY OF MILITARY WIDOWS,
Springfield, VA, May 7, 1991.

Hon. ENRIQUE MENDEZ, JR., M.D.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs),
The Pentagon (Room 3E346), Washington, DC.

DEAR HANK: My Board of Directors and I have reviewed the 4 April 1991 Memorandum, Subject: Coordinated Care Program (CCP) Policy and want to express our concerns with some of the provisions of the plan and make recommendations for change as follows.

As you know, we generally support a coordinated care program for all the beneficiaries of the Military Health Service System. The current proposal, however, appears to be based too much on negative and coercive incentives that could be devastating for beneficiaries. We had hoped that a managed care system would keep the best features of our current system, including both direct care and contract care for all the 9.2 billion beneficiaries including those over age 65. This would have increased access care for a much greater number of beneficiaries, improved the overall efficiency of the system and eventually reduced costs. By establishing better management, gaining some cost savings and improving the quality and delivery system controls, managed care would have benefited DOD and the beneficiaries of the system. Instead, this proposal is largely cost driven with little regard to the needs and desires of the beneficiaries.

We strongly believe that, initially, non-enrollee beneficiaries should not be penalized by increased deductibles, at least until the system can take care of all of the 9.2 million beneficiaries including those retirees and dependents over age 65. We believe the CCP plan, as written, places too much emphasis on cost savings too early in the initial stage of the program. We believe implementing the non-enrollment penalty elements of the plan will result in much higher costs to beneficiaries. It does not place enough emphasis on the incentives for improved access and more efficient and effective medical care in military treatment facilities and care provider networks. We believe adequate incentives to enroll voluntarily can be provided by emphasizing the positive factors of improved access, better service and stable costs. We believe that negative or coercive factors will produce a "captive audience" of patients before the majority of beneficiaries can be accommodated in the CCP. We strongly believe military medical care beneficiaries will voluntarily enroll in the plan when improved medical care actually materializes as the plan is fully implemented. This should occur when the military treatment facilities and the provider networks are fully organized and adequately staffed based on the completed CAM test findings and lessons learned from the on-going CRI test in California and Hawaii.

One of our For concerns with the proposed DOD policy is an almost complete lack of acceptance by DOD of any real responsibility for the over age 65 Medicare eligible military retiree beneficiaries. We believe under the DOD plan the majority of Medicare eligible retirees, now receiving treatment in military, facilities, will be forced out of the system by the higher priority given to the CHAMPUS enrollees. The tightly managed CCP appear to have as its primary objective the reduction of

DOD financed CHAMPUS costs and diversion of space available Medicare capacity (for which it currently receives no compensation) to CHAMPUS eligible personnel. Accomplishment of this goal will certainly ensure that there is little or no space available care left for Medicare eligible retirees.

We, therefore, urge you to allow a significant percentage of Medicare eligible military beneficiaries to take part in voluntary enrollment under the CCP. We are confident that with active DOD support we can gain congressional support of subvention (HFCA reimbursement for medicare eligible beneficiaries) by 1992 and that reimbursement to military MTF's and VA hospitals will eventually make treating the over 65 retiree population a much more attractive option for both DOD and the Veterans Administration. NAUS and the Military Coalition are working hard to obtain approval for early pilot projects on subvention at several locations. We urge DOD's strong support in our efforts to obtain congressional approval of this Medicare reimbursement plan.

We also are especially concerned that no mention was made in your plan regarding how the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative (CRI) fits into the CCP. This program has been highly successful and it has been thoroughly tested. On the other hand, the CAM concept upon which CCP is largely based has not been fully tested and evaluated. The high beneficiary satisfaction with the quality of care and the demonstrated cost savings under CRI, indicate that the contract should be extended. CRI should then be expanded to other States immediately and modified as required to mesh or coexist with CCP. As you recall, when your predecessor tried to fully implement CRI nationwide without adequate testing, DOD was heavily criticized by the military associations and Congress. Congress subsequently directed the present CRI test be completed before full implementation. Now it appears that if DOD implements the CCP prematurely before the CAM test is completed and evaluated, it will be making the same mistake again.

We believe that CRI also can play a major role in helping to form a network of health care providers on a contract basis for the medical facility commanders under CCP. In fact, by operating the network for the hospital commanders, CRI would be in a position to provide the required continuity if the medical facility or unit is deployed overseas. We also see a role for CRI operating a complete system in areas that are not within the catchment areas.

We are strongly opposed to increasing non-enrollee annual deductibles to $250/$500 as a destructive and highly coercive method to force enrollment. Such actions will cause much ill will and resistance from beneficiaries to the detriment of the eventual success of CCP. We believe adequate incentives are already provided by the recent tripling of the CHAMPUS deductibles to $150/$300.

We also believe that another important guiding principle should be added to those now listed in the CCP. That principle is DOD acceptance of their responsibility for the health care of the retirees who fought in the last 4 hot wars and the 45 years cold war, regardless of funding source for such care. We support DOD and the VA in obtaining as much funding as possible from the Health and Human Services Department but strongly believe DOD must accept responsibility for providing health care to all 9.2 million beneficiaries, including the old soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines over age 65 who have fought in these wars for the last 50 years. These retirees believe very strongly they have earned lifetime medical care by years of service and have paid for it again through mandatory social security payroll tax deductions and they cant that care under the supervision and control of the DOD and the VA medical systems. The vast majority of the Nation's major corporations have recognized and accepted this responsibility for their *current and former employees—active and retired.* Surely DOD should accept the same responsibility in honoring the *unique contract* between the government and its military personnel which requires the *ultimate sacrifice if necessary.*

In summary, we believe the CCP, when tested and properly implemented over an adequately "phased in" period of time, could be a positive step in controlling DOD medical costs and eventually improving medical care for all its military health care beneficiaries. But, we are very concerned that the plan, as written, significantly reduces the choice of beneficiaries beyond that necessary for managing the system and obtaining savings. We also believe the enrollment requirements are too coercive and are being implemented prematurely before the policies and procedures are adequately tested under the very similar CAM project. We are especially concerned that the plan does not accept DOD's responsibility for all beneficiaries of the total military force—active, retired and dependents. Medicare eligible beneficiaries under this plan will have very little access to CCP and, in fact, will have much less medical care available in military treatment facilities than under the current system.

I would very much like to present these views of the NAUS/SMW leadership and members to you and your staff. I also strongly recommend that you and your staff meet with all the representatives of the Military Coalition for detailed discussion and analysis of your plan before proceeding further with implementation.

Sincerely,

J.C. PENNINGTON,
Major General, USA (Ret), President.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

The American Psychological Association, the largest organization representing psychologists nationwide engaged in the practice, teaching and research of psychology, thanks the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify on urgently needed improvements in the CHAMPUS mental health program. We offer this testimony on behalf of our 109,000 colleagues in the APA. As one of the most widely geographically distributed mental health provider groups, psychologists have a major role in providing mental health services to CHAMPUS beneficiaries.

We are concerned about recent increases in CHAMPUS expenditures, and, as both taxpayers and professional health care providers, believe that CHAMPUS should provide *only* necessary services in the most cost-effective manner.

We begin by noting that the APA stands ready to cooperate with the Committee in helping to identify and refine sensible, effective, and equitable cost control measures. However, as one of the original contractors with the Department of Defense (DOD) to review mental health services under the CHAMPUS program, APA has substantial concerns about the present course being pursued by DOD and Congress to contain costs under the CHAMPUS program.

We would first like to highlight certain points about ongoing efforts within DOD/CHAMPUS which we believe are most significant in determining the future validity of any meaningful reform in mental health under this major insurance program.

First, no objective base-line data on mental health need and utilization is available. For example, there has been no systematic effort to understand the causes or factors correlated with increased mental health utilization. Our review of the Lewin/ICF (1990) and DOD Report (1991) reveals that both documents are primarily focused on efforts to contain costs without much regard for the potential of decreased utilization and without any consideration of the factors associated with increasing utilization rates or needs of special populations, such as children. Likewise, neither report supplies data to support the notion that significant utilization by the military family population is, in fact, evidence of *over*-utilization.

Second, quality of care assessments have not been conducted in any thorough or systematic manner under any of the DOD/CHAMPUS Demonstrations. In other words, no objective information exists regarding the effects of any CHAMPUS cost-saving measures on patient well-being, patient outcome, or overall quality of care.

Given these concerns, the balance of this testimony will examine:

- primary contributors to the recent trends in CHAMPUS expenditures and utilization patterns;
- lessons learned from various CHAMPUS demonstrations, the research literature, and the experience of other programs relevant to cost control, and;
- recommendations concerning more appropriate cost control measures and future studies that are vital to improving efficiency, effectiveness, and quality within the CHAMPUS mental health program.

WHY HAVE CHAMPUS MENTAL HEALTH COSTS INCREASED?

Two major factors are driving cost increases in CHAMPUS programs, namely, increased utilization of mental health benefits by adolescents aged 10–19, and increased costs associated with inpatient care.

Factor 1: Increases in Children and Adolescent Utilization of Mental Health Services

We concur with the DOD report (March 1991) that the increase in CHAMPUS expenditures for mental health care is being driven almost solely by an increase in participation and utilization of mental health services by children between the ages of 10 and 19. As graphically illustrated in Chart 1 (attached), *if services to these children had not increased. total CHAMPUS expenditures would not have increased.* Therefore, this committee should focus its attention on causes for such dramatic increases in this subpopulation, and direct cost containment efforts accordingly. APA is concerned, however, that DOD's attention is not appropriately focused, and that cost cutting measures will be implemented for services that are not contributing to

any increases in costs. In fact, an even closer examination of the data reveals, and is depicted in Chart 2, that not all treatment modalities are contributing to increased costs. As pointed out by the Lewin/ICF Report, *inpatient psychiatric care* is the service primarily responsible for increasing expenditures. In contrast, costs for outpatient care have not risen at a rate any faster than general health care costs. Accordingly, cost containment efforts should be targeted at controlling inpatient costs.

The referenced reports further indicate that increased utilization was present in only 33 catchment areas nationwide. We have only anecdotal information on why these particular areas had such increases, but it seems clear that outreach efforts by a variety of groups in these same areas may be contributing to the increase in utilization. For example, children's advocacy organizations, such as the Children's Defense Fund, have launched major campaigns to see that children receive needed medical services. Again, no objective data is offered to account for the utilization surges or possible factors driving such activity. As such, we argue that cost containment efforts must be targeted to those services in those areas where there is demonstrable and significant cost increases; any broader-based controls could inappropriately restrict patient access to care.

Increased Utilization: Unmet Need or Inappropriate Utilization?

Two important questions not addressed by DOD's reports regarding this documented substantial growth in mental health care utilization among adolescents are: What are the factors contributing to this growth in utilization? And how can we appropriately address inappropriate use while continuing to provide the broadest access to high quality, affordable mental health service for those children truly in need?

We realize that utilization rates within the CHAMPUS program population has not been conclusively established. The evidence from the CHAMPUS demonstrations is mixed on this subject and not specific to the 33 catchment areas responsible for the recent surge in expenditures. However, it is imperative that DOD determine whether increasing utilization is reflective of unmet needs of CHAMPUS eligible adolescents or the inappropriately high rates of utilization.

We contend that a significant portion of this increased utilization can be explained by the documented need for services. The DOD studies to date have not made any valid comparisons. Instead, they have compared utilization rates of the CHAMPUS program and utilization rates of two "Manufacturers" (Lewin/ICF 1990) and concluded that CHAMPUS utilization rates are higher than manufacturers. We have considerable concern about the validity of this comparison of the CHAMPUS population with manufacturing workers and their dependents.

First, as the DOD report to Congress documented, there is considerable regional variation in utilization, reimbursement, service availability and other relevant factors that might invalidate the comparison. Second, participation in a typical "large manufacturing" program might be reflective of a considerably different population in terms of demographics such as age, income, etc., that would render the comparison meaningless. Finally, details of the characteristics of the health insurers program that the manufacturers offer, such as copayment requirements, could invalidate the comparison. We have a similar set of concerns about the comparison of the CHAMPUS population to the federal employees program (FEHBP).

The bottom line is that although the DOD contractors made an effort to address the fundamental question of whether it is "unmet need" or inappropriate utilization, they did not answer this important question. Such a determination might be made by comparing the incidence of mental illness in the CHAMPUS adolescent population per thousand eligible children and the actual utilization rates per thousand program . We strongly recommend that the committee direct the Secretary to prepare a report on this issue at the earliest possible date. The statistical and methodological techniques necessary for such a study exist. Our organization stands ready to assist in the design and execution of such a study.

Pursuit of this information and implementation of appropriate cost controls is critical to the future of the CHAMPUS program, for outreach efforts like those cited earlier are likely to expand over the foreseeable future. Should the outreach efforts observed in the 33 areas be expanded to all areas of the country, the potential impact in terms of cost to CHAMPUS could be enormous. One estimate suggests that such activity could stimulate increased utilization, perhaps increasing current CHAMPUS expenditures by as much as $450 million per year.

It is important for Congress to note that experts are just beginning to reveal the characteristics of mental health need and utilization generally among our Nation's children and adolescents. For example, the Institute of Medicine recently reported that at least 7.5 million children under 18 (approximately 12 percent) suffer from one or more mental disorders (Institute of Medicine, 1989). Other researchers report

similar prevalence rates among subpopulations of children, namely adolescents aged 16 to 19, for specific disorders such as depression, alcohol abuse, and substance abuse (Deykin, Levy & Wells, 1987). Taken together, these studies document the unique and prevalent needs of this population.

Standing in stark contrast to this well-documented need is the fact that many children and adolescents who need care do not receive services. According to an Office of Technology Assessment Report (1986), only about 20 to 30 percent of children needing mental health treatment actually received care. Of those who did receive care, as many as one-third are seen just once. Even more surprising, under the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan administered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, widely believed to foster excessive use because of its generous mental health benefits, anecdotal evidence suggests that only one-fifth of 1 percent of child claimants receive mental health treatment in a year (Schlesinger, 1989; Burns, 1989).

In general the mental health care needs among the children of this Nation are not met. This also holds true for CHAMPUS-insured children. However, there is also evidence of inappropriate utilization such as use of inpatient care when outpatient services would have been more appropriate from both cost and quality perspectives. A more thorough discussion will follow.

Factor 2: CHAMPUS Bias Toward Inappropriate, More Expensive Inpatient Care

As mentioned above and depicted on Chart 2, inpatient psychiatric care is responsible for the bulk of increased costs under CHAMPUS. However, CHAMPUS maintains incentives to use more expensive and oftentimes more inappropriate means of care such as inpatient treatment. For example, DOD and several of its demonstration evaluation contractors have concluded that the current CHAMPUS copayment structure almost requires that active service families place their children in expensive, and not necessarily appropriate, inpatient settings rather than seek outpatient care or less restrictive or intensive institutional care.

In human terms, the choice for active service personnel is often very simple. If the family of an E-5 has two children who need mental health services places them in an inpatient hospital setting it will cost an average of $20,550 to CHAMPUS and $350 to the family. If, on the other hand, the family chooses to use outpatient mental health treatment, it will cost an average of $6,200 to the Federal Government and $1,600 to the family or approximately 35 percent of their total military pay. The bottom line is that the system has created a copayment benefit that clearly prejudices CHAMPUS beneficiaries to choose expensive inpatient settings.

Efforts to stop inappropriate or excessive inpatient utilization are underway throughout CHAMPUS. These include preauthorization and precertification of care, concurrent review, day and new-day limits, revised reimbursed rates and new payment methodologies for providers. Any or all of these actions, when *properly* and *thoughtfully* administered, will likely result in more appropriate utilization of inpatient service and likely some improvement in efficiency. However, these efforts have not fully addressed the distinct bias toward inpatient care which is rooted in CHAMPUS' medical- model structure. This model places high value on inpatient care, with the belief that more intensive, medically or hospital-based care is inherently best for the patient. Obviously, this bias results in the most expensive, most restrictive, and oftentimes an unnecessary course of treatment. In direct contrast, research and clinical experience in mental health over the last two decades strongly argues in favor of less restrictive forms of outpatient care.

The evolution of health care technology and services have produced a number of new and innovative services and a variety of professionals with specialty expertise. And while DOD/CHAMPUS has had long-standing policy which promotes use of professionals other than physicians in the delivery of mental health services, it is clear that this same policy needs to extend more freely to community and outpatient-based mental health programs.

Solutions to Reducing Inappropriate Utilization

The Lewin/ICF report suggests that if restrictions are placed on inpatient mental health care, the effect could be a major shift toward outpatient mental health care. To limit this shift in utilization, the researchers suggest that simultaneous controls be placed on outpatient services. In particular, increases in outpatient mental health copayments and deductibles were recommended as a way to prevent increased outpatient use and expenditures.

While this solution appears simple, it would spell disaster for beneficiaries by creating a barrier to the only cost-effective form of care delivered under CHAMPUS. For example, too high a copayment could result in needed services being positioned beyond the reach of the families or a too low copayment might encourage utilization. Moreover, an inappropriate copayment structure could create incentives for

placement of children in inappropriate settings by providers out of the belief that some care is better than the child receiving no care because the family cannot afford the appropriate copayment level.

We urge the committee to avoid changes in copays or deductibles for outpatient care until a good deal more is known about the nature of both the problem and the effects of changes in the copayment structure on the CHAMPUS population. Attention needs to be directed to questions such as whether copayments should be limited to a specific percentage of a family's income. These and a variety of other questions need careful consideration before the copayments are restructured. This is especially important given the fact that general research on the effects of copayments in mental health are inconclusive. More specifically, however, information on the CHAMPUS population on these issues is non-existent but can be obtained through a properly conducted study. We recommend that the Committee direct the Secretary to undertake a study and/or demonstration of the effects of various copayment policies on utilization. We feel it urgently important that Congress have access to such data and base policy reform on empirical evidence.

One area with potential for substantial savings for CHAMPUS, however, and mentioned earlier in our testimony, is the use of alternative, less costly, outpatient forms of mental health treatment. Only very recently has CHAMPUS begun to recognize such services as evidenced in recent approval of payment to partial hospital and day treatment programs, even though such programs have existed for many years. The point is that less-costly, more-efficient programs do exist, but are not utilized as often by CHAMPUS as seems appropriate or necessary.

For example, adolescent treatment programs, a major source of mental health expenditures in the CHAMPUS mental health system, typically involve intensive, long-term, 24-hour in-facility treatment. According to the Lewin/ICF report, average length of stay (ALOS) in hospital-based residential treatment programs is 776 days per thousand beneficiaries (ages 14–21). Costs for such services vary, but in certain urban areas such as Boston, hospital-based adolescent treatment is $750 per day.

In sharp contrast, there are alternatives to these programs. In Boston, Wediko Children's Services is a residential treatment program that offers an innovative 90 day winter program and a special 45 day summer treatment program with on-site intensive therapeutic and educational services. The cost of treatment is $205 and $108 per day respectively for the winter and summer programs. Professional staff-to-patient ratio is extremely intensive (6 to 8). Wediko focuses on early reintegration into the community and family, with an emphasis on providing intensive follow-up services in and through the local school system. The program's philosophy centers around the concept of service provision in the least restrictive environment.

This program offers high quality, cost-effective treatment for those adolescents requiring intensive 24 hour care at cost substantially less than more traditional programs located in the same geographic area. CHAMPUS, however, does not recognize this program and many others similar to it. We urge Congress, through demonstration or waiver authority, to encourage use or development of some alternative, community-based programs for the treatment of adolescents and children. This is particularly important in light of a growing body of evidence to suggest that clinical outcomes are improved or better when alternatives to inpatient care are used, especially with children suffering from alcohol or substance abuse.

Some Observations on the Demonstrations

We have a number of observations concerning the demonstrations and studies that DOD has undertaken.

Observation One: Quality of Care and Other Outcomes

We are concerned that insufficient emphasis has been placed on examining quality of care and other outcomes in the DOD demonstrations to date. Measurement of the quality of care received by beneficiaries and clinical outcome is difficult, but can be done. Moreover, complexities of mental health treatment also confound the problem. Many quality concerns stem from inappropriate managed care and utilization management procedures and the APA has serious concerns about the impact these procedures have on patient care. A more thorough discussion of these and related issues will be provided later in this testimony.

CHAMPUS and managed care data also omit any reference to longitudinal studies of the "downstream costs" of denial of requests for mental health treatment. In terms of quality of care and patient satisfaction, however, it is important to note that Court decisions are just now beginning to reflect the surfacing of consumer response to utilization review denials of care or demands for revisions in treatment planning.

In addition, the DOD bias toward cost-containment has led to a predominant concern with cost-savings and has provided little or no data on cost- effectiveness. Demonstrating *cost savings* associated with various policies and provider arrangements is simply not the same as demonstrating the *cost-effectiveness* of policies. It would seem important for Congress and others to be aware of data comparing any cost savings resulting from CHAMPUS mental health demonstrations with the implementation, start-up, and management costs of the CHAMPUS demonstration projects.

Observation Two: Standards for Utilization Review

Relevant to our discussion of the CHAMPUS mental health program and by way of background, the APA played an early, active role in shaping many of the basic principles of utilization review currently used by CHAMPUS and many other third-party insurers. APA designed and implemented a professional service review program to conform to DOD regulations. DOD's requirements for professional service review, however, proved highly cumbersome, and as a result, APA authorized a panel of experts to design a research-based professional service review program.

Our research efforts helped us to develop a number of more innovative and cost-effective approaches which we eventually incorporated and implemented in our review program. In fact, many of our procedures were subsequently adopted by DOD and many other insurers and resulted in very significant reductions in the overall cost of performing service review.

Since that time, APA has been carefully monitoring managed care procedures used through CHAMPUS and in the demonstration projects. We continue to receive reports and complaints from consumers and providers about poor management and problems in quality of care within certain programs.

We have gathered several examples of unnecessarily restrictive utilization review practices and more general managed care policies that can illustrate our concerns about quality of care and patient well-being. These examples generally suggest that many utilization management practices place the patient at risk for delays in treatment, interruptions of treatment, and impose the threat to patients that services may terminate at any given time, irrespective of sound clinical judgment or therapeutic need. It also seems that an inherent conflict of interest exists whenever professional or utilization review is performed by a party with an economic interest in the entity which is financially at risk in providing health care services.

In general, it has been the experience of many providers that there are serious demonstrable problems created by certain managed care procedures employed in the CHAMPUS demonstration projects.

While we cannot conclude these unfortunate and unnecessary incidents occur in wholesale fashion, they do occur significantly often to warrant thorough exposure and investigation. And they certainly merit the attention of Congress and efforts to limit the possibility of such events from occurring. The CHAMPUS demonstration projects have concluded that prior, concurrent and post utilization review activities reduce utilization. We agree that such activities are effective in achieving savings and appropriate activities. However, we urge 'bob to publicly undertake an effort to draw these demonstration results together in order to establish a consistent set of acceptable uniform and objective standards that will allow consumers and providers to make informed judgments about participation in such health delivery programs.

States are becoming increasingly concerned with incidents of abuse in unrestricted managed care programs and the uncontrolled operation of "utilization review" programs. Currently, a number of states have passed laws controlling utilization review activities, and we are aware of similar legislation proposed in Texas and Connecticut. These proposals offer regulatory guidelines aimed at correcting those features of utilization review that are most problematic. We urge Congress, in the interest of consistency, uniformity and fairness, to adopt similar regulatory guidelines as currently being enacted in states for utilization review practices.

Observation Three: Substance Abuse Treatment

CHAMPUS program data shows that inpatient substance abuse treatment for all age levels is one of the most costly mental health treatments per case that the program currently covers. Again, the demonstration projects have consistently shown that at least a portion of the cases that are currently being treated in the inpatient setting could be transferred to an outpatient setting. The current DOD initiative, as described in the report to the committee, places emphasis on seeing that CHAMPUS beneficiaries are treated in the most appropriate setting. Me believe that the bob national utilization review initiative should place particular emphasis on these high cost cases. Based on a conservative assumption that 20 percent of the current inpatient substance abuse cases could be treated in a residential or outpatient setting, according to an estimate prepared for us by the consulting firm of Tauke and Wal-

gren Associates, the CHAMPUS program could save in excess of $30 million per year. Research indicates, in fact, that most substance abuse cases can be treated more effectively and efficiently on an outpatient basis. Therefore, we urge the committee to pursue this area as a potential cost saving area.

Observation Four: Encouraging Less Costly Forms of Care

The APA's position regarding the use of .less-costly, more appropriate alternatives to inpatient care has been spelled out in other sections of this testimony. It is clear that inpatient utilization is the primary and nearly sole source of cost increases over the last few years. Moreover, the DOD demonstrations have unanimously found that some of the inpatient admissions could more appropriately and cost effectively be treated in residential or outpatient settings. The Medicaid program currently has a major initiative for what they term "home and community based care." This Medicaid initiative has an important lesson to offer for the CHAMPUS program. First, and most importantly, community-based care does work. Almost $1.5 billion dollars out of the $91 billion being spent on Medicaid in fiscal year 1991 will be spent on community-based care. Estimates of the savings from this care vary from $400 million to $1 billion dollars per year.

We believe that CHAMPUS should be (1) encouraged to develop and place individuals in similar settings, and (2) Congress should grant the program waiver authority to establish separate reimbursement methodologies to facilitate the development of alternative forms of outpatient care. The savings to the program by avoiding unnecessary inpatient admissions could be substantial.

Again, we appreciate the opportunity to testify on these important matters. Charts 1 and 2, cited in this testimony, follow.

CHART 1

CHAMPUS Expenditures: All Care, Mental Health, and Mental Health Minus Children (By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars)



Source: DOD, OCHAMPUS, SA-8-90

CHART 2

CHAMPUS Mental Health Benefits: Total Inpatient and Outpatient (By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars)



Source: Analysis of CHAMPUS Mental Health Policies, June 7, 1990, Lewin/ICF

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) is a medical specialty society representing 37,000 psychiatrists nationwide. The APA appreciates this opportunity to provide Congress with our professional assessment of the recent and proposed reforms that affect the access, quality and cost of mental health services delivered to beneficiaries of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). In addition, we commend you Mr. Chairman and the Members of this subcommittee for your efforts to postpone last year's CHAMPUS mental health coverage limitations until cessation of the "Desert Storm" campaign.

Mental illness and addictive disorders are some of the most destructive and costly health care problems facing our nation. Almost one-third of American adults will suffer from a mental or substance-abuse disorder at some time in their lives, according to the National Institute of Mental Health. Conservative estimates indicate that about twelve percent of the Nation's children (or nearly eight million) under the age of eighteen are in need of mental health services. Nationally, fewer than one-fifth of the individuals identified with a mental disorder in a 6-month period use any mental health service. Direct medical costs and indirect costs—such as lost productivity and social security disability payments—attributable to mental illness and addictive disorders cost the nation $273 billion annually.

I mention these brief statistics to illustrate that the incidence and cost of mental illness and substance abuse is not unlike that other illnesses such as heart disease, diabetes and cancer. At the same time it is important toe appreciate that the so called CHAMPUS costs of mental illness and substance abuse are exaggerated because unlike the other medical illnesses: their treatment is not provided to the CHAMPUS beneficiary in a military hospital or by a military physician or other health professional, and thus, such health costs to CHAMPUS are "hidden" or significantly less. While there are many similarities in the cost and incidence of mental and physical illness; such similarities do not translate into similar coverage treatment by private indemnity insurance or Health Maintenance Organization plans.

Prior to the CHAMPUS mental health coverage reforms enacted last year, CHAMPUS beneficiaries had access to an exemplary mental health benefit package. The benefit was offered through a continuum of mental health care so that individual patients may receive treatment in the most appropriate, least restrictive setting necessary for their particular illness. That continuum included outpatient services, residential treatment centers (RTC) for adolescents, and, for the most severely ill, hospital care. All of which will be subject to new coverage limitations beginning October 1, 1991.

Last year, arguments to support CHAMPUS mental health benefit limitations were steeped in concern over the rapidly escalating cost of such benefits and we heard claims that such benefits accounted for 25 percent of the total CHAMPUS program cost. Furthermore, the proponents of the CHAMPUS cuts alleged that the 25 percent figure was out of "synch" with the civilian sector indemnity plans. Concern over such unreasonable costs and the apparent dichotomy between the CHAMPUS and civilian package of mental health benefits was "fodder" for some radical changes to CHAMPUS mental health benefits—now postponed until the end of the fiscal year. Congressional comparison of the military health care system for military spouses and dependents—CHAMPUS—with health insurance programs provided to the civilian population is a grave mistake. These two populations and service delivery systems—and reimbursement system as noted previously—are dissimilar on numerous accounts. First, military life in general is more stressful than civilian life. There are long periods of separation from one's family, and very few types of employment require the employee to give her or her life if required. The young children and adolescents of military families are often most hardest hit by the absence of their military mom or dad and the stress of military life. In addition, frequent moving either within the country or overseas can add additional emotional strain on children. In fact, the DOD's preliminary assessment of the various CHAMPUS demonstrations point out 'that rising CHAMPUS mental health benefit costs are largely attributable to the service needs of child and adolescent CHAMPUS beneficiaries.

Second, the service delivery system for CHAMPUS mental health benefits is unique and different from service delivery patterns in the civilian sector. Such differences contribute to higher CHAMPUS mental health costs than experienced by the civilian sector. For example—and I would like to stress the reimbursement comments made previcusly—unlike psychiatric services, over 75 percent of all medical services provided to CHAMPUS beneficiaries are provided on military bases, and

are thus not charged to the CHAMPUS program. In contrast, only 38 percent of inpatient psychiatric services for CHAMPUS eligibles are provided on-base; the other 62 percent are provided off-base because the military either does not have the capability to provide them or has not structured the military medical care system to provide direct treatment due to the military's mission or concern for the sensitive confidentiality issues rooted in treatment of mental illness and substance abuse.

In addition to our view that the CHAMPUS and civilian insurance programs are dissimilar enough to warrant different coverage patterns, we believe that the mental health coverage changes passed last fall were enacted prematurely. The mental health coverages were limited before the numerous ongoing CHAMPUS demonstration projects designed to test out various cost containment strategies had been completed and fully analyzed. The demonstrations are designed not only to control the utilization and costs of all CHAMPU5 benefits, but to explore the possibility of providing a more flexible coverage policy that would allow for alternative treatment settings such as partial hospitalization.

We will now turn our attention to managed care options for CHAMPUS mental health coverage.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, we want you to know that the managed care system options have inherent problems particularly for the military dependent who finds him or herself in need of treatment for mental illness. We fear that coverage changes will be hindered by the historic stigma attached to mental and addictive disorders and the lack of third party payor appreciation of the cost-effectiveness of psychiatric treatment. While managed care systems encourage contractors to establish networks of "preferred providers," you should know that this delivery system's effectiveness in assuring consumer access to quality mental health care is largely untested. What we do know, however, is that the financial incentives to the contractor in this approach point to underprovision of services, deterioration of the quality of services, and subsequent adverse effects on patient management and health. The fiscal incentives to maximize profit clearly counter improved beneficiary access to mental health care.

The mental health managed care demonstration program, in effect at the Tidewater Virginia area, appeared to confirm many of our fears. The most serious problems from the beneficiary point of view—an apparent diminution in the level of care to which CHAMPUS beneficiaries are entitled and, in fact, receiving in the non-demonstration regions of the country. Both CHAMPUS and Pentagon officials were informed these APA concerns.

In the DOD's March 1991 Report to Congress—Report to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations, DOD's efforts to Control the Costs of CHAMPUS Mental Health Care—on the CHAMPUS demonstration projects and mental health coverage it is unclear what patient outcomes measures if any were included in the reviewed demonstration projects. Cost containment appeared to be the primary variable of concern to those writing the report. We are alarmed that the report does not describe the mechanisms in place under the various demonstrations to adequately measure patient outcomes or to assure that the level of care required by statute and CHAMPUS regulations is provided.

This information should be included the standards of criteria employed by the contractors in deciding which treatment options are appropriate for a patient, how long such treatment should be continued, and when patients should be moved from one level of treatment to another. These decisions, although made in the short term, have a critical impact on the long term treatment of mental disorders and the prognosis for the patient. Of great concern is the premature termination of treatment or an appropriate type or length of treatment.

INPATIENT AND OUTPATIENT MANAGED CARE RECOMMENDATIONS

APA has developed a Model Managed Care "Bill"—the key provisions of which I will outline for you shortly. These key provisions were influenced strongly by utilization review laws in Arkansas and Maryland, as well as by utilization model legislation from the American Medical Association (AMA) and the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals (NAPPH). These provisions seek careful regulation of utilization review and also expand the same to managed care activities. Also, while the APA supports non-discriminatory coverage for physical and mental illnesses, the key provisions noted below only require non-discrimatory utilization review and managed care practices for physical and mental illnesses. Finally, the importance of independently assessed quality of service and proper utilization management approaches needs to be incorporated in to any such plans. Evidence for our concerns about managed mental health care is highlighted in a recent 500 page

report by the Insurance Commissioner of Connecticut, who found a plethora of abuses which our model bill would remedy (and two recent newspaper articles are attached to my testimony). Our recommendations to you include:

- Requirement that private review agents provide patients and providers with its utilization review or managed care language, including review criteria and standards.
- No determination adverse to patient or provider vis-a-vis necessity or justification for any hospital, medical or other health care service without prior evaluation and concurrence by a physician.
- Any determination resulting in denial of reimbursement or pre-certification must include evaluation, findings and concurrence of a physician trained in the relevant specialty.
- Prohibition of incentives or contingent fee arrangements based on the reduction of health services.
- Requirement of non-discriminatory utilization review of treatment of medical/physical and mental illnesses.
- Private review entities must have policies and procedures to ensure compliance with State and Federal confidentiality laws and protection of medical records.
- Aggrieved patient or provider must be given the right to file a complaint alleging a reviewer's failure to comply with requirements of the law and or regulations, and judicial appeal must be available.
- Timely authorization, concurrent review and discharge planning should be featured in such plans.
- The outcome measures for mental and addictive disorders and any practice guidelines for the treatment of mental and addictive disorders need to be very carefully constructed.

RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT CARE

Regarding Residential Treatment Care (RTC) facilities the APA is dedicated to the proposition that RTCs should only provide medically necessary and appropriate care to the largely child and adolescent beneficiaries, we feel that this payment approach runs counter to an equally important objective—the continued delivery of care to the best of our capabilities.

Treatment goals of residential care settings and the fact that patients present with widely varying degrees of psychiatric disability, make uniform classification impossible and clinically irresponsible. An important contributing factor in the rise in RTC costs during the this period was the implementation of the 60-day limitation on inpatient mental health treatment which necessarily caused a shift in the locus of care from individuals in continued need of active psychiatric treatment but not longer eligible for hospital benefits.

We urge Congress to join with us in development of a classification scheme for RTC based on intensity of care provided rather than uniformity and accounting regularity. Without this, the potential disruption to the physician-patient relationship will negatively affect the continuity of care and the ability of the RTC and the psychiatrists to provide appropriate psychotherapeutic and pharmacologic treatment, given the limited resources available.

WAIVERS

On the issue of waivers, the existence of a process for waiving the annual coverage limits implies that a patient who requires hospitalization for valid medical or psychological reasons beyond the limit will be able to receive that care. However, the waiver can only be granted by regulation in cases where a patient is actively suicidal or a significant danger to others. Given the forthcoming RTC coverage changes, we expect a dramatic increase in waiver requests because a much larger percentage of patients will require care beyond the new limits.

Inclosing, we are pleased to learn that the DOD will not immediately establish a separate mental health deductible or a separate mental health catastrophic cap. We encourage the Congress to adopt differentials for officers that include higher deductible and co-payments than those imposed upon the lower grade active duty enlisted personnel if the DOD wants to move in this direction in the future.

Arbitrary coverage caps penalize beneficiaries needing intensive treatment. The new external preadmission and concurrent review procedures under CHAMPUS prevent inappropriate admissions and unnecessary days of care. Further reductions in the number of covered inpatient care days will do nothing more than penalize those CHAMPUS beneficiaries who require care beyond the forthcoming day limits effective on October 1 of this year.

Lastly, in undertaking CHAMPUS mental health coverage changes we hope that Congress will guarantee similar access to all CHAMPUS mental health services across all service locations.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide you with a summary of the APA's views on the CHAMPUS Mental Health programs.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EX-PARTNERS OF SERVICEMEN/WOMEN FOR EQUALITY (EX-POSE)

UNIFORMED SERVICES VOLUNTARY INSURANCE PROGRAM (US VIP)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for allowing us to present our views. Ex-Partners of Servicemen/women for Equality (EX-POSE) is a non-profit, volunteer organization with 3,600 members, residing in every State. Since 1980 we have been dedicated to improving the lives of former spouses of service and women.

We are distressed that the US VIP is no longer accepting new applicants. Many of our members, married for even 35-40 years, did not share 20 active duty years with their former husbands and are thus not eligible for an ID card with full medical privileges. In October 1984, the 98th Congress passed legislation granting military medical care to former spouses, divorced before April 1, 1985, if the member had served for at least 20 years and they were married for 20 years, 15 of which coincided with the husband's active duty time (20--20-15s). Former spouses in the 20-20-15 category divorced *after* April 1, 1985, were granted health care for 2 years (later stranded to one year) with the promise that they would then be able to buy into a health insurance plan which the Department of Defense was directed to establish.

The US VIP was a life saver for those woman in the 20-20-15 category who were divorced while being treated in a military hospital for a chronic disease. We continue to hear from women with severe disabilities who are in the process of being divorced. Most often, the husband initiates the divorce because he cannot tolerate living with an invalid. Where will these woman go for their medical care? Most insurance companies will not accept them at all; if they do, the pre-existing illness is not covered. If a civilian woman is enrolled in a group health plan sponsored by her husband's employer, the insurance company must allow her to convert the policy, if she is divorced. Could there not be such an option for the military spouse?

We plead with you to see that some way is found to carry out the intent of the 98th Congress and provide reasonable health care for these very needy women.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1992 AND 1993

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 5, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY REPORT, AND MANPOWER AND FORCE STRUCTURE PLANS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Glenn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Glenn, Nunn, Dixon, Thurmond, and Smith.

Committee staff member present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director.

Professional staff members present: David S. Lyles and Frederick F.Y. Pang.

Minority staff members present: George K. Johnson, Jr., and George W. Lauffer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Barbara L. Braucht and Debra A. Rice.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN GLENN, CHAIRMAN

Senator GLENN. The hearing will come to order. The Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel meets today to receive testimony on the Total Force Policy Report to the Congress, and to receive testimony on the four military packages that the Defense Department has formulated as the basis for the force structure and manpower levels in the future years defense program.

Last year, we put the military services on a glide slope that would reduce active duty manpower by about 25 percent by fiscal year 1995, 100,000 per year or about 500,000 over 5 years.

We did this with the expectation that these reductions would result from a draw-down in active force structure of about 25 percent over that same period. Quite frankly, we did this without much input from the Department of Defense, because when we received the fiscal year 1991 defense budget request early last year, it seemed to us to be pretty much out of phase with what we viewed as reality, to be quite frank about it.

The request proposed a reduction in active duty manpower of about 40,000 for fiscal year 1991, but gave no long-term projection of where active duty manpower would settle over the next 5 years.

More broadly, the budget gave us no long-term vision of a military strategy that we could have confidence in. So in effect, we had a budget request last year, that as Chairman Nunn properly characterized it as having a threat blank, a strategy blank, a dollar blank, a force structure blank and a program blank.

Now at the same time we were faced with having to cope with proposals on this side of the river to substantially reduce defense spending by making deep cuts in force structure and manpower.

These proposals, like the defense budget, also lacked any long-term supporting military strategy. So in order to act responsibly in this environment, the Armed Services Committee had to develop its own sense of the threat, develop the outlines of a credible military strategy to counter the threat and then develop a fiscal year 1991 defense budget that would set in motion the long-term course for the military services.

The committee's actions in this regard are spelled out in the first 36 pages of last year's committee report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. With regard to that military strategy supporting its actions, the committee outlined five key elements.

First, nuclear deterrence, we should continue to look to nuclear deterrence as the critical underpinning of military strategy for the foreseeable future and it should be achievable at significantly lower levels of weaponry and with a much higher degree of stability.

Second, a reinforcement strategy, we should look to a reduction in our forward deployed forces, consistent with changes in the threat, much greater emphasis should be placed on reinforcement with combat forces to support our allies.

Third, use of our Reserve forces, we should look to greater utilization of our Reserve forces to handle missions being withdrawn from the Active components, assuming a reduced operational tempo, and take advantage of lower costs where it is possible to do that.

Fourth, flexible readiness, we should look to the adjustment of the readiness levels of various forces, Active and Reserve, based on an order of forced employment that takes into account increased warning times.

And fifth, a resource strategy, we should look to a resource strategy that makes more efficient use of procurement dollars, based on concepts such as flying before buying and as I think the Chairman said, thinking smarter, not richer.

So that in a nutshell is sort of the conceptual basis for what we did last year. With regard to the matter of the Active Reserve force mix of our forces in the future and that goes right to the heart of our Total Force Policy, I must say we were very disappointed last year in the "share the pain" approach taken in the 1991 budget request. By "share the pain" I mean just straight percentage cuts.

In the absence of a force structure basis for the proposed reductions in the Reserve and National Guard and consistent with one of the five key elements of military strategy that the committee de-

veloped, greater utilization of the Reserves, we froze Reserve and National Guard force structure.

Now I reluctantly supported this 1 year freeze in the full expectation that we would receive a Total Force Policy report this year that would lay force structure options for the Active Reserve mix of each of our military services in the future.

There has not been a real bottom to top review of the Active Reserve mix in any of the services since the Total Force Policy went into effect in 1973. I, along with others such as our Chairman, Sam Nunn, our ranking minority member, Senator Warner and ranking minority member on this subcommittee, Senator McCain, have been pressing for several years for such a study.

I pushed it in this subcommittee and in fact, it started out in this subcommittee, but at that time we got no results. So we finally mandated such a study in the Fiscal Year 1990 Defense Authorization Act and the Department of Defense had over a year to do its work.

We will be getting into the substance of the report with our witnesses later, but I think that how well the report makes a case for the planned, Active Reserve mix of the services will be crucial to the action that we take this year.

We will also hear from defense witnesses on what some have termed the Department's base force plan, which as I understand it, embodies the four force packages that constitute the basis for the future force structure of the military services.

The four force packages include: (1) a strategic nuclear forces package; (2) an Atlantic forces package; (3) a Pacific forces package; and (4) a contingency forces package.

I will be interested in seeing how our military services fit into each one of these four packages in terms of force structure and also, what the Active and Reserve mix will be in each of these.

With regard to the Reserve and National Guard, manpower levels in the Fiscal Years 1992-1993 Defense Authorization Request, it is unclear how much of the reductions are a direct result of either the Total Force Policy review or the basic force plan as opposed to being strictly dollar driven.

So it is in this context that we will be conducting this hearing today. As I have repeatedly stressed, the bottom line of the actions we take must be based on the effect of such actions on one thing and that is, combat efficiency and I mention that I think at practically every hearing we have, because our bottom line driving force is combat efficiency.

And everything we do, whether it is organizational or what fits in what pigeon hole, if it contributes to combat efficiency, that is what we are interested in and this bottom line is even more crucial as we draw down our standing forces.

So that is what we are after and that is what will be the focus of this hearing.

At this point we usually turn to Senator McCain for any remarks he has but he is involved in another hearing right now. I understand he will be along very shortly if he can make it.

Senator McCain has been ranking minority member on this subcommittee and has played a very major role in the formulation of the requirement for the total force study requirement that was

written into law in 1989, and we do have a common interest in having, as I said, the most combat efficient force mix that we can have as we draw down over the next few years.

So I want to publicly thank Senator McCain for his work in this very important area.

I will turn to Senator Dixon, if he has any opening statement this morning.

Senator DIXON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like your consent to place a statement in the record and may I briefly make this comment.

Senator GLENN. It will be in the record.

Senator DIXON. I understand that the Secretary of Defense, along with the Army, has proposed a plan to decrease the strength of the National Guard and Army Reserves by 32 percent nationally.

Now, Mr. Chairman, regrettably, it has been suggested, a suggestion I cannot believe, that the Illinois Army National Guard could potentially lose 58 percent of its force, and I simply want to make the record very clear that I will strongly oppose cuts that deep.

A 58 percent reduction in the Illinois Army National Guard and major cuts in the 85th Reserve Training Division are far too much compared to what most other States may lose and this is especially important, Mr. Chairman, to keep in mind because every Illinois National Guard unit mobilized for Desert Storm met all readiness and timeliness criteria.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I have expressed to you and to the distinguished Chairman of the committee, and the ranking member and a great many others my concerns about this. I am willing to support cuts, but not cuts that dramatic, and I think that will be one of the issues we will want to discuss in the committee.

I thank the Chair.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, I wish to extend a special welcome to this distinguished panel.

I am interested in hearing from them about the Army's Total Force Plan and how it affects the Army National Guard and Reserves, while preserving and protecting our future national security objectives.

I understand the Secretary of Defense, along with the Army, has proposed a plan to decrease the strength of the National Guard and Army Reserves by 32 percent nationally. Regrettably, it has been suggested—a suggestion I cannot believe—that the Illinois Army National Guard could potentially lose 58 percent of its forces. I strongly oppose cuts this deep.

I realize these proposed cuts are part of an effort to reduce militia in response to this Nation's budgetary constraints. While reduction of our deficit is indisputably a critical priority, these cuts ironically come at a time when the Army National Guard and Reserves, our most cost effective fighting forces, deserve to be praised for their superb performance in Operation Desert Storm.

A 58 percent reduction of the Illinois Army National Guard and major cuts in the 85th Reserve Training Division are far too much compared to what most other States may lose. This is especially important to keep in mind, because every Illinois National Guard unit mobilized for Desert Storm met all readiness and timeliness criteria. Additionally, little regard has been given to the impact such a reduction would place on workers, municipalities, commerce and industry in Illinois. I must object to losing sight of the big picture as we all struggle to pare our Armed Forces. Pare we must. Demolish we must not. Balance is the key. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. I want to introduce our witnesses today. On our first panel, we have the Honorable Christopher

Jehn, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Personnel; the Honorable Stephen Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; Mr. I. Lewis Libby, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Strategy and Resources; Brig. Gen. William Fedorochko, Deputy Director for Force Structure and Resource, the Joint Staff.

The others appearing as back-up military witnesses are Brig. Gen. Tom Montgomery, Deputy Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, U.S. Army; Brig. Gen. Robert Rosenkranz, Army Director of Force Programs Integration; Rear Adm. Edward Baker, Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy; Maj. Gen. Don Gardner, USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs Division, Marine Corps; Maj. Gen. Richard Hawley, Air Force Director of Operations.

So gentlemen, with that, we will lead off with Chris Jehn this morning. I understand you all do have lengthier statements that have been submitted and we have been through those.

If we could have your summaries of those this morning we will start now with Mr. Jehn.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER JEHN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

Mr. JEHN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am so very pleased to be here today to discuss with you our 1992 budget and our Total Force Policy.

Mr. Duncan and I appeared before this committee about 14 months ago to discuss our Total Force Policy and since then, there has been a lot of activity. Three very obviously important events have occurred since then, most notably and most obvious to the public, of course, we fought a serious, major war in the Persian Gulf.

We have also, as you noted, conducted a major review on the Department's Total Force Policy, the first one to be conducted since the policy's inception in 1973. But probably the most important event, for the long-term defense posture of the Department was the President and the Secretary of Defense articulating a new defense strategy, the first one in many, many years.

Now all three of these events confirmed the wisdom of our Total Force Policy, and so our budget that we have submitted to you for fiscal year 1992 reflects that while reducing and restructuring the Department, we have continued strong reliance on Reserves and other components of the total force.

Our 1992 budget and the associated defense plan represent a careful, thorough, and we think creative response to the new strategic environment and the fiscal realities currently facing us.

And that, I think, in turn reflects the insistence of the President and the Secretary, that we think through the implications of these new realities, not just cut the military in a rout or reflexive fashion.

Many people worked long and hard to meet those expectations and among those, I am proud to say were the participants in our Total Force Policy study. As you know, Mr. Duncan and I were

privileged to serve as the vice-chairman and chairman of that study effort.

We were ably supported by 40 staff members and we enjoyed the essential and conscientious contributions from 22 other members of the study group. Those members represented the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the individual military services, and also included the heads of all seven Reserve components.

Their hard work included countless informal meetings, about 20 formal meetings of the study group, three colloquia at which we were able to obtain the opinions of outside experts and policy makers; two technical conferences.

As you have noted, our most visible product is our study report and its supplement, but the study group's work was essential to the planning, programming and budgeting process that produced the 1992–1993 budget that the Congress is now considering.

As part of that process, Mr. Duncan and I met regularly with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to discuss our progress on the Total Force Policy study, and also the implications of the results of that study for the budget development.

We attended about a dozen meetings of the Defense Planning and Resources Board, including several where we presented and discussed Total Force Policy issues exclusively.

This open and candid process has produced a balanced and realistic defense program, one that preserves and strengthens the essentials of our total force, while producing a force that will capably address the threats we are likely to face in the future.

With that, sir, I think I will conclude and I look forward to trying to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jehn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. CHRISTOPHER JEHN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

TOTAL FORCE POLICY STATEMENT

The Total Force Policy is a creative response to this Nation's responsibilities as a global power tempered by fiscal and demographic realities. Although the majority of the military capability of the United States resides in the Active component, we also depend upon the Reserve forces, the civilian component, host nation support, and contract support to maintain, in peacetime, capabilities that would be required in war. The roles assigned to the components of the Total Force reflect national defense strategy and have evolved over time in reaction to world and national events. Our new strategy was articulated by President Bush in his speech in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990.

The key element of this strategy is the redirection of attention away from a global war beginning in Europe, focusing instead on regional contingencies with the concurrent requirement to sustain the forward military presence necessary to deter the outbreak of regional conflicts. The strategy recognizes the requirement to field a quality military force, to maintain and modernize our strategic capabilities, and to remain cautious in an increasingly uncertain world.

The new strategy is the result of changes in the geopolitical environment that have taken place throughout the world. The most important are the changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the decreased Soviet ability to project conventional military power beyond its own borders, and the enormous uncertainty about developments inside the Soviet Union and in the Eastern European nations all indicate a reduced requirement for forward deployed forces dedicated to the defense of Europe. Notwithstanding all of the problems facing the Soviet Union, it must be remembered that

the Soviets retain a significant strategic capability, and that this capability is being modernized across the board.

The development of this new strategy has also been driven by changes in the characteristics of future regional threats. We postulate that regional crises or conflicts are likely to arise, or escalate, unpredictably and on very short notice. At the same time, however, the danger of escalation into global war has decreased.

Changes in relations with our allies is another key factor allowing refinement of our national strategy. Fundamental changes in the political geography (such as the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, German reunification, and the reduced Soviet influence in Eastern Europe) have caused far-reaching changes in the relationships among allies as nations seek to identify their appropriate role in the world community. While each is being expected to shoulder an increased proportion of defensive responsibilities, all agree that continued U.S. presence remains vital to provide reassurance of U.S. intent and provide regional stability.

Last, changes in the nature of warfare have considerable impact on strategic considerations as demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm. Changes in advanced technologies, as manifested in stealth technology and the rapid advancements made in information technology, and doctrinal and operational developments have all changed the manner in which war is waged.

In summary, all of these changes dictate a fundamental shift in our strategy. The key elements of this new strategy are contained in the following six tenets:

1. Maintenance of a system of worldwide alliances.
2. Maintenance of U.S. forward-deployed forces, but at lower levels.
3. Retention of forces and mobility to respond to crises and to reinforce forward units.
4. Maintenance of a robust Navy to control the world's oceans.
5. Retention of a national capacity to reconstitute forces.
6. Preservation of a strong strategic offensive and defensive capability.

These tenets have important and far-reaching implications for the Total Force. As President Bush noted in his Aspen speech, "... the United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present ... what we need are not merely reductions—but restructuring."

Based upon the President's vision of the force structure needed to implement the national strategy and its basic tenets, we have formulated a Total Force structure consisting of four force packages with four supporting capabilities. Definition of these force packages has a direct impact upon the roles assigned to each of the Total Force components.

The first of the force packages is Strategic forces, which consists of a modern strategic arsenal, including the B-2 bomber, the Trident submarine, strategic C3I, and a strategic defense initiative reoriented to the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. With its immediate response requirement, the strategic forces will necessarily be completely within the Active component.

The second force package is Atlantic forces. This package includes a reduced forward presence in Europe, possibly a heavy Army Corps with supporting Air Force wings. It would have the ability to reinforce Europe or Southwest Asia if necessary. With the anticipated lengthened warning time in Europe, this force package includes a significant Reserve component structure.

The Pacific forces are primarily maritime in nature with some Army ground and Air Force presence. This will be a lighter force and will be less forward-deployed than the Atlantic forces. We will maintain the capability to reinforce from Hawaii, Alaska and CONUS which means there will be less Reserve component structure dedicated to the Pacific forces than to the Atlantic.

The fourth force package is the Contingency force. This is a light, mobile force ready to go anywhere in the world in a moment's notice. Due to its required high state of readiness, it will be less dependent upon the Reserves except to sustain operations in excess of 60 days in length.

These four force packages by themselves would be virtually incapable of sustained operations without the existence of four critical capabilities. The first of these is Transportation. This includes additional sealift and modernized airlift to include the C-17. We can expect significant Reserve component structure to be called upon to provide the necessary sea and airlift. Second, we also must ensure sufficient Space Systems are provided for command and control, surveillance, navigation, and the ability to operate freely and effectively from space.

The third capability is Reconstitution. The ability to rebuild our forces in 2 or 3 years is necessary in case the world does not develop the way we think it will or we find we do not have the right type or number of forces to meet an emerging require-

ment. We must ensure that we have invested in those elements of reconstitution that would be needed to generate the military capability required to meet future contingencies. Cadre structure, for example, is one way that we will be able to rebuild our forces over a relatively short period of time.

Fourth, a solid Research, Development, and Acquisition system is necessary to ensure that U.S. forces are always supplied with the most modern, reliable, and technologically advanced weapon and support systems possible.

The force packages and capabilities just outlined have been formulated to meet the Nation's evolving defense needs in a rapidly and dramatically changing world. The recent experiences of Desert Shield/Desert Storm will help us refine the missions assigned to each of the Total Force components.

The implementation of the Total Force precepts and the recognition of the fiscal constraints placed upon the Department require that we reduce the Active military force by over 416,000 or 20.1 percent, between fiscal years 1990 and 1995. At the same time we will reduce the Reserve components by about 222,000, or 19.7 percent. This is more than a reduction, it is a fundamental restructuring of our military force. From the end of fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 1993, the Army will deactivate four Active and two Reserve divisions and one Active corps. At the same time, two Reserve divisions will be converted to cadre status. The Navy will decommission 81 battle force ships, going from 545 to 464 ships, and inactivate two Active component carrier air wings. The Air Force will reduce eight Active and one Reserve tactical fighter wings and eliminate 97 strategic bombers. Civilian reductions during the end fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 1995 period will be about 133,000, or 12.4 percent, and reflect the reduced requirement for supporting infrastructure and the implementation of management improvements.

This restructuring is consistent with the President's new strategy and reflects Total Force Policy by taking advantage of the strengths of each component. We have increased reliance upon Active forces for early deployment and forward presence. The Reserves will provide follow-on support to early deploying forces and reconstitution capability. Finally, all components of the Total Force, Active, Reserve, and civilian, will contribute to the four critical capabilities necessary for the force packages to accomplish their intended purpose.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. Mr. Duncan.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN M. DUNCAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RESERVE AFFAIRS

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because my written statement was rather comprehensive, I am also going to be brief.

But I think it might be useful to the committee for me to emphasize two points before we begin the questioning. First, the Total Force Policy is sound. It is not just a theory. It has now been tested in war as well as in peacetime.

The combined performance, and I tried to describe that performance in my written statement, of both the Active and Reserve forces in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was magnificent and the individual performance by the Active and Reserve components and each of the Reserve components was also.

The bottom line is that the planning efforts of the Department of Defense for the last several years has now resulted in what the President only recently described to the Congress as the finest fighting force that this Nation has ever known in its history.

Second, and for the reasons which several of us have discussed in our written statements, the world is rapidly changing, and the forces that are going to be required for the future will be much different from the forces that were required for yesterday's threat.

Both the results of the 1990 study of the Total Force Policy and our actual experience in Desert Shield and Desert Storm lead us to believe that the Reserve and National Guard forces will continue to be a major part of the Total Force.

Indeed, it is our current plan that by the end of fiscal year 1997, the percentage of the Total Force which is represented by all of the Reserve components will be greater than at any time since the Total Force Policy was adopted.

The force structure and the force mix which is included in the President's budget is the result of, not just intense effort and good faith, but rigorous analysis by the Department of Defense, not only in the planning and programming and budgeting system process that Mr. Jehn described, but also in many other forms.

And in making his recommendations to the President, I am absolutely convinced that the Secretary was fully informed and had received a wide range of advice about all of these matters, including advice as Mr. Jehn indicated, based upon the work of his Total Force Policy study group.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, we cannot predict with certainty, and I think we would all subscribe to this, we cannot predict with certainty what threats our Nation is going to face in the future.

We can, however, state with certainty that the Department of Defense is absolutely committed to the objective of ensuring that the Total Force of the future is as good as the Total Force of 1991.

And I look forward to your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Duncan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN M. DUNCAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RESERVE AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee: Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense Total Force Policy. As public debate proceeds on the nature of the future contributions of Reserve forces to the implementation of our new military strategy, it is critical that there be a full understanding of this important policy.

In my testimony to the Congress last year, I asserted that the Reserve forces of the United States are the best in the world. In my testimony to this committee on April 24, 1991, I explained how the wisdom of the Total Force Policy and the Nation's reliance on Reserve forces have been tested since August 1990 in ways that are unprecedented since the adoption of the policy. As a consequence of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and of the first Presidential call-up of Reserve forces in over two decades, 228,000 Reservists were ordered to active duty and 106,000 have served in the Kuwait Theater of Operations. Tens of thousands of additional Reservists have volunteered or have been called to active duty to serve at bases in the United States and in other parts of the world.

In my April 24 written statement, I described the use of Reserve forces in the several stages of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. No written statement on the Total Force Policy would be complete, however, if it did not include such a description. Consequently, it is also included in this statement. It is important to note at the beginning of any analysis of the Total Force Policy that both the call to active duty and the performance of the National Guardsmen and Reservists who have served in connection with those operations, have been marked by extraordinary success.

In his address to the Congress and the Nation on March 6, the President declared that ". . . this victory belongs . . . to the Regulars, to the Reserves, to the National Guard. This victory belongs to the finest fighting force this Nation has ever known in its history." The Secretary of Defense recently noted that "we could not have done what we did in the Gulf without the tremendous performance of a quarter of a million Reservists. . . . They did everything, and they did it extremely well." In testimony to the Congress on February 7, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff described the contributions of the Reserve components to Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm as "magnificent." On March 6, the Commander in Chief of Forces Command informed Congress that the performance of National Guardsmen and Reservists has been "one of the major success stories of the entire operation." In recognition of the vital role of Reservists in the liberation of Kuwait, the President and

the Congress designated and proclaimed May 22, 1991 as National Desert Storm Reservists Day.

Our task now is to profit from our recent study of the Total Force Policy and our experience in Desert Shield/Desert Storm as we apply the Policy to the new military strategy in an increasingly unpredictable world.

THE 1990 STUDY OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm have, of course, provided a unique opportunity to test the Department's Total Force Policy. The lessons which have been learned from those operations and the empirical evidence which is being accumulated, will be invaluable.

It will, perhaps, be an ironic footnote to the history of the Department of Defense, that during much of the same time that this "test" of the policy was underway, a separate study of the policy was being conducted within the Department. As this distinguished committee is aware, on December 31, 1990 and pursuant to Section 1101 of the fiscal year 1990 National Defense Authorization Act, the Final Report of the work of the Department's Total Force Policy Study Group was presented to the Secretary of Defense. I served as the Vice Chairman of the 24 member Study Group which included the chiefs of each of the Reserve components and other senior civilian and military leaders from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments.

The study of the Total Force Policy took place during a time of rapid and historic change in the strategic environment. When the work of the Study Group commenced, American Armed Forces were engaged in Operation Just Cause in Panama. When the report was completed, American forces were engaged in Operation Desert Shield and 134,000 members of the Selected Reserve had already been called to active duty. During the course of the study, public debate was intense on issues that would have significant implications for future defense budgets.

The Final Report of the study of the Total Force Policy could not answer with finality the many complex issues that were considered in the study. The Study Group's work did serve, however, and should continue to serve as an important point of departure for the reevaluation of old assumptions, the consideration of the many lessons that have been learned in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and the building of the forces that will be necessary to meet our Nation's future security needs. The work of the Study Group is also reflected in the President's Defense budget. The study was not, of course, conducted in isolation. Rather, it proceeded simultaneously with the Department's preparation of the proposed budget and Defense programs and the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense were well informed about the work of the Study Group as they made decisions on force structure and force mix issues.

On the question of the fundamental wisdom of the Total Force Policy, there is no doubt. The Final Report of the study of the policy concluded that "while the implementation of the policy has been uneven at times, since its inception the Total Force Policy has, by any standard, been a great success." Even before the commencement of hostilities by American forces and in testimony to the Congress on December 3, 1990, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that:

> . . . the success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance, and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last 10 years to strengthen the Total Force concept."

Similar remarks were made by General Maxwell Thurman, the former Commander in Chief of the Southern Command and field commander of Operation Just Cause at his recent retirement ceremony:

> "The Total Force became a reality in the 1980s . . . The Total Force is an American and military success story. Any problems we have encountered pale against the talent—dedication and professionalism of our Guardsmen and Reservists."

As early as last September, Secretary Cheney informed Congress that he remains "fully committed" to the Total Force Policy.

It would not be useful here to summarize the many observations and conclusions that were contained in the Final Report of the Total Force Policy Study Group, but in light of actual experience in the Gulf war, many of those conclusions are instructive. The report specifically noted for example, that the objective of the Total Force Policy has been to maintain as small an Active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy and overseas commitments permit, and to integrate the ca-

pabilities and strengths of Active and Reserve forces in a cost-effective manner. While it is unnecessary and unrealistic and would be unacceptably expensive to attempt to make every National Guard and Reserve unit the absolute equal of the best Active units (in terms of readiness and capability), the Study Group concluded that it is clear that Reserve forces can be relied upon for effective augmentation of Active units.

The effect of the Total Force Policy during the decade of the 1980s, was to place a substantial portion of our total military capability in the Reserve components. Reserve forces were assigned demanding wartime missions and critical peacetime operational responsibilities. Experience since 1973 has demonstrated unequivocally, that in times of both peace and war, the Total Force Policy has provided a cost-effective vehicle for achieving the objectives which are established by our military strategy at acceptable levels of risk.

Future improvement in the implementation of the policy will require broader understanding of the often unique capabilities, but also of the limitations of the various types of Reserve forces. It will also require more insightful appreciation of the kinds of specific missions which can and should be assigned to specific Reserve forces; innovative approaches to the training of Reserve units and individuals for the performance of specific missions; and a general willingness by all who engage in the public debate on the improvement of the Total Force Policy, to permit their current views on the subject to evolve as new evidence is brought to light from our experience in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and as new training methodologies and technologies open new opportunities.

OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

The Use of Reserve Volunteers

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. On August 8, the President announced the major deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia to take up defensive positions against an attack by Iraqi troops across the Kuwait border. The subsequent deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia was one of the most challenging deployments in our Nation's history. In the first 3 weeks of the operation, the United States deployed more military capability than it did during the first 3 months of the Korean conflict.

Even before the President authorized an involuntary call-up of Reserve forces, Reserve volunteers made major contributions to Operation Desert Shield. Over 500 Reservists volunteered for active duty on the first day of the deployment. As soon as the decision was made to deploy forces to Southwest Asia, volunteers from the Air Reserve components responded immediately to perform vital strategic airlift and tanker support missions with C-5, C-141, C-130 and KC-135 aircraft. In August 1990 alone, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard volunteers flew 42 percent of the strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of the aerial refueling missions. By the time that Operation Desert Storm commenced on January 16, 1991, over 188,000 personnel and 375,000 short tons of equipment had been airlifted by the Air Reserve Components to Saudi Arabia. Air Reserve component volunteers also performed important maintenance, medical, civil engineering, aerial port, and security police operations.

Volunteers from the other Reserve components also provided critical skills. Army Reserve volunteers promptly addressed urgent water-purification, supply distribution and other support needs. Naval Reserve volunteers supported air operations with C-9 aircraft and performed important medical, logistics support, intelligence and cargo handling missions. Coast Guard Reserve volunteers provided port security and supervised and controlled the loading of explosives and other hazardous materials. Army National Guard volunteers also made important contributions by providing military police and movement control assistance. By August 22, the date on which the President authorized the involuntary activation of Selected Reserve units and individuals, over 10,000 volunteers from all of the Reserve components were serving on active duty. The challenge was to match the military skills of the volunteers to those skills which were needed.

TABLE I.—Reserve Component Volunteers Who Supported Operation Desert Shield

	August 8	August 15	August 22
Army National Guard	5	68	107
Army Reserve	0	200	392
Naval Reserve	0	26	183

TABLE I.—Reserve Component Volunteers Who Supported Operation Desert Shield—Continued

	August 8	August 15	August 22
Marine Corps Reserve	0	50	50
Air National Guard	216	2,700	3,737
Air Force Reserve	350	4,500	5,992
Coast Guard Reserve	24	131	197
Total	595	7,675	10,658

The Call to Active Duty of the Selected Reserve

On August 22, 1990, 20 days after the Iraqi invasion, and less than 2 weeks after the first U.S. forces arrived in Saudi Arabia, the President signed Executive Order No. 12727, exercising Title 10, Section 673b of the U.S. Code. By that action he authorized the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to order to active duty organized units and individual members of the Selected Reserve. The exercise of Section 673b was the first involuntary call to active duty of Reserve forces since the adoption of the "Total Force" concept in the early 1970s. The next day, Secretary Cheney delegated authority to the Secretaries of the military departments to order to active duty as many as 48,800 members of the Selected Reserve. Ceilings of 25,000, 14,500, 6,300 and 3,000 were established for the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, respectively. The Secretary of Transportation authorized the Coast Guard to order to active duty as many as 1,250 Coast Guard Reservists.

On August 24, the first call to active duty of specific Selected Reserve units from the Air Reserve components was announced. Later the same day, the Army National Guard began giving advance notice to certain units, and within the next 2 days the first Army Guard and Army Reserve units were ordered to active duty. Selected Reservists from the Navy and Coast Guard were also called. Units from the Marine Corps Selected Reserve were not called until October 11 because the initial plans for Desert Shield did not contemplate their use.

By November 14, 1990, the Army had activated 235 National Guard and Reserve units including 24,000 personnel from 44 States and Puerto Rico. Medical, maintenance, terminal operations, and a variety of other critical combat support and combat service support units were called to fill shortfalls both in CONUS and Saudi Arabia. More than 285 Naval Reserve units from 39 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico were ordered to active duty. Many of the units called, especially those with medical skills, were used to backfill critical vacancies created by the deployment of active duty personnel from CONUS facilities. Other Naval Reservists were called to participate in cargo-handling, minesweeping, control of shipping, sealift, logistics and intelligence missions. Some 32 Selected Reserve units from the Air Reserve components were called to perform the ongoing and urgent airlift, aeromedical, and related requirements. During the week of October 7, the Marine Corps activated the first 157 members of the Fourth Marine Division. A total of 44,847 Selected Reservists were called to active duty by November 18.

TABLE II.—Selected Reservists Called to Active Duty Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 673b

	August 27	September 30	October 28	November 18
Army	4,300	18,035	23,485	33,461
Navy	1,179	4,030	4,494	4,617
Air Force	1,556	3,562	4,489	5,041
Marine Corps	0	0	157	1,138
Coast Guard	0	181	181	590
Total	7,035	25,808	32,806	44,847

On December 1, 1990, and once again pursuant to Section 673b of Title 10, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Secretaries of the military departments to order to active duty a total of 188,000 members of the Selected Reserve, including as many as 115,000 members of the Army Selected Reserve, 30,000 members of the Navy Selected Reserve, 23,000 members of the Marine Corps Selected Reserve, and 20,000

members of the Air Force Selected Reserve. By January 13, 1991, a total of 146,106 Selected Reservists had been called to active duty in accordance with Section 673b and thousands of Reserve volunteers remained on active duty.

TABLE III.—Selected Reservists (Unit Personnel) Called Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 673b

	November 18	November 25	December 2	December 9	December 23	January 13
Army	32,938	52,058	69,240	83,720	87,567	102,172
Navy	4,616	5,416	6,849	6,979	7,438	11,366
Air Force	4,733	4,730	5,639	6,895	10,492	14,328
Marine Corps	1,101	3,932	10,551	15,861	16,354	17,962
Coast Guard	280	278	278	278	280	278
Total	43,668	66,414	92,557	113,733	122,131	146,106

As Table IV demonstrates, the Reservists were engaged in a wide range of activities and missions.

TABLE IV.—Use of Selected Reservists in Operation Desert Shield

Component/Usage	Personnel
Army	
Combat (Field Artillery)	979
Transportation	13,708
Military Police	8,242
Supply & Service	13,716
Maintenance	6,548
Command & Control	1,074
Engineer	2,554
Intelligence	420
Medical	18,036
CONUS (Augmentation)	25,138
CONUS (In Preparation/CS,CSS)	20,181
CONUS (In Preparation/Combat)	13,000
Total	123,596
Navy	
Medical	7,731
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare	197
Mine Sweepers	51
Military Sealift Command (MSC)	373
Naval Control of Shipping (NCS)	80
Intelligence	245
Logistics Support	2,173
Combat SAR (HCS)	28
Cargo Handling Battalions/Staff	644
Seabees	2,314
Ship Augment	1,112
Other/Misc	635
Total	15,583
Marine Corps:	
CONUS (Augmentation/Training)	5,189
MEF (Augmenting/Reinforcing)	16,840
Command and Control	674
Total	22,703
Air Force:	
Strategic Airlift	3,149
Tactical Airlift	1,359
Medical	5,226
Combat Communications	169
Fighter	1,582
Security Police	606

TABLE IV.—Use of Selected Reservists in Operation Desert Shield—Continued

Component/Usage	Personnel
Supply and Service	94
Refueling	2,948
Command and Control	19
Intelligence	67
Search and Rescue (SAR)	124
CONUS Augmentation/Training	10,467
Total	25,810
Coast Guard:	
Port Security (USA)	1,367
Port Security (Middle East)	545
CONUS Augmentation/Training	227
Total	2,139

It is important to note that even before the armed conflict began, various combat units from the Selected Reserve were called to active duty along with a wide range of support units from each of the services. The labeling distinction between "combat" and "support" units and personnel can be more artificial than real, but it is fact that by January 15, 1991, the following National Guard and Reserve units were already serving in the Kuwait Theater of Operations:

TABLE V.—Selected Reserve Combat Units Called Prior to Operation Desert Storm

Service/Unit	Number of Personnel
Army:	
142nd Field Artillery Brigade	1,410
196th Field Artillery Brigade	1,490
Marine Corps:	
14th Artillery Regiment	1,150
4th Tank Battalion	400
8th Tank Battalion	950
2/24th Infantry Battalion	810
3/23rd Infantry Battalion	890
1/25th Infantry Battalion	760
3/24th Infantry Battalion	800
Air Force:	
152nd Tactical Recon Group	140
174th Tactical Fighter Wing	450
169th Tactical Fighter Group	580
926th Tactical Fighter Group	425
Navy:	
USS IMPERVIOUS (MSO)	30
USS ADROIT (MSO)	20

On November 5, 1990, Congress amended Section 673b to permit the activation by the President (in connection with Operation Desert Shield only) of combat units of the Selected Reserve for an extended period of time, up to 360 days. Only 3 days later, three Army National Guard "roundout" combat brigades were notified of the Army's plans to activate them. I will say more about the "roundout" concept and those brigades below.

The Call to Active Duty of the Ready Reserve

On January 16, 1991, Operation Desert Storm commenced. On January 18, 1991, the President authorized the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation to order to active duty members of the Ready Reserve, including units and individuals of both the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve, pursuant to the provisions of Section 673 of Title 10, United States Code. The immediate

impact of the authorization was twofold. First, it permitted retention on active duty of certain Reservists who had critically needed skills for a period longer than the cumulative total of the 180 days authorized by Section 673b of Title 10. Second, it permitted a call to active duty of a total number of Ready Reservists in excess of the 200,000 authorized by Section 673b.

The following day, Secretary Cheney authorized the Secretaries of the military departments to order to active duty units and individuals of the Ready Reserve. The services were authorized to call as many as 360,000 members of the Ready Reserve, including 220,000 members of the Army Ready Reserve, 44,000 members of the Naval Ready Reserve, 44,000 members of the Marine Corps Ready Reserve, and 52,000 members of the Air Force Ready Reserve. The subsequent call to active duty of members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) was the first such call since May 1968. Members of the IRR are not assigned to units, have usually served previously on active duty or in the Selected Reserve, and have a remaining military service obligation. When Operation Desert Shield commenced, the IRR (including the Inactive National Guard) constituted some 13 percent of the Total Force and 28.6 percent of the Ready Reserve.

When combats operations in Desert Storm ceased on February 28, a total of 222,614 members of the Ready Reserve had been called to active duty, including 202,337 Selected Reservists and 20,277 members of the IRR. Table VI summarizes the number of Ready Reservists who have been called to date, including those called subsequent to the cessation of hostilities to assist in the return of equipment and units to the United States or the process of demobilization.

TABLE VI.—Ready Reservists Called To Active Duty as of March 10, 1991

Service	Selected Reserve	IRR	Total
Army	126,037	13,170	139,207
Navy	19,948	15	19,963
Marine Corps	26,659	6,204	32,863
Air Force	33,792	842	34,634
Coast Guard	1,049	0	1,049
Total	207,485	20,231	227,716

Responsiveness to Orders to Active Duty

Subsequent to the adoption of the Total Force Policy in 1973, and until August 22, 1990, no unit or individual of the Ready Reserve had been involuntarily called to active duty. All available indicators reflected the high quality of Reserve personnel, but there was no historical experience upon which to base conclusions about their likely responsiveness to involuntary calls to active duty. While a test of the responsiveness of randomly selected units of the Selected Reserve was conducted on October 24-26, 1987, that test was limited in that it involved only 15,451 Selected Reservists from 120 units, and it did not involve personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve. I informed the Congress in early 1988 that over 92 percent of the Reservists contacted in that test reported to their Reserve Center or Armory (or were excused), but I could not inform the Congress of the readiness or capability of the units involved in the test since readiness and capability were not tested.

The fact that it had not been necessary for any President to call Reservists to active duty in over two decades caused some observers to believe that Reservists would not be called for any reason short of a global conflict. Two of the most impressive and rewarding aspects of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, however, have been the smoothness of the process by which Reservists have been activated, and the responsiveness of Reservists in every service to the Nation's call to arms in what the Commander in Chief of Forces Command has called "the largest, fastest mobilization since World War II."

Much of the success of the activation can be attributed to the recently improved understanding of Sections 673 and 673b (of Title 10) by senior DOD policymakers. Intense focus on these statutory provisions by the Total Force Policy Study Group in 1990, and by participants in wargaming exercises in 1989 and 1990, paid dividends when it became necessary to actually exercise the authority granted by those provisions.

The responsiveness to orders to active duty of units and individuals from the Ready Reserve was very impressive. They responded with alacrity and high motivation. No significant problems were encountered and with minor exceptions, the number of Ready Reservists who were unable to deploy was comparable to that of Active units. The fact that almost 228,000 Ready Reservists have responded in this way is, by itself, eloquent testimony to the quality of the modern American National Guardsman and Reservist.

The anecdotal stories about the performance of both National Guard and Reserve combat and support units are legion, but the stories of Company "B" of the 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division, a Reserve unit from Yakima, Washington, and of the Air Force Reserve's 926th Tactical Fighter Group from New Orleans, Louisiana, are illustrative. In December, Company "B" was ordered to active duty. Leaving its aging M60A1 tanks at home, the unit proceeded to Saudi Arabia after stopping for 18 days at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California, to train on modern M1A1 tanks. The training was completed on February 14. The unit deployed 3 days later. Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia on February 19, the unit picked up 13 M1A1s and took them into battle on February 24, 1991 with the 2nd Marine Division. In its first engagement shortly before dawn on February 25, Company "B" detected (using night vision devices) an Iraqi Mechanized Brigade. A formation of T72s (Iraq's most modern tank) was passing through another formation of Iraqi T55 tanks that were dug into revetments. In an action that lasted only a few minutes, Company "B" destroyed or stopped 34 of 35 enemy tanks. In a total of four engagements, Company "B" accounted for 59 enemy tanks, including 30 T72s.

Last month, I flew to New Orleans to be present when a squadron of 18 A-10 aircraft from the 926th TFG returned home from the Gulf. One of the planes had returned to its base from a single combat sortie with 327 holes in it. Another Reserve pilot had brought his plane back from a mission and successfully landed it despite having both hydraulic systems shot out. I was informed that no one had ever flown and landed an A-10 with both hydraulic systems dead. Two other pilots from the 926th destroyed 20 Scud launchers and two ammunition dumps in a single day. The unit was also credited with two air-to-air kills.

Selected Impressions: the Army's "Roundout" Concept

The lessons to be learned from the Gulf war will require study for months or even years, and it is premature to attempt to describe all of the specific ways in which the implementation of the Total Force Policy can be improved or in which it will be applied in the future to give the Nation maximum combat capability within fiscal constraints. Our experience in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm is, however, already influencing thinking within the Department on the proper use of Active and Reserve forces in the context of the new military strategy.

One of the difficulties encountered in discussing and applying the "Total Force" Policy, however, is the general lack of understanding of some of the more subtle aspects of the idea. There is high potential for confusion when certain related, but collateral ideas are included in the discussions. In testimony to the Congress last year, I noted that even the term "Reserves" can be misleading to some people. Many Reserve units have early deploying missions and are not "Reserves" at all in the sense of forces held in "reserve" for use late in a conflict.

There is also a general tendency, to speak in broad terms about the missions that can be assigned to Reserve units generally, rather than to focus on the types of specific missions that can be performed by specific types of Reserve units. Some missions are ideal for Reservists. Others are clearly not. Many "Reserve" units (with a mix of part-time and full-time support personnel) can and should be assigned combat and support missions which require early deployment because of the unique skills involved. Other Reserve units should be assigned missions which permit later deployment. Some missions can be assigned to either Active or Reserve units, depending upon cost considerations, the amount of risk that force planners are willing to accept, and other factors.

Similar confusion has arisen in recent months on the distinction between the Total Force Policy, which applies to all of the military services and to Department of Defense civilians, and the related but collateral practice of the Army only, known as the "roundout" concept. To a great extent this confusion is the result of a lack of understanding about the differences that exist between the type of training that is required of Reservists who perform combat missions as part of large, ground maneuver units, and the training which is required of Reservists who perform other types of combat and support missions.

As I stated to this committee on several occasions, Mr. Chairman, the Total Force Policy seeks to integrate the capabilities of combat and support units (including early and late deploying units) in all of the six Reserve components, with those of Active units, in order to give the Nation the greatest available military capability for the least cost. The "roundout" concept does involve the integration of Active and Reserve forces, but the concept usually refers to the Army's practice of using Army National Guard or Reserve brigades to "roundout" Active component divisions which include two Active component brigades. Three Army National Guard brigades were called to active duty in connection with Operation Desert Shield, including the 155th Armored Brigade from Mississippi, the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) from Georgia, and the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) from Louisiana. The brigades constituted less than 7 percent of the total number of Reservists who were called to active duty, but they have been the subject of much and often uninformed attention.

Some of the attention resulted from the fact that when the Army's 24th Division was deployed to Saudi Arabia shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it was not yet clear that it would be necessary to order any Reserve forces to active duty. The division thus deployed without the 48th Brigade, its "roundout" brigade. Instead, the Army sent an available active duty brigade from Fort Benning, Georgia. When the President authorized the activation of Reservists on August 22, limitations of law (which then restricted activations of Reservists to an initial period of 90 days and one extended period of 90 days) made a call-up of such large combat units impractical. After receiving the post call-up training that had long been planned and shipping their considerable equipment by ship to the war zone, such units could not have been retained in the theater as long as necessary.

On November 5, 1990, Congress did, of course, amend Section 673b of Title 10 of the U.S. Code to permit activation of Reserve combat units for Operation Desert Shield for as long as 360 days. Three days later, the Secretary of Defense announced that the three Army National Guard brigades would be activated. Subsequent to that activation, they received extensive training at various locations and when the temporary cease fire took place, had either been certified or were about to be certified by the Army as ready for combat, if needed. Since the President had directed the Department to minimize casualties even if that objective required a prolongation of an armed conflict involving U.S. forces, Secretary Cheney made it clear from the beginning of Desert Shield that no military unit, Active or Reserve, would be sent into combat until it was ready. Any other policy would have been irresponsible and completely disloyal to the gallant soldiers whose lives would have otherwise been at greater risk.

Because of the great interest that was attracted by the three National Guard roundout brigades, I spent considerable time subsequent to their activation observing and studying their training and performance. Over a several week period I visited the 48th Brigade during its training at Fort Stewart, Georgia and the 155th Brigade and 256th Brigade during their training at Fort Hood. I talked at length to the commanders of each of the brigades; to soldiers of all ranks within the brigades; to the commanders and officers of the divisions to which the 155th and 256th Brigades were rounded out (the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions respectively); to a GAO team that was itself studying the brigades; to the Army Inspector General; to training specialists; to the Commander in Chief of Forces Command; and to various other National Guard, Department of the Army and DOD officials.

From these efforts I received several impressions. First, that the soldiers of all three brigades are very highly motivated, aggressive and intelligent. The comments of Active component trainers at all levels were uniform in this regard and the Commander in Chief of Forces Command has expressed the view that the "enormous progress" that the three roundout brigades made during 3 months of training at Fort Hood and the National Training Center was a reflection of their "intrinsic professionalism, competence, and commitment." Consequently, and as Secretary Cheney has stated, the facts that the brigades were not among the very first units called to active duty and that the quick victory in the armed conflict made it unnecessary to send them to the Persian Gulf "in no way reflects adversely upon those units." To the contrary. We have every reason to be extremely proud of each of the brigades.

Second, I found no instance where the brigades were receiving training that was unnecessary for the missions they were being readied to perform or where standards were applied that were different from those applied to Active units. Every Guardsman I talked to welcomed the training and felt that it was necessary.

Third, it was clear that considerable effort was made by the roundout divisions to bring the brigades to combat readiness standards. Some 1,800 soldiers from the 4th

Infantry Division (Fort Carson, Colorado) traveled to Fort Hood, Texas, for example, to assist in the training of the 155th Brigade. The 5th Infantry Division provided the same level of effort to the 256th Brigade.

The training experience with the three brigades did corroborate important observations that emerged from the 1990 study of the Total Force Policy. The Final Report of the Study Group noted that readiness is a function not only of resource and training levels, but also of various intangible factors, such as motivation and experience. The remarkable enthusiasm of the brigades permitted them to perform in training in ways that were not predicted on the basis of their actual experience. The Final Report also noted, however, that:

> Development of unit skills, particularly in large units, is more difficult in the face of limited training time. Large units need to train together, so that commanders and staffs develop the coordination skills essential for effective mission performance.

The Commander in Chief of Forces Command recently testified before the Congress on the difficulty involved in providing to large Reserve (roundout) maneuver units (e.g., armor and infantry), sufficient pre-mobilization training in the synchronization and integration of complex battlefield systems (such as air defense, direct and indirect fire support, close air support, command and control, etc.), to permit them to be deployed as a rapid, crisis response force. As a general proposition, the time limitations of weekend drills are simply too great to permit the amount of combined arms training for large maneuver units such as brigades and divisions that would be required to permit them to serve as crisis response forces.

Training challenges thus remain in connection with large "roundout," combat (maneuver) units, but there is reason to believe that those challenges can be met. The Commander in Chief of Forces Command recently informed Congress that National Guard roundout units have "important contemporary relevance." The Army Chief of Staff recently described to the Armed Services Committee plans for the use of National Guard roundout brigades not as rapid deployment forces, but as part of early reinforcing Active divisions.

I agree that the roundout concept is sound, especially for Reserve units that do not have to deploy during the very earliest stages of a contingency operation. The roundout concept may have even greater utility for units that are smaller than brigades. Reserve combat (maneuver) battalions and companies were used with considerable success by the Marine Corps in Desert Storm. The amount of post-mobilization training that may be required of future roundout units will, of course, be a function of the specific missions and pre-mobilization training programs which are assigned to them and the unique characteristics and capabilities of each unit.

We also need to explore improvements that might be made in the methodology used to evaluate the capability and readiness (to perform assigned missions) of Reserve forces. One of the three National Guard roundout brigades had recently been evaluated as mission ready when tested on the range which is normally used for training in its home State, only to find that it was not ready when it was first tested on the range at Fort Hood. The apparent inconsistency was at least partially explained by the facts that the unit was very familiar with the local range, since it trained there often and that the range at Fort Hood was capable of testing the unit under conditions more similar to those likely to be encountered in combat. Readiness standards need to be made and applied in a uniform manner to eliminate such inconsistencies.

It should be remembered, however, that whatever challenges exist in the coordination/synchronization training of large roundout (combat) maneuver units such as brigades and divisions, they do not exist at all, or at least not to the same degree in other types of Reserve combat units, such as field artillery units, tactical fighter (e.g., F-15, F-16) units, etc. In fact, the Army Reserve's 142nd and 196th Field Artillery Brigades were called to active duty on November 18 and December 2, and were engaged in combat operations on February 22. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve aircrews also flew F-16, F/A-16 and A-10 fighter aircraft, RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft and special operations aircraft in Desert Storm. Nor do such challenges exist in the Army's combat support and combat service support units.

Involuntary Calls of the Ready Reserve

For the first time since the Total Force Policy was adopted, members of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) were involuntarily activated pursuant to the authority granted by 10 U.S.C. 673b and 10 U.S.C. 673. Thousands of Reserve volunteers have also provided key airlift, medical, reconnaissance, combat communications, intelligence, air refueling, maintenance, civil affairs, port

operations/security, water purification and other forms of support. But, the successful use of volunteers in Desert Shield/Desert Storm does not guarantee that sufficient numbers of Reserve volunteers with appropriate grades and skills will be available in the future. Moreover, it is difficult to form cohesive, effective units from a pool of individual volunteers.

The Department of Defense is currently evaluating various proposals for the amendment of the statutory authority which permits involuntary call-up of the Selected Reserve and the IRR. The obvious goal is to give the President sufficient flexibility to respond to a range of contingencies of which we may have little advance notice.

THE RESERVE COMPONENTS IN THE NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY

In recent testimony to the Congress, Secretary Cheney outlined the major elements of a new strategy for our Nation's defense. He noted that while the strategy will continue to evolve as we monitor the many fast-paced sources of change in the new and still emerging global security environment, "the overall goal is to streamline and restructure" the Armed Forces in order to provide needed capabilities within projected fiscal constraints. Because the political and military changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will give us sufficient warning of the redevelopment of a Soviet threat of global war, the new defense strategy focuses on the preservation of our ability to deploy sufficient forces with the capabilities needed to counter a wide variety of contingencies, including significant regional conflicts.

The Secretary made it clear that the Department of Defense "will continue its Total Force Policy to ensure the optimal utilization of its Active and Reserve components." The composition of the Total Force will be derived, however, from the requirements of the new strategy. Some types of Reserve forces will be fully retained or even increased, while others will be cut considerably. The total number of National Guardsmen and Reservists will decline by approximately the same percentage as Active forces, but the reductions will bear a direct relationship to the new strategy and will not be the result of an effort to merely have Active and Reserve forces "share the pain" of budget reductions equally. Forces that were maintained on the basis of the previous threat of a short-notice global war will be eliminated, or reduced. The Active/Reserve force mix which is the target of our planning efforts is designed to meet the requirements of the new strategy for forward presence and crisis response in major or prolonged contingencies.

As a general proposition, of course, the most effective mix of Active and Reserve forces is one that provides a balance of capability with minimum risk across the range of likely threats and within the parameters of available resources. Because serious contingencies can arise quickly, Active forces will generally—though not exclusively—be used for rapid response. Certain Reserve units will also be required in the future to maintain high levels of peacetime training and readiness in order to augment and assist the deployment, support and sustainment of early-deploying Active combat units which are responding to short-warning requirements. Reserve forces will continue to perform airlift, sealift and other vital support missions in the earliest stages of contingency operations. Army Reserve component combat brigades will continue to round out Active component divisions that are assigned early reinforcement (but not rapid response) missions. Other Reserve component ground combat divisions will continue to be assigned missions as follow-on reinforcing units. Reserve combat units will thus be used primarily, though not only, in larger or protracted conflicts.

By fiscal year 1997, the total size of the Active component and the Selected Reserve will be smaller. Fiscal restraints require reductions to Reserve, as well as to Active forces. As I said earlier, we are planning to eliminate those forces which were designed to meet the threat of a short-notice global war. The future mix of Active and Reserve forces will be one that can best meet the requirements of the new military strategy, including the need for forward presence and retention of appropriate capabilities for responses to crises.

Some Reserve forces will be maintained in what may generally be referred to as a "cadre" type status. The Department's current plans include two cadre divisions in the Army which would operate with greatly reduced manpower and training. The divisions would retain sufficient equipment and other resources to be able to build to full strength if required. The Army is examining several concepts for cadre divisions. A similar idea is being developed by the Navy for use in connection with training frigates. One frigate would be manned with a full-time support crew consisting primarily of active duty, Naval Reserve personnel. This crew would train an augmentation crew made up of Selected Reservists, and four additional Selected Re-

serve nucleus crews which would be assigned to four additional (inactive) frigates that could be made ready for sea within 180 days.

The future role of each of the Reserve components will thus be a function of the requirements of the new military strategy. In some cases, the missions assigned to units within a particular Reserve component will not change at all. In other cases, the missions will change significantly. Where significant cost savings can be achieved by a transfer of force structure to a Reserve component for the performance of a particular mission, we will continue to fully consider the transfer. Any such cost savings will, of course, be weighed against any decreases in capability and flexibility that might result and against the hardship that a Reserve unit might incur as a result of the training that is required for the performance of the mission.

CONCLUSION

The last 18 months have been a remarkable period in the evolution of the Total Force Policy. Volunteer National Guardsmen and Reservists and those who have been called to active duty have engaged in armed conflicts in Southwest Asia and Panama. Almost a quarter of a million Reservists responded to the Nation's call to arms in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They performed vital combat and support missions with high motivation and professionalism. They made great personal sacrifices to serve and 71 of them made the supreme sacrifice for freedom.

We will be studying our experiences in this most recent conflict for some time, but whatever else may be learned from our experiences, we are absolutely secure in our belief that the Total Force Policy is sound and that the Reserve forces of the United States are, in fact, the best in the world.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Mr. Libby.

STATEMENT OF I. LEWIS LIBBY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, STRATEGY AND RESOURCES

Mr. LIBBY. Thank you, sir.

As you noted, the Department has developed and presented a new defense strategy and a base force. These are designed to address the dramatic changes in the world and the future as we see it.

This strategy was first presented by the President on August 2, 1990, presented to this committee again by the Secretary of Defense in February and by the Under Secretary in April.

My written statement today focuses on that new strategy and on the changes and opportunities in key areas that have shaped it and our proposed forces.

I thank you for the opportunity to submit it for the written record, and welcome your invitation to summarize just a few points from it.

The new defense strategy proposed by the President and the Secretary squarely confronts both the revolutionary changes in the world and the fiscal constraints within our own country.

On the broadest level, despite the end of the Cold War, we cannot ignore our interests nor shrink from our responsibilities in key regions of the world. But the strategy judges that the events of the past 2 years in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union allow a shift from our focus on a threat of a European-wide or global war, with only perhaps a few weeks warning.

Instead, we can begin safely building down to lower Active and Reserve force levels, sufficient for regional security concerns, including forward presence and crisis response, that we will still face.

Should these trends take unexpected twists or should other potent challenges emerge, the new strategy also provides a framework to adjust our capabilities or reconstitute them accordingly.

With this new strategy have come dramatic reductions in the size of our force and our Defense budget. When building this new strategy and its forces, the President and the Secretary built on many of the traditional strengths of our Armed Forces, strengths that enabled us to prevail in the Cold War and the Persian Gulf.

Of most interest here, the new defense strategy reaffirms the important role played not only by our Active component forces, but also by the Total Force and particularly by our Reservists and National Guardsmen.

The new strategy and the base force, built as they are in a time of fiscal constraints, could not provide the needed military capabilities within the available resources without the contribution of our Reserve component forces. As Secretary Cheney has noted, we could not have done what we did in the Gulf without the tremendous performance of a quarter of a million reservists.

Mr. Chairman, 2 months ago, in a remarkable symbol of the changes of recent times, President Havel of Czechoslovakia addressed the NATO Council. In doing so, he spoke of our hopes in this new era and of the continuing uncertainties of our times.

Let me quote briefly from his speech: "When the totalitarian systems collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe, and Democracy won, and when as a consequence of this the Iron Curtain that divided Europe collapsed, everything seemed to us in the first exciting months of freedom clear and simple. A year full of dramatic events has passed and now we see that history is going, after all, through a much more winding and complicated path than we thought in the first moments of excitement."

To plan now the forces and capabilities for the future, the United States must recall the historic strengths that brought us our well-deserved success, and be sensitive to the inevitable uncertainties we will face.

Because of the rigorous standards set by my predecessors on the panel, I would like to mention just two of those if I might. The newly emerging Eastern European democracies are embarked on a dramatic, inspiring and unprecedented effort to establish secure democratic traditions and free market economies.

We should not underestimate the scale of the task. As Poland's Adam Michnick has said, "We know how to make fish soup out of an aquarium, but no one has yet succeeded in making an aquarium out of fish soup."

We also should not underestimate our strategic stake in the successful outcome of their democratic endeavor. NATO's continued success will play a big role in guaranteeing the stability they need.

But we will also need to thicken our rapidly developing web of relations to help them cope with the profound uncertainties they face.

The greatest uncertainty may lie in events within the Soviet Union itself. Here President Gorbachev has at times followed a fitful path between advocates of political reform and the traditional pillars of Communist rule, between steps toward a market economy and measures to retain central control.

Until the Soviet Union adopts wide-ranging political and economic reform, our long-term hopes for a thorough-going transformation in our relations will be frustrated. The election later this month of

Russia's first freely elected leader in over 1,000 years is a helpful step in a long and difficult road.

We must continue to hope, as President Bush has often said, for successful reform. In the meantime, we must expect that the Soviets will continue to possess the largest national army in Europe and to modernize their strategic nuclear systems virtually across the board.

The enormous ethnic, regional and economic problems within the Soviet Union both hobble Soviet military efforts and demand our continued attention.

Finally, the nature of war itself is changing. For some time the Soviets have been writing about a military technological revolution that lies just ahead. They liken it to the 1920s and 1930s, when revolutionary break-throughs such as the blitzkrieg, aircraft carriers and amphibious operations changed the shape and nature of warfare.

The recent Gulf war forcefully demonstrated the impact of new and innovative technologies. The Soviets and others watched development in the Gulf very closely. Many of these nations already boast of advanced conventional and—increasingly—unconventional capabilities.

They will surely continue to push the frontiers of both technology and military doctrine to develop or acquire new capabilities of their own, either legally or illegally.

Technological advantage comes not just in hardware, but also in the training and proficiency of the high quality personnel in our Armed Forces. As with our investments in research and development, investing in the training and professionalization of our Active and Reserve personnel will be critical to the future.

Mr. Chairman, it is the quality and dedication of our Active and Reserve forces that offers, in the end, our greatest measure of national security.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Libby follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. I. LEWIS LIBBY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, STRATEGY AND RESOURCES

THE NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TOTAL FORCE POLICY

Mr. Chairman, Dean Acheson called his autobiography of his years at the State Department in the immediate post-World War II era "Present at the Creation." We are all now, in our time, present at a new creation. The post-war universe that Acheson helped create has ended. Its fundamental threat—a short-warning conventional thrust by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact across the breadth of Europe—has faded. The ideological struggle, once severely contested, has been decisively won by democracy and free markets. The captivity Eastern Europe that helped usher in the Cold War has ended. Thus, the Cold War requirement for the unrelenting U.S. response of containment has passed.

Last year, the President and Secretary Cheney announced a new defense strategy to respond to these dramatic changes in the strategic environment—changes more dramatic than any since Acheson's own time. With this new strategy come dramatic reductions in the size of our forces and our defense budget. By 1995, we anticipate that defense spending will fall to only 3.6 percent of our GNP—the lowest level since before World War II. This level is nearly 3 percentage points of GNP lower than the peak of the last decade. The new strategy also will entail reductions in our Active forces of over 500,000 men and women, a force almost as large as that deployed to the Gulf in Operation Desert Storm. Remarkably, this plan to reshape and reduce our forces has been devised against the backdrop of a major war in the Per-

sian Gulf and worrisome trends in the Soviet Union. I know of no historical precedent for our country charting changes of this magnitude under such conditions.

When responding to these changes and building this new strategy and forces, the President and the Secretary built on many of the traditional strengths of our Armed Forces, the same strengths that enabled our military to emerge victorious from the challenges of the Cold War, and to prevail so spectacularly in the Persian Gulf conflict. The new strategy emphasizes America's preeminence in defense technology, even as we discover that the stealth aircraft in the Gulf consistently attacked the toughest targets and returned without a scratch. The new strategy underscores the importance of our alliances, even as the continued relevance of our most important alliance—NATO—was reaffirmed at the meeting last week of Defense Ministers. And even as we reduce our forces, the strategy underscores that the quality of our servicemen and women, built up so painstakingly throughout the 1980s, is the single most important element ensuring our forces' outstanding performance.

And, of most interest here, the new defense strategy reaffirms the important role played not only by our Active component forces, but also by the Total Force, and particularly by our Reservists and National Guardsmen. The new strategy and the base force—built as they are in a time of fiscal constraints—could not provide the needed military capabilities within the tight fiscal topline without the contribution of our Reserve component forces.

CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF RESERVE ROLE

The outstanding ability of the Reserve component forces to play the missions outlined for them in the new defense strategy has been demonstrated by their performance in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Secretary Cheney has noted that, "we could not have done what we did in the Gulf without the tremendous performance of a quarter of a million reservists." Two hundred and twenty eight thousand Reservists were ordered to active duty and 106,000 have served in the Kuwait Theater of Operations. Tens of thousands of additional Reservists have volunteered or have been called to active duty to serve at bases in the United States and in other parts of the world.

The thousands of our Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines serving in Saudi Arabia provided such critical capabilities as water purification and distribution, transportation, port operations, fuel handling, supply and services, maintenance and medical support. Some served in combat roles, including tactical air combat forces and Marine infantry units. Many others served in the continental United States and overseas, assisting in the deployment of forces in such functional areas as strategic airlift, port security and terminal operations. Activated Reserve soldiers and units filled critical responsibilities and functions left vacant by active units deployed to Saudi Arabia. This latter category includes medical, legal, military police, and air ambulance units as well as garrison support units and engineers.

Consistent with the experience of Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the new strategy and the Department's proposed force structure recognize the strong capabilities and advantages of the Reserves, as well as the capabilities and advantages of Active forces, the demands of force modernization and the need for continued technological innovation all within a framework of shifting international pressures and declining budgets. In the end, striking this balance will mean changes and reductions in both Active and Reserve forces. As the President said last week at the Air Force Academy:

> We must ensure that the cuts in the Active and Reserve components result in the most effective and efficient forces possible. We must not compromise our readiness just to protect unneeded bases, programs and forces.

To provide some of the strategic rationale for the Department's proposed force structure and budget recommendations, let me first provide an overview of the emerging security environment and the new strategy. This entails a brief review of changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in regional contingencies, in relations with our allies, and in the nature of warfare. These changes underlie the new defense strategy the President presented last August 2.

TRENDS IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The remarkable developments of the past 2 years in Europe and the Soviet Union brought to the fore the need to reexamine the strategy of containment that had guided us from the early post-World War II days. Events in Southwest Asia have only underscored the wisdom of the change. Let me focus on changes and opportuni-

ties in five key areas that have interlocking effects on our strategy and proposed forces:

— Changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
— Changes in Future Regional Threats,
— Changes in Relations with our Friends and Allies,
— Changes in the Nature of Future Warfare, and
— Uncertainty.

CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

The revolutionary changes in the nations of Eastern Europe have been more wide-ranging than anything we have seen in the last 40 years. Noncommunists now lead in most of the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are embracing democracy and free markets. Bulgaria, too, is making serious steps in these directions. Germany has been unified in NATO. The Soviet Union is unilaterally reducing its general purpose forces and has taken steps toward reform at home. It has agreed to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Germany, and negotiations on troop withdrawals from Poland continue. The military structure of the Warsaw Pact, which had largely ceased to be effective last year, has been formally dissolved. In short, a great strategic shift, sought by the West for over 40 years, has occurred. In large measure, it has occurred with Soviet acquiescence and even support.

Militarily, what is most remarkable about this year of remarkable change is the passing of the threat that had so preoccupied us since World War II—the canonical threat of a sudden, massive Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. As President Bush and Secretary Cheney have each stated, this threat should no longer drive our military planning for the mid- to late-1990s.

For over a year, as the Defense Department has planned forces for the mid- to late-1990s, it has had certain preconditions in mind to mark the passing of this traditional threat and demonstrate enhanced prospects for a Europe that, in President Havel's terms, "radiates peace."

• The Soviets must complete their withdrawal from Eastern Europe as promised. This provides strategic depth NATO has previously lacked.

• The Soviets must reduce to CFE-like levels of rough parity west of the Ural's and reduce defense spending overall. This diminishes the great, historic imbalance.

• The Soviets must maintain progress toward internal political and economic reform. This gives us some confidence in their direction away from the expansionist, militaristic policies of the past.

• Western Forces must retain sufficient cohesion for defense, even at reduced levels which facilitate force balance within CFE goals. Force is relative.

• Key East European states must continue their progress toward stable democracy and free market economies. This promises peaceful growth in an historically troubled and critical part of the world.

Progress toward these five conditions remains uneven, but promising. The East European democracies are embarked on a dramatic, inspiring, and unprecedented effort to transform themselves from totalitarian states to democratic polities and free market economies. We should not underestimate the scale of the task. As Poland's Adam Michnick has said "We know how to make fish soup out of an aquarium, but no one has yet succeeded in making an aquarium out of fish soup." We also should not underestimate our strategic stake in the successful outcome of their democratic endeavor. NATO's continued success will play a big role in guaranteeing the stability they need. But we will also need to thicken our rapidly developing web of relations to help them cope with the profound uncertainties they face, and to emphasize, as President Bush did with respect to Poland when President Lech Walesa visited Washington, that "the United States attaches great importance to the consolidation and safeguarding of Poland's democracy and independence, which it considers integral to the new Europe, whole and free."

The greatest uncertainty may lie in events within the Soviet Union itself. Here President Gorbachev has at times followed a fitful path between advocates of political reform and the traditional pillars of Communist rule, between steps toward a market economy and measures to retain central control. Until the Soviet Union adopts a firm stance for political and economic reform, our long term hopes for a thorough-going transformation in our relations will be frustrated. The election later this month of Russia's first freely elected leader in over a thousand years is a helpful step in a long and difficult road. Failure of reform would not necessarily mean a return to the worst days of the Cold War. But democratization and demilitarization of Soviet society are the key to long-term confidence in across-the-board cooperation

between our countries. We must continue to hope, as President Bush has often said, for successful reform.

In the meantime, we must expect that the Soviets will continue to possess the largest national army in Europe and to modernize their strategic nuclear systems virtually across the board. Rather than sweeping and radical long term reductions in Soviet military capabilities, we see a pattern of stubbornly persistent military spending, even in the face of massive economic dislocations. The enormous ethnic, regional and economic problems within the Soviet Union both hobble Soviet military efforts and demand our continued attention to remaining, and potentially regenerated, Soviet military might.

REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

While the threat of global war has receded, many threats of regional conflict remain. Our recent and unexpected experience in Operations Desert Shield/Storm reminds us that America needs a strong defense because we have interests around the world which we must defend against substantial threats. We have vital national interests in the volatile Middle East, and we must continue to seek remedies for the troubles that vex that region. But beyond the Middle East, the United States has interests in Europe, Asia and Central and South America also. We need a strong defense capability because our interests--political, military, economic, diplomatic—are often engaged far from our shores, and because our sense of national morality often combines with more tangible interests to declare that "wrong shall not stand." American strength will not be the cause of war—but American weakness has induced others to see aggression and war in critical regions as profitable courses of action.

It should be clear from history, particularly from recent history, that regional threats can arise and embroil us in conflicts with very short warning. The Soviet Union still will be capable of posing short warning threats to a single flank or region—a much more limited attack than the European theater-wide or even global conflict we have had to worry about for over 40 years, but formidable nevertheless. But perhaps the most sobering development is the threat of greatly expanded and more sophisticated arsenals which regional powers can field. Some of these will include missiles and chemical or even biological or nuclear capabilities. While Saddam Hussein was in the end deterred, this last war raised a very real prospect that our troops might face chemical or biological weapons, and reminded us of the prospects of future wars threatening nuclear confrontation. Fortunately, Iraq's military capability, previously the most serious regional threat, have been reduced by half and otherwise substantially eliminated as a near-term external threat.

It is these sorts of challenges that the President's recent Middle East Arms Control Initiative addresses. The proposals seek to curb the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East, as well as the missiles that can deliver them. The President's proposals also seek to restrain destabilizing conventional arms build-ups in the region. The success of these initiatives would help control these difficult challenges in the Middle East, and eventually elsewhere.

Beyond the Middle East, there are other areas whose future course is uncertain. Let me mention three potentially troublesome areas—China, North Korea, and Cuba. While it is our wish to work with China to foster a more stable environment in the region, China's path, especially after the current leadership passes from the scene, is quite uncertain. Given the continued unpredictability of North Korean politics, the Korean peninsula will remain one of the world's potential military flashpoints; this is all the more dangerous given North Korea's continued devotion of an extraordinary percentage of its national wealth to excessive military forces, and its unsafeguarded nuclear activities. Curtailment of East European and, to a lesser extent, Soviet subsidies has put increasing pressure on the Cuban regime; the collapse of Communist ideology in Europe has a less quantifiable but, in all probability, significant effect.

I believe our success in Desert Storm should make potential aggressors in areas of concern to us think twice. We also hope events in Iraq will demonstrate to potential arms suppliers the importance of efforts to control the proliferation of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction. These post-Desert Storm developments will ameloriate, but not nearly eliminate, our concerns for regional contingencies. Our planned force structure, as I will discuss later, considers the likely size and the warning associated with regional threats.

OUR KEY FRIENDSHIPS AND ALLIANCES

The events of the past 2 years in Europe and the Middle East have been so dramatic that they tend to obscure other important challenges and long term developments, including particularly the emergence of new strength in our allies in Europe and Asia. Yet a clear demonstration of this strength was the substantial contribution by key coalition members—principally the Gulf States, Germany, Japan and Korea—of substantial amounts of money to defray the costs associated with coalition operations. At $54 billion in total contributions, this amount alone greatly exceeds the third largest defense budget in the world.

In Europe, even with continued economic success, German reunification, and progress toward European integration, a substantial American presence and continued cohesion within the Western alliance remain vital to furthering our interests. A U.S. presence will provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of Eastern Europe strive to weave themselves into a larger and evolving Europe. While its mission may evolve in this new era, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance remains indispensable to peace and stability in Europe. In this regard, it is important to note that both our new friends in Eastern Europe and the leaders of the Soviet Union have made it clear that they consider a continued U.S. presence in Europe essential to overall European stability. We believe NATO is the crucial means for that continued U.S. presence.

While abrupt and major changes in our security posture could be destabilizing, adjustments to our forward deployed force structure can and should be made to accommodate changing realities. This is true not only in Europe, but in Asia. Both global and regional trends indicate threats, opportunities, and uncertainties in this region that can be positively shaped by a continued American presence. We recently completed a comprehensive review of our Pacific Rim strategic framework and are trimming our forces. We have already announced cuts of about 15,000 in our forces in the region.

The U.S./Japanese relationship remains the critical linchpin of our Asian security strategy and a key to peace in the region. Despite persistent trade problems, our ties will remain strong. As Japan extends its regional economic influence, latent regional concerns may resurface that a continued U.S. presence could help manage.

MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION

For some time the Soviets have been writing about a military technological revolution that lies just ahead. They liken it to the 1920s and 1930s, when revolutionary breakthroughs—such as the blitzkrieg, aircraft carriers, and amphibious operations—changed the shape and nature of warfare. We have already seen the early signs of this revolution in the recent breakthroughs in stealth, information, and other key technologies. This revolution will present enormous challenges, not just technologically, but in the development of doctrine and operational concepts.

One of our strongest national advantages has been our ability to introduce innovative technology. Carrying this philosophy forward into the future will require a sustained commitment to our scientific and technological communities.

The recent Gulf war demonstrated, even more forcefully than any of us had expected, how the introduction of new and innovative technological advances into our weapons can enhance over-all battlefield effectiveness and improve the survivability of combatants and non-combatants alike. The extensive use of such recent innovations as the F-117 "Stealth" fighter; precision guidance systems on lethal ordnance; land-attack cruise missiles; improved sensors, data processing and space-based capabilities, all gave U.S. and allied forces the edge.

Technological advantage comes not just in hardware, but also in the training and proficiency of the high-quality personnel in our Armed Forces who use this equipment and in the innovative doctrine that military planners developed to guide its effective employment. As with our investments in research and development, investing in the training and professionalization of our Active and Reserve personnel will be critical in the future, especially as we move from our current force posture to the smaller military of the mid-1990s and beyond.

Our advanced technology will have important effects on our adversaries' attitudes toward aggression and even on their domestic politics. The Soviets unanticipated explosion of an atomic weapon in 1949 had such an effect. So did Sputnik. Not long ago, a member of the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies called President Reagan the "initiator of perestroika." He noted that President Reagan was dedicated to developing new technologies—he mentioned stealth and SDI specifically—that the Soviets knew they could not match unless they radically changed their system. The

technologies we demonstrated in Desert Storm will have their own effect on other nation's internal debates.

We can rest assured that the Soviets and others were watching developments in the Gulf very closely. Many of these nations already boast of advanced "conventional and—increasingly—unconventional capabilities. They will surely continue to push the frontiers of both technology and military doctrine to develop or acquire new capabilities of their own—either legally or illegally. Revolutionary military capabilities are a reality with which our future strategy must deal. Therein lies the challenge for both the future for technological development and the U.S. role in maintaining our leadership in this vital national security arena.

UNCERTAINTY

Just as we did not predict the collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, so too the events of recent months have been unexpected. President Havel's historic address before the NATO Council noted the uncertainties of our times:

> When the totalitarian systems collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe, and Democracy won, and when as a consequence of this the Iron Curtain that divided Europe collapsed, everything seemed to us in the first exciting months of freedom clear and simple. . . . A year full of dramatic events has passed and now we see that history is going, after all, through a much more winding and complicated path than we thought in the first moments of excitement.

The difficulty of predicting the routes of these "winding and complicated paths" of current events is a warning to us all. Dramatic changes have attended nearly every decade of this century. A similar challenge of predicting events faced Secretary Acheson when he stood, in the immediate post-war period, at the creation of his era:

> 1941 through 1952—was [a period] of great obscurity to those who lived through it. Not only was the future clouded, a common enough situation, but the present was equally clouded. We all had far more than the familiar difficulty of determining the capabilities and intentions of those who inhabit this planet with us. The significance of events was shrouded in ambiguity. We groped after interpretations of them, sometimes reversed lines of action based on earlier views and hesitated long before grasping what now seems obvious.

To plan forces and capabilities now for even the immediate future, the United States must be sensitive to the inevitable uncertainties about the challenges and opportunities it will confront. This is particularly true given the long lead-times—sometimes a decade or more—needed to develop, build, and field major systems or new capabilities: Uncertainty thus exerts its own powerful influence on how U.S. forces are shaped, because it underscores the importance of hedging against the unexpected threats that can emerge more rapidly than forces can be designed to counter them.

THE NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY

The new defense strategy proposed by the President and the Secretary squarely confronts both the revolutionary changes creating a new world security environment and the fiscal constraints within our own country. In general, the strategy judges that the events of the past 2 years in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union allows a shift from our focus on a threat of Europe-wide or global war with perhaps a few weeks warning. Instead, we can begin safely building down to lower Active and Reserve force levels sufficient for regional security concerns—including forward presence and crisis response—that we will still face. Should these trends take unexpected and forbidding twists, or should other potent challenges emerge, the new strategy also provides a framework to adjust our capabilities accordingly.

Let me summarize briefly the key elements of the new defense strategy outlined by the President last August and by the Department in recent testimony. On the broadest level, despite the end of the Cold War, we cannot ignore our interests or shirk from our responsibilities in key regions of the world. We remain committed to keeping NATO strong, to working with other friends and allies, to deterring threats to our interests, and where necessary, to defending them.

In defense terms, this will require, first, a robust and capable forward presence, though significantly reduced from Cold-War era levels. Forward presence is critical to keeping our relations strong, to helping shape the future strategic environment

in ways favorable to us, and to positioning us favorably to respond to emerging threats.

Second, the new strategy requires the ability to respond to continuing threats of regional crises on short notice. Highly ready and rapidly deployable air and ground forces, as well as a robust naval capability are key elements of protecting ourselves and our far-flung interests from unexpected or sudden challenges. We must be ready to deploy both heavy and light forces of significant size at great distances. Our ability to insert forces quickly—particularly heavy ground forces—into distant theaters can be greatly enhanced through prepositioning equipment either on land (POMCUS) or afloat (MPS), as well as increased investment in lift. Forward presence and crisis response capabilities for regional security concerns play critical roles in sizing our Active and Reserve forces.

Third, we must keep an eye to the future and plan to reconstitute additional U.S. conventional forces if necessary to respond to a global threat, such as a decision by the Soviets to return to a strategy of global confrontation. Longer warning and reduced likelihood of a renewed global threat enables us to reduce our forces in being able to meet the regional threats which are now our focus. But we must be prepared to build, in the President's words, "wholly new forces" should the need to counter a global threat reemerge. The forces we might build for new threats might differ from the units we had eliminated. In addition, some Army and Navy units will be maintained in a cadre-type or innovative-reserve status. The new strategy thus prudently refocuses resources both on the more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in future defenses.

Successful reconstitution will require that we retain those elements of our defense that would take longer to reconstitute than the available warning of a renewed global threat. Such critical long-lead items include, particularly, our technological edge, our industrial base, major equipment, and the quality of our military leaders and technical personnel.

Finally, on the strategic side—where we have not seen a major change in the nature of the threat we must maintain a robust strategic deterrent and enhance prospects for defensive forces to respond to limited threats of nuclear weapons.

Our program of reductions and our budget have thus been based on certain assumptions about the future strategic environment. If trends prove less favorable along the way than we first projected, we may not be able to reduce forces as fast or as far as we have planned. I would emphasize that in sizing these reductions, we have not simply apportioned cuts from current levels based on budget reductions; rather we have assessed anew the overall force requirements of the dramatically changed threat we now project.

CONCLUSION

As the President stated on August 2, the easing of superpower competition gives us the opportunity to reduce our force levels within prudent levels of risk. Yet, as the August 2 invasion of Kuwait demonstrated, events will be no more predictable and specific threats no easier to foresee in this new era. We will need to be poised to shape distant events and, if necessary, respond to sudden and distant regional contingencies that threaten our interests, as we did in Desert Shield. We will have to peer into longer warning periods to discern strategic changes in the Soviet Union or other potential global threats, and we will have to maintain the ability to reconstitute needed forces. We will face continued technological challenges and the need to modernize our strategic capabilities. The poet quoted by Secretary Acheson at the outset of his autobiography observes, "If I had been present at the creation of the universe I would have had some hints for its better ordering." As we confront the challenge of ordering the universe of post-Cold War international affairs, we will be guided by this new defense strategy, and ultimately strengthened by those elements of our democratic society that make us inventive, determined, and an enduring source of hope to others.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. General Fedorochko.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM FEDOROCHKO, JR., DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE AND RESOURCE, THE JOINT STAFF

General FEDOROCHKO. Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a detailed written statement. I would ask that it be included in the record.

Senator GLENN. It is included.

General FEDOROCHKO. And with your permission, I would like to summarize some key points from that statement. I believe there is also a hand-out of charts which you might care to refer to as I go through the things.


Challenge in Perspective
Regional Uncertainties
Soviet Threat
Fiscal Pressures
Vision for the 90's
• Minimum Force Structure for Enduring Needs
• Credible to Friends and Foes
• Tailored to Regional Interests, Threats
• Avoid Hollow Force

The first chart in there, sir, underneath the cover, basically lays out the challenge before the Department with regard to what we had to do for the future, and that was to develop a plan for the 1990s that defined the minimum force structure and supporting capabilities needed to achieve our national objectives and strategy, given the projected world environment and domestic fiscal constraints.

This force had to be credible to friends and foes, tailored to our regional interests and potential threats and consist of well-trained, well-equipped combat ready units manned by quality people.



Our vision for the 1990s, which we have called the base force, shown on chart 2 provides for four conceptual military force packages and four supporting capabilities. These force packages and capabilities define our requirements. They do not represent command arrangements.


STRATEGIC FORCES
• Deters Nuclear Aggression
• Supports Arms Control Objectives
• Retains Triad - Increased Reliance on Seabased Systems
• Incorporates Strategic Defenses
• SSBN
- 18 TRIDENTs vice 22
- Retire Poseidons (22)
- Defer TRIDENT backfit
• BOMBERS
- Fleet of B-52s, B-1s & B-2s (96/97/75)
- Retire B-52Gs
- FB-111s to Tactical Role
• ICBMs
- Force of MM IIIs & PK (550)
- Retire MM IIs (450)
- PK Rail & SICBM
— Develop Only
— Future Hedge
• Restructured SDI
- GPALS--> Phase I requirements
- Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

The first package is strategic nuclear forces. The highlights of that are shown on chart 3. Despite the positive improvements that have occurred, the Soviet Union is still the only country on Earth able to destroy the United States. There is no evidence that this will change any time soon.

Our strategic deterrent force must therefore remain viable. The strategic offensive force we are proposing will be smaller than previously planned. We will have 18 Trident II SSBNs with a mix of C-4 and D-5 missiles; and a bomber leg consisting of B-52, B-1 and B-2 bombers.

We will reduce the current ICBM force by retiring Minuteman II and to protect future options, we will continue research and development on both the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison and the Small ICBM while deferring their deployment.

We also remain committed to the development of strategic defenses. The SDI program, although restructured, remains consistent with the Phase I objectives established by the Joint Chiefs.


ATLANTIC FORCES
• Underwrites Stability and Vital Interests in Europe, Middle East, and SWA
• Commitment to Alliances
• Primarily Heavy Ground Forces
• Bulk of Reserves
• Available to Other Regions
• Europe
- Less than 200K (now > 300K)
- 1 Corps/2 Divisions vice 2 Corps/4 Divisions
- 3.4 TFW vice 8.4
- 1 CVBG/MARG/MPS
• Persian Gulf Presence
• CONUS
- Army DIV – 3-4 AC/6 RC + 2 Cadre
- AF TFW – 2 AC/11 RC+
- Navy – 5 CVBG/2 MEB's (AC) (+1 RC)
• Basis for Reinforcement/Regeneration

The second package is our Atlantic forces. These forces which include elements from all services, will span the area from our East Coast to the Persian Gulf and form the backbone of our conventional deterrence posture. They will also be the bedrock of our reconstitution capability should we receive warning of a Soviet return to a posture of direct military confrontation with the West.

The configuration of our forward presence forces in Europe is being negotiated with our European allies. The forces remaining, approximately less than half of today's, will be operationally relevant and available for use in other areas should the need arise as it did during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

In this regard, we see the need for a heavy corps of two active Army divisions plus supporting elements remaining in Europe in addition to some POMCUS assets. Much of the Army's CONUS-based reinforcements forces, three to four Active, six Reserve component and two cadre divisions will be configured for employment in this region.

The Air Force will keep about three fighter wings based in Europe backed up by both Active and Reserve forces in CONUS. Two to three carrier battle groups will maintain forward presence throughout this area, and a permanent, but rotational, Marine amphibious ready group will also be kept in the Mediterranean.

The bottom line then is that we plan to reduce Europe-oriented, Active and Reserve component units and to cadre two Army heavy divisions. Mr. Chairman, we believe this is consistent with the reduced threat, emerging world events, and our revised strategy.


PACIFIC FORCES
• Major Pacific Power and Key Stabilizing Influence
• Protect US Interests in Pacific Region to Include Southeast Asia and Indian Ocean
• Principally Maritime Force
• Korea
- 1 DIV (-), 1-2 TFW
• Japan
- 1-2 TFW
- 1 CVBG
- MAGTF/MPS
• Hawaii/Alaska
- 1 DIV (Lt), TFW, MEB
• CONUS- 5 CVBG, MEB

Our Pacific force package, shown on chart 5, is structured to continue to deter would-be aggressors in the region and demonstrate our commitments to our allies.

We view the Pacific as primarily maritime theater. Six carrier battle groups will operate in this region, as will three Marine expeditionary brigades. Our Army forces will be trimmed to two divisions, and the Air Force will deploy three to four tactical fighter wings in the region.

Finally, we have provided contingency forces for dealing with the unexpected, the local crises, which are limited in time, space and scope. The highlights of that package are on chart 6.


CONTINGENCY FORCE
• Capable of Responding to the Unexpected and Unpredictable Crisis Limited in Scope and Time
- Principal Response for LATAM/SubSaharan Africa/ Island Nations
- Rapidly Deployable, Light Forces
- Mostly Active Force -- Limited Reserves
• Initial Response for Major Crisis
- 4-5 Divisions
- 7 TFWs
- Atlantic/Pacific Navy and Marine Corps Forces
- RRF
- SOF (All Services)

Depending on the circumstances, forward presence forces in the Atlantic and Pacific, such as carriers and Marine air-ground task forces, would be augmented by Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces configured for this task.

The Army forces will be built around the 18th Airborne Corps, consisting of airborne, air assault and light infantry divisions and one to two heavy divisions. Special operations forces from each of the services will also be an integral part of the contingency force package.

Forces

	Current	FY 95
Army Divisions	28 (18 AC)	18 (12 AC) + 2 Cadre
Aircraft Carriers	13	12
Carrier Air Wings	15 (13 AC)	13 (11 AC)
Battle Force Ships	545	451
Tactical Fighter Wings	36 (24 AC)	26 (15 AC)
Strategic Bombers	268	181

Mr. Chairman, the breadth and the depth of the major force structure changes envisioned by the base force are highlighted on chart 7 of your hand-out. When constructing the force we carefully considered the vital contributions of Reserve components to the Total Force. We sought to ensure that our future plans for Active and Reserve component forces were complementary and consistent with our assessment of future events and our revised strategy.



In addition to these four conceptual force packages, Mr. Chairman, we also need the four supporting capabilities shown on chart 8. Transportation: the Atlantic force needs air and sealift to deploy and reinforce elements in trouble spots away from our forward bases and to keep those forces resupplied. Clearly, our CONUS based ground contingency forces will need a rapid deployment transportation system to move them to crisis areas.

Space is an integral part of every military operation today. And it is important to the viability of our strategic deterrent. This capability will become even more important in the future.

Reconstitution consists of three elements, industrial production, mobilization planning, and force regeneration. We have considered each of these elements in our planning. For example, we plan to cadre two Army divisions and pursue the Navy's Innovative Naval Reserve Concept where we take one class frigate, man it full time for training purposes for every four moth-balled frigates.

Finally, we need a healthy research and development base. That goes without saying. Desert Storm vividly demonstrated how investments in high technology can pay enormous dividends on the battlefield.



In closing, Mr. Chairman, we carefully considered our assessment of future events and the needs of our revised strategy in structuring the base force proposal. The manpower reductions associated with our force structure plans are highlighted on the last chart in your handout. These reductions provide for an orderly downsizing and reshaping of our Active and Reserve component forces, seek to avoid a hollow force, and will permit us to reevaluate our decisions and fine-tune the force in response to change and emerging world events.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I appreciate the opportunity to be here.

[The prepared statement of General Fedorochko follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM FEDOROCHKO, JR., DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE AND RESOURCE, THE JOINT STAFF

Mr. Chairman, I and my colleagues from the four military services welcome this opportunity to discuss the Department's force structure plans for the future.

Before getting to the specifics of the numbers of divisions, wings, and carrier battle groups in our plans, let me briefly highlight three of the realities we face and our strategic vision for dealing with those realities.

The first reality is that the Soviet Union is today a different place than it has been and it represents a different kind of threat than the threat it has posed to us for the last 40 years. But, at the same time, we must remember that the Soviets still have nuclear weapons and are continuing to modernize those weapons; and that they still have the largest conventional Army in Eurasia.

The second reality is that, even with the end of the Cold War, our world is still characterized by danger, uncertainty, and challenge as evidenced by Desert Storm. In the past 18 months our military forces have been involved in several operations throughout various regions of the world. Most of these operations did not involve the use of lethal force, but all of them required trained and readily-available forces. These regional requirements—which have often placed simultaneous demands on

our forces—have played a major role in our current strategic thinking and our force structure plans for the future.

The last reality is the fact that domestic fiscal constraints have led us to plan for a significantly smaller Defense budget. Today, Defense accounts for roughly 5 percent of our Gross National Product. By fiscal year 1995, we estimate that Defense will account for about 3.5 percent of our Gross National Product—that's the lowest in percentage terms in over 50 years.

KEY ELEMENTS OF U.S. STRATEGY

These three realities have brought about a shift in our strategy for achieving the national security objectives established by the President. That strategy, which is designed to preserve the security of the United States through the decade of the 1990s and beyond, its rationale, and a comprehensive assessment of our planned forces are contained in the Secretary of Defense's 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment. This Assessment was forwarded to the Congress in classified and unclassified form in March of this year.

As explained in the Net Assessment, our strategy is now shifting from an earlier focus on containing Soviet aggression to four broader-based themes. These four themes—deterrence, crisis response, forward presence, and reconstitution—broadly define the capabilities we need to ensure our national security in the future and provide a framework for our force structure plans.

CENTRAL MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

These themes are linked to our forces through nine fundamental military strategic concepts. These concepts, discussed below, are baseline tenets that have effectively guided our thinking in the past, and remain as major players for our future plans.

Deterrence. We seek to maintain a capable and credible nuclear deterrent. Likewise, our commitment to deter conventional aggression influences the size and character of U.S. forces, along with the location and scope of our forward presence and the tempo of our forward deployments and exercises.

Power projection. The Desert Shield operation convincingly demonstrated the military value of power projection. No other nation on earth possesses this capability. Our sealift and airlift programs, complemented by equipment prepositioning ashore and afloat, are critical capabilities which we intend to preserve and modernize.

Forward presence. As we reduce our forces stationed overseas, we will place increased emphasis on the other components of forward presence—rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military relations with our security partners worldwide.

Reconstitution. We also are placing renewed emphasis on our reconstitution capability. Reconstitution begins with an industrial base capable of responding to our defense requirements. It also includes well-conceived mobilization plans, and the ability to regenerate forces in the event of a crises.

Collective security. Today we have a strong network of alliances and lateral military relationships that serve us well. Reductions in forward presence and lower defense budgets will increase our reliance on collective security arrangements.

Maritime and aerospace superiority. We have maintained superiority of sea and air lines of communications since World War II. Control of sea, air, and space lines of communication is essential to our ability to deter conflict, to protect our global interests, and to project power should that become necessary.

Security assistance. When we nurture the capability of friendly nations to protect their own national security interests, we effectively lessen the potential for greater burdens on our own forces and further the cause of regional security cooperation. Thus a viable security assistance program is essential, particularly as our own force structure is reduced.

Arms control. Arms control has succeeded in limiting the scope of strategic arsenals, and has provided a framework for reducing force structure and the probability of confrontation in Europe. Arms control, though not an end in itself, serves our interests by reducing military threats, increasing predictability, and stabilizing force modernization.

Technological superiority. Technological superiority is a hallmark of American Armed Forces. The recent conflict in the Middle East reaffirmed how valuable this is to us, and how important it can be not only in ensuring victory, but also in reducing friendly and noncombatant losses.

OTHER MILITARY TASK

In addition to these nine concepts or tenets, two other specified military tasks have influenced our thinking and force structure planning. First, we have been directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense to assist in the war on drug trafficking. Second, we seek to deter and defend against international terrorism.

THE BASE FORCE CONSTRUCT

Our force structure plans provide for downsizing and reshaping both our Active and Reserve component forces—this is consistent with the realities before us, our national military objectives, and our revised strategy. We arrived at this conclusion after a broad-based assessment that considered our national objectives; our military strategy and strategic concepts; current and future threats as best we could define them; regional strategies and scenario analyses; and other special considerations such as fiscal constraints and political realities. At the same time, we took care to protect unique capabilities such as special operations, search and rescue, and amphibious forces as well as missions such as counter-drug operations and disaster relief. Last summer's program review and the fall budget review were structured to ensure that forces matched our strategy, and that investment programs matched our forces.

Our challenge, shown schematically below, was to develop a vision for the 1990s and a plan that enabled us to downsize and configure our future forces in a way that minimized risk and maximized our flexibility. In developing our vision for the 1990s, we set about defining the minimum Active and Reserve component force structure and supporting military capabilities needed to achieve our national objectives given the dynamic world environment. This force had to be credible to friends and foes, tailored to our regional interests and potential threats, and consist of well-trained and equipped, combat-ready units manned by quality people.

Our vision for the 1990s, the Base Force, provides for four conceptual force packages and four supporting capabilities. It links our revised strategy to the military force structure and supporting military capabilities proposed in the Department's Future Years Defense Program. It is important to note that the force packages and capabilities of the Base Force define our requirements—they do not represent command arrangements. Additionally, the proposed mix of forces in each package will certainly change as a result of regional threats and consultations with our friends in Europe, the Gulf, Asia, and indeed around the world.

MILITARY FORCE PACKAGES

The first package is our strategic nuclear forces. Despite the positive developments that have occurred, we need to remember that the Soviet Union is still the only country on earth able to destroy the United States. There is no evidence this will change anytime soon. Our strategic deterrent force must therefore remain viable.

Our planned strategic offensive force retains the triad of submarines, manned bombers, and ground-based ballistic missiles in recognition of the strength of each leg and its value to our overall nuclear strategy. Our submarine force will consist of 18 Trident II SSBNs armed with a mix of C-4 and D-5 missiles. Previously we were planning for 22 Tridents all of which would be equipped with D-5 missiles. Our strategic bomber leg of the Triad will consist of a mix of B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers.

We also plan to reduce our ICBM force over time by retiring older Minuteman IIs. To protect future options, we will continue research and development on both the Peacekeeper rail garrison and the Small ICBM while deferring their deployment.

Finally, we remain committed to the development of strategic defensive forces. Although our primary focus remains to deter an attack on the United States, it is essential that we also have the ability to defend our Nation against such an attack, if deterrence should fail. We also believe it is prudent and complementary to work toward defense against limited strikes and theater ballistic missile attacks, given the global cottage industry in Third World missile technology and potential for fielding weapons of mass destruction.

The second conceptual force package is our Atlantic forces. These forces, which include elements from all the services, will span the area from our east coast to the Persian Gulf. The Atlantic forces form the backbone of our conventional deterrence. They will also be the bedrock of our reconstitution capability should we receive warning of a Soviet return to a posture of direct military confrontation with the West.

The precise configuration of our forward-presence forces in Europe will be negotiated with our European allies. The forces remaining, though less than half of

today's, will be operationally relevant and available for use in Europe or other areas should the need arise as it did during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

The Active and Reserve Army divisions in this conceptual force package are primarily heavy divisions. We foresee a heavy corps of two Active Army divisions, plus supporting elements remaining in Europe, in addition to some POMCUS assets. Today we have two corps and four divisions. Much of the Army's CONUS-based Reserve forces—3 to 4 Active, 6 Reserve component, and 2 cadre divisions—will be configured for employment in this region. This makes it absolutely necessary that we have adequate sea and air lift assets to assure the timely movement of these forces in the event of a crisis, and also to ensure that we can keep those forces supplied should conflict occur.

The Air Force will keep about three fighter wings based in Europe, backed up by both Active and Reserve wings in CONUS.

We foresee two to three carrier battle groups maintaining forward presence throughout this area, including the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. We also plan to maintain a permanent, but rotational, Marine Amphibious Ready Group in the Mediterranean.

In the wake of the recent conflict in Kuwait and Iraq, we may retain a presence in the Middle East in the near term to ensure stability in the region, to provide for the orderly redeployment of our equipment and munitions, and to assist the restoration of Kuwait's infrastructure. In the longer term, we will keep a continuous naval presence in the Gulf, and we expect to exercise ground and air forces there regularly. We are currently working with the CINC and our friends in the Gulf to define the details of that presence.

In sum, consistent with the reduced threat of a short warning massive conventional attack by the Soviet Union and our new strategy, we plan to reduce European-oriented Active and Reserve component units and to cadre two Army divisions.

Our Pacific force package is structured to continue to deter would-be aggressors in the region, and demonstrate our commitment to our allies. Our military presence there is beneficial to the entire region and not just to our military allies. It promotes a stable security environment in the Pacific, allowing economic and commercial development to flourish.

We view the Pacific as primarily a maritime theater. Six carrier battle groups—half of our projected carrier force—will operate in this region, as will three Marine Expeditionary Brigades. Our Army forces in this area will be trimmed to two divisions and the Air Force will deploy about three to four fighter wings in this region.

Finally, we have provided contingency forces for dealing with local crises which are limited in time, space, and scope. For such contingencies we need primarily light, hard-hitting, deployable forces that are kept at a high state of readiness. Depending on the circumstances, forward presence forces in the Atlantic and Pacific (such as carriers and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces) would be augmented by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces configured for this task. The Army forces will be built around the XVIII Airborne Corps, consisting of airborne, air assault, and light infantry divisions, and one to two heavy divisions. Special operations forces from each of the services will be an integral part of the contingency force package.

The breadth and depth of the major force structure changes envisioned by the Base Force construct are high-lighted below. When constructing this force, we carefully considered the vital contributions of Reserve components to the total force and sought to ensure that our future plans for Active and Reserve component forces were complementary and consistent with our assessment of future events and our revised strategy.

SUPPORTING MILITARY CAPABILITIES

In addition to these four conceptual force packages, we also will need the four supporting capabilities highlighted below.

Transportation. Strategic mobility is crucial to the success of each of our force packages. The Atlantic force needs air and sea lift to deploy and reinforce elements in trouble spots away from our forward bases in Europe, and to keep those forces supplied. A similar requirement exists in the Pacific, which spans more than half the globe. Our ground contingency forces based in the United States will clearly need a rapid deployment transportation system to move them to crisis areas.

To meet these requirements, we need to replace the capability lost as the C-141 is retired because of age. For sealift, this means a modest increase in the size of the Ready Reserve Fleet so that we can deploy and sustain the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units required by our most stressful contingency scenario. We also need to deploy three squadrons of Marine maritime pre-positioning ships, which

give us the rough equivalent of a Marine division's worth of equipment uploaded, though configured so that smaller task-organized elements can be employed if necessary. We will also need pre-positioned materiel and standby installations in both Europe and Southwest Asia.

Our second essential supporting capability is our *space capability*. Communications, intelligence, and navigation activities performed by space systems are now essential to the success of virtually every U.S. military operation—including the viability of our strategic deterrent. This capability will become even more important in the future to support surveillance and operations as we reduce our forward presence forces and reshape our overseas bases and access agreements. Our program for space forces modernizes and builds on our current systems, increasing the capacity of our space platforms to support commanders and forces in the field.

Reconstitution is the third supporting capability we need. Reconstitution consists of three elements: industrial production, mobilization planning, and force regeneration. We have considered each of these elements in our planning. For example, we plan to cadre two Army divisions and pursue the Innovative Naval Reserve concept whereby one Knox class frigate is manned full time for every four mothballed frigates.

The final supporting capability we need is a healthy *research and development* base. Product improvement, modernization, and innovation all flow from R&D. The recent war in the Persian Gulf vividly demonstrated how investments in high technology can pay enormous dividends on the battlefield. Our past research and development programs served us well during the war. As we transition to a smaller force, our need for high-quality weapon systems that are versatile, mobile, and lethal, will be even greater than in the past.

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

Operation Desert Shield occurred at a critical and yet fortuitous time for us. Our revised strategy, base force construct, and force structure plans were well developed before the crisis in the Gulf arose. As the contingency unfolded, operational experience confirmed our view that we must provide for a highly capable contingency force, manned with quality people and equipment to deter, and confront regional troublemakers. It also confirmed the continuing requirement for prepositioning of equipment backed up by a massive, highly effective rapid deployment capability; and demonstrated that a coalition of nations can provide substance to unity of purpose.

Desert Storm proved that our current forces are certainly up to the challenge of combat. Our future force structure, which will be smaller than todays, will also have a capability to succeed in a Desert Storm-type contingency. However, it will be more difficult. Our flexibility will be reduced and our total response time may be longer. We are thoroughly reviewing the operation for lessons learned and will apply them accordingly. Clearly, one lesson learned is that we must improve our strategic mobility, particularly for rapid sea movement of heavy forces and supplies—our Mobility Requirements Study is thoroughly evaluating our needs and the options available to fulfill these needs. Another is that we must continue to rigorously pursue opportunities for international cooperation and burdensharing and seek to retain key bases and obtain access rights around the world.

SUMMARY

In closing, Mr. Chairman, we carefully considered our assessment of future events and the needs of our revised strategy in structuring the Base Force proposal contained in the Department's Future Years Defense Program. The manpower reductions associated with our force structure plans are highlighted below. These reductions provide for an orderly downsizing and reshaping of our Active and Reserve component forces, seek to avoid a hollow force, and will permit us to re-evaluate our decisions and fine tune the force in response to change and emerging world events.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. We welcome your questions.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, General.

Let me start off with you, since you were last here, but you mentioned that the new arrangement we are talking about, Atlantic, Pacific, strategic, and contingency forces will not require any changing of command functions. Is that correct?

NEW COMMAND FUNCTIONS

General FEDOROCHKO. Sir, what I meant to say was that we view those as conceptual packages of military requirements. They are not necessarily a unified command plan if that is what your question is. They are not directly translatable into changes in the unified command structure.

Senator GLENN. What has changed then with this? Basically we have had forces like this that are aligned in these various theaters. Is this just a restatement of what we have had in the past or is this some new arrangement? I thought it was being presented by the President and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as a new arrangement for our military. But it sounds as though it is not to change command functions in any way. It is pretty much what we have now, but just scaled down. Is that it?

General FEDOROCHKO. Mr. Chairman, as I view it, there is a considerably different focus in this whole construct than we have had heretofore in the past. Sir, as you probably recall, our plans essentially were built upon a particular Soviet threat, a particular vision of the world.

What this new construct does, is it says, yes, the threat for which we have developed our plans and forces for over 40 years has been reduced substantially, but it has not gone away. We still have to contend with that.

Our vision of the future also sees a greater need for us to be able to contend with regional uncertainties and crises throughout the world. And this construct, although it may appear on the surface, sir, to be just a rehash of the same thing, has a fundamentally different focus than what we have had for the past 10 years, 20 years, 30 years, or 40 years.

Senator GLENN. I agree that we have been looking at the Fulda Gap and such, across Europe for many, many years. And that obviously has taken a lot of the forces. But while those are drawing down, I think we have had some of these other interests around the world also at the same time.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY

I mentioned in my opening remarks the requirement for the Total Force Policy Report was mandated in the 1990 Defense Authorization Act. Section 1101 of the act spells out the requirement.

And copies of that language have been placed before our witnesses and our members and without objection, will be included in the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

TITLE XI—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT MATTERS

PART A—FORCE STRUCTURE

SEC. 1101. STUDY OF TOTAL FORCE POLICY, FORCE MIX, AND MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since the inception of the Total Force Policy in the Department of Defense in 1973, there has never been a comprehensive, authoritative study done by the Department on the operation and effectiveness of that policy.

(2) Decisions within the Department of Defense with respect to military force mix appear to be made in a fragmented and decentralized manner.

(3) A comprehensive study of the Total Force Policy, force mix, and military force structure is long overdue.

(b) STUDY.—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall convene a study group to review the operation, effectiveness, and soundness of the following policies and practices of the Department of Defense and to make recommendations to the Secretary for improvement of those policies and practices:

(A) The Total Force Policy.

(B) Assignment of missions within and between the active and reserve components of the armed forces.

(C) Force structure of the active and reserve components of the armed forces.

(2) The study group shall include—

(A) senior-level active-duty officers from each branch of the armed forces;

(B) senior-level reserve-component officers from each of the seven reserve components;

(C) civilian officials of the Department of Defense; and

(D) such participants from outside the Department of Defense as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(3) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall provide such joint staff support to the study group as necessary. He shall participate in the activities of the study group in accordance with the provisions of section 153 of title 10, United States Code, including the responsibility to assess the conformance of manpower programs and policies with strategic plans and to advise the study group about the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and for the combatant commands.

(4) The Secretary shall ensure that the study group, in carrying out its duties and responsibilities, has access to federally funded research centers (FFRCs) and other necessary support.

(5) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the functions of the study group insofar as they relate to the Selected Reserve of the Coast Guard Reserve.

(6) Meetings of the study group may be closed to the public in connection with the consideration of classified material.

(c) MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED.—(1) In carrying out the study re-

quired by subsection (a), the study group shall evaluate and make recommendations to the Secretary concerning each of the following matters (with each such matter to be evaluated separately insofar as it relates to each policy or practice set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (b)(1)):

(1) With respect to the Total Force Policy of the Department of Defense, the basic tenets of that policy, how well that policy has been implemented, and what changes (if any) are desirable to improve upon that policy and its implementation.

(2) The effectiveness of the existing chain of management and command responsibility in evaluating and integrating force requirements among the armed forces, and between the active components and the reserve components.

(3) The extent to which officials responsible for such evaluation and integration of force requirements currently (and should in the future) participate in the budget and resource allocation processes of the Department of Defense.

(4) The adequacy of the methodology used by the Department of Defense in the assignment of missions between the active and reserve components and, within each active and reserve component, the assignment of missions among various major types of units, including—

(A) the extent to which that methodology includes the use of cost-benefit analyses; and

(B) the methodology for the manner by which force reductions are distributed within individual units and between active and reserve components.

(5) The scope and size of force reductions with respect to major units (such as air wings, carrier groups, and divisions) that would result in an irreversible change of the capability of those units to perform assigned missions, with emphasis on considerations such as mobilization, loss of skilled manpower, equipment, and training.

(d) ADDITIONAL MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED.—(1) In carrying out its study and making its recommendations, the study group shall also evaluate the process by which decisions within the Department of Defense respecting force mix and force structure are made with regard to the readiness, sustainability, and overall mission capability of the active and reserve forces. The study group shall also consider whether the Department of Defense has a cogent strategy for making such decisions with respect to force mix that anticipates a substantially smaller military force structure in the future and whether the Department has developed a system for regular and systematic top-level evaluation of decisions respecting force mix or reductions in force structure.

(2) In carrying out the evaluation required by paragraph (1), the study group shall consider (among other matters it considers appropriate) the following:

(A) The optimal structure of military forces required to meet the threat as described in net assessments prepared pursuant to section 153 of title 10, United States Code, taking into account currently available and projected budget resources.

(B) The appropriateness of the missions that have been assigned to major units (such as air wings, carrier groups, and divisions) in each of the active and reserve components in view of

the status of those units with respect to personnel and equipment resources and training systems.

(C) The response times for the deployment of such units in the event of a mobilization.

(D) An evaluation of the readiness and sustainability of each of the active and reserve components and of the contributions of each such component to the overall military capability of the United States.

(E) The extent to which the active and reserve component units that are identified for use during the first 30 days of a mobilization are prepared to undertake wartime missions (as measured against the standards established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with section 153 of title 10, United States Code), the reasons for any lack of preparedness for such missions, and recommendations for measures that would be necessary for those units to become fully mission capable.

(F) The adequacy of equipment distribution and modernization in the active and reserve components, including consideration of the importance of prepositioning of light and heavy equipment in the mobilization process.

(G) The adequacy of the current base of military personnel and equipment available for short notice rotation and deployment in order to meet worldwide defense commitments.

(H) The capability of each component of the active and reserve forces to meet assigned and projected missions at each step in the mobilization process and the adequacy of current airlift and sealift capability.

(I) The resources (including funds) needed for sufficient personnel, equipment, and training to achieve desired force structure and mission capability in both the active and reserve components.

(J) The capability of the active and reserve components, jointly and separately, to respond to mobilization requirements at each stage of the mobilization process.

(d) REPORTS.—(1) The study group shall submit to the Secretary of Defense an interim report on its findings and recommendations at such time as the Secretary may require, but not later than September 1, 1990. The Secretary shall submit the interim report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than September 15, 1990.

(2) The study group shall submit its final report, including its findings and recommendations, to the Secretary not later than December 1, 1990. The Secretary shall submit the final report of the study group, together with any comment and recommendation of the Secretary, to those committees not later than December 31, 1990.

(e) LIMITATION ON OBLIGATION OF CERTAIN FUNDS IF REPORTS SUBMITTED LATE.—If either of the reports required by subsection (d) is not submitted to those committees by the date specified in that subsection for the report to be submitted, the Secretary of Defense may not, on or after that date, obligate any funds for a new contract for advisory, consultant, or assistance services until the report is submitted.

Senator GLENN. I particularly refer to the second page which gets into additional matters to be considered and lists quite a number of them that we wanted answers to in that Total Force Policy Report. I have some questions about those today.

Mr. Jehn, on April 18 of last year you testified before the subcommittee on the status of the study on Total Force Policy, force mix, and military force structure.

In your testimony you said, and I quote, "As you have asked and we certainly agree, this is going to be in essence a zero-based study. There are no preconceived notions about the balance between the Active and Reserve components. As we proceed with the study, we are going to be starting from an assessment of the threat as we have already discussed and proceeding from that testing the principles, methodologies, tools we developed by constructing force structures to meet various notional threats, that again, the Joint Staff is preparing for us."

In this report, where do you address the force structure alternatives that address various notional threats on a zero-based basis?

Mr. JEHN. The report itself does not present alternatives, as you correctly state. But the study group considered those alternatives and the force structure. The strategic context in which we think that force structure fits is presented in the report.

This report was, obviously, as I know you and I have talked about, not considered to be a substitute for the PPBS process last year, but was used, and I think used quite effectively, as an adjunct to that process. It made an important contribution to that process. And the force structure and the threats that we discussed and the new strategic environment that is discussed in the study report are the results of that analysis.

Senator GLENN. General, did you provide notional threats to the study group for its consideration?

General FEDOROCHKO. Sir, I did not personally, but I believe that there was a Joint Staff representative who participated in discussions. And I believe——

Mr. JEHN. Let me go ahead and just second what the General just said. He is absolutely right. The Joint Staff representative to the study group not only gave us briefings and led discussion of the threats we were facing, but also talked about specific scenarios that we might need to be able to counter in the future. Those were the basis for the planning.

I think that paralleled, in fact, the way the entire planning, programming, and budgeting process last year worked. It was, I think, a textbook case. We began with discussions of the strategic environment and threats. Went from there to a discussion of overall threats, or rather overall forces necessary to meet those threats. And then proceeded to work out the details as the services made proposals to address those threats and to answer the force structure requirements. And then the Secretary gave them further guidance based on discussions at, among other places, meetings of the Defense Planning and Resources Board.

So we did exactly as I suggested last April that we would do. Not only in the conduct of the Total Force Policy Study, but also in the conduct of the planning, programming, and budgeting process that produced the 1992 budget that is before you today.

We began with threats, the new strategic environment, and built force structures from there on up.

Mr. DUNCAN. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that the Joint Staff's representative who provided those threat scenarios was Gen. Lee Butler, then Lieutenant General, now Gen. Lee Butler who is the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command. And we also heard from representatives of each of the other major commands on threat analysis.

Senator GLENN. You assured us last year, Mr. Jehn, that the work of the Total Force Policy Study Group would be an integral part of the process by which the Department arrived at its recommendations it would make to the President and to the Congress this year. What effect did the Total Force Policy Study have in the formulation of the four military force packages? Did it serve as a basis for our structure and manpower levels in this request and the future program, also?

Mr. JEHN. It is difficult to assess the effect of any set of proposals or any analysis on the final budget and plan that has been presented to the Congress simply because the process was long, complex, and very open and careful.

But rest assured, as both Mr. Duncan and I have already stated, that the results of the Total Force Policy Study, the considerations and discussions that were held in our meetings found their way into the process that we use to form the budget.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Duncan, you indicated in testimony before the subcommittee on April 18 last year, and I quote, "Strength adjustments after fiscal year 1991 will be dependent in important part on principles being developed by the Total Force Policy Study group and the allocation of missions among all the uniformed components of the total force, which obviously includes the Reserves."

My question then is, are the Reserve and National Guard strength reductions in the Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Defense Authorization Request and the Future Year Defense Program directly related to the results of the Total Force Policy Report?

Mr. DUNCAN. I believe they are. In all fairness, we were, I think, reasonably criticized, I say, we, the Department collectively, in recent years for taking an approach to budget-cutting that—and I say Department, even though it might have been some of the individual services, it was the Department's responsibility—for taking an approach to budget-cutting that was as you characterized it, a "share of the pain" approach.

Secretary Cheney made it clear that that was not going to be the way we approached this, that the reductions we made were going to be related to mission requirements.

I would like to say that it was a neat, clean, easy, mechanistic, formalistic process. I cannot say that, but I can tell you that at the same time the conduct of the study of the Total Force Policy was being engaged in, so was a very vigorous debate in several other forums, including, not the least of which, was the Defense Planning and Resources Board as we applied the Secretary's new military strategy and the President's, to the force structure requirements that we needed.

And while I would be the first to say that reasonable people can disagree about some of the outcomes, we certainly were engaged in

an active dialogue with all of the representatives of both of the groups. And the end result, I believe, fairly represents decisions that were made not to cut strength across all of the Reserve components or the Active components, but to have end strength relate to what missions that have to be performed.

What forces do we need in the world of the future? What missions have to be performed? Who is best qualified to perform those missions as we see it today, understanding that as we get more information next year we may change our mind. And therefore, what kind of forces do we need? What size forces?

That debate was very energetically engaged in. And it is not one that is over with. I would be the first to say that my personal opinion is that we will continue to engage in this kind of ongoing debate as we follow the events that Mr. Libby talked about. There is not a whole lot of certainty in the world today. And as we find new information and learn new facts, we will be prepared to reassess all of that.

But this is our collective best judgment based on a very rigorous debate and analysis and attempting to make the force structure and the end strength relate to mission requirements.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Libby, my time is up, but just one question here following up on the last one.

What effect do you think the Total Force Policy had in the formulation of the four military force package?

Mr. LIBBY. As Secretary Jehn mentioned, I think the Total Force Policy work was integral to a very long and complicated process that went on in the Department.

If I might just give a brief explanation of that process. Beginning in the fall of 1989, the Secretary called everyone together and challenged them to reexamine the forces, to look at the new world that we were seeing unfold even as the Wall was coming down and other events were occurring in Eastern Europe.

This was followed by the preparation of a Defense Planning Guidance. An examination of the new world raised these challenges for the services and among other things focused us more on regional threats—including those in Southwest Asia, which came to pass.

Following that, there was a series of very high-level discussion meetings in the Department, with virtually the DPRB membership that occurred in December 1989 and January 1990. After Hill testimony, these resumed in the spring when the new strategy and the base force were presented before the entire DPRB and discussed thoroughly by the entire DPRB.

That led to a refined process that on August 2, 1990 yielded the President's speech in Aspen, Colorado, where he first unveiled the new strategy.

In all of that time the work of the Total Force Policy was very much before the group and very much at the staff level. It had worked through the building very thoroughly as an element of the input that people looked at as they considered the options.

Senator GLENN. I will have more questions later. Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to follow along, if I may, in the vein that you have been working so assiduously in your questioning.

First of all, I take it, Mr. Chairman, that Section 1101 of the Fiscal Year 1990 Defense Authorization Act is included in the record. I hold it in my hand.

Senator GLENN. It is. I entered it in the record.

Senator DIXON. As you know, that act required the Department of Defense to conduct a thorough review of the Total Force Policy, the Active/Reserve force mix rationale of the military services.

A key element of the new military strategy that the committee adopted last year was to look for greater utilization of our Reserve forces to handle missions withdrawn from the Active forces.

The committee received a Total Force Policy report this January, Mr. Chairman. The report, as I understand it, is 71 pages long. The first 28 pages contain an executive summary and a summary of the history of the Total Force Policy. That is 40 percent of the report. The remaining portion of the report discusses the process of managing the total force in DOD. That is 20 pages. It discusses the changing strategic environment on 2 pages. Finally, it discusses the affect of evolving military strategy on the total force for 6 pages.

So the report, in my view, falls far short of meeting the requirements spelled out in the language.

When the Total Force Policy report was being coordinated in August of last year, the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy took issue with the Reserve favorable tilt of the draft report. Apparently the draft report pressed for an expanded role for the Reserves consistent with the position of this committee, which ran counter to the strategy being developed by that office for a substantially reduced role for the Reserves.

Now the final report appears to be watered down accordingly. So the work of 24 senior civilian and military officials, plus the work of 40 supporting staff, which apparently presented an objective case for greater reliance on Reserve forces has been, in effect, bottled up in the Pentagon.

That leads me to these questions. The first question, Mr. Chairman, to anybody here, why was the committee denied the opportunity to review alternative force structures that placed greater reliance on Reserve forces as originally developed by the Total Force Policy Study Group?

Mr. JEHN. Sure. Let me address that.

What you are addressing, Senator Dixon, is really the internal workings of both the Total Force Policy Study Group and the decisionmaking process within the Department. The results of that process are reflected in the Total Force Policy Study Report, not the actual deliberations.

I think it is important to know that we did this report so that it would be of assistance to the Secretary of Defense. I feel confident it was, as we have already addressed. The work of the Total Force Policy Study Group and the entire staff was and has been accurately, I think, reflected in the deliberations of the Defense Planning and Resources Board and was, in fact, reflected in the final outcome as represented by the budget and the defense plan that has been submitted to the Congress.

Senator DIXON. But, Mr. Jehn, though the mandate was for a report to the Congress. This is the Congress.

Mr. JEHN. The mandate was for the Secretary of Defense to conduct this review. The Secretary of Defense, through this study group, has conducted that review. And we have submitted to you the results of that review.

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator, if I could add to that?

Section 1101 of the statute requiring the report says that the Secretary of Defense shall convene a study group to review the operation, effectiveness, and soundness of the following policies and practices of the Department of Defense and to make recommendations to the Secretary. The whole theme of the statute talks about recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Indeed, the Secretary was required to submit the final report to the Congress, as he did.

But the last part of the statute says the study group shall submit to the Secretary of Defense not only the interim report, but its final report with findings and recommendations. That is how we interpret it.

Senator DIXON. Well, could I follow up, Mr. Duncan, with this question.

Why should the Total Force Policy be reversed to give the Reserve components a less universal role when they proved themselves to be ready to deploy early and to be a good investment in the Persian Gulf conflict that we all agree was a successful experience?

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator, I would not agree, respectfully, with your characterization of what has happened in the President's budget. As a practical matter, if you look at the force structure that the Department of Defense envisions for fiscal year 1997 there will be a higher percentage of the Total Force that will be in the Reserve components in fiscal year 1997 than at any time since the Total Force Policy was adopted. Indeed, higher than the peak year of 1987 when we had the largest structure of all.

Both Active and Reserve forces are coming down. But the relative proportion of the Total Force that will remain consistently high and growing, will be the Reserve components. No one is out to do away with the Total Force Policy. Au contraire, the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President have all endorsed it strongly. Our job is to evaluate the new world with the new threat and to design forces to meet the new threat. And we think we have successfully accomplished that.

Senator DIXON. Well, all right. The Active Army will be reduced by approximately 24 percent from 1991 to 1995. The Army National Guard will be reduced by 32 percent.

Mr. JEHN. Let me address that, Senator.

Senator DIXON. All right. Address it.

Mr. JEHN. The discussions that people have or the arguments that people have made regarding end strength reductions focus on those years that make the argument or make the case people try to make or want to make most strongly. What I prefer to look at is what has been happening in the Department and what we propose will happen over the next 5 years to 6 years since 1987.

As you know, the Congress has directed that no cuts should be made to the Reserve components between 1987 and 1991. But if you look at what has happened and will happen if our plan is adopted

between 1987 and 1997, while the Active components of the entire Defense Department will come down nearly 25 percent, as you correctly noted, between 1987 and 1997 the Reserve components will shrink barely 21 percent.

So if anything, the cuts to the Reserve components that we are proposing are less than the cuts to the Active component.

Focusing on 1 year or a period of a couple of years, conveniently, I would submit, ignores what has been happening the last 4 years or 5 years, namely that there have been no cuts whatsoever to the Reserve component. In fact, the Reserve components are slightly larger in 1990 and 1991 than they were in 1987 while the restructuring and the reduction of the Active component began in 1987.

If we look at the change in structure, change in size over the entire period, we see, in fact the premise from which you started, namely that the Active component is coming down a smaller amount than the Reserve component. That is simply not true.

Senator DIXON. I guess my response to that would be, in all candor, Mr. Jehn, that it has been the sense of the Congress over the last several years while I have been here on both sides of the aisle, and I would include in that my good friend, the distinguished senior Senator from South Carolina who is here today, that these Reserve and Army National Guard units in the situation of a very constrained budget, give us more bang for the buck. And we have followed that course.

In the legislation we passed last time, which is in the record here, we directed the Department to come back and define these concepts for us in a way where the Total Force Policy continued to show high regard for those Reserve and Guard units. And my understanding is that the original discussions that took place before there was intervention by the Under Secretary for Policy followed that strategy.

Am I in error?

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me respond, because I am the one who follows the performance of the Reserve components, I suspect, more than anyone, Senator.

I have submitted an elaborate statement, I think, that describes precisely our view of how the Reserve forces performed. Magnificently, by any standard. And they are very cost effective.

But I want you to understand that we value very highly retention in the force of the quality we talk about. We do not just give lip service to it. And one of the very real life factors we deal with is this. We have to weigh the risk to the Reserve components. And when I say risk, I mean this. We called up 228,000 for this conflict. Many of them have been away from home for some period of time. And we are doing our darndest to get them home soon.

But those people are away from civilian jobs. And while we want to maximize the use of Reserve forces and National Guard forces and utilize that experience and utilize those skills, we do not want those people to have to be put in a position to make a decision where they say "I am either going to accept a promotion in my civilian employment or I am going to accept a promotion in the Reserve forces. My family comes first. I chose to leave the Reserve forces."

We do not want to design a force structure that requires us to rely upon Reserve forces so much that we have to call them to active duty for every small contingency. That would drive them out of the force. And our objective is to maintain quality.

Senator DIXON. May I indulge myself by making one final comment, Mr. Chairman? I recognize my time is up. And I hear what you say and I respect it.

I hope you understand, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Readiness, Sustainability, and Support, I understand the value of the Active forces. I accept that. And I understand the great job they do.

But I also want to comment that in times when we are in budget and fiscal constraints of a very serious nature, while we are downsizing all our forces over a period of years, and you are talking to the choir here, the people that want to do the best they can to prevent having a hollow Army and other things, when you are talking about those kinds of situations.

I think to suggest dramatic downsizing of the Reserve and Guard beyond what is the desire of this committee and the Congress generally is a fatal mistake and one that we ought not to pursue.

I would hope that we adjust those numbers.

I respect you very much. But I think we need to contain this thing within the kind of balance that will respond to the fiscal constraints we face.

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me suggest just in response that the economic factor is terribly important to us. And that is why we addressed it in the Total Force Policy Study. It is very important to us to know how much cost savings we can make by reliance upon Reserve forces.

But that is not the only factor that goes into decisions on force structure. Not only are we talking about the factor I mentioned about not wanting to drive them from the force, but we are also concerned about weighing the risk that may be incurred to the extent that any is incurred. Risk, defined in matters of readiness, in terms of availability, in terms of all kinds of factors, weighing that also in the equation.

For example, you can assign some missions to some Guard and Reserve components and they will perform at least as well as the Active components. And they are instantly ready. There are other kinds of missions that require that those missions be performed by Active forces. Cost savings can be achieved there, but it is not the only factor.

So ultimately, it becomes a matter of judgment for the President and the Secretary of Defense to weigh all of these factors, not just the cost factor.

Senator DIXON. I respect that.

Senator GLENN. Your bottom line is who can do what against what time base.

General FEDOROCHKO. That is correct.

Senator GLENN. To get combat effectiveness. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I am not a member of the subcommittee and I thank you very much.

Senator GLENN. We invited all the members of the full committee because we thought there would be a lot of interest in this hearing today.

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Duncan, what impact has Operation Desert Storm had on retention in our Reserve components?

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator, at this point it is a little premature to tell. We are following it very closely. There are mixed signals. At first, there were some indications that it might be an adverse factor. Now it is just much more cloudy. We are following it. But thus far we have not had sufficient time pass, I think, for us to reach any conclusions about whether it is an adverse impact or a good impact.

I keep suggesting to the services that if we handle the return of the reservists properly and if they come home and recognize that they are the heroes they truly are, that our retention problems will be very, very small.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Libby, the new strategy assumes that future crises will be similar to the Persian Gulf conflict and not a European-type scenario. Based on this assumption, what role will the Reserve combat forces have in this type of conflict?

Mr. LIBBY. Let me see if I can answer the beginning part of that. And then perhaps the Joint Staff representative would like to talk specifically about the role in the conflict.

The new strategy assumes that the basic contingency for which we should size and structure our forces is a regional contingency. That does not mean that it would be like a Persian Gulf crisis. For one thing, there are not many armies out there like Saddam Hussein's army at that distance.

Each of these situations is likely to be unique. And therefore, in the process of building the forces, there was an examination of a host of different possible contingencies at different ranges and with different warning times.

In this case, of course, Saddam Hussein moved initially into Kuwait with very little warning. But then there was a long period in which we had the luxury of building up forces. That luxury of time may not be present in the future. In that sense the Persian Gulf is a model, but not the only model on which the work to create the base force was done.

The Reserve component's role in this particular contingency would be as envisioned by the general strategy: to support the transport and other activities of the Active component combat forces to the extent that there is very little warning and very little time to get ready for the forces. They would then be available for uses in a protracted war, in a concurrent situation, or as a follow-on as the contingency may develop.

So the Active role would be early deploying. The Reserve component supporting at that stage, and also, as soon as the political will is shown to get them ready, to ready them up, and then to bring them on in the time frame that they can be available.

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator, could I add to that just a brief comment?

Basically we see "rapid deployment forces." And much of the debate here gets bogged down in words and terminology. "Rapid deployment forces," the Secretary said, are going to be primarily, though not exclusively, Active duty forces because those would be

the ones who go in the first hour of a conflict. But Reserve forces will continue to be relied upon for "early reinforcing" missions as well as "follow-on reinforcing" missions and some Reserve units and individuals will be included in the rapid deployment forces depending upon the missions that have to be performed.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Duncan, measuring the readiness of our Reserve components has been a persistent problem. Is the Department considering any revision in how you measure the readiness of the Reserve components, particularly the combat forces?

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, one of the initiatives that we are all working on is to find a way to talk about readiness that is much more performance-related instead of resource-related.

We have a system now that is better than some think, the SORTS system. But it is basically resources related. It tells us how much equipment there is on hand and those kinds of things. It is not very useful for measuring intangibles, such as unique esprit de corps, leadership, morale, and so forth of particular units.

And so I am interested in exploring, and I think the services are, Mr. Jehn is helping us on this, we are jointly working to develop new methods of measuring readiness because we all agree we need a better method.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Duncan, what impact will these reductions in the Reserve components have on the Individual Ready Reserves?

Mr. DUNCAN. It is unclear. One of the things we learned, Senator, from the conflict is that we needed, as you know we called up the Individual Ready Reserve in January, just before Desert Storm commenced. And we found out that we do need Individual Ready Reservists who have certain unique skills to fill in certain units.

One of the concepts that I am exploring and I just learned this week that the Army is also exploring the same idea, is the idea of perhaps taking some of the Individual Ready Reservists that have unique skills that would be needed and making them something a little different than the Individual Reservists as we know them today. Not quite Selective Reservists, but something more. Individual Reservists who would be accessible. This is just something that is in the discussion stage at this point.

But clearly we need to find ways to fill in units without breaking up other units. And we are exploring those concepts.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Duncan, considering the sums of money invested by the States and local communities in support of their Reserve and National Guard units, are there any provisions to compensate these localities as units are deactivated?

Mr. DUNCAN. To compensate the communities? I am aware of no such proposals. Although we are doing a couple of things, Senator, as we are forced by the budgetary top lines to reduce the size of the force structure, we are doing such things as talking to the units that served in the Persian Gulf to see if there is any way we can continue to use those units. We are also working with the National Guard Bureau to try to minimize adverse impact in the case of National Guard on any communities that might feel those kinds of things.

We have no magic solution, but we are very sensitive to that and we are working very hard to try to minimize those impacts.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Libby, under the concept of the base plan, what changes will there be in the role of the CINCs?

Mr. LIBBY. This is primarily, I think, more a question for the Joint Staff representative. But let me state my understanding.

Senator THURMOND. You can pass it to him, if you would rather do that.

Mr. LIBBY. All right. I will.

General FEDOROCHKO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. [Laughter.]

General FEDOROCHKO. Sir, the base force construct plan is a conceptual plan. It is not directly relatable to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) nor is it intended to say this is the direction that the Department will be in 5 years, 10 years, or 15 years from now.

The UCP review is ongoing now. The Chairman and the JCS are reviewing the future. And I am sure that there will be some modifications made to the plan ultimately.

But, again, Senator, I know it is confusing. We perhaps have not articulated it clearly enough, but this is not intended to be a Unified Command Plan.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Jehn, one of the most frequently heard criticism of the Reserves is that it has a great deal of politics involved in the promotion and selection of officers. Please understand that this is not my position. I am just stating what the criticism is.

Is this a valid criticism as you see it? And what should be done to correct this perception?

Mr. JEHN. To be honest, Senator, I do not have a firm position one way or another on that question. I have not heard it a great deal although it has come up occasionally.

As you may know, however, we have just recently completed a thorough review of the services' promotion practices for field grade and general officers throughout the Active components. And we believe that a similar review should be conducted for the Reserve components.

The position I am going to be taking with the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary is that we ought to review the practices we use to select officers for promotion in the Reserve components, both for general officer positions, but also for field grade positions. If they accept my recommendation, we will, sometime this year, conduct that review. And we will have, I think, a much better answer to your question than I have today.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Duncan, and my time is up after this question, assuming that the cuts in the Reserve components are approved, which in my mind may be questionable, how will you ensure that States are not disproportionately impacted by the cuts?

Mr. DUNCAN. I go back to my previous answer, Senator. We are working with the Guard Bureau to try to minimize adverse impact. Basically, we start with the Preamble to the Constitution, provide for the common defense, and that is what we are in the business about.

But as we design forces and as we have to reduce forces, if the reductions have an adverse impact on unique geographical areas, specific geographical areas, we will do all we can to minimize that impact. We are not looking to harm anyone. To the contrary, we are looking to minimize impact. What we are trying to do is to

design forces that are the most capable for the world that we see in the next several years.

Mr. JEHN. Senator, if I may, I would like to just add to that.

To the extent the effects on local communities and States are economic because of the closing of armories or bases or the reduction in reserve units, our Office of Economic Adjustment, which is part of my Secretariat, stands ready to assist local communities in making adjustments. I think we have produced an enviable record over the last 30 years in doing just that, in assisting communities to adjust to the closure of bases, to the closures of defense plants, and so on.

We are prepared to do all we can to minimize the adverse consequences of reductions of these kinds.

Senator THURMOND. Are you looking into the question of being sure that we do not dispose of bases that are needed by the Guard or the Reserves?

Mr. JEHN. I believe that was a factor that was considered in our base closure recommendations.

Senator THURMOND. I suggest you look into that.

Mr. JEHN. I will, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I want to thank you, gentlemen, for your presence and I commend you for your good work.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On page 3 of the Total Force Policy Report, the indication says whether to place early deploying combat capability for crisis response in the Reserve components depends principally on the immediate readiness of the reserve units involved, the probability that they would be available when needed, and the desirability of having the execution of more of our strategy dependent on reserve availability.

Any of you gentlemen, how would you assess the combat readiness of our Reserves using specifically how you felt about what happened in the Persian Gulf and then a little bit beyond that, if you could?

Mr. DUNCAN. I will interpret your question broadly. Combat readiness meaning combat readiness for all units, including combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

As it turns out, we really did not know how fast they would show up, first of all, in the mobilization. They showed up. They showed up quickly. And they were ready to go. The number of problems we had with 228,000 National Guardsmen and Reservists are statistically insignificant and not worth talking about compared to how fast almost a quarter of a million people showed up and were prepared to go.

Some of the Reservists required some post-call up training. Usually that was planned for and a function of something we knew for a long time. Others were instantly ready to go.

When you talk about combat readiness, it is almost imperative that you focus on what kind of units are you talking about. For example, in the earliest days, even before the President authorized an involuntary call up of Reserve forces, during the first 20 days of the conflict, literally thousands of National Guardsmen and Re-

servists volunteered to participate. And a very high percentage of all of the strategic airlift flights were flown, for example, by volunteer Reservists.

At one point, we literally had—there was a day I remember sitting in a meeting with the Secretary—we literally had over 10,000 volunteers from the Air Reserve components alone. They were ready to go, instantly ready to go.

You can talk, of course, about certain kinds of units differently than you can talk about other kinds of units. It depends upon their size, their mission and so forth. But generally, we were very, very pleased with their capability and their readiness.

Senator SMITH. How about the blending in with the Active forces as they got there, what is your assessment of that? How did that work? From what I understand from the people in my State, it worked very well.

Mr. DUNCAN. Generally it worked very well. There were instances which we are trying to . . . I mean, I am not suggesting that when you go to a war everything is as neat and as tidy as you would like to have it. I have heard instances, and I am trying to find out more facts, about where there was a little bit of reluctance to integrate some of the Reserve forces, reluctance by some of the individual Active units to integrate some of the Reserve units.

But as a general proposition, that did not happen. As a matter of fact, I have many, many stories where commanders have come back and told me they simply could not tell the difference between the Active and the Reserve forces. And curiously enough, some of the stories that are most praise-worthy of the performance of the Reserve components are coming from active duty unit commanders who simply had one impression of Reserve component forces and that impression was quickly dispelled in about 30 seconds when they saw the reality of the quality of the people that had been called to active duty.

So some of the greatest praises that I am hearing today are coming from active duty commanders.

Senator SMITH. With this new concept, not new concept, but concept in use today in today's real world of rapid deployment and quick mobility, it seems to me that it is pretty obvious that the Reserve units take on a much more significant meaning than in the past. They were so much a part of what happened in the Persian Gulf and should another situation develop like that, then any problems that are there hopefully we would focus on to see to it that it would be as smooth as possible.

But I think all things being equal, from what I understand, things went very well.

Mr. DUNCAN. I will tell you, Senator, in the context of this Total Force Policy study, we were energetically debating, as recently as July 1990, the whole statutory provision that authorizes the President to call Reserves.

And I will tell you that the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq took place on August 2. And by August 22, all of the military services, the field commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense had all debated the issue of the need for Reserve forces and the President

of the United States had authorized, by executive order, the calling of those Reserve forces.

Now I will not say that it was a perfect process, but given the fact that so much was unknown, to have all of that happen within 20 days, according to the statute and according to policy, was pretty impressive from my perspective.

Senator SMITH. I think what was also very impressive and I think as the days, months, and years go by you will have a chance to assess how significant this was, but you literally jerked people out of one life into another one. An active duty military person has reason to expect transfers and changes and so forth. But when you take somebody out of a job, literally put them right in to active duty and in a matter of days, over to the Persian Gulf, I mean there are a lot of personal decisions that have to be made in a hurry. And speaking from New Hampshire's point of view, Mr. Chairman, I did not get one letter of complaint about that. No concerns or complaints by anybody. As a matter of fact, some people went above and beyond, I know of one particular case without being specific on names, of an individual who had just opened up a business and proceeded to borrow money just to continue hiring his employees so that he would not have to lay them off even though he did not have any idea when he was coming back.

I think these are the kinds of things that perhaps go somewhat unnoticed, but believe me there were some very, very patriotic decisions that were made.

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator, may I add that they do not go unnoticed. I flew up to New Hampshire and had the honor of appearing with Governor Gregg in your Statehouse to recognize many of the people of New Hampshire who made those kinds of sacrifices.

Senator SMITH. I know you did. I appreciate it. I am very concerned about these end-strength reductions and proposed reductions. I know the Army and the Air Force, as I understand it, are going to have the most difficulty in dealing with them. How are you going to focus on the mandated retirements or mandated removal from the service, where you cannot do it by voluntary separation. What types of criteria do you plan to use in the Army, Air Force? Give me some examples of the criteria.

Just to make one editorial comment, my concern—in talking to active duty military personnel and others, the families of those people—is that if you ask somebody to separate, you know, you can ask them to separate voluntarily. If they do not separate voluntarily, you can separate them, but there is that stigma there that you are okay as an officer, or whatever your rank is, but because I asked you, you get the impression that you are not quite as good as the other guy and so out you go. I am very concerned about that because of the morale impact that that might have.

Could you just comment on how you feel this is going to be accomplished in a general sense?

Mr. JEHN. Sure. The concern you have expressed, by the way, is one that is shared by the Secretary and by the rest of us who are worrying about this very problem. The first way we address an issue, of course, is to minimize the number of involuntary separations we have to go through. So, as most of the members of this committee know, we have constructed a reduction plan over the

next few years that maximizes the use of normal attrition in achieving our end-strength reductions.

The actual involuntary separations that are necessary, and as I said, we hope to keep those to an absolute minimum, are basically going to follow the procedures we have used for a number of years. They will be focused, first, in occupational areas that are currently over-strength. They will also address individuals who have not kept pace with their peers in terms of promotion and so on.

But I think first and foremost, our idea is to try to minimize those separations, as possible, and when involuntary separations are necessary, for example, try to focus as many as we can on individuals who are already eligible to draw retirement benefits.

For those who are separated, however, we have also—as you know, and I am very thankful to the Congress for providing us help in this regard—we have constructed a pretty intricate and well-developed safety net, if you will, for these people. It begins with separation pay for both officers and now enlisted—this was authority you granted us in the 1991 authorization bill, and we are very grateful for that—but you also granted us the authority to introduce a wide range of transition benefits, ranging from assistance in getting jobs, preparing resumes, how to interview for jobs and the like, where to find jobs, but also authorizing us to provide benefits such as short-term medical care, access to commissary, and PX privileges.

So the concern you have expressed is one that is shared widely throughout the Department and we are doing all we can to minimize it.

Senator SMITH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much.

RESERVE MISSIONS

Mr. Duncan, I have a number of quotes from your previous testimony where you stated once again that the policy of the Department of Defense is to maintain as small an active peace-time force as national security policy and military strategy and overseas commitment permit. And then you quoted, I believe, Mr. Jehn, you quoted him as saying, "it is the DOD policy to place maximum reliance on Guard and Reserve units and manpower. We use Active units and manpower to support scheduled overseas deployments or sea duty training requirements and to support the rotation base. Above that level, we plan to support military contingencies with Guard and Reserve units and manpower when they can be available and ready within a planned deployment schedule on a cost-effective basis."

You then indicated that the reinforcing role concept ignores the obvious opportunities for using the Reserve. Finally, you indicated that the reinforcing role concept incorrectly assumes that force packages designed for contingency missions cannot include Reservists because of the inevitable result of unacceptable delays for retraining or mobilization.

Now, is that still the policy of the Department of Defense?

Mr. DUNCAN. Those were my words from last year, Senator?

Senator GLENN. Yes. You were quoted in part here, from a more lengthy quote. Actually you had a quote within a quote.

Mr. DUNCAN. I do not remember the words or where I said it, but certainly I would subscribe to the general view that anyone who would suggest that Reserve forces be relegated entirely to a late reinforcing role is missing huge opportunities for using Reservists in earlier roles.

Senator GLENN. I am not talking about other people. I am talking about, is it the policy of the Department of Defense to place maximum reliance on Guard and Reserve units and manpower. If it can be done with the Reserves you do it there, otherwise it goes to the regulars. Is that it?

Mr. DUNCAN. I believe it is. I believe it is.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Jehn.

Mr. JEHN. That is how I would characterize their policy, yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Libby, is that your understanding also?

Mr. LIBBY. My understanding, sir, is we would do the mission in the most cost-effective manner possible, and that often involves the Reserve force. I have never heard it put exactly in the terms you are putting it.

Senator GLENN. General Fedorochko.

General FEDOROCHKO. Thank you, sir. Sir, that is my understanding. Our force structure flows from the mission requirements, and those include, as you aptly suggested before, the time lines that are required to deploy forces and get them there. We have to do that in the most cost-effective manner.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General FEDOROCHKO. With risk considered, et cetera, and I think we do that.

Senator GLENN. Well, is that the way we are deciding things? Because we just come out with a salami slice approach, it appears, on some of the figures. A certain percentage for the regulars, a certain percentage cut for the Reserves. Does that all just happen to fall that way? Is it all accidental?

Mr. DUNCAN. No, let me address that. That question, Senator, as you know is asked so often—and primarily it focuses on the Army because of the size of the Army.

Senator GLENN. That is right.

Mr. DUNCAN. The answer is relatively simple. Most, or a disproportionate amount, of the Army's combat structure is in its Active component. A disproportionate amount, something like 70 percent of its combat support, combat service support, is in its Reserve structure. And when you take down combat units that, because of the new geopolitical situation, we believe are no longer necessary, it is very difficult to make a case that you should leave in the force structure all of the support units for those combat units.

Therefore, if you are to be cost effective and you take out combat units, you should likewise take out the support units for those combat units.

Mr. JEHN. If I may, Senator, let me just add some specific numbers to what Mr. Duncan said there. For example, a division force equivalent in the Army comprises about 48,000 end strength. In the Active component there, the combat portion is equal to about

15,000 end strength, which leaves approximately 33,000 of the 48,000 as combat support and combat service support.

Approximately 70 percent of that 33,000, or 23,000, is in the Reserve components. So in other words, what we have, out of a division force equivalent of about 48,000 end strength, we have about 25,000 in the Active component, about 23,000 in the Reserve component.

So if we remove an Active component division, we take about 25,000 out of the Active force. And it stands to reason then, as Mr. Duncan just said, that what we next want to do is take out the 23,000 in Reserve component end strength that is associated with that Active component end strength that comes down.

Senator GLENN. Okay, I do not want to spend all our time on this, but I agree. Where there is a direct combat support, combat service support, function, why, they will run roughly the same percentage.

What I am aiming at, though, are the things in your supplemental report. You have 40, maybe 50, different specialties, some of which are performed 100 percent in the Guard and Reserve, various percentages clear down.

I thought what we were going to get to help guide us for the future was something that used the experience of Desert Storm and told us, here are the things that worked and here are the things that did not work. I talked to General Schwarzkopf over there about 10 weeks ago. We had a small Senate group over there and he gave us quite a list of things. He talked about the Reserve/Regular relationships, and what worked and what did not work, and some of the things were quite obvious at the time. I think we need to reflect some of that thinking in this.

You said you reflected Desert Storm. I am not sure we reflected all the experience that Desert Storm——

Mr. JEHN. No. All of the experience of Desert Storm is most assuredly not reflected in the Total Force Policy Study Reports, sir. That, of course, was completed back in November and December.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

Mr. JEHN. And the Department is actively engaged right now in doing exactly the analysis you have suggested ought to be done. Namely, trying to draw lessons from Desert Shield and how things worked, what things did not work, and what effect that ought to have on our budget and end-strength decisions over the next year or two.

Senator GLENN. Well, are we going to continue using the round-out concept, for instance, on the same time base we have? Where, when you send the 24th, you expect the 48th to go with them? Or, some people did, anyway, and that has been the impression that we have been given. Otherwise, you are sending a two-brigade division over and expecting somebody to come over and fill in later. Are we altering that kind of a situation?

Mr. DUNCAN. That is an interesting question. I know some members of the Senate have informed me in hearings that they were lead to believe, I am not sure by whom, lead to believe that round-out brigades would deploy in the first hours of a conflict. I will tell you that I have studied that issue probably as much as anyone, and I am convinced that it was never the intent to deploy round-out

brigades in the first hours. There is a reasonable disagreement about how long it takes to——

Senator GLENN. Then our intent is to deploy immediately two-brigade divisions. Is that right?

Mr. DUNCAN. The intent will probably not be, although this is still being debated within the Department, not to use round-out units of the brigade size in rapid deployment forces. That is not to say that the round-out concept is bad. I happen to believe it is a good concept that needs to be explored, perhaps at battalion and company level size.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

Mr. DUNCAN. But at least at the brigade size, it is going to be very difficult for us to include brigade-size units in rapid deploying forces.

ROLE OF MARINE CORPS

Senator GLENN. I may get into that later. I would like to get into another one. I read clear through the Total Force Policy Report, and I am surprised at the use or non-use of the Marine Corps. The only way that the Marine Corps is even mentioned in there is in its amphibious role. Yet when you wanted the readiness force to go in and plug that gap in there between Kuwait and Dhahran, you put the Marine Corps in because it had all the elements of supporting arms. That is its reason for being. It is the readiness force. It always has been, traditionally, for 200 years.

Now we used it over there the way it has been used, and they were ready, and used the Reserves more integrated, I think, than anybody else—right into the regular units. The only way it is referred to is in the amphibious role. Of course, that is what Secretary Cheney used to shoot down the V-22 also, saying it only cut down a few minutes time from ship to shore and if that was going to be the only use for the V-22, I would agree with him 100 percent.

But the Marine Corps is not limited just to an amphibious role; it has been a ready force, ready to go. Part of your equipment is boxed and ready to be put on the trucks or the ships or whatever instantly. And yet we find in here, in the contingency forces of all places, the Marine Corps is practically left out. They are off in the Atlantic and the Pacific some place and are left out of the contingency forces, and we got four Army heavy divisions in the contingency forces, I gather. Is that the way we are going?

Mr. DUNCAN. I can only speak for myself on this as far as the Total Force Policy Study Report and the Marine Corps is concerned, but I will say that we did not presume to attempt to address all issues that could be addressed in the context of all warfighting capabilities. The Marine Corps is an outstanding example of the use of total force.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, it was in fact Bravo Company of the 4th Battalion of the 4th Marine Division that set one of the records that we will be talking about for some time around here in the conflict in the Persian Gulf. Because they do have the air-ground concept and their task force concept approach, they integrated Reservists very, very effectively. There was no attempt in

the report to suggest otherwise. We just could not address all questions in the context of that limited report.

Senator GLENN. I understand that, but even if we had not had Desert Storm, would the use of the Marine Corps in the future be just solely looked at as amphibious? Not for contingency forces, to be the ready force?

Mr. JEHN. No, sir.

Senator GLENN. It goes with all elements of supporting arms, air, the whole works right with it and supplies for 30 days move-in.

Mr. JEHN. No, sir. In fact, I believe, my recollection is that not only do we talk about the amphibious role of the Marine Corps in the Total Force Policy Report, but we also talk to the role of the Marine Corps in using their prepositioned supplies. And as you know, those three prepositioned brigades were really a key element in our ability to get forces into the Persian Gulf in a hurry.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

Mr. JEHN. The experience of the Marine Corps during the Persian Gulf war was so successful that I think the Army now is looking at the same concept as a way to get some of their equipment into a theater in a hurry. So there was no attempt or desire to slight the Marine Corps in any way. I quite agree with your assessment of the Marine Corps' capabilities.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Let me go into it, then. You said that the Army is going to move in the same direction for organization as the Marine Corps, is that correct?

Mr. JEHN. No, no. What I said was simply, and I do not presume to speak for the Army here, so please, do not misinterpret what I am saying.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

Mr. JEHN. What I did say was that the Marine Corps' experience using maritime prepositioning during the Persian Gulf conflict was so successful that I know the Army is actively looking at the possibility of putting a division or several brigades worth of equipment on ships as well.

Senator GLENN. Okay, well, would that include indigenous air to the divisions and things like that that they are going to need if they are going into combat?

Mr. JEHN. I do not know. In fact, of course, in the Marine Corps case, it does not. Aircraft are flight ferried or carried in transport aircraft as part of the prepositioning concept, although some ground support equipment is included on the ships.

General FEDOROCHKO. Senator, if I may.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General FEDOROCHKO. I would just like to clarify a point. I brushed over it very rapidly, and I apologize for that, in my opening remarks. The Marine Corps forces are an integral part of the contingency force. They have always been in our planning as such. Their capabilities are rather significant, and as you have mentioned, they had a major role to play in the Middle East.

As a matter of fact, the Marine Corps forces that are a part of the Atlantic force and the Pacific force, that is the forward deployed and the MEBs, MPS, and things like that, really in reality are our first ready reaction force to crisis such as the type that you are referring to.

Senator GLENN. Would you look at them then from the JCS level as being the first deployed contingency force because they are deployed in the Atlantic and Pacific areas, is that correct?

General FEDOROCHKO. Yes, sir. That is correct, sir.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General FEDOROCHKO. And then we pile on with the heavier forces. Depending on the circumstances and time lines, the forward presence forces in the Atlantic and the Pacific, such as carriers and Marine air-ground task forces, would be augmented by Army, Navy, Air Force, and additional Marine Corps units.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY APPROVAL

Senator GLENN. Let me ask one other thing. Have all the service chiefs signed off on this Total Force Policy? Have the JCS passed on this and said, yes, this is a great plan. We can use it, and it is the best way to go for the future. They are the ones who are going to have to do the fighting. Have the services concurred on this?

Mr. DUNCAN. I have heard no dissent and the Chairman characterized, in testimony before, I think, the Senate—it is quoted in my written statement, December 3 testimony, I believe—his own belief of the success of the Total Force Policy. And the Secretary has made it clear it is the policy of the future.

Senator GLENN. How about the base force plan that we are talking about? Have the JCS, the individual service members, signed off on that? Have they all signed on that—that is the policy of the future?

Mr. DUNCAN. Absolutely, sir. That is part of the budget.

General FEDOROCHKO. Sir, are you talking about the force structure plans that are reflected in the President's budget in the FYDP?

Senator GLENN. The Total Force Policy generally.

General FEDOROCHKO. Because if you are talking about the number of divisions, the number of wings, the number of this and that and the other thing, most assuredly that has been discussed at the highest levels of the Department, and it is supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the senior leadership of the Department.

Senator GLENN. Has the concept been agreed upon as to the split between regulars, reserves, and the split functions between the services in this new concept, the contingency strategic Atlantic-Pacific concept? Has everybody signed off on that?

Mr. JEHN. Absolutely, sir.

Senator GLENN. They have. Okay. All four services.

Mr. DUNCAN. This could not have been debated more exhaustively, in my opinion, than it has been with the Joint Chiefs—not just within OSD. This was not an OSD product exclusively.

Senator GLENN. I am over my time, but if you will just let me finish this thought, Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. General you are with the JCS. Did the JCS meet and talk about this and say, here is our concept for the different areas, contingency and strategic, and what each serv-

ice would do in this area, and are they signed off on this? And then it was presented to us as Total Force Policy?

General FEDOROCHKO. Mr. Chairman, the JCS met on numerous occasions, discussed the concept, discussed the forces, discussed the capabilities of the force against the threat. In that context, the issue was also discussed in terms of Active component versus Reserve component, how soon, how fast, how much combat power could we get there. Most assuredly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed off and endorsed the concept and the forces.

Senator GLENN. They signed off; they said, yes, we buy this thing and everybody concurred with it. Is that correct?

General FEDOROCHKO. On the base force construct, yes, sir. Now, I am not trying to be evasive. If you are asking me, sir, I can attest to you personally that the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed off on the base force construct.

If you are asking me, Mr. Chairman, did they personally sign off on the Total Force Policy Study Report, I cannot answer that question.

The base force, I believe, is consistent with the Total Force Policy approach. I do not know how to answer you any other way, sir.

Senator GLENN. Well, were there objections? I will put it a different way. If they did not formally approve, did they formally object?

Mr. DUNCAN. To which, Senator, to the force structure that is included in the budget?

Senator GLENN. To any parts of either one, the base force structure plan that we are talking about—the force plan that we are talking about, or the Total Force Policy as it has been presented to us.

Mr. DUNCAN. I think the General has answered the question on the force structure and the force mix that is included in the President's budget. But with respect to the Total Force Policy Study, of which there was a 24 member study group, the way Mr. Jehn and I handled that was to circulate drafts to all of the members of the study group, including the representatives of the Joint Chiefs. It included the DCSOPS of the Army, for example, and people at that level, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

And on the basis of that, we did not—I mean, to be candid—sit down and have unanimous consent to every word that was included in that report, but all of the members of the study group had an opportunity to review drafts, to provide input, to engage in the debate, privately and formally, and ultimately we drafted a report which represents our best understanding and judgment of the collective views.

I will be the first to tell you that probably Mr. Jehn and I do not agree with every word in the report, but I believe it fairly represents the input—I hate that word "input"—but the input of all of the members of the study group as best as we could do it.

Mr. JEHN. Just to pick up on that, our letter to the Secretary of Defense in forwarding the report, I think, summarizes it quite well. We said, "While much of the final report has the collective support of the study group, every member does not agree with every point in it. To the extent possible, the report reflects the views of the members of the study group."

In other words, what Mr. Duncan and I tried to insure was that the report reflected honest and heart-felt dissent on the part of some members about some points. We tried to give the Secretary as balanced a view as we could of the views of the study group, and I think we were successful in doing that, sir.

Senator GLENN. Okay, well, my time is up, but what I was getting at was this. The people who are going to have to carry this out, if we go into combat again one of these days, the people who are in the individual services.

Mr. JEHN. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. They are going to be the ones implementing the relationship between Regulars and Reserves. They are going to be implementing the stated views and policies of the Total Force Policy, and they have to buy that or we are on some pretty thin ice. And they have to be wholeheartedly for implementing it, or it is not going to work very well. That is the reason I was concerned about whether they concurred or did not concur with the recommendations in both areas and they are separate.

And if I want to follow up, I will later, but I am over my time. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, please, go ahead and follow up. I will be happy to yield.

Senator GLENN. Go ahead.

Senator SMITH. My concern, just so that I might state it for the record here, is that not only in the area of end strength and manpower reductions, but also in some of the other things that we are looking at across the board in defense, are being—and I hate to use the term—budget driven, rather than national security driven. But I believe that to be the case.

I have not found too many people that I have talked to privately on this, either in the military or in the government, who are enthusiastic about the magnitude of the reductions that we are talking about here. We have had testimony before the Armed Services Committee—I cannot recall whether it was a particular subcommittee or the full committee—in which individuals—I remember Secretary Cheney saying he could not respond to a crisis like we had in the Persian Gulf, with these manpower reductions, in 5 years.

He said, in response to a question, could you 5 years from now do what we had to do in the Persian Gulf again, and he said, not if we had a similar circumstance simultaneously, for example, in Korea or some place else. Well, we cannot predict that.

So why are we rushing to judgment so fast on these dramatic reductions? I understand what Congress imposed. I did not agree with it, but I understand it. But that does not mean we cannot speak out; it does not mean that we have to acquiesce to these things.

I would just like some feedback from you gentlemen. You are saying that our national security is in no way breached by what we are now proposing.

Mr. JEHN. Let me just make a quick observation on that, sir. In about 20 years now of work in the national security arena, I have never observed a circumstance where everyone in the Pentagon

thought their budgets were as large as they ought to be. This time, of course, is no different in that respect.

But I think what we have labored hard to do and we believe successfully done, is achieve a balanced defense program that is both cognizant of and accurately and sensibly reflects the fiscal realities we face, as well as providing for the country's defense at a suitable level of risk. And perhaps Mr. Libby and General Fedorochko would like to add to that, but basically there is always a bit of a balancing act done here.

Senator SMITH. But is it not—excuse me for interrupting you.

Mr. JEHN. Go ahead.

Senator SMITH. But is it not correct that a large portion, if not all, of these decisions were made prior to the Persian Gulf conflict?

Mr. JEHN. I think it is fair to say most of them were being made while we were conducting Operation Desert Shield. In other words, August, September, October were a very intense period of time in the Department, not only because we were conducting this buildup in the Persian Gulf, but because we were putting the final touches and actually making the ultimate, final decisions that are now reflected in the defense program and the budget for 1992 and 1993 that is before the Congress.

Senator SMITH. Would somebody else with to speak?

Mr. LIBBY. If I might supplement that a little bit. The strategy that was developed, beginning in November 1989, looked at, among other things, something like the Desert Storm conflict as it eventually developed. One of the things specifically pointed to in that period was a regional threat—read Iraq—into the Arabian Peninsula, and on that basis, forces were developed, concepts were employed to determine what it was that we thought we would need for that sort of contingency.

And it is because of that that when the Secretary was asked in previous testimony, Secretary Cheney, could you respond to something like Desert Storm in 1995; he said, yes, but it would be done differently. We would have different forces. This time we took two divisions out of Europe. It would be harder to do in the future because we would only have a much smaller force structure left in Europe, and you may end up taking it all out if you did it that way.

So his answer is, and the answer of Chairman Powell, asked the same question at the same hearing was, "yes, but." We can do it, but it will be done differently.

Senator SMITH. The question is, why do it differently.

Mr. LIBBY. You do it differently for a few basic reasons. One is because the threat has changed. The forces that we built for today were built primarily to look at a canonical Soviet thrust across Western Europe, and that required a certain sort of—sir?

Senator SMITH. I think that is a given. I understand that. There is no question that the circumstances in Eastern Europe certainly would support basic changes in reductions in manpower, weapons, equipment, and so forth, in that area of the world. No question about that. But we have gone far beyond that in—all across the board, not only in manpower—you folks are all associated with that part of the equation.

Five years ago we were talking about a 650-ship Navy; today, we are talking about somewhere between a 400- and a 450-ship Navy. The world has not changed that much. We still are an island Nation, essentially, and I just—for the sake of no other reason other than having somebody put it on the record—as one Senator want to say I think we are making a terrible mistake. I think we are going to regret it. We are going to look back on this period in our history and we are going to be very sorry for what we did.

And I, frankly, am disappointed in the way so many in positions who know better are coming before this committee and not saying so. If you look at the end-strength figures on your manpower chart, as I understand that, we are going to total Active component—what is that--1.6 million.

Mr. JEHN. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. As I understand it, by fiscal 1997. We are what, now, 2.3, 2.4?

Mr. JEHN. No, no. Barely over 2 million, sir.

Senator SMITH. Two million. Other than the Soviet Union, what has changed? And that is a big other, I understand that, but there is a world out there that is changing, and 20 years from now, who knows. We may be in the middle of Africa in a conflict. I do not know. Nobody knows where it is going to be.

But the point is, we have a tremendous technological advantage today. We have a tremendous superiority in just the inventory. We have a superiority in manpower, training, all of these things, and I understand that we have to make reductions, yes. But why throw it all away?

WARNING ON DRAWDOWN

I will make one last point, and you can respond to if you like. We talk about all of this in relation to the budget, but in 1963 47 cents out of every dollar was spent on defense in this country. That is hardly even 30 years ago. At that time, John Kennedy was President of the United States. Today, it is 20 percent and going down, not up. Interest on the national debt is soon going to pass what we spend on defense.

So it is the portion of the pie, it is the priorities, that are concerning me, and I just sense that instead of swimming against the current, some of you are jumping into the raft and going on down with the river. And I think that the river is going in the wrong direction.

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator, at the risk of venturing into dangerous territory, let me respond. Because if you are implying that the Department of Defense and Secretary Cheney, in an area of unconstrained resources, would choose to lower the force structure of the Armed Forces to dangerous levels, you are just wrong. We would not.

But we do live in an era, not only of changed geopolitical circumstances, but of very severe budgetary constraint. The Secretary, I think, has been very candid that it is a matter of what risk is acceptable, and at the risk of getting into the nomenclature again of base force, basically, as I understood General Powell's explanation of that, that was not anything more or less than the force below

which our Nation cannot afford to go. The risk is unacceptable below that force.

He did not indicate, and the General can correct me if I am wrong, but I have never heard General Powell say that this was, you know, the force unconstrained by budgets that we would necessarily choose, but it is an acceptable force level to meet our national security interests in the future changed world, given the budgetary constraints. So it is a matter of judgment and reasonable people can reach different judgments about that, but we are constrained by budgets as well as the new realities of the world.

General FEDOROCHKO. Senator, if I just might add perhaps a point to it. What we sought to do was to provide for an orderly plan for downsizing or building down smartly our Armed Forces consistent with the needs of the new world environment that we saw, what we envision for the future, our new strategy, and domestic fiscal constraints.

Now, as we build down, there are what you might call off ramps, or exits, and as the Secretary has said, if the world unfolds differently or if there are marked changes which cause us great concern, he and the President will be back to the Congress and say, we cannot do this, we must change our plans.

Senator SMITH. And the ball will be on the 10-yard line and we have got to move it all the way across the 50 and back down to the goal line again, and that is the whole point. We went through this in the Carter years. And not to be political about it, but frankly, if it was President Dukakis proposing this, there would be an uproar in this country.

I just want it on the record how I feel about it. I do not care what people think of me for saying it, but I just want it on the record. We are making a mistake and we are going to regret it. Thank you.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. I do not have any more questions at this time. Thank you.

Senator GLENN. All right. Thank you.

Mr. Jehn, with respect to the freedom of the Total Force Policy Study Group to explore options and make recommendations, you testified last year that, and I quote, "I should also state publicly, as I have on previous occasions, the Secretary has given us no stated outcome. He has not described the conclusion he wants us to reach. We are totally unfettered in making our best policy recommendations to the Secretary."

Were you, Mr. Duncan or Mr. Jehn, either one, or the Executive Director of the Total Force Policy Study Group, given any predetermined outcomes to work toward or constrained in any way in putting forth your report?

Mr. JEHN. No, sir.

Senator GLENN. I have two memos that were addressed to you in your respective positions as chairman and vice-chairman of the Study Group. These memos were sent to you by Mr. Libby. You have been provided with copies of them at the table before you.

Both memos clearly indicate rather strong opposition to what he termed a general Reserve-favorable tilt. So even before we received your interim report on the Total Force Policy Study, it would

appear that a decision had already been made to reduce substantially Reserve and National Guard force structure. Indeed, the memos clearly direct you to reverse course from leaning toward expanded roles for the Reserve and Guard and clearly tell you to build a case for Active and Reserve force reductions.

I want to ask unanimous consent, without objection, to include them in the record.

But, Mr. Jehn, did those memos change the direction and outcome of the Total Force Policy Study?

[The information follows:]

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

August 3, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP

SUBJECT: Draft Interim Report

Attached is a copy of the draft interim report that will be discussed at the Study Group meeting on Thursday, August 9, 1300 to 1430 in room 3E869.

As noted in the July 23 memorandum from Messrs. Jehn and Duncan, the purpose of the August 9 meeting will be to discuss substantive points of the draft report. To facilitate incorporating your comments into the draft that will be sent to Secretary Cheney, the chairman has asked that at the August 9 meeting you provide him a written copy of your major comments. As requested previously, please provide editorial comments and minor changes in writing to the Executive Director prior to the August 9 meeting.

Frank A. Tapparo
Executive Director

Attachment

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Total Force Policy Study Group
Draft Interim Report

August 3, 1990

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DRAFT

August 3, 1990 1630

Interim Report of the Total Force Policy Study Group

I. Introduction

Since its inception in 1973, the Total Force Policy has been an unqualified success. There has been unprecedented integration of purpose and capability between the active and reserve components, as well as improved coordination among the DoD civilian, contractor, and host nation support communities. This has resulted in an extraordinarily high degree of efficiency in planning and employing U.S. military forces.

Although the Total Force Policy has been successful, the study mandated by the FY 1990 Defense Authorization Act is timely, as the policy must be reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted to facilitate operations in the changing defense environment we foresee for at least the coming decade. This new environment portends an era in which there probably will be less need for the large, rapidly available conventional forces that were maintained during the height of the Cold War, when we had to plan against the possibility of a massive attack by Warsaw Pact forces, launched on very short warning.

Furthermore, the security climate is changing from one that focused on the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat in Central Europe to a more diffuse, more uncertain multipolar world in which smaller, but equally intense, conflicts are likely to dominate. Our deterrent policy against the Warsaw Pact was a success. To ensure the continued effectiveness of that policy and to retain the ability to react to threats to the security of the United States, its friends, and allies in the uncertain times ahead will require continued dependence on strong active and reserve forces. These forces, however, may have characteristics that differ in some important ways from those with which we have been familiar.

The effectiveness of the Total Force Policy has, in no small measure, been the result of a sound management structure within the Department of Defense (DoD)--a structure that has relied on unity of planning, programming, and implementation among the multiple components of the total force. Guided by the Secretary of Defense, with military expertise provided by the Chairman and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the management and command structures of the Defense Department have provided unity of effort as missions and responsibilities of active and reserve components have been integrated into a cohesive whole. This unity has enabled each element of the total force to do what it does best in a manner that results in economy of personnel and material resources. This economy has been achieved through the participation of a broad spectrum of managers and commanders. Officials representing both the active and reserve communities of the four military services, as well as the Coast Guard, have played key roles in deliberations related to the development, training, staffing, and equipping of the total force.

The Department has developed a force that capitalizes on the strengths of both the active and reserve components. Missions generally are assigned to the unit that can do it most cost effectively, and resources are allocated based on the deployment priority of individual units (the "first-to-fight" principle). The same approaches that helped us guide the force as it was growing will apply as we reduce the force's size in the future: we will continue to focus on missions and the ability to accomplish them in the most effective and economical manner. Force and manpower reductions will not be driven by an attempt to maintain proportionality among the components; rather, they will be guided by the requirement to provide a total force that meets the security needs of the country now and in the future.

In planning for reductions in our total force size, particular attention is being paid to future uncertainties to preserve the capability to rebuild forces eliminated from both the active and reserve structures, should future circumstances so require. Furthermore, although it may not be possible to keep all of our skilled leaders and technicians in our future active and reserve forces, we have not lost sight of the invaluable resource these people

represent. This report notes the provisions that are being made to retain the capabilities of trained personnel so that we can regain their expertise, if they are once again needed. The same principles will be applied to the retention of long-lead-time equipment, which will--at least for the immediate future--not be destroyed, except as necessary to meet the requirements of a CFE agreement.

During this period of transition, we see no need to change the procedures that DoD uses to evaluate the force structure and make force-mix decisions. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) has served the Department well for over a quarter of a century, and we will continue to rely on it in the years ahead. The PPBS has helped the Secretary allocate resources consistent with the readiness and sustainability priorities of both active and reserve forces. The PPBS also provides a mechanism for conducting biennial reviews of the force structure and adjusting the force mix as necessary to meet changing resources and world situations. The PPBS provides an ideal mechanism for reviewing each service's program and for integrating the military advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and field commanders with policy and resource guidelines promulgated by the Secretary and his senior staff. Complementing the PPBS are the efforts of the Conventional Forces Readiness Committee which reviews and advises on measures affecting the readiness and sustainability of our forces.

The interim report of the Total Force Policy Study Group will introduce, and the final report will address, broad total force issues, including:

- The military force structure necessary to meet the challenges of the coming decade, and the processes that will be used to facilitate the transition to the future structure;

- The rationale underlying decisions on both active and reserve forces, particularly with regard to manning levels and equipment allocations;

- The capability of the force to expand in the event of a national mobilization, and the time necessary to accomplish a mobilization;

- o The readiness and sustainability of the active and reserve components;

- o The role assigned to each component in the overall defense plan;

- o The ability of the force to respond to contingencies that require an immediate response and the reliance to be placed on both the active and reserve components (including combat, combat support, and mobility forces), along with the role of call-up authorities in generating required forces;

- o The types of forces included in each component and the rationale for their assignment;

- o The personnel and material resources needed to achieve a force that provides the desired capabilities;

- o The costs of both active and reserve forces (including expenditures associated with force structure changes) and the cost-benefit of changes in the active-reserve mix; and

- o The deployment plans for the force, and the rotation base necessary to maintain deployments.

II. Study Group Activities

The Department of Defense has devoted considerable resources to the Congressional requirement to review its Total Force Policy. The review has been led by the Assistant Secretary for Force Management and Personnel and the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, both of whom have been personally directing the day-to-day efforts of the Executive Director and his 40-person staff. The work has already begun to refine the Department's thinking about total force issues: the two assistant secretaries (ASDs) were heavily involved in this summer's review of the services' proposed FY92-97 programs,

and drew on the work of the Total Force Policy Study Group in formulating alternatives for the Secretary.

Efforts within the Department in support of the Total Force Policy Study have taken several parallel tracks:

- Study Group meetings;
- Colloquia to gain the views of experts outside the Department;
- Technical conferences to gain the perspective of DoD experts;
- Briefings to interested organizations that have resulted in inputs from reserve policy boards and associations; and
- Ongoing efforts of the Study Group staff and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs).

Study Group Meetings

The Study Group consists of 24 senior military and civilian officials who represent a wide variety of viewpoints within the Department. The group has met about twice a month since its inception in January to review substantive issues and provide guidance to the staff.

In addition to the two ASDs serving as Chairman and Vice-Chairman, four other Assistant Secretaries of Defense serve on the Study Group (Health Affairs, Production and Logistics, Program Analysis and Evaluation, and Legislative Affairs), as does the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Resources) and the Department's General Counsel. The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of each military department also serve on the Study Group, as does a representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a senior representative from each service, the head of each of the seven reserve components (including the Coast Guard Reserve), and the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board.

The Executive Director of the Study Group leads a professional staff of 40 civilian and military members who come from the organizations represented on the Study Group.

Topics considered in Study Group meetings have included:

- o Strengths and weaknesses of techniques for gaining reserve involvement in operational missions, including particularly volunteerism and the Title 10 U.S.C. 673b call-up authority;
- o Types of contingencies, if any, that might require use only of active forces;
- o Possible conflict scenarios and the forces needed for those conflicts;
- o Proposed methodologies for costing active and reserve units;
- o Missions and requirements for land, naval, tactical air, and mobility forces;
- o Manpower, personnel, and training issues; and
- o Medical forces.

Colloquia with Outside Experts

To gain the insight of outside experts and policymakers, the Study Group hosted two Total Force Policy colloquia. The first on April 10, was attended by twelve former military and civilian DoD officials. From that meeting, the Study Group received valuable advice on active and reserve mission areas, call-up authority, resource allocation, and manpower efficiency. At the second colloquium, on April 30 and May 1, attendees included current and former Members of Congress, current Congressional Budget Office staff members, former service secretaries, and former members of the Defense Advisory

Committee on Women in the Service. Discussion topics focused on national strategy, force structure, the Total Force Policy and force mix, the role of the reserves, call-up authority, mission transfers, resource allocation, and public support.

Several experts who were invited to the colloquia, but were unable to attend, met the Study Group chairmen in separate sessions.

Because of a strong interest in obtaining the views of our senior military commanders--a concern emphasized in the Goldwater-Nichols Act--the Study Group also met with the commanders-in-chief of the combatant commands or their deputies, and will continue to seek similar military expertise and advice as the study progresses.

Technical Conferences

The work of the Study Group was supplemented by technical conferences. These conferences provided an opportunity to meet with cost and personnel experts from each of the services. The cost conference gave us additional insight into methods for evaluating the costs of active and reserve forces in the performance of specific missions. That conference also permitted a discussion in some detail of the knotty definitional and data problems that confront efforts to determine the transition, operating, and support costs associated with active and reserve units. The conference on personnel discussed key manpower, personnel, and training issues that we will be facing as we begin to reduce the force structure in the months ahead.

Briefings by the Executive Director

The Executive Director of the Study Group has met with representatives of approximately 20 reserve advisory and policy boards and associations. From these meetings, the Study Group has gained valuable advice on the role of reserve forces not only in the total force, but also in gaining public support for national security missions.

Ongoing Work of the Staff

The Study Group staff and several FFRDCs have provided background information and research in support of the Study Group's work. The staff and the FFRDCs have examined a wide array of questions, including:

- Changes in the strategic environment and their implications for force structure and mix, including weighing the increased warning available for some scenarios against the short warning times available for others;

- DoD and service directives on "Total Force Policy," to illustrate how the policy has evolved since its articulation in the 1970s and its current applications for resource and mission allocation;

- The relative costs of active and reserve units performing roughly the same mission;

- How manpower, personnel, and training policies can encourage and benefit from flows of skilled personnel into the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and from the active component, and principles that could determine the relationship between peacetime manning levels and wartime requirements for active and reserve units;

- Alternative force structures, to illustrate the implications of varying the force mix (including any cost savings made possible by heavier reliance on reserve forces as well as the concomitant loss in immediate reaction capability and flexibility);

- DoD policy on sizing the total medical force to meet wartime requirements and to maintain on active duty a medical contingent at least adequate to meet wartime needs until reserve, retired, or civilian mobilization manpower becomes available;

- o Strategies to train reservists and mitigate the problems growing out of limitations on time available for reserve training, and to gain employer support for such training;

- o The processes and criteria used by the military departments to make force-mix decisions; and

- o Broader implications of the total force, include strategic forces, host nation support, use of government civilian employees, contractors, and retirees.

III. Initial Planning Principles

Since the adoption of the Total Force Policy, there has been very little central guidance within DoD for deciding what portions of the total force should be in the active and reserve components and what missions reserve forces should perform within that mix. The force-mix decision process is largely decentralized, and the criteria used by the military departments are largely informal in nature. The absence of formal initial guidance, along with periodic turnover of both civilian and uniformed staff within the military departments, contributes to a lack of a uniform institutional knowledge about, and a consistent application of, criteria that are important to force-mix decisions.

As the work of the Total Force Policy Study Group has proceeded in recent months, various planning principles have been debated. It is recognized that force-mix decisions should be based on mission-by-mission, unit-by-unit (capability vs. cost) analyses that relate to the war plans and that the rationale for those decisions must be credible and easily understood.

To this end, the Total Force Policy Study Group has focused attention on the following planning principles that might be given to the military departments for the preparation of future POMs and proposed budgets:

1. The total force must provide, within fiscal constraints, the most capable forces to ensure the security of the United States, protect American interests, and retain global leadership.

2. If significant cost savings can be achieved by a transfer of force structure to a reserve component (for the performance of a particular mission), a working presumption should be established that the transfer should be made. The presumption can then be rebutted by the demonstration of a sound military reason why the transfer should not be made (e.g., that the mission requires a specific forward-deployed unit for a period of several months).

3. The military departments will assume that the authority granted under 10 U.S.C. 673b will be exercised in circumstances in which such exercise is necessary to the performance of a required mission, and planning will be based on this assumption. War plans should, however, also include response options that do not require the exercise of authorities under 10 U.S.C. 673b (200,000 callup), where the associated threats and prospective warning times make such options feasible.

4. Active and reserve component forces will generally be balanced between combat and support forces, and particular missions will not be placed exclusively in one component unless there are demonstratively sound military reasons for doing so.

5. All units (active or reserve) will be resourced for equipment, training, personnel, facilities, and other purposes according to the sequence in which they would be required to perform their wartime or other operational missions.

6. On a regular basis, OSD/JCS will review the force structure/force mix of each service and the balance between combat, support, sustainment, and strategic lift capabilities that are required to meet national security objectives.

7. The reserve components will be considered for mission tasking across the full spectrum of military operations, from contingencies through full mobilization. In very short-warning contingencies, active, self-sustaining ground forces should be used initially, except where unique skills available in a reserve component are required.

8. The military services should expand the integration and should enhance the effectiveness of active and reserve components into a total force that provides the greatest military capability for the least cost.

9. To accommodate the objective of forward presence, the services will consider integrating periodic active and reserve component deployments into the forward basing program.

10. The Department of Defense should develop and implement a program of periodic evaluations, using objective, performance-oriented criteria, to assess the capability of each unit to perform its assigned mission.

IV. Issues

Mobilization

1. What assumptions should the nation make about the types of skills and number of reserve volunteers that would be available for military operations in the absence of any involuntary activation of reserve forces?

   The President has several ways to involuntarily activate reserve forces. The President has had authority (10 U.S.C. 673b) since 1976 to order Selected Reservists to active duty whenever they are needed to augment active forces for any "operational mission." In order to exercise this authority, it is not necessary for the President to declare a national emergency: he may order to active duty anywhere between one and 200,000 Selected Reservists for as long as 180 days (90 days plus a 90-day extension). The President has never used his 673b call-up authority.

The military departments have never recommended use of this authority and no Secretary of Defense has recommended the use of the authority to the President. In addition to the authority to call up reservists through 673b, the President, of course, could mobilize reservists by ordering a partial, full, or total mobilization should those more drastic steps be warranted by the international situation.

Since the 673b call-up authority has never been used, relying on volunteers has been the military's primary means for gaining access to reserve skills since the Total Force Policy was articulated. Reserve volunteers have worked well for missions that do not require close, intra-unit coordination (strategic airlift, for example), but they are less effective for missions where unit cohesiveness is important (for example, ground combat units).

Some observers urge the Department to develop specific assumptions about the numbers of volunteers and types of skills that reasonably would be available in the absence of any type of involuntary activation. Assumptions about the availability of reserve volunteers for strategic airlift might be, for example, that two-thirds of a reserve flying unit's capability would be available in the Air Force Reserve for 14 days with 48 hours' notice. Articulating these assumptions would help DoD define a subset of capabilities it requires even without involuntary activation of the reserves through either call-up or mobilization. Other analysts argue that the President will exercise the 673b call-up authority when it is needed for a valid operational mission, and thus, refining assumptions about reserve volunteer availability are unnecessary.

The Army position is that volunteerism, in selected skills, has effectively augmented active component units for short-notice contingencies in the past. However, volunteerism is not an acceptable alternative to meet the majority of operational missions assigned to Army reserve component units. Volunteers do not necessarily meet the skill/grade requirements for particular contingencies, nor do they

provide the unit cohesion and chain-of-command structure that is needed and can be achieved by activating units.

2. Should DoD assume that Title 10 U.S.C. 673b call-up authority will be used when needed for all operational missions? Conversely, should it assume that the call-up authority would be used only in the event of a global confrontation?

The debate on the effectiveness of the Title 10 U.S.C. 673b authority centers on differing assessments as to whether it would be used for peacetime contingencies and regional conflicts. There appears to be general acceptance it (and indeed, the more serious power to order partial, full, or total mobilization) would be used in the case of a global confrontation. Some argue that the 673b call-up authority has not been used in the 13 years since the President gained the authority because reserve volunteer levels have been sufficient for all of the missions in which augmentation of the active forces was needed. Others believe that political concerns have discouraged use of 673b, including concerns that Presidential use of the call-up authority would invoke Congressional imposition of the Wars Power Resolution. There is, however, no evidence that the Secretary of Defense or the services have ever requested the President to exercise his authority.

Some have urged that 673b authority be used in future contingencies, perhaps even if there are indications that volunteerism would be adequate. Proponents of this approach believe that acceptance and recognition of the need to utilize 673b for contingency responses would preclude it from being interpreted as a precursor to total mobilization, a fear some believe has weighed in decisions not to use the authority.

If the assumption is made that 673b authority will be used, then force structure decisions may allow for reductions in the size of active forces. Alternatively, significant reductions in the active force may leave the President with no option except involuntary call-up in even

the most minor contingencies. If the consensus is, for example, that the 673b authority extracts too heavy a political price during peacetime contingencies, or that the operational security problems associated with call-up may lesson its utility, then a different set of decisions may be made.

Both the Navy and the Army express concerns about planning based on 673b. In the 1980s, the Navy assumed that 673b would be invoked by the President if reserve augmentation was needed to carry out a particular operation. That assumption allowed the Navy to place significant reliance on the reserve component in some warfare areas. The Navy has since stated, however, that its experience in the Persian Gulf with minesweepers indicates that its assumption regarding the use of 673b was not valid. The Navy maintains that to say, as some do, that DoD has never formally requested 673b authority is disingenuous. Extensive discussions regarding the need for reserve assets in the Persian Gulf resulted in clear signals from both the White House and the Congress that use of 673b was not politically feasible. The Navy has stated that nothing has happened since to indicate that the political implications associated with involuntary recall have changed.

The Army similarly urges that general assumptions about routine use of 673b authority be avoided. The Army stresses that planning for the use of reserve forces for contingency operations must quantify specific unit and individual requirements and clearly identify the need for involuntary activation under that 673b authority. Forces identified for potential call-up under that authority must, in the Army's view, be essential to operational success, and they must be maintained at the highest peacetime readiness levels.

3. Should the Department seek legislative changes to the 673b call-up legislation?

Even though there is no consensus about why the authority under 673b has never been exercised by the President, that authority may need to be

liberalized in any case given the future security environment where the United States will have smaller standing forces and will continue to face short-warning threats. The need for reserve forces as the initial and primary source of augmentation for active units in any contingency argues for an improvement in the availability of reserve forces, and the requisite implementing authority.

One alternative that has been discussed is to seek legislation authorizing the Secretary of Defense to order up to 25,000 reservists to active duty without concurrent Presidential action or a declaration of a national emergency. The 25,000 would be a significantly smaller number of reservists than the Presidential 673b which permits calling up to 200,000, yet could accommodate a range of activities, including a test of mobilization capability, training of reserve units overseas, and military operations such as those undertaken in Grenada and Panama. Such legislation might also provide more flexibility in acquiring the skills needed for particular operations by permitting the Secretary to order to active duty reservists by name or skill.

Reserve Role in "Quick Reaction" Contingencies

1. Should we plan for contingency responses without any reserve component call-up, and if so, for what types and numbers of contingencies? To ask the same question slightly differently, should reserve forces be included in any early-deploying combat and combat support forces, and, if so, how should they be used?

At present, decisions regarding the types of conflicts to plan on fighting without reserve augmentation are made separately by each service. As a result, the plans differ from one service to the next. The Army, for example, requires reserve augmentation for all major contingency operations, whereas the Air Force requires reserves to meet strategic airlift surge requirements. The Navy and Marine Corps, on the other hand, generally do not plan to use reserves for contingencies that do not involve mobilization.

Placing early deployment combat capability in the reserves turns principally on the immediate readiness of the specific reserve units involved and the probability that they would be activated when needed.

Reserve readiness for the land forces tends to be better in smaller units, and there is general agreement that reserve component combat and support units can attain a capability for almost immediate deployment at the company level in peacetime. There is evidence that with sufficient resources battalion-sized units could also be ready for deployment with little additional training. With certain exceptions, reserve brigades and divisions will need some additional training on activation. The air reserve components, in contrast, can often match their active counterparts in capability.

Even for modest operations, use of reserve forces can have significant resource implications. Many, including senior reserve component commanders, argue that the reserves are capable of augmenting early-deploying active forces and must do so or become a second-class force as planning emphasis shifts from Europe.

Another view in favor of reliance on the reserves is based on the assumption that, even if the magnitude of cost differences between active and reserve forces is questioned, there is no doubt that the reserves are less expensive than the active force. The argument then follows that unless there is an immediate need for a capability, forces should be in the reserves. Others argue that relying on the reserves could serve as a psychological impediment to military actions that are in the national interest. The proponents of this position point to the possible delays and loss of operational security as units are called to active duty. Furthermore, there is concern that exercising the Presidential call-up authority might result in Congressional imposition of the War Powers Resolution.

The Army is exploring creative uses of reserve forces in both

contingency and peacetime operations (e.g., nation building, counternarcotics, natural disasters). The Army states that it is reasonable and practical to plan for the use of reserve forces in contingency roles for which their capabilities and limitations are properly accommodated. Such planning must be limited to roles that would not compromise operations and to scenarios for which involuntary activation decisions might reasonably be expected. Illustratively, forces particularly well-suited to reserves might include:

Special Operations Forces	Public Affairs
Combat Engineers	Civil Affairs
Military Police	Psychological Operations
Military Intelligence	

2. Are there critical logistics or other support capabilities in the reserve components that do not exist, or have inadequate unit structure, in the active forces and might be required for certain contingencies? By what principles should the division of combat and combat support/combat service support between active and reserve forces be made?

The majority of the Army's nondivisional combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) forces have been placed in the reserves. Since, the late 1960s, calculations of nondivisional support requirements typically have assumed that half of a division's nondivisional support (about 15,000 personnel) could sustain a division's combat forces for the first 60 days of a conflict. On the other hand, there are those who believe that at least two-thirds of support should be available immediately. The requirement for immediate deployment of at least half of the nondivisional support for active forces augurs for keeping these units in the active component. Others note that some reserve forces could deploy with active units if the decision to activate them were made in a timely fashion. The remaining nondivisional support (as many as 15,000 personnel per division) should deploy no later than 60 days after the intial deployment of forces,

after which the division could be supported indefinitely. Regardless of the portion, it should be possible to have some part of the support for active forces in the reserves. A corollary is that when an active division is eliminated, there should be a corresponding reduction in reserve nondivisional support forces if the Army has been structured to provide full support.

3. What is the relative extent to which we should rely on the Army and Marine Corps for light forces?

The size of the active Marine Corps is set by law at three divisions and air wings. Yet we have amphibious lift for only about one division. It would take about 45 days to assemble all the available lift in one theater, load the Marines, and transport them to an area of operations. As a result, the Marine Corps will probably deploy forces by a combination of airlift and sealift. If more than one Marine division and its supporting elements must be deployed simultaneously, the majority of the Marine forces would deploy by air or sea--in the same way the Army deploys.

Legislative history seems to indicate that a primary reason the Congress specified a minimum of three active Marine divisions and air wings was to establish the Marine Corps as the country's primary rapid-deployment force for contingencies short of major war.

The 82d Airborne Division has traditionally been the Army's primary rapid-reaction force. With the advent of light infantry divisions, however, other units have begun to compete for that rapid-reaction role. The critical question is whether the Army should be prepared to deploy additional divisions designed especially for rapid deployment or leave that role to the Marine Corps. For each division retained for rapid reaction, the size of the active Army land force grows by 26,000 to 42,000 spaces, depending on the level of reliance on reserve component support. If providing nonamphibious rapid-reaction forces is deemed

solely an Army mission, then an active Marine Corps of the current size becomes more difficult to justify.

Links Between Readiness and Warning Times

1. To what extent should we seek to link readiness with warning time? Or to put it differently, how should resource levels for manpower and training be set in peacetime to ensure that units can get ready within the time available before deployment?

Heretofore, DoD policies have encouraged peacetime manning levels for each component equal to at least 90 percent of wartime required strength. The most commonly used unit resource indicators--the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) C-ratings--compare peacetime resource levels to wartime requirements. The extended warning times now posited for a major conflict raises an interesting challenge to our current C-rating process: an absolute C-3 rating or better may not be cost-effective if desired standards can be attained within the postulated warning time and the unit can be made "combat ready" by the time it deploys. Current Army policy specifies that newly created reserve units be provided the resources needed to achieve C-3 status within three years.

In today's environment, some units could have over a year's warning time in which to prepare for deployment, and peacetime readiness goals could be linked to the time available for a unit to achieve combat readiness. Active and reserve units required for short-warning contingencies would have to be kept at high levels of readiness, while units required for long-warning scenarios could be maintained at lower readiness levels in peacetime--possibly at 60 to 70 percent of wartime requirements--and trained at a reduced operating tempo. In a mobilization, pre-trained manpower and intensive pre-deployment training would bring these units to wartime strength and readiness.

There are some arguments against tying force readiness levels too closely to the warning time expected for various conflicts. Currently, there is not so much a spectrum of warning times for different scenarios as there are two extremes: more than a year for the European scenario and as little as several days for other contingencies. Most units that would remain in the active component--and many reserve units--would still have to maintain a high level of readiness. Giving emphasis to a "spectrum of readiness" could invite the misperception that these units could perform their missions at lower levels of manning and training. An approach more consistent with today's scenarios might be to retain the current high readiness for the smaller number of active and reserve units in the peacetime force structure, but have plans to expand this force structure quickly. This could be characterized as a "flexible force structure" rather than a "spectrum of readiness" philosophy.

There are some concerns about adopting this type of approach, however. Historically, as warning time has increased, military reaction/decision time has not increased proportionally; maintaining current reserve readiness therefore ensures optimum capability and flexibility. In addition, higher levels of training contribute to both wartime readiness and morale. Many of the cost-saving proposals being advanced today (for example, lowering readiness) closely resemble initiatives that were implemented in the 1970s. Some analysts warn that we must consciously seek to avoid retracing the path we took then, which yielded poor morale, poor retention, and severely degraded capability. These analysts warn that experience shows that low readiness consistently breeds low morale and inefficiencies.

Forward Missions

1. Should the reserve role in the forward presence mission be expanded? If so, how could it be expanded?

The importance of maintaining a forward presence in some regions has been underscored, yet other forward deployments are being reduced and in some regions could perhaps be shifted to a more intermittent presence, using both active and reserve units. The reserves could participate more through additional rotations for annual training and joint exercises. For forward presence missions, it would be possible to rotate active and reserve units rather than permanently assign active units. If a squadron of F-16s must be forward deployed, for example, it would be possible to send an active squadron for three months, followed by a gap, followed by rotating (every two to three weeks) National Guard/Reserve squadrons, followed by another gap, and then the assignment of another active squadron. Such rotation plans would not be appropriate at all locations, but if used selectively, they could offer significant cost savings.

2. Should current estimates of rotation base requirements be reexamined?

One of the most frequently cited obstacles to greater reliance on the reserve components is the desire to maintain a rotation base. Sufficient units must be maintained in the continental United States (CONUS) so that personnel rotating from overseas assignments can be assigned to stateside duty. This is believed to be key to recruitment, morale, and retention in a volunteer force.

However, certain traditional planning and rotation ratios could also be reexamined. The Air Force has relied, for example, on a 60/40 CONUS/OCONUS ratio in its active component and a 2:1 ratio between active and reserve component tactical fighter wings. The Navy and Marine Corps use a 3:1 ratio on the basis that even when assigned to CONUS, their forces spend considerable time at sea. These rules of thumb were designed to minimize hardships on personnel assigned overseas. If a new type of forward presence is possible, ratios such as these should be reevaluated.

Cost

1. How should DoD calculate the "cost" of active and reserve units?

To capture the full costs and all potential savings, total force cost-estimating methodologies must address a broad spectrum of funding impacts, including those related to unit activations, deactivations, and transfers of equipment between active and reserve forces. To be complete, cost estimates associated with force structure changes need to consider funding impacts in each of the following categories:

Unit Operating Costs--Funding for the resources required for day-to-day operations of primary force structure units, defined essentially as Army division force equivalents, Navy carriers and major surface combatants, Marine brigades, and Air Force tactical fighter wings;

Direct Support Costs--Funding for the acquisition of equipment and other programs directly supporting primary force structure units;

Infrastructure Costs--Funding for activities that provide indirect support to multiple primary force structure units; and

Transition Costs--One-time expenses associated with equipment, facilities, and personnel that are required to execute a force structure change and are outside the normal scope of primary force units' day-to-day activities.

A complete methodology for force costing includes recurring and one-time transition costs associated with a change to a new force structure. Recurring costs consist of both direct and infrastructure costs. Direct costs include both unit operating and other programmatically related direct support costs.

Even when all costs that can logically be related to force structure changes are included, estimates of the change in total defense spending will not be proportional to the change in major force units. A 10 percent reduction in total force size will not by itself produce a 10 percent reduction in defense spending. There are two reasons for this. Infrastructure costs are likely to have a fixed as well as variable component. Also, there are parts of the defense program that are not directly driven by force size. These include research and development programs, intelligence and warning capabilities, national command and control programs, access to and use of space, maintenance of the defense industrial base, and other less visible activities. Changes to these programs must be considered on their own merits, not simply as by-products of force structure decisions. A decision to reduce force size accompanied by other policy and program decisions could ultimately yield a proportional spending cut, but force-costing methodologies should not presume those other policy and program decisions.

State Missions

1. How should we characterize the value of the capability for state missions and the community support provided by the National Guard or Reserve?

In considering National Guard force structure, recognition must be given to the state mission to provide an organized, trained, and equipped force to protect life and property and to preserve peace, order, and public safety under state authority. Furthermore, the many thousands of communities throughout the United States that contain National Guard and Reserve organizations are a primary source of grass-roots support for national security and a boon to recruiting. Changes to the force structure such as deactivations, consolidations, or unit movements that alter community involvement in reserve component activities should not be made lightly.

2. Should peacetime control of the National Guard be altered?

Even though the governor has statutory authority over the day-to-day

activities of National Guard units in peacetime, this does not adversely affect the authority of the National Command Authority (NCA) to use the National Guard when needed. The recent Supreme Court ruling has reaffirmed the right of the NCA to activate and use the National Guard units for missions and training activities deemed necessary by the NCA.

Reconstitution

1. Do the longer warning times now projected for the most demanding conventional scenario--a conflict against a resurgent Soviet Union--permit us to focus on preserving the ability to "reconstitute" capability as opposed to maintaining a large active and highly-ready reserve force?

Current pressure to reduce defense spending makes moving additional forces into the reserves and into lower readiness units like cadres an attractive option. In addition to the budgetary savings such a move would generate, reduced readiness units would retain the forces in the overall structure and thus aid efforts to reconstitute our combat capability should that prove necessary. However, the loss of immediate capability and flexibility that would accompany moving toward some of these reduced readiness options in many cases must be carefully weighed. Given the lengthened warning for some scenarios, however, it may be acceptable to have reserve forces or other special types of forces in some sort of reduced readiness status.

Reserve forces are generally less expensive than comparable active forces, although the precise magnitude of the cost differential is often disputed and varies depending upon the manning, mission, and operating tempo of the units in question. Reserve ground units, for example, are considerably less costly than active ground units, while units in air reserve components are closer in cost to their active counterparts. Current manning and operating policies for Naval Reserve Force ships (60% active crew and 40% reserve) minimize the cost differential between similar active and reserve ships and, in some cases, even make the

reserve ships more costly. Cost savings would also be available with lower manning levels or new unit structures like cadres.

A basic consideration in constructing a force is the amount of time assumed between mobilization and combat: the longer the time, the lower the required readiness. With longer warning, we must weigh anew the required readiness of forces designated for war in Europe and evaluate if they could be placed in the reserves, manned at significantly reduced levels and organized into cadre units, or taken out of the force structure entirely. Any of these strategies must seek to preserve our long-lead-time equipment that exceeds current requirements, just as we preserve trained leaders and other highly trained personnel.

2. How should we seek to preserve long-lead talent? Should DoD maintain an active-duty reserve of senior personnel to preserve human capital and provide the basis for possible expansion of the force structure?

With the uncertainty surrounding future U.S. security needs, there is a need to maintain the flexibility to rebuild force structure. Current manpower policies restrict the number of senior personnel on active and Selected Reserve duty to those required for the programmed force.

The establishment of active or Selected Reserve cadre units might be one way to maintain DoD's investment in skilled personnel. While these options deserve further investigation, past experience with reserve cadres suggests that it is difficult to attract high-quality personnel and to maintain their skills in skeletal units with few resources. Active cadres may avoid many of these problems, since cadre personnel could be rotated into fully manned active units. Preliminary estimates, however, suggest that maintaining active cadres in peacetime could prove as expensive as maintaining fully manned Selected Reserve units.

An alternative to cadre units would be to maintain a reserve of senior active-duty personnel within the existing active and reserve force

structure. Currently, some DoD infrastructure billets--positions that would otherwise be given to civilians--are filled by military personnel in order to maintain an adequate CONUS rotation base. The same approach could be used for senior personnel with skills needed during a force build up and who would be dual-slotted for use in force expansion.

Some might argue that using military personnel for civilian jobs would increase the cost of peacetime operations. Current policies that minimize the number of personnel on active duty have been effective and should not be abandoned lightly.

The Army is examining cadre concepts and believes they must be subjected to a thorough review before a decision is made to implement them.

3. What should be the role and priority of pre-trained individual manpower (PIM) in the total force?

Pre-trained individual manpower includes members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)--primarily those who have time left on their eight year military service obligation--and military retirees. Current plans call for the use of PIM for: 1) initial fill of active and reserve units; 2) casualty replacement; and 3) backfill in non deploying units to free active-duty personnel for initial fill or casualty replacement. In practice, the use of PIM for initial unit fill has been limited somewhat by DoD's emphasis on maintaining very ready active and reserve units in peacetime. Because PIM have low priority in the competition for DoD resources, the policy that mandates regular screenings for members of the IRR is not being fully enforced.

Increasing the role of PIM is consistent with an approach in which unit billets would be identified for fill with PIM and left unmanned in peacetime--or where DoD would plan to create new units during a mobilization. Compared to active-duty and Selected Reserve personnel, PIM are a less costly--but less ready--source of manpower. The role of PIM in the total force warrants increased attention as we enter a period

of increased warning times and reduced resources.

In the short run (1991-1993), flows of trained personnel leaving active duty with more than 4 but less than 20 years of service could swell from 205,000 per year to over 245,000. DoD's ability to reconstitute military capabilities during this period may depend on whether it plans for the effective use of these personnel as pre-trained manpower. Although the number separating from active duty with between 4 and 19 years of service will fall in the long run, total force manpower policies cannot afford to neglect this potential source of trained manpower during this interim period of high uncertainty.

Possible initiatives for increasing the availability of PIM include affiliation bonuses for those leaving active duty with more than 8 but less than 20 years of service, and the addition of a Ready Reserve service obligation of two years to active component reenlistment contracts.

In order to increase the readiness of PIM, it would be useful to create a new Ready Reserve category for those personnel who are identified for initial unit fill and early casualty replacement. This group would be more intensively managed and trained than the current IRR. It could include both individuals with recent active-duty experience and those with civilian jobs that match military skills. There might be modest quarterly payments for participation in this group, biennial screenings that are fully funded, and a two-week annual training period for individuals having skills where such refresher training is cost-effective.

There are counterarguments to the above approach. For example, some say that it may not be equitable to rely more on pre-trained individual manpower. Retirees and members of the IRR have already served their country, and although they might be viewed as a fully trained resource for a few months after leaving active duty, some observers believe it is wrong to put them in a reserve category where they might be called up at

the same time, or even before, Selected Reservists, who are paid and trained to be on call. Others points out that high and early "retirement" pay is partially justified as retainer pay. In other cases, it may not be feasible to rely on PIM due to the speed of skill decay and the extensive requirement for refresher training.

Finally, counterarguments note that the services already rely on PIM to the extent that they believe it to be cost-effective. Unless there is to be an increase in undermanned units or cadre units for which PIM resources would be earmarked, there is no need to increase DoD's reliance on pre-trained individual manpower. If PIM are to be relied on to a greater extent, extensive planning will be needed to determine just how they would be used and how they would receive refresher training in a mobilization.

4. Should the number of full-time support positions for the reserves be increased? Would this be an opportunity to take advantage of individuals who will be leaving active service?

The Army is investigating ways to take advantage of fully trained, qualified soldiers lost from the active component during the programmed end-strength reductions. One option would be to adopt a policy that encourages migration into the full-time support elements of reserve component units. Current policy allows for soldiers leaving the active component to compete on a "best qualified" basis for full-time support positions within the reserve component. Full-time support end-strength is currently below requirements, and with the requisite appropriations, there is room to infuse this talent into the reserves, given the proper incentive. A standard set of selection criteria, including retaining states' prerogatives in the case of the National Guard, would be an essential component. Another option is to retain individuals in the active force and increase the percentage of full-time support provided by the active component as opposed to the AGR.

Integration

1. Should total force manpower policies have active/reserve integration as a policy objective?

During the 1980s, when threats to U.S. national security were easily defined and resource levels were high, both the active and reserve components of the total force maintained high morale and a sense of mission. These traits may be difficult to maintain the 1990s, when the threat is less clear and when resource levels for many late-deploying units will decline. Since most late-deploying units will be in the reserves, the notion that reserve status is "second-rate status" may be reinforced. That impression may extend even to those reserve units that will, in fact, be required for short-warning contingencies and that must maintain high resource and readiness levels.

Combating this perspective and maintaining the integrity of the total force may require a deliberate emphasis on manpower and personnel policies that aim at active and reserve component integration as well as short-run cost-effectiveness. People are not equipment; the jobs to which active and reserve component personnel are assigned and the ways in which they interact are likely to influence the relative status, resource levels, and capabilities of the active and reserve components in the total force. Outlined below are some of the kinds of policies that could foster greater integration in the total force.

Active-Reserve Rotations. It might be desirable to increase the rotation of AGR personnel (full-time reserve component members) into positions of responsibility--including command positions--in active component units. Increased numbers of high-quality active component personnel might, in turn, be assigned to rotations with reserve units. Current policies, aimed at cost-effectiveness, sometimes discourage this broadening by emphasizing the use of reserve component experts to deal with reserve issues. The assignment of high-quality active personnel to reserve units is important, since active component officers do not

currently view service with reserve units--even highly ready units--as career enhancing.

Hybrid Units. Where it is consistent with desired readiness levels, total force unity might be enhanced by increased reliance on hybrid units that have a mix of active and reserve personnel. Where reserve units have high readiness goals and require skills that cannot be maintained well in the reserve component, active personnel might be used in greater numbers to fill skill shortages, as well as to provide training and administrative support. Within active units, the expanded use of Individual Mobilization Augmentees, Selected Reserve associate crews, Selected Reserve augmentation units or the "nesting" concept for ships, or the introduction of company-level roundout for ground units could provide this integration. (This is an approach that would have to be applied cautiously, however. The risk in combining active and reserve personnel is that the resulting unit has neither the cost advantage of a conventional reserve unit nor the deployment availability of a fully active unit.)

Strengthened Active-Reserve Affiliations. Total force policies must place continued emphasis on establishing relationships between individual active and reserve units. This emphasis must include affiliations between reserve units and active units that would fight together in a mobilization, and affiliations between active and reserve units that are solely for peacetime training purposes. The potential for strengthening linkages between active units and affiliated reserve units through personnel flows warrants further study. Exchange programs for full-time personnel or--where the affiliated units are collocated--enlistment terms that would combine an initial period of service with the active unit followed by service with the reserve unit might be considered.

Active Component Involvement in all Missions. Although the assignment of missions to the reserves must be driven primarily by

considerations of cost and capability, many believe an effort should be made to keep at least some of each kind of unit in the active component rather than assign all of a given mission to the reserve component. The reserve components rely heavily on the active component for training and for doctrine development, functions that the active component cannot perform well unless it is involved in the mission. Active component involvement ensures that no mission is viewed as a "reserve ghetto."

Prior Service. Total force policies in the 1990s might encourage an increased role for prior-service personnel in the reserve components. In ground units, it might be possible to allow flexibility in manpower requirements so that E-4 prior-service personnel can be used for reserve billets that would otherwise be filled by non-prior-service E-2 or E-3 personnel. A revision of the current reserve retirement system, which encourages individuals to remain in the reserves even after 20 years of service, might also play a role in opening up greater opportunities for Selected Reserve service for prior-service personnel.

Medical

1. How should the total medical force be sized? Should the size of the active-duty medical force be driven by its peacetime mission?

The Military Health Services System (MHSS) differs from all other major military components in that it has two distinct missions--a wartime and a peacetime mission. The wartime mission is to provide medical care for military forces over the course of a conflict. The peacetime mission is to provide health benefits to more than nine million active and reserve personnel, military retirees, and their dependents. Military health benefits represent a form of compensation, influences the quality of life of the beneficiaries, and support a commitment made by the Defense Department to "take care of its own."

For the last decade, the Department has been faced with spiraling

medical health care costs. The currently changing world situation and constraints on the defense budget, coupled with the ever-increasing demand for and utilization of health care services, necessitate innovative approaches to structuring and managing the MHSS.

U.S. forces require medical support regardless of scenario. We must prepare for contingencies such as Grenada or Panama as well as the potential for world war. Wartime health services requirements stem from two sources: (1) workload-based personnel and other resources (for example, operating rooms and hospital beds), and (2) requirements for medical personnel derived from the force structure.

Force structure programs are based primarily on the premise that, for a given combat unit to exist in a combat theater, certain supporting units must exist there also. Many of these relationships are relatively independent of work load-based requirements. Examples include division-level medical battalions, medical elements organic to fleet units, and squadron medical elements.

The scope of wartime medical force structure is based on the casualty flow, which, in turn, is determined by the projected magnitude and lethality of combat. Medical is the "tail" that is "wagged" by the dog. Until the Department has completed its net assessment of the new strategic environment and adjusted its plans accordingly, the "trickle down" effect on medical force structure will be unknown.

The mission of delivering health services to active-duty and other authorized beneficiaries in war and peace will not change substantially as a result of force mix and force reduction decisions made by the Department.

It now costs $13 billion per year to operate the Military Health Services System. Absent changes in entitlements, cost growth to meet peacetime demands of beneficiaries can be expected to continue.

The Department will improve the quality of health services by putting in place over the next three years a coordinated care program embracing many of the best management approaches taken in the civilian sector to control cost, but not relying heavily on the beneficiary cost-sharing increases common in the civilian world.

Process

1. Are periodic reviews of active/reserve force-mix decisions needed?

There have been proposals made to the Study Group for periodic reviews of active/reserve force-mix decisions. The majority of these proposals appear to be based on a recommendations from a 1984 Logistics Management Institute (LMI) study calling for biennial reviews of force-mix decisions. For example, one suggestion submitted to the Study Group read: "Service force structure/force mix will be reviewed biennially on a mission-by-mission, unit-by-unit (capability/cost-effectiveness) basis which is clearly related to war plans."

The LMI study role that there now exists no forum or process by which to review the overall status, mix, and balance of the total force in the context of existing guidance, policy, and legislation. The objectives of the reviews advocated in the LMI study would include recommending any necessary changes in policy and guidance to affect the mix of forces as it evolves over the subsequent four years.

Opposition to proposals such as this takes many forms. One argument is that the PPBS, with its biennial Defense Planning Guidance update and program reviews provides the services, OSD, and the CINCs ample opportunity to review and question changes in policy and force mix. Others argue that, if such reviews were held, they should involve the civilian staff (who are not now privy to war plans) as well as the military staff. A third point often raised is that the war plans do not provide an adequate basis for review since they (1) probably do not

provide a unique solution (almost any unit could be an early deployer in some war plan), (2) do not reflect any prioritization or presidential/secretarial risk assumptions, and (3) cannot be reviewed by the civilian staff. Along the same lines, some argue that war plans should tell you how to use what you have--not tell you what to buy in the future. Still others argue that since neither capability nor cost is well-defined or measurable, any review prior to solving those analytic problems is premature. Finally, there is the sheer magnitude of the task. The Army troop list contains over 8,000 units. Our research indicates that over a two-year period, more than 4,000 of those units may be modified, added, or deleted from the list. Although not of equal magnitude, similar volatility exists in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.

On a different plane, many believe that total reviews are necessary only when there are major shifts in national policy or strategy. These persons would argue that a force-mix review is necessary only after a strategy review and after the services have had time to adjust their force plans. There are also those who believe unit-by-unit reviews represent increased micromanagement. These people believe the services have developed adequate decision processes and that, while OSD/JCS supervision and review in the aggregate is essential, it is not necessary to audit every decision made in every military unit.

While many call for these reviews, it should be noted that none of the previous total force reviews has either recommended or resulted in major changes in the active/reserve mix, and that all have concluded that unit-by-unit reviews are not essential.

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

STRATEGY AND RESOURCES

APPROX 7 PGS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP
THE VICE-CHAIRMAN, TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Interim Report to Congress

Recently the Secretary and the President have been briefed on, and approved the essentials of, the Crisis Response and Reconstitution strategy and force posture, which were provided to you in the Conventional Force Structure DPRB issue paper and successive DPRB briefings. Several themes and emphases in the draft Interim Report run counter to this strategy and force posture, which we must now begin incorporating into the Department's work and the Congress's thinking. These major areas are of most concern:

RECONSTITUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF WARNING: The draft Report leans toward rapid near-term reconstitution through retaining reserve units at lower readiness and manning levels. It therefore underemphasizes a main thrust of the Reconstitution strategy: eliminating some forces in favor of investing in innovation for longer term reconstitution capability. As the President stated in his recent Aspen speech, "the need for a massive short-term mobilization has diminished," and projected warning time "will be sufficient to allow us to rely not solely on existing forces, but to generate wholly new forces." The Report must not overshadow these concepts with concerns about political decision time and the need to retain some long-lead personnel and materiel assets (although we must of course address those concerns). Also, the Report prominently links increased warning time to proposed readiness reductions; in the rationale for the Reconstitution strategy, increased warning is instead linked to the ability to forego entirely some long-response forces.

RESERVE FORCE ROLES: The draft Report appears to press for expanded Reserve Component roles in early deploying combat missions. This is evident, in part, in the endorsement of broad (and rather vague) assumptions regarding exercise of 673b callup, and an apparent leaning toward reduced emphasis on support roles for the Reserves. The Crisis Response/Reconstitution strategy and force envision using Reserves primarily for: support (CS/CSS) for deployed active forces; reinforcement or augmentation of earlier-deployed active combat forces in very large or concurrent contingencies; and providing a sustaining rotation base for deployed forces, and reestablishing a CONUS strategic reserve, especially in protracted or concurrent contingencies. This reflects realistic assumptions regarding exercise of callup or mobilization authority (as reflected in the planning scenarios), as well as Reserves' lower readiness.

RESERVE FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS: The Crisis Response/Reconstitution strategy and force structure envision reducing Reserve force structure in the coming years. The President stated that given reduced need for rapid mobilization we will adjust the size and structure, as well as readiness, of Reserves. In doing so, however, DoD will face stiff opposition from the Congress. The Report should make clear that we expect this strategy to lead to both active and reserve force structure reductions, and begin to build a case for this position, particularly in the discussion of reconstitution. The draft's suggestions of moving additional forces into Reserves, and its leaning toward expanded Reserve roles, do the opposite.

Several other important concerns with the draft are as follows:

Army/Marine Corps light forces roles: A report on Total Force issues need not address this topic; it may be best to simply omit it in the interim report. In any case, the focus on amphibious lift for a division-sized mass Marine deployment miscasts the issue: Marine forces typically deploy as MEBs, not divisions. Their role is largely sub-division-size forward presence and rapid response, for which they use MPS and ashore prepo as well as amphibious lift.

Integration of Active and Reserve forces: Terming this a basic policy aim may be acceptable, but we should make clear that measures adopted to achieve it will be evaluated for their impact on active and reserve forces' costs and capabilities for appropriate respective roles. Integration should be a means to these ends, not pursued as an end in itself.

Reserve unit involvement in peacetime forward presence: The Report must recognize that rotating Reserve (or Active) units forward does reduce those deployments' effectiveness, especially if it assumes gaps in such presence. Until we can identify regions, forces, and deployment times where we would apply this idea, it is premature to issue so broad an endorsement of it; better to term it a possibility we are investigating for selected application if and where appropriate (and note that some limited examples have occurred).

Periodic special reviews of force mix, based on war plans: The need for major "out-of-cycle" reviews arises not at any set time interval, but rather when strategy or forces undergo major change (as now). The paper should reflect this as a given, or perhaps omit this issue entirely. In any case, the references to using war plans as a basis for such review should be deleted. Operational plans apply to current forces, not required future capabilities, and in any case civilian access to them is limited due to their sensitivity. Planning scenarios instead provide the basis for future force planning. Indeed, at several points in the paper this distinction is blurred. In general, the paper should address force planning issues: the Total Force Policy is a principle for planning future capabilities, not operations.

Finally, I would note that many of the draft "Principles" (especially #3, #4, #5, and #7) seem very broadly stated, and their intent and effect is not immediately clear. Perhaps after discussion at the Study Group's meeting it will be more possible to assess whether the Department should endorse them. I do think it may be appropriate to replace #2 with a more "classic" statement of Total Force Policy, such as: "The Department will program structure and manning based on the most cost-effective Total Force mix of active, reserve, civilian, and contract resources to support national policy and military strategy." And I am concerned that #10 is not reflected later in the Report; if it is to be included, we need some suggestion of what "objective, performance-oriented criteria" we have in mind for assessing unit capability.

I assume the Study Group members will review a revised draft report prior to forwarding to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Meanwhile, my staff has marked up the draft to reflect the above concerns and others in more detail, and will gladly work with the Study Group staff on reflecting our concerns in that version.

I. Lewis Libby

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

September 7, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP

SUBJECT: A Draft Interim Report

Mr. Jehn has asked that I provide you the attached draft of the interim report. He would appreciate receiving your comments by noon on Tuesday, September 11, in order to meet the deadline of providing a report to the Congress by September 15.

A copy of your comments should be provided to Frank Tapparo, in 2-C-270, x70373.

Frank A. Tapparo
Executive Director

Attachment

cc: Mr. Jehn
Mr. Duncan

MEMBERS OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP

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MajGen KILLEY	Director, Air National Guard	2E378/34750
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9/7/90 1400

INTERIM REPORT OF THE

TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP

FOREWORD

The Department of Defense, as directed by the 1990 Defense Authorization Act, Title XI, Section 1101, is reviewing its Total Force Policy, force mix, and military force structure, including the operation, effectiveness, and soundness of the Policy, the assignment of missions within and between the active and Reserve components of the armed forces, and the force structure of the Active and Reserve components.

The study was undertaken in addition to the regular review of force

structure issues that the Department conducts as part of its program and budget deliberations. The Study Group has spent eight months considering assumptions about the use of Reserve forces, and an array of other issues related to the Total Force. Operation DESERT SHIELD is now testing many of these assumptions and will help provide insights to possible future revisions of both the policy and the force.

The events that have taken place since August 2, 1990, in connection with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, are allowing the Department of Defense to evaluate daily, military questions relating to policy, force structure, and force mix issues that are linked to the Total Force Policy. Consequently, we plan to integrate the lessons from DESERT SHIELD with the body of knowledge we have already gained about Active and Reserve issues. However, the operation is still unfolding and it is premature to use the DESERT SHIELD operations to draw broad conclusions or to make recommendations on factors that will affect the composition of the Total Force throughout the remainder of this century.

This interim report describes the ongoing work of the Study Group that was formed by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of complying with the legislative mandate, focusing on the implementation of the Total Force Policy in the current Middle East crisis through August 31. There are three sections to the interim report. Section I describes the environment in which the study of the Total Force Policy is being conducted. Section II describes the activities to date of the Study Group. Section III provides data and commentary on the application of some aspects of the Total Force Policy in the current Middle East operations. While active forces have provided the bulk of the U.S. response, Section III focuses on some of the contributions being made by the other components--the reserves, host nation support, and contractors.

I. INTRODUCTION

The military capability of the United States has never resided entirely within its Active forces. We have always depended on the Reserve components and our mobilization base to maintain in peacetime capabilities that would be

required in war. Between the end of World War II and 1970, Active forces were used for forward deployments, as the first echelon of forces for war in Central Europe against the Warsaw Pact, and in some regional contingencies. In the 1950s, the missions of the Reserve components were diffused, with Reservists being used primarily as individual fillers and the National Guard deploying by unit as reinforcements. After the mid-1960s, Reserve and National Guard forces were seen as the second echelon of forces for a war in Central Europe.

The "Total Force" concept was first articulated by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970. The concept was formally adopted as the Total Force Policy under Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1973. The policy was never intended to make full-time, Active soldiers and part-time Reserve soldiers mirror images of each other. Rather, the policy was a creative response to the Nation's post-World War II experience as a global power and to the fiscal and demographic realities facing the Defense Department. As a general proposition, the policy has had two principal tenets: to plan for the integrated use of all forces that are available--Active, Reserve, civilian, and allied, including host-nation support; and to use Reserve forces as the primary augmentation for Active forces. Since its inception in 1973, the Total Force Policy has been a great success. There has been unprecedented integration of purpose and capability between the Active and Reserve components, as well as improved utilization of DoD civilian, contractor, and host nation support communities.

The specific objective of the Total Force Policy has been to provide maximum military capability within fiscal constraints by integrating the capabilities and strengths of Active and Reserve units in the most cost effective manner. The effect of this policy has been to place a substantial portion of our total military force in the Reserve components. As a result, the Reserve components have been assigned demanding wartime missions and peacetime responsibilities.

Strategic Environment

U.S. national strategy is shifting from one focused principally on the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat in Central Europe to smaller scale, but demanding threats throughout the world. In this changed environment, forward presence will remain a key element of U.S. strategy. Forces for forward presence provide an impetus for continuation of the favorable changes we are seeing; they help preserve stability in Europe and other regions that are undergoing political and military evolutions; and they provide an initial basis for U.S. response to crises and contingencies.

Smaller, but still potentially very intense, regional conflicts and crises--often erupting with little warning--are the most likely future threats. To retain the ability to react to such threats to the security of the United States, its friends, and allies in the uncertain times ahead will require continued dependence on strong, though reduced, Active and Reserve forces. These forces will, however, have characteristics that differ in important ways from those with which we have been familiar. The size, overall manning, and the readiness of some units may be changed. For shorter warning regional threats, our forces may emphasize, more than ever before, flexibility, versatility, global deployability, and rapid responsiveness. Readiness must be our highest priority for those forces which are designated to respond to short-warning conflicts.

In our restructured forces, Reserve forces will be important, but in new ways. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-warning mobilization for a major conflict with the Warsaw Pact has diminished. We can now adjust the size, structure, and readiness of our Active and Reserve forces to help us deal with the more likely challenges we will face. Policies to meet these threats will have major implications for the size, structure, organization, readiness, and mix of our standing forces.

For the largest force-driving threats we face--a European theater strategic offensive or a major global conflict, we can plan on much longer

warning and we are incorporating this factor into planning for the reconstitution of our forces. As President Bush stated at Aspen, Colorado, on August 2: "By the mid-90s, the time it would take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that marked the depths of the Cold War will be sufficient to allow us to rely not solely on existing forces -- but to generate wholly new forces." This strategic shift means we can plan for substantial reductions in the size of the Total Force.

As we make these reductions, however, we must attend to future uncertainties and preserve the capability to reconstitute forces, should future circumstances require us to replace the forces that will be eliminated from the Active and Reserve structure. For example, we must preserve our long-lead time capabilities, particularly the invaluable resource represented by our skilled leaders and technicians. We are developing strategies to retain the capabilities of trained personnel so that we can regain their expertise, if they are once again needed. Planning for reconstitution of our forces also allows us to use currently available resources for the long-lead innovations that will guard against longer-term future threats.

Our future forces must, however, be something more than a scaled back or shrunken-down version of the forces we possess at the present time. In his Aspen speech the President noted that if we simply pro-rate the reductions, cutting equally across the board, we may not find ourselves with the forces we need for the new security environment, and that what we need "are not merely reductions--but restructuring." As we plan for the future, we start with a major asset--the exceptionally high quality of the Active and Reserve components. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff very recently described this force as "the finest peacetime military in the history of America."

Force Mix Considerations

Consistent with the reduced need for large forces on short notice, moving forces into the Reserve components is an attractive option because of the cost savings such a transfer could generate. Such transfers would retain

the forces in the overall structure and thus aid efforts to reconstitute our capability if that should prove necessary. However, the loss of immediate capability and flexibility that would accompany such a transfer in many cases must be carefully weighed.

Reserve forces are generally less expensive than comparable Active forces, although the precise magnitude of the savings is often disputed and varies depending upon the manning, mission, and operating tempo of the unit. Reserve ground units, for example, are considerably less costly than Active ground units. While still offering significant savings, units in air Reserve components are closer in cost to their Active counterparts. Current manning and operating policies of the Navy on Naval Reserve Force ships (60% full-time crew and 40% part-time Reserve) minimize the cost difference between similar Active and Reserve ships.

In considering the most appropriate force mix, we must focus on the need for forces to (1) provide peacetime presence, (2) maintain early deployment capabilities, and (3) hedge against a Soviet resurgence. Peacetime presence is provided by our forward deployed forces. These forces are generally in the Active component and require a rotation base to permit personnel assigned to deployed units to rotate from overseas assignments to stateside duty. The importance of maintaining a forward presence in some regions has been underscored, yet other forward deployments are being reduced and, in some regions, might be shifted to a more intermittent presence, using both Active and Reserve units.

The question of whether to place early deploying combat capability in the Reserve components turns principally on the immediate readiness of the Reserve units involved and the probability that they would be activated when needed. Because Reserve units often include motivated volunteers with significant prior Active duty experience, their capabilities may equal those of Active units that have similar missions. Other Reserve units are less ready as a result of insufficient resources, management problems involving mismatches between individual military skills and unit requirements, and the

difficulties of collective training. The readiness of Reserve ground forces tends to be better in smaller units. Reserve brigades and divisions often need additional training upon activation. The Air Reserve Components, by contrast, can often match their Active counterparts in capability.

War fighting capability should be placed in the Reserve components only to the extent that the units will be called-up when they are needed. The President has authority under Title 10, section 673b of the U.S. Code to involuntarily call-upas many as 200,000 reservists. That authority has not been exercised prior to Operation DESERT SHIELD. For previous operational missions, we have been able to rely upon Reserve volunteers. Reliance on volunteers has tended to work well with unit or individual missions that do not require close, intra-unit coordination (strategic airlift, for example), but individual volunteers would be less effective in ground combat units and ship crews, where unit cohesiveness is more important. The decision to call-up Reserves for contingencies short of general war, however, may well involve considerations beyond pure military requirements, for example, the political symbolism of the action.

A basic consideration in the construction of a force is the time assumed between mobilization and combat: the longer the time, the lower the required readiness. With the longer warning which we would have for a war in Central Europe, we must weigh anew the required readiness of forces designated for the war in Europe and evaluate if they could be placed in the Reserves, manned at significantly reduced levels, organized into cadre units, or taken out of the force structure. Any of these strategies must seek to preserve our long-lead-time equipment that is excess to our current requirements, just as we preserve trained leaders and other highly-trained personnel.

Not all missions are appropriate for the Reserve components. Some missions that require a high surge of activity in wartime but comparatively low activity in peacetime (e.g., air defense) are ideal for reservists. Others, such as those that require long periods of forward deployment in peacetime (e.g., strategic submarines), are unsuitable. Yet other missions

can be assigned to either Active or Reserve units, depending upon such factors as how soon the missions must be performed after a crisis or conflict develops, the demographic profile of a geographical area (for Reserve component recruiting purposes), and the particular characteristics of individual units.

Peacetime missions that require intensive training, that have unique highly technical military applications, or that require high peacetime tempo or readiness are generally more appropriate for the Active component. Many peacetime missions, however, can be performed by the Reserve components as part of regular, ongoing training and Active duty tours. By 1991, for example, the Air National Guard will perform virtually all of the CONUS air defense missions, while the Air Force Reserve provides about 60 percent of the strategic airlift manpower and a large percentage of the tactical air lift capability.

Management Process

Choices about the size of the Total Force and the mix of Active and National Guard/Reserve forces depend upon an assessment of current and potential threats to the nation, a determination of the capabilities required to meet the threats, the availability of resources, and the willingness to accept greater or lesser risk concomitant with various levels of defense spending.

The evaluation of these and related factors and the planning which is required to achieve a desired force size and mix necessarily requires a sound management process. The effectiveness of the Total Force Policy has, in no small measure, been the result of the use of such a process within the Department of Defense. The management and command structures of the Department have provided unity of effort as missions and responsibilities of Active and Reserve components have been integrated into a cohesive whole. This unity has enabled each element of the Total Force to do what it does best

in a manner that results in economy of personnel and materiel resources.

During the current period of transition in strategy and forces, in which this special review is useful and appropriate, we will continue the fundamental procedures that DoD uses to evaluate the force structure and to make force-mix decisions. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) have served the Department well for over a quarter of a century, and we will continue to rely on them in years ahead. They have helped the Secretary of Defense allocate resources consistent with our readiness and sustainability goals for both Active and Reserve forces and to plan for the use of these forces. The PPBS also provides a mechanism for conducting biennial reviews of the force structure and adjusting the force mix as necessary to meet changing resources and world situations. The PPBS provides an ideal mechanism for reviewing each service's program and for integrating the military advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and field commanders with policy and resource guidelines.

II. THE WORK OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP

Membership and Staff Support

The Study Group appointed by the Secretary of Defense consists of 24 senior civilian and military officials who represent a wide range of experience and views. The Study Group has been chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has served as vice chair. The group includes the following officials:

1. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel (Chairman)
2. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Vice-Chairman)
3. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
4. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

5. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics
6. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation
7. Department of Defense General Counsel
8. Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Resources)
9. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
10. Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
11. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations & Environment)
12. Director, J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) the Representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
13. Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), U. S. Army
14. Director, Strategy Plans and Policy Division, U.S. Navy
15. Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and Resources, U.S. Air Force, Chief, Policy Division, Director of Personnel Plans, U.S. Air Force
16. Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps
17. Chief, Army Reserve
18. Director of Naval Reserve
19. Chief of Air Force Reserve
20. Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower & Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps
21. Director, Army National Guard
22. Director, Air National Guard
23. Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve
24. Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

The Study Group is supported by a professional staff of 40 civilian and military members who have been assigned from the organizations represented on the Study Group under the direction of a member of the Senior Executive Service who serves as Executive Director.

Formal Meetings

The Charter establishing the Total Force Policy Study Group was signed by the Secretary of Defense on December 26, 1989. The initial meeting of the Study Group was held on February 2, 1990 and was attended by both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Study Group has met formally approximately two times per month since its first meeting in early February. These meetings have addressed such topics as:

-- Possible conflict scenarios and the forces and capabilities needed for those conflicts;
-- Short term contingencies;
-- Advantages and disadvantages of various techniques for the use of Reserve forces in operational missions, including the use of volunteers and the authority granted to the President in Title 10, U.S.C. 673b;
-- Costing methodologies to evaluate the comparative costs of Active and Reserve forces;
-- Land forces;
-- Naval Forces;
-- Tactical air forces;
-- Manpower, personnel and training policies;
-- Strategic mobility;
-- Medical manpower.

Colloquia with Outside Experts

In order to obtain the insight and policy recommendations of outside experts and policy makers, the Study Group hosted three formal Total Force Policy Colloquia. The first was held on April 10, 1990, and was attended by former senior military and civilian officials and representatives of important public or private policy groups including:

-- The Director, Selective Service

-- Former Director of the Joint Staff
-- Former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation)
-- Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)
-- Former Secretary of the Air Force
-- Reserve Officers Association
-- Two former Chiefs, National Guard Bureau

At the first colloquium, the Study Group addressed subjects which included Active and Reserve missions, use of the Section 673b call-up authority, resource allocation, and manpower efficiency.

The second colloquium was held on April 24, 1990. This colloquium was devoted to Total Force issues of importance to the Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) of the operational commands. The participants included the CINC or his representative from the following operational commands:

-- Atlantic Command
-- Central Command
-- European Command
-- Forces Command
-- North American Air Defense Command
-- Pacific Command
-- Special Operations Command
-- Transportation Command

The third colloquium was conducted on April 30 and May 1, 1990. At this colloquium the Study Group was addressed by the Secretary of Defense. Attendees included a wide range of current and former members of the Federal Government including:

-- Honorable John McCain, United States Senator
-- Honorable Herbert R. Bateman, Member of Congress

-- Honorable Beverly B. Byron, Member of Congress
-- Honorable William L. Dickinson, Member of Congress
-- Honorable G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Member of Congress
-- Director of the Congressional Budget Office
-- Two former Secretaries of the Army
-- Three former members of the House of Representatives
-- Former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
-- Former Chairman of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
-- Executive Director, Reserve Officers Association,
-- Former Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy
-- Former US Ambassador to NATO
-- Two Adjutants General

The discussion topics for the third colloquium focused on national strategy, force structure, force mix issues, appropriate missions and roles for Reserve forces, the 673b call-up authority, transfer of wartime missions, resource allocation, and public support issues.

Several experts were invited to attend the formal colloquia with the full Total Force Policy Study Group, but were unable to do so for scheduling or other reasons. Consequently, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Total Force Policy Study Group met individually with the following:

-- Former Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps
-- Former Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board
-- Two Adjutants General; one the President of the Adjutants General Association of the United States, the other the President of the National Guard Association of the United States

Technical Conferences

The work of the Study Group has been supplemented by the work of a large

group of participants in two separate technical conferences. The first conference focused on costing methodologies and related matters and addressed the various methodologies for evaluating the comparative costs of Active and Reserve forces in the performance of specific missions. That conference also permitted a discussion in some detail of the knotty definitional and data problems that confront efforts to determine the transition, operating and support costs which are associated with Active and Reserve units. The cost conference was attended by cost experts from each of the services. A second technical conference focused on key manpower, personnel and training issues.

The Work of the Professional Staff

The professional staff of the Study Group has provided background information and research in support of the Study Group's work. The staff has examined a wide array of questions, including:

-- Changes in the strategic environment and their implications for force structure and mix, including weighing the increased warning available for some scenarios against the short warning times available for others;
-- DoD and service directives on "Total Force Policy," to illustrate how the policy has evolved since its articulation in the 1970s and its current applications for resource and mission allocation;
-- The relative costs of Active and Reserve units performing roughly the same missions;
-- How manpower, personnel, and training policies can encourage and benefit from flows of skilled personnel into the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and from the Active component, and principles that could determine the relationship between peacetime manning levels and wartime requirements for Active and Reserve units;
-- Alternative force structures, to illustrate the implications of

varying the force mix (including any cost savings made possible by heavier reliance on Reserve forces as well as the concomitant loss in immediate reaction capability and flexibility);

-- DoD policy on sizing the total medical force to meet wartime requirements and to maintain on Active duty a medical contingent at least adequate to meet wartime needs until Reserve, retired, or civilian mobilization manpower becomes available;

-- Strategies to train reservists and mitigate the problems growing out of limitations on time available for Reserve training, and to gain employer support for such training;

-- The processes and criteria used by the military departments to make force-mix decisions; and

-- Other components of the total force, including strategic forces, host nation support, civilian employees, contractors, and retirees.

III. TOTAL FORCE CONSIDERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST OPERATIONS

The events triggered by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait have provided the first opportunity to observe a large scale operational deployment of forces constructed after the adoption of the Total Force Policy. Operation DESERT SHIELD offers new lessons, will develop new insights, and will challenge existing preconceptions. While Operation DESERT SHIELD will not answer all questions on the appropriate composition of our forces, our understanding of a wide range of force structure questions will undoubtedly improve. Certainly, the Total Force Policy is being implemented very clearly in our response to the invasion.

Iraqi troops crossed the border of Kuwait before dawn on August 2. One day later, Iraqi troops were reported on the border of Saudi Arabia. In response, two American aircraft carriers, the INDEPENDENCE and the EISENHOWER, were sent to the area. On August 6, Secretary Cheney met with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd. On August 7, the UN Security Council voted 13-0 (with 2 abstentions) to impose a sweeping ban on trade with Iraq. On August 8, the President announced that he had ordered U.S. military aircraft and troops to Saudi Arabia.

The following descriptions of contributions being made by the Total Force is more illustrative than complete. Little is mentioned of the Active forces that have provided the core of the U.S. response to the crisis. The focus is on those components of the Total Force that have supplemented the active forces in key, and often vital, ways--the Reserves, host nation support, and contractors. Some of the contributions of these other components are discussed below.

Reserve Component--Volunteer Phase

The use of RC volunteers, especially by the Air Force, was critical to the success of the early stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Volunteers filled key roles for the other services as well, although not to the extent they were used by the Air Force.

RESERVE COMPONENT VOLUNTEERS SUPPORTING OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

	8 Aug	15 Aug	22 Aug	27 Aug	31 Aug
ARNG	5	68	107	109	109
USAR	0	200	392	448	685
USNR	0	26	183	264	264
USMCR	0	50	50	59	59
ANG	216	2700	3737	1808	1808
USAFR	350	4500	5992	5907	3810
USCGR	24	131	197	193	193
TOTAL	595	7675	10658	8788	6928

The Air Reserve Components responded quickly. By the time Secretary Cheney had met with King Fahd on August 6, the Air Force Reserve had placed its strategic airlift and tanker unit volunteers into pre-mission crew rest. Neither the Air Force Reserve nor the Air National Guard encountered difficulties in obtaining volunteers. By 8:40 A.M. on August 7, the 459th Military Airlift Wing at Andrews AFB, MD, had launched its first C-141 mission in support of DESERT SHIELD. By the end of the day, the unit had provided seven of its eight assigned aircraft and eleven additional flight crews to the MAC airlift system. Reserve C-5 units from Kelly AFB, TX, and Westover AFB, MA, were also available on August 7, with a total of 14 of 31 assigned aircraft and 20 crews ready to fly.

Numerous other units also supported the deployment. During the period from August 8-28, the Air Force Reserve flew 18 C-5s (42 crews), 6 C-141s (28 crews), and 27 C-130s (38 crews). They also flew 17 KC-135s, providing 43 tanker crews. Additionally, 638 personnel from 40 aerial port units supported the operation at 26 locations, and 749 personnel from 12 maintenance units supported the operation at eight locations.

The Air National Guard responded in a similar way. After consulting with HQ Military Air Command (MAC), the Air National Guard Support Center polled its strategic airlift units at Jackson, MS, and Stewart, NY, for availability of volunteers. By August 7, the 172d Military Airlift Group at Jackson had provided six of its eight assigned C-141 aircraft and 14 augmentation crews. The 105th Military Airlift Group at Stewart although in a conversion status initially offered six C-5 aircraft and seven crews, and then added one more for a total of seven of its nine available aircraft. Also, by August 7, the Air National Guard had provided 46 KC-135 aircraft and crews to deploy to sites in CONUS and overseas. During the period August 8-28, the Air National Guard flew 365 KC-135 sorties, air refueling more than 500 aircraft and moved 140 tons of cargo and 830 passengers. They deployed six RF-4, 4 EC-130, and 4 C-130 aircraft and associated personnel, 11 communication units with 66 personnel supported the DESERT SHIELD operations at seven locations. Ten Air Guard aeromedical units operated at four locations, and ten mobile aerial port units operated at three locations. Other augmentations included linguists, medical personnel, civil engineering and fire fighting, both in CONUS and overseas, as well as command posts, and combat communications. The Air Reserve components also devoted a significant portion of their tactical airlift for CONUS movements in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD.

The Army Reserve components also brought volunteers onto Active duty to fill requirements identified by U.S. Forces Command (USFORSCOM) and other commanders. In their review of force lists for a large scale deployment of forces to the Middle East, the USFORSCOM staff identified an urgent need for water purification, supply, distribution, psychological operations, and civil

affairs units--capabilities found primarily in the Army Reserve--to support the deployment.

By August 20, the Army Reserve volunteer participation consisted of 286 personnel supporting the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) at ports, "backfilling" professionals of the Health Services Command, and assisting at Headquarters, Third Army. A five-member communications cell from the 228th Signal Brigade (South Carolina Army National Guard) was brought on duty at Headquarters, Third Army on August 8, and has remained there. About two dozen Army National Guard personnel have supported operations at Ft. Bragg and Ft. Stewart.

Almost from the beginning of DESERT SHIELD, Naval Reserve personnel supported air operations, primarily flying passengers in C-9s. Other Naval Reservists supported intelligence data collection in support of the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) U.S. Central Command, the CINC for DESERT SHIELD operations. A total of 103 Naval Reserve surface personnel provided support to port operations and staff support to headquarters, including support for the Military Sealift Command and the Middle East Task Force in Bahrain.

During the period August 8-31, the Marine Corps Reserve provided 59 volunteers for DESERT SHIELD. These were primarily Civil Affairs experts along with a few linguists and Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) personnel. Marine Corps policies do not require call-up of reserve forces for the initial commitment to a conflict.

Also, 190 Coast Guard Reservists performed a variety of programmed Annual Training (AT) and Additional Duty for Training (ADT) at various CONUS posts in direct support of the crisis.

Reserve Component -- Call to Active Duty of Units and Personnel

On August 22, 1990, and pursuant to section 673b of Title 10, United States Code, the President authorized the Secretary of Defense and the

Secretary of Transportation to order units and individual members of the Selected Reserve not assigned to units to Active duty. The purpose of the call was to perform missions determined to be necessary to support the United States forces conducting operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula. The range of activities for the reservists in Operation DESERT SHIELD included joining deployed Active units or filling critical military support vacancies both in the United States and abroad.

On August 23, the Secretary of Defense delegated to the Secretaries of the Military Departments authority to order Selected Reservists to Active duty. In the Army, 25,000 members were authorized but they were only "to provide combat support and combat service support." The ceiling for the Navy was 6,300 members, for the Marine Corps 3,000. The limit for the Air Force was 14,500.

On August 25, the Army alerted 173 National Army Guard and Reserve units that could potentially be called to Active duty prior to October 1, 1990. The following day, 16 Army National Guard and 34 Army Reserve units from 25 states were ordered to Active duty. These elements included medical, linguist, maintenance, public affairs, administration, water distribution, terminal operators, and movement control units.

The Navy initially announced that 127 Naval Reserve units from 32 states and the District of Columbia were affected by the call. The units included medical, minesweeping, port and harbor security, and sealift support. Initially, no Marine Corps Reserve units were order to Active duty.

Three Air National Guard and three Air Force Reserve units from six states were called up on August 24. Five of the six were military airlift squadrons of C-5A Galaxies and C-141B Starlifters and one was a mobile aerial port squadron of airlift terminal and cargo managers.

In conjunction with the call-up by the Secretary of Defense, the

Secretary of Transportation proposes to call-up 1,250 Coast Guard reservists. By August 31, Reserve personnel were called for three Port Security Units, as well. It is reported that many of Saudi Arabia's airfields were operated by foreign contractors prior to the crisis , and these contractors have remained.

IV. Conclusions

It is clearly too early to draw any general conclusions about the effectiveness of the Total Force from Operation DESERT SHIELD. The operation is still in an early phase and the implications of our efforts are still unfolding. Many lessons from this operation have yet to be learned, and critical events may yet occur. The on-going work of the Study Group will, however, continue to be considered by the Secretary of Defense in his evaluation of the budgets proposed by the military departments for FY 92-93. The conclusions and recommendations that will be included in our final report to the Secretary will provide a sound basis for the very challenging force structure, force mix, and program decisions that the Department will make in the preparation of future budgets.

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

12 SEP 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP
THE VICE-CHAIRMAN, TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP

SUBJECT: Comments on Redraft of Interim Report to Congress

Although the redraft of the Interim Report is much improved with respect to the concerns I expressed regarding the first draft, it would still require significant editing before I would recommend that it be forwarded to Congress. My major concerns (primarily with pp. 4-10 of the draft) are described below, and the attached markup shows detailed revisions that would allay them.

The reconstitution-related portions (pages 6, 7 and 10) still emphasize a need to retain in standing force structure the long-lead elements of forces, and could even be misconstrued as calling for retaining current levels of those elements (especially personnel) in standing forces. Any discussion of reconstitution strategy must make clear that its major effect on force structure will be to reduce both active and reserve force size (as reflected in the President's statement: "rely not solely on existing forces, but to generate wholly new forces"). The endorsement of "moving forces into the Reserve components" to "retain forces in our overall structure and thus aid efforts to reconstitute" (page 7, 2nd paragraph) is directly counter to this thrust of the reconstitution strategy, and to the Department's clear intent to reduce Reserve component structure (most recently and clearly manifest in the Deputy Secretary's program assumptions guidance). That paragraph should be deleted, and other edits made as shown in the attached, to properly state reconstitution policy and strategy concepts.

The paper still exhibits the general Reserve-favorable "tilt" of the previous draft, which some Study Group members commented on at our 9 August meeting. This is due in part to statements which broadly attribute to the Reserve components various favorable characteristics -- lower cost, readiness near that of Active counterparts, capability for early-deploying and/or combat roles -- which in fact characterize only some types of Reserve units. Clearly the primary role in forward presence and rapid crisis response, and combat force structure generally, is and will remain the Active components'. The Reserves' orientation toward support roles for all but the largest or longest-term deployments has been demonstrated clearly in our DESERT SHIELD experience. To avoid the potential to mislead the reader or be deceptively quoted out of context, the Report must make clearer these respective emphases. Insertions throughout the attached markup such as "some types of Reserve units" and Reserve "combat" (or "support") roles are therefore more than merely editorial suggestions. The markup's clarifications of the reasons for reservations regarding dependence on use of reserves, including the political constraints on reserve activation, are similarly essential. To make clearer these relative emphases among active and reserve components' combat and

support roles, you might insert early in the Report a chart of current end strength data broken out by Service, component, and combat and support categories.

Finally, the attached markup includes several significant insertions, plus relocation of a paragraph on page 7-8, to make more visible as organizing concepts the three elements of strategy -- forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution -- around which the President's Aspen speech was structured.

I. Lewis Libby

Attachments
a/s

Chris/Steve,
I assume I will see this again before it goes to SecDef (letting his "reconstitution" points correctly will be very important; there's a lot of focus on this. If there may have this will go forward without our final review, please let me know
Scooter

cc: Frank Tapparo, Total Force Study Executive Director

Total Force Policy Report to the Congress

Department of Defense
December 1990

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

December 31, 1990

The Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to your memorandum of December 26, 1989 and Section 1101 of the FY 1990 National Defense Authorization Act, we have the honor to present this Final Report of the work of the Total Force Policy Study Group.

The work of the Study Group has taken place during a time of rapid and historic change in the strategic environment. When the work commenced, American armed forces were engaged in Operation JUST CAUSE. As this report is forwarded, American forces are engaged in Operation DESERT SHIELD, one of the largest and most successful deployments of military power in our nation's history and an operation that has already involved the call-up of 134,000 members of the Selected Reserve. Public debate also continues on issues that will have significant implications for future defense budgets.

This Final Report is not intended to answer with finality the many complex issues the Study Group considered. The Study Group's work has already served, however, as an important tool for the reevaluation of old assumptions, the consideration of the lessons being learned daily from our experience in DESERT SHIELD, and the building of the forces to meet the nation's future national security needs.

All of the 24 members of the Study Group and the very dedicated staff have contributed significantly to the work of the Group. We are deeply appreciative of their professional efforts to share their experience and perspectives with us. While much of the Final Report has the collective support of the Study Group, every member does not agree with every point in it. To the extent possible, the Report reflects the views of the members of the Study Group.

While we should continue our efforts to improve the implementation of the Total Force Policy, the wisdom of the policy and the contribution it makes to our nation's military flexibility and balance are not in doubt. We concur completely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who testified to Congress that the participation of National Guardsmen and Reservists in DESERT SHIELD has been significant and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last ten years to strengthen the Total Force concept.

Sincerely,

Christopher Jehn
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Force Management
& Personnel
Chairman

Stephen M. Duncan
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs
Vice Chairman

PREFACE

In accordance with Section 1101 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, the Department of Defense (DoD) has reviewed its Total Force Policy, active-reserve force mix, and military force structure. As required by the Authorization Act, the review has given special emphasis to the operation, effectiveness, and soundness of the Total Force Policy; the assignment of missions within and between the active and reserve components; the structure of U.S. active and reserve forces; and the specific issues raised in subsections 1101 (c) and (d) of the act.

The Total Force Policy Study complements the regular reviews of force structure issues conducted by the Department as part of its planning, programming, and budgeting process. The Study Group has considered numerous assumptions concerning the structure and use of the Total Force, with particular emphasis on the role of the reserve components. As noted in our Interim Report in September, Operation Desert Shield is now testing many of those assumptions. The insights it is providing have contributed to this review, and will guide future DoD total force considerations.

The Total Force Policy Study was conducted by a group of 24 senior civilian and military officials appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) served as chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the Study Group. A professional staff of 40 civilian analysts and military officers supported the group's efforts. A member of the Senior Executive Service served as Executive Director. A roster of the Study Group's members and a description of the group's major activities can be found in the supplement to this report.

This Final Report is divided into five sections. Section I provides a brief description of the evolution of the Total Force, including an update of Total Force activities related to Operation Desert Shield. The section also describes the components of the Total Force, and discusses some of the principles that have guided the implementation of the Total Force Policy over the past two decades. Section II describes the process by which the Department makes force structure decisions, reviews the costs associated with placing units in either the active force or the reserve components, and provides a brief discussion of the Department's medical programs. In addition, the section discusses the role of the reserve components in the Total Force--the capabilities they contribute, how their participation in military missions is obtained, and their potential uses in "quick reaction" contingencies.

Section III examines changes in the strategic environment. Section IV discusses the effects of the new strategic environment on the structure of the Total Force, and describes a number of approaches for managing the Total Force in the new environment. Section V is a concluding statement. In

addition to this report, material in a Supplement elaborates on many of the topics considered in this Final Report.

In addition to producing this study and the related Supplement, the Study Group requested several studies from federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs). The FFRDC studies include a review of costing methodologies and a study of unit cohesion between the active and reserve components, several manpower studies, and studies on the use of civilian contractors and the history of the Total Force. While the results of these efforts are referred to in the report, each FFRDC will publish other documents on the topics. By commissioning these studies, the Study Group believes it has expanded and improved the defense community's body of knowledge on important Total Force issues. A bibliography appears in the Supplement.

Table of Contents

PREFACE i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

SECTION I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL FORCE 13

Historical Use of Active and Reserve Forces in Conflict 13
Operation Desert Shield 18
Reserve Forces in Peacetime Operations 20
National Guard State Missions 20
Components of the Total Force 20
Planning Principles for the Total Force 27

SECTION II. MANAGEMENT OF THE TOTAL FORCE 33

Oversight 33
Service Force Planning Processes 35
The Relative Costs of Active and Reserve Forces 38
Maintaining Early Response Capabilities 46
Medical Forces 51
Integration of Active and Reserve Components 53

SECTION III. THE TOTAL FORCE AND THE CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 57

Threat Environment 57
Resource Environment 57
Strategy 59

SECTION IV. THE EFFECT OF THE EVOLVING MILITARY STRATEGY ON THE TOTAL FORCE 63

Future Roles for Active and Reserve Forces 63
Atlantic Force 65
Pacific Force 66
Contingency Force 66
Force Structure 67
Resources for Reconstitution 68

SECTION V. CONCLUSION 71

List of Tables

Table 1. Reserve/National Guard Federal Call-Ups Since the Korean Conflict 16

Table 2. Categories of Reserve Personnel 25

Table 3. Manpower Levels by Service and Component 26

Table 4. Composition of Defense Spending in the 1980s 39

Table 5. Summary of Direct Unit Cost Comparisons 41

Table 6. U.S. Military End Strength, FY 1990-95 66

Table 7. Illustrative Force: Army Corps and Divisions 67

List of Figures

Figure 1. Components of the Total Force 22

Figure 2. Composition of the Total Force, FY 1992 23

Figure 3. Department of Defense Total Obligational Authority, FY 1970-91 58

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The executive summary has two main parts: the first summarizes the content of the report; the second focuses on the matters outlined in Section 1101 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1990-91 for consideration by the Study Group.

THE REPORT

The development of the Total Force Policy has closely paralleled the end of national selective service and its replacement by the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). To take advantage of the manpower resources provided by the AVF, as well as to maximize the use of all resources available for the national defense, the Department of Defense (DoD) has adhered to a Total Force Policy.

Development of the Total Force

The Total Force Policy is a creative response to the nation's post-World War II responsibilities as a global power and the fiscal and demographic realities that have faced DoD since the Vietnam War. While the implementation of the policy has been uneven at times, the Total Force Policy has been a great success.

Historical Use of Active and Reserve Forces in Conflict. The military capability of the United States has never resided exclusively in the active component. America has always depended upon reserve forces and our mobilization base to maintain, in peacetime, capabilities that would be required in war.

Some 200,000 of the 4.7 million Americans who served in World War I were mobilized National Guardsmen or filler personnel from the new reserve components. A total of 16 million Americans served in World War II, and by the end of the war, over 12 million men and women were in uniform (including conscripts and volunteers). Once again, relatively small standing forces and reserve forces, reinforced by conscripts and volunteers, proved to be a workable organization of forces.

After the rapid and massive demobilization following World War II, the country relied more on volunteers and conscription to expand the active force than on the mobilization of reserve components. During the first year of the Korean conflict, over 2 million American men and women entered active military service. Mobilized personnel sources were split evenly among the National Guard and Reserve, voluntary enlistments, and draftees. This experience demonstrated the difficulty of using reserve forces for rapid mobilization when their readiness had been permitted to decline.

Since 1953, U.S. reserve forces have been called into action for international crises on several occasions, including the current call-up for Desert Shield. The major commitment of U.S. troops in Vietnam in 1965, however, did not lead to an immediate call-up of reserve component forces. As an alternative, the draft was increased to supply the wartime manpower pool.

In recent decades, reservists and National Guardsmen have volunteered for duty in connection with a wide range of operations: the military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965; in 1973, during the Yom Kippur War; and in 1975, when the S.S. Mayaguez was captured. In 1983, Guard and Reserve personnel participated in the invasion of Grenada as well as volunteered for duty in Lebanon. Members of the Naval Reserve and the Air Force reserve components voluntarily augmented active forces within 72 hours of the 1986 "Eldorado Canyon" raid on Libya. Reservists also contributed to the 1987-88 tanker escort operation in the Persian Gulf, and performed critical missions during Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989.

Operation Desert Shield. The application of U.S. military power in Operation Desert Shield has involved all components of the Total Force. Because of the scope and complexity of the operation and because the situation in Saudi Arabia is changing so quickly, it is premature to draw broad conclusions about the applicability of the Total Force Policy to it. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in December 3, 1990, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, this has already been one of the largest and most successful deployments in our nation's history. Important lessons are being learned daily.

Reserve Forces in Peacetime Operations. Since the adoption of the Total Force Policy, the reserve components have assumed responsibility for a wide range of ongoing peacetime operational missions. This has freed active force units and personnel for other assignments that require their use. In many instances, it has also resulted in significant cost savings.

National Guard State Missions. The National Guard is actively involved in the new DoD counternarcotics mission and is the first organized force called upon by a state's governor to respond to emergency situations requiring support above the normal capabilities of operating agencies of local or state governments. These factors must be considered in any analysis of the Total Force Policy.

Components of the Total Force. Since its adoption in 1973, the Total Force Policy has provided the DoD with an integrated force of active, reserve, retired military, federal civilian, and contractor personnel. Host nation support agreements have added allied military and civilian personnel to the manpower pool. The sum of these resources constitutes the Total Force (see Figures 1 and 2 in Section I). The Total Force concept has allowed steady and significant progress toward making the most effective and efficient use of the manpower resources available to the DoD. Many of the missions traditionally

performed by active-duty personnel--the most costly manpower asset--have been assumed by reserve forces, civilian government workers, private contractors, and foreign nations that host U.S. forces.

Planning Principles for the Total Force. In light of the dramatic geopolitical changes during the past year, the need for large U.S. forces that can fight on short notice has diminished. Retaining forces in the reserve components rather than on active duty becomes an attractive option because of the cost savings that such steps can generate. The potential savings must, however, be weighed against any loss of desired immediate capability, readiness, or flexibility.

Whether to place early-deploying combat capability for crisis response in the reserve components depends principally on the immediate readiness of the reserve units involved, the probability that they would be available when needed, and the desirability of having the execution of more of our strategy dependent on reserve availability. Warfighting capability should be placed in the reserve components only to the extent that units can, and will, be called up and mission-ready by the time they are deployed.

A basic consideration in force structure decisions is the time assumed between mobilization and combat: the longer the warning time, the lower the required level of peacetime readiness. Not all missions are appropriate for the reserve components. Those that require high levels of activity in wartime but comparatively low levels in peacetime (air defense, for example) are ideal for reservists. Peacetime missions that require intensive training, have highly technical military applications, require continuous presence, or demand high peacetime operating tempos or readiness are generally more appropriate for the active component.

The allocation of resources to the Total Force has been governed by the "first to fight" policy, which gives priority for manning, training, and equipping to those units that would deploy first, whether active or reserve. While the "first to fight" policy addresses a range of issues, it has been applied primarily to equipment allocation.

In light of the changing strategic environment, and as part of the reevaluation of Total Force assignments, unit equipment and training will be reviewed. This reevaluation will undoubtedly lead to the redeployment to the continental United States (CONUS) of some units that currently are stationed abroad, with other units drawn down or inactivated. The size and location of U.S. prepositioning and war reserve stocks also will be reviewed.

Interoperability is another basic principle of the Total Force. Achieving force interoperability generally requires that reserves train on the same types of equipment that they would use upon mobilization. Finally, the reserve components must be given sufficient training to perform their missions

43-455 - 91 - 19

effectively. Training policies attempt to ensure that reservists can attain the required readiness status before deployment.

Management of the Total Force

The effectiveness of the Total Force Policy has in no small measure been the result of the existence of a sound management process within the Department of Defense. The management and command structures of the Department have provided unity of effort as missions and responsibilities of active and reserve components have been integrated into a cohesive whole. This unity has enabled each element of the Total Force to do what it does best in a manner that results in economy of personnel and material resources.

Oversight. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) advises the Secretary on existing and projected military threats and the mix of forces needed to meet the threat. The principal advisors to the Secretary of Defense for Total Force issues are the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel (ASD/FM&P) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA).

The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) provides a management framework for making force structure decisions. Through the PPBS, the Secretary of Defense provides centralized policy direction to the military services and defense agencies, who, in turn, are responsible for developing and executing programs to carry out the Secretary's policy guidelines.

Service Planning Process. Developing a force structure that can carry out the national strategy is the aim of force planning. Decisions affecting the mix of active, reserve, and civilian personnel are made by the services as part of the PPBS process. Although each service uses a different analytic framework to guide its force mix decisions, they all follow the same general procedures to arrive at their proposed forces. Forces are structured to support the national military objectives set forth in the Defense Planning Guidance, and risk evaluations are used to allocate scarce resources. The services' proposed force structures (presented in documents called Program Objective Memoranda) are reviewed and adjusted by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and their principal advisors in meetings of the Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB).

The Relative Costs of Active and Reserve Forces. The cost-estimation methodologies used to support Total Force Policy decisions consider the cost implications of alternative sizes and mixes of active and reserve component forces. The methodologies incorporate a broad perspective of defense program costs that includes the direct and indirect costs of owning, operating, and supporting forces and recognizes both short- and long-term effects on defense funding. Even though improved methods and data sources are continually being developed, the costing methodologies in use today provide

sufficiently accurate information to assess the costs and risks associated with different force sizes and mixes.

Because of the variety of cost relationships associated with defense funding, we consider four types of costs: direct unit costs, direct support costs, infrastructure costs, and transition costs. Direct unit costs include the compensation (e.g., pay, allowances, and retirement benefits) of unit personnel, the day-to-day operating costs (e.g., fuel, parts, travel) of units, and the long-term recurring investments required to periodically replace unit equipment and keep it up to date. Direct support costs, as their name implies, are expenditures associated with programs and units that provide direct support to primary forces. Examples of these kinds of programs are specialized training that qualifies service members in the operation of weapon systems and funding for large-scale joint exercises. Changes in the size of primary force elements can have effects on direct support costs. Infrastructure programs include activities and services such as installation support, central logistics, central training, and central communications programs. Infrastructure cost impacts are important because nearly one-third of the budgets of the military services goes to provide these base-level and centrally managed services to the Total Force. Finally, transition costs are the one-time costs that arise in implementing changes in force structure. The costs of unit activations, deactivations, and transfers between active and reserve forces can run into the hundreds of millions of dollars, overshadowing the recurring savings. Transition costs fall into three general categories: personnel costs, facility costs, and equipment costs.

Maintaining Early Response Capabilities. The United States must be able to respond to a range of contingencies that require the use of military force. The increased reliance on the reserve components that has taken place in recent years has raised the inevitable question of the proper role of each of the reserve components in crisis situations that require an early response. Some observers believe that in view of the recent geopolitical developments, reserve forces should generally be limited to reinforcing and sustaining roles, in which they would serve only to supplement active forces during protracted contingencies or a general mobilization and subsequent to some initial period of conflict. In addressing this issue, it is important to avoid broad generalizations about reserve forces and to focus on specific missions. Many National Guard and federal reserve units (with a mix of part-time and full-time support personnel) are highly ready and capable of responding rapidly to orders to active duty. Flying units in the Air Reserve Components are obvious examples. In this sense, they are much more than forces held in "reserve." Other reserve units, especially brigade- or division-size ground units, are much more likely to need some post-call-up training before deployment.

Reserve Availability. Under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673b, the President has the authority to order Selected Reservists to active duty for two successive periods of 90 days whenever they are needed to augment active forces for "operational missions." (This authority was recently expanded to two

consecutive periods of 180 days for Operation Desert Shield combat units for FY 1991 only.) The Presidential call-up authority can be used independent of a partial or full mobilization. It is limited, however, to the activation of units or individual reservists designated as Individual Mobilization Augmentees. Operation Desert Shield marks the first time that the Section 673b call-up authority has been invoked.

Except for Desert Shield and other operations mentioned in the historical review, U.S. presidents have relied on voluntary participation to secure the reserve capabilities needed to augment the active force in contingency operations. While volunteers offer maximum flexibility, cost effectiveness, and responsiveness for the capability attained, several concerns remain. These include: (1) uncertainty regarding the amount and duration of voluntary participation; (2) loss of integral team/unit capability when larger units (e.g., ships, companies) do not volunteer together; and (3) possible employer reprisals against employees who volunteer for active duty.

Current Reliance on Early-Deploying Reserve Forces. As they are structured today, the armed forces rely to widely varying degrees upon their reserve components for the performance of missions that require early deployment. The Army requires substantial reserve augmentation for all major contingency operations. The Air Force has relied with success upon voluntary participation by its reservists to meet the bulk of the strategic and tactical airlift and air-refueling surge requirements for major, short-warning crises. With limited exceptions, however, the Navy and Marine Corps do not plan to use reservists for short-term contingency operations.

Reserve Readiness. While it is appropriate to monitor the readiness and capability of early-deploying active and reserve forces, it is important to note that readiness neither is--nor should be--consistent for all units. Not all active or reserve units need to maintain the capability of immediate deployment. The range of warning times we now anticipate--short amounts for contingencies of moderate size and much greater amounts for large-scale conflicts--argues for expanding and extending differences in readiness.

Medical Forces. The Military Health Services System (MHSS) has two distinct missions. The primary mission is the provision of medical care for the armed forces in wartime. The secondary mission is to provide peacetime health benefits to other authorized beneficiaries, including active and retired military personnel, military dependents, and reserve personnel.

In recent years, increasing effort within the Department of Defense has been concentrated on the development of a medical force that is capable of meeting the wartime mission. At the same time, the Department has been faced with the reality of the spiralling costs of peacetime medical care. Peacetime health services have a direct effect on the readiness of warfighting forces. They also represent a form of compensation, influence the quality of life of all beneficiaries, and are part of a commitment made by the Department of

Defense to "take care of its own." The numbers and kinds of medical personnel required in total, and on active duty, are determined by a combination of anticipated wartime needs and the structure of the peacetime health care system. The Department should continue to address these manpower needs as a high priority.

Integration of Active and Reserve Components. Maintaining the integrity of the Total Force will require a deliberate emphasis on manpower and personnel policies that enhance active and reserve component integration as well as short-run cost-effectiveness. The jobs to which active-duty personnel and reservists are assigned, and the ways in which they interact, influence the relative status, resource levels, and capabilities of active and reserve forces. Various methods to foster greater integration between the active and reserve components are being considered.

The Total Force and the Changing Strategic Environment

Threat Environment. The focus of U.S. national strategy has shifted over the past year in response to the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As the Warsaw Pact threat in Central Europe has receded, defense planning has begun to focus on the smaller-scale but demanding and most likely types of conflicts in which the United States might be involved. In this changed environment, crisis and contingency response capabilities should loom increasingly large in the military strategy. Regional conflicts and crises--often erupting with very little warning--are the most likely future threats. Retention of the ability to react to such threats in the uncertain times ahead will require continued dependence by the United States on strong--though smaller--active and reserve forces.

Resource Environment. The resources available to the Total Force have changed significantly during the past 20 years, but they continue to have a major impact on Total Force planning and policies. The resource environment includes not only the defense budget and that portion allocated to manpower, but also the manpower pool available to the Total Force and the equipment and technology available to support them. Over the past decade, the reserve component has grown in relation to the overall level of military manpower. This growth has occurred primarily in the Army and the Air Force, although the Navy and Marine Corps have transferred some forces to the reserves. The number of civilians employed directly by DoD or indirectly as contractors also has increased as we have accomplished the transition to an all-volunteer military.

Conventional Forces for Crisis Response. A variety of factors will affect the size and mix of active/reserve conventional forces that will be required for the Atlantic, Pacific, and contingency forces. Different types of forces will be required. For example, heavy and light ground forces, as well as naval and air forces, will be necessary for deterrence and to provide the flexibility to respond to a variety of types, sizes, and locations of crises.

Moreover, when sizable forces are committed to a particular regional contingency, it will still be necessary to retain the ability to deter or counter various other potential regional crises. An overall force that provides the flexibility needed in the Atlantic, Pacific, and contingency forces would also provide such capabilities for a range of concurrent contingencies of similar or differing types, sizes, and locations.

In his August 2, 1990, speech in Aspen, Colorado, the President noted that "the United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. . . . what we need are not merely reductions--but restructuring."

Reconstitution of Forces. The increased warning time the United States could reasonably expect in the event of a return by the Soviet Union to the force levels that existed during the height of the Cold War should allow us not only to rely on existing forces--but to generate new units. The timely generation of such forces would, of course, require early decisions to increase the readiness of reserve units and to generate new units from cadres, the Individual Ready Reserve, and untrained manpower.

The Effect of the Evolving Military Strategy on the Total Force

Future Roles for Active and Reserve Forces. As the new military strategy is developed in response to the changing strategic environment, it is not possible to design a force structure and a mix of active and reserve forces that will be the best obtainable for all circumstances and all potential conflicts, many of which may not be predictable. Any force structure necessarily involves an attempt to balance the need for forces that can meet predictable national security needs against available resources and acceptable risks. This report describes one force structure that is consistent with the changing strategic environment and illustrative of the kind of structure that can be achieved within current budgetary constraints.

For example, if current trends continue, a reduction of as many as ten Army division flags may be possible. A reduction of that size would have to come from both the active and reserve forces, with the majority of the division reductions taken from the active component, primarily those forces now assigned to the NATO reinforcement mission. Many of these divisions are supported by reserve combat, combat support, and combat service support units, and their inactivation would result in the disestablishment of numerous reserve units.

Active end strength in this illustrative force would be reduced from the FY 1990 level of about 2 million to about 1.7 million by the end of FY 1995. Selected Reserve strength would decrease from 1.15 million to about 910,000 over that same period.

Force Structure. The Army would have 12 active and six reserve divisions, plus two cadre divisions in the reserve component. Reserve forces would continue to provide roundout brigades for active divisions, as well as combat support and combat service support, mainly for the Atlantic force and later-deploying elements of the contingency force. Air Force tactical fighter wing equivalents would be reduced from a total of 36 in the FY 1990 force to about 26 by the end of FY 1995. We assume that the tactical fighter wings would have 72 aircraft per wing in both the active and reserve forces. The interceptor force would consist of 180 aircraft by FY 1995, all in the reserves. By the end of FY 1995, the Navy would have about 450 ships in its active force and 33 in the Naval Reserve Force. Included in the naval force could be 13 carriers (including a training carrier), with 11 active and two reserve air wings. One possibility for using our Naval Reserve forces better would be to place additional frigates (FF-1052 Knox class) in the reserve component in a way that would allow as many as five ships to be mutually supporting ("nested"). Finally, as part of the force restructuring, Marine forces could be reduced by one active Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) by the end of FY 1995.

Resources for Reconstitution. In addition to the active and reserve structure described above, the Total Force should accommodate the ability to reconstitute forces. To maintain a relatively rapid reconstitution capability as a near-term hedge, the United States will continue to need access to some long-lead elements of force structure--specialized personnel with hard-to-regain skills (like maintenance technicians) and weapons platforms with long production or recommissioning times. A parallel, longer-term aspect of the reconstitution concept could be to use resources freed from current forces to invest now in the longer-lead, longer-term innovative--technological, organizational, and doctrinal--concepts needed to hedge against any future resurgence of a more threatening environment abroad.

MATTERS CONSIDERED BY THE STUDY GROUP

Subsections 1101 (c) and (d) of the Authorization Act directed that a number of matters specifically be considered by the Study Group. The matters can be grouped in two general categories: (1) management of the Total Force and (2) structure, readiness, and sustainability of the force.

The initial management consideration is an identification of the basic tenets of the Total Force Policy, how well the policy has been implemented, and possible changes to the existing policy. The report notes two tenets that are fundamental to the policy: first, reliance on reserve forces as the primary augmentation for the active force, with conscription used only during full mobilization; second, the integrated use of all available forces--active, reserve, civilian, and allied. As stated above, since its inception in 1973, the Total Force Policy has been a great success. There has been unprecedented integration of purpose and capability between active and reserve components, as well as improved utilization of the DoD civilian, contractor, and host nation

support communities. The policy will need to be adjusted (not changed) in the coming years. The focus of U.S. national strategy is shifting from a Warsaw Pact threat in Europe to one in which there is a potential for smaller-scale, demanding contingencies throughout the world. As the need to be prepared for a massive, short-warning conflict diminishes, we can now adjust the size, structure, and readiness of our active and reserve forces to deal with the more likely challenges we will face (page 57).

Management and command responsibilities currently in place have served the Department well in evaluating and integrating force requirements among the services and their components. We should continue to use the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), which has been in place for over a quarter of a century. The PPBS has helped the Secretary of Defense allocate resources consistent with our readiness and sustainability goals for both active and reserve forces and plan for the use of these forces. The PPBS also provides a mechanism for reviewing service force structure and adjusting force mix. It is also a useful framework for reviewing service programs and for integrating the advice of the Secretary's senior civilian and military advisors (page 33).

Responsible officials are active participants in force evaluation and integration and take part in the Department's budget and resource-allocation process. The principal advisors to the Secretary of Defense for Total Force issues are the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, who attend all Defense Planning and Resource Board meetings where Total Force issues are being discussed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises the Secretary on the threat and the forces needed to meet the threat.

Each service has its own methodology for determining the assignment of missions between the active and reserve components and units within components (page 35). While cost-benefit considerations are at least implicit in all service methodologies, cost is not the driving factor--supporting national military objectives is. Service methodologies should not change when determining the distribution of force reductions, as mission accomplishment would continue to be the deciding factor in determining the units to be downsized or eliminated from the force structure.

Section IV of this report shows the magnitude of possible reductions should world events continue to point to a reduced Soviet threat. Despite the reduced threat, a need exists to preserve skills and equipment and to explore innovative force structure concepts, such as cadre units and "nested" ships. There is also a need to continue evaluation of the strategic environment, so that we do not reach a point where the changes we make are irreversible.

As directed in subsection 1101 (d), the Study Group considered many additional matters in preparing this report.

As noted previously, the PPBS is a process the Department has used and will continue to use for its periodic evaluations of force mix, force structure, readiness, sustainability, and overall mission capabilities of the active and reserve forces. The review conducted in preparing this report supplemented that process.

Section IV provides the broad outline of a possible force for meeting the threats of the future consistent with current and projected resources. That section also addresses competing views on the assignment of quick-reaction missions to active and reserve components. Section IV also discusses crisis response for reserve combat and support units.

The illustrative force structure described in Section IV would not count on reserve participation--other than volunteers--for contingencies expected to last less than 30 days. Reserve support units would be considered for contingencies expected to last up to 60 days. Reserve combat units would be considered for contingencies expected to be longer than 60 days. Reserve units would be expected to maintain the appropriate levels of readiness consistent with the above noted response times (page 64).

The Study Group reviewed factors affecting the readiness and sustainability of active and reserve components individually and the extent to which each component contributed to overall military capability. Measures reviewed included the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) and operating tempo (OPTEMPO) data. The report focuses on the extent these comparisons affect training and resourcing, especially in the event of reconstitution.

The Study Group, as a whole, did not have access to the data on units identified for use during the first 30 days of a mobilization. Those data are scenario-dependent and are operational data under the control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a more general sense, the report notes that the departure from focus on a war with the Warsaw Pact centered in Europe has complicated the identification of units needed in the first 30 days of a conflict, as the units change depending on the scenario (page 63). The administration of the "first-to-fight" policy of assigning resources to units is also complicated by the multiplicity of scenarios in the new strategic environment (page 29).

Equipment distribution, modernization priorities, and prepositioning of equipment were considered by the Study Group in conjunction with the "first to fight" policy (page 29), as well as the need for possible redistribution of prepositioned equipment (page 68). Furthermore, the Study Group reviewed the tie between the proposed Marine Corps structure and the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS).

The report considers the need for an adequate base of military personnel and equipment for rotation and deployment. Included in the base are the possible use of non-unit assignments for military personnel (page 70).

Adequate airlift and sealift capabilities for projected missions were considered when analyzing the illustrative force and are included in that force. The Study Group also devoted an entire meeting to a discussion of the adequacy of airlift and sealift, which also influenced the illustrative force structure.

The report does not discuss the funding that is needed for sufficient personnel, equipment, and training of the Total Force. That discussion is properly included in the President's Budget. The report does, however, have an extended discussion of costing methodologies that are used to determine costs for the manning, equipping, and training of the Total Force.

The discussion of Operation Desert Shield describes in detail the capability of the force needed to respond to a crisis situation. In the context of relying on a Total Force, with both active and reserve components, it is not meaningful to consider the capabilities of the active and reserve components separately, as each component complements the other.

SECTION I

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL FORCE

The "total force" concept was first articulated by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970, and adopted as formal DoD policy by Secretary James Schlesinger in 1973. The Total Force Policy has constituted a creative response to the nation's post-World War II responsibilities as a global power and the fiscal and demographic realities that have faced the Department of Defense since the Vietnam War. The Total Force Policy was never intended to make full-time active soldiers and part-time reservists mirror images of each other. It would be expensive, unnecessary, and unrealistic to attempt to make every National Guard and Reserve unit the absolute equal, in terms of readiness and capability, of the best active units.

As a general proposition, the Total Force Policy has had two principal tenets: first, reliance on reserve forces as the primary augmentation for the active force; second, the integrated use of all forces that are available--active, reserve, civilian, and allied. While the implementation of the policy has been uneven at times, since its inception the Total Force Policy has, by any standard, been a great success. There has been unprecedented integration of purpose and capability between the active and reserve components, and improved utilization of the DoD civilian, contractor, and host nation support communities.

The objective of the Total Force Policy has been to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy, and overseas commitments permit, and to integrate the capabilities and strengths of active and reserve forces in a cost-effective manner. The effect of this policy, especially during the 1980s, has been to place a substantial portion of our total military force in the reserve components, with reserve forces assigned demanding wartime missions and fulfilling critical peacetime operational responsibilities. The Total Force Policy has thus provided a cost-effective approach for achieving national military objectives at an acceptable level of risk.

Historical Use of Active and Reserve Forces in Conflict

The military capability of the United States has never resided exclusively in the active component. America has always depended upon reserve forces and our mobilization base to maintain, in peacetime, capabilities that would be required in war. (Note: Hereafter, the term "reserve" shall, unless otherwise stated or apparent, include both National Guard and federal reserve personnel.)

The earliest military organization of the American colonies followed the British pattern of local militia maintained for self-defense purposes. The Constitution gave the Congress authority to raise and support armies and to

provide and maintain a navy during peacetime and war. It also provided for the militia, which it put under state control, but it gave the Congress the power to call the militia for federal purposes. Thus, the foundation of our military organization was a small standing force backed by a larger militia force.

The early 20th century saw the beginnings of a federal reserve force entirely separate from the militia, which by then was known as the National Guard. The Army and Naval Reserve were placed under federal control and were not subject to call for state missions. Some 200,000 of the 4.7 million Americans who served in World War I were mobilized National Guardsmen or filler personnel from the new federal reserve components. A combination of regular and National Guard units provided 17 combat divisions; 2.8 million draftees supplied additional manning. After World War I, these standing forces were largely disbanded.

When the war in Europe commenced in 1939, the strength of the regular Army was at 190,000. The Army's organized reserve strength included 104,228 officers and 3,233 enlisted personnel who were available for wartime service. Between September 1940 and June 1941, eighteen Army National Guard divisions composed of 300,000 personnel were mobilized in increments. In addition, the Naval Reserve was mobilized in May 1940. By the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, there were 45,000 Naval Reservists on active duty. At the end of the war, American forces numbered over 12 million men and women in uniform, including conscripts and volunteers. A total of 16 million Americans had served. Once again, relatively small standing forces and reservists, reinforced by conscripts and volunteers, proved to be a workable structure that permitted adequate time for a large-scale mobilization and the equipping and training of combat units before employment. After the war, American forces were rapidly demobilized, and by 1948, the active force had declined to 1.4 million personnel. The strength of the reserve components was 2.6 million.

The invasion of South Korea in June 1950 presented unexpected manpower needs that did not fit with a strategy that called for full mobilization. The time for training, deployment, and employment was limited, and the United States suddenly faced a requirement for substantially larger forces than it had on active duty. After the rapid and massive demobilization following World War II, the country had come to rely more on volunteers and conscription to expand the active force than on the mobilization of reserve components. During the first year of the Korean conflict, over 2 million men and women entered active military service. Mobilized personnel were split evenly among the National Guard and Reserve, voluntary enlistments, and draftees. The need at the beginning of the conflict for trained individuals to fill units and provide replacements resulted in the mobilization of 168,000 individual reservists, including large numbers of World War II veterans who had not trained since their release from active duty following that war. With as little as three days' notice and twelve days of retraining they provided squad

leaders for the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army, thereby demonstrating that certain soldier and survival skills can be regained quickly. Because of insufficient resources, however, the readiness of some Army Reserve units had deteriorated rapidly after World War II, and those units required as much as a year of additional training before they could be deployed.

The Marine Corps experienced greater success in recalling reservists for the Korean conflict. Over 90 percent reported quickly to their units, and an additional 5 percent responded to the call-up with only minimal delays. Upon arriving at Camp Pendleton, California, after mobilization, all reserve ground units were disbanded and individual reservists were reassigned to active combat units to alleviate manning shortfalls. Most of the reserve aviation squadrons were employed as units rather than as individual replacements. By the end of the conflict, reservists made up 45 percent of the total Marine force of 192,000 and 48 percent of the Marine forces deployed to Korea. Between August and December 1950, more than 88,000 reservists either reported to Korea as replacements or filled training and support establishment billets in the continental United States (CONUS).

This first experience in the post-World War II era demonstrated the difficulty of using reserve forces for rapid mobilization when their readiness has been permitted to decline. Eventually, eight Army National Guard divisions (138,600 personnel) and many support units were mobilized, as were 14 separate battalions and 40 separate companies of the Army Reserve and 147,000 Air Force reserve component personnel. Only two of the Army National Guard divisions, however, were sent to the Pacific. Two others were sent to Germany in support of the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and four remained in the United States as training divisions and a source of replacements. This raised the issue of how to determine who was to serve when not all forces were engaged. It was clear that a new organization of forces was needed for the new circumstances facing the United States as a global power. As a consequence, after the Korean conflict, active forces were retained at much higher readiness and force levels to compensate for reduced reserve readiness.

Since 1953, U.S. reserve forces have been called to active duty for international crises on several occasions, including the current call-up for Operation Desert Shield. There have also been several federal call-ups of the reserve components in connection with civil emergencies (see Table 1). During the Berlin crisis in 1961, the Congress authorized the President to mobilize 250,000 Ready Reserve personnel for 12 months. Approximately 155,000 reservists served on active duty during the crisis, including 39,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve. During the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, the President was given authority to call up as many as 150,000 Ready Reservists for 12 months. Over 14,000 Air Force reservists were ordered to active duty at that time. During both crises, the mobilization of reserve forces served as a means of demonstrating U.S. resolve.

Table 1
Reserve/National Guard Federal Call-Ups Since the Korean Conflict

Event	Dates	Authority	Components	Number
Little Rock, AR	9/24/57 - 5/29/58	Executive Order 10730 (9/23/57)	Arkansas Army and Air National Guard	9,873
Berlin	10/1/61 - 8/31/63	Joint Resolution (P.L. 87-117) (8/1/61)	Army Reserve and National Guard	119,822
			Navy Reserve	8,357
			Air Force Reserve and National Guard	27,821
			Total	155,800
Oxford, MS	9/30/62 - 10/23/62	Executive Order 11053 (9/30/62)	Mississippi Army and Air National Guard	10,927
Cuba	10/27/62 - 11/1/62	Joint Resolution (P.L. 87-736) (10/3/62)	Air Force Reserve	14,200
Tuscaloosa, AL	6/11/63 - 7/11/63	Executive Order 11111 (6/11/63)	Alabama Army and Air National Guard	16,463
Alabama	9/10/63 - 9/14/63	Executive Order 11118 (9/10/63)	Alabama Army and Air National Guard	All
Selma, AL	3/20/65 - 3/29/65	Executive Order 11207 (3/20/65)	Alabama Army and Air National Guard	4,000
Vietnam	1/25/68 - 12/15/69	Executive Order 11392 (1/25/68)	Army National Guard	12,234
			Air National Guard	10,673
			Army Reserve	5,181
			Air Force Reserve	5,604
			Navy Reserve	1,588
			Total	35,280
Pueblo	1/23/68 - 12/22/68	Executive Order 11406 (6/10/68)	Navy Reserve	996
New York City	2/24/70 - 4/10/70	Executive Order 11519 (3/23/70)	Army National Guard	10,845
			Air National Guard	1,876
			Army Reserve	7,465
			Air Force Reserve	3,694
			Navy Reserve	2,207
			Total	26,087
Desert Shield*	8/22/90 -	Executive Order 12727 (8/22/90), extended by Executive Order 12733 (11/13/90)	Army Reserve and National Guard	88,183
			Air Force Reserve and National Guard	13,080
			Navy Reserve	7,720
			Marine Corps Reserve	16,313
			Coast Guard Reserve	761
			Total	126,057

* As of December 24, 1990

The major commitment of U.S. troops in Vietnam in 1965 did not lead to an immediate call-up of reserve component forces. The draft was increased to supply the wartime manpower pool. By 1968, manpower requirements for Vietnam had become so great that more than 17,000 Army National Guard and Reserve personnel were mobilized. The Air Force Reserve mobilized 5,604 reservists for duty throughout Southeast Asia, and four tactical fighter squadrons of the Air National Guard (10,673 personnel) saw combat service. In the Naval Reserve, six aviation squadrons and two construction force battalions were mobilized. With the exception of 1,700 Individual Ready Reservists who were ordered to active duty by the Army, this call-up of 35,000 personnel was accomplished at the unit level. Concern with the readiness of reserve forces led to the passage in 1967 of P.L. 90-168, "The Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act," which created the Selected Reserve.

The 1968 crisis involving the U.S.S. Pueblo also resulted in a call-up of reservists. Six Naval Reserve aviation squadrons (995 personnel) were activated. There have also been several call-ups during the past three decades for domestic reasons. For example, in March 1970, approximately 2,000 Naval Reserve personnel and 24,000 members of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve were called to active duty to support the government during the New York City postal strike.

Reservists have also volunteered for duty in connection with a wide range of operations. During the military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, some 600 Air Force reservists were utilized as part of a 115-crew contingent of airlift personnel. In 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, 286 Air Force reservists volunteered and participated directly in the airlifting of personnel out of hostile areas and the provision of assistance to Israel. Another 1,495 volunteers supported Military Airlift Command (MAC) missions, freeing MAC crews to provide direct support for the war efforts. In 1975, when the S.S. MAYAGUEZ was captured, reserve participation consisted of two Air Reserve Component C-141 crews. In 1983, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Naval Reserve personnel participated in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, and volunteered for duty in Lebanon. The Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve also participated in the Grenada operation.

Members of the Naval Reserve and the Air Force reserve components voluntarily augmented active forces within 72 hours of the 1986 "Eldorado Canyon" raid on Libya. The Naval Reservists served for 150 days; they included 33 officers and six enlisted personnel who performed search-and-rescue duties. Additionally, Air Force reserve component members of the Strategic Air Command provided aerial-refueling support.

During the 1987-88 tanker escort operation in the Persian Gulf, approximately 300 Naval Reservists volunteered for duty. Naval Reserve volunteers served aboard minesweepers and fast frigates, assumed naval control of shipping duties, and performed missions with small boat units. These

reservists served temporary active-duty tours, ranging from 30 to more than 180 days. Other volunteers performed special warfare tasks and served in the naval control of shipping unit in Bahrain.

Reserve volunteers also performed critical missions during Operation Just Cause in Panama in late 1989 and early 1990. Air National Guard units flew combat sorties (with A-7 aircraft) and airlift missions (C-141 and C-130 aircraft). Air Force Reserve units flew AC-130 gunship sorties, KC-10 tanker missions, C-5 and C-141 airlift missions, and aeromedical evacuation missions. Army Reserve civil affairs units provided critical assistance in the rebuilding of the infrastructure of the new government of Panama. Military police from Army National Guard units detained prisoners and processed civilian detainees.

Operation Desert Shield

The application of U.S. military power in Operation Desert Shield has involved all components of the Total Force. Because of the scope and complexity of the operation and because the situation in Saudi Arabia is changing so quickly, it is premature to draw broad conclusions. Certain preliminary observations can, however, be made.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in December 3, 1990, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee that this has already been one of the largest and most successful deployments in our nation's history. The operation has provided the nation with the first large-scale practical test of the Total Force Policy. Important lessons are being learned daily.

Two aircraft carrier battle groups established an initial U.S. presence in the region. After the decision to send forces to Saudi Arabia, a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division and tactical air forces were quickly deployed, along with components of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades and additional naval forces. A rapid force buildup followed and, by the end of August, approximately 100,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines were in the region.

Reserve volunteers were vital to the success of the early stages of the operation. During the first weeks of the deployment, thousands of reserve volunteers performed critically important missions, such as airlift and tanker support. By the sixth week, a combination of active, National Guard, and reserve personnel had already moved by air as much material as was transported during the entire Berlin Airlift--an operation that took place over a period of 65 weeks. More personnel and equipment were moved in the first three weeks of Desert Shield than in the first three months of the Korean conflict.

On August 22, 1990--only 20 days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait--the President signed an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of Defense,

pursuant to Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 673b, to call members of the Selected Reserve to active duty. This particular call-up authority had never before been used. Two days later, the first call-up of specific National Guard and reserve units was announced.

The deployment of active and reserve forces to Saudi Arabia has continued at a rapid pace. By the end of 1990, it is expected that American forces in theater will number approximately 326,000, including 276,000 active personnel and 50,000 reserve personnel. The Secretary of Defense has authorized the call-up of approximately 189,000 Selected Reservists.

Reservists are serving in Saudi Arabia in a wide range of support functions, including communications, transportation, and medical care. Three National Guard combat brigades have also been called to active duty and are currently undergoing individual and unit training. The experience to date in Desert Shield is consistent with the results of a test call-up of randomly selected reserve units conducted in October 1987. The reserve personnel have reported to active duty in a timely fashion, and the number of reservists who have been declared "non-deployable" because of physical or other limiting factors is comparable to that of active personnel. The motivation and initiative that have been demonstrated by the reserve units has also mitigated many of the obstacles encountered during the call-up.

The ongoing role that Reservists and National Guardsmen are playing in Operation Desert Shield should not be overstated, but their numerous contributions to date have been essential to the success of the operation. The prompt integration of active, National Guard, and reserve forces into a formidable "Desert Shield" is eloquent testimony to the capabilities of the reserve forces generally, to the often unique skills and experience they bring to the Total Force, and to the progress that has been made in recent years in implementing the Total Force Policy. On December 3, 1990, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff described the application of the Total Force Policy to Desert Shield as follows:

> To summarize, the success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance, and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last 10 years to strengthen the total force concept.

Host nation support provided by Saudi Arabia has been important to the sustainment of a U.S. presence in the region. The facilities and supplies made available to U.S. forces by the Saudi government have reduced some of the costs associated with the operation. For example, the Saudis are providing fuel to U.S. forces at no charge. Other nations in the region are also providing support to U.S. forces.

Civilian technicians and engineers are performing maintenance on aircraft, missiles, radars, tanks, and helicopters at regional locations, just as they do in the United States. The support they have provided extends to facilities as well, including some Saudi airfields. DoD has also used commercial aircraft provided through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program to support operations in Southwest Asia. Early in the operation, the Commander of the U.S. Military Transportation Command ordered the implementation of the first stage of the CRAF program, making 38 civilian aircraft (almost all wide-bodied) available to DoD for moving passengers and cargo.

Reserve Forces in Peacetime Operations

Since the adoption of the Total Force Policy, the reserve components have assumed responsibility for a wide range of ongoing peacetime operational missions. This has freed active force units and personnel for other assignments that require their use. In many instances, it has also resulted in significant cost savings.

The nature of the peacetime missions performed by the reserve components has expanded in recent years. At the very minimum, it is clear that as the Total Force Policy has evolved in recent years, reserve forces have become much more than forces in waiting. They have assumed a major role in performing missions that are crucial to the Department's day-to-day responsibilities.

National Guard State Missions

Analyses of the Total Force Policy must necessarily consider the importance of the state or domestic missions of the National Guard, as well as its federal missions. The National Guard is normally the first organized force called upon by governors to respond to situations which require support that exceeds the capabilities of state and local agencies. The scope of the support provided is broad, and ranges from emergency assistance during natural and man-made disasters to congressionally-mandated support to law enforcement agencies in the nation's fight against illegal drugs. In FY 1990 the National Guard responded to nearly 300 calls to state duty, and some 23,171 individual Guardsmen were involved. The state missions included such activities as disaster relief for Hurricane Hugo and the San Francisco Bay area earthquake. In addition, the National Guard used almost 533,000 training mandays to support federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the implementation of counternarcotics programs.

Components of the Total Force

Since its adoption in 1973, the Total Force Policy has provided the Department of Defense with an integrated force of active, reserve, retired

military, federal civilian, and contractor personnel. Host nation support agreements have added allied military and civilian personnel to the manpower pool. The sum of these resources constitutes the Total Force (see Figure 1).

Military Personnel. As Figure 2 shows, the active force and the Selected Reserve are the two largest components of the Total Force. Together, they comprise about 3.2 million personnel, with the active component providing two-thirds of the total and the Selected Reserve the remaining one-third. In wartime, the civilian and host nation sectors would grow to fill demands not present in peacetime.

The Total Force Policy has allowed steady and significant progress toward making the most effective and efficient use of the manpower resources available to the Department of Defense. Many of the missions traditionally performed by active-duty personnel--the most costly manpower asset--have been assumed by reserve forces, civilian government employees, private contractors, and foreign nations that host U.S. forces. The active component remains responsible for the mission which it alone can perform: provision of highly ready and rapidly deployable combat and support forces to defend U.S. interests worldwide.

As the Total Force Policy has evolved over the last decade, a dramatic change has occurred in the way some reserve forces are viewed and used. While the Department has planned for decades to rely upon the reserve components as the primary source of augmentation for active forces in a global war or other large-scale conflict, some National Guard and Reserve units (with a mix of part- and full-time personnel) are capable of responding rapidly either as volunteers or on orders to active duty for crises or other operational requirements. These forces are not "reserves" in the traditional "forces in waiting" sense. For example, over 90 percent of the continental air defense mission in the United States is now performed by the Air National Guard. Likewise, major portions of military airlift and counter-drug missions are performed by reserve forces, including the federal reserve forces and the National Guard acting under the control of state authorities.

The reserve components of the armed forces include the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. Reserve manpower is assigned to one of three categories--the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, or the Retired Reserve. These categories are described in Table 2.

The reserve components have grown significantly over the past decade. In FY 1990, 51 percent of Army military manpower and 27 percent of Air Force military manpower were in the reserve components. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard reached their current reserve levels of 21 percent, 18

Figure 1
Components of the Total Force



Figure 2
Composition of the Total Force*
FY 1992



* Does not include contractors and U.S. Coast Guard.
1 Includes military and civilian personnel at peacetime levels.
2 Does not include disabled or retirees above age 60.

percent, and 24 percent, respectively, in the late 1980s. Table 3 shows active and Selected Reserve component and civilian manpower levels by service.

Civilians. The mix of military and civilian personnel in the Total Force reflects organizational changes in the delivery of services and functions, as well as adjustments in force structure. Starting in the late 1950s, the Department established a number of defense agencies to support the military components. These predominantly civilian organizations (about 100,000 nonmilitary employees) have reduced overall costs by consolidating overhead functions and reducing military manning requirements. With changes in technology and continued pressures to reduce defense costs, the Department of Defense--as part of its implementation of the Secretary of Defense's July 1989 *Defense Management Report to the President*--is undertaking additional consolidations of support functions, including financial management, contract management, depot supply, consumable item management, and commissary operations. Organizational and technical changes in support functions will continue to change the military and civilian mix and the way the Department views requirements for military personnel. It should be noted, however, that civilian data reflect peacetime employment only, whereas military data (because they include reserves) reflect wartime resources. The *Defense Manpower Requirements Report* indicates that DoD would need to hire another 320,000 civilians in the event of a major conflict.

Combat and certain support positions are assigned to military personnel, as are other positions needed to maintain an overseas rotation base. It is departmental policy that positions not requiring recent operational military expertise be filled either by civilian DoD employees or private contractors. Nonmilitary functions that can be performed only by government personnel, or that are deemed critical mobilization assets, are reserved for DoD employees. All other nonmilitary functions are assigned to either DoD or contractor personnel, based on the relative cost advantages.

The civilian work force of the Defense Department currently numbers about one million men and women, or about 16 percent of the Total Force. These individuals perform the bulk of logistics, base operation support, and research and development functions. Civilians also constitute a substantial portion of the force structure devoted to medical and personnel support; personnel training; and essential auxiliary activities, including intelligence and communications.

Contractors. In both peacetime and war, civilian contractors make important contributions to the Total Force. Over 200,000 peacetime positions are held by contractors, of which about 80,000 have been subject to contracting competition in the United States, ensuring the least-costly provision of services consistent with national defense needs. Contractors perform about one-third of DoD's depot maintenance workload, a significant portion of research and development (through universities, federally funded research and development

Table 2
Categories of Reserve Personnel

The Ready Reserve consists of the Selected Reserve (including individuals in both National Guard and reserve units), the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National Guard (ING).

The Selected Reserve comprises personnel assigned to Selected Reserve units, reservists in training programs, individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs), and full-time support (FTS) personnel.

The Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive National Guard are composed of reservists who are not attached to units. Most IRR/ING members previously served in the active component or the Selected Reserve, and have a military service obligation remaining. Members of the Individual Ready Reserve are eligible for mobilization and for limited involuntary active duty for training. They may train voluntarily for retirement points and promotion, with or without pay. Members of the Inactive National Guard are not eligible to earn retirement points or pay, nor can they be promoted.

The Standby Reserve is a pool of individuals who could be mobilized to fill specific manpower needs. Members of the Standby Reserve (who often have medical or other skills that might be critical in the case of mobilization) are not required to train, are not assigned to units, and do not receive pay or retirement credit.

The Retired Reserve consists of: (1) reservists who receive retired pay; (2) reservists eligible for retired pay who have not reached age 60 and are not members of the Ready or Standby Reserve; and (3) retired regular enlisted personnel who have completed 20 years but less than 30 years of service. (All retired regular officers and retired enlisted personnel with over 30 years active and retired service are on the regular retired list.) Members of this reserve category may be ordered to active duty in national emergencies under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 672(a), Title 10 U.S.C. Section 675, or Title 10 U.S.C. Section 688(a).

Table 3
Manpower Levels by Service and Component, End FY 1990
(In thousands)

	Active	Selected Reserve	Civilian	Total
Army	732	754	430	1,950
Navy	580	153	331	1,067
Marine Corps	197	45	21	261
Air Force	535	202	261	1,005
Coast Guard	37	12	5	54
Total	2,081	1,166	1,048	4,337

centers, or private-sector firms), much of the health care provided via CHAMPUS, and peacetime and wartime transportation services. First-year savings from contracting have been estimated to exceed 30 percent of the cost of providing equivalent services "in house." The nearly 150,000 private-sector employees who supported U.S. forces in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam conflict demonstrated the value and practicality of large-scale use of contract services in wartime.

The Defense Department is required by law to rely on contractors for commercial activities where cost-effective. Between 1979 and 1989, DoD's Commercial Activities Program examined 81,519 military and civilian positions, of which 51,244 were transferred to the private sector. Congress exempted core logistics activities from the law. The Commercial Activities Program has been particularly successful in subjecting functions and processes to critical scrutiny, to the extent that even some of the functions designated to remain in house have subsequently been eliminated or restructured on a more cost-effective basis.

Host Nation Support. The United States obtains host nation support (HNS) in varying degrees from almost all of its NATO allies, as well as from other nations, including Korea and Japan. The type and level of support vary from country to country, and may include facilities, exercise support, prepositioning facilities, or infrastructure. Estimates of the value of host nation support depend on the type of assistance provided, but all such arrangements reduce the costs of maintaining U.S. forces abroad. For example, as stated in the 1990 report to Congress, *Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*, the Japanese government paid at least 50 percent of the cost of employing Japanese workers at U.S. military facilities in Japan in 1990, with the total support from that country equating to about $40,000 for each U.S. service member stationed there.

Wartime host nation support (WHNS) consists of civilian or military assistance provided by host nations to allied forces operating from, or transiting through, their territory in time of war. It has been estimated that, for the Army alone, WHNS agreements provide capabilities equivalent to over 120,000 U.S. military support personnel. These are spaces not formed or paid for because of our ability to rely on allied assistance. The United States relies extensively on WHNS in Europe and Northeast Asia but, until recently, has had few such initiatives in the Americas and Southwest Asia.

The wartime host nation support agreement between the United States and Germany is the most comprehensive such arrangement, with 93,000 German reservists committed to the direct support of U.S. forces. Germany also has agreed to provide 22,000 items of equipment mobilized from the civilian sector. The savings to the United States from having Germany provide this equipment amount to approximately $578 million.

Planning Principles for the Total Force

Force-Mix Considerations. In light of the dramatic geopolitical changes that have taken place during the past year, the need for large U.S. forces that can fight on short notice has diminished. Retaining forces in the reserve components rather than on active duty becomes an attractive option because of the cost savings that such steps can generate. The potential savings must, however, be weighed against any loss of desired immediate capability, readiness, or flexibility.

Reserve forces are less expensive than comparable active forces, but the precise magnitude of the cost differential varies according to the manning level, mission, and operating tempo of the units in question. Reserve ground units, for example, are considerably less costly than active ground units. While still offering significant savings, some flying units in the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Naval Reserve are closer in cost to their active counterparts. As an example of the savings that might be achieved, a study by the Center for Naval Analyses concluded that Naval Reserve patrol (P-3) squadrons operate at 44 percent of the cost of active patrol squadrons and Naval Reserve carrier air wings operate at 50 percent of the cost of active wings. On the other hand, historical manning and operating policies for the Naval Reserve Force ships--65 percent active and full-time support (TAR) personnel and 35 percent Selected Reserve crews--result in a less significant cost difference between similar active and reserve frigates. If significant cost savings can be achieved by a transfer of force structure to a reserve component for the performance of a particular mission, prudence requires that the transfer be fully considered. Any such cost savings must be weighed, however, against the decreases in capability and flexibility that could result. (A detailed discussion of cost-estimation methodologies for the Total Force is provided in the Supplement.)

In considering the most appropriate force mix, focus must be placed on the need for forces to (1) provide peacetime presence, (2) maintain rapid crisis-response capabilities, and (3) hedge against a need to reconstitute forces. Peacetime presence is provided by forward-deployed forces. These forces generally are in the active component, and require a rotation base of active-duty personnel to permit members of deployed units to shift from overseas assignments to stateside duty. The need to maintain a forward presence in some regions has not diminished, although in certain areas, deployments could perhaps be reduced or conducted on an intermittent basis, perhaps using both active and reserve units. For example, Naval Reserve patrol (P-3) squadrons have maintained a forward presence for the past ten years, routinely providing support to deployed P-3 squadrons in the Mediterranean (Sixth Fleet) and Western Pacific (Seventh Fleet) theaters of operation. The Army and Air Force have had successful intermittent forward deployment programs in Europe using both active and reserve units. The Army is currently seeking ways to expand its program. The national security implications and costs of maintaining intermittent deployments should be weighed carefully, however, before such an approach is expanded.

The question of whether to place early-deploying combat capability for response to crises in the reserve components depends principally on the immediate readiness of the reserve units that would perform the early-deploying missions, the probability that they would be available when needed, and the general desirability of shifting greater responsibility to the reserve components. Reserve units that include personnel with significant prior active-duty experience may have capabilities comparable to those of active units with similar missions. The Air Reserve Components, for example, often match active units in capability and are typically ready to deploy on short notice, in part because of the high individual skill level of reservists with prior active-duty experience, but also because these units are backed by sizable numbers of full-time personnel. The readiness of reserve ground forces tends to be better in smaller units. Large reserve ground units (e.g., brigades and divisions) often need additional training before they can be employed in combat. Some reserve units are less ready as a result of insufficient resources, management problems involving mismatches between individual military skills and unit requirements, and the difficulties of collective training, which are exacerbated for the reserves by the limited time available for peacetime training.

Participation by reserve forces in operational missions can be secured through different methods. First, and as indicated earlier in this report, National Guardsmen and reservists may volunteer to serve on active duty. Second, and pursuant to the authority granted in Title 10 U.S. Code 673b, the President may call as many as 200,000 Selected Reservists to active duty for a period of 90 days, with an extension of an additional 90 days. A recent amendment to Section 673b (for FY 1991) authorizes the President to order Selected Reserve combat units to active duty in support of operations in and around the Arabian Peninsula and Operation Desert Shield for 180 days, with

an extension of an additional 180 days. Finally, the President may initiate a partial mobilization after declaring a national emergency, or seek the approval of Congress for a total mobilization.

Use of reserve volunteers has tended to work well for unit or individual missions that do not require close, intra-unit coordination (strategic airlift and some support missions, for example). It has been less effective in force elements such as ground combat units or ship crews, where unit training and cohesiveness is more important. The ordering of reserve units to active duty provides enhanced military capabilities in a crisis and a demonstration of national will that can assist in deterring aggression.

A basic consideration in determining the force mix is the time assumed to be available between mobilization and combat: the longer the warning time, the lower the required level of peacetime readiness. Appropriate consideration, however, must be given to the difference between warning and reaction time: firm decisions to act are not always made at the moment of first warning. With the much longer warning times now projected for a European or major global conflict, the United States must weigh anew the size and readiness of the forces heretofore maintained only for those threats. Some of these forces could be transferred to the reserve components, manned at significantly reduced levels, organized into cadre units, or taken out of the force structure entirely. In implementing any of these approaches, some of the long-lead-time equipment that exceeds current requirements must be preserved, in the same manner that we seek to preserve trained leaders and other highly-trained personnel.

Not all missions are appropriate for the reserve components. Those that require a high level of activity in wartime but comparatively low levels in peacetime (air defense and the work of construction battalions, for example) are ideal for reservists. Missions requiring extended peacetime deployments (such as ballistic missile submarine patrols), on the other hand, are often unsuitable for reservists. Some missions can be assigned to either active or reserve units, depending on how soon the missions must be performed after a crisis develops and on the availability and readiness of individual units.

Peacetime missions that require intensive training, have highly technical military applications, require a continuous presence, or demand high peacetime operating tempos or readiness are generally more appropriate for the active component. Many peacetime missions, however, can be performed by reserve units as part of their regular monthly training or annual active-duty tours.

"First to Fight" Policy. The "first to fight" policy was first enunciated in 1982 by then-Secretary of Defense Weinberger:

> Under the Total Force Policy, each service Secretary is responsible for providing the manning, equipment, training facilities, construction and maintenance necessary to ensure

> **that Selected Reserve units meet the readiness standard and deployment schedules required by our national contingency plans. . . . Units that fight first shall be equipped first, regardless of component.**

The allocation of resources to the Total Force has been governed by the "first to fight" policy, which gives priority for manning, training, and equipping to those units that would deploy first, whether active or reserve. Thus, some reserve units have a higher priority for manning, equipment, and training than do some active units. The "first to fight" policy has been applied primarily to equipment allocation. Within this context, the policy has provided a basic framework for establishing distribution priorities and schedules. In the past, priorities were determined on the basis of a global war scenario. Although the policy pertained to all forces, it was more easily applied to ground and air combatants, whose deployments could be sequenced in advance. In the new strategic environment, however, with its emphasis on regional contingencies, "first-to-fight" determinations have become less clear and the priority of some units could change.

In light of the new strategic environment, and as part of the reevaluation of Total Force assignments, unit equipment and training should be reviewed. A reevaluation would undoubtedly lead to the redeployment to CONUS of some units that currently are stationed abroad, with other units drawn down or inactivated. With redeployment to CONUS and planned force restructuring, some unit resources may be considered for reapportionment to other units or components. Reserve component units that lack equipment needed upon mobilization may be allocated some of the material currently assigned to forward-deployed units. On the other hand, experience to date in Operation Desert Shield demonstrates that transfers may also be made from reserve to active units, or within the reserve components if early-deploying units lack some of their required equipment.

The size and location of U.S. prepositioning and war reserve stocks also will be reviewed. To the extent permitted under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, excess equipment is likely to be redistributed to units in the United States to enhance multi-regional contingency capabilities and alleviate reserve component shortfalls.

Interoperability. Interoperability is another basic principle of the Total Force. Achieving force interoperability generally requires that reservists train on the same type of equipment that they would use upon mobilization. Interoperability also requires that early-deploying reserve forces receive equipment compatible with that of the active units that they support. Temporary situations have occurred in which these requirements could not be met because of problems of availability or distribution. This is often the case, for example, when weapons are produced under multi-year contracts, and thus enter the inventory in increments over a period of years.

Training. U.S. military personnel, whether active or reserve, must be well-trained and capable of responding to threats to the nation's security interests. It is neither necessary nor cost-effective, however, to maintain all units at the same levels of readiness. Later-deploying reserve units can be maintained at levels of readiness that will ensure their readiness for deployment after a certain amount of post-mobilization training. Limits on the availability of training equipment, ranges, and strategic lift make it prudent to consider this factor in structuring forces.

For example, in order to more closely integrate the Total Force, the Army could provide, in peacetime, specific alignments of its reserve divisions and separate brigades to the corps with which they would be employed upon mobilization. The concept would include corps training and readiness affiliation as well as equipment distribution and modernization of all forces within the corps, consistent with the state of modernization of aligned divisions and separate brigades. Such "force packages" could enhance the overall preparedness of the force and complete a relatively fixed affiliation throughout. Such redirection and expansion of the previously successful CAPSTONE program would be a welcome response to the demands brought about by the changing size and direction of the forces.

Concluding Note. The force that has evolved from the colonial militia to the modern Total Force has served the United States well. Through the years, our nation has continued to embrace the philosophy of a comparatively small standing force backed by mobilizable reserve forces. Section II describes how today's Total Force is managed to ensure that its several components form a cohesive, effective organization.

SECTION II

MANAGEMENT OF THE TOTAL FORCE

Choices about the size of the Total Force and the mix of active and reserve forces depend on the nature of current and potential threats to the nation, the military capabilities required to meet those threats, the ability of different types of forces to accomplish their wartime missions, the availability of defense resources, and the willingness to accept the greater or lesser risks associated with various levels of defense spending.

The evaluation of these and related factors, and the planning that is essential to achieve a desired force size and mix, clearly require a sound management process. The effectiveness of the Total Force Policy has in no small measure been the result of the existence of such a process within the Department of Defense. The management and command structures of the Department have provided unity of effort as missions and responsibilities of active and reserve components have been integrated into a cohesive whole. This unity has enabled each element of the Total Force to do what it does best in a manner that results in economy of personnel and material resources.

These issues are discussed in more detail in the remainder of this section. Further information on the Department's force structure plans and manpower policies may be found in Sections III and IV.

Oversight

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), assisted by the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) of the unified and specified commands, provides strategic direction to the armed forces and develops operational plans. As part of his force planning responsibilities, he reviews the international security environment and U.S. national security objectives, and provides net assessments of the capabilities of potential adversaries. The scenario-dependent forces that are developed under the Chairman's direction are termed the Risk Evaluation Force.

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the principal advisors to the Secretary of Defense for Total Force issues are the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel (ASD/FM&P) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA).

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Total Force management and military and civilian manpower. The ASD(FM&P) also develops plans and programs to support Total Force manpower readiness and sustainability. Furthermore, he develops policy for allocating active, reserve,

and civilian manpower among DoD components and criteria for evaluating the mix of active and reserve military personnel.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on reserve component matters, including Total Force policy issues. The responsibilities of the ASD(RA) include full participation in planning, programming, and budgeting activities. He is charged with exercising oversight to ensure that DoD actions are compatible with and support Total Force objectives and requirements, enhance the readiness and capabilities of reserve component units and personnel, promote the integration of reserve components with active-duty forces, and make the most effective use of reserve components within the Total Force.

The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) provides a management framework for making force structure decisions. Through the PPBS, the Secretary of Defense provides centralized policy direction to the military services and defense agencies, who, in turn, are responsible for developing and executing programs to carry out the Secretary's policy guidelines.

The starting point in determining the composition of the Total Force is the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), issued by the Secretary of Defense during the initial phase of the PPBS. This document describes projected threats, and outlines the defense policies and strategies needed to meet them. The policy statements embodied in the DPG guide the military services in formulating program plans for the coming six fiscal years. The Secretary's policy guidelines are expanded upon by DoD directives that prescribe detailed procedures for managing specific portions of the Total Force. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy oversees the preparation of the DPG, in coordination with other components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretaries of the military departments.

The military departments use the DPG to develop the respective force structures they recommend to carry out the national military strategy. Although the services use different analytical frameworks to guide their force-mix development processes, they all follow the same general procedures to develop the force structures that they propose to the Secretary of Defense.

The detailed program blueprints that emerge from this second phase of the PPBS process are described in documents entitled Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs). The POMs are reviewed by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and their principal advisors. As programs are developed and resources allocated, the CJCS evaluates the capabilities provided by the programs and assesses the risks associated with them. Where appropriate, the CJCS and OSD staff propose changes that would bring the programs into

greater conformance with strategic priorities. Selected issues are considered by the Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB)--the Department's most senior management body for programming and budgeting matters. The DPRB includes as permanent members the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries, the CJCS, the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Acquisition, the DoD Comptroller, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. Other senior officials are invited to attend DPRB sessions depending on the topics under discussion. For example, the ASD(FM&P) and the ASD(RA) attend when matters pertaining to active and reserve forces and personnel are discussed.

The DPRB evaluates the service program proposals and alternatives to them, and advises the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary's decisions on the issues are then transmitted to the services in Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs).

The services use the PDMs to prepare budgets to carry out the mix of programs approved by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. The service budget proposals are subjected to review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget, and are modified by the Secretary of Defense or the President before being incorporated into the President's Budget.

Service Force Planning Processes

Developing a force structure that can carry out the national military strategy is the aim of force planning. As noted earlier, the services have developed different analytical frameworks to guide their force structure/mix decisionmaking process. The paragraphs that follow review the processes used by the individual services.

Army. The Army develops its program in a two-year process known as Total Army Analysis (TAA). The process begins with a series of computer-assisted simulations of force deployment and warfighting that are used to identify the combat forces needed to support the DPG. In addition to the DPG, inputs for the TAA are provided by The Army Plan--the official Army interpretation of military strategy, threat data, resource assumptions and priorities, and force structure guidance. Additional computer models and simulations establish time-phased, geographically distributed estimates of nondivisional combat and tactical support units to round out the theater forces. The product of this computer modeling is used to develop the Army's Total Force, following which a plan is prepared showing the transition to the proposed force structure over the POM years.

Projected readiness, desired mobility capability, demographics, and cost are key criteria in making trade-offs between active and reserve forces. Because it is more difficult to maintain the readiness of most reserve component units at very high levels, the Army normally assigns rapid-response

missions to the active force. Missions that require intensive training, highly technical skills, high peacetime operating tempos, or high readiness levels are considered carefully before assignment to the reserve components. For example, forward-deployed forces are composed primarily of active component personnel. Demographic factors limit reserve unit growth in some regions of the country, but more favorable trends in other regions generally offset this constraint, enabling overall manning goals to be achieved. After he has reviewed the recommendations of the major Army commands, the Army Chief of Staff selects a base force that is used to build the Army POM.

Navy. The process by which the Navy develops its force recommendations is not as structured as the Army's TAA approach. The Navy's primary objective in developing its force structure is to meet the objectives of the maritime element of the national military strategy. The Navy's proposed force structure is developed on the general premise that any capability not needed in peacetime and not obtainable from the civilian sector should be assigned to the Naval Reserve.

The Navy force-mix decisionmaking process is a subset of the force structure process, and is designed to maintain: (1) active forces sufficient to meet peacetime commitments; (2) reserve forces trained, equipped, and ready to augment the active force when needed; and (3) an affordable force mix. The Director of Naval Reserve participates in the force review process. The Navy has also designated a Total Force Advocate, a flag-level officer on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations who has responsibility for keeping naval forces in balance and for providing policy guidance and oversight for the integration of the active and reserve components.

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps force structure, unlike that of the other services, is established by law. Title 10 of the U.S. Code, paragraph 5063, stipulates that the Marine Corps shall have not less than three divisions and three air wings, but it does not prescribe the number or composition of Marine forces. As with the other services, decisions on the structure and active/reserve mix of the Marine Corps are made in accordance with guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. The Marine Corps focuses its active force on low- to mid-intensity conflicts, with a capacity to make any initial commitment of force in a transition to general war. The Marine Corps Total Force is designed to be capable of responding at any level of conflict, with reserve forces providing capabilities and depth for sustained conventional combat. Force-mix decisions are also consistent with the Marine Corps Total Force Policy. This policy states that the general criteria for determining whether capabilities should be placed in the active component or the reserves are: peacetime commitments and forward-deployments, responsiveness (reserve availability), reserve accessions, rotation base requirements, and cost. In general, unless there is a partial or full mobilization, peacetime forward-deployment demands must be met by active forces.

43-455 - 91 - 20

The number and types of units in the active force are monitored for cost and effectiveness in a peacetime environment. Capabilities not immediately needed for low- to mid-intensity expeditionary operations (including some general support artillery and bulk fuel companies) may be placed in the Marine Corps Reserve. Manpower requirements are examined biennially in conjunction with the PPBS process. Force structure and mission-area analyses are conducted by the Marine Corps Combat and Development Command and documented in approved Master Plans. These plans incorporate a Total Force approach to force structure and manpower specifications. The costs and merits of each proposal are briefed to committees of the senior leadership of the Marine Corps. Ultimately, the approved proposals are submitted to the Office of the Secretary of the Defense as part of the Navy POM.

Air Force. The Air Force develops its programs on the basis of top-down guidance. National military objectives established by the President, the Defense Planning Guidance, the DoD Total Force Policy, and fiscal constraints provide the framework for force development.

In constructing the Air Force POM, the primary objective is to provide aerospace forces to sustain deterrence, provide power projection, supply rapid global mobility, and provide control of both air and space. The major air commands, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard participate with the Air Staff in the process of developing the POM. The process requires tradeoffs between force structure composition and size on the one hand, and procurement needs and research and development initiatives on the other, all within the bounds of the fiscal constraints provided by OSD. When force structure/force mix issues are discussed, criteria developed jointly by the active and reserve components and approved by the Secretary of the Air Force are used. Their purpose is to provide a framework for use during force structure deliberations and development of supporting rationale for decisions. The criteria are used to provide the most cost-effective force to meet stated warfighting levels. Key considerations include availability, supportability, and mission capabilities. Force structure/force mix options are then forwarded to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force for final approval.

Coast Guard. The Coast Guard, as an agency of the Department of Transportation, approaches force development differently than do the military departments within DoD. The Coast Guard's size and composition is based on statutory missions and the capability needed to accomplish them. Decisions on force structure and force mix are based on Congressional funding actions, which are driven by peacetime missions. The Coast Guard's wartime activities are extensions of peacetime authorities and responsibilities.

The Relative Costs of Active and Reserve Forces

The cost-estimation methodologies used to support Total Force Policy decisions consider the cost implications of alternative sizes and mixes of active and reserve component forces. The methodologies incorporate a broad perspective of defense program costs that includes the direct and indirect costs of owning, operating, and supporting forces and recognizes both short- and long-term effects on defense spending. Even though improved methods and data sources are continually being developed, the costing methodologies in use today provide sufficiently accurate information to assess the costs associated with different force sizes and mixes. (For more information on the costs of active and reserve forces, see the Supplement.)

When force structure is changed, the effects on military pay and on the unit operating costs of primary force elements (e.g., divisions, regiments, wings, naval combatants) are usually felt immediately. Changes in force size and composition can also incur significant one-time costs during the transition to the new structure. Moreover, changes in primary force elements can have secondary effects on units and programs that provide direct support to the primary forces. These changes also have impacts on the defense infrastructure, and they affect spending to replace the inventory of defense systems. One result of such adjustments is that the cost of reserve forces goes well beyond the total of the reserve accounts (because system procurement and infrastructure support provided by the active components are not included). Each of these types of potential cost impacts are considered in Total Force Policy deliberations. While it is important to include all relevant costs, it is also important to exclude costs that are not associated with force size or mix. National command and control; foreign intelligence; research, development, test, and evaluation; science and technology; space; and foreign assistance expenditures are not normally considered in estimating the cost of force structure changes.

Table 4 illustrates the importance of considering more than just the pay and operating costs of force structure alternatives. In the 1980s, personnel and operating costs of mission programs accounted for about 25 percent of the budgets of the military departments. Force cost estimates that consider only these expenditures understate the total, long-term cost effects of changes in the size of the Total Force. Investment programs, which provide primarily for the replacement and modernization of military equipment, made up nearly 30 percent of the defense budget in the 1980s. The amount of equipment purchased over the long term is generally related to the size of the Total Force. Exceptions occur where procurement decisions are driven only by the size of the active component. Cost-estimating methodologies must consider the impact of changes in force size on investment decisions. Infrastructure costs accounted for 35 percent of defense spending during the past decade, and the variable portion of these costs is considered in Total Force costing.

Table 4
Composition of Defense Spending in the 1980s
(In percents)

	Pay and Operating Costs	Investment	Infrastructure	Programs Not Related to Force Size or Mix
Army	27	21	44	8
Navy/Marine Corps	26	35	30	9
Air Force	17	29	32	22
All Military Services	23	29	35	13

Because of the variety of cost relationships associated with defense funding, we consider four types of cost-estimating methodologies: direct unit costs, direct support costs, infrastructure costs, and transition costs.

Direct Unit Costs. Force structure decisions generally focus on primary mission elements, such as divisions and battalions, wings and squadrons, and naval combatants. For this reason, Total Force costing begins with the estimation of the costs directly related to those elements. These expenses, referred to as direct unit costs, include the compensation (e.g., pay, allowances, and retirement benefits) of unit personnel, the day-to-day operating costs (e.g., fuel, parts, travel) of units, and the long-term recurring investments required to periodically replace unit equipment and keep it up to date. Direct unit costing is driven by manning, equipping, and operating levels, all of which can explain the major variations in direct unit costs between active and reserve units. These costs also provide a basis for estimating the direct funding impacts of different force sizes.

Unit manpower and operating costs affect the defense budget within one to two years of the time a force structure change is made. Equipment-related cost impacts are not as closely linked in time, but they have a major long-term effect on defense spending. These costs are relevant in decisions related to the affordability of forces of different sizes. This report includes these costs in its consideration of Total Force Policy decisions with the clear understanding that the full impact of equipment-related costs on defense budgets may not be felt in the near term.

Comparisons of active and reserve unit costs recognize that costs are largely determined by a unit's manning, peacetime operating tempo, and equipment. These three factors also are fundamental determinants of unit

readiness and capability, and they provide an important link between cost and capability in Total Force cost-benefit analyses.

Several studies over the past fifteen years have examined the relative unit costs of active and reserve component forces. The Study Group has reexamined the content and conclusions of these studies and added some new evaluations. The most recent results are very similar to those obtained in the past. In almost all cases, reserve units have lower short-term and long-term costs of ownership than do similar active units. Exceptions may occur when reserve component units perform peacetime missions that require high full-time manning and operating tempos.

In many instances, differences in unit costs are accompanied by differences in how soon units would be fully prepared to execute their assigned missions in actual combat situations. Since not all units are required to deploy and fight immediately, the force contains units of high, moderate, and relatively low readiness. The ability to preserve readiness at lower levels of training varies by unit type, and requires a case-by-case evaluation of cost differences relative to risks. In some instances, reserve units can achieve high levels of readiness with relatively low operating tempos because of the higher experience level of their personnel. This, of course, depends on adequate numbers of skilled personnel joining the reserves upon leaving active duty. If changes in the force mix reduce the flow of experienced personnel, reserve components (particularly those requiring highly skilled personnel, such as pilots) may not be able to maintain adequate readiness levels without increases in peacetime training.

The costs of owning and operating forces vary greatly, and depend on the types of units considered. Table 5 summarizes the results of our most recent analyses. The table breaks out cost data into its major components. Personnel costs (column 4) and operating costs (column 5) make up annual recurring unit direct operating and support (O&S) costs (column 6). Equipment-related costs (column 7) are an annualized average of the long-term replacement and other "capital" costs. The total average annual costs of owning and operating the various types of units are shown in the last column of the table. Below each entry for a reserve component unit is the ratio of the reserve cost to the cost of a similarly manned and equipped active unit.

Several lessons can be drawn from the figures in Table 5. First, the cost differences between active and reserve component units vary widely across different types of units. Second, reserve units are generally less costly than active units, but cost differences depend on which categories of costs are included--personnel costs usually show the largest differences between reserve and active component units. Third, cost differences can be a function of policy and operational considerations that are subject to change. Thus, certain reserve units with intensive peacetime missions that require higher operating tempos can be as costly to operate as comparable active units. The increased

Table 5
Summary of Direct Unit Cost Comparisons
(FY 1992 dollars in millions)

Service	Unit Type		Comp	Pers	Ope	Unit Recurring Per Yr	Equip Avg/Yr	Long Term Avg/Yr
Army	Armored Division		Active	617	184	801	175	976
	(C1/ALO1)		ARNG	145	66	211	175	386
				(24%)	(36%)	(26%)	(100%)	(40%)
Army	Light Infantry Division		Active	371	29	400	31	431
	(C1/ALO1)		ARNG	92	11	103	31	134
				(25%)	(38%)	(26%)	(100%)	(31%)
			USAR	83	8	91	31	122
				(22%)	(28%)	(23%)	(100%)	(28%)
Army	Non-Division Combat Increment		Active	197	15	212	13	225
	Supporting a LtInfDiv		ARNG	49	5	54	13	67
	(C1/ALO1)			(25%)	(33%)	(25%)	(100%)	(30%)
			USAR	44	4	48	13	61
				(22%)	(27%)	(23%)	(100%)	(27%)
Army	Tactical Support Increment		Active	266	17	283	10	293
	Supporting a LtInfDiv		ARNG	66	6	72	10	82
				(25%)	(35%)	(25%)	(100%)	(28%)
			USAR	60	5	65	10	75
				(23%)	(29%)	(23%)	(100%)	(26%)
Navy	FFG-7		Active	6.8	5.4	12.2	12.4	24.6
		(65% full-time manning)	USNR	6.4	4.1	10.5	12.4	22.9
				(94%)	(76%)	(86%)	(100%)	(93%)
Navy	F-14 Squadron	(4018 flhrs)	Active	9.1	10.7	19.8	40.0	59.8
	(12 aircraft)	(2203 flhrs)	USNR	5.4	6.3	11.7	35.3	47.0
				(59%)	(59%)	(59%)	(88%)	(79%)
USMC	Infantry Battalion		Active	24.9	8.9	33.8	.6	34.4
			USMCR	4.5	5.3	9.8	.6	10.4
				(18%)	(60%)	(29%)	(100%)	(30%)
USMC	Tank Battalion		Active	26.4	7.7	34.1	7.2	41.3
			USMCR	5.2	5.7	10.9	7.2	18.1
				(20%)	(74%)	(32%)	(100%)	(44%)
USMC	CH-46 Squadron	(4056 flhrs)	Active	6.7	5.4	12.1	14.4	26.5
	(12 aircraft)	(2041 flhrs)	USMCR	4.1	2.1	6.2	12.8	19.0
				(61%)	(39%)	(51%)	(89%)	(72%)
USAF	F-16 Squadron	(8134 flhrs)	Active	20.2	13.8	34.0	30.8	64.8
	(24 aircraft)	(5064 flhrs)	ANG	11.1	8.9	20.0	28.8	48.8
				(55%)	(64%)	(59%)	(94%)	(75%)
		(4682 flhrs)	USAFR	14.7	8.3	23.0	28.6	51.6
				(73%)	(60%)	(68%)	(93%)	(80%)
USAF	KC-135 Squadron	(2840 flhrs)	Active	7.4	5.9	13.3	23.0	36.3
	(10 aircraft)	(3500 flhrs)	ANG	12.8	8.0	20.8	23.4	44.2
				(173%)	(136%)	(156%)	(102%)	(122%)
		(3801 flhrs)	USAFR	11.5	7.3	18.8	23.3	42.1
				(155%)	(124%)	(141%)	(101%)	(116%)

costs of such reserve units can be attributed to such factors as the relatively greater number of flying hours, and the loss of efficiencies (e.g., tanker-bomber collocation) that lower maintenance, manpower, and staff costs.

The USAF KC-135 unit comparisons shown in Table 5 illustrate these points. In the active force, tanker squadrons normally are supported at the same facility as bomber squadrons. Unit collocation permits efficiencies in unit staff sizes, maintenance manning, and aircraft security personnel in active units that are not achieved in reserve units. Tanker squadrons in reserve components also require more crews per aircraft to meet alert line commitments (two alert lines were used for each unit). The greater number of primary crews and the additional flying required to maintain the qualifications of the larger reserve unit staffs cause the reserve units to fly more total hours (and accomplish more refueling) than similarly equipped active units. In instances where operating tempos and manning are similar between active and reserve units, lower reserve infrastructure support costs could offset some of the higher costs. Moreover, some higher costs of reserve component units could be eliminated if the reserve units were not required to maintain an alert status similar to active units.

Major differences in the direct unit costs of active and reserve component units are directly traceable to differences in manning and operating tempos. Reserve units almost always have lower personnel costs, primarily because total compensation in these units is less than in active units. The manpower cost savings can exceed 80 percent, depending on how many full-time personnel (active-duty service members assigned to reserve units, full-time reservists, civilian technicians) a reserve unit must have to perform its mission. Savings in unit operating costs (e.g., fuel, spares, etc.) can also reach 80 percent, but savings of this magnitude only occur in personnel-intensive support units. Operating rates and the amount of full-time manning are related and are unique to the type of unit involved. When reserve component units have intensive peacetime missions, as in the case of KC-135 squadrons that are maintained in alert status, both personnel and operating costs can be higher than they are in the active component. Equipment costs are generally the same for similarly equipped units, whether they are in the active force or the reserves. However, some long-term differences can arise, owing to the lower peacetime attrition rates in units with lower peacetime operating tempos.

Direct Support Costs. Changes in the size of primary force elements can have secondary effects on programs and units that provide direct support to the primary forces. Examples of these kinds of programs are the specialized training that qualifies service members in the operation of weapon systems; funding for large-scale joint exercises; procurement of war reserve materiel; mission-unique command, control, and intelligence programs; and some theater-wide support activities. Even though total funding for these programs and units is relatively small compared with the total size of the service budgets, impacts on these programs are considered as part of the overall cost-estimation

process. These costs must be examined on a program-by-program basis because their relationship to the Total Force is highly scenario dependent. Often, direct support programs and forces are not linked on a one-for-one basis with primary force elements. Hence, the cost impacts on these programs can be assessed only in the context of the overall change to primary force elements.

Infrastructure Costs. In addition to estimating cost impacts of policy decisions on units and direct support programs, force costing also estimates the effects that force structure changes have on infrastructure funding. Infrastructure programs include activities and services that provide installation support, central logistics, central training, force management and administration, central medical programs, central communications programs, and central personnel programs. Infrastructure cost impacts are important because nearly one-third of the budgets of the military services goes to provide these base-level and centrally managed services to the Total Force.

Active and reserve component units jointly receive essential support from central training, logistics, and other programs that are funded by the active component. Estimates of the cost impacts of force structure changes on infrastructure recognize that reserve components do not fund all of their indirect support. When units are transferred from the active to the reserve component, the impact on joint infrastructure programs is less than would be the case if the units were removed from the force structure altogether. The methods used to estimate infrastructure effects also recognize that there are differences in the kinds of infrastructure support provided to active and reserve units. Reservists do not use family housing, do not have the same medical benefits or access to commissaries as the active force, and do not change assignments like their active-duty counterparts. Each component also funds support functions that benefit only that component. To account for the different ways that infrastructure activities are funded, cost impacts for dedicated active and reserve support functions are considered separately from the joint support activities that are centrally funded. The total effect of a force change on a service's infrastructure is the sum of the component-unique and joint support impacts.

Estimating the relationship between infrastructure costs and the size of the force is not a precise calculus. Infrastructure costs, by their very nature, must be allocated to primary mission units. This process involves some subjectivity. Estimation of infrastructure costs is further complicated when implementation details for prospective force changes are not available. In these conditions, one reasonable approach is to estimate changes in infrastructure costs on the basis of changes in direct unit operating and support costs. (Historically, funding for infrastructure programs has followed O&S funding trends for primary mission forces.)

As details are developed during subsequent phases of the PPBS process, or when a policy alternative being evaluated has sufficiently specific data to

provide more insight into infrastructure impacts, the more specific infrastructure relationships are used in place of aggregate methodologies. Estimates of infrastructure impacts based on factors for specific indirect support activities are preferable to a "macro" approach. Currently, factors for specific infrastructure costs are not available for all types of indirect support in all services. Additional work to improve infrastructure costing is under way within the Department.

Each service differs in its degree of centralized and decentralized support. The methodologies used to estimate infrastructure costs allow for variations in the ways the services provide support to their primary force elements. The Department also recognizes in its programming and budgeting activities that infrastructure costs are only partly variable with the size of the force. As in private industry, there are fixed costs in maintaining the defense establishment. Because Total Force alternatives potentially cover such a broad spectrum of possible scenarios, we use a conservative but reasonable assumption that infrastructure costs are 50 percent fixed and 50 percent variable when using "macro" estimating relationships. (Detailed evaluations and specific funding decisions concerning infrastructure changes are made during the budgeting phase of the PPBS, when detailed implementation data are available.)

Over the past decade, infrastructure costs have been 15 percent higher for active components than for similar types of reserve support, when measured as a fraction of the cost to staff and operate primary mission units. On average throughout the Department, active component infrastructure costs have been estimated to change $0.65 per $1.00 change in the O&S costs of active primary mission units. The comparable average for reserve components has been $0.57 per $1.00 of reserve unit O&S. (These factors vary somewhat among the services; see the Supplement for more detail.) Even though the total active and reserve component infrastructure costs per dollar of primary mission O&S are fairly close, the Department of Defense often incurs lower total infrastructure costs to support reserve forces than to support similar active units because O&S costs can be substantially lower for reserve component units.

Because of the relatively high cost of aviation training and the fact that this cost is only relevant to decisions involving flying units, special treatment is given to flight training in infrastructure estimates. Examination of one scenario (see the supplemental volume) shows that, on average, converting one Air Force active F-16 squadron to an Air National Guard unit would save $3.2 million annually in pilot training costs, in addition to the savings associated with direct unit cost reductions and other infrastructure changes. These results, while valid for small changes in force mix, cannot necessarily be extended to larger changes. The assumption that there are enough pilots separating from active units to fill vacancies in reserve component units is critical to this comparison. Increasing the proportion of aviation forces in the

reserves past a critical point will require that more pilots and crews be trained directly for reserve units and may require an increase in reserve unit flying time to provide appropriately experienced crews.

Transition Costs. As a final step in estimating the costs of any significant force change, the one-time costs that arise in implementing changes in force structure need to be identified and estimated. The costs of unit activations, inactivations, and transfers between active and reserve forces can run into the hundreds of millions of dollars, overshadowing the recurring savings. Transition costs fall into three general categories: personnel costs, facility costs, and equipment costs. Force changes can create requirements to recruit and train members of new units, to move more personnel than would normally rotate between assignments, or to compensate personnel who are involuntarily separated. Force changes may or may not affect facilities. Where facility realignments are involved, environmental studies and cleanup programs may be needed. Depending on the nature of the force change, new facilities may be required and there could be one-time costs associated with closing defense installations. Equipment sometimes needs preparation, storage, movement, decommissioning, or disposal. When active units are inactivated and reserve units activated, there may a need for additional support equipment, especially if multiple reserve units replace one large active unit. If equipment, facilities, or properties that have resale value to the U.S. government are being abandoned, this is considered in the calculation of transition costs.

Some examples of the size of specific transition costs may be instructive. Converting an active Army armor division could require upgrading equipment to meet transfer standards, at an estimated cost of $36 million. The cost of transporting the personnel and equipment of the division from Europe to CONUS would be approximately $45 million. Facilities and personnel-related costs would be additive to those expenditures. Converting an Air Force fighter wing based in Europe to a CONUS reserve unit could incur $16 million to $25 million in personnel relocation costs. The cost of decommissioning a Navy attack submarine is estimated to run as high as $30 million. Mothballing a battleship costs at least $40 million. The formation of a new Marine Corps reserve infantry battalion could require spending $25 million for interim facilities, construction of permanent armories, recruiting, and initial training.

There are no general techniques, other than ensuring that the full spectrum of potential costs are examined, for estimating transition costs. Each situation is assessed individually to determine the specific effects a force change will have on funding for personnel, facilities, and equipment.

Cost estimation in support of Total Force Policy decisionmaking is complex. The methods and supporting data currently used to estimate the direct unit costs of primary force elements are adequate in most cases for evaluating the cost differences between alternative force sizes and mixes. Infrastructure costing is not as complete as it could be, but progress is being

made. Despite these problems and limitations, the Department is able to make sufficiently accurate cost estimates to support Total Force Policy decisions. The Department fully recognizes the need to continually improve the methodologies and data bases that support force costing and is sponsoring several efforts to improve these tools.

The Study Group's review of the relative costs of active and reserve component units reaffirms its understanding that trade-offs between capabilities and costs vary dramatically for different types of units. Reserve units generally cost less to operate, but in a certain few cases they can be as expensive as active forces when assigned very intensive peacetime missions. Opportunities for cost savings are greatest in the area of unit O&S costs, where savings can run as high as 80 percent. This level of savings applies to only a quarter of defense spending, however; in other areas, savings are not proportionately as large. Large savings can be achieved only when training rates and full-time manning are substantially reduced. Such reductions may be accompanied by reduced capability or readiness, but this varies considerably by type of unit. The potential savings associated with direct support programs (e.g., aircrew transition training) can also affect comparisons of active and reserve units. Because reserve units generally have lower operating tempos and do not benefit from all forms of indirect support provided to active units, infrastructure savings can be nearly as large as unit O&S savings. Finally, elimination of forces or conversion of forces between the active and reserve components typically incurs substantial one-time transition costs that may significantly affect total savings.

In the final analysis, good cost estimates for Total Force policymaking cannot be based on simple rules of thumb. They require a thorough examination of many categories of costs, sensitivity to the types of units affected, and where applicable, realization that large-scale changes in force size or mix can affect historical cost relationships.

Maintaining Early Response Capabilities

The United States must maintain the capability to respond to a wide range of contingencies that require the use of military force. The increased reliance that has been placed on the reserve components in recent years has raised the inevitable question of the proper role of each of the reserve components in crisis situations that require an early response.

Some observers believe that in view of the recent geopolitical developments, reserve forces should generally be limited to reinforcing and sustaining roles in which they would serve only to supplement active forces during protracted contingencies or a general mobilization and subsequent to some initial period of conflict. Such a concept assumes a need to place all rapidly deployable contingency forces in the active component and to generally assign late-deployment responsibilities to reserve units. Others, including

reserve component commanders, argue that many reserve units are fully capable of deploying with active forces in "quick reaction" contingencies. They further contend that reserve units must maintain quick-response capabilities (or at least high states of readiness), or risk becoming a second-class force as highly motivated reservists leave the All-Volunteer Force because of the absence of intense, stimulating training.

In addressing this issue, it is important to avoid broad generalizations about reserve forces and to focus on specific missions. Many National Guard and federal reserve units (with a mix of part-time and full-time personnel) are highly ready and capable of responding rapidly to orders to active duty. Flying units in the Air Reserve Components are obvious examples. In this sense, they are much more than forces held in "reserve." Other reserve units, especially brigade- or division-size ground units, are much more likely to need some post call-up training before deployment.

Reserve Availability. As indicated in Section I, the President has authority under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 673b to order Selected Reservists to active duty for two successive periods of 90 days whenever they are needed to augment active forces for "operational missions." (This authority was recently expanded to two consecutive periods of 180 days for Desert Shield combat units for FY 1991 only.) The Presidential call-up authority can be used independent of a partial or full mobilization. It is limited, however, to the activation of Selected Reserve units or individual reservists designated as Individual Mobilization Augmentees. The Section 673b call-up authority was invoked for the first time in Operation Desert Shield.

Except for Desert Shield and the other operations described in Section I, U.S. presidents have relied on voluntary participation to secure the reserve capabilities needed to augment the active force in contingency operations. For example, reserve volunteers were used to support Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 and Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989. While the degree and duration of voluntary participation has varied by service and mission, enough reservists generally have volunteered for past operations to meet the active force's augmentation needs in specific mission areas.

While volunteers offer maximum flexibility, cost effectiveness, and responsiveness for the capability attained, concerns remain. First, there will always be some uncertainty regarding the amount and duration of voluntary participation for each crisis. Second, there is often a loss of integral team/unit capability when larger units (e.g., ships, companies) do not volunteer together. Third, and despite statutory reemployment protection for reservists, the reaction of employers during any call-up or crisis cannot be taken for granted, especially the reaction of employers of reservists who volunteer. Finally, a degree of uncertainty regarding benefits (specifically, medical and death gratuities) remains for situations which involve reservists serving on a voluntary basis.

It is difficult to maintain forces for long periods using volunteers, but the Air Reserve Component personnel who have participated on a voluntary basis in Operation Desert Shield have demonstrated that, with crew rotation, augmentation can be sustained for several months. While there is reluctance to plan for voluntary augmentation, experience has demonstrated that certain minimum levels of voluntary support have always been available, albeit for limited periods of time. Involuntary augmentation by the reserve forces can, however, be integrated into the contingency planning process.

For small-scale operations, such as those in Grenada and Panama, sufficient numbers of reserve personnel volunteered for duty. In both instances, relatively small numbers of reservists were needed--primarily pilots and crews for transport aircraft and aerial-refueling aircraft, military police, psychological operations forces, and civil affairs personnel. For larger deployments, such as Operation Desert Shield, Presidential call-ups are almost certainly needed to ensure that adequate numbers of reservists, with the appropriate mix of skills, are available to augment the active force. While reservists employed on short notice perform quite well in missions that emphasize individual skills, greater training is needed where unit cohesiveness or integration of unit capabilities is important.

If it is assumed that the Section 673b call-up authority will be used to meet deployment requirements in major contingencies, it is much easier to make reductions in the size of the active force. On the other hand, excessive or unwise reductions in the active force could leave the President with few options except an involuntary call-up of reservists for even the most minor contingencies.

Current Reliance on Early-Deploying Reserve Forces. As they are structured today, the armed forces rely to widely varying degrees on their reserve components for the performance of missions that require early deployment.

The Army requires substantial reserve augmentation for all major contingency operations. Since the late 1960s, Army force planners typically have assumed that one-half of the nondivisional elements (i.e., combat, combat support, and combat service support units) that normally support an Army division, or about 12,500 to 15,000 personnel, would be needed to sustain that division during the first 60 days of a deployment. Accordingly, in 1968 the Secretary of Defense directed that at least 50 percent of each division's nondivisional support elements should be able to deploy immediately with the division. Deployment of the remaining nondivisional support would have to be completed within 60 days of the division's closure. Thus, the Army has placed about one half of the support elements for its nondeployed active forces in its reserve components. Because these units need not be ready to deploy until lift is available for them, the additional time required to refresh their skills does not reduce their value to the active units. For divisions with roundout units,

an even higher percentage of support is in the reserve components, while for reserve units themselves, essentially all of their support is in the reserve component. While this arrangement has reduced peacetime costs, it substantially constrains the Army's ability to conduct major operations in the absence of a reserve call-up.

As currently structured, the Army requires reserve support if four or more divisions are to be deployed for 60 days or more, or if more than two divisions are deployed for an indefinite period. (As of January 15, 1991, seven Army divisions will be in Saudi Arabia.) In addition, the Army maintains some types of units exclusively in its reserve components. These include heavy helicopter units and TOW light antitank infantry battalions.

The desire to have a major share of the Army's nondivisional support forces for a contingency available for immediate deployment argues for keeping at least some of these units in the active component. On the other hand, some reserve units could deploy with the active force if the decision to use them was made in a timely fashion. Proponents of the use of reserves point out that any military operation large enough to require more than 60 days of support would likely involve mobilization or require use of the Presidential call-up authority

The Air Force has relied with success upon voluntary participation by its reservists to meet the bulk of strategic and tactical airlift and air-refueling surge requirements for major, short-warning crises. Some 55 percent of the crews that operate strategic airlift aircraft are in the Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard. Almost 60 percent of tactical airlift capability, 57 percent of aerial port units, 67 percent of aeromedical evacuation units, and 46 percent of tactical reconnaissance assets are also in the Air Force reserve components.

Like the Army and Air Force, the Navy maintains certain types of units and capability exclusively in its reserve component. Examples include combat search-and-rescue squadrons and U.S.-based logistic airlift squadrons. Naval Reserve units and individual reservists have also assumed important responsibilities in sealift operations. Naval control of shipping efforts and early support of the Military Sealift Command have been important in recent years. Slightly more than 90 percent of the Navy's cargo-handling battalions are also in the Naval Reserve.

With limited exceptions, however, the Navy and Marine Corps do not plan to use reservists for short-term contingency operations. When minesweeping capability was required in the Persian Gulf in 1987, no recommendation was made to call up the Naval Reserve crews assigned to the minesweepers, despite the fact that nearly all of the vessels were maintained in the Naval Reserve. Instead, a combination of active-duty sailors and reserve volunteers manned the ships. In all, 305 Naval Reservists volunteered for duty. Since that time, the distribution of naval minesweeper forces has been

readjusted so that a portion of the ships are now maintained in the active component.

In its *Report on the Navy's Total Force FY90*, the Navy concluded that the biggest obstacle that must be overcome in using Naval Reserve assets to support contingencies short of full mobilization is what it described as the "limited availability of Selected Reserve personnel" and "reluctance to initiate a reserve call-up." The success to date of the reserve call-up in Operation Desert Shield has, perhaps, removed this perception.

The Marine Corps keeps a larger share of its forces in the active component than do the other services. Although 40 percent of tank battalions, 33 percent of artillery batteries, and 50 percent of force reconnaissance capability is maintained in the Marine Corps Reserve, the Marine force structure is designed to enable two Marine Expeditionary Forces to be formed entirely from the active component. Deployment of a larger force requires significant augmentation by reservists. In addition, the Marines require support from either the Navy or the Army for extended combat operations.

The Coast Guard relies upon its reservists for almost all contingency operations. The Coast Guard uses reservists in all of its missions, but none of the missions are assigned exclusively to the reserves. Most Coast Guard reservists augment the active force in a manner similar to Individual Mobilization Augmentees. Coast Guard involvement in Desert Shield has involved activation of deployable Port Security Units and CONUS port security personnel, and use of many reservists on voluntary recall.

Reserve Readiness. While it is appropriate to monitor the readiness and capability of early-deploying active and reserve forces, it is important to note that readiness neither is--nor should be--consistent for all units. Not all active or reserve units need to maintain a capability for immediate deployment. The range of warning times we now anticipate--short amounts for contingencies of moderate size and much greater amounts for large-scale conflicts--suggests the wisdom of exploring the possible expansion of the concept of differing levels of readiness.

Readiness is a function not only of resource and training levels, but also of various intangible factors, such as motivation, leadership, and experience. Generally, reserve personnel perform well on an individual level, even when the skills required are technical and complex. Individuals who previously served in the active force enter the reserve components with a base of knowledge and military skills. Reserve training programs need only keep those skills current. Examples of reservists who fall into this category are pilots who enter the reserve components with significant amounts of active-duty flying time, and specialists in artillery fire direction.

Even with lower operating tempos, reservists can maintain high levels of readiness if their military jobs require the same or similar skills as their civilian occupations. Commercial airline pilots who fly transport aircraft for the reserve components, for example, use many of the same skills in military missions as they do in their civilian professions. Similarly, engineers, medical personnel, and linguists bring to their military assignments skills that they use daily in their civilian jobs.

Development of unit skills, particularly in large units, is more difficult in the face of limited training time. Large units need to train together, so that commanders and staffs develop the coordination skills essential for effective mission performance.

An additional issue arising from Operation Desert Shield concerns the use of members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). These individuals have skills that are not always present in the active force or the Selected Reserve. Access to the IRR could become critical if, in a crisis, there was inadequate time to recruit and train personnel to a fully qualified level. Utilizing specialized skills which may be available in the IRR would enable the force to be brought to wartime readiness levels much faster than would a total reconstitution of forces. Currently, members of the IRR are not available unless they volunteer or a partial or full mobilization is called.

The IRR and military retirees are generally considered to be "less ready" than the Selected Reserve, where needed skills are maintained through monthly drills and two-week annual tours. While IRR and retiree skills are perishable, and proficiency levels vary a great deal both among and within services, acceptable skill levels generally are retained for three to five years after a member leaves active duty or the Selected Reserve. Appropriate levels of requalification training would need to be planned for these categories of reserve component personnel, and a decision would have to be made as to how they would be assimilated upon recall.

Medical Forces

The Military Health Services System (MHSS) has two distinct missions. The primary mission is the provision of medical care for the armed forces in wartime. The secondary mission is to provide peacetime health benefits to other authorized beneficiaries, including active and retired military personnel, military dependents, and reserve personnel.

In recent years, increasing effort within the Department of Defense has been concentrated on the development of a medical force that is capable of meeting the wartime mission. At the same time, the Department has been faced with the reality of the spiralling costs of peacetime medical care. Peacetime health services have a direct effect on the readiness of warfighting forces. They also represent a form of compensation, influence the quality of life

of all beneficiaries, and are part of a commitment made by the Department of Defense to "take care of its own." The numbers and kinds of medical personnel required in total, and on active duty, are determined by a combination of anticipated wartime needs and the structure of the peacetime health care system.

As the Department seeks to continue the improvement of its capability to meet wartime requirements, the rapidly changing nature and scope of the conflicts for which the armed forces must be prepared, and the severity of budgetary constraints, pose a major challenge. Because of the recent and dramatic geopolitical changes in the world, the determination of wartime medical requirements is necessarily in a state of flux. Wartime medical requirements are based on assumptions about the casualty flows that would result from the types of armed conflicts in which the nation might be engaged in the future. The casualty flows are, in turn, determined by assumptions about the magnitude and lethality of combat in each of the conflicts.

Wartime medical readiness is critical to the ability of combat commanders to sustain their forces. The credibility of combat forces without medical capability is suspect. A wartime theater of operations is divided into two zones. The combat zone (CBTZ) is the land, sea, and airspace required to conduct combat operations. To its rear is the communications zone (COMMZ)--the land, sea, and airspace required to support the combat zone. The borders of these zones are frequently ill-defined.

The theater health services support system represents a continuum of care, beginning in an area of conflict and ending in the CONUS base. It is organized into four levels, or echelons, of care that extend rearward throughout the theater. Each echelon reflects an increase of medical capability and plays a vital part in the progressive treatment, hospitalization, evacuation, and disposition of the sick, injured, and wounded. Because the four military services have different wartime missions, their theater health services support systems vary accordingly. Yet, while differences exist, the application concept and objectives of each of the service systems are compatible, consistent, and designed to sustain supported forces at risk.

The theater health services system is also the single greatest source of trained combat replacements, especially during the early days of a crisis. Casualties who have been exposed to combat prior to their admission to the health services system, and who are returned to duty following treatment, fare better in subsequent combat. Because inexperienced troops are at greater risk, casualties who can be returned to duty are more effective than new troops.

The military services rely heavily on the reserve components to meet wartime medical manpower needs. Approximately 70 percent of the Department's wartime health care force structure is in the reserve components. Ideally, medical manpower should be placed in the active force structure only

to the extent that it will be needed in wartime before reserve personnel become available, or if it provides cost-effective care in peacetime. Several factors, however, affect the determination of the most appropriate active/reserve mix of medical personnel. The speed of availability in wartime, the need to support a contingency without a call-up of reserve personnel, and the need to provide a CONUS rotation base for deployed forces are some of the more obvious factors.

Other factors also must be considered. The need for medical support in CONUS rises as mobilization takes place and forces are deployed to a theater of operations. The increase is not attributable solely to the need to provide care to patients returning from overseas operations. Health care services must also be provided to forces that are mobilizing in CONUS, to forces that are associated with any expanding training base, and to an increasing beneficiary population as dependents of reserve personnel who are called to active duty become eligible for military medical care. As active-duty medical personnel are deployed to a theater of operations, additional medical forces will be mobilized from the reserve components.

The Department of Defense is currently engaged in the difficult task of simultaneously reducing the structure of U.S. forces and deploying to Saudi Arabia the largest number of deployed forces since the Korean War. This turbulence, along with the complex task of developing a new military strategy to meet constantly changing geopolitical and budgetary realities, will continue to make the determination of the most appropriate active/reserve mix of medical personnel very challenging. Energetic efforts must continue to be made by the Department, however, to constantly reassess expected casualty rates from the most likely conflicts in which the nation might be engaged, the medical manpower needs associated with those rates, and the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve manpower to meet those needs.

Integration of Active and Reserve Components

During the 1980s, the active and reserve components maintained high morale and a sense of mission. These traits may be difficult to sustain in the 1990s, when the threat is changing and less clear and when resource levels for later-deploying units may decline.

Maintenance of the integrity of the Total Force will require a deliberate emphasis on manpower and personnel policies that enhance active and reserve component integration as well as short-run cost-effectiveness. The jobs to which active-duty personnel and reservists are assigned, and the ways in which they interact, influence the relative status, resource levels, and capabilities of active and reserve forces. Use of reserve personnel to support active units (and vice versa) should be targeted to key leadership and management positions. Various methods to foster greater integration between the active and reserve components are being developed for further consideration.

Active-Reserve Rotations. Full-time reserve component personnel could serve in positions of responsibility--including command positions--in active units. Also, increased numbers of active component personnel might, in turn, be assigned to rotations with reserve units.

Hybrid Units. Where consistent with readiness goals, Total Force units might be enhanced by placing increased reliance on "hybrid" units containing a mix of active and reserve personnel. For example, the Army's "roundout" concept might be expanded, but applied to smaller units. Reserve roundout companies/batteries might be established for active battalions; roundout platoons could be established for active force companies. Predesignated individual reservists might even be assigned to round out active units to improve their readiness condition. Where unit skills cannot be maintained at acceptable levels in the reserve component, active personnel could be used in greater numbers to fill critical shortages, as well as to provide training and administrative support. This is an approach that would have to be applied cautiously. The risk in combining active and reserve personnel is that the resulting units would have neither the cost advantage or continuity of experience of purely reserve units, nor the rapid deployment capability of standard active units.

Strengthened Active-Reserve Affiliations. Total Force policies could place greater emphasis on the establishment of relationships between active and reserve units that would operate together in wartime, and affiliations between units that are maintained solely for peacetime training purposes. The potential for strengthening linkages between active units and affiliated reserve units through personnel flows warrants further study. Exchange programs for full-time personnel or, where affiliated units are collocated, enlistment terms that combine an initial period of service with the active unit followed by service with the reserve unit might be considered.

Prior Service. Total Force policies in the 1990s should encourage an increased role for prior-service personnel in the reserve components. In ground units, for example, a more flexible manning policy could allow E-4 or E-5 prior-service personnel to occupy reserve billets that would otherwise be filled by non-prior-service E-3 personnel. The Naval Reserve already does this on a selective basis.

As force size is reduced, the transition of active component members to the reserve component requires attention. Given that those involuntarily separated from the service may be trained and experienced in skills required in the reserve component, and that authority exists for the reserve component to absorb some of their talent, the services need to pursue such a transition program. Given the magnitude of the end-strength reductions in both the active and reserve components, there may be significant competition for the remaining reserve component spaces. Thus, the program represents a significant challenge.

Currently, most individuals who leave active duty with more than eight but less than 20 years of service do not join the reserve component. To increase integration of active and reserve components and make better use of trained manpower, a two-year Ready Reserve obligation (which could be satisfied by either Selected Reserve or IRR participation) could become a standard clause in reenlistment contracts for the active force. A revision of the current reserve retirement system, to encourage individuals to leave the Selected Reserve after 20 years of service, or at ages 50 to 55, might also play a role in opening up greater opportunities for Selected Reserve service for individuals with prior military service.

Concluding Note

The management of the Total Force is complex, and in shaping and sizing the force to meet strategic objectives within budgetary, demographic, and policy constraints, force planners welcome stability. In the current strategic and fiscal environment, turbulence is more likely to be the reality. Section III addresses the changing strategic environment.

SECTION III

THE TOTAL FORCE AND THE CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Threat Environment

The focus of U.S. national strategy has shifted over the past year in response to the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As the Warsaw Pact threat in Central Europe has receded, defense planning has begun to focus on the smaller-scale but demanding types of conflicts in which the United States might be involved. In this changed environment, appropriate responses to regional crises or contingencies that affect U.S. interests should loom increasingly large in the military strategy. Such regional conflicts and crises--often erupting with very little warning--are the most likely future threats. Retention of the ability to react to such threats in the uncertain times ahead will require continued dependence by the United States on strong--though smaller--active and reserve forces. Manning levels and readiness can be reduced in some cases. Forward presence will remain a key element of U.S. strategy, but there can be force reductions, particularly in Europe, consistent with the changing threat and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

In view of the recent changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, strategic planners now believe that the Soviet Union would need from one to two years to regain the capability needed to mount a European theater offensive or to engage in a major global conflict. Should the Soviet Union return to a strategy that would increase the threat to U.S. interests in Europe and elsewhere, the United States would have to reconstitute its forces. To retain the ability to reconstitute forces, the United States must preserve, or be prepared to quickly obtain, the long-lead-time elements of the force structure. This includes sophisticated equipment and the invaluable human capital represented by the experience and skills of trained leaders and technicians. Planning for a reconstitution of force structure instead of the permanent retention of that structure would permit the Department to reallocate resources for the long-lead innovations that will guard against future threats.

Resource Environment

The resources available to the Total Force have changed significantly during the past 20 years. The availability or absence of resources continues to have a major impact on Total Force planning and policies. The resource environment includes not only the defense budget, but also the manpower pool available to the Total Force and the equipment and technology that are available.

Defense Budget Trends. As illustrated in Figure 3, the U.S. defense budget has continually declined in real terms over the past five years. As a result of the changed strategic environment, this downward trend is likely to continue over the next five years, although the rate of decline may be greater. Such reductions are likely to result in major changes in DoD programs affecting procurement, manpower, and infrastructure.

Figure 3
Department of Defense Total Obligational Authority, FY 1970-91
(In constant FY 1991 dollars)



Offsetting these trends is an increase in support from countries that host U.S. forces or that otherwise are important to U.S. security interests. Since the 1970s, many of our allies have become increasingly able to support our efforts on their behalf. As the U.S. defense budget decreases, host nation support agreements will become even more important.

Manpower. During the decade of the 1980s, the reserve components grew in relation to the overall level of military manpower. This growth occurred primarily in the Army and the Air Force, although the Navy and Marine Corps transferred some forces to their reserve components. The number of civilians employed directly by DoD or indirectly as contractors also has increased as part of the transition to an all-volunteer military. A primary change since the early 1970s is the growth in reliance on wartime host nation support.

The resources allocated to maintain the All-Volunteer Force have increased in order to keep the armed forces competitive with other careers and to maintain the technical and educational expertise of those making a career in the military. Demographic trends indicate that the number of young people eligible to join the armed forces will decrease over the first part of the next decade but then begin to increase. This factor, plus the impact of Operation Desert Shield, may put additional pressure on manpower budgets and may, in the short run, require more innovative use of other components of the Total

Force--reservists, civilians, contractors, and foreign nationals. In the long run, demographic trends should offset some of these problems.

Strategy

Overview. On September 6, 1990, the Secretary of Defense outlined the basic tenets of the evolving new U.S. military strategy. It involves, as he stated then:

> . . . the U.S. commitment to be actively involved in the world. We still depend very much upon forward deployments in Asia and the Pacific, a historic relationship with our friends in Japan and Korea, and the deployment of forces in that part of the world, but at lower levels. It would, obviously, continue to involve significant U.S. deployments in Europe, but again, at significantly lower levels as embodied in the CFE talks and reflective of the fundamental changes under way there as well. Finally, it would involve here at home, in the United States, the development of the kinds of contingency forces that would allow us to back up our strategic capability. So that concept of an Atlantic force and a Pacific force, contingency forces based in the United States, and strategic forces becomes the driver, if you will, of our force structure in the years ahead. And most importantly, in terms of sizing our active force and our reserve forces, would be to maintain those forward deployments and to be able to reinforce in the event of a contingency on a regional basis, keeping in mind the notion that if we ever did have to reconstitute forces to be prepared for global conflict, that we would have adequate warning time to do that.

Conventional Forces for Crisis Response. A variety of factors will affect the size and mix of active and reserve conventional forces that will be required for the Atlantic, Pacific, and contingency forces. Several of those factors were discussed in Section II. In his August 2, 1990, speech in Aspen, Colorado, the President noted that "the United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. . . . What we need are not merely reductions--but restructuring." Consequently, different--not just smaller--forces will be required. For example, heavy and light ground forces, as well as naval and air forces, will be necessary for deterrence and to provide the flexibility to respond to a variety of types and sizes of crises at various locations. Moreover, when sizable forces are committed to a particular regional contingency, it will still be necessary to retain the ability to deter or counter various other potential regional crises. An overall force that provides the flexibility needed in the Atlantic, Pacific, and contingency forces would also provide such capabilities

for a range of concurrent contingencies of similar or differing types, sizes, and locations.

For the active forces needed to respond immediately to crises, readiness will be the highest priority. Active forces can provide the forward presence, crisis response, and power projection capabilities needed to prevent a potentially major crisis from escalating, or to resolve less demanding conflicts on terms favorable to the United States. Highly ready, instantly deployable crisis-response forces should become relatively more important in the future. The need for forward presence will also require a sufficiently large peacetime rotation base to enable service members to spend adequate time in the United States. Most of the capability that would be required for short-duration, concurrent contingencies should be provided by active forces.

Reserve forces should continue to support and assist the deployment of active forces in regional contingencies, especially larger ones and those of long duration. During extended crises or sustained operations, the reserve components should be capable of providing some combat capability and substantial support capabilities to augment the active force. Their role could include providing a contingency rotation base, to permit recycling of personnel who are deployed for longer-term contingencies or to compensate for forces drawn down from other theaters. Reserve forces should also provide some of the added capability that might be needed to deal with concurrent regional contingencies.

The capabilities of the other elements of the Total Force--civilian DoD and contractor personnel and host nation support--should also be used as appropriate in contingency situations.

Reconstitution of Forces. The increased warning time that the United States could reasonably expect in the event of a return by the Soviet Union to the force levels that existed during the height of the Cold War should allow us to rely not only on existing forces, but to generate new units. The timely generation of such forces would, of course, require early decisions to increase the readiness of reserve units and to generate new units from cadres, the Individual Ready Reserve, and untrained manpower.

The Department should continue to examine ways to retain access to trained personnel who will be exiting the active and reserve components in the coming years. It also will be necessary to retain equipment from units that are disestablished. Cadre units are one way of preserving equipment and the basic structure of a military unit. Some forces could be placed in a cadre status, in which equipment would be retained along with a core of experienced personnel to train new forces, should such units need to be reconstituted. Likewise, the mix of active and reserve naval forces could be modified pursuant to the proposed Innovative Naval Reserve Concept (INRC) force described more fully in Section IV.

Concluding Note

All of the concepts noted above would be prudent management approaches to the adaptation of the Department's investment in personnel and equipment to the changing strategic environment.

SECTION IV

THE EFFECT OF THE EVOLVING MILITARY STRATEGY ON THE TOTAL FORCE

Future Roles for Active and Reserve Forces

As the new military strategy is developed in response to the changing strategic environment, it is not possible to design a force structure or a mix of active and reserve forces that is optimized for all circumstances and all potential conflicts, many of which may not be predictable. The choice of a force structure necessarily involves an attempt to balance the need for forces that can meet predictable national security needs against available resources and acceptable risks.

The force structure described in this section is consistent with the changing strategic environment discussed in Section III, and is illustrative of the kind of force structure that can be achieved within current budgetary constraints. The forces it would provide could carry out the full range of defense missions.

Despite the strategic changes described in Section III, it is clear that the United States must continue to maintain a strong strategic deterrent to counter the nuclear challenge posed by the Soviet Union. Currently, the majority of U.S. strategic deterrent forces are in the active component, although reserve component forces provide support in a number of areas. Units from both the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard, for example, provide aerial-refueling support for strategic bombers, while the Air National Guard has major responsibility for the continental air defense mission. Naval Reserve units provide support for ballistic missile submarines, and other units provide command, control, communications, and intelligence support.

The bulk of the support functions for the strategic deterrent forces are assigned to the active force for several reasons. First, land-based strategic weapons tend to be deployed in remote locations, well away from population centers. Such deployment patterns enhance security and protect the general population from nuclear strikes or accidents. Second, notification and recall procedures for reservists are incompatible with the readiness and security requirements of some strategic forces. Finally, for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the relatively junior crew manning requirement leads to lower personnel costs than would be the case if crews were drawn from the generally more senior (and hence more expensive) reserve population. (ICBM crews are composed largely of O-1s to O-3s, while the reserve component has a higher concentration of O-3 to O-6 officer personnel.)

Reserve personnel have, on the other hand, demonstrated the capability to participate in strategic operations in the Army Nike program and the Air Force air defense program. Reserve personnel constitute on older, mature force with continuity that is appropriate for use in some parts of the strategic force.

Conventional forces must be sufficient to retain a U.S. position of world leadership and to prevent potential foes from doubting the credibility of our commitments. While smaller than today's force, the illustrative force described in this section could be expanded should the favorable trends in today's strategic environment reverse.

As the focus of defense planning shifts from a global war scenario to various types of regional contingencies, U.S. force needs change as well. The large standing force that the nation maintained in the Cold War era can now be replaced by a smaller, ready active force supported by smaller reserve forces. Fewer forces are needed in the new structure, and greater reliance can be placed on a reconstitution of forces if a greater military capability is again needed. Thus, a force structure consistent with the new military strategy and with changes in both size of the projected threats and the time it would take the threats to develop can be significantly smaller than the structure in place today. For example, if current trends continue, a reduction of as many as ten Army division flags may be possible. A reduction of that size would have to come from both the active and reserve forces, with the majority of the division reductions taken from the active component, primarily those forces now assigned to the NATO reinforcement mission. Many of these divisions are supported by reserve combat, combat support, and combat service support units, and their inactivation would result in the disestablishment of numerous reserve units.

The illustrative force discussed below assumes different roles for the active and reserve components than is the case today. For contingencies expected to last less than 30 days, a U.S. response should not require a Presidential call-up of individual reservists or reserve units. Continued reliance could be placed on voluntary participation by reservists who possess unique skills and on augmentation from reserve aviation units to support strategic airlift operations during the initial response to such a contingency. While volunteerism can be relied upon to support the needs of the active force, it cannot be assumed that an inexhaustible pool of reserve volunteers exists for operations of indefinite duration. Once a recall under 10 U.S.C. 673b is exercised, use of volunteers for the same contingency should be restricted to short, specific, home-station-based missions.

Reserve combat forces should not be used for contingencies lasting less than 60 days. Reserve forces should continue, however, to provide combat support and combat service support for these types of contingencies. Such support might include strategic mobility augmentation, other support functions generally not in the active components, and back-filling for deployed active

forces. In addition, both active and reserve component forces should utilize cross-service support to enhance their capabilities.

Consistent with the evolving new military strategy, reserve forces should be capable of providing combat as well as support units for contingencies expected to last longer than 60 days, as they are doing now in Operation Desert Shield. Included in these forces would be roundout combat units for later-deploying active forces, as well as forces needed to maintain a rotation base.

In addition, reserve general purpose forces should be retained in the force structure. Some of these forces could be maintained at lower readiness levels than those needed for immediate crisis response. Some of these forces might well have at least a year to reach combat readiness levels. The support for these particular units could also be at lower readiness and strength, and in the case of skills that can be drawn from the civilian work force or from prior-service personnel, some units could even be formed subsequent to mobilization.

The active end strength in such a restructured force would be reduced from the FY 1990 level of about 2.1 million to about 1.7 million by the end of FY 1995. Selected Reserve strength could decrease from 1.15 million to about 910,000 between FY 1990 and FY 1995. Approximate military end strengths by service are shown in Table 6.

Conventional forces for crisis response and major regional contingencies are, as noted in Section III, grouped into three categories: Atlantic, Pacific, and contingency forces.

Atlantic Force

The United States will continue to be the power that underwrites Western security and will continue to have important interests in Europe, Latin America, the Mideast, and the Persian Gulf. While future U.S. force levels in Europe are yet to be decided, the total force maintained there will be smaller than it is today. The force will likely include an Army corps, about three tactical fighter wings and other Air Force elements, worldwide forces such as Defense Communications Agency (DCA) detachments, and units designed to assist in the reintroduction of forces. It will probably be necessary to continue a Persian Gulf maritime presence, and to maintain Navy carrier and Marine forces in the Mediterranean. The Atlantic force would have reinforcements in the United States from all services, including heavy Army forces from both the active and reserve components.

Table 6
U.S. Military End Strength: FY 1990-95
(In thousands)

	FY 1990	FY 1993	FY 1995
		Active Force	
Army	730	620	540
Navy	580	520	510
Air Force	540	460	440
Marine Corps	200	180	170
Coast Guard	37	37	37
Total	2,087	1,817	1,697
		Reserve Force	
Army	750	620	550
Navy	150	120	120
Air Force	200	200	200
Marine Corps	50	40	40
Coast Guard	12	12	12
Total	1,162	992	922

Pacific Force

The continued role of the United States as the guarantor of access in the Pacific region means that we will continue to maintain forces in Japan and Korea, and the facilities to support their presence. We also would have forces in Hawaii and Alaska as part of the Pacific force. All of these forward-deployed forces should be supported by U.S.-based reinforcements.

Contingency Force

A contingency force would be composed of rapidly deployable forces. Except for airlift and certain related missions such as aerial refueling, the forces for minor, short-term contingencies would come from the active component, and would be augmented as necessary by the Atlantic and Pacific forces. Special operations forces would be an integral part of such a contingency force. The force would be structured to counter crises of limited scope and duration, as well as to provide the initial forces for major conflicts. The contingency force would also have the ability to "surge" naval assets, such as carrier groups and Marine expeditionary units, and it would be supported by modernized airlift and sealift forces able to move troops and materiel quickly.

Together, the conventional elements of the force would give the United States the ability to meet enduring defense needs with a military structure that reflects a hopeful, yet realistic, view of the future political-military environment. The global reach of the force would provide overarching strategic assurance, protect U.S. interests in the Atlantic and Pacific, and be capable of projecting U.S. military power worldwide. It would be a force of great utility fashioned from today's force, and would meet the demands of the next decade and beyond with sufficient flexibility.

Force Structure

Army. The Army structure could consist of 12 active and six reserve divisions. Eight of the active divisions in any such structure should be heavy, and four light. The six reserve divisions should include at least four heavy divisions. In addition, the reserve force would have two cadre divisions. The cadre divisions could have all the equipment of a heavy division, but be manned by about 3,000 personnel apiece and, to the extent possible, have only a skeleton support structure.

The divisions in such a contingency force--about two heavy and three light--would have the majority of their forces (combat and support) in the active component. Reserve forces would continue to provide roundout brigades for some active divisions, as well as combat support and combat service support, mainly for the Atlantic force and later-deploying elements of the contingency force. Table 7 provides a breakout of the corps and divisions in this illustrative force. The corps are in the active component; the cadre divisions, in the reserves.

Table 7
Illustrative Force:
Army Corps and Divisions

	FY 1990 (Active/Reserve)	FY 1995 (Active/Reserve/Cadre
Corps	6	4
Divisions		
Light	8/6	4/2
Heavy	10/4	8/4/2
Total	18/10	12/6/2

Navy. By the end of FY 1995, the Navy would have about 450 ships in its active force and 33 in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF). Included in the naval force would be 13 carriers (including a training carrier), with 11 active and two reserve air wings. The 16 NRF frigates would have active-duty crews

composed of about 70 percent active personnel and full-time support reservists (TARs) and 30 percent part-time Selected Reservists. One possibility for using our Naval Reserve forces better would be to place additional frigates (FF-1052 Knox class) in the reserve component in a way that would allow as many as five ships to be mutually supporting ("nested"). Each group of nested ships would have one complete crew composed of active and TAR sailors who would train nucleus crews assigned to the other ships in the "nest," thus providing an almost instantaneous surge capability. Amphibious shipping would be sufficient for two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).

Marines. In this illustrative structure, Marine forces would be reduced by one active Marine Expeditionary Brigade by the end of FY 1995. Fleet Marine Forces, though smaller, would be sufficient to form three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). As noted above, there would be sufficient amphibious shipping to lift two MEBs simultaneously. The remaining Marine forces could be employed either to reinforce and expand the amphibious brigades into MEF-size forces or to operate independently as airlifted contingency forces, maritime prepositioning ship forces, fleet anti-terrorist security teams, or some combination of the above depending on the tactical situation. Marine sustainability would remain at current levels.

Air Force. The number of tactical fighter wing equivalents could be reduced from a total of 36 in the FY 1990 force to about 26 (approximately 15 active and 11 reserve component) by the end of FY 1995. The tactical fighter wings would be structured identically in both the active and reserve forces, with 72 aircraft per wing. The interceptor force would consist of 180 aircraft by FY 1995, all in the reserve components. Reserve volunteers, supplemented as necessary by involuntary recalls, would continue to provide airlift support for all contingencies, as they did in Grenada and Panama and are doing now in Southwest Asia.

Resources for Reconstitution

In addition to the kind of force structure illustrated above, the future Total Force should accommodate an ability to reconstitute forces. To maintain a relatively rapid reconstitution capability as a near-term hedge, the United States will continue to need access to certain long-lead elements of force structure--specialized personnel with hard-to-regain skills (like maintenance technicians) and weapons platforms with long production or recommissioning times. The Department is now examining innovative ways to retain access to the pool of trained personnel that will be exiting the active and reserve components in coming years.

A parallel, longer-term aspect of such a reconstitution concept could be to use resources freed from current forces to invest now in the longer-lead, longer-term innovative--technological, organizational, and doctrinal--concepts needed to hedge against any future resurgence of a more threatening environment abroad.

This approach would use the current period of reduced tensions and reduced threats to Europe to hedge against the harder-to-predict threats of the distant future.

Unit Structure and Manning Policies for Reconstitution. In the currently projected strategic environment, it is not necessary--and in a fiscally constrained and balanced strategy and Total Force, it is not prudent--to maintain, even in a low-manning or cadre status, all of the units we might possibly foresee a need to reconstitute. Still, some quantity of reconstitution assets within standing units will likely be necessary.

The maritime patrol mission has been successfully performed by Naval Reserve units for some time, and has been fully integrated with the active force's maritime patrol duties. With the lessening of U.S.-Soviet tensions, the tempo of antisubmarine warfare operations can be reduced somewhat. Giving the Naval Reserve additional responsibility for the maritime patrol mission might retain the requisite capability (including equipment and trained personnel) in the Total Force at reduced operating levels and reduced cost. Such a Naval Reserve mission would be analogous to the role that Air Force reserve components already play in augmenting strategic airlift operations.

The proposed INRC--the "nesting" idea discussed earlier in this section--is well suited to a strategic environment in which extended warning times permit the reconstitution of forces. This program would emphasize flexible readiness by using surface units in the NRF in an expanded role to provide trained cadre crews for mobilization. The advantage of the INRC training frigate plan is that the nation would retain, as available resources, ships and trained crews throughout the vessels' useful life. By placing these assets in the NRF, this force structure could be retained at moderate cost. (The Navy estimates the annual cost of a 40-ship program to be $150 million.) Similarly, the transfer of maritime patrol aircraft to the Naval Reserve would provide an opportunity to retain force structure and operational capability at reduced peacetime costs and operating tempos. Under both of these concepts, trained personnel and modern equipment would be retained in the Total Force, and would be available when needed through the mobilization process.

Given the high percentage of reserve personnel (especially Naval Reserve officers) with previous active-duty experience, and the high quality and the motivation of today's reserve forces, it would likely be very difficult to attract high-quality personnel and to maintain their skills in skeletal units (including the Navy's INRC) with few resources. Thus, there should be no doubt about the leadership challenge that would be involved. There should be considerable planning before any such program is implemented.

An alternative to cadre units which should once again be explored would involve the establishment of a reserve of senior active-duty personnel within existing active and reserve force structures. (This would require changing

current manpower policies, which restrict the number of senior personnel on active and Selected Reserve duty to those needed for the programmed force.) Highly skilled and experienced personnel--for example, technicians--could be permitted to fill currently unauthorized or lower-grade full-time support (FTS) billets in reserve units. These additional FTS personnel could provide training on current doctrine and for technical skills. They would not replace reservists in the management of the reserve units, and they would not mobilize with the reserve units. Rather, they would be preassigned to provide a cadre for new units.

Another way to provide a reserve of senior personnel might be to increase the number of infrastructure rotation base billets. This would represent a change from current policy, under which some DoD infrastructure billets (positions that otherwise would be given to civilians) are filled by military personnel in order to maintain an adequate CONUS rotation base.

Use of Pre-Trained Individual Manpower (PIM). Pre-trained individual manpower includes members of the Individual Ready Reserve (primarily those who have time left on their eight-year military service obligation), military retirees, and the Standby Reserve. Current plans call for the use of PIM after mobilization for: (1) initial fill of active and reserve units; (2) casualty replacement; and (3) backfill in non-deploying units to free active-duty personnel for initial fill or casualty replacement (assuming the appropriate skill levels exist.)

Concern has been expressed in recent years about the ability of the Department's PIM pool to fulfill the replacement needs of the Total Force. Manning levels in the IRR--the principal source of replacements--have dropped from 1.23 million in 1973 to about 490,000 today. As numbers in the IRR follow but lag active-duty and Selected Reserve strengths, the decline in the mid-1970s reflected the post-Vietnam drawdown. In an effort to increase IRR strength, the military service obligation was increased from six to eight years for recruits entering after 1983. This change is expected to increase the size of the IRR by about 50 percent over the next several years. Over the longer term, however, as personnel let go during the current budget cuts complete their obligation, IRR strength will likely decline.

Whether the PIM pool will be adequate depends not only on the number of individuals in it, but also on whether these individuals can be reached in a national emergency, whether they will respond to a call-up, and whether they will be physically fit to serve and have adequate skills. The mix of skills entering the PIM pool does not necessarily match the mix that the Department requires, and even a PIM pool large enough to meet aggregate replacement needs may not allow the Department to meet replacement needs by skill.

43-455 - 91 - 21

SECTION V

CONCLUSION

This study of the Total Force Policy has taken place during a time of rapid and historic change, both around the world and within the United States. When the study commenced, American armed forces were engaged in Operation Just Cause in Panama. As the work progressed, major policy decisions were being reached that will have significant short- and long-term implications for the defense budget. As this report is forwarded, American forces are engaged in one of the most successful deployments of military power in our nation's history. Operation Desert Shield has already involved the call-up of 134,000 members of the Selected Reserve, and has resulted in the deployment of approximately 326,000 personnel to Saudi Arabia.

This report is not intended to answer with finality the many complex issues relating to the determination of the most appropriate size and shape of U.S. armed forces at a time of rapid change in the strategic environment. The study has served, however, as an important tool for the reevaluation of old assumptions, the consideration of lessons that are being learned daily from our experience in Desert Shield, and the building of forces that will meet the nation's future security needs.

Total Force Policy Report to the Congress

Supplement

Department of Defense

Table of Contents

INDEX TO SUPPLEMENT v

MEMBERSHIP AND ACTIVITIES OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP 1
- Formal Meetings 1
- Colloquia with Outside Experts 1
- Technical Conferences 5
- Commissioned Studies 5

CIVILIAN, CONTRACTOR, AND HOST NATION SUPPORT 7
- U.S. Government Employees 7
- Private Contractors 7
- Host Nation Support 8
- Implications of Reliance on Nonmilitary Force Elements 9

RECENT PEACETIME RESERVE ACTIVITIES 11
- Army 11
- Air Force 12
- Navy 13
- Marine Corps 14
- Coast Guard 14
- State Role of the National Guard 15
- Summary 15

ROTATION BASE 35
- Service Rotation Policies 36
- Alternative Rotation Base Policies 38

CALL-UP AUTHORITIES 43

CONSIDERATIONS IN A COMPREHENSIVE TOTAL FORCE COST ESTIMATE 51
- Direct Unit Costs 54
- Direct Support Costs 80
- Infrastructure Costs 83
- Transition Costs 91

MILITARY PERSONNEL RESOURCES 93
- Non-Prior-Service Recruit Quality 93
- Prior-Service Recruits 94
- Policies to Improve the Match Between Billets and Skills 96

INDEX TO SUPPLEMENT

This supplement to the Total Force Policy Study provides additional information on selected topics covered in the Final Report. The material is organized into eight papers focusing on different aspects of the Total Force. The content of the papers is described briefly below.

Membership and Activities of the Total Force Policy Study Group
Lists members, describes various colloquia and other meetings held to discuss Total Force issues, and lists publications commissioned by the Study Group.

Civilian, Contractor, and Host Nation Support
Describes the activities of these components of the Total Force and their respective contributions to U.S. military activities.

Recent Peacetime Reserve Activities
Discusses the use of reservists, including the National Guard, in state missions; lists recent missions in which reservists have played a major role.

Rotation Base
Describes the rotation base policies of the military services and discusses some alternative methods for managing assignments.

Call-Up Authorities
Explains the call-up authority used in Operation Desert Shield and identifies other available call-up authorities.

Considerations in a Comprehensive Total Force Cost Estimate
Discusses methods for estimating force costs, including the cost implications of transfers between active and reserve components.

Military Personnel Resources
Examines personnel available to the Total Force, and discusses policies affecting enlistment and retention of personnel.

MEMBERSHIP AND ACTIVITIES OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP

Formal Meetings

The Secretary of Defense signed the charter establishing the Total Force Policy Study Group on December 26, 1989. The Study Group was composed of 24 senior civilian and military officials appointed by the Secretary of Defense (see membership roster on page 2). The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) served as chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the Study Group.

The Study Group held its first meeting on February 2, 1990, with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in attendance. Over the course of the study, the group met formally approximately 20 additional times. In these sessions, it addressed topics such as:

- Possible conflict scenarios and the forces and capabilities needed to respond to them;
- Short-warning contingencies and their force and capability needs;
- The advantages and disadvantages of alternative techniques for gaining the use of reserve forces for operational missions, including voluntary participation and use of the Presidential call-up authority;
- Alternative methodologies to evaluate the relative costs of active and reserve forces;
- Land, naval, and tactical air force requirements and capabilities;
- Strategic mobility requirements and capabilities;
- Manpower, personnel, and training policies; and
- Medical manpower requirements.

Colloquia with Outside Experts

To obtain the insights and recommendations of outside experts and policymakers, the Study Group hosted three colloquia. The first colloquium was held on April 10, 1990, and was attended by former senior military and civilian officials and representatives of important public or private policy groups, including:

TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP

Chairman: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel

Vice Chairman: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Members: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation
Department of Defense General Counsel
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations, and Environment
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources
Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board
Director, J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy), representing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans), U.S. Army
Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division, U.S. Navy
Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs and Resources), U.S. Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans, Policies, and Operations), U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) for Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief, Army Reserve
Director, Naval Reserve
Chief, Air Force Reserve
Director, Army National Guard
Director, Air National Guard
Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, Coast Guard

- A former Secretary of the Air Force;
- A former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation);
- A former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis);
- A former director of the Joint Staff;
- Two former chiefs of the National Guard Bureau;
- Representatives of the Reserve Officers Association; and
- The director of the Selective Service System.

At the first colloquium, the participants addressed topics such as the allocation of active and reserve missions, the use of section 673(b) call-up authority, resource allocation trends, and manpower efficiency.

The second colloquium, held on April 24, 1990, was devoted to Total Force issues of importance to the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) of the operational commands. The CINC or a senior representative from each of the following commands participated in that session:

- Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM)
- Central Command (USCENTCOM)
- European Command (USEUCOM)
- Forces Command (USFORSCOM)
- North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
- Pacific Command (USPACOM)
- Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
- Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

The third colloquium was held on April 30 and May 1, 1990. At that meeting, the Study Group was addressed by the Secretary of Defense. A wide range of current and former federal officials participated in the session. They included:

- The Honorable John McCain, United States Senator
- The Honorable Herbert R. Bateman, Member of Congress
- The Honorable Beverly B. Byron, Member of Congress
- The Honorable William L. Dickinson, Member of Congress
- The Honorable G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Member of Congress
- Three former Members of Congress
- The director of the Congressional Budget Office
- Two former Secretaries of the Army
- A former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
- A former Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy
- A former chairman of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
- The executive director of the Reserve Officers Association
- A former U.S. Ambassador to NATO
- Two Adjutants General

The discussion topics focused on national strategy, force structure and force mix issues, appropriate missions and roles for reserve forces, the Presidential call-up authority, transfers of wartime missions to the reserves, resource allocation considerations, and public support issues.

Several outside experts who had been invited to attend the colloquia were unable to do so because of schedule conflicts or other reasons. Consequently, the chairman and vice chairman of the Study Group met individually with the following:

- A former Commandant of the Marine Corps
- A former chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board
- Two Adjutants General--one the president of the Adjutants General Association of the United States and the other the president of the National Guard Association of the United States

Technical Conferences

The work of the Study Group has been supplemented by two technical conferences. The first conference focused on costing methodologies and related matters, and addressed various techniques for evaluating the comparative costs of active and reserve forces in the performance of specific missions. That conference also permitted a discussion in some detail of the knotty definitional and data problems that hinder efforts to determine the transition, operating, and support costs associated with active and reserve units. The conference was attended by cost experts from each of the services. The second technical conference focused on key manpower, personnel, and training issues.

Commissioned Studies

In addition to the colloquia, conferences, and other meetings of the Study Group, several studies on topics related to the Total Force were commissioned. These are listed below.

Bailey, Ronald B. and W. Stanford Smith, *Army Cadre Divisions*, Logistics Management Institute, FP004-02TR3 (forthcoming).

Bailey, Ronald B., David V. Glass, and W. Stanford Smith, *Total Force Policy History*, Logistics Management Institute, FP004-02TR1, Bethesda, MD, December 1990.

Bailey, Ronald B., *Update of 1984 LMI Report on the Total Force*, Logistics Management Institute, FP004-02TR2, Bethesda, MD, February 1991.

Dial, Elizabeth B., *Contracting DoD Industrial Activities to the Private Sector: The Commercial Activities Program*, Logistics Management Institute, FP004-03TR2, Bethesda, MD, December 1990.

Dial, Elizabeth B. and Donald C. Prettol, *Host Nation Support*, Logistics Management Institute, FP004-03TR3, Bethesda, MD, December 1990.

Gotz, Glenn A., and Marygail K. Brauner, *Active Component Support for U.S. Army Reserve Component Training*, The RAND Corporation, R-4017-RA/FMP/PAE, Santa Monica, CA (forthcoming).

Grissmer, David, Richard Eisenman, William Taylor, Jennifer Kawata, *Managing the Enlisted Personnel Reductions*, The RAND Corporation, N-3274-FMP/RA/PAE, Santa Monica, CA (forthcoming).

Grissmer, David W., and Bernard Rostker, *Military Manpower Issues for the 1990's*, The RAND Corporation, N-3273-FMP/RA/PAE, Santa Monica, CA (forthcoming).

Grissmer, David W. and Jennifer Kawata, *Total Force Manpower Management: Personnel Flows Between Active and Reserve Components*, The RAND Corporation, R-4036-FMP/RA/PAE, Santa Monica, CA (forthcoming).

Heiser, Joseph M., *Civilian Combat Support in Vietnam: Some Lessons Learned*, Logistics Management Institute, FP004-03TR4, Bethesda, MD, December 1990.

Hix, William M. and Susan D. Hosek, *Elements of Change in Medical Force Structure: A White Paper*, The RAND Corporation, N-3272-FMP/RA/PAE, Santa Monica, CA (forthcoming).

Jennings, John B. and Elizabeth B. Dial, *Transportation Activities in Support of Operation Desert Shield*, Logistics Management Institute, FP004-03TR1, Bethesda, MD, December 1990.

Lacy, James L., *Cadre Approaches to Force Structure: The Army, Past and Future -- A White Paper*, The RAND Corporation, R-4023-PAE/RA/FMP, Santa Monica, CA (forthcoming).

Tillson, John, et al., *Alternative Concepts for Organizing the Total Force*, Institute for Defense Analyses, R-378, Alexandria, VA, November 1990.

CIVILIAN, CONTRACTOR, AND HOST NATION SUPPORT

The civilian component of the Total Force includes U.S. government employees, private firms providing contract services to the U.S. military, and civilian support provided by host nations to U.S. forces. While the use of nonmilitary personnel has been a success, civilian components are not interchangeable with all military positions. There are unique capabilities and limitations associated with each component, all of which must be considered in planning for the most effective and efficient Total Force. Currently, nonmilitary personnel constitute approximately 25 percent of the Total Force.

U.S. Government Employees. Federal civilian personnel make significant contributions to the Total Force. Although less expensive than active-duty personnel, government workers are more expensive than reservists, contractors, or host nation support. Even though they are more costly than the other nonmilitary alternatives, federal employees represent a reliable, controllable personnel base that can be used for sensitive full-time duties (such as intelligence operations) where maintaining government control is important but the skills of military personnel are not necessary.

Private Contractors. Contractors represent a manpower resource that can be acquired when and where needed at a predetermined cost. Contractors eliminate the need for government overhead structure (although contractor overhead costs are included in the price of contracts). Contractors, even when performing full-time duties, may be less expensive than active-duty military or government civilian personnel because they have greater flexibility in managing their businesses and may pay benefits and retirement compensation that are less than the standard for military or government civilians. In some cases, first-year savings from shifting to contractor support have been estimated at 30 percent of the cost of providing comparable services "in house." Reliance on contractors has provided the U.S. military with flexible low-cost services and promoted greater efficiency in the military and civilian government positions that have survived competitive review.

Contractors are a viable alternative both in the United States and abroad, in peacetime or war. At the peak of the Vietnam conflict, nearly 150,000 contractor personnel were employed in Southeast Asia in support of U.S. combat forces. Most of these individuals were Vietnamese nationals, but U.S. citizens and third-country nationals also were employed. These workers provided construction, transportation, supply, maintenance, and general logistics services. In some cases, they performed combat support functions, substituting for reserve forces, which were not recalled in large numbers. Pre-planned arrangements with contractors for infrastructure development and support in Third World wartime locations, such as were used in Vietnam, can act much like a host nation agreement as a means of avoiding costs in peacetime.

Since 1979, more than 80,000 U.S. military and civilian government positions have been reviewed as competitive candidates for contracting, and today over 220,000 positions in the Total Force are filled by contractors. More than 50,000 of the positions currently under contract are a direct result of the Commercial Activities program, while over 13,000 military and civilian government positions that were reviewed have been retained. The remaining contractor positions either existed prior to the inception of the Commercial Activities program or have always been filled by contractors.

More than 200,000 additional military and civilian government positions remain potential candidates for contracting out. Other positions have been removed from consideration, including those exempted from the Commercial Activities program by the Congress. Examples of such exemptions include more than 128,000 core logistics activities positions, and nearly 40,000 installation services positions.

Host Nation Support (HNS). Host nation support agreements reduce requirements for U.S. military support personnel. Host nation support avoids costs during peacetime, enhances the deployment of combat forces in wartime, and promotes burdensharing among allies. There is no uniform format or structure for HNS agreements, nor is such uniformity possible. Indeed, some nations, owing to political sensitivities, may not wish to conclude formal agreements, even though they intend to provide support. Lack of formal agreements does not preclude extensive host nation support, however, as can be seen from the support provided for Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations.

The United States obtains host nation support in varying degrees from almost all of its NATO allies, as well as from other nations, including Korea and Japan. The type and level of support varies from country to country, and may include facilities, exercise support, prepositioning facilities, or infrastructure. Estimates of the value of host nation support depend on the type of assistance provided, but all such arrangements reduce the costs of maintaining U.S. forces abroad. For example, as stated in the 1990 report to Congress, *Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*, the Japanese government paid at least 50 percent of the cost of employing Japanese workers at U.S. military facilities in Japan in 1990, with the total support from that country equating to about $40,000 for each U.S. service member stationed there.

Wartime host nation support (WHNS) consists of civilian or military assistance provided by host nations to allied forces operating from, or transiting through, their territory in time of war. It has been estimated that, for the Army alone, WHNS agreements provide capabilities equivalent to over 120,000 U.S. military support personnel. These are spaces not formed or paid for because of our ability to rely on allied assistance. The United States relies extensively on WHNS in Europe and Northeast Asia but, until recently, has had few such initiatives in the Americas and Southwest Asia.

The wartime host nation support agreement between the United States and Germany is the most comprehensive such arrangement, with 93,000 German reservists committed to the direct support of U.S. forces. Germany also has agreed to provide 22,000 items of equipment mobilized from its civilian sector. The savings to the United States from having Germany provide this equipment amount to approximately $578 million.

Implications of Reliance on Nonmilitary Force Elements. The use of nonmilitary force components has been a success. Host nation support agreements, especially in Europe, have enabled the United States to rely on smaller numbers of military personnel and to develop a base of structured, pre-planned burdensharing with its allies. Conversion of military and federal civilian billets to contractor positions under the Commercial Activities program has lowered military support costs in the United States and has fostered a more entrepreneurial approach to the provision of those services.

Reliance on nonmilitary personnel is driven primarily by efforts to reduce the cost of providing military services. A trade-off to cost in adding civilian elements to the defense structure is that control of the Total Force becomes more difficult. If cost were not a consideration, the United States could rely entirely on military personnel to meet its defense needs. A force consisting solely of military personnel would have one command structure, minimizing the external factors that compete for the attention and loyalties of personnel. With the addition of nonmilitary force elements, some degree of control and flexibility is lost.

Reliance on federal civilian personnel and contractors must be balanced against the need to maintain an adequate rotation base for military forces. To the extent that civilian personnel replace military personnel in the continental United States (CONUS), they reduce the number of slots available to military personnel between overseas tours. Thus, in designating CONUS positions, consideration must be given to the fact that while some forward-deployed military personnel may be displaced by civilians--including host nation personnel--most of our forward assignments are filled by military personnel.

In the new strategic environment, the probability of regional contingency operations and the need for rapid response to crises may diminish the value of contract and host nation support. Such operations often require close control, surprise, and rapid execution. Contractors or host nations may not be able to respond on that basis or, more importantly, operational security may preclude the use of those resources even if contract or host nation agreements exist. In such cases, sufficient support capability needs to be maintained in the active or reserve component to execute military operations successfully.

Effective use of nonmilitary personnel is location and scenario dependent. Deliberate plans need to exist to determine the potential use and value of such resources. Without such scenario-specific plans, actions to increase or decrease

the contribution of nonmilitary force elements may be counterproductive. Even existing agreements may not be appropriate or sustainable in the future. For example, current NATO agreements may change as the alliance undergoes a major review of military strategy. Sufficient resources need to exist within the military force structure to meet rotation needs and carry out crisis and contingency operations at some level without the use of nonmilitary personnel.

RECENT PEACETIME RESERVE ACTIVITIES

As the Total Force Policy has evolved, a subtle yet dramatic change has occurred in the manner in which reserve forces are viewed and used. Historically, the principal mission of the reserve components has been to provide well-trained, fully equipped units and individuals in time of war, national emergency, or when required for national security purposes. Until the early 1970s, the reserve components were generally viewed as a source of augmentation for the active components when the national security was threatened. While this primary mission remains constant, important new dimensions to reserve service have emerged under the Total Force Policy.

The reserve components today are not merely a "force in waiting." Particularly since the late 1970s, the reserves have assumed a major role in performing missions crucial to DoD's day-to-day functions. In addition, capabilities currently exist in the National Guard and Reserves that do not exist in the active force. The reserve components have been increasingly integrated with their active counterparts and now make significant contributions to ongoing active missions. Tables 1-5 at the end of this section list activities performed by Guard and Reserve personnel in FY 1990.

Army

Participation in a broad spectrum of intraservice and interservice readiness exercises allows Army reserve component personnel to hone their wartime skills. A significant amount of both exercise and real contingency planning is accomplished by reservists. This includes preparation of plans for exercises like Reforger and Bright Star. In addition, some parts of the plans for Operation Just Cause were written by reservists who later were called upon to implement those plans. During many training exercises, the Army National Guard and Reserve also undertake "nation building" functions. For example, since 1983, the National Guard and Reserve have each deployed nearly 40,000 soldiers to Latin America to conduct medical, veterinary, communications, and engineer training missions. These operations have included building bridges, roads, and airfields, and treating sick patients. The exercises not only assist local governments but also provide quality training for the soldiers.

The Equipment Maintenance Center-Europe (EMC-E) was established in January 1989 to receive and employ Guard and Reserve maintenance units assigned the theater general support maintenance mission. So far, Guardsmen and Reservists have contributed nearly 40,000 direct labor man-hours to this mission.

Similar to the EMC-E is the Aviation Classification Repair Activity Depot (AVCRAD) in Belgium. The AVCRAD is manned by National Guard personnel

performing annual training on two- to three-week rotations. It provides U.S. forces in Europe with a forward-deployed, pre-mobilization, depot-level aircraft maintenance capability.

The Army Guard and Reserve operate schools and state academies that provide alternative means for reserve component personnel to receive advanced training close to home. In some cases, these same institutions also are attended by active component personnel. The Army Reserve Training Divisions and Separate Brigades provide initial entry training each year for about 5,000 soldiers from both the active and reserve components. Additionally, the Army Reserve operates Forces Schools, Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Academies, and Regional Training Sites to augment the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) training base. The Army Reserve also provides assistance in organizing and training reserve units in other countries. For example, in response to a request from the government of Venezuela, drill instructors from the U.S. Army Reserve 95th Training Division have participated in training new Venezuelan reservists. The Army National Guard also operates several schools and training courses for both active and reserve component personnel; these include the Mountain Warfare School, the Air Assault School, the Tank Commanders Course, and a Battle Skills Course.

Army Reserve Military Intelligence Detachments (MIDs) conduct both weekend drills and annual training, accomplishing real intelligence missions on-site in a variety of intelligence agencies. Each year, about 250 Army Reserve soldiers perform "real-time" military intelligence training in the REDTRAIN program. This type of operation combines training with support of a real world mission. MIDs also provide some intelligence collection and analysis in support of counternarcotics activities.

Reserve component fixed-wing aircraft are coordinated through the regional Centralized Army Aviation Scheduling Offices (CAASOs), thereby providing capabilities to fulfill both active and reserve component requirements.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have undertaken important responsibilities in support of the nation's counternarcotics efforts. During FY 1989, more than 1,811 missions were conducted by 6,700 Army National Guard personnel in support of law enforcement agencies. The missions of these personnel ranged from ground and aerial reconnaissance, surveillance, and transportation of law enforcement officers to training, administrative, engineering, communications, and maintenance support.

Air Force

In recent years, the Air Force has shifted numerous missions to and placed additional reliance on the Air Reserve Components. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration is military airlift, where nearly 60 percent of current capability is

provided by Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve squadrons flying C-130, C-141, and C-5 aircraft. These pilots and aircraft were among the first U.S. military forces to respond to the President's call for volunteers following Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Another illustration of a critical ongoing mission performed by reserve forces is continental air defense. Flying F-16 aircraft, Air National Guard fighter-interceptor units are responsible for 92 percent of continental air defense operations. In addition, almost 100 percent of tactical reconnaissance missions are flown by reserve component units.

The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard also have had total responsibility for C-130 airlift rotations in Central and South America since 1977. Averaging about 6,000 flight hours annually, the Air Reserve Components provide support to the U.S. Southern Command and to U.S. embassies throughout Central and South America. Also, from 1977 to 1990, the Air National Guard maintained a continuous A-7D fighter rotation to Panama in support of the Canal Zone defense mission (Coronet Cove). Today, this Air National Guard mission is being shared by air defense and air superiority F-16 and F-15 units.

Since the mid-1970s, the Air Reserve Components have played a vital role in providing aerial-refueling support for Air Force aircraft. Today, about one-fourth of this worldwide mission is carried out by Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve aircrews flying KC-135 and KC-10 tanker aircraft. In the continental United States, KC-135 squadrons operated by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve provide around-the-clock support for Strategic Air Command bombers maintained in alert status.

By the end of FY 1989, the Air Reserve Components were responsible for 92 percent of the aeromedical evacuation mission. Today, 100 percent of aerial spraying capability is assigned to the Air Force Reserve in support of requirements worldwide.

Navy

Since the late 1970s, Naval Reservists have been responsible for 100 percent of the U.S.-based medium and heavy Navy logistical airlift mission. Twelve Naval Reserve squadrons logged nearly 61,900 flying hours in FY 1989 while airlifting 13 million pounds of cargo and transporting 500,000 passengers.

The Naval Reserve initiated the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA) program in 1980 to provide maintenance support for both active and reserve ships. The SIMAs perform intermediate as well as organizational-level maintenance. They provide meaningful shore assignments for sea/shore rotations and help retain the skilled petty officers necessary to staff the fleet. Upon mobilization, SIMAs are scheduled to augment destroyer tenders and repair

ships for forward battle damage repair. Selected Reservists are being trained to backfill the SIMAs.

The Naval Reserve has actively supported DoD's drug interdiction efforts. Naval Reserve frigates provided 13 percent of the total steaming days in support of drug interdiction operations during FY 1990. They accounted for 12 percent and 1 percent, respectively, of the total cocaine and marijuana confiscated during that year.

Since the mid-1970s, Naval Reservists have provided more than 35 percent of the Navy's maritime air patrol capability. During FY 1989, the 13 Naval Reserve air patrol squadrons logged about 13,000 flight hours and Navy Reserve frigates steamed 465 days in support of Atlantic and Pacific fleet missions, including drug interdiction.

Since 1974, Naval Reservists have performed a critical role in the production of intelligence information for the Navy. Comprising more than 60 percent of uniformed naval intelligence personnel, Naval Reservists contributed more than 78,000 man-days during FY 1989 in direct support of the fleet commanders.

Marine Corps

Marine reservists participate on a daily basis in drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean with the U.S. Coast Guard and along the southwest border of the United States with the U.S. Border Patrol. They also take part in disaster and emergency relief operations, such as those undertaken in 1989 in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo and the San Francisco earthquake.

Coast Guard

The cornerstone of the Coast Guard Reserve training program is augmentation training, which provides peacetime assistance to the active force. When conducting augmentation training, reservists work side-by-side with their active-duty counterparts, performing such missions and support functions as search and rescue, law enforcement, and port and marine safety. Specifically, they provide all waterside and range recovery area security for space shuttle launches. Port security support for U.S. Marine Corps maritime prepositioning ships is another Coast Guard Reserve mission. Coast Guard Reservists man search-and-rescue stations in the Great Lakes annually during peak boating periods. They are also used during national emergencies, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Hurricane Hugo, and the San Francisco earthquake.

The Coast Guard Reserve also plays a role in nation building. Coast Guard training teams, composed of active and reserve members, regularly provide training to the navies and coast guards of developing countries.

State Role of the National Guard

Because of the National Guard's dual status (members serve both state and federal governments), Guard units are immediately available to the state governors to deal with local and regional matters. Illustrative of the more than 5,000 state call-ups to which the Guard has responded during the past seven years are: the Mount Saint Helen's volcanic eruption, the Alaskan oil spill, the San Francisco earthquake, the Sioux City airline crash, Hurricanes Gilbert and Hugo, forest fires, widespread flooding throughout the South and Midwest, tornadoes, blizzards, energy and water shortages, search-and-rescue operations, medevacs, civil disturbances, public employee strikes, and state employee "walkouts." It is significant to note that these missions were paid for by state funds. Although they are a federal force, during major emergencies the Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force Reserves may be called upon to lend assistance to state governors. Table 6 details National Guard involvement in state missions in FY 1989.

Also in support of the governors, the Army and Air National Guard provide an average of 2,000 personnel per day in support of local, state, and federal anti-drug agencies; during 1991 this will equate to 730,000 man-days. Specific National Guard anti-drug support missions include physical search of containerized cargo, intelligence analysis, ground and aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, transportation, special operations, loan of equipment, and specialized instruction to law enforcement agencies. In addition to its stateside operations, the Air National Guard provides reconnaissance and interceptor support to selected CINC drug-interdiction initiatives abroad. Table 7 summarizes the FY 1989 National Guard counternarcotics support missions. Although more restricted than the National Guard, the Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force Reserves are authorized indirect involvement in U.S. counternarcotics activities by lending equipment, providing personnel support, conducting training, and sharing information with law enforcement agencies.

Summary

The extent to which reserve forces are involved in ongoing, day-to-day military missions is significant and varies by service and reserve component. Augmenting the capabilities of active forces in diverse mission areas attests not only to the effective training and dedication of reservists, but also to the benefits to be gained from fully integrating reserve and active forces.

The extensive peacetime responsibilities of U.S. reserve forces often go unnoticed. Their activities enhance diplomatic efforts in the Third World, extend crucial support to U.S. counternarcotics efforts, and safeguard property and lives throughout the country. At the same time, these personnel continue to train for wartime duties.

Table 1
Army National Guard and Army Reserve Contributions to the Total Army, FY 1990

Unit Types[a]	National Guard % of Army	Army Reserve % of Army	Combined % of Army
Heavy Helicopter Units	100	0	100
Infantry Scout Groups	100	0	100
TOW Light Antitank Infantry Battalions	100	0	100
Training Divisions and Brigades	0	100	100
Railroad Units	0	100	100
Judge Advocate General Units	2	98	100
Civil Affairs Units	0	97	97
Infantry Battalions	90	6	96
Supply and Service Companies	52	42	94
Public Affairs Units	58	29	87
Heavy Equipment Maintenance Companies	76	10	86
Chemical Smoke Generator Units	12	72	84
Light Equipment Maintenance Companies	28	56	84
Pathfinder Detachments	0	83	83
Separate Brigades	70	10	80
Truck Companies POL	24	55	79
Hospital Units	16	59	75
Engineer Bridge Companies (Nondivisional)	48	26	74
Corps Support Groups, Headquarters	15	58	73
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant (POL) Companies	16	56	72
Truck Companies Cargo	49	23	72
Engineer Battalions (Combat)	35	36	71
Military Police Companies (Nondivisional)	44	27	71
Military Intelligence Units	6	63	69
Psychological Operations Units	0	68	68
Conventional Ammunition Companies	25	43	68
Theater Defense Brigades	50	17	67
Truck Companies	44	22	66
Equipment Maintenance Companies (Nondivisional)	45	20	65
Engineer Battalions (Combat Heavy)	25	32	57
Signal Battalions (Corps Area)	39	14	53
Field Artillery Battalions	45	8	53
Area Support Groups, Headquarters	26	26	52
Aviation Assault Companies	36	16	52
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	49	2	51
Armored Battalions	48	2	50
Special Forces Groups	22	22	44
Aviation Attack Battalions	39	4	43
Watercraft Units	13	27	40
Armored Cavalry Regiments	40	0	40
Infantry Battalions (Light)	31	8	39
Combat Divisions	36	0	36
Aviation Lift Companies	11	11	22

SOURCES: Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Army (DAMO-FDF)

a. Percentages determined by counting like-type units.

Table 2
Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Contributions to the Total Air Force, FY 1990

Unit Types	Air National Guard % of Air Force	Air Force Reserve % of Air Force	Combined % of Air Force
		Flying Units	
Aircraft[a]			
Aerial Spraying	0	100	100
Strategic Interceptor Force (U.S.-Based)	92	0	92
Air Rescue/Recovery	32	42	74
Tactical Airlift	38	26	64
Tactical Reconnaissance	60	0	60
Tactical Air Support	41	0	41
Weather Reconnaissance	0	40	40
Tactical Fighters	25	9	34
Aerial Refueling/Strategic Tankers	20	5	25
Special Operations	11	18	29
Support Aircraft	23	0	23
Strategic Airlift	6	11	17
Aircrews[b]			
Aeromedical Evacuation	26	71	97
Strategic Airlift (Associate)	0	50	50
Tanker/Cargo (Associate)	0	43	43
Aeromedical Airlift (Associate)	0	30	30
		Non-Flying Units[c]	
Aircraft Control and Warning	94	0	94
Aerial Port	13	58	71
Engineering Installation	70	0	70
Combat Communications	65	0	65
Combat Logistics Support Squadrons	0	59	59
Tactical Control	49	0	49
Civil Engineering	26	18	44
Strategic Airlift Maintenance (Associate)	0	40	40
Medical[c]	11	7	18
Weather	14	1	15
Reconnaissance (Technical)	13	0	13
Communications Flights	3	3	6
Electronic Security	1	0	1

SOURCES: Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve

a. Percentages determined by counting primary authorized aircraft.

b. Percentages determined by counting authorized personnel.

c. Excludes aeromedical evacuation personnel.

Table 3
Naval Reserve
Contributions to the Total Navy, FY 1990

Unit Types[a]	Naval Reserve % of Navy
Combat Search and Rescue Squadrons	100
Fighter/Composite (Adversary/Service Squadrons (U.S.-Based)	100
Logistic Airlift Squadrons (U.S.-Based)	100
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units	100
Naval Embarked Advisory Teams	100
Strike Rescue/Special Warfare Support Helicopter Squadrons	100
Naval Control of Shipping (Military Personnel)	99
Cargo-Handling Battalions	93
Military Sealift Command (Military Personnel)	85
Ocean Minesweepers	70
Mobile Construction Battalion	68
Fleet Hospitals	53
Intelligence Program Personnel	48
Mobile Mine Assembly Groups	48
Mobile Diving and Salvage Units	44
Airborne Mine Countermeasures Squadrons	40
Maritime Air Patrol Squadrons	35
LAMPS MK-1 Antisubmarine Warfare Squadrons	33
Frigates (FFG-7s/FF-1052s)	29
Carrier Air Wings	14
Amphibious Warfare Ships	5

SOURCE: Naval Reserve

a. Percentages determined by counting like-type units or personnel.

Table 4
Marine Corps Reserve
Contributions to the Total Marine Corps, FY 1990

Unit Types[a]	Marine Corps Reserve % of Marine Corps
Force Reconnaissance Companies	50
Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies	50
Tank Battalions	40
Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalions	25
Low-Altitude Air Defense	25
Engineer Support Battalions	25
Landing Support Battalions	25
Artillery Regiments	25
Infantry Regiments	25
Aircraft Types[b]	
Adversary Aircraft	100
Observation Aircraft	33
Aerial-Refueling Aircraft	29
Light Attack Aircraft	28
Fighter Aircraft	20
Electronic Warfare Aircraft	18
Helicopters	18

SOURCE: Marine Corps Reserve

a. Percentages determined by counting like-type units.

b. Percentages determined by counting primary authorized aircraft.

Table 5
Coast Guard Reserve
Contributions to the Total Coast Guard, FY 1990

Unit Types[a]	Coast Guard Reserve % of Coast Guard
Deployable Port Security	100
Marine Safety Office	43
Operational Shore Facilities	31
Command and Control	28
Repair/Supply/Research	23
Vessels	15
Air Stations	3

SOURCE Coast Guard Reserve

a Percentages determined by counting mobilization billets

Table 6
National Guard State Military Support Missions, 1989

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
ALABAMA			
De Kalb County	20 Aug 88	Water Haul	4 ARNG
Jefferson County	27 Jun 88	Water Haul	6 ARNG
Talladega County	2 Sep 88	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Marengo County	23 Dec 88	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Talladega	10 Mar 89	Tornado Support	15 ARNG
Phenix City	16 Feb 89	Water Haul	5 ARNG
Hamilton	19 Apr 89	Tornado Support	11 ARNG
Etowah County	22 Apr 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Statewide	2 May 89	Drug Support	8 ARNG
Statewide	2 Apr 89	Drug Support	8 ARNG
Plantersville	22 Jun 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Tallapoosa	26 Jul 89	Engineer Support	30 ARNG
ALASKA			
Nome	5 Jan 89	Evacuation Support	4 ARNG
Anchorage	27 Jan - 15 Feb 89	Snow Emergency	7 ARNG
Valdez	26 Mar - 1 Jun 89	Oil Spill	130 ARNG
Seward	12 May 89	Search and Rescue	3 ARNG
Oscarville	14 May 89	Search and Rescue	6 ARNG
Bethel	25 May 89	Search and Rescue	3 ARNG
Nunivak Island	26-27 May 89	Search and Rescue	3 ARNG
King Salmon	5 Jul 89	Search and Rescue	3 ARNG
Anchorage	15-21 Aug 89	Search and Rescue	15 ARNG
Nome	6 May 89	Community Support	8 ARNG
Anchorage	18 Feb 89	Community Support	26 ARNG
Anchorage	1-30 May 89	Engineer Support	10 ARNG
Anchorage	20 Aug 89	Aviation Support	6 ARNG
Nome	15-16 May 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
Anchorage	15-17 May 89	Aviation Support	6 ARNG
Anchorage	4 Jul 89	Community Support	24 ARNG
Fairbanks	16 Jul 89	Community Support	12 ARNG
Eagle River	21 Jul 89	Community Support	4 ARNG
Nome	12 Aug 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
Dillingham	12 Sep 89	Aviation Support	9 ANG
Anchorage	16-18 Sep 89	Transportation Support	2 ARNG
Nome	10 Feb 89	Search and Rescue	3 ARNG
Statewide	18-25 Apr 89	Aviation Support	45 ARNG/ ANG
ARIZONA			
Winslow	3 Jan 89	Aerial Search	3 ARNG
Yuma County	28-31 Dec 88	Drug Support	8 ARNG
Yavapai County	4 Jan 89	Aerial Support	3 ARNG
Nogales	14 Jan 89	Drug Support	10 ARNG
Mesa	23 Jan - 31 Mar 89	Shelter for the Homeless	4 ARNG
Phoenix West	23Dec88 - 31Mar89	Shelter for the Homeless	4 ARNG

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
ARIZONA (CONT'D)			
Phoenix 52th St	23Dec88 - 31Mar89	Shelter for the Homeless	4 ARNG
Tucson	6 Feb - 31 Mar 89	Shelter for the Homeless	4 ARNG
Yuma	6 Feb - 31 Mar 89	Shelter for the Homeless	4 ARNG
Yavapai County	11 May 89	Search and Rescue	3 ARNG
Border Entry Points	15 May 89	Drug Support	29 ARNG
Yavapai County	18 Jun 89	Search and Rescue	3 ARNG
Pina County	7-31 Jul 89	Forest Fire	15 ARNG
Graham County	7-31 Jul 89	Forest Fire	16 ARNG
Cochise County	8-31 Jul 89	Forest Fire	15 ARNG
Maricopa County	7-31 Jul 89	Forest Fire	15 ARNG
Coconino County	14 Aug 89	Search and Rescue	3 ARNG
ARKANSAS			
Statewide	8-11 Mar 89	Snowstorm Support	8 ARNG
Statewide	8 Jun 89	Drug Support	9 ARNG
CALIFORNIA			
Tuolumne County	17-19 Mar 89	Shelter for Law Officials	1 ARNG
Grand Canyon, AZ	28 Jun 89	Aviation Support	8 ARNG
Off Coast of San Francisco	5 Jul 89	Medevac	16 ANG
Lassen County	8 Jul 89	Forest Fire	4 ARNG
Butte County	8 Jul 89	Forest Fire	4 ARNG
Statewide	7 Jul 89	Forest Fire	31 ANG
New Mexico	7 Jul 89	Forest Fire	31 ANG
Lassen County	10 Jul 89	Laundry Support	2 ARNG
San Diego	10 Jul 89	Forest Fire	18 ARNG
Monterey County	10-18 Jul 89	Forest Fire	14 ARNG
Orange County	11-13 Jul 89	Aerial Fire Suppression Spt	15 ARNG
Monterey County	14 Jul 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
Lassen County	15 Jul 89	Facility Support	1 ARNG
Fresno County	19 Jul 89	Search and Rescue	4 ARNG
El Dorado County	14 Jul 89	Aerial Search	4 ARNG
Nevada County	26-27 Jul 89	Medevac	4 ARNG
Inyo County	30 Jul 89	Medevac	4 ARNG
Inyo County	30 Jul 89	Search and Rescue	5 ARNG
Inyo County	18 Aug 89	Ground Transportation Spt	4 ARNG
Statewide	10Nov88 - 31Mar89	Shelter for the Homeless	57 ARNG
Trinity County	19-21 Sep 89	Search and Rescue	6 ARNG
Amador County	21 Sep 89	Search and Rescue	4 ARNG
COLORADO			
Larimer County	11-16 Jul 89	Forest Fire	12 ARNG
CONNECTICUT			
Litchfield County	11-16 Jul 89	Tornado Aerial Damage Survey	12 ARNG
DELAWARE			
New Castle	25-30 Jun 89	Oil Spill Cleanup Support	197 ARNG/33 ANG
New Castle	5 Jul 89	Rescue and Evacuation	20 ARNG

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
DIST OF COL			
Ft. Belvoir, VA	25-26 Feb 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
Ft. Belvoir, VA	15-16 Apr 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
Ft. Belvoir, VA	17-18 Jun 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
Ft. Belvoir, VA	8-9 Jul 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
Ft. Belvoir, VA	5-6 Aug 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
Ft. Belvoir, VA	9-10 Sep 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
FLORIDA			
Taylor County	9-14 Apr 89	Aviation Support	13 ARNG
Lafayette County	9-14 Apr 89	Aviation Support	13 ARNG
Baker County	28 Apr-2 May 89	Transportation Support	10 ARNG
Columbia County	28 Apr-2 May 89	Transportation Support	10 ARNG
GEORGIA			
Demorest	26 Jun 89	Water Haul	3 ARNG
Baldwin	26 Jun 89	Water Haul	3 ARNG
Atlanta	20-21 Jan 89	Security Support	1,119 ARNG
GUAM	None		
HAWAII	None		
IDAHO			
Dubois	6-10 Feb 89	Aerial Search	4 ARNG
Spencer	6-10 Feb 89	Aerial Search	4 ARNG
Statewide	6-10 Feb 89	Snow Removal Support	31 ARNG
Statewide	9 Sep 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
Coeur d'Alene	3-11 May 89	Aviation Support	35 ARNG
Boise	3-4 May 89	Aviation Support	4 ARNG
Pocatello	11 May 89	Aviation Support	4 ARNG
Statewide	28 Jul-Aug 89	Forest Fire Support	509 ARNG
ILLINOIS	None		
INDIANA			
Shelby County	18 May 89	Aviation Support	2 ARNG
Madison County	13-22 Jul 89	Dining Facility Support	34 ARNG
IOWA			
Benton	10 May-28 Jul 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Maloy	10 May-28 Jul 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Delphos	10 May-28 Jul 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Redding	10 May-28 Jul 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Beaconsfield	10 May-28 Jul 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Granddriver	8 May-28 Jul 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Pleasanton	9 May-15 Aug 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Thayer	8 May- 3 Aug 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Pleasant Plain	10 Jul-16 Aug 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Packwood	16 May- 9 Aug 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
IOWA (CONT'D)			
Kossuth County	3 Apr 89	Generator Support	4 ARNG
Sioux City	19 Jul-31 Aug 89	Airliner Crash Recovery Support	1200 ARNG/ 67 ANG
KANSAS			
Atwood	29-30 Jun 89	Aviation Support	8 ARNG
Atwood	29-30 Jun 89	Flood Recovery Support	50 ARNG
Rawlins County	29-30 Jun 89	Flood Recovery Support	7 ARNG
KENTUCKY	None		
LOUISIANA			
Baton Rouge	17-22 May 89	Flood Recovery Support	63 ARNG
Epps	6-7 May 89	Tornado Debris Removal Support	39 ARNG
MAINE			
Penobscot County	11 Jan 89	Search and Rescue	5 ARNG
Franklin County	22 Jan 89	Search and Rescue	5 ARNG
York County	17 Feb 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
Cumberland County	17 Feb 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
Hancock County	28 May 89	Medevac Support	5 ARNG
York County	3 Jul 89	Search and Rescue	2 ARNG
Bangor County	16 Jul 89	Crash/Fire/Rescue Support	5 ANG
Penobscot County	30 Jul 89	Medevac Support	4 ARNG
Penobscot County	19 Sep 89	Search and Rescue	4 ARNG
Washington County	26-27 Sep 89	Medevac Support	4 ARNG
MARYLAND			
Garrett County	17-22 Feb 89	Water Haul	11 ARNG
Calvert County	24 Feb 89	Snow Emergency	2 ARNG
MASSACHUSETTS			
Springfield	7-8 Jun 89	Food Transportation	5 ARNG
Fall River	10-11 Jun 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Randolph	25 Jun 89	Dining Facility Support	10 ARNG
Mattapoisett	11-17 Jun 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
MICHIGAN	None		
MINNESOTA	None		
MISSISSIPPI	None		
MISSOURI			
Barry County	10-18 Mar 89	Snow Emergency	30 ARNG
McDonald County	10-18 Mar 89	Snow Emergency	30 ARNG
Newton County	10-18 Mar 89	Snow Emergency	27 ARNG
St. Joseph	7-10 Feb 89	Water Haul	40 ARNG
MONTANA			
Helena	2-3 Feb 89	Train Wreck Emergency	21 ARNG

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
MONTANA (CONT'D)			
Deer Lodge	7 May 89	Aviation Support	2 ARNG
Flathead County	2 Aug 89	Transportation Support	2 ARNG
NEBRASKA			
Valentine	30 Mar 89	Life Saving Neonatal	2 ARNG
Crawford	9-14 Jul 89	Forest Fire	231 ARNG
Belmont County	8-9 Jul 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Belmont County	19 Jul 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Belmont County	29 Jul 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Belmont County	4-5 Aug 89	Forest Fire	23 ARNG
Dawes County	31 Aug-5 Sep 89	Forest Fire	4 ARNG
NEVADA			
Mojave County, AZ	1-6 Jan 89	Water Haul	4 ARNG
Alameda County	18 Jan 89	Aviation Support	4 ANG
Carson County	28-29 Jun 89	Water Haul	2 ARNG
Lassen County	10-11 Jul 89	Forest Fire	9 ARNG
Lincoln County	16-21 Jul 89	Forest Fire	14 ARNG
Douglas County	15-22 Aug 89	Water Haul	4 ARNG
Fresno County, CA	30 Jul-4 Aug 89	Forest Fire	6 ARNG
NEW HAMPSHIRE	None		
NEW JERSEY	None		
NEW MEXICO			
Rio Arriba County	8-9 Feb 89	Search and Rescue	8 ARNG
Torrance County	20-21 Mar 89	Snow Emergency	9 ARNG
Statewide	8-30 Sep 89	Emergency Food Haul	92 ARNG
NEW YORK			
New York City	1 Oct 88-31 Oct 89	Shelter	65 ARNG
Island of Jamaica	1 Oct 88-14 Sep 89	Hurricane Recovery Support	371 ARNG/ 186 ANG
Statewide	3-5 May 89	Space Shuttle Support	6 ANG
	6 Sep 89	Aerial Rescue	6 ANG
	7 Sep 89	Aerial Rescue	6 ANG
	10 Sep 89	Aerial Rescue	6 ANG
	28 Sep 89	Aerial Rescue	6 ANG
NORTH CAROLINA			
Hertford	24-25 Feb 89	Snow Emergency	5 ARNG
Wallace	23-25 Feb 89	Snow Emergency	5 ARNG
Pitt County	18-19 Feb 89	Ice Storm Emergency	4 ARNG
Dare County	13-14 Mar 89	Coastal Storm	4 ARNG
Beaufort County	8-9 Mar 89	Generator Support	2 ARNG
Forsyth County	22-29 May 89	Tornado Recovery Support	8 ARNG
Lincoln County	8 May 89	Tornado Recovery Support	4 ARNG
Cleveland County	8 May 89	Tornado Recovery Support	4 ARNG
Union County	8 May 89	Tornado Recovery Support	4 ARNG
Union County	17-19 May 89	Debris Removal Support	2 ARNG

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
NORTH CAROLINA (CONT'D)			
Rowan County	8 May 89	Fire Protection Support	2 ARNG
Lincoln County	8 May 89	Tornado Recovery Support	4 ARNG
Cleveland County	8 May 89	Tornado Recovery Support	4 ARNG
Union County	8 May 89	Tornado Recovery Support	4 ARNG
Stanly County	17-19 Jun 89	Aviation Support	7 ARNG
Alamance County	17-19 Jun 89	Generator Support	7 ARNG
Guilford County	17-19 Jun 89	Aviation Support	7 ARNG
Randolph County	17-19 Jun 89	Aviation Support	7 ARNG
Union County	17-19 Jun 89	Generator Support	2 ANG
Caldwell County	4-6 Jul 89	Flood Recovery Support	7 ARNG
NORTH DAKOTA			
Burleigh County	18-20 Feb 89	Dining Facility Support	1 ARNG
Red River Valley	3-20 Apr 89	Flood Recovery Support	10 ARNG
Maddock	10-14 Jul 89	Tornado Recovery Support	9 ARNG
OHIO			
Centerburg	12-15 Jun 89	Water Haul	27 ARNG
Portage County	22-29 Jul 89	Water Haul	53 ARNG
Anderson County	2-4 Sep 89	Shelter	3 ARNG
OKLAHOMA			
Farris	3-5 Apr 89	Dining Facility Support	3 ARNG
Pauls Valley	5-6 Mar 89	Snow Emergency	2 ANRG
Ardmore	5-6 Mar 89	Snow/Ice Storm Emergency	11 ARNG
Little Axe	15-23 Mar 89	Snowstorm Emergency	2 ARNG
Statewide	18-25 Sep 89	Transportation Support	16 ARNG
OREGON			
Baker County	28 Jul-21 Aug 89	Forest Fire	150 ARNG
Wallowa County	28 Jul-21 Aug 89	Forest Fire	143 ARNG
PENNSYLVANIA			
Lackawanna County	2 May 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
PUERTO RICO			
Island Wide	16-30 Sep 89	Hurricane Recovery Support	732 ARNG
RHODE ISLAND			
Cranston	31 Jan 89	Hospital Support	70 ARNG
Cranston	19-23 Feb 89	Hospital Support	393 ARNG
Bristol County	23-25 Jun 89	Oil Spill Recovery Support	400 ARNG
SOUTH CAROLINA			
Saint Matthews	19 Aug 89	Transportation Support	3 ARNG
Statewide	22-30 Sep 89	Hurricane Recovery Support	3477 ARNG
SOUTH DAKOTA	None		
TENNESSEE	None		

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
TEXAS			
Houston	22 Feb 89	High Rise Emergency Training	3 ARNG
Cooke County	16 May 89	Flood Recovery Support	4 ARNG
UTAH			
Diamond Peak	3-13 Jul 89	Forest Fire	27 ARNG
Uintah County	5-12 Jul 89	Forest Fire	3 ARNG
Duchesne County	7-12 Jul 89	Forest Fire	4 ARNG
Sanpete County	11-17 Jul 89	Engineer Support on Burning Land	6 ARNG
Uintah County	19-24 Jul 89	Forest Fire	21 ARNG
Grand County	19-24 Jul 89	Forest Fire	21 ARNG
Salt Lake County	21-26 Jul 89	Hospital Air Conditioning Support	3 ARNG
VERMONT	None		
VIRGINIA			
Virginia Beach	1-5 Sep 89	Civil Disturbance	485 ARNG
VIRGIN ISLANDS			
Virgin Islands	16 Sep 89-Present	Hurricane Hugo	954 ARNG/29 ANG
WASHINGTON	None		
WEST VIRGINIA			
Statewide	1-31 Mar 89	Food Distribution	32 ARNG
Statewide	1-31 Apr 89	Food Distribution	23 ARNG
WISCONSIN			
Statewide	23 Dec 88-5 Feb 89	Armenian Relief Support	10 ARNG/51 ANG
WYOMING			
Lovell	7 Jan 89	Search and Rescue	12 ARNG
Lincoln County	5-11 Aug 89	Forest Fire Support	1 ARNG

43-455 - 91 - 22

Table 7
National Guard Anti-drug Support to Law Enforcement Agencies, 1989

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
ALABAMA			
	2Oct88 - 30Apr90	Cargo Inspection	8 ARNG
	2 May - 4 Jun 89	Cargo Inspection	8 ARNG
	2 Apr - 30 Apr 89	Cargo Inspection	8 ARNG
	5 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	5 ARNG
	5 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Ground Transportation	4 ARNG
	17 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Ground Reconnaissance	6 ARNG
ALASKA			
	10-20 Jun 89	Cargo Inspection	15 ANG
	21 Jun 89	Aviation Support	5 ARNG
	22 Jun - 1 Sep 89	Ground Surveillance	8 ARNG
	15-30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	27 ARNG
ARKANSAS			
	8 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	9 ARNG
ARIZONA			
	22Nov88 - 19Dec89	Cargo Inspection	12 ARNG
	6Nov88 - 30Apr89	Cargo Inspection	12 ARNG
	14 Jan - 14 May 89	Cargo Inspection	10 ARNG
	28Dec88 - 30Sep89	Cargo Inspection	8 ARNG
	20Dec88 - 30Sep89	Vehicle Inspection	7 ARNG
	22Nov88 - 30Sep89	Operation Aviation Support II	12 ANG
	15 May - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	29 ARNG
	8 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	8 ARNG
	14 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	18 ARNG
CALIFORNIA			
	24Oct88 - 9Jan89	Aviation Support	26 ARNG
	10 Jan - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	1 ARNG
	10 Jan - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	2 ARNG
	22 Mar - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	2 ARNG
	9 May - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	468 ARNG
	21 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	15 ARNG
COLORADO			
	27 Jul - 29 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	10 ARNG
CONNECTICUT			
	29 Aug - 29 Sep 89	Ground Reconnaissance	3 ARNG
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	1 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Command/Control Support	3 ARNG 2 ANG
	3 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Military Police Support	40 ARNG 30 ANG
	9 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	4 ARNG
	28 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Hotline Support	2 ARNG 1 ANG

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
DELAWARE			
	4 Sep - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	10 ARNG
	29 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	9 ARNG
FLORIDA			
	24 Apr - 29 Jul 89	Cargo Inspection	81 ARNG/17 ANG
	30 May - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	13 ARNG
	17 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Ground Radar Monitoring	24 ARNG
	30 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	6 ARNG
GEORGIA			
	8 May - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	7 ARNG
	23 May - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	7 ARNG
	5 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	7 ARNG
GUAM			
	16 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	0 ARNG/0 ANG
HAWAII			
	13Dec88 - 20Feb89	Aviation Support	5 ARNG
	26Oct88 - 30Sep89	Marijuana Eradication	5 ARNG
	22 Feb - 19 Mar 89	Aviation Support	6 ARNG
	20 Mar - 15 May 89	Aviation Support	7 ARNG
	16 May - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	9 ARNG
	5 Jun - 21 Aug 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	10 ARNG
	22 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	2 ARNG
IOWA			
	24 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	14 ARNG
	29 Jul - 25 Aug 89	Tactical Control Radar	23 ANG
	26 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Tactical Control Radar	23 ARNG
IDAHO			
	11 May - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Photo/Recon	10 ANG
	24 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	3 ARNG
ILLINOIS			
	17 May - 1 Jun 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
	6 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
INDIANA			
	24 Jul - 21 Aug 89	Aerial Transport	2 ARNG
	22 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Transport	2 ARNG
KANSAS			
	30 May - 30 Sep 89	Radar Support	24 ANG
	10-31 Jul 89	Aerial Transport	3 ARNG
	1 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Transport	10 ARNG
KENTUCKY			
	31 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	60 ARNG
	31 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Ground Surveillance	20 ARNG

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
LOUISIANA			
	24 Apr - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	21 ARNG
	16-30 May 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
	31 May - 13 Jun 89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
	14 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	4 ARNG
	22 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Administrative/Intelligence/ ADP/Logistic Support	8 ARNG
	9 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Ground Surveillance	4 ARNG
MASSACHUSETTS			
	23 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	4 ARNG
	28 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	13 ARNG
MARYLAND			
	23 May - 15 Jul 89	Cargo Inspection	11 ARNG
	5 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	2 ARNG
	17 Jul - 29 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	13 ARNG
MAINE			
	4 Mar - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	4 ARNG
	13 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Vehicle Inspection	9 ARNG
	30 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Ground Surveillance	8 ARNG
MINNESOTA			
	25Nov88 - 29Sep89	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
	14-24 Nov 88	Aviation Support	3 ARNG
MISSOURI			
	11 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	62 ARNG
	31 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	28 ARNG
MISSISSIPPI			
	21 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	6 ARNG
	17 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	11 ARNG
MONTANA			
	24 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	26 ARNG
NORTH CAROLINA			
	21 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	35 ARNG
NEBRASKA			
	2 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	5 ARNG
	1 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Photo/Recon	5 ARNG
	6-30 Sep 89	Ground Surveillance	4 ARNG
NEW HAMPSHIRE			
	9-30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	53 ARNG
NEW JERSEY	1 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	12 ARNG
	24 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	2 ARNG

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
NEW MEXICO			
	26 May - 30 Aug 89	Aviation Support	4 ARNG
	29 May - 30 Jun 89	Transportation Support	4 ARNG
	11 Jul - 20 Sep 89	Transportation Support	7 ARNG
	22 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Ground Surveillance	18 ARNG
	30 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Ground Surveillance	3 ARNG
	13-30 Sep 89	Aerial Surveillance	3 ARNG
	22-30 Sep 89	Aerial Transport	4 ARNG
NEVADA			
	11 Jun - 22 Aug 89	Aerial Photo/Recon	2 ANG
	23 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	0 ARNG/0 ANG
	30 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Training for LEO	6 ARNG
NEW YORK			
	18 Feb - 20 May 89	Aviation Support	8 ARNG
	24 May - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	2 ARNG
	19 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	16 ARNG
	7 May - 15 Jun 89	Cargo Inspection	80 ARNG
	26 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	4 ARNG
OHIO			
	19 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	16 ARNG
OKLAHOMA			
	7 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	6 ARNG
	7 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Transport of LEO	6 ARNG
	7 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Transport/Destruct Drugs	48 ARNG
OREGON			
	4 Mar - 30 Sep 89	Aerial/Ground Surveillance	200 ARNG
	5 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Administrative/Intelligence/ AUP/Logistic Support	36 ARNG
PENNSYLVANIA			
	1 Jul - 24 Sep 89	Tactical Radar Support	23 ANG
	15 Aug - 21 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	2 ARNG
	22-30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	10 ARNG
	21 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	7 ARNG
PUERTO RICO			
	28Nov88 - 11Jun89	Aviation Support	9 ARNG
	2 Jan - 30 Sep 89	Radar Support	20 ANG
	12 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	14 ARNG
	12 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	6 ARNG
	12 Jun-30 Sep 89	Aerial Photo Support	4 ARNG
	12 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	2 ARNG
RHODE ISLAND			
	23 May 89	Aviation Safety Brief	3 ARNG
	12-30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	3 ARNG

State	Dates	Mission	Personnel
SOUTH CAROLINA			
	28 Mar - 6 Jul 89	Cargo Inspection	45 ARNG
	7 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	28 ARNG
	31 Jul - 29 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	12 ARNG
SOUTH DAKOTA			
	10 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	3 ARNG
TENNESSEE			
	19 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aviation Support	19 ARNG
TEXAS			
	15 Oct - 30 Sep 89	Ground Reconnaissance	44 ARNG
	27Dec88 - 30Mar89	Cargo Inspection	7 ARNG
	1-20 Apr 89	Cargo Inspection	49 ARNG
	16-20 Apr 89	Drug Operations	40 ARNG
	21 Apr - 20 Jun 89	Cargo Inspection	49 ARNG/31 ANG
	21 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	49 ARNG
	10 Jul - 30 Sep	Aerial Reconnaissance	8 ARNG
UTAH			
	1 Jul - 30 Sep 89	Tactical Control Radar	23 ANG
VIRGINIA			
	19 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	18 ARNG
	19 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	18 ARNG
VERMONT			
	6-30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	4 ARNG
WASHINGTON			
	8 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	4 ARNG
	15 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Cargo Inspection	13 ARNG
	29 Jul - 25 Aug 89	Tactical Control Radar	23 ANG
	26 Aug - 30 Sep 89	Tactical Control Radar	23 ANG
WISCONSIN			
	27 Jun - 30 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	2 ARNG
WEST VIRGINIA			
	29 Aug - 25 Sep 89	Aerial Reconnaissance	9 ARNG
	13-30 Sep 89	Ground Reconnaissance	21 ARNG
	27-30 Sep 89	Aerial Photo/Recon	5 ARNG

ROTATION BASE

The need to provide adequate time in the continental United States (CONUS) for service members returning from tours abroad is a key concern in force planning. The CONUS force structure that enables forward deployments to be maintained over prolonged periods is called the rotation base. A small rotation base may necessitate more frequent overseas deployments, which can lead to serious morale and retention problems. The amount of time service members spend overseas, particularly if separated from their dependents, is a key quality-of-life issue influencing reenlistment decisions and morale in the all-volunteer force. In part due to inherent service differences, there is currently no standard DoD policy for determining rotation base needs, although the length of individual tours is regulated. Current service policies provide for 12 to 36 months of stateside duty between overseas assignments, although the amount of time spent in CONUS varies considerably among units and individuals.

Overseas tours can be characterized as either short (normally unaccompanied by dependents) or long (normally accompanied). Currently, each service has general guidelines for determining how frequently personnel are expected to serve in each category. There are many exceptions, however, to the stated guidance. Special pays and bonuses, such as selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs) and sea pay, are used to enhance retention in specialties requiring extensive time overseas (either due to the nature of the specialty or to a small rotation base). SRBs are pay supplements that make military compensation more competitive with salaries in the private sector. They are given in most cases to offset the salary incentives that draw trained personnel to the civilian sector.

Rotation base needs are a consideration in the determination of when and where forces are deployed in peacetime, although national security objectives, U.S. military strategy, and treaty commitments are the primary determinants. In crises or conflicts, forces are deployed to forward locations in response to DoD or National Command Authority (NCA) guidance, requests from combatant commanders (CINCs), and treaty obligations. The nature and scope of these deployments can change frequently, with significant effects on planned rotation schedules.

The rotation base, or overseas queue, varies widely among military occupational specialties (MOS). (The term MOS is used generically here to denote the job classifications used by the various services. As such, it encompasses the Naval Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes used by the Navy and the Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) employed by that service.) While all of the services state a need for adequate billets in CONUS to maintain a rotation base, service policies do not explicitly address the proportion of CONUS forces (personnel and units) needed to sustain an overseas force of a given size. The services do track personnel rotations by MOS, with the Air Force, for

example, maintaining an Unsatisfactory Rotation Index (URI) for each MOS in the force. Where necessary to provide relief from frequent overseas tours, some CONUS billets that otherwise would be candidates for conversion to civilian positions or transfer to the reserves are filled by active-duty personnel.

Table 1 shows the distribution of personnel, by service, in the United States and abroad. The approaches adopted by the individual services to meet rotation base needs are described in the sections that follow.

Table 1
Disposition of Forces[a]
(In thousands)

	CONUS		OCONUS	
	Ashore	Afloat	Ashore	Afloat
Army	443	0	307	0
	(59%)	--	(41%)	--
Navy	268	195	70	48
	(46%)	(34%)	(12%)	(8%)
Air Force	392	0	151	0
	(72%)	--	(28%)	--
Marine Corps	142	1	47	5
	(73%)	(1%)	(24%)	(2%)

SOURCE: Department of Defense, *Defense 90 Almanac* (November/December 1990).
a. As of March 31, 1990.

Service Rotation Policies

Army. The Army sustains its forward-deployed forces primarily through individual replacements. Tour lengths are classified by geographical location. In planning troop rotations, the Army attempts to alternate long and short overseas tours, with at least 12 months (24 if possible) spent in CONUS between overseas assignments. Long tours are 36 months accompanied or 24 months unaccompanied; short tours last less than 24 months.

An MOS is declared imbalanced if 55 percent or more of its authorized billets are overseas. Programs exist to remedy those MOSs that are determined to be imbalanced. Examples include the Overseas Tour Extension Incentive program and the Space Imbalanced MOS (SIMOS) program. The Cohesion,

Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) program also may help alleviate imbalances overseas, but it is primarily a training and readiness program; the total number of personnel in the COHORT program is relatively small.

Air Force. Like the Army, the Air Force relies on individual replacements to sustain its forces overseas. Tour lengths are classified as long (more than 18 months) or short (less than 18 months). As a matter of policy, the Air Force prefers its personnel to spend no more than eight years of a 20-year career overseas, with at least 24 months (36 are desired) of stateside duty between involuntary short tours.

Programs exist to remedy those specialties that are found to be imbalanced. Some of these programs are the Overseas Tour Extension Incentive Plan, the Extended Overseas Tour Volunteer program, and the Unsatisfactory Rotation Index program.

Navy. The Navy establishes rotation base objectives in terms of ship types (e.g., if four carriers are constantly deployed, the Navy believes that at least 14 carriers are needed to accommodate overhaul and training requirements, allow for transit and deployment time, etc.). After decisions on force positioning and deployment are made, the MOSs needed for all ship types are aggregated and managed by occupational specialty. However, even a reasonable rotation base for ship types will result in unfavorable sea-to-shore ratios for some MOSs.

The Navy has established eight categories of tour assignments, each with varying lengths of deployed time. Since assignment to a ship results in sailors leaving their families for extended periods even if the ship is based in CONUS, the normal definitions of short or long tours cannot accurately reflect deployed time. Even though a ship is CONUS-based, a sailor assigned to "sea duty" can expect to spend more than 150 days per year at sea. The Navy's policy sets a goal that significant deployments out of home port be limited to six months deployed, six months in maintenance standdown, and six months in training for the subsequent deployment.

Tour types and lengths are specified for individual MOSs. The Navy frequently uses a sea/shore rotation ratio to express the amount of time a sailor can expect to spend on sea duty. The desired ratio is 3:3, with time split equally between sea and shore tours. The majority of MOSs exceed that objective, however. Some MOSs have sea/shore rotation ratios that result in sailors spending 60 months at sea for every 24 months ashore.

The Navy has several programs to remedy imbalances and provide relief from frequent or lengthy deployed tours. Some shore billets (such as recruiters or instructors) are open to any MOS. A number of these positions could be transferred to the civilian sector were it not for the need to provide relief from constant sea tours.

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps sustains its forward-deployed forces through a combination of individual and unit replacements. Individual overseas tours are classified as "accompanied" (normally 36 months), "dependents restricted" (normally 12 months), or "all others" (24 months). An "all others" tour is one in which a Marine would normally be accompanied by his or her dependents but elects to go alone. The Marine Corps attempts to provide at least 24 months of duty in CONUS for its personnel between overseas tours.

Deployments to the western Pacific region are sustained through unit replacements under the Unit Deployment Program (UDP). Entire units (infantry battalions, artillery batteries, aircraft squadrons) are rotated to the western Pacific for six months, followed by 12 to 18 months of CONUS duty. A similar system of rotating units provides replacement forces for Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs).

MOS monitors track deployed time for individual Marines in all of these tours. Like the Navy, the Marine Corps uses non-MOS-specific billets ("B" billets), such as recruiters and drill instructors as well as staff positions, to provide some relief from overseas tours.

All Services. In all services, rotation base needs are determined on the basis of individual MOSs. While the Navy has a clearly defined system for determining the number of ships needed to sustain deployed battle groups, it manages its personnel rotation base on an occupational specialty basis. Even the Marine Corps manages its total rotation base needs on an individual basis since not all overseas tours are sustained by the UDP. Generally, the Army and Air Force contend that the ratio of CONUS to overseas forces should be about 2:1, while the Navy and Marine Corps prefer a 3:1 ratio due to the significant deployed time experienced by CONUS-based units.

Alternative Rotation Base Policies

Although there are some problems within individual MOSs, the present overseas force is being sustained adequately. Each service has a network of programs to fine-tune assignment policies and provide relief from, or compensation for, excessive overseas tours.

The different manning and deployment requirements of the services would make it difficult to implement a standard, DoD-wide rotation policy. If such a policy were in force, the exceptions would be numerous. There are simply too many variations among the services to expect a single policy to address unique needs adequately. On the other hand, the services might alleviate some of their rotation base problems by "borrowing" policies and procedures from each other.

Unit Rotations. A unit rotation system similar to that employed by the Marine Corps might relieve some rotation problems in the other services.

Forces deploying as units would maintain a higher degree of readiness, since they would simply be changing location. MOS assignment problems might be lessened somewhat under a unit rotation scheme, as forces would deploy with appropriate mixes of personnel. Costs also might decrease, since the services should not have to pay as much for permanent change of station (PCS) moves for short tours. If units spent 6 months abroad, followed by 18 months in CONUS, the effect of frequent deployments on service members and their families should be lessened.

A unit rotation program would benefit operations of maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) and POMCUS (Prepositioning of Material Configured to Unit Sets) units. Such a program would foster greater uniformity of doctrine, tactics, and procedures among units stationed in CONUS and abroad. Not all force elements, however, are amenable to a unit rotation policy. Headquarters (brigade, regiment, and division) and support (administration, supply, maintenance) organizations do not lend themselves to unit rotations as readily as do smaller units. These units should continue to be sustained by PCS moves.

There are several potential drawbacks to implementing a wider policy of unit rotation. To provide a proper CONUS rotation base, two or three like units would have to be stationed in the same geographic area in CONUS for each unit deployed overseas. The value of unit replacements is that service members could deploy unaccompanied for six months, then return to their former CONUS location and their families. If two or three like units could not be maintained in the same location, service members might have to be reassigned elsewhere upon their return to CONUS, requiring their families to move and increasing PCS costs.

Likewise, units in a common rotation base would have to use the same equipment. This could be a problem for aviation units, which often operate different models or series of aircraft overseas than they do in CONUS. To implement a unit rotation program, CONUS units would either have to deploy overseas with their aircraft and equipment (incurring additional expenses) or rotate only their personnel, which would require significant additional training time at the new location. A unit rotation program for ship crews could encounter similar problems, given the differences in equipment among ships of the same class. The alternative would be to rotate units with their equipment, at a great increase in cost.

Expanded Bonuses. If unit rotations cannot be implemented on a large scale, a significant increase in incentives for overseas tours might be another way to improve retention and reduce shortfalls within MOSs. A flexible program that targeted bonuses on "short-staffed" MOSs could allow the services to match personnel more closely with unit needs. Compensation increases would, of course, cause manpower costs to rise, although the amount of cost growth is difficult to project. Factors influencing the size of bonuses that might

be needed include domestic economic conditions and the length of time between CONUS tours. Furthermore, there is probably a limit on the extent to which deployed time could be increased, regardless of compensation level.

Increased Use of Reserves. It may be possible to make greater use of reserve forces in routine peacetime deployments although further study is needed before implementing such policies. Substituting reserve for active units in selected elements of deployed forces might reduce pressures on the rotation base by lowering active manning requirements. In considering such a step, however, it is important to remember that for major combat structure, active force size is driven as much by contingency response needs as by forward presence and rotation requirements.

There has already been some successful, albeit limited, use of reserve units in operational missions. Such has been the case with Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve C-130 rotations to Panama and Europe, KC-135 rotations to Pacific and European tanker task forces, and Air National Guard tactical fighter and air defense fighter rotations to Panama and Europe. Also noteworthy have been the deployment of Naval Reserve P-3 aircraft squadrons in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations and the use of Army National Guard heavy equipment maintenance companies in Europe.

Units that place a premium on individual or small-team skills (e.g., mechanics, technicians, aircrews) might be more effective in periodic rotations than units emphasizing collective skills (e.g., infantry units and ship crews). Also, units that are CONUS based but have missions requiring frequent short deployments, such as ASW aircraft and strategic airlift squadrons, might be easier to augment with reserve units than forces based permanently overseas. The use of reserve components for extended peacetime missions outside CONUS is now, however, constrained by legislation that limits the availability of these forces and by the ability of the reserves to provide sufficient resources even if unconstrained by legislation.

Increasing the use of reserves in overseas deployments could have some advantages. Reserve forces could be more closely tied to the doctrine, tactics, and procedures employed by active units. The readiness of reserve forces also should improve. Rotating reserve forces routinely to forward locations would reinforce the concept of the reserves as an integral part of the "first team," while increasing their skill levels and refining the procedures and systems needed to deploy for war. These potential benefits can be seen in the Air National Guard, which currently operates in such a manner, employing the same doctrine, tactics, procedures, and readiness standards as the active component, training regularly overseas in combat-tasked areas of operation, and deploying together with active units in wartime. Conflicts between military and civilian job obligations might be mitigated by the fact that reservists would be deployed for finite periods that could be anticipated well in advance.

The increased use of reserves in forward locations might have drawbacks, however. Deployment costs would rise as reserve units rotated to and from overseas postings at more frequent intervals than their active-duty counterparts, who typically deploy for periods of 12 to 36 months. To provide continuous coverage in a single force element for one year, as many as 30 reserve units could be needed, assuming two weeks' active duty per unit plus transit and turnover time. Increasing active duty for training to three weeks would reduce the number of reserve units needed to about 20 per year, but would entail either increased overall reserve pay costs or a reduction in other reserve component units. A more telling constraint is that there are very few reserve units of the same type in the current force structure; much greater numbers would be needed to provide continuous coverage.

The learning curve for reserve units, coupled with their short deployment times, may make them substantially less effective than their active counterparts. Reserve component units currently participating in annual active-duty training overseas generally require considerably more transportation, administration, and preparation time than similar units training in CONUS, and much more time than active units permanently based overseas.

CALL-UP AUTHORITIES

Title 10 U.S. Code Section 673b provided the authority for the President's call-up of reservists for Operation Desert Shield. Although the call-up authority was granted to the President in 1976, Desert Shield marks the first time it has been exercised. Under the law, the President may authorize the involuntary call to active duty of as many as 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for up to 90 days, with an additional 90-day extension if needed. (The call-up authority applies both to members of Selected Reserve units and to Selected Reservists not assigned to units.) For FY 1991, the Congress extended the time limit for combat forces serving in Operation Desert Shield to 180 days plus a 180-day extension.

A unit is defined as any group or detachment of two or more individuals organized to perform a particular function, whether or not such a group is part of a larger group. One of the restrictions on using the call-up authority is that reserve component units and individuals may *not* be ordered to active duty under 673b for the purpose of training. While a declaration of war or national emergency is not required, the President must report to Congress within 24 hours of exercising the 673b authority or upon use of the 90-day extension authority. Under this authority, National Guard and Reserve forces become part of the active armed forces of the United States during their period of active duty.

In 1976, when Congress initially gave the President this authority, the call-up limit was set at 50,000 personnel for a maximum of 90 days. In 1980, based on exercise experience that indicated a greater need for augmentation in the early stages of a crisis-response buildup, the Defense Department recommended, and the Congress approved, an increase from 50,000 to 100,000 in the number of Selected Reservists that the President could order to active duty. In 1986, the Congress again amended Section 673b, raising the limit to 200,000 personnel and extending the 90-day active service limitation to allow for a second 90-day period.

In addition to Section 673b, other call-up authorities can be used to place reserve components on active duty. These authorities, identified in Title 10 of the United States Code, are summarized below in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1
Reserve Component Activation Authorities

RESOURCE	TITLE 10 AUTHORITY	SITUATION	WHO CALLS UP?	LIMIT	PERIOD (TIME)	PURPOSE	REMARKS
RC Units and Individuals (IMAs and IRRs), Retired Reserve, Standby Reserve	672(a)	War or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized	Service Secretary or designee	None	Duration plus 6 months	General activation of reserve components; "Order to active duty other than for training"	a) Activated without member's consent b) Used as authority for full and total mobilization c) See Addendum #1
RC Units and Individuals (IMAs and IRRs), Retired Reserve, Standby Reserve	672(b)	Anytime	Service Secretary or designee	None (Governor's consent required for National Guard)	Not more than 15 days a year	Training	a) Activated without member's consent b) See Addendum #2 c) See Addendum #3 d) See Addendum #4
Any reservist	672(d)	Anytime	Service Secretary or designee	None (Governor's consent required for National Guard)	Indefinite	General purpose reserve components	a) Member's consent required b) See Addendum #5
RC Units and Individuals (IMAs and IRRs)	673	National emergency declared by the President	Service Secretary or designee	1,000,000	Not more than 24 months	Augmentation of active component for national emergencies; "Order to active duty other than for training"	a) Activated without member's consent b) Used as authority for partial mobilization
Individuals in RC Troop Program Units (TPUs)	673a(a)	Unsatisfactory performance in a TPU or possibly a call-up authority for individual reservists	President	None	Until total service on active duty equals 24 months	Ready Reserve members not assigned to or participating satisfactorily in units	a) Sends individual to active duty for unsatisfactory performance (remnant of now-expired Russell Amendment used during Vietnam) b) See Addendum #6

Table 1 (Cont'd)
Reserve Component Activation Authorities

RESOURCE	TITLE 10 AUTHORITY	SITUATION	WHO CALLS UP?	LIMIT	PERIOD (TIME)	PURPOSE	REMARKS
RC Units and IMAs (Selected Reserve only)	673b	Anytime as determined by the President	Secretary of Defense/ Transportation	200,000 total for all services	90 days with additional 90-day option	Augmentation of active component by Selected Reserve for any operational mission; not to be used for insurrection, threat of invasion or rebellion, or disaster assistance	Activated without member's consent
RC Units only	263	When more units are needed than are in the active force	Congress	None	No limit	Basic policy for activating Ready Reserve	
Individuals in RC units	270(b)(c)	Unsatisfactory performance	Service Secretary	None	Not more than 45 days	Fulfillment of service obligation	Sends individuals to Active Duty for Training (ADT) for unsatisfactory performance
Federalize Militia	331	Insurrection	President	Upon request of the state legislature or governor	No limit	Federal aid for state government	Allows militia to be called to federal service to suppress an insurrection
Federalize State Militia	332	Unlawful obstructions, combinations, assemblages or rebellion against state authority	President	As considered necessary	No limit	Enforcement of federal authority	Allows militia components to be called to federal service as necessary to suppress a rebellion

Table 1 (Cont'd)
Reserve Component Activation Authorities

RESOURCE	TITLE 10 AUTHORITY	SITUATION	WHO CALLS UP?	LIMIT	PERIOD (TIME)	PURPOSE	REMARKS
Federalized State Militia	333	Suppress insurrection, domestic violence, or conspiracy	President	As considered necessary	No limit	Enforce state and federal law on behalf of any part or class of people within the state	a) Allows militia to be called to federal service as necessary to suppress domestic violence or conspiracy b) Used to protect individual civil rights
Federalized Army National Guard	3500	Invasion/rebellion	President	As considered necessary	Duration	Repel invasion, suppress rebellion, execute laws of the United States	Orders issued through governors
Federalized Air National Guard	8500	Invasion/rebellion	President	As considered necessary	Duration	Repel invasion, suppress rebellion, execute laws of the United States	Orders issued through governors

Table 1 (Cont'd)
Reserve Component Activation Authorities

ADDENDUM

Title 10, Section 672(a)

Addendum #1 Provides authority to call up inactive status and Retired Reserve personnel when there are not enough qualified reservists in the Ready Reserve.

Title 10, Section 672(b)

Addendum #2 While this law does not directly require this duty to be training related, legislative history implies that it should be used as such, and therefore this section normally should not be used for operational missions or "ramp ups" for the 200,000 call-up ceiling.

Addendum #3 This section was enacted to permit training of Army Reserve and Air Reserve personnel. Enactment of Section 270 rendered it obsolete for practical purposes.

Addendum #4 National Guard units and individuals must have the consent of the state governors, territories, Puerto Rico, and the Commanding General of the District of Columbia.

Title 10, Section 672(d)

Addendum #5 National Guard units and individuals must have the consent of the state governors, territories, Puerto Rico, and the Commanding General of the District of Columbia.

Title 10, Section 673a(a)

Addendum #6 United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that this authority can be used to mobilize "any member not assigned to a unit of the Ready Reserve, whether or not that individual is performing satisfactorily."

Table 2
Five Major Categories of Reserve Component Duty

RESOURCE	TITLE 10 AUTHORITY	SITUATION	WHO CALLS UP?	LIMIT	PERIOD (TIME)	PURPOSE	REMARKS
Initial Period of Active Duty (IAUT); pertains to RC individuals	Title 10, 672(d); DoD 1215.6, Para E, 4	Basic military training and technical skill training	Service Secretary or designee	None	Any	Basic training and technical skill training	May not be deployed outside the United States in time of war or national emergency if basic training is less than 12 weeks
Annual Training (AT); pertains to Ready Reserve	Title 10, 672(b), 270 (a), Title 32, 502 (a)	Annual training	Service Secretary or designee	None	Not less than 14 days (exclusive of travel) for Reserves; 15 days (including travel) for National Guard	Readiness training	Cannot exceed a 30-day period during any fiscal year for Federal Reserve personnel
Active Duty for Training (AUT)	Title 10, 672(d)	Provide RC members necessary skills to support RC missions (e g , professional development flight training, specialized skill training)	Service Secretary or designee	None	Length of training requirement	Used to provide readiness training	Requires consent of the state governor for members of the National Guard

Table 2 (Cont'd)
Five Major Categories of Reserve Component Duty

RESOURCE	TITLE 10 AUTHORITY	SITUATION	WHO CALLS UP?	LIMIT	PERIOD (TIME)	PURPOSE	REMARKS
Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW); pertains to RC individuals	Title 10, 672(d); DoD 1215.6, Para E, 4, d	Utilized for projects supporting AC or RC programs and requiring RC experience or qualifications	Service Secretary	None	If extended past 179 days, may be counted against active duty or AGR end strength limitations	Special projects	
Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD); pertains to RC individuals	Title 10, 672(d); DoD 1215.6, Para E, 4, d; AR 135-200 Chap 1-4c	Utilized for projects supporting AC programs and requiring AC experience or qualifications	Service Secretary	None	Normally not longer than 139 days, if extended past 179 days, may be counted against AC end strength limitations	Special projects	Uses MPA funds

CONSIDERATIONS IN A COMPREHENSIVE TOTAL FORCE COST ESTIMATE

The methodologies used by the Department of Defense to estimate the cost effects of force structure changes are varied, reflecting differences in the organization of the services and in the cost characteristics of different types of forces. This can present problems in comparing alternative force structures unless estimates and comparisons are made using a consistent set of guidelines that ensure that all relevant costs are considered in a balanced manner. As long as the general guidelines are followed, the Department has sufficient tools to support Total Force policy decisions. Recognizing that the current estimating methods can and should be improved, the Department and the services have ongoing efforts to refine the data and estimating relationships applicable to force costing.

Force structure analyses consider the availability and effectiveness of different types of units, as well as cost impacts, when evaluating force mix alternatives. Cost is just one of the many factors that must be weighed in deciding on a force structure to meet essential national objectives.

Estimates of Total Force costs must consider changes in the size of the force as well as in the mix of active and reserve forces. Because of the scope of Total Force policy considerations, force-costing methodologies incorporate a broad perspective of defense program costs that encompasses the direct and indirect costs of owning, operating, and supporting forces and recognizes both short- and long-term effects on defense funding.

When defense force structure is changed, the effects on military pay and on the operating costs of primary force elements (e.g., divisions, regiments, wings, naval combatants) are nearly immediate. Inappropriately, these costs are sometimes the only ones considered, giving an incomplete picture of the funding implications of alternative force structures. Significant one-time ("nonrecurring") costs can be incurred during the transition to a new structure. Changes to primary force elements also can have secondary effects on units and programs that directly support those elements. Likewise, force structure changes influence defense infrastructure costs, and they affect spending to replace the inventory of defense systems. Each of these potential cost impacts is considered in Total Force policy deliberations.

The Department's approach to force costing also recognizes that not all defense program funding is directly related to force size or mix. For example, funding for national command and control and foreign intelligence programs may remain essentially unchanged even if the size of the Total Force is reduced or the active-reserve mix is changed. The need for a next-generation tactical fighter does not diminish if the total fighter force is reduced, nor does the need to deploy an improved attack submarine necessarily reflect the number of

submarines in the Navy inventory. In general, funding for major research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and science and technology programs is driven by threat estimates, technology issues, and even fiscal limitations, but not directly by the size of the force that ultimately will be modernized. Similarly, policy decisions that affect funding for military space programs and foreign aid are not closely related to force size. Force-costing methodologies should not attempt to tie the costs of these kinds of programs to Total Force policy decisions as an automatic consequence of force structure changes.

Table 1 illustrates the importance of considering more than just the pay and operating costs of units affected by changes in force structure. In the 1980s, personnel and operating costs accounted for about 25 percent of the budgets of the military departments. Cost estimates that consider only these expenses understate the total, long-term cost effects of changes in Total Force size. Investment programs, which provide primarily for the replacement and modernization of military equipment, made up nearly 30 percent of the defense budget in the 1980s. Since the amount of equipment purchased over the long term is related to the size of the Total Force, impacts on investment costs are taken into account when changes in force size are evaluated. Infrastructure costs constituted 35 percent of defense spending over the past decade, and the variable portion of these costs is considered in Total Force costing.

Table 1
Composition of Defense Spending in the 1980s
(In percents)

	Mission Programs			Programs Not Related to Force Size or Mix
	Pay and Operations	Investment	Infrastructure	
Army	27	21	44	8
Navy/Marine Corps	26	35	30	9
Air Force	17	29	32	22
All Services	23	29	35	13

Policy-level force structure decisions focus on primary defense mission elements such as divisions, wings, and naval combatants. For this reason, Total Force costing begins with the estimation of the costs directly related to those elements. These expenses, referred to as "direct unit costs," include the compensation of unit personnel, the day-to-day operating costs of units, and the long-term recurring investments required to replace unit equipment periodically and keep it up to date.

Changes in the size of primary force elements can have secondary effects on spending for other programs, such as war reserve procurement, training, and deployable support. These "direct support costs" generally must be examined on a program-by-program basis because their relationship to the Total Force is highly scenario dependent. Their budgetary impacts can be properly assessed only after the changes in primary force elements are identified.

Major changes in force size or mix will affect the size and cost of the defense infrastructure. Our approach is based on the observation that, historically, the size of the infrastructure program has been related to the size and operating tempo of primary force elements. Estimates of changes in infrastructure funding are therefore based on projected changes in the pay and day-to-day operating portions of direct unit costs.

As a final step in estimating the costs of any significant force change, the one-time costs that arise in implementing changes in force structure need to be identified and estimated. The costs of unit activations, deactivations, and transfers between active and reserve forces can run into the hundreds of millions of dollars, overshadowing the recurring savings in some circumstances.

Because of the variety of cost relationships associated with defense funding, our approach considers four types of costs: direct unit costs, direct support costs, infrastructure costs, and transition costs. These cost categories are defined as follows:

- *Direct Unit Costs.* Funding for personnel compensation, for the day-to-day operation of force structure units, and for the replacement of equipment in units that are primary force elements (e.g., ground divisions and battalions, including their deploying support forces; air wings and squadrons; and naval combatants).

- *Direct Support Costs.* Funding for programs and units that provide war reserve materiel (WRM) and non-centrally managed support benefiting specific portions of primary force elements (e.g., weapon system qualification training, tactical training, deployable mission command and control elements, deployable material-handling units).

- *Infrastructure Costs.* Funding for activities that benefit multiple primary force structure units, including installation support and centrally managed support activities.

- *Transition Costs.* One-time expenses associated with equipment, facilities, and personnel resulting from a force structure change.

The sections that follow discuss the methods used to calculate costs in each category and show how expenditures are affected by changes in force mix and size.

DIRECT UNIT COSTS

Direct unit costs are the total resources required to own and operate primary force elements in peacetime. The units of primary interest in this portion of force costing are the divisions/battalions, wings/squadrons, naval combatants, and Marine forces explicitly identified in Total Force policy decisions. (Nondivisional combat and tactical support forces associated with Army combat divisions and Marine Force Service Support Group (FSSG) elements are considered in the estimation of direct unit costs.) The calculations take into account the costs of personnel assigned to units, the day-to-day expenses of operating the forces, and the long-term average costs of replacing and upgrading unit equipment. Direct unit costs are driven by manning, equipping, and training policies (i.e., operating tempos). Differences in these "cost drivers" explain the major differences in direct unit costs between units in the active and reserve components, and provide a basis for estimating the direct funding impacts of different force sizes. Unit operating tempos and manning decisions are affected both by desired readiness levels and by the experience level of unit personnel.

Consistency in cost comparisons is important but difficult to achieve, given the multiplicity of data-gathering systems and models in use throughout the Department. The first step in attaining some degree of uniformity is to establish a common set of cost elements to be considered, recognizing that all elements are not relevant to all kinds of units. Table 2 shows the basic cost elements that should be included in unit costing.

Table 2
Elements of Direct Unit Costs

- Unit Manpower Costs
  - Pays and allowances
  - Accrual for retirement pay
- Unit Operating Costs
  - Fuel and other POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants)
  - Replenishment parts
  - Consumable parts and supplies
  - Other unit training costs
    - Unit-funded transportation to training
    - Consumables such as ammunition and tactical missiles
  - Unit-funded contract services
  - Other sources of intermediate maintenance
- Equipment-Related Costs
  - Replacement of mission equipment
  - Major overhauls of primary mission equipment funded on a unit basis
  - Modifications
  - Replacement of support equipment

Unit Manpower Costs

Unit manpower costs are calculated based on individual pays, allowances, and the accrual value of retirement pay. The cost calculations cover all full-time and part-time military members and all civilian personnel who are assigned to units. Costs are estimated on the basis of current or planned manning policies, thus reflecting the personnel resource levels that will actually drive budgeted costs. Often, this is less than a unit's fully authorized wartime manning level.

Total compensation costs include amounts set aside for the annuities that military members will receive when they retire. Accrual rates differ for full-time active or reserve personnel and part-time reservists. Currently, full-time personnel have accrued retirement pay set aside at the rate of 43.9 percent of basic pay and part-time reserve personnel at the rate of 13.4 percent. This differential will gradually change as the new military retirement laws affect larger proportions of military members. The rates are projected to stabilize at 36.6 percent and 12.0 percent, respectively, for active and reserve component personnel. Direct unit cost estimates of retirement pay accrual are based on the rates that will apply in the six-year defense program period.

Total unit manpower costs are generally less for reserve units than for active units because the annual number of paid duty days is significantly higher in the active force. There are circumstances in which somewhat higher average grade levels in reserve units (together with the use of full-time civilian technicians in place of junior enlisted personnel) make the average man-day costs a little higher in those units. In most circumstances, however, this difference is more than overcome by the differences in retirement pay accrual rates and the lower number of full man-days served in reserve units each year.

The operational characteristics of some types of military units limit the extent to which part-time manning can be used and/or operating tempos can be reduced. The safe peacetime operation of complex equipment and the maintenance requirements of some equipment items can lead to relatively high levels of full-time manning in certain types of reserve units. For example, the technical complexity of aviation units limits the extent to which manning levels and operating tempos in reserve aviation squadrons can be reduced below active levels. Operating tempos are not permitted to fall below certain levels so as to maintain crew proficiency and ensure the safety of peacetime training operations. The higher operating tempo of reserve aviation units affects maintenance and general support requirements and leads to a relatively high level of full-time manning. Some reductions below active flying-hour rates are possible where the skill level of reservists is relatively high (because of prior active-duty training and experience), where skills can be recovered reasonably quickly following mobilization, or where civilian employment provides some degree of transferable proficiency. The conditions that determine minimum operating tempos limit the cost savings possible from active-to-reserve transfers.

Despite these limitations, savings are still achieved in most reserve aviation squadrons, even though they are not nearly as high as in many other types of forces.

Full-time manning and peacetime training levels in reserve units also are affected by readiness requirements, mission complexity, the transferability of civilian job skills, and the type of equipment employed by the units. In the case of naval combatants, the need to keep ships ready for deployment on short notice accounts for a relatively high level of recurring maintenance requirements. If the lead time from peacetime operations to active involvement in hostile operations is long, ships can be maintained differently or laid up during peacetime and the amount of full-time manning can be greatly reduced, as in the Navy's Innovative Naval Reserve Concept. Trade-offs between the risks of extending the transition period and the potential for cost savings have been and continue to be considered as the worldwide military environment changes.

Unit Operating Costs

The second major component of direct unit costing is the resources expended in the day-to-day operation and maintenance of forces. The costs of fuel, repair parts, supplies, and training consumables (e.g., ammunition, tactical missiles, etc.) account for the majority of these expenditures and apply to all types of units. In cases where intermediate maintenance is provided by organizations that are not part of the primary force element (e.g., shore-based intermediate maintenance activities in the Navy), the associated expenditures are counted as direct unit costs. Also included in this cost category are expenses that are unique to a unit's operation, such as the support services performed under contract for naval combatants in foreign ports of call. Where units regularly incur costs to travel to training locations, these expenditures also are counted as direct unit costs.

The Department is currently considering changes in the way certain support activities are funded. In the future, some activities that are now considered direct support or infrastructure costs may be funded with the units receiving the support. As such changes occur, the definition of unit cost elements will be revised accordingly.

Equipment-Related Costs

Estimates of manpower and operating costs capture the most apparent and immediate budgetary effects of force changes. These costs affect defense expenditures within one to two years of the time a force structure change is made. Equipment-related cost impacts are not as closely linked in time, but they do have a major long-term effect on defense spending. These costs are relevant in decisions related to the affordability of forces of different sizes.

All major force elements require a large investment in expensive equipment. As Table 1 showed, mission investment costs in the 1980s (which were driven almost entirely by procurement of new equipment) outpaced operating costs as a share of defense spending. Similar patterns existed in the 1970s. A methodology that omits procurement and major modification costs will underestimate the long-term costs of maintaining a total force of a given size. We include these costs in our consideration of Total Force policy decisions with the strong caveat that the full impact of equipment-related costs on defense budgets often is not felt in the near term.

Over the long term, force structure reductions are accompanied by a roughly proportional change in the total number of weapon systems procured annually. A 20 percent reduction in aviation units will, in the long run, lead to a 20 percent reduction in aircraft procurement. However, from a budgetary perspective, cost savings must be viewed in the context of the current acquisition profiles for weapon systems. If procurement plans do not support the replacement of equipment of existing forces, proportional savings in procurement will not necessarily be realized. If current plans do not even support the lower total force size, it is possible that no procurement savings can be realized in the budget years. In the extreme, it is possible that no new systems of a given class are planned for procurement over a given period of time. In that case, there is no rationale for projecting budget savings associated with procurement of those systems.

To be more specific, consider an aviation force in any of the services. If the force consisted of 1,000 aircraft with a projected lifetime of 30 years, approximately 33 new aircraft would be bought each year (on average). If the procurement budget for these aircraft supported only 25 purchases annually and a force reduction of 25 percent were being evaluated, it would be inappropriate to forecast annual savings equivalent to the procurement cost of eight aircraft (i.e., 25 percent of 33).

Not all types of equipment are bought as part of a regular, annual modernization program. Replacement equipment, for example, is procured only periodically as threats change or new technologies emerge. Moreover, to reduce production costs, these purchases often are made in lot sizes larger than the long-term annual average. A methodology that assumed an automatic reduction in procurement spending where none is currently programmed or budgeted would be incorrect. A practical and accurate methodology requires a more careful examination of the actual procurement programs for affected classes of equipment.

Because replacement costs cannot be estimated precisely, projections of these expenditures reflect approximate long-term average funding impacts. The estimates take into account current replacement costs of like equipment and expected average inventory life, recognizing that equipment in different types of units is replaced for a wide variety of reasons.

When equipment-replacement cost effects are relevant, they incorporate any differences that could arise from dissimilar operating practices in active and reserve units (e.g., average annual operating tempos). Some equipment is replaced or subject to major overhaul when it reaches a milestone with respect to total operating hours. The number of years required to reach this point could be higher in reserve units if equipment is used less intensively than in active units. This could be a consideration in decisions involving strategic mobility forces as well as other force elements.

Equipment-related costs include the expenditures associated with replacing primary and support equipment, conducting major overhauls where they are a routine and essential aspect of owning a class of equipment (e.g., ships), and modifying and upgrading equipment to maintain its military utility over its projected lifetime.

Over the long term, funding for the procurement of new equipment is related primarily to the size of the Total Force and only to a much lesser degree to the mix of active and reserve units within the force. A larger Total Force will require larger recurring investments to replace and modify equipment. The conversion of units from one component to another does not significantly affect equipment replacement needs. For example, a total force of a particular type of unit will, in general, require roughly the same average amount of equipment to be replaced annually, whether the force contains 70 percent active and 30 percent reserve personnel or 30 percent active-duty personnel and 70 percent reservists.

Equipment-replacement and other major costs associated with keeping military materiel ready for operation account for a major share of defense spending. These costs can be affected by Total Force policy decisions but in ways that vary from one time period to another and from one type of unit to another. These differences in circumstances require an informed use of this element of direct unit costs.

The Relationship Between Unit Cost Drivers and Unit Capability

The factors that underlie direct unit costs--the "cost drivers"--are levels of manning, tempos of operation, and equipage. Manning levels for full-time and part-time personnel drive manpower costs; operating tempos (e.g., flying hours, steaming hours, training miles) strongly influence unit operating costs; and equipment types and quantities largely determine recurring investment costs. The factors that drive unit costs also are the basic factors that determine unit capability and readiness. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship.

Direct unit costs are lower for force elements that have lower full-time manning levels, smaller equipment inventories, and lower operating tempos. The same factors that allow the cost of one unit to be lower than that of

Figure 1
The Relationship Between Unit Cost Drivers and Unit Capability

another also tend to limit unit capability and readiness, but this is not always the case. Many factors interact in determining how units are affected by reduced operating tempos. Mission and equipment complexity, unit personnel stability, average experience levels, transferability of civilian skills, and the relative importance of unit-level and individual skills all influence how annual training rates affect unit capability. While not generally the case, it is possible for active and reserve units with differing operating tempos to have essentially the same readiness, given the right combination of conditions. Some aviation units (e.g., strategic airlift) and certain medical units are cases in point.

In other instances, reduced manpower training and support resources prevent some types of reserve units from being as ready as their active counterparts. For example, it has been estimated that, while an active Army division with a SORTS rating of C-1 is ready to deploy immediately, a SORTS status C-4 National Guard division might not be able to deploy effectively until six months after mobilization, depending on the nature and extent of its readiness deficiencies. Similarly, it is not practical for naval aircrews to remain qualified for night carrier landings given their low peacetime operating levels, although they would require less than a month to requalify upon activation. The lower immediate readiness of many reserve units reflects their lower manning levels and operating tempos in peacetime. The readiness of these units may be quite adequate for their role in the Total Force, but they do not have the same capability as a fully resourced active unit. Active and reserve force mix deliberations take these differences into account. It should be understood that active and reserve units have a spectrum of SORTS ratings and that active unit ratings are not axiomatically higher.

Costing Data

Current information on actual expenditures for the direct unit cost categories discussed here is sometimes not readily available. In addition, exact relationships between operating tempo and some elements of cost are not

precise. However, data are available from the services that allow the most significant portions of the cost element structure to be addressed adequately in Total Force policy deliberations. The cost factors used for these estimates vary in reliability but are sufficiently accurate to ensure that Total Force policy options within a single service are properly compared.

The following sections apply the estimating structure described above to examples from each service. Active and reserve cost comparisons are provided for each force element evaluated.

Unit Costing for the Army. Policy-level decisions involving the Army's size and component mix are most often characterized in terms of changes in combat divisions and brigades. However, characteristics of Army force design make it difficult to accurately estimate the cost of Army force structure changes described at this "generic" level. Army divisions differ in ways that greatly affect costs. Armored divisions cost more to own and operate than do light infantry divisions. Divisions nominally of the same type are manned and equipped differently. Active divisions have different portions of their total combat and support capability provided by the reserve components. The magnitude and variety of the support provided at echelons above the division level further complicate the estimation problem. The character and amount of such support vary from corps to corps and theater to theater. To apply force costing in a policymaking environment where detailed unit-level decisions are not available for the dozens of affected organizations, it is necessary to adopt a generalized estimating approach and then tailor each application to the characteristics of a given policy alternative.

At a minimum, force costing for the Army requires identification of the type (e.g., armored, light infantry, etc.), theater, and component affiliation (i.e., active or reserve) of the affected combat units; the mix of active and reserve support units at echelons above the division level; and the anticipated manning and equipage levels and operating tempo of the affected units. These latter parameters (i.e., manning, equipage, and operating tempo) can be approximated by selecting a comparable unit to use as a baseline and, if desired, adjusting its manning and operating tempos for different readiness levels. For example, Authorized Levels of Organization (ALO) 3 units are manned at 80 percent of ALO 1 units.

Estimating Army direct unit costs is a two-step process. The first step is to identify the type (e.g., armor, light infantry) and component affiliation (i.e., active, Army National Guard, Army Reserve) of the combat division or brigade being evaluated. Using techniques described below, the manpower, day-to-day operating, and equipment-related costs of the combat unit are then estimated. Next, costs of supporting units above the division level are estimated and added to the cost of the combat unit. These two components make up what is called a "division slice," which typically consists of a mix of active and reserve units. Estimating the costs of support from echelons above the division level requires a

generalized approach that allows for a wide variety of mixes of active and reserve support.

Support above the division level comes from corps- and theater-level units. In general, corps-level support can be considered to be roughly proportional to the size of the combat units requiring support within a corps. Thus, removing one of five combat divisions from a corps would result in roughly a 20 percent reduction in requirements for nondivisional combat and tactical support. The same proportionality is not necessarily true of theater-level units and assets. Neither of these two generalizations is always borne out in actual practice, but errors arising from the fact that some corps-level support is fixed are balanced by the fact that not all theater-level support is completely fixed. A reasonable approximation can be obtained by treating corps-level support as varying with the number of combat units in a corps. (The amount of support varies according to the composition of combat divisions in each corps.)

If major reductions in theater-level forces are envisioned, they need to be specifically identified and costed as if the forces were "stand alone" units. An example is the 32nd Air Defense Command (ADCOM) in Europe. This unit provides combat support to all ground divisions in Europe. It is possible that a large number of U.S. combat divisions in Europe could be withdrawn, while leaving a major portion of the 32nd ADCOM in place to provide air defense for NATO.

To estimate the support portion of a division slice, representative "generic" corps are defined based on their warfighting structures. The examples that follow are based on the unit structures of V Corps and a generic CONUS-based corps composed of light and heavy divisions. These two corps were chosen because they represent opposite ends of the cost spectrum. At the high end is the European-based V Corps, with its large, well-resourced, heavily mechanized and highly modernized divisions and extensive corps-level support structure. The low end of the cost spectrum is represented by a generic CONUS-based corps, with a mix of light and heavy divisions and less extensive corps-level support.

To assess the cost impact of various mixes of active and reserve units within a corps, two nominal baselines were constructed: a 100 percent active corps and a 100 percent reserve corps. To evaluate units with different capabilities, baselines were formed for C-1/ALO 1 and C-3/ALO 3 active and reserve units with appropriate manning and operating levels. From these baselines, cost estimates for division slices of any mix of active and reserve units can be developed as consistent excursions.

Because requirements for support from echelons above the division level are derived from wartime combat requirements, the baseline corps include all of the units (division as well as corps level) that would be attached to the corps in wartime. Thus, the 100 percent active baseline V Corps includes the active

equivalent of two Army National Guard (ARNG) combat divisions and their associated support. The CONUS generic corps consists of three active heavy divisions, one active light division, the active equivalent of a reserve mechanized division, and all corps-level support. The active baselines then serve as the foundation from which 100 percent reserve baselines are formed.

Data to support this type of costing are constantly being updated and improved. The principal source of unit manpower data for existing units is the Army Force Builder data base. Data on manpower costs and asset values for active units are obtained from the Army Force Cost System (TAFCS), developed by the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center. Manpower cost factors for Army Reserve (USAR) and ARNG units are from the Army Budget Office and the National Guard Bureau, respectively. Military pay and allowance (MPA) costs are computed using separate cost factors for six categories of personnel: Active OCONUS, USAR Ready Reserve, ARNG Ready Reserve, Active CONUS, USAR Active Guard Reserve (AGR), and ARNG AGR. Reserve units are assumed to consist of 4 percent AGR and 96 percent Ready Reservists (including 4 percent also serving as civilian military technicians). Army National Guard units are assumed to have 5 percent AGR personnel, and 5 percent of the Ready Reservists are assumed to be civilian military technicians.

Operations and maintenance (O&M) costs are computed using the Training Resources Model (TRM) employed by the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The TRM model estimates O&M costs on the basis of readiness levels (expressed in terms of operating tempo), authorized equipment levels, and personnel levels. Costs are divided into two basic categories: those that are driven by unit operating tempo and those that are not. Costs that are not driven by operating tempo are assumed to be a function of numbers of personnel. TRM calculates operating-tempo-driven costs in three categories: petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); spares and repair parts; and other equipment-related costs. Operating-tempo-driven costs are derived from factors that are in turn derived from Army battalion-level training models (BLTMs). BLTMs specify the training resources required to achieve given readiness levels at given ALOs.

(The TRM model is currently used by the Department of the Army to compute its program and budget requirements. TRM is oriented toward providing detailed cost information at the Army Management Decision Package (MDEP) level. Each active division constitutes an MDEP; thus the MDEP process provides a relatively simple and consistent way of estimating costs at the division level and below.)

Models of 100 percent active corps were constructed based on the V Corps in Europe and a generic CONUS-based corps, using the current TRM structure as a baseline. For V Corps, the modifications consisted primarily of adding active versions of the reserve units that would be attached to V Corps in a war. For the generic CONUS corps, in addition to adding active versions of reserve

units, it was necessary to add active support units associated with wartime support of the corps.

Force structure is modeled in TRM by assigning BLTMs to an MDEP. For example, an armored division would be assigned BLTMs representing a division headquarters and headquarters company, six M1A1 tank battalions, four Bradley mechanized infantry battalions, a main support battalion, three forward support battalions, and so forth. For each modeled BLTM, TRM has associated cost factors representing operating-tempo-driven costs. Developing new force structures consists largely of identifying new BLTM associations.

TRM cost factors vary on an annual basis, reflecting changes in Army support policies. The most significant changes for cost-estimating purposes are those associated with the transition to unit funding of depot-level repairable items via the stock fund. The impact of changes associated with the stock fund are expected to stabilize by FY 1995. The baselines use factors that reflect these changes at the steady-state level.

Training ammunition costs are derived from the TAFCS data base, which in turn is based on actual training ammunition consumption. Asset values for active divisions are provided in the data base. These values are amortized over a 15-year period for each division.

Costs of purely USAR or purely ARNG division slices are derived from purely active division slices. MPA costs are computed using the same personnel levels but applying USAR or ARNG pay factors, as appropriate. Operating-tempo-driven OMA and training ammunition costs are scaled in accordance with the reduced operating rates associated with reserve component units. Currently, USAR units operate at 25 percent the rate of equivalent active units to achieve the same nominal readiness level (i.e., C-rating); ARNG units operate at 36 percent. Non-operating-tempo-driven costs are scaled in accordance with the number of duty-days for the reserve component in question.

Baseline data are presented in Tables 3 to 8. Each table provides separate breakouts at the division level and echelons above. Separate tables are provided for each component, and two different readiness levels are evaluated. (The examples include a full spectrum of division and support units in the active and reserve components. The full complement has been included for illustrative purposes only, as not all types of units are maintained in each component.)

The data show that about 80 to 90 percent of annual recurring operating costs for Army units are driven by manpower. Fuel, parts, travel, and ammunition associated with peacetime training are an important but small fraction of the total cost of both active and reserve component units. As a result, reserve component forces with very high percentages of part-time personnel have significantly lower annual operating costs. These examples also reveal differences in the cost of different types of divisions. Heavy divisions can

43-455 - 91 - 23

Table 3
Army Direct Unit Costs, 100% Active
(C1/ALO 1)

	Europe		CONUS	
	Armored Division	Mechanized Division	Mechanized Division	Infantry Division
			Division Only	
Manning	17,302	16,744	16,753	10,969
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	617	597	566	371
Unit Operations	184	136	125	29
Annual Recurring	801	733	691	400
Equipment-Related[a]	175	104	138	31
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	976	837	829	431
			Nondivisional Combat Increment	
Manning	10,615	10,273	9,039	5,820
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	379	366	306	197
Unit Operations	74	52	59	15
Annual Recurring	453	418	365	212
Equipment-Related[a]	57	34	57	13
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	510	452	422	225
			Tactical Support Increment	
Manning	14,322	13,860	12,195	7,853
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	511	494	412	266
Unit Operations	76	49	56	17
Annual Recurring	587	543	468	283
Equipment-Related[a]	38	23	44	10
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	625	566	512	293

a. Based on the costs of replacing equipment in these units over a 15-year period. Equipment types differ for the two mechanized divisions shown.

Table 4
Army Direct Unit Costs, 100% Active
(C3/ALO 3)

	Europe		CONUS	
	Armored Division	Mechanized Division	Mechanized Division	Infantry Division
Division Only				
Manning	13,751	13,642	13,402	8,775
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	494	486	453	297
Unit Operations	127	94	85	22
Annual Recurring	621	580	538	319
Equipment-Related[a]	175	104	138	31
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	796	684	676	350
Nondivisional Combat Increment				
Manning	9,492	8,218	7,231	4,656
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	303	293	245	157
Unit Operations	61	35	39	11
Annual Recurring	364	328	284	168
Equipment-Related[a]	57	34	57	13
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	411	362	341	181
Tactical Support Increment				
Manning	11,458	11,068	9,756	6,282
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	409	396	330	212
Unit Operations	57	37	41	13
Annual Recurring	466	432	371	225
Equipment-Related[a]	38	23	44	10
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	504	455	415	235

a. Based on the costs of replacing equipment in these units over a 15-year period. Equipment types differ for the two mechanized divisions shown.

Table 5
Army Direct Unit Costs, 100% ARNG
(C1/ALO 1)

	Europe		CONUS	
	Armored Division	Mechanized Division	Mechanized Division	Infantry Division
Division Only				
Manning	17,302	16,744	16,753	10,969
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	145	140	140	92
Unit Operations	66	49	45	11
Annual Recurring	211	189	185	103
Equipment-Related[a]	175	104	138	31
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	386	293	323	134
Nondivisional Combat Increment				
Manning	10,615	10,273	9,039	5,820
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	89	86	76	49
Unit Operations	27	19	21	5
Annual Recurring	116	105	97	54
Equipment-Related[a]	57	34	57	13
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	173	139	154	67
Tactical Support Increment				
Manning	14,322	13,860	12,195	7,853
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	120	116	102	66
Unit Operations	27	18	20	6
Annual Recurring	147	134	122	72
Equipment-Related[a]	38	23	44	10
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	185	157	166	82

a. Based on the costs of replacing equipment in these units over a 15-year period. Equipment types differ for the two mechanized divisions shown.

Table 6
Army Direct Unit Costs, 100% ARNG
(C3/ALO 3)

	Europe		CONUS	
	Armored Division	Mechanized Division	Mechanized Division	Infantry Division
			Division Only	
Manning	13,751	13,642	13,402	8,775
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	116	114	112	73
Unit Operations	46	33	31	8
Annual Recurring	162	147	143	81
Equipment-Related[a]	175	104	138	31
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	337	251	281	112
			Nondivisional Combat Increment	
Manning	8,492	8,218	7,231	4,656
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	71	69	60	39
Unit Operations	18	12	14	4
Annual Recurring	89	81	74	43
Equipment-Related[a]	57	34	57	13
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	146	115	131	56
			Tactical Support Increment	
Manning	11,458	11,088	9,756	6,282
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	96	93	82	53
Unit Operations	21	13	15	5
Annual Recurring	117	106	97	58
Equipment-Related[a]	38	23	44	10
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	155	129	141	68

a. Based on the costs of replacing equipment in these units over a 15-year period. Equipment types differ for the t- mechanized divisions shown.

Table 7
Army Direct Unit Costs, 100% USAR
(C1/ALO 1)

	Europe		CONUS	
	Armored Division	Mechanized Division	Mechanized Division	Infantry Division
		Division Only		
Manning	17,302	16,744	16,753	10,969
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	132	127	127	83
Unit Operations	50	37	34	8
Annual Recurring	182	164	161	91
Equipment-Related[a]	175	104	138	31
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	357	268	299	122
		Nondivisional Combat Increment		
Manning	10,615	10,273	9,039	5,820
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	81	78	69	44
Unit Operations	20	14	16	4
Annual Recurring	101	92	85	48
Equipment-Related[a]	57	34	57	13
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	158	126	142	61
		Tactical Support Increment		
Manning	14,325	13,860	12,196	7,853
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	109	106	93	60
Unit Operations	20	13	15	5
Annual Recurring	129	118	108	65
Equipment-Related[a]	38	23	44	10
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	167	141	152	75

a. Based on the costs of replacing equipment in these units over a 15-year period. Equipment types differ for the two mechanized divisions shown.

Table 8
Army Direct Unit Costs, 100% USAR
(C3/ALO 3)

	Europe		CONUS	
	Armored Division	Mechanized Division	Mechanized Division	Infantry Division
			Division Only	
Manning	13,751	13,642	13,402	8,775
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	105	104	102	67
Unit Operations	34	25	23	6
Annual Recurring	139	129	125	73
Equipment-Related[a]	175	104	138	31
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	314	233	263	104
			Nondivisional Combat Increment	
Manning	8,492	8,218	7,231	4,656
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	65	62	55	35
Unit Operations	14	9	11	3
Annual Recurring	79	71	66	38
Equipment-Related[a]	57	34	57	13
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	136	105	123	51
			Tactical Support Increment	
Manning	11,458	11,088	9,756	6,282
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	87	84	74	45
Unit Operations	15	10	11	4
Annual Recurring	102	94	85	52
Equipment-Related[a]	38	23	44	10
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	140	117	129	62

a. Based on the costs of replacing equipment in these units over a 15-year period. Equipment types differ for the two mechanized divisions shown.

have 50 percent more personnel than light infantry divisions but cost twice as much to operate on an annual basis. For this reason, it is not good practice to treat the cost of Army divisions as if they were all interchangeable, generic units.

Unit Costing for the Navy. The Navy maintains information that permits consistency in unit costing of Total Force policy alternatives. This information was used to develop a unit costing methodology for naval forces. It is necessary to draw on different sources to analyze ship and aircraft squadron costs. Personnel costs, operating costs, and equipage costs are assessed for both kinds of forces.

Manning data for active and reserve units of various types are available from the Navy. The examples given in this section are based on recent manning practices. If alternative manning patterns are analyzed, it is a relatively straightforward exercise to derive the associated manpower costs.

For ships, the VAMOSC (Visibility and Management of Operating Support Cost) data system is the primary source of information on operating and support costs. VAMOSC maintains historical data on many categories of costs for every active ship in the Navy. Information is available by ship class on active manning levels, active personnel costs, fuel costs, hours underway, maintenance performed at all levels, ammunition and other stores used in training, and fleet modernization costs. Data on equipment replacement costs are available from the Naval Sea Systems Command.

Table 9 provides estimates of the comparative cost of active and reserve ships of the FFG-7 class as an illustration of our costing methodology. The estimates were derived for ships whose manning and operating levels are representative of those historically associated with the FFG-7 class. (Manning and operating tempos are currently being increased to permit reserve FFGs to participate in anti-drug activities. These increases are not reflected in the table.)

Compared to active FFGs, reserve FFGs save money on both manpower and operating costs. The reserve ships have 35 percent fewer full-time personnel (saving $1.8 million a year) and lower operating tempos (saving $1.3 million annually). These savings are, however, offset in part by increases in other support activities. The Navy has found that it must increase the level of manning at shore-based intermediate maintenance activities (SIMAs) in order to accomplish required preventive maintenance on reserve ships. Up to 45 additional enlisted personnel may be needed for this task. These extra SIMA personnel can erode as much as $1.4 million of the manpower savings from an active-to-reserve transfer. Moreover, as noted above, the Navy has recently increased full-time manning levels for reserve FFGs participating in drug interdiction operations. This will further erode potential savings.

Table 9
FFG-7 Direct Unit Costs

	Active	Reserve	
		Ship	SIMA
Manning			
Active Officer	16	7	
Active Enlisted	194	65	Up to 23
TAR Officer	--	3	
TAR Enlisted	--	64	Up to 22
SelRes Officer	--	6	
SelRes Enlisted	4	69	
Total	214	214	Up to 45
Operating Tempo	2,700 hrs/yr (36 days/qtr)	1,350 hrs/yr (18 days/qtr)	
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)			
Manpower	6.8	5.0	Up to 6.4
Operations			
Fuel	1.1	0.5	
Materials	3.4	2.7	
Purchased Services	0.3	0.4	
Other Maintenance	0.6	0.5	
Subtotal	5.4	4.1	
Annual Recurring	12.2	9.1	Up to 10.5
Equipment-Related			
Overhauls	1.1	1.1	
Modifications	2.8	2.8	
Replacement[a]	8.5	8.5	
Subtotal	12.4	12.4	
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	24.6	21.5	Up to 22.9

a. Ship cost is $297.9 million in FY 1992 dollars. Service life is 30 years.

The operating tempo of reserve FFGs is generally about half that of active ships. Fuel costs are roughly proportional to operating tempo. Maintenance costs also are related to operating tempo, but less closely so. Research indicates that about 60 percent of the material cost of organizational-level ship maintenance can be considered fixed, with the rest varying according to operating tempo. Training stores, included as part of materials in Table 9, also are assumed to vary in this way. Purchased services (rent, utilities, etc.) are required primarily when ships are not steaming. Since reserve ships spend about a third more time not steaming, they can be expected to spend a third more on purchased services. Taking all of these effects into consideration, reserve FFGs can be expected to cost $4.1 million per year versus $5.4 million for active ships, thus saving 24 percent in operating costs.

Table 9 shows that, if no additional SIMA resources are required, the long-term average annual cost of a reserve FFG is $3.1 million (or 13 percent) less than that of an active FFG. The equipment-related costs of active and reserve FFGs can be expected to be similar, as the two components follow the same overhaul and modernization policies. Including the cost of extra SIMA manpower can reduce the savings to as little as $1.7 million (or 7 percent below the cost of an active ship). When only manpower and operating costs are considered, reserve FFGs are cheaper by 14 percent to 25 percent, depending on the extent to which additional SIMA personnel are needed.

Although different data sources are used to estimate aircraft squadron costs, the analytic techniques are quite similar. Personnel costs are derived from current manning practices. To a greater extent than is the case with FFGs, some augmenting reserve personnel are associated with active naval air squadrons, which are not manned at their full wartime requirements.

Operating costs are driven by the costs of fuel, maintenance, and training munitions. The first two of these cost elements are assumed to be proportional to flying hours. This is consistent with the results of past studies of the determinants of aircraft operation and repair costs. Navy planning documents show that training munition requirements are roughly the same for active and reserve squadrons. Fuel and maintenance cost data are provided in Navy budget submissions. The cost of training munitions for active squadrons is derived from the VAMOSC Air data base.

Equipment costs include replacement costs and the cost of aircraft modifications. Replacement costs are incurred as aircraft wear out, become obsolete, or are lost in accidents. Reserve squadrons have fewer accidents because they fly less. Despite the lower operating tempo of reserve squadrons, their accident rate is no higher than that of active squadrons because their pilots are more experienced on average. Aircraft procurement costs are available from published sources. Data on the cost of modifications, the last element of equipment-related costs, are available from the VAMOSC Air system.

Replacement costs are calculated based on an average life of 25 years and a unit procurement cost of $49.8 million.

Depot-level rework costs for aircraft are treated as infrastructure costs rather than as direct program costs. This is unlike the treatment of ship overhaul costs. The reason for this methodological variation is practical rather than theoretical. The cost of ship overhauls is associated with individual ship types in the program element structure of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. This is not the case for aircraft reworks for either the Navy or the Air Force.

Table 10 presents an illustrative cost comparison of F-14 squadrons in the active and reserve components. As the table shows, the manning of active and reserve squadrons is extremely similar. Manpower costs are $3.7 million less per year in reserve squadrons, however, because of the use of part-time personnel. The lower operating tempo of these squadrons reduces their annual operating costs by $4.4 million relative to the cost of active squadrons. The equipment-related costs of the reserve squadrons are $4.7 million less because of lower expected attrition.

Table 10
F-14 Direct Unit Costs

	Active	Reserve
Manning		
Active Officer	33	–
Active Enlisted	227	–
TAR Officer	–	6
TAR Enlisted	–	124
SelRes Officer	6	33
SelRes Enlisted	39	142
Total	305	305
Operating Tempo	4,018 hrs/yr	2,203 hrs/yr
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)		
Manpower	9.1	5.4
Operations		
Fuel	3.0	1.7
Parts and Supplies	7.0	3.9
Training Stores	0.7	0.7
Subtotal	10.7	6.3
Annual Recurring	19.8	11.7
Equipment-Related		
Replacement		
Normal	23.9	23.9
Attrition	10.4	5.7
Modifications	5.7	5.7
Subtotal	40.0	35.3
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	59.8	47.0

In sum, over the long term, a reserve F-14 squadron will cost, on average, $12.8 million less per year than an active squadron. Therefore, over the long term, a reserve squadron costs 79 percent as much as an active squadron. Approximately $8.1 million of the cost differential represents nearly immediate savings in manpower and operating costs. When only these categories are considered, a reserve squadron costs 59 percent as much as an active squadron. Because of the greater manpower savings and because maintenance costs are more sensitive to operating tempo, naval aviation offers greater relative cost savings from active-to-reserve transfers than do ships.

Unit Costing for the Marine Corps. Marine forces are composed of three basic elements: land forces, air wings, and Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs). This structure serves as the basic organization for peacetime force management and training. Combat forces are assembled from these elements and organized into Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). MAGTFs take three basic forms: Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). A MEF, numbering nearly 45,000 personnel, consists roughly of a division, an air wing, and an FSSG. A MEB, with about 16,000 personnel, is composed of a regimental landing team (i.e., an infantry regiment with supporting artillery, tank, and other combat support units), a Marine air group (about 36 attack aircraft, 40 helicopters, and support aviation units), and a MEB service support group. A MEU, totaling approximately 2,400 personnel, normally consists of a battalion landing team (BLT), a composite air squadron made up primarily of helicopter and AV-8B aircraft, and a MEU service support group. MEFs, MEBs, and MEUs vary in composition depending on the specific mission of the task force. The forces are assembled from regimental, battalion, battery, and company units and squadrons from divisions, air wings, and FSSGs.

The Marine Reserve has essentially the same peacetime structure as the active force. In crises and wartime, Marine reserve units would be called on to augment and reinforce existing task forces. Reserve infantry units would be integrated with active infantry battalions; reserve tank units would augment tank battalions. In all but extraordinary conditions, Marine reserves would not mobilize and deploy as task forces made up only of reservists. Because Marine task forces contain a mix of units (e.g., infantry, artillery, tank, combat engineer, etc.) tailored to the requirements of specific missions, it is more useful to estimate Marine force costs at the battalion or squadron level rather than as a cross section of a MEB or MEF.

Marine forces include both Marine Corps and Navy manning. Operations involving air wing elements are funded from both Marine Corps and Navy operations and maintenance (O&M). Cost estimates should reflect these practices by including costs from all funding sources. Funding for naval support that is integral to Marine unit operations is included as part of Marine force costing. Marine amphibious operations also depend on support from Navy amphibious ships and other amphibious elements, such as mobile construction

battalions, cargo-handling groups, beach groups, and miscellaneous other support. However, amphibious lift and naval amphibious support units are not tied on a one-for-one basis with Marine Corps forces. Therefore, changes in Marine force size and mix do not always produce corresponding changes in naval amphibious support. For this reason, force structure impacts on Navy amphibious ships and support units are considered in separate policy decisions and are addressed in Navy unit costing.

Data on the direct costs of Marine Corps units are obtained from the *Marine Cost Factors Manual* and U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters. Estimates derived from these data showing the costs of an infantry battalion, tank battalion, and aviation squadron are presented in Tables 11 through 13. Manning levels have been set at approximately 90 percent of the Fleet Marine Forces Table of Organization. Active and reserve manning reflect current policies within the Marine Corps.

Table 11
Marine Infantry Battalion Direct Unit Costs

	Active		Reserve	
	USMC	Navy	USMC	Navy
Manning				
Active Officers	40	3	6	--
Active Enlisted	775	59	34	--
Full-Time Reserve Officers	--	--	1	--
Full-Time Reserve Enlisted	--	--	14	--
Part-Time Reserve Officers	--	--	40	3
Part-Time Reserve Enlisted	--	--	775	59
Total	815	62	870	62
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	24.9		4.5	
Unit Operations	8.9		5.3	
Annual Recurring	33.8		9.8	
Equipment-Related[a]	0.6		0.6	
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	34.4		10.4	

a. Based on the costs of replacing equipment in these units over a 15-year period.

Table 12
Marine Tank Battalion Direct Unit Costs

	Active		Reserve	
Number of Tanks	70		70	
	USMC	Navy	USMC	Navy
Manning				
Active Officers	45	2	6	--
Active Enlisted	874	16	56	--
Full-Time Reserve Officers	--	--	--	--
Full-Time Reserve Enlisted	--	--	14	--
Part-Time Reserve Officers	--	--	45	2
Part-Time Reserve Enlisted			874	16
Total	919	18	995	18
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	26.4		5.2	
Unit Operations	7.7		5.7	
Annual Recurring	34.1		10.9	
Equipment-Related[a]	7.2		7.2	
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	41.3		18.1	

a. Based on the costs of replacing equipment in these units over a 15-year period.

Table 13
Marine CH-46 Squadron Direct Unit Costs

	Active		Reserve	
Number of CH-46s	12		12	
Operating Tempo	4,056 hrs/yr		2,041 hrs/yr	
	USMC	Navy	USMC	Navy
Manning				
Active Officers	32	1	2	--
Active Enlisted	173	3	71	--
Full-Time Reserve Officers	--	--	5	--
Full-Time Reserve Enlisted	--	--	35	--
Part-Time Reserve Officers	--	--	25	1
Part-Time Reserve Enlisted	--	--	67	3
Total	205	4	205	4
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)				
Manpower	6.7		4.1	
Unit Operations	5.3		2.1	
Annual Recurring	12.0		6.2	
Equipment-Related[a]	14.4		12.8	
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	26.4		19.0	

a. Based on an aircraft cost of $18.93 million (FY 1992 dollars) and a service life of 20 years.

Unit Costing for the Air Force. Air Force Regulation 173-13, *U.S. Air Force Cost and Planning Factors*, provides a costing methodology and cost factors that support assessments of many of the components of direct unit costs. The methodology is based on years of research to develop models and data for estimating the budgetary requirements of active and reserve forces. Properly applied, this methodology permits direct unit costing of alternative force structures and provides meaningful squadron-level comparisons between active and reserve components. One of the models in AFR 173-13, designated SABLE (for Systematic Approach to Better Long-Range Estimating), provides a good representation of budgeted manpower and operating costs that is sensitive to manpower, operating tempos, and equipage. The SABLE model does not, however, address all of the costs of replacing and upgrading mission equipment. Additionally, it includes some indirect costs that are treated as part of infrastructure (as opposed to direct unit) costing.

SABLE uses a mixture of active and reserve cost factors to estimate Air Force Reserve (AFR) and Air National Guard (ANG) squadron operations and support (O&S) costs. Some factors are common to active and reserve components, while others are specific to a particular component. For application to Total Force costing, the SABLE model provides estimates of personnel costs, fuel, supplies, repairable exchangeables, training munitions, contracted services, reliability and maintainability modifications, and support equipment replacement.

The two direct unit cost elements that the SABLE model does not estimate are the replacement costs of primary mission equipment and mission enhancement modifications. An average annualized total procurement cost (i.e., total procurement costs/expected inventory life) for replacement equipment is needed to compare force alternatives properly. The expected lifetime of aircraft varies by system: fighters last 20 to 25 years, while strategic airlift aircraft, bombers, and tankers tend to last longer.

Differences in the direct costs of active and reserve component units are almost wholly driven by their respective flying-hour programs and the closely related manning practices. Reserve component units are able to retain required pilot proficiency and readiness levels with fewer total flying hours because the experience level of reservists is higher, on average, than that of active-duty personnel. If reserve units were required to fill aircrew positions with a lower percentage of prior-service pilots (e.g., insufficient numbers of active component pilots joined reserve units), overall experience levels would decrease and the flying-hour program would have to be increased to maintain the same capability.

As an illustration of our costing methodology, a comparison of the direct costs of active and reserve component F-16 squadrons is presented in Table 14. The manning includes a share of wing and group staff personnel, and flying-hour totals include proficiency flying for rated staff. Differences in flying hours and peacetime manning levels drive the direct unit cost differences reflected in the table. Reserve component squadrons fly, on average, 4,682 to 5,064 hours

Table 14
F-16C/D Direct Unit Costs

	Active	Reserve AFR	Reserve ANG
Aircraft per Squadron	24	24	24
Total Flying Hours	8,134	4,682	5,064
Manning			
Active Officers	48	--	4
Active Enlisted	573	--	30
Drill Officers	--	87	58
Drill Enlisted	--	679	537
Civilians	--	273	162
Total	621	1,039	791
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)			
Manpower			
Active Military	20.22	--	1.49
Reserve Military	--	4.15	3.38
Civilian	--	10.50	6.20
Subtotal	20.22	14.65	11.07
Unit Operations			
Fuel	4.92	2.83	3.06
Consumable Supplies	2.47	1.42	1.54
Recoverable	5.52	3.18	3.43
Training (munitions)	0.85	0.85	0.85
Subtotal	13.76	8.28	8.88
Annual Recurring	33.98	22.93	19.95
Equipment-Related[a]			
Modifications/Overhauls	1.55	1.55	1.55
Replacement			
Support Equipment	1.35	1.35	1.35
Primary Equipment			
Aircraft	22.72	22.72	22.72
Attrition Aircraft	5.08	2.92	3.11
Subtotal	30.70	28.54	28.73
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	64.68	51.47	48.68

a. Based on an aircraft cost of $18.93 million (FY 1992 dollars) and a service of life 20 years

per year compared to 8,134 hours for active squadrons. The reserve forces' lower flying hours result in a 40 percent reduction in expenditures for fuel and other materials. The differences in manpower costs reflect the fact that reserve squadrons contain a mix of full-time and drill personnel, whereas active squadrons rely exclusively on full-time personnel. The $2 million difference in recurring investment between the active and reserve components reflects the lower peacetime aircraft attrition rates of reserve squadrons resulting from their lower flying-hour programs. In sum, an active squadron (which trains at a higher peacetime rate with 100 percent full-time manning) will experience an annual recurring operating cost of $34 million versus $23 million for an Air Force Reserve unit and $20 million for an Air National Guard squadron. Over the longer term, the costs are $65 million for the active squadron versus $51 million for the AFR unit and $49 million for the ANG squadron.

A similar comparison for active and reserve component KC-135R tanker squadrons is presented in Table 15. A 10-aircraft squadron was selected for cost comparison purposes. As with the F-16, flying hours and peacetime manning levels are the two major determinants of differences in the direct costs of active and reserve component units. The AFR and ANG average 3,801 hours and 3,500 hours of flight time, respectively, per year compared to 2,840 hours for an active squadron. The requirement to provide two lines of alert aircraft results in the reserve components having a crew ratio of 1.5 versus 1.27 for active squadrons, resulting in 660 more flying hours for the ANG and 961 more for the AFR. ANG and AFR units also have different staff flying-hour requirements, and this accounts for the differences between the two reserve components.

In the active force, tanker squadrons normally are supported at the same facility as bomber squadrons. Unit collocation permits efficiencies in unit staff sizes, maintenance manning, and aircraft security personnel in active units that are not achieved in reserve units. The higher flying hours and manpower costs cause the annual recurring direct unit costs of reserve squadrons to exceed those of active squadrons by 50 to 65 percent. Equipment-related costs for active and reserve component squadrons are essentially the same, with the small differences reflected in the table resulting from the lower attrition rates associated with the active component's lower flying hours.

DIRECT SUPPORT COSTS

Each service has programs and/or force elements that can be affected in a secondary manner by changes in primary mission forces. Examples include training units managed and funded by operational commands (e.g., naval readiness groups and Air Force combat crew training wings); procurement of war reserve materiel (e.g., ammunition, tactical missiles, fuel); and combat support units that perform specialized (often theater or task force oriented) tasks in wartime (e.g., tactical communications, cargo handling, heavy runway repairs, special intelligence). The total funding for these force elements and activities is

Table 15
KC-135R Direct Unit Costs

	Active	Reserve[a] AFR	Reserve[a] ANG
Aircraft per Squadron	10	10	10
Total Flying Hours	2,840	3,801	3,500
Manning			
Active Officers	49	--	18
Active Enlisted	139	56	68
Drill Officers	--	90	65
Drill Enlisted	--	435	424
Civilians	--	206	115
Total	188	787	690
Cost (millions of FY 1992 dollars)			
Manpower			
Active Military	7.4	1.8	4.1
Reserve Military	--	3.1	3.0
Civilian	--	7.9	4.4
Subtotal	7.4	12.8	11.5
Unit Operations			
Fuel	2.5	4.2	3.8
Consumable Supplies	0.7	1.1	1.0
Recoverable	2.9	2.7	2.5
Subtotal	6.1	8.0	7.3
Annual Recurring	13.5	20.8	18.8
Equipment-Related[b]			
Modifications/Overhauls	1.7	1.7	1.7
Replacement			
Support Equipment	0.2	0.2	0.2
Primary Equipment			
Aircraft	19.9	19.9	19.9
Attrition Aircraft	1.2	1.6	1.5
Subtotal	23.0	23.4	23.3
Long-Term Average Unit Cost	36.5	44.2	42.1

a. The dollar totals shown below differ from those in the Final Report. The totals in this table are correct.

b. Based on an aircraft cost of $79.6 million (FY 1992 dollars) and a service life of 40 years.

relatively small compared to the total size of the service budgets. The impact of force structure reductions on them must be assessed in the context of the total force structure changes being considered rather than as direct by-products of decisions about individual primary force elements.

Analysis of the cost impacts of force structure changes must recognize that there can be secondary effects on the operating costs of other units. Where unit operations provide both training and industrially funded reimbursable services, additional consideration must be given to the economic impact that changes in the operating tempo of these units will have on total defense spending (e.g., the cost of providing these services by other means). The cost of providing these services in other ways must be examined in evaluating the total cost effects of a force-mix decision. The most apparent (but not necessarily the only) example is the conversion of a strategic mobility program from active to reserve status. If the active unit provides peacetime airlift that will have to be replaced by other sources, the difference in the cost of these services is considered. Similar conditions could apply to other programs or activities that provide peacetime support services.

Some training that is oriented toward combat tactics and qualification in the operation of weapon systems is conducted by operational commands rather than as part of the central training programs of the services. The throughput of these programs can be related to the total size of the force and can even be affected by the mix of active and reserve units. Combat crew training in the Air Force provides the means for crew members to make the transition from one aircraft type to another and for new pilots to qualify in their first combat system. Historically, the Air Force has required one training aircraft for every four aircraft in active combat squadrons and one trainer for every eight fighters in reserve squadrons. Reserve requirements have historically been lower because new reserve crew members are often already qualified in the aircraft operated by their unit and pilot assignments are more stable. These historical patterns would change if the active-reserve mix changed to the point that the number of pilots leaving active duty and joining the reserves was insufficient to meet reserve manning requirements and the reserves were forced to train larger numbers of new pilots.

WRM and tactical missile procurement programs purchase materiel that is largely stored for use between the time hostilities arise and wartime production begins. Some of these purchases are related to force size and should be considered when evaluating major changes in the size of the Total Force. These programs are not normally affected by changes in force mix and so are not primary considerations in active/reserve mix decisions.

Adjustments to WRM procurement programs cannot be made on a proportional basis. Relatively small percentages of the tactical missiles and other smart munitions procured each year are used for peacetime training. (We account for appropriate changes in these buys as part of direct unit costing.)

Annual procurement levels for such items are driven largely by war reserve requirements. Procurement quantities for some materials are based on the number of targets to be attacked rather than the number of units or delivery platforms or force size. Because it takes several years to achieve total war reserve inventory requirements, procurement plans in the budget period may not be affected by reductions in force structure. Seldom are WRM requirements affected by conversion of units from active to reserve status.

Deployable support activities provide tactical support such as command, control, communications, and intelligence equipment and personnel and a variety of logistics services. These units normally support several combat elements, often under theater control. Changes in their number do not automatically follow changes in the number of primary mission units. Changes in the forward-deployed status of primary mission units can also affect the need to keep direct support units forward. Again, we examine impacts on these types of units on a program-by-program basis in the context of Total Force changes.

Direct support programs, such as those identified above, must be systematically examined for cost impacts but cannot be automatically changed. It is important that these programs not be treated as a form of proportionally related indirect cost. Systematic consideration of these "ripple effects" tailored to each service's operating structure is an integral part of Total Force costing.

INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS

Approximately one-third of the budgets of the military services goes to provide base-level and centrally managed services to the Total Force. Ideally, estimates of the impact of force structure changes on service infrastructure funding are based on detailed cost-estimating factors for each major type of indirect cost. Two problems limit the achievement of this ideal. First, cost-estimating factors have not been developed for the full spectrum of infrastructure costs in all services, and second, descriptions of force structure alternatives in the policymaking environment often do not provide sufficient detail to apply factors when they do exist. Despite these problems, it is important to estimate the impact that force structure alternatives will likely have on defense infrastructure costs.

Infrastructure programs include the activities and services shown in Table 16. These programs provide support that cannot realistically be directly tied to individual units. Base-level activities generally support more than one unit; central activities provide services (such as recruiting and basic training) whose benefits are spread over many units.

Where detailed estimates are not feasible, it is possible to approximate infrastructure cost effects using historical funding relationships at an aggregate level. Examination of historical funding trends for infrastructure programs

Table 16
Basic Infrastructure Activities

Installation Support
- Base Operating Support
- Real Property Maintenance
- Base-Level Communications

Central Logistics Activities
- Depot-Level Support Activities in Major Force Program 7

Central Training Activities
- Training in Major Force Program 8

Force Management and Administration
- Departmental and Management Headquarters
- Operational Headquarters

Central Medical Programs
- Regional Hospitals
- CHAMPUS

Central Communications Programs

Central Personnel Programs
- Personnel Management
- Recruiting and Examining
- Commissary Operations
- Family Housing
- Permanent Change of Station Funding
- Holding Accounts for Transient Status Personnel

shows that expenditures vary with changes in O&S spending for defense mission forces. Even though there is a historically observable linkage, estimating the relationship between infrastructure costs and the size of the force is not a precise calculus. Infrastructure costs, by their very nature, must be allocated to direct costs. This process always involves a degree of subjectivity.

Force costing recognizes that defense infrastructure costs are not totally variable with the size of the force. As in private industry, over the short to mid-term there are fixed costs of maintaining a large, ongoing establishment. Force cost estimation also accounts for the fact that reserve component units receive essential support from training, logistics, and other centrally funded active component programs. An appropriate means of allocating the costs of these services is provided in our Total Force costing methodology. There are also differences in the kinds of support provided to active and reserve units. Reservists do not use family housing, do not have the same medical benefits or access to commissaries as do their active-duty counterparts, and do not have to move to change assignments like active-duty personnel. Total Force costing recognizes these differences in allocating infrastructure costs. Each component

also funds support functions that benefit only that component. To account for the different ways that infrastructure activities are funded, cost effects for dedicated active and reserve support functions are considered separately from joint-support activities, which are centrally funded. The total effect of a force change on a service's infrastructure is the sum of the component-unique and joint support impacts.

We base our estimates of the impact of force structure changes on infrastructure costs on the historical relationship between O&S spending for mission programs and the funding for the kinds of programs listed in Table 16. We have analyzed how the services have adjusted infrastructure funding as primary force O&S spending both increased and decreased over the past twenty years. A sufficiently strong long-term relationship is evident to convince us that force structure changes do affect infrastructure costs.

The infrastructure estimation methodology applied to Total Force policy analyses recognizes that there are differences in the support provided to active and reserve component forces. Where infrastructure programs exist primarily to support active forces, the variable portion of their cost is allocated solely to active units. Such programs include, but are not limited to, PCS travel, family housing, medical services, and commissaries. The variable portion of infrastructure activities funded by reserve component budgets for reserve component support is allocated only to the reserve component. Activities such as central logistics and central training are largely funded by the active component but serve both active and reserve requirements. A portion of the costs of these centrally managed programs is allocated to both active and reserve units based on their O&S costs. Figure 2 illustrates our approach to allocating infrastructure costs to recognize the commonalities and differences in supporting active and reserve forces.

Data from the past 20 years demonstrate that while a portion of infrastructure costs is fixed, significant portions vary with Total Force size. It is also evident that infrastructure savings are not fully realized in the year that force structure changes are made. In periods of declining force levels, infrastructure reductions have lagged force reductions by as much as three years.

The services differ somewhat in their organization of infrastructure activities. Cost-estimating methodologies allow for the ways each service and component provides indirect support. Table 17 provides data on infrastructure spending by all four services for each infrastructure category during the 1980s. The table shows expenditures for the major types of infrastructure support by component affiliation (i.e., active-only, reserve-only, and joint support). Table 18 combines infrastructure spending and the average amount spent on mission O&S to show the average infrastructure spending per dollar of O&S spending.

Figure 2
Allocation of Infrastructure Costs


Infrastructure Activities Supporting Only Active Component Forces
Infrastructure Activities Supporting Both Active and Reserve Component Forces
Infrastructure Activities Supporting Only Reserve Component Forces
Infrastructure Allocated To Active Forces
Infrastructure Allocated To Reserve Forces

Table 17
Average Infrastructure Spending in the 1980s
(FY 1991 $B)

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD
Infrastructure funding by active component for active-only support					
Installation Support	5.2	NA[a]	1.2	8.0	14.4
Force Management	1.0	NA[a]	0.1	1.2	2.3
Central Personnel	4.7	3.2	0.9	3.5	12.3
Subtotal	10.9	3.2	2.2	12.7	29.0
Central Medical Support					
Medical (Active)	4.0	2.9	NA[b]	3.2	10.1
Infrastructure funding by reserve component for reserve-only support					
Installation Support	0.6	NA[a]	--[c]	0.5	1.1
Force Management	0.2	NA[a]	--[c]	0.2	0.4
Central Personnel	1.6	NA[a]	--[c]	0.1	1.8
Subtotal	2.4	NA[a]	0.1	0.8	3.3
Infrastructure funding providing support to both active and reserve components					
Installation Support	0.4	4.6	--[c]	0.2	5.2
Force Management	1.4	1.9	0.2	1.4	4.9
Central Personnel	0.3	0.2	--[c]	0.1	0.6
Central Training[d]	7.5	4.4	1.3	3.3	16.5
Central Logistics	7.5	8.6	0.6	8.3	25.0
Central Comm	1.6	0.9	--[c]	1.8	4.4
Subtotal	18.7	20.6	2.2	15.1	56.6
Total	36.0	26.7	4.5	31.8	99.0

a. So little of the Navy's primary forces have been in the reserve component that it was not possible to develop a separate reserve-only infrastructure component. To maintain consistency, the only infrastructure costs retained in the active-only category were those for programs that should not be allocated to the reserve component (e.g., family housing, commissaries, permanent change-of-station costs).

b. Marine Corps medical support is provided by the Navy; the costs are allocated between the services on a pro rata basis.

c. Less than $0.1 million.

d. Excludes flight crew training costs.

Table 18
Variable Portion of Infrastructure Spending in the 1980s
(FY 1991 $B)

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD
Active-Only	10.9	3.2	2.2	12.7	29.0
Reserve-Only	2.4	NA	0.1	0.8	3.3
Joint Support	18.7	20.6	2.2	15.1	56.6
Central Medical Support					
Medical	4.0	2.9	0.0	3.2	10.1
Average Mission O&S					
Active Forces	19.5	22.9	4.3	17.2	63.9
Reserve Forces	4.2	1.2	0.4	3.3	9.1
Total	23.7	24.1	4.7	20.5	73.0
Average Infrastructure Spending per $1.00 Mission O&S					
Active-Only	.55	.14	.52	.74	.45
Reserve-Only	.58	NA	.19	.25	.37
Joint Support	.79	.85	.46	.74	.77
Medical[a]	.10	.05	.05	.09	.08
Variable Portion of Infrastructure per $1.00 Mission O&S (50% fixed, 50% variable)					
Active Total[b]	.72	.53	.52	.78	.65
Reserve Total[c]	.69	.43	.33	.49	.57

a. Allows for 50% CHAMPUS and Regional Hospital funding for retirees.

b. 50% of (Active Only + Medical + Joint Support).

c. 50% of (Reserve Only + Joint Support).

Medical costs have been broken out as a separate part of active-only support in the tables because the cause of their variability differs from other types of support. Unlike other kinds of infrastructure, medical programs serve a large retired military population as well as full-time personnel. Medical cost factors vary by service, largely due to differences in the proportions of military members with dependents.

Because Total Force alternatives potentially cover such a broad spectrum of possible scenarios, we use a conservative assumption that infrastructure costs are 50 percent fixed and 50 percent variable. The second to last line of Table 18 shows the result of combining active-only, medical, and joint-support variable costs to form a total active infrastructure cost factor. The reserve total factor is obtained by adding the reserve-only and joint-support variable costs.

These figures show that active forces incur slightly higher total infrastructure costs per dollar of O&S spending than do their reserve counterparts. This occurs because active-duty personnel receive some support services not provided to part-time reservists. Even though the total active and reserve component infrastructure costs per dollar of mission O&S are nearly identical for several services, the Defense Department still realizes savings in its infrastructure programs for reserve component forces because reserve unit O&S costs (which are the basis for estimating infrastructure costs) are normally 30 to 75 percent those of active units.

Because of the relatively high cost of aviation training and the fact that this cost is relevant only to decisions involving flying units, special treatment is given to flight training in infrastructure calculations. Aviation crew training is a centrally provided training program and is not funded by or tied directly to units. Even though crew training costs for aviation units are estimated on the basis of unit manning, the impact of large force structure changes on such training can be assessed accurately only at the service level, where the impact of all prospective force changes can be considered.

Cost impacts on flight crew training are based on several interrelated factors, including the effect that prospective changes in the active-reserve mix will have on the total number of crews that must be trained. Historically, a large number of reserve component flight crews have entered reserve service already flight qualified. Valuable training that would have been lost to the Total Force when crew members left active duty has thus been retained, and the services have not needed to train as many new pilots. As long as the number of pilots joining reserve units upon leaving active duty exceeds the number needed to fill reserve component pilot billets, the number of pilots trained specifically for the reserves is not affected by the active-reserve mix (i.e., the supply exceeds the demand). As the relative size of reserve forces increases, however, there is a point where not enough prior-service personnel are available to fill reserve flying billets. The point at which the demand cannot be met by active separations is affected by the active-reserve mix, retention rates in both

components, and the rate at which prior-service personnel join reserve component units. Each of these factors changes over time, and the cost effects are best estimated on a Total Force basis using current retention data.

Table 19 illustrates the impact of pilot training costs on active and reserve units, using F-16 training as an example. The data assume a change to only a single squadron, and reflect the current Air Force active-reserve fighter force mix and current crew turnover rates. The assumption that there are enough pilots separating from active units to fill vacancies in reserve component units is critical to this comparison.

Table 19
Comparison of F-16 Pilot Training Costs

Number of Aircraft: 24
Crew Ratio: 1.25
Pilot Training Costs: $1.84 million per pilot

	Active	Air National Guard	Air Force Reserve
Pilot Turnover	8%	6%	8%
Non-Prior Service	100%	36%	10%
Total Training Costs	$4.42	$1.19	$0.44

NOTE: Total Training Cost = (Number of Aircraft) x (Crew Ratio) x (Pilot Training Cost) x (Pilot Turnover) x (Non-Prior-Service Fraction)

The data in Table 19 show that, on average, converting one active F-16 squadron to an Air National Guard unit will save $3.23 million annually in training costs, in addition to the savings in direct unit costs and other infrastructure-related expenditures. Savings from conversions to the Air Force Reserve would average almost $4 million per year. These results, while valid for small adjustments in force mix, cannot necessarily be extended to larger changes. Increasing the proportion of aviation forces in the reserves past a critical point would require that pilots and crews be trained directly for reserve units, thus increasing the percentage of non-prior-service personnel.

TRANSITION COSTS

Changes in force structure almost always require the expenditure of funds for one-time activities related to bases, facilities, equipment, and personnel. Existing bases affected by force structure changes require environmental impact studies and environmental cleanup, and may produce revenues if sold. Bases gaining new forces may require environmental studies, new construction, renovations, interim facilities, or purchases of property. Equipment must be destroyed, disposed of (e.g., decommissioned), moved, or stored. Large changes in personnel can require one-time separation pays and funding for changes of station above steady-state requirements. Increases in end-strength by either component may require increased recruitment and training, even when there are comparable reductions in other components of the same service. These costs can quickly add up to hundreds of millions of dollars and can potentially nullify a major portion of the anticipated near-term savings. Total Force costing needs to systematically consider these as well as the changes in recurring costs.

In the Army, for example, M-1 tanks from deactivated European armored units would be redistributed to replace older tanks in other units. First, however, the M-1 tanks would have to be brought to a standard configuration to meet transfer standards. The Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center estimates equipment preparation costs for an armored division (including all equipment, not just tanks) at $36 million. The cost of transporting an armored division from Europe back to CONUS is estimated at $45 million. This cost results from moving the division and would be incurred regardless of the division's component affiliation upon its return to CONUS.

Lower transportation costs are incurred when relocating fighter wings from Europe to CONUS. Although support equipment must be shipped, the aircraft themselves may be flown. Moreover, the fuel and other costs of flying the aircraft may be treated as operating tempo that would have been accumulated anyway in order to maintain pilot proficiency. For the Air Force, permanent change-of-station costs are relatively more important than transportation costs. Current Air Force factors used in the COBRA (Cost of Base Realignment Action) model imply PCS costs of $16 million to $25 million per fighter wing.

The main transition costs for the Navy are those associated with decommissioning ships. Decommissioning costs can run as high as $30 million for nuclear-powered ships, such as attack submarines. Mothballing a battleship costs at least $40 million. On the other hand, base realignment costs for the Navy would be minimal under most scenarios. Naval bases support many activities, such as Naval Air Rework Facilities (NARFs), in addition to providing berthing spaces for several ships. The loss of a few ships at a given base would have a minimal one-time impact on these facilities.

Forming new Marine Corps Reserve infantry battalions would require the leasing of interim facilities and funding for permanent armories. Even though

equipment may be available from active units being deactivated, activation of a large number of Marine reserve units would present challenges and incur additional costs for recruiting and initial training. These one-time costs could amount to $25 million for each battalion added to the reserves. Depending on the deactivation rate for the active units, additional costs could be incurred for separation and permanent change-of-station moves.

MILITARY PERSONNEL RESOURCES

The match between available personnel resources--the number of military personnel and their mix by military occupational specialty (MOS) and skill level --and the manpower requirements of the active and reserve units in the force structure is a major determinant of the capabilities of the Total Force. Achieving and maintaining a match between personnel resources and requirements is particularly difficult for some reserve components due to geographic and time constraints on their use of part-time personnel. Unlike the active components, the reserve components are not always free to reassign personnel to units on a worldwide basis or even to assign them to retraining on a full-time basis when there is a mismatch between skills and requirements. In addition, recruit quality is important in determining the quality of the force; this is particularly true for the reserve components, given the limited training time they have.

Non-Prior-Service Recruit Quality

Non-prior-service (NPS) recruits currently account for 95 percent of active component accessions and 40 percent of accessions in the reserve components. The quality of these recruits is high in both components. In 1990, 95 percent of active and 93 percent of reserve NPS recruits had a high school diploma or were high school graduates. Only 6 percent of active and 7 percent of reserve NPS recruits scored in the lowest category (IV) on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). This contrasts with DoD's experience in 1973 through 1979, when low military pay and inadequate recruiting resources left both the active and reserve components unable to meet their quality goals for NPS recruits. In 1974--when the All Volunteer Force was established--only 61 percent of active and 53 percent of reserve NPS male recruits had a high school diploma or were high school graduates. At that time, more than 10 percent of active and 20 percent of reserve NPS recruits scored in the lowest category of the AFQT.

The recent success of the active and reserve components in NPS recruiting is particularly impressive given that the number of youths aged 18 to 24 in the U.S. population--the pool from which most NPS recruits are drawn--fell by 16 percent between 1981 and 1991. The services' recruiting success in the face of this decline is due in part to an improved attitude toward military service among youth and in part to increased pay and recruiting incentives. Recruiting incentives are not restricted to the active component. Today, the reserve components benefit from the use of the same types of enlistment incentives--cash bonuses, educational assistance, loan repayment programs--that are used to attract active-duty recruits. Other factors contributing to recent success in both recruiting and retention are improvements in the quality of life for active-duty personnel and in the quality (and hence the attractiveness) of training for reservists. It remains to be seen, however, whether these reserve enlistment

incentives will continue to prove effective in a post-Desert Shield/Desert Storm environment.

The size of the youth population will level off in the mid-1990s and then start to increase gradually. This, together with a reduction in the number of NPS recruits needed to support a smaller force structure, should enable DoD to maintain the quality of its NPS recruits during the 1990s. Yet while aggregate NPS recruiting goals will be met, some reserve components are experiencing significant recruiting problems in some regions, particularly the Northeast. Although innovative solutions--including bonuses targeted at specific locations--are being implemented, the least costly long-run solution is to place units in areas where demographic trends indicate that recruits will be available. Provided that DoD has the flexibility to select the best locations for reserve units, the ability of the reserve components to recruit high-quality non-prior-service personnel is not expected to be a factor constraining the mix of active and reserve units during the 1990s.

The long-run impact of Operation Desert Storm on reserve recruiting and reserve retention remains to seen, however, and will be carefully monitored by DoD. Reserve recruiters may face a more difficult environment now that potential recruits have a clearer understanding that reserve duty involves a commitment that can go far beyond one weekend a month and two weeks each summer.

Prior-Service Recruits

The reserve components depend heavily on prior-service (PS) personnel to provide the "hands-on" expertise that is acquired most readily through active-duty service. Some training experts question whether it is possible for NPS recruits--who, after completing their initial recruit and individual skill training, must rely primarily on weekend drills and two weeks of summer training to obtain hands-on expertise--to achieve the same skill levels in technical military occupations as their full-time counterparts in the active force or their colleagues in reserve units with previous active-duty experience.

The Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the Naval Reserve--three of the most technically-oriented reserve components--rely the most heavily on PS personnel. In the Air Force Reserve, 74 percent of recruits have prior military experience. The comparable figures for the Air National Guard and Naval Reserve are 67 percent and 87 percent, respectively. In ground units, the proportion of prior-service personnel is lower. At present, 57 percent of Army Reserve recruits have served previously in the military, while 48 percent of new Army National Guard members have prior military experience. The Marine Corps Reserve, with its emphasis on junior enlisted personnel in combat

specialties, takes in a recruit mix that contains only 27 percent prior-service personnel.

The current drawdown in the active component means that the number of personnel leaving active duty will increase somewhat during FY 1991 through FY 1994. This will (temporarily) increase the pool of prior-service personnel from which the reserve components can recruit. The short-run challenge in prior-service recruiting is how to take advantage of these skilled personnel. Tighter "up-or-out" policies (which restrict the number of years that reservists can spend in the same grade) and changes in the structure of reserve retirement (to encourage personnel with more than 20 years of service to leave) could play a role in opening up reserve billets for prior-service personnel with recent active-duty experience. Greater flexibility in grading billets--so that prior-service E4 or E5 personnel can be used instead of NPS E3 personnel--could also be of value. Since NPS personnel who are undergoing initial recruit and skill training count against unit authorizations in the reserve components, increased reliance on prior-service personnel might also increase trained manning levels in the reserve components.

Over the long run, however, a smaller active force means fewer individuals separating from active duty each year and a smaller pool of prior-service recruits from which the reserves can draw. Significant increases in the proportion of the Total Force that is in the reserves pose a potential challenge to the reserves' ability to recruit prior-service personnel. This potential is heightened by the fact that, due to improved retention in the active components during the 1980s, there is already a long-run trend toward a smaller pool of prior-service personnel. During the 1980s, reserve prior-service recruiting goals were met because the reserve components were able to recruit an ever-increasing proportion of individuals who were leaving active duty. In the Army, the percentage of those separating from active duty who were eligible for further service and were recruited into the National Guard or Reserve rose from 20 percent in FY 1979 to almost 40 percent in FY 1989.

Although the reserve components may still be able to recruit the aggregate numbers of prior-service recruits that will be required in the late 1990s, the need to take a higher proportion of the available pool is likely to reduce the match between prior-service recruits and the skill and grade requirements of reserve component billets. Currently, almost half of Army prior-service recruits must be retrained in a new occupational specialty. In the long run, DoD may need to focus more on policies that will increase the supply of prior-service recruits or that will facilitate the retraining of prior-service personnel into occupational specialties needed by the reserves.

43-455 - 91 - 24

Policies to Improve the Match Between Billets and Skills

The force drawdown will not affect all skills equally, and even in the active component, transitional imbalances between manpower requirements and personnel skills and grades will be experienced. In the reserve forces, where the ability to match skills and grades can be complicated by geographic considerations and the time required to retrain personnel who may be available only on a part-time basis, adjustments to changes in force structure and missions will be even more difficult. Skill mismatches have a direct impact on the readiness of reserve units, and may in some cases limit DoD's ability to give missions to the reserve components. While this should not forestall reorganization of active and reserve missions to deal with changing threats, Congressional and DoD policymakers should recognize that--in the long run--stability in the missions assigned to individual reserve units is itself an important policy that will improve both the match between billets and skills and the overall readiness of reserve units.

Historically, the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, as well as the aviation units of the Naval Reserve, have been relatively successful in matching prior-service personnel to billets requiring the skills already held by those personnel. In part, this may be because--although these components rely heavily on prior-service recruits--they have been able to meet their recruiting goals using only a small proportion of the available pool of prior-service personnel from their services. The ground forces--the Marine Corps Reserve, the National Guard, and particularly the Army Reserve--have been less successful. Lack of MOS qualification is one of the primary reasons for low reported readiness ratings by ground units. It is a problem even for some units with high-priority missions.

The extent to which the Army Reserve has been structured to perform combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) missions clearly has contributed to the "skill mismatch" problems experienced by this component. There are relatively few CS/CSS units in the active component to produce prior-service personnel with the specific skills required by the Army Reserve. Moreover, the length of initial skill training often makes retraining difficult for part-time personnel. Adjustments in the structure of the Total Force that would provide greater balance in the distribution of CBT/CS/CSS units between the active and reserve components could alleviate this problem somewhat, although DoD cannot rely on this alone to generate the desired mix of prior-service personnel.

The mix of full-time and part-time manning within individual components and units also plays a role in determining the match between personnel and billets. In some reserve component aviation units, for example, high peacetime workloads and maintenance requirements result in as many as 30 percent of positions being filled by full-time personnel. Aviation units seeking skilled maintenance personnel for full-time positions can essentially recruit nationwide

whereas ground units seeking part-time maintenance personnel must recruit from a limited geographic area. Currently, the proportion of full-time personnel (including active component personnel temporarily assigned to support reserve units, reserve component members, DoD civilians with dual status as drilling members of reserve units, and DoD civilians without dual status) in the different reserve components ranges from approximately 26 percent in the Air National Guard to 10 percent in the Army Reserve. Although it is a relatively expensive policy, one approach to improving the match between personnel and billets would be authorize the assignment of full-time personnel (whether active-duty or reserve) to specific billets in reserve units that prove difficult to fill with part-time personnel from the local area.

There are a number of ongoing efforts to improve the match between the manpower requirements of reserve units and the personnel resources available to them. These initiatives include bonuses targeted toward prior-service personnel in critical skills and locations, enhanced training opportunities during regular monthly drill periods (to make reserve service more rewarding and to reduce personnel turbulence), and training courses designed to provide reservists with initial skill training in short segments that can be worked into the schedules of part-time personnel.

Once the transition to a smaller Total Force is complete and the accompanying temporary improvement in reserve recruiting prospects has passed, DoD will be in a position to assess whether additional policies are needed to improve the match between prior-service personnel and reserve billets as well as to increase the overall size of the prior-service pool and the proportion of those in the pool who choose to enlist in the reserves. If so, increased reliance on joint enlistments (enlistment contracts that involve an initial period of two or three years of active duty followed by two or three years of Selected Reserve service) could increase the supply of reserve personnel with specific skills. Such joint enlistments are already used to some extent by the Navy and the Army. DoD might also increase the size of the prior-service pool by bringing in more NPS recruits for short active-duty commitments. Since the size of the DoD training base is dictated in part by mobilization requirements, the additional training costs associated with such a policy might not be excessive. For units that rely on the kinds of skills that can be maintained through part-time military duty, the range of feasible active and reserve mixes is very wide, given sufficient flexibility in personnel policies. Due to the costs associated with alternative personnel policies, however, the cost advantage of reserve units relative to active units of the same type can be expected to decline as the proportion of the Total Force in the reserve component increases.

97

Mr. JEHN. What you have in front of you here, sir, are comments by 1 of the 22 other members of the Study Group. While we were hearing from Mr. Libby and some others that perhaps the study report and recommendations tilted in the direction of the Reserves too far, we were hearing from others that we were tilting too far in the Active direction.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

Mr. JEHN. So what Mr. Duncan and I had to do throughout the process of conducting this study was to walk, if you will, a line that balanced on the one hand those who would have had a much heavier Reserve emphasis in the report on one side, and those who would have had a much lighter Reserve emphasis on the other.

I think it is regrettable that everybody tends to focus on the comments of only one member of the study group, Mr. Libby. I am sure he is quite prepared and willing to discuss the basis and the reasons for his dissent, but let me assure you he was not the only one

we heard from and we heard loudly and frequently from many people in the process of doing this study, as you can well imagine.

A study group that consists of 24 separate, strong-minded, opinionated individuals in the Defense Department was not something that was conducive to producing a consensus report easily. And in the final analysis, we did not try to produce a consensus report.

We tried to present to the Secretary in a balanced fashion and in an honest fashion, the views of all members of the study group, to the greatest extent we could. I am not going to stand here—sit here rather—and try to tell you we did that in a perfect or unflawed way. But as mortals here, Mr. Duncan and I tried our best and I feel confident that that is exactly what we did.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Libby, would you tell us how you were so convincing in the reports you sent over there? They certainly did get attention. I do not know whether you were that convincing or whether it was the fact that you are the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources. Which do you think it was?

Mr. LIBBY. Well, I find it quite flattering that people are attributing to me the ability to push around Mr. Jehn and Mr. Duncan. [Laughter.]

I immediately will pass that back to my family so that they will treat me with more respect.

What this particular memo in front of you does is to look at language in a particular paper, which was a predecessor to an interim draft, and to say that in that context the language seemed to be too much in one direction.

In the course of my discussions with the Total Force Policy Group, I always found the discussions to be robust, to say the least, and contentious. This was the 12th of September 1990. This was about 6 weeks into the Iraq war. We were doing everything we could to be sure that the Total Force Policy Report fully complied with the speech that the President had given on August 2, 1990—that the sentiments expressed there and expressed by the Secretary through the DPRB process in the spring that I mentioned earlier were fully reflected in the Total Force Policy Report, and that is the spirit in which the comments were given.

In fact, I recall, I spoke to the chairman of the study group on the phone right after this memo was sent and we talked about it. We had agreement on some of the points raised in the memo.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

Mr. LIBBY. So I will be happy to certify for the record that Secretary Jehn and Secretary Duncan are not easily pushed around. [Laughter.]

Mr. JEHN. Well, without commenting on that point, I will just mention that Mr. Libby, regrettably, was not the only member of the study group I had long conversations with about this interim draft report. It consumed a lot of time. I think it was time well worth spending, and I think the Secretary was served well by the active and conscientious participation of Mr. Libby as well as his 21 colleagues on the study group.

Senator GLENN. In a slightly different but connected direction here, we have just been given the military base closure lists, of course, and those are under discussion and the Commission is

working on those right now. Were those selections of bases tied in with this Total Force Policy? And our reductions, not only policy, but the actual reductions that we were looking at in the future and what the Reserve and Regular roles are going to be?

Mr. JEHN. Sir, none of us, none of the witnesses here today were active participants in the base closure deliberations within the Department, but let me speak from my own personal knowledge that each of the departments—each of the services, used slightly different methods for making proposals to the Secretary that then were forwarded to the Congress. And among the criteria, both they and the Office of the Secretary of Defense used in putting together the final list that got submitted to the Congress, were in fact considerations having to do with where to expect the force structure to be in the Department 4 or 5 years from now.

In other words, there is no necessity for some bases because we expect a considerable reduction in the size of the force structure and consolidation on other bases to make better use of training facilities, training ranges, and the like. So that certainly an important criterion that was used in the compilation of that list was the force structure we expect to have and want to have in the Department 5 years from now.

Senator GLENN. Well, you must have all the different units then tailored right down to what you want it to be 5 years from now, and as outlined partially in this and so on. Do you have that outline to that extent? Otherwise, I do not see how we are picking bases without knowing what the forces are that are supposed to man the bases.

Mr. JEHN. Each of the services have been working exactly that way, sir.

Senator GLENN. Do they have it all spelled out so we can get a copy of what each service's specific units are and where they are going to be based and what this is going to look like in 5 years?

Mr. JEHN. I cannot speak to the detail as to the services' plans concerning, say, 1994 or 1995. Certainly the services know exactly which units they are going to move, which ones they are going to close and so on in 1992, for example.

Senator GLENN. Okay. General, did the CINCs sign off on all this, do you know?

General FEDOROCHKO. Sir, the base force?

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General FEDOROCHKO. The CINCs endorsed the base force, yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. They did, okay. And also this concept of Atlantic, Pacific, Contingency, and Strategic force packages, they are fully aware of what is going on under that?

General FEDOROCHKO. Yes, sir. It was discussed personally with them and the service chiefs and the Chairman. They were all together in a conference.

Senator GLENN. And we are realigning that much, but we are not changing the command structure, is that correct, what you said before?

General FEDOROCHKO. That is correct, sir. I mean, again, this is a conceptual thing. I do not want to mislead you.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General FEDOROCHKO. The UCP is being reviewed.

Senator GLENN. Okay. We are going to have to move along, we are most likely going to have some additional questions for you all. If you would please just stay at the table there, but I would like to also call up Brig. General Thomas Montgomery, Deputy Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Army; Brig. General Robert Rosenkranz, Army, Director of Force Programs Integration; Rear Adm. Edward Baker, Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Navy; Maj. Gen. Don Gardner, Marine Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs Division; Maj. Gen. Richard E. Hawley, Director of Operations, Air Force.

Gentlemen, come on up to the table, if you would, please.

And my time has already expired. Senator Smith, go ahead.

Senator SMITH. Go ahead. I have asked my questions.

Senator GLENN. You do not have any? Okay, fine.

General Montgomery, the assignment of four Army divisions to the contingency force indicates these divisions would be self-sustainable for a considerable period of time. I also note that there are no Reserve component units assigned to the contingency forces. Does this mean that you will be reassigning certain combat support and combat service support missions from the Reserve components to the Active?

General MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, the Army's contingency force will be a force of up to five divisions, one to five divisions, a balanced force that will have armor, infantry, special operations forces as a part of it. So it is a balanced force that can, in fact, be tailored depending on the contingency or the initial requirements.

The Reserve components will continue to play a vital role in the Army's contingency forces. There are a number of kinds of Reserve component organizations that support combat—combat support and combat service support, for instance; port handlers, and organizations like that—that will continue to play a vital role.

The contingency force will primarily be an Active component force, but it will not totally be an Active component force. It does, in fact, need to be sustainable for a period of time without significant call-up of Reserve component units, and it is our intention, then, that a larger percentage of the combat service support that supports the contingency force should be in the Active component.

Senator GLENN. That means you are going to be transferring some of those functions into those divisions, then, that are now in the Reserves.

General MONTGOMERY. Our intention is to do that, but in a way that is consistent with the needs of the contingency corps.

Mr. DUNCAN. Or to phrase it another way, Mr. Chairman, to make the Active forces and the Reserve forces a little more balanced, to place a little more support force for the rapid deployment forces for the short-term sustainment, understanding that anything that requires very much time at all, or is very large at all, will necessarily involve and require the use of Reserve component support forces.

Senator GLENN. Well, a contingency force would indicate that you are on a shorter time leash than you would otherwise be. That is the main difference here. You have to get there and you cannot wait to activate the Reserves, get them in, do whatever, combat

support, combat service support, so you are putting that into the regular function. That means there will be less in the Reserves at that point. Otherwise, you are just going to be over staffed. Why have them both places?

General MONTGOMERY. Sir, I would also add that we are really talking about a number at the margin here, too. It is not a significant adjustment.

Senator GLENN. Well, I do not know. I would have to look at some figures on that, I am afraid. Combat service support, we have about a 7-to-1 tooth-to-tail ratio, normally. That includes an awful lot of things and it is more than just combat support and combat service support, I know that. But I think you are talking about a transfer of quite a significant number of people to move enough combat support and service support people in that you can have sustained combat for, say, 30 days. That is a sizable move of people, I would think.

General ROSENKRANZ. Sir, that five division corps would have up to about 200,000 people in a corps fully deployed. We are going to adjust that piece of the corps that deploys initially with three divisions to give it the capability of sustaining itself for about 30 days. That requires an adjustment of somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000 troops.

Senator GLENN. General Montgomery, again, you plan to reduce Army Active component manpower by 27 percent; National Guard manpower by 30 percent; Reserve manpower by 28 percent from fiscal 1990 levels by the end of fiscal year 1995. With regard to the National Guard and Army Reserve manpower reductions, General Burdick, the Chief of Army National Guard and General Ward, the Commander of the Army Reserve, both testified before this committee in April that the force structure associated with the reductions had not yet been approved.

Their testimony further indicated that the manpower numbers were determined first and the Army was in the process of sorting out what forces and units would come out and when. So there is considerable uncertainty about what will be left and how much cross-leveling will be required. Is this the current state of play in the Army, or have you moved further down the road? That was just late April; it was about a month and a half ago.

General MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, that really should be addressed by General Rosenkranz, sir.

Senator GLENN. Fine. General?.

General ROSENKRANZ. Sir, the mechanism for determining what is going to come out is a very rigorous one, analytically based, and it comes to fruition over the next 60 days. It is further along than when they talked to you in April, but it is not complete. We go through a total Army analysis, based on requirements, then determine the types of units that have to come out.

Then it is given as a mandate to the major commands to determine which specific units will be coming out, and that is when we determine the geography. We are deeply enmeshed in that at the moment and, in fact, are briefing that this week and will continue to brief it and coordinate it.

One of the things that we should point out, in the actual geographic application of the reductions, is that there is a very strenu-

ous attempt to do that smart. We placed FORSCOM (U.S. Army Forces Command) in an oversight position for the two Reserve components to try to do it better than it has been done in the past because of the very large numbers in this case.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General ROSENKRANZ. That is ongoing at the moment.

Senator GLENN. Did the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have any role in formulating the manpower strength levels you plan, or were they just given numbers to hit?

General ROSENKRANZ. The numbers that we arrived at for reductions starts with the requirements given to us by JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Once we determine what the above-the-line force requirements are, then we determine how much comes out below that for support. So it is really a derivative process. They are engaged with us in determining the specifics of that, but pretty much it derives analytically.

Senator GLENN. How much did budget constraints, as opposed to force structure decisions, drive the manpower reductions in the Guard and Reserve?

General ROSENKRANZ. I think the budget constraint has the biggest impact on the ramp, but not on the end-state. The end-state is derived analytically, based on doctrinal requirements. So however we get to that last number is going to be impacted by the amount of money available along the path, and we try to do that smart to retain readiness.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General ROSENKRANZ. But the actual end-state number is based on an analysis of the doctrinal requirement.

Senator GLENN. Yes. You still plan to continue with the roundout concept?

General ROSENKRANZ. Yes, sir, we do. We have changed the roundout concept for the two contingency force heavy divisions. We have now fully structured those two divisions. They will however retain their affiliation with their Roundout brigade. These two roundup brigades will have an enhanced capability, really, in the sense that in addition to being potentially an additional brigade, or being employed separately, they may be employed when needed at a reduced level. That is, smaller component pieces of these brigades may be used to supplement the capabilities of the division. That's only for those two divisions.

For the three heavy divisions that are coming on later (1st, 4th, and 5th Mech), they will have Roundout brigades as they have always had them. They have two Active brigades, and one Reserve brigade each in these three divisions.

So the roundout concept, for these three divisions, is unchanged. It has however been adjusted for the two contingency heavy divisions, the 1st Cav and the 24th.

Senator GLENN. What would you do? Would you deploy a two-brigade division, then?

General ROSENKRANZ. No, sir, we would not. The way we have timed it, those three roundout divisions, based on our planning scenarios, should not be required before the Roundout brigades are trained, in terms of lift and requirements.

Senator GLENN. Well, the 48th took, what, about 60 days. They were just about ready when the war ended over there, correct?

General ROSENKRANZ. We estimate it may even take longer than that.

Senator GLENN. Does this mean any of your Roundout force, then, whatever the division was, the Roundout brigade being the time-setting factor there, you would not figure on deploying any of your divisions then under 60 days?

General ROSENKRANZ. The three later deploying divisions that have Roundout brigades, we do not envision as being required short of 60 days. They may be; in that case, we would have to take other—well, like we did this time. Take other adjustments and use a different brigade mix.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General ROSENKRANZ. But the two divisions that we envision going earliest, the 1st Cav and 24 MX for which we will have lift, are fully structured. They have three brigades. Their fourth brigade, in this case the 48th and 155th would come later. But the divisions themselves would still have three Active brigades.

Senator GLENN. So you still feel that there is enough advantage to the roundout concept that you are sticking with that.

General ROSENKRANZ. We need it. We have no way to fully structure those other three divisions (the 1st, 4th and 5th MX) and we see no need to. It is a very cost-effective use of the National Guard brigades in this case because we do not envision those three heavy divisions as being needed before their Roundout brigades can be ready. We do not envision the lift being available to move them before that 60 days elapses, so it makes a lot of sense to retain that concept.

Senator GLENN. Well, why was it not used that way in the Gulf, then? Why did you send the 24th when they had a Roundout brigade that was not ready?

General ROSENKRANZ. Well, we rounded it out with an Active brigade.

Senator GLENN. Yes, but that is something that you did not figure on in advance, was it?

General ROSENKRANZ. We did not.

Senator GLENN. Then why set up a situation where you are going to have to do the same thing all over again?

General ROSENKRANZ. We have a situation where we do not have to do it again. That is exactly why we took the 197th at Fort Benning and made it part of the 24th and added an Active brigade to the 1st Cav.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

General ROSENKRANZ. The 24th and 1st Cav will go with three brigades.

Senator GLENN. All right.

Mr. DUNCAN. The point is, the 24th Mech had to go before the 60 days. It had to go instantly, Senator.

Senator GLENN. I know. That is the reason I have always questioned that as a concept, because I just do not see why you set it up where you have that part of a unit, you may have to use them right now, but part of the unit is not going to be ready for 60 days.

You send them over later, sometime. Meanwhile, the first out that went over, the two brigades, are likely to be in combat.

Mr. DUNCAN. The point the General made, as I understand it—let him speak for himself—was that the divisions to which these Roundout brigades are rounded out would not be needed within the first 60 days.

Senator GLENN. I understand that, but what I was saying was that was not the way it happened this time.

General ROSENKRANZ. No, sir. No, sir. That was a lesson learned that we took to heart and we have made those two early deployers (the 24 MX and 1st Cav) full divisions.

Mr. DUNCAN. That is right. That is absolutely correct.

Senator GLENN. Yes, okay.

General Gardner, you have heard me address this a little while ago, you were in the room, I believe, here. There are apparently no Marine Corps units assigned to the contingency forces under this new base force plan. The immediate force would be the four Army divisions, seven Air Force fighter wings. These Army and Air Force units would be supplemented by the Marine and Navy units assigned to the Atlantic and Pacific forces.

Now, maybe General Fedorochko addressed this a little bit earlier, that the Marine forces that are assigned in the regional area, the Pacific Basin or the Atlantic, would really be the first contingency forces used and the other forces come in to back them up. Now, that is what you stated a while ago.

General FEDOROCHKO. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I think, again, we have a semantics thing that we could perhaps have done better with. As the Chairman has recently begun to suggest, what we are talking about here is a national contingency force. Forward-deployed forces, such as MEBs, MPS, et cetera, that are readily available to the CINCs are really their first reaction forces.

Senator GLENN. Yes. General Gardner, is that your understanding of this, too?

General GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to answer some questions. The Joint Staff has highlighted for you what the contingency force is made up of, and as you know, there are Marine forces specified in the Atlantic and the Pacific forces.

In the contingency force, you were briefed this morning that it is Marine Corps forces who provide flexible force. While the size unit is not specified, I would suggest to you, based on the Chairman's previous testimony in February to the Congress, that there is an enduring requirement for contingency forces and it is going to have to be contingency forces that are capable and can get there for an expected crisis in a hurry. And Marine forces are going to be forward deployed and will be available to be used by the CINCs.

I could give you an example, based on Desert Storm/Desert Shield. When the Chairman's testimony characterized contingency forces as including Marine forces and power projection forces, and he characterized the forces used in Desert Storm and Desert Shield as contingency forces, and for the Marine Corps we had two MEFs in Desert Storm.

So I would suggest to you that Marine forces under contingency forces could go as high as, for example, two MEFs in Desert Storm, or might go as low as a Marine Expeditionary Unit that is forward

deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, depending on what the crisis is.

So while the contingency force does not specify a size unit, on the slide you were briefed on this morning, it implies that Marine Corps forces could be either large or small.

Personally, I wish they were specified by size, but the Joint Staff has not chosen to do that. But we certainly see a contingency role for us to play and expect to play a role similar to the one we had in Desert Storm.

Senator GLENN. The Active component of the Marine Corps is being reduced by 19 percent; Reserve component is being reduced 21 percent in the base force plan. The Marine Corps has a commitment by law to maintain three Active divisions, three Active air wings. Will the Marine Corps be able to fulfill that kind of commitment with these cuts?

General GARDNER. Sir, the Congress set that in law some years ago, as the Senator already knows, and we expect in the future-year defense plan to still have three divisions and three wings and three FSSGs.

And to answer your question about the Reserves in the current future-year defense plan, the Marine Corps Reserve is reduced 20.7 percent, which is about equal to the Active Reserve cut.

Senator GLENN. If we reduce that much for the Marine Corps, will there be units in the Marine Corps, the so-called hollow units?

General GARDNER. Sir, as the Marine Corps programmer, it is my absolute desire and intent to influence this so that we have as balanced an Active and Reserve force structure as we possibly can. We are going to reduce some of our Reserve force structure, some of it will be expanded. I am very interested, for example, in those Reserve squadrons that we have in the Reserves that must get modernized during this process, and that is going to occur.

But the requirements of the new strategy brings us down to a smaller force. I will do my very best to ensure that neither the Active force or the Reserve force are hollow.

Senator GLENN. Describe briefly how the Marine Corps used the Reserves. You integrated them into the units more I believe than the other services did. And I think that was the concept. And, as opposed to the roundout concept, it is a different way of doing things. How did that work and do you plan to go ahead—what are your plans for the future?

General GARDNER. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you already know there is a division, wing and FFSG in the Reserve, and we have about 5,000 Active duty Marines who work with the Reserves on a regular basis training and helping to train on equipment, and keep them organized. This is what every chief is required to do, and that is going to continue. And that is in part I think why they are successful and why they come to us fairly well trained. We called for them at about the 60-day point to assist us.

Clearly, in the future when we draw down to the kind of strengths that we are going to be in 1997, it will take 100 percent of the Reserve force if we get a Desert Storm-type mission. We are going to need them, and they are going to have to be ready to go. We are going to depend on them to be ready to go, and intend to integrate them as we did in Desert Storm.

Secretary Duncan has already referred to you this morning, Company B, of the 4th Tank Battalion. They went over equipped with M-60s, traded their tanks in, got the newer ones and went in the attack with the 2d Marine Division and destroyed some 59 Iraqi tanks and 28 BMPs. They did such a remarkable job that General Keys has reported to me that Reserves could not perform better for him. So they were an integral part of our success in Desert Storm and we expect them to be in the future.

Senator GLENN. Well, if we go through this 21 percent reduction in selective reserve strength though, what is that going to do to the Total Force concept strength of the readiness of the Marine Corps?

General GARDNER. It will make our U.S. Marine Corps Reserve reduction, percentage-wise, about the same size as the Active duty Marine Corps. Because we need a rotation base of some reasonable size and because we have so much of your Active duty Marine Corps forward deployed, we have to be very careful walking that line of how many units we put in the Reserve and how many we put on the Active side. But I am sensitive to what you have said to us here this morning, and we are looking for the optimum utilization of our Reserve. And we may get the best fit the best way we possibly can to achieve the missions given to the entire Marine Corps.

Senator GLENN. Okay, well, I expressed myself a little while ago about this. And on this contingency force, I did not like what I was seeing, and the way it was just outlined here, and I was glad to hear General Fedorochko's statement about this, about what the use would be, because that is a whole different thing than I got out of the Total Force Policy, with all due respect to the authors over here who want to see that be the way it gets carried out.

Admiral Baker, Active component strength for the Navy is reduced by 13 percent, selective reserve strength is reduced by 23 percent in the base force plan. What force structure reductions drive these manpower reductions in the Naval Reserve?

Admiral BAKER. Mr. Chairman, 80 percent of the Naval Reserve is tied to augment, sustaining, and reenforcement. Only 20 percent are tied to particular equipment, ships, and aircraft squadrons. So the cut in the Naval Reserve would come predominantly out of the 80 percent component I just mentioned.

The Navy right now is going through an analysis—we call it the Innovative Reserve Study. It is a zero-based scrub of Reserve missions and the mix between Active and Reserve. We are doing that using the lessons learned from Desert Storm and Desert Shield. This effort will be concluded in about 3 or 4 months. And at that time we will be in a better position to give you an answer on the particular mix between the Active and the Reserve.

Senator GLENN. Do you see any difference in the mission of the Naval Reserve and the base force plan that is going to be very different from the current mission?

Admiral BAKER. There probably will be some differences. But as we look at the new strategy and work our way down the logic stream and look very, very carefully at what the Reserves can and should do and what the Active can and should do, it could very well be that we will see some missions change from Active to Reserve or vice versa.

By the same token we do not want to fall in the trap of having any mission in the Reserves, or any one mission completely in the Active, because there is mutual support between the two.

Senator GLENN. When are we going to get all these changes now? In the Total Force Policy you are saying we are still studying this or something else, or something else, but we cannot vote maybe. We have to vote yes or no on a budget. We have to vote yes or no on a certain number of people, and I have to give a recommendation to Chairman Nunn on the manpower and so on out of this subcommittee. And we have to deal in finite numbers. We cannot deal in waiting for a study. We have to vote for a number. When are we going to have all these figures done?

Mr. DUNCAN. Senator, the figures are done. They are reflected in the President's budget. That does not mean we stop work as soon as one budget is submitted. We are continuing to evaluate these things, and next year we will have new recommendations to the Secretary, but our recommendations are reflected in the President's budget.

Senator GLENN. But there are several places in here, and I did not specifically mark them, but there are several places in there where you referred to ongoing studies that would alter so and so and so and so. When do we get those?

Mr. DUNCAN. There are many studies. I mean we will be studying the results of Desert Storm for at least months, probably years and as we do that it will be reflected in future budgets. But right now this is our best judgment.

Senator GLENN. Just one note of caution, I think Desert Storm was not our typical war, if there is such a thing as a typical war. You are operating out in the sands, and then you also had the weather conditions. This was not Vietnam. You did not have things hidden under forests.

Mr. DUNCAN. I only cited that as one example of the ongoing studies.

Senator GLENN. I just hope that we are not basing everything, all our planning for the future and our equipment and manning levels and everything else on Desert Storm which turned into a reasonably nonlethal war, thank heaven. So we cannot depend on that for the future.

General Hawley, the Air Force is the only service in which the Reserve component, the Air Reserve and the Air National Guard, increases in relation to the Active component in the base force plan. So one service has seemed to have stuck by the DOD policy to place maximum reliance on Guard and Reserve units' manpower. What will be the mission of the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve and the base force plan? Does it change any or are you just moving a few functions over?

General HAWLEY. Sir, our Reserve components will continue to perform the basic mix of missions that they perform today. But in each of those missions areas, with the exception of the strategic bomber and missile forces, they will increase the proportion of the total force that they represent. That is made possible by and large by our reduced requirement to maintain permanently based forces overseas.

As you know, one of the major drivers for the size of the Active forces is the rotation base requirement. So some of the planned reduction in our overseas presence permit a larger reliance on the Reserve force. That is particularly true in the fighter forces. To some extent we are also experiencing growth in the tactical airlift and in the strategic tanker forces. Similar reasons permit those kinds of increases and we do that because we recognize the efficiencies to be gained by maintaining force structure in the Reserve components.

Senator GLENN. What percent of your people would be people who had any experience out of Vietnam? That was a big factor for a while in the Air Force Reserve and Guard being exceptionally good. They won weapons contests and everything else, but they were basically experienced people out of Vietnam. Are most of those people now phased out or do you still have cadre of them that are leaders in the Reserves?

General HAWLEY. We still have Vietnam experienced people in both the Active and the Reserve. As you know, it has been nearly 20 years since the last combat in Southeast Asia. So they are at the fairly senior leadership positions now, as opposed to down in the tactical leadership environment.

Mr. DUNCAN. I might add, Senator, they do exist though. The 926th Tactical Fighter Group of the Air Force Reserve just had a squadron of A-10s come home. And one of the old Vietnam vets, in a single day, destroyed 10 Scud launchers and 2 ammunition dumps flying an A-10.

Senator GLENN. Pretty good. Mr. Libby, the central concept of the base force plan is reconstitution. As has been described, the concept includes among other things detailed and accurate plans for gradual mobilization of national assets in response to strategic warning and the ability to regenerate forces through activation of cadre units and to create additional new units. How well is that concept fleshed out? In other words have you developed the detailed and accurate plans called for in this concept?

Mr. LIBBY. Sir, the JCS and each of the services is working on developing detailed plans to flesh out this concept. I do not know the particular level of detail reached therefore in each service.

Senator GLENN. We are going to have to move on gentlemen. And, as I said before we may have additional comments or additional questions submitted to you. We would appreciate an early response so we could include them with the record. As always with these hearings and you gentlemen, we get into all sorts of things and they are always very interesting. And we hope you would respond to our questions as fast as possible so we can include them in the record.

Thank you much.

I want to invite Panel 2 to take their places at the witness table and I thank them for being so patient with us this morning.

Maj. Gen. Robert Ensslin, President, National Guard Association, accompanied by Lt. Gen. LaVern Weber, Executive Director, National Guard Association of the United States; Maj. Gen. Evan Hultman, retired U.S. Army, Executive Director, Reserve Officers Association of the United States; Rear Adm. Lester Robert Smith, Naval Reserve, retired, National President, Naval Reserve Associa-

tion; Col. Kevin Doyle, USMC, Reserve, President, Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association.

Gentlemen, we welcome you. I know each of you have submitted a written statement which we have included in the record earlier. I would ask each of you to briefly summarize the perspective of your respective organizations on the future role of our National Guard and Reserve components.

General Ensslin, perhaps you could lead off for us this morning. I believe all of you gentlemen have been in the room so you have heard what direction we have taken on everything this morning. Any comments on earlier testimony or your own comments, either one, are welcome. General Ensslin.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT F. ENSSLIN, JR., PRESIDENT, NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. LAVERN WEBER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

General ENSSLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate the opportunity to be here and speak to you and your committee. The National Guard Association agrees that the Total Force Policy Study Group did not deliver the mail. We felt that a lot of the preliminary detailed work of that study group was ignored in favor of a report that really supported the proposed base force strategy. There were some principles that were initiated early in the study that we felt were eliminated by the time the report was printed.

And one principle was the rebuttable presumption principle which stated that basically if a mission was significantly less costly when it was assigned to the Guard and Reserve, it should be assigned to those components unless it was rebutted for a sound military reason.

Senator GLENN. Well, now, they backed that up and said that is still Pentagon policy, too. I questioned them very specifically on that this morning and they all agreed that that is policy.

General ENSSLIN. Yes, sir, but it was not so stated in the report.

We feel that the Total Force Policy which we have been operating with since the early 1970s works, and that it was just proven in Desert Storm. We feel that the most advantageous mix of Active, Guard, and Reserve forces needs to be developed. We can appreciate that there may be some differences of opinion between men of goodwill about what that mix should be. But we believe that if you utilize the Guard and Reserve fully, you can have a larger total force for a given budget or you can have the same size force for a lower budget.

With the exception of some failures to follow the policy in the areas particularly of equipping and employing the Guard and Reserve, the Total Force Policy has been a great success.

Overall the Guard is better manned, equipped, and trained than it has been at anytime in its history. With some fine tuning in the training arena and a dedication to the integration of forces by the leadership of DOD and military services, the National Guard can play at least as large a role in the base force strategy as it has in the recent Warsaw Pact strategy.

Even a cursory review of the roles and missions of the Air Guard proves that point. It would take only a commitment to validation of unit readiness and a firm intention to integrate and employ Army Guard units to achieve the same end in the Army. We feel that the Army needs a validation process in which it can have confidence. The Air Force has a validation process that gives them full confidence in the capabilities of their Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units.

Another great concern that we have is in the area of lift. In a very cost-constrained environment, and it is obvious that we are in that, we questioned the viability of putting roles and missions and force structure on active duty that cannot be delivered to the point of crisis in less than 60 to 90 days. Given that opportunity to mobilize, prepare, and deploy Guard and Reserve forces, we think you can make a strong case for putting that structure which is beyond initial lift capability in the Guard and Reserve. We think that the lessons that we have learned in this mobilization can serve us well.

One thing that became very apparent to National Guard leaders in the States as the mobilization progressed was what happened to public opinion as thousands of Guard and Reserve units were mobilized across the country. In Florida we had units from town like Appalachicola, Prairie, Live Oak, Lake Wales, mobilized. And as those units were sent away from their home towns, those towns had an ownership in Desert Storm. It belonged to them. They supported it. They were part of it.

That was in great contrast to the Vietnam conflict when people as individuals came and went to be a part of that conflict and it did not really touch the hinterlands of the country as Desert Storm did. And we feel that is an important part of total force.

I think when General Abrams fostered the total force concept, he had it in his mind that we should not again go to war without the full participation and full support of the country. He designed a structure for the Army that really required that the Guard and Reserve be employed when we got into any kind of extensive conflict. We feel that that was also validated by this mobilization.

We do not want to overlook the key roles that the Guard plays in the States. Counter-narcotics activities have been very important in the National Guard in recent years. We have in the State of Florida at least 200 Guardsmen and women on active duty everyday of the week in support of various counter-narcotics activities. That kind of activity really reenforces the readiness of our units.

We urge the committee to evaluate force structure alternatives to support the base-force strategy considering cost effectiveness, world instability, political consensus, and the successes of Total Force Policy before accepting the force structure and force-mixed proposals or the resulting end-strength reductions contained in the fiscal years 1992–1993 defense budget. We especially thank the committee for your actions last year on behalf of the National Guard, particularly in maintaining National Guard end-strength.

In closing let me reiterate the conviction of the National Guard Association that the 1973 Total Force Policy has been tested and demonstrated successful. That policy must continue to be the nucleus of our defense strategy for the 1990s, and we urge this committee to strongly support this proven policy.

[The prepared statement of General Ensslin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. ROBERT F. ENSSLIN, JR., PRESIDENT, NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss the most important issues facing the National Guard today—the continuation of a viable Total Force Policy and development of an effective mix of Active, Guard and Reserve force structure for the future.

While the focus of this hearing is on the Department of Defense Total Force Policy Study Group Report to the Congress, our comments go beyond a discussion of that report to explore alternatives. The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) is convinced that the report intentionally only validates past management procedures and supports the recently developed "Base Force" defense strategy. It does not provide an evaluation of, or recommendations on, the methodology used in the assignment of missions between and within Active, Guard and Reserve components, as directed in the fiscal year 1990 National Defense Authorization Act. We believe that this is a critical omission.

As a result, we believe the DOD report takes too narrow a perspective. It does not present a flexible set of principles which can be used in providing guidance for future force structure decisions or a changing world environment. In effect, it provides only one point of view. It addresses a pre-determined strategy with no basis for supporting that strategy emerging from study group efforts. Further, no alternatives are offered for consideration or comparison.

THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

The National Guard Association has reviewed the original documents establishing the Total Force Concept in 1970 and the Total Force Policy in 1973, copies of which are attached. Except for minor editing, and update of titles of those responsible for actions, we believe these documents should continue as the central guidance for the Total Force of the future. These guiding principles have resulted in increasingly successful integration of Active, Guard and Reserve forces over the past 20 years and are adequate to serve as the basis for continued improvement in the future.

The 1970 memorandum set the tone for the Total Force Policy when it discussed the need to reduce expenditures in fiscal year 1971 and future budgets. It stated: "Within the Department of Defense, these economies will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the Active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserves."

The 1970 memorandum went on to state: "Emphasis will be given to concurrent consideration of the total forces, Active and Reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve forces." It then continued with aversion of what we will refer to later as the "rebuttable presumption" when it stated: "Application of the concept will be geared to recognition that in many instances the lower peacetime sustaining cost of Reserve force units, compared to similar Active units, can result in a larger total force for a given budget or the same size force for a lesser budget. In addition, attention will be given to the fact that Guard and Reserve forces can perform peacetime missions as a by-product or adjunct of training with significant manpower and monetary savings." Finally the memorandum assigned responsibility for actions to achieve a series of objectives which have substantially been achieved over the past 20 years and which could be restated as objectives to be maintained in the future.

The 1973 memorandum did little to change the concept. What it did was reemphasize the validity of the policy and specify actions to be taken to improve the mobilization process and to ensure that Guard and Reserve units would be able to meet the readiness standards required for wartime contingencies. The memorandum recognized the progress made in the Air Force and Marine Corps components and indicated an anticipation that strong command emphasis and good selection of leaders in the Army would result in visible improvement in Army components.

It is difficult to determine any significant differences between the conditions which led to the development of the Total Force Policy in the early 1970s and those we are facing in 1991. The driving forces for that change were severe budget constraints, a force reduction and the need for political consensus on military spending

and action. The two Department of Defense Memoranda could adequately serve as guidance for developing the Total Force of the 1990s.

NGAUS STUDY GROUP SUGGESTIONS

In an attempt to identify methods to ensure that the Total Force Policy will work effectively in the future, our Association recently convened a study group to examine the DOD Total Force Policy Study Group Report, the available details of the Base Force strategy, and some of the early lessons learned from the call-up for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. A copy of the NGAUS Study Group Report is attached.

The Study Group concluded that the Total Force and especially that portion related to combat roundout units, could be improved through greater interaction or integration of Active and Guard forces. Of particular concern was the lack of consistent readiness measurement standards throughout the Total Army and an apparent lack of faith by the Army leadership in their readiness reporting system, in general, and in the reported readiness of the Army Guard Roundout brigades, in particular. The Study Group recommended that the Guard unit readiness be made an integral part of the parent division readiness as the first step in developing a credible, validated readiness capability before mobilization, so that all participants have confidence in the rating.

A second basic change that was recommended is legislative relief to automatically mobilize roundout units at the time the parent unit is alerted for deployment. Such a provision eliminates the political indecision encountered in previous contingency operations and the reduction of military and Department of Defense leaders in the recent call-up. While the call-up could be reversed, it would initially make automatic the decision to approve the mobilization of the roundout units consistent with operational plans and requirements.

The Study Group also recommended that lessons learned in the Desert Shield/Desert Storm call-up be incorporated into future plans and programs to improve the integration of administration, logistics and training prior to mobilization in order to facilitate mobilization processing. Although the call-up was certainly a dramatic success, processing procedures can be improved.

Finally, the Study Group suggested that two guiding principles should be used when developing force structure and force mix. They are:

1. If a unit is required in the structure but is not required for immediate deployment, then cost effectiveness would normally dictate that it be in the Guard.

2. If lift is not available to transport a unit within 60 days, then that unit would usually be in the National Guard.

The first principle is quite similar to one of a series of "initial planning principles" included in a draft version of the DOD Total Force Policy Study Group Report. It had previously been referred to as the "rebuttable presumption" and stated: "If significant cost savings can be achieved by a transfer of force structure to a Reserve component (for the performance of a particular mission), a working presumption should be established that the transfer should be made. The presumption can then be rebutted by the demonstration of a sound military reason why the transfer should not be made (e.g., that the mission requires a specific forward-deployed unit for a period of several months)." The list of principles was subsequently dropped from the report.

The second NGAUS Study Group principle is based on the conclusion that post-mobilization training would not be a constraining factor for any unit for which lift to the theater of operation is not available within 60 days. The Group was convinced that, except for problems caused by lack of timely delivery of modern equipment and a current state-of-the-art logistics system, the difficulties encountered by the Army National Guard Roundout brigades were no different than those encountered by other Active and Reserve units. The units could and would have been ready by the time lift was available if they had been called when the parent division was alerted for deployment.

The deliberations of the NGAUS Study Group, and the majority of the comments in its report, were directed toward the proposed force structure reductions in the Army National Guard. The Study Group did discuss the roles and missions of the Air National Guard, but found the efforts by the Air Force to include the Air Guard in peacetime missions and training had been extremely successful. Those efforts had prepared the Air National Guard for almost immediate integration into the contingency operations of the Air Force. They had also disproved the position held by many that missions requiring a high level of technical skills, or integration into a large unit coordinated effort, could not be preformed by Guard or Reserve units. The budget program not only does not reflect similar cuts for the Air Guard and Air Force, but actually increases slightly the Air Guard strength in the budget years.

At the same time the integration of the Air components continues to improve, the failure of the Army to follow contingency plans for call-up of Army Guard combat units appears to have reversed much of the progress made over the past few years. The National Guard Association is concerned that a reversal of that progress is being incorporated into the Base Force strategy.

VALUE FOR THE DEFENSE DOLLAR

It is incumbent on our Nation's leaders to develop the most cost effective defense formula for long-term force mix and resourcing. The National Guard community has some major concerns about the proposed Base Force strategy and, therefore, the conclusions of the Total Force Policy Study Group Report. The strategy, in our view, could destroy the successful balance achieved under the Total Force Policy and negate the progress made over the past 20 years.

Continued reliance on the National Guard and its proven capabilities is a cost-effective and efficient method of achieving the best defense for the dollars available. The Total Force Policy Study Group Report data confirms that National Guard and Reserve units consistently provide a cost savings. The savings realized may be as high as 75 percent for certain ground units. Even units with a high level of full-time support and high operating tempo usually provide savings of 25 percent or more.

We are not in an economic environment that can support fully resourcing and modernizing units at home, keeping a substantial forward deployed presence and maintaining a wide array of pre-positioned stocks around the world. At the same time, the National Guard Association is not convinced that a strategy of dependence on reconstitution of a substantial portion of our defense forces, cadre elements in the Guard and exclusion of Reserve component combat elements from many contingencies is the most effective solution to the potential range of threats facing us in the 1990s.

Reconstitution is a most troublesome concept in the new strategy since it is a mainstay in developing the required force relatively early in any major contingency. The strategy implies that reconstitution will be rapid, but leaves undefined the period from decision to trained forces on the ground. A stated basic premise relies on an underlying ability/willingness to quickly rebuild our forces in the future when we recognize that the Base Force is not adequate to meet an increased threat.

Historically, this Nation has not heeded warnings of impending military threats and responded decisively. Further, recent history should caution that the pace of modern world events may not provide long-lead warning time. We firmly believe that conscription would be essential to reconstitute the size force being considered. A decision to initiate a draft, particularly based on early indications of an increased threat, is fraught with unpredictable, and probably unacceptable, political consequences. On the other hand, with a larger fully structured National Guard and Reserve force in being, intelligence gathering and diplomatic actions could proceed without jeopardy until military actions were required.

In order to convince the American public to support a force of appropriate size and capability, it will be necessary to create the most efficient force at the least possible cost. Peacetime missions will certainly be a measure of value for investment. Because of the multiple benefits National Guard forces can provide, and their ability to link the community and defense needs, the Guard is the best value for the Nation in the 1990s.

The National Guard's unique dual State/Federal status acts as a service multiplier. The Guard can perform a myriad of counternarcotics functions and serve the communities of the Nation as a by-product of military training and through volunteer efforts. The Guard also provides benefits from nation building training exercises performed around the globe.

SUMMARY

The Army and Air National Guard are a proven, capable force. In view of the continuing uncertainty of the threat and the economic forecast, the Guard represents a cost-effective means of buying more defense for less expenditure. During the Department of Defense review of the Total Force Policy, a guiding principle for force structure decisions was proposed. It stated that the presumption should be made that structure should go into the National Guard and Reserve unless a sound military reason was provided as to why it must be placed in the Active component. Since we know that lift capability is and will continue to be a constraining resource, an additional criteria for force structure decisions should be the availability of transportation. If forces cannot be moved in 60 days, they should be placed in the National Guard and Reserve because of the cost effectiveness of those components.

The National Guard Association believes the fiscally responsible approach is to maintain maximum force structure at minimum cost. It is better to maintain a larger cross Section of the force structure in the National Guard and Reserve at a lower operating tempo, and have it if required, than to drastically reduce the Total Force and have insufficient structure.

We ask the committee to provide the Nation with the most effective national defense by preserving the fundamental principles of the 1970 and 1973 Total Force Policy memoranda. It is equally important to maintain the Total Force at strength levels sufficient to effectively train, to sustain interoperability between Active, Guard and Reserve elements and to attract and retain quality personnel. We strongly recommend that the committee evaluate force structure alternatives to support the Base Force strategy, considering cost effectiveness, world instability, political consensus, and the successes of the Total Force Policy before accepting a force structure/force mix philosophy which results in reductions in strength in the National Guard and Reserve as great as, if not greater than, the Active Army.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D C 20301

AUG 21 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Department of Defense Agencies

SUBJECT: Support for Guard and Reserve Forces

The President has requested reduced expenditures during Fiscal Year 1971 and extension of these economies into future budgets. Within the Department of Defense, these economies will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserves. I am concerned with the readiness of Guard and Reserve units to respond to contingency requirements and with the lack of resources that have been made available to Guard and Reserve commanders to improve Guard and Reserve readiness.

Public Law 90-168, an outgrowth of similar Congressional concern, places responsibility with the respective Secretaries of the Military Departments for recruiting, organizing, equipping and training of Guard and Reserve Forces. I desire that the Secretaries of the Military Departments provide, in the FY 1972 and future budgets, the necessary resources to permit the appropriate balance in the development of Active, Guard and Reserve Forces.

Emphasis will be given to concurrent consideration of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve Forces. Application of the concept will be geared to recognition that in many instances the lower peacetime sustaining costs of reserve force units, compared to similar active units, can result in a larger total force for a given budget or the same size force for a lesser budget. In addition, attention will be given to the fact that Guard and Reserve Forces can perform peacetime missions as a by-product or adjunct of training with significant manpower and monetary savings.

Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces. Toward this end, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is responsible for coordinating and monitoring actions to achieve the following objectives:

- Increase the readiness, reliability and timely responsiveness of the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserve and individuals of the Reserve.

- Support and maintain minimum average trained strengths of the Selected Reserve as mandated by Congress.

- Provide and maintain combat standard equipment for Guard and Reserve units in the necessary quantities; and provide the necessary controls to identify resources committed for Guard and Reserve logistic support through the planning, programming, budgeting, procurement and distribution cycle.

- Implement the approved ten-year construction programs for the Guard and Reserves, subject to their accommodation within the currently approved TOA, with priority to facilities that will provide the greatest improvement in readiness levels.

- Provide adequate support of individual and unit reserve training programs.

- Provide manning levels for technicians and training and administration reserve support personnel (TARS) equal to full authorization levels.

- Program adequate resources and establish necessary priorities to achieve readiness levels required by appropriate guidance documents as rapidly as possible.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

AUG 23 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Director, Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation
Directors of Defense Agencies

SUBJECT: Readiness of the Selected Reserve

An integral part of the central purpose of this Department -- to build and maintain the necessary forces to deter war and to defend our country -- is the Total Force Policy as it pertains to the Guard and Reserve. It must be clearly understood that implicit in the Total Force Policy, as emphasized by Presidential and National Security Council documents, the Congress and Secretary of Defense policy, is the fact that the Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the Active forces.

Total Force is no longer a "concept." It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole.

As a result of this policy, the Selected Reserve has moved towards timely responsiveness and combat capability. Application of this policy has improved equipping, funding, facilities, construction, programing and some training areas.

I recognize and appreciate the great amount of effort that has been made to develop the Guard and Reserve. Progress has been made. However, gross readiness measurements (which should be improved) indicate that we have not yet reached a level consistent with the objective response times. It is clear that we should move as much post-mobilization administration as possible to the pre-mobilization period and streamline all remaining post-mobilization administrative and training activities.

We must assure that the readiness gains in the Selected Reserves are maintained and that we move vigorously ahead to reach required readiness and deployment response times in areas still deficient.

I want each Service Secretary to approach affirmatively the goals of producing Selected Reserve units which will meet readiness standards required for wartime contingencies. Each Secretary will provide the manning, equipping, training, facilities, construction and maintenance necessary to assure that the Selected Reserve units meet deployment times and readiness required by contingency plans. You will have my support and personal interest in overcoming any obstacles in these areas.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is charged by statute and by Defense policy and Directives with the responsibility for all matters concerning Reserve Affairs. It is my desire that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, as a matter of priority, take such actions as are necessary to bring the Selected Reserve to readiness goals. In this respect, the Services, the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation and other Defense Agencies will provide support on a priority basis. Particular emphasis will be placed on assistance in manning, equipping and training. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) will continue to function in accord with current statutes and directives.

To emphasize and to strengthen Selected Reserve management, I suggest a civilian Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs in the office of each of the Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. This Deputy should be supported by an adequate staff and be assigned responsibilities and functions similar to those assigned the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

At the military level, the Navy has been given specific guidelines for developing the new office of Chief of Naval Reserve. The Air Force and Marine Corps management structure has produced combat readiness and that is the vital test. I expect that the Army's reorganization, with strong command emphasis and good selection of leaders will produce demonstrably visible improvement and I shall follow the results with interest.

The Chiefs of the National Guard and Reserve components will be the staff level managers of the Guard and Reserve programs, budgets, policy, funds, force structure, plans, etc. They will be provided the authority, responsibility and means with which to accomplish their functions effectively. The overall management responsibility of the Chiefs of the Selected Reserve, under the Service Chiefs, will be supported by all other appropriate staff agencies.

In addition to the foregoing emphasis on Reserve Force policy and management, I am asking my Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, with your support, to manage a study covering the issues of availability, force mix, limitations and potential of Guard and Reserve Forces.

In summary, strong management with achievement of readiness levels in the Selected Reserve is among our highest priorities -- we must and will accomplish this objective as soon as possible.

NGAUS Force Structure Study Group Report

The National Guard Association of the United States is deeply concerned about Army National Guard force reductions programmed over the next 5 years. The programmed force appears to continue the reliance on a large standing Army rather than the historical precedence of greater emphasis on a militia. This force fails to adequately recognize the cost effectiveness and dual benefits of the National Guard in providing national defense and state and local support during emergencies, disaster relief and support of counter narcotics efforts.

These reductions raise many questions. Foremost among them are:

•• What is the prime factor in deciding if force structure should be in the active or Guard and Reserve?

Missions should be assigned to the Guard and Reserve unless there are "sound and apparent military reasons for assigning the missions to the Active forces."

•• Are the programmed force reductions the most effective way to reduce conventional defense expenditures?

There is a significant cost savings associated with National Guard organizations. Cost comparisons must be made. For example, in FY92 dollars, it requires $801 million to man and operate an armored division in the Active Army. If this armored division were in the National Guard it would cost $211 million. A decision to maintain structure in the active component is questionable if the National Guard can perform the mission and lift is not available in the first 60 days.

•• What effect will large force structure reductions in the National Guard have on the broad base of public support for the military throughout the nation?

In many communities the Guard is the only visible tie to national defense. The benefit of this tie was clearly evident when communities, because of their sense of "ownership" of Guard and Reserve units, supported the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operation. State and local communities have always relied on the National Guard for assistance in the protection of life, property and the preservation of peace. A significant reduction in the National Guard would have an immediate and negative impact on public support of the military.

•• Is the drastic reduction in the Total Army well considered in view of the volatile political changes that are taking place in the world and the continuing evolution of regional threats?

DoD leaders have stated in testimony before Congress that the programmed Army force structure will not be sufficient to meet the threat estimate. Based on these statements the reduction of approximately 500,000 force structure spaces appears to be too great a loss of military capability. Desert Shield/Desert Storm clearly showed the need for force structure beyond that required for a single contingency. It also demonstrated the need for forces to backfill deployed forces to meet other unexpected requirements. Many of the units scheduled for deactivation under the current down-sizing plan were required during the Southwest Asia operations. When viewed from a cost effectiveness and capability perspective, reductions in the Army National Guard do not seem prudent.

•• Should force structure changes be implemented prior to a full review of the lessons learned in the Southwest Asia contingency in the context of a rapidly changing strategic environment?

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the first "real world" test of the Total Force Policy. Most aspects of the mobilization, deployment and subsequent performance exceeded expectations. An assessment must be made that goes beyond a single contingency. That assessment must include consideration of the wide array of threats in a larger strategic environment. The Policy worked well and only needs fine-tuning to meet the demands of the future.

•• How did the Army's readiness reporting system impact on the recent call up of the National Guard?

Lack of confidence by the Army in it's readiness reporting system was clearly detrimental to the callup of National Guard combat units. The Army's system has proven to be too subjective and lacks standardization. The readiness reporting process must be reviewed to provide for a system of validation in order to ensure full acceptance of a unit's readiness report. Other service reporting systems, such as the Air Force system, should be considered in the review.

Answers to these questions should be weighed before the most stable part of the conventional defense forces, the National Guard, is drastically reduced. Without a full and analytical review of world events during the past year we may unnecessarily cut military capability. Reduction of National Guard structure should be delayed while this nation determines how best to meet the evolving threat.

Investment of tax dollars in the Total Army has created a quality force. This is certainly evident in the National Guard. The Total Force Policy and the resulting increase of support to the National Guard has borne fruit. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm has provided visible proof. Artillery brigades, engineers, military police, transportation, maintenance and other service support units, mobilized quickly and with little or no post mobilization training deployed to the theater and performed their mission.

Of special significance was the performance of the Army Guard's combat units. The two field artillery brigades called and deployed to Southwest Asia met Army expectations and integrated into maneuver operations. These units participated in combat with some of the most complex equipment in the Army arsenal. The Roundout brigades proved that Guard combat units could be validated combat-ready in the prescribed period of time, even when faced with serious challenges, to include lack of modern equipment for integration of information management systems and new combat equipment training.

We believe the readiness reporting system must be fixed before drastic reductions to the National Guard are implemented. Defining readiness is difficult because many factors must be considered. Measurement of Total Army readiness must include operational, logistical and administrative factors. Substitution of major systems that cannot perform the primary function in combat should be eliminated. Information management systems, especially in the Roundout units, must match the Active Army systems. Consistent readiness measurement standards must be established throughout the Total Army.

It is also incumbent, while assessing improvements to the readiness evaluation process, to ensure that the readiness reports of Roundout units are a part of the parent units' readiness report. Until there is a comprehensive, coherent and standardized system for evaluating "unit combat readiness," combat units will continue to be rated subjectively and not objectively. A readiness reporting system must be developed that is credible and validates capability before mobilization so that all participants have confidence in the rating.

As integral as the National Guard has become in the Total Force, we recognize that there are currently limitations in place that might preclude using the Guard in contingency missions. Presidential call-up authority should be reviewed and legislative relief sought to extend that authority to 180 days with an additional 180 day extension. Legislative relief should also be sought to automatically mobilize Roundout units if the parent unit is called. Removal of these two impediments would help overcome political reluctance to use the Guard because of time limitations.

Other improvements to the mobilization process are required. Our present mobilization planning is based on full mobilization and not partial call-ups for contingency missions. We also learned that mobilization stations were not fully prepared to deal with receiving, processing and deploying Guard and Reserve units.

It is even more difficult to structure a force to meet emerging threats in a multi-polar environment than it was to meet a Soviet Central European threat. The type of future combat environment our forces might have to be inserted into is uncertain. Recent history has seen American forces involved in a jungle environment and a desert environment while training was primarily directed to a European scenario. Host nation support is also uncertain, not just because of the varied port capabilities across the world but also because of the level of local political support for American forces. This spectrum of challenges focuses very closely on lift capability and on what will actually be available to move American forces. If lift is not available to transport a unit within 60 days, and the mission can be performed by the Guard, then that unit should be in the Guard.

Assessment of the threat and development of a corresponding strategy determines force structure. Force structure development is also limited by dollars available to field that force. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm proved that the Total Force Policy was a success and a prudent investment. It also proved that the Guard, given the resources, can mobilize and deploy in a short period of time.

Changes in the strategic environment and budget constraints have created pressures to reduce defense expenditures. Unfortunately as we have gone from a bipolar to a multipolar world the future has become more uncertain. Although the Soviet near term threat appears to be reduced, internal disruptions cause concern as to what the Soviet military might do. To reduce our capability prematurely to levels that may be too low increases immediate and future risks.

The Total Force Policy must be reexamined and reinforced. As final decisions are made on future force structure, four precepts must be considered:

- Lessons learned must be incorporated to improve the integration of administration, logistics and training prior to mobilization in order to facilitate mobilization processing.
- The readiness reporting system must be improved to instill confidence in the validity of the reports.
- If lift is not available to transport a unit within 60 days, then that unit should usually be in the National Guard.
- If a unit is required in the structure but is not required for immediate deployment, then cost effectiveness would normally dictate that it be in the Guard.

Our position is that this nation must retain and maintain maximum force structure at minimum cost. Traditionally our nation has relied on the National Guard to accomplish that goal. It is better to maintain as much structure as possible in the National Guard, and have it if required, than to drastically reduce the Total Army and have insufficient structure.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, General.

General Weber, do you have an additional statement?

General WEBER. Mr. Chairman, I have no prepared remarks in support of the National Guard Association position, but I look forward to responding to questions.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. General Hultman.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. EVAN L. HULTMAN, USA (RETIRED), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

General HULTMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nunn. I would like to begin where General Ensslin just left off, because I think that is really the thrust of your basic questions that you have been asking all morning and clearly were set forth in the five basic elements, Senator Nunn, of your analysis and your study this past year.

The Total Force Policy works. If there is one thing we all agree on here at this table today, and I think basically you gentlemen, is that the Total Force Policy is proven. And there were a lot of doubters. And for good reasons there were a lot of doubters. But the Total Force Policy worked, which then brings us to the question, where do we go from here in light of the budget constraints that again all of us must recognize and live with.

So when you put those two together, Senator Glenn, as you asked time and time again this morning, and as General Ensslin referred to awhile ago, it just seems that, Senator Nunn, your third point, your third thesis, is correct and sound because of those two premises, that we do have to rely in the future with fewer dollars on more Reserves and on only Reserves that will meet the mission. And we all agree there, that will first meet the mission. Because if the Active is the entity, Senator Glenn, as you put it in a number of ways this morning, that is needed for all those reasons, then it should be Active. No question.

But if that Reserve unit, whatever kind it is from any service, can meet that capability, as we have proven at least in many instances in the operation that just came about, then it just seems that simple logic says that we ought to put and keep the capability in. If you do away with the combat unit, whatever service it may be, you do not need the combat support and the combat service support and the tail that goes with it.

But it does not mean that automatically when you take out X amount of combat units of whatever capability it is out of the Active that automatically it ought to then be done away with in terms of the tail that follows or in the process. We are actually going to put more of the combat support and service support into the Active side of the equation under the plans that are being formed now.

Now, to the degree that somebody can make a credible case for that under the first major premises, I think we would all agree in this room and at this table, Guard, Reserve, and Active. But until that case has been made in those specific instances, then we should not be about bringing down Reserve forces that, once you bring them down, as everyone in this room likewise knows, you have one hell of a time to bringing them back up. You can bring back an Active force in a relatively short period of time or at least comparatively in a much, much, much shorter period of time than you can a Reserve unit for the obvious reasons and the obvious equations.

As we look then at the 1992-1993 DOD budget request and project it on out to the years that are the follow on, we say that we

have got to make the sound decisions that will not be dangerous decisions, especially affecting the Guard and Reserve, for which we cannot recover in the short time frame.

Lastly, and this has been alluded to already. It seems to me there are three components, simply put, of national strength that the Reserve gives to the Total Force.

And three things that we need in general, and, Chairman Nunn, you covered these very clearly. One, a strong economy and clearly the United States is having some very serious difficulties there, although without any question we are the strongest economy in the world. Two, a credible military which is the reason for our hearings here today, and third, a strong national will.

And this particular item, item 3, somehow, quite often, and I do not mean it in a derogatory way, does not get worked in the equation by all those at the Pentagon, who deal with all those other things first. And I have no argument with that. But uniquely the Reserves bring item 3 to this equation. And, Senator Glenn, it has been referred to here that to a Marine tank unit and that was a combat unit I might add, not a combat support unit or combat service support unit.

I had the good fortune to be in my home town of Waterloo, Iowa, this weekend when an artillery unit that went on active duty in December, went to the Gulf and was in combat and performed admirably, came home. And it was an event that will repeat itself in northeast Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. I can tell you that it is because of that dimension that that community and all the communities in three States that that unit represents, little towns, crossroads, that give strengths and confidence to you men and women on this Hill at those critical times that you must make those critical decisions.

I have never seen a time when that part of the country and I know it spoke for all of the country was so united behind bringing the third dimension of the equation. And Active units do not add that dimension. That is not derogatory of those units, because they are off at a base somewhere. They are not back in all those home towns. And when that home town unit goes, that home town is affected in every single way and that area is affected in every way and you have the third element that you always have when you are going to go to war or be the deterrent to keep from going to war; you have the national strength.

And so we have got to be, if for that reason alone, erring on the Reserve side when it comes to making decisions and not erring on a force that is primarily just a rapid deployment force of Actives who do not bring the element of national will, that critical element, to this equation.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Hultman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. EVAN L. HULTMAN, USA (RETIRED) EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on behalf of the 115,000 Reserve Officers Association members from each of the uniformed services, I appreciate the opportunity to present to the committee the association's view on the Total Force Policy Study Report.

I want to commend the committee for scheduling this hearing on the force mix and Total Force Policy. Budget pressures bind the altered threat to national security, resulting from economic and political changes in the Soviet Union and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, have triggered the largest reduction in U.S. military force structure since World War II, a reduction intended to decrease the force by 25 percent in the next 5 years. It is inevitable that the cutback will result in a restructure of the remaining forces and a change in the mix of Active and Reserve units. The restructuring of the forces is critical to the future of the Reserve components and to national security.

THE CHALLENGE OF RESTRUCTURING FORCES

Congress is well aware of the challenge inherent in restructuring defense forces to reduce costs and meet national security needs. In fact, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn, took the lead on serious new debate regarding the future of our military structure with the publication of a series of four papers, and associated Senate speeches, starting in March 1990. His appraisal began as an identification of "blanks" in the Department of Defense budget request for fiscal year 1991 and evolved to an outline for a new military strategy for the United States with five basic elements:

1. Lower levels of nuclear weapons.
2. Reduced numbers of forward-deployed forces.
3. More forces in the Reserve.
4. Employ a concept of flexible readiness for our forces.
5. Think "smarter not richer" in defense management.

Noting changes in world politics that were affecting the threat to national security and responding to increasing budget pressures, the Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a "Total Force Study" in the fiscal years 1990-1991 Defense Authorization Act. The study was to include a review of the Total Force Policy, Active-Reserve force mix, and the military force structure required to meet the emerging military threats of the future.

Concerned over the thrust of the ongoing Total Force Policy Study, Congress provided direction on the future of our Nation's Reserve forces in the following strong language outlining its position in the fiscal year 1991 Department of Defense Authorization Act:

> Since the earliest days of the Nation, citizen-soldiers of the United States have protected their fellow citizens, defended the country, and provided heroic assistance during and following natural disasters.
>
> The citizen-soldier has played a key role in the protection of freedom since the days of freedom since the days of the American Revolution.
>
> The National Guard and the Reserve have been accorded significantly increased status in the overall defense posture of the United States since the end of World War II.
>
> During a period in history when the Nation may face new and varied threats to peace, it is imperative that the combat capability of the National Guard and the Reserve be adequately maintained and supported.
>
> The excellence of the National Guard and Reserve is directly attributable to hard work and dedication of the outstanding men and women who regularly perform duty in the Guard and Reserve.

These "findings" by Congress were followed by two declarations that "Congress—

> (1) acknowledges the valuable contribution that the men and women of the National Guard and Reserve have made to the Nation's security; and
>
> (2) continues to support the essential role that the National Guard and the Reserve perform in the total defense establishment of the United States.

With the above as background, the act expressed "the sense of the Congress on greater use of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces":

> The Reserve components of the Armed Forces are an essential element of the national security establishment of the United States.
>
> The overall reduction in the threat and the likelihood of continued fiscal constraints require the United States to increase the use of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces.
>
> The Department of Defense has not adequately implemented the Total Force Policy since its inception in 1973.

The Department of Defense should shift a greater share of force structure and budgetary resources to the Reserve components of the Armed Forces.

Expanding the Reserve components is the most effective way to retain quality personnel as the force structure of the Active components is reduced over the next 5 years.

The United States should recommit itself to the concept of the citizen-soldier as a cornerstone of national defense policy for the future.

The President and the Secretary of Defense should take note of and be willing to exercise existing Reserve call-up authority for the purpose of using Reserve component forces to perform operational missions without the necessity for declaring a national emergency.

As a result of these declarations, Congress went on to proclaim that:

(1) the structure and strength of the current Reserve components should be preserved;

(2) the equipment levels in existing Reserve component units should be increased to match their active duty counterparts;

(3) selected missions of the Active components of the Armed Forces should be increasingly transferred to the Reserve components;

(4) the equipment available to the units of the Reserve components should be modernized; and

(5) the integration of Active component and Reserve component units should be promoted as a means of achieving the Total Force Policy of the Department of Defense.

The President had also been sensitized to the need to review comprehensively the military threat facing our Nation and to develop a new and less expensive way to counter this danger. President Bush summed up the situation succinctly in his speech to the Aspen Institute on August 2, 1990, coincidentally the very day of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, when he said: "We're entering a new era: the defense strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace can—and must—be different."

The President, as he continued to outline the task of reshaping our defense capabilities, noted:

In a world less driven by an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war—in a world where the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence—we know that our forces can be smaller . . . we calculate that by 1995 our security needs can be met by an Active force 25 percent smaller than today's.

What matters now then is how we reshape the forces—the forces that remain. Our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to guard our enduring interests—the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crisis, to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed.

The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the same ones we possess. Forces that we possess right now. If we simply prorate our reductions—cut equally right across the board—we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely, and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. What we need are not merely reductions, but restructuring.

As we restructure, we must put a premium on readiness. For those Active forces we'll rely on to respond to crises, readiness must be our highest priority.

In our restructured forces, Reserves will be important, but in new ways. The need to be prepared for massive, short-term mobilization has diminished. And we can now adjust the size, structure, and readiness of our Reserve forces to help us deal with the more likely challenges we will face.

Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of reconstitution of our forces . . . to rely not solely on existing forces, but to generate wholly new forces.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY REPORT

The Total Force Policy Report to the Congress, required by law, was released on December 31, 1990. In spite of the clear guidance originally provided and subsequently affirmed by Congress, the report still did not contain the specific force level and force mix recommendations expected by many Members of Congress. In fact, the House Armed Services Committee, in its report accompanying its version of the fiscal year 1992 DOD Authorization bill, states that the report "was unresponsive to

the tasking" and recommend the creation of an "independent study to examine the existing and projected Active and Reserve component force structure, force mix, and end strength and to make recommendations for reductions or revisions in the future."

The report was also considered to be deficient by some because the very due-date imposed by Congress, only 1 year earlier, precluded any meaningful analysis of lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Obviously, also because of the deadline set by Congress, it was also completed much too soon to include any observations or recommendations which could come from analysis of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Although this report focused on policy, rather than presenting the specific force-mix recommendations which were desired by Congress, it does contain several clues regarding the thrust of force-mix decisions that were then being made within the Department of Defense and which would start to materialize in the President's budget request for fiscal years 1992 and 1993.

For example, the report includes an "illustrative" force structure for the future which would reduce the Active force from the fiscal year 1990 level of about 2.1 million personnel to about 1.7 million by the end of fiscal year 1995. Selected Reserve strength would decrease from 1.15 million to .91 million during the same period—an 18.7 percent reduction for the Active force and a 20.7 percent reduction for the Reserve forces.

The actual budget request indicated an even greater reduction for the Reserve forces than the illustrative force in the report. Specifically, the reduction proposed for the Reserve forces by the end of fiscal year 1995 would be 23 percent less than the fiscal year 1991 authorized end strength (-270,426 Selected Reservists).

The Total Force Policy Report to the Congress based many of its theses on points made by the President in his Aspen speech, including the prospect of increased warning time before the next major conflict, enabling the United States to use concept of "reconstituting" many of the military units that would be needed to win such a conflict. In the words of the report, "to rely not only on existing forces, but to generate new units."

This concept of reconstitution is certainly appealing in theory, particularly in light of the fiscal pressures being placed on defense expenditures. One of the principal proponents of this concept, Mr. Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, sees the new warning time for possible conflict with the Soviets in the range of 1 to 2 years.

However appealing the lower resource demands (both human and fiscal) of reconstitution make this concept appear, the lessons of history have repeatedly shown that we will not recognize the precursors of war 2 years in advance even if they are evident. And often, even if the signs of pending conflict are apparent to some, the message of such signals will be subject to dispute. Certainly, the scenario for the war in the Persian Gulf was not part of our contingency plans in 1989.

More important is the fact that even if the indications of future conflict are clear and abundant, historically, we have been loathe to take the necessary preliminary actions in a timely manner. The adoption of the military draft by the narrowest of margins, the vote of a single Congressman, just prior to World War II is one of the more memorable examples of reluctance to act to address a pending threat that is much closer than 2 years away.

Additionally, if the Reserve components are restricted to a reinforcing or reconstitution role in the future, we will have robbed the Reserve of its vitality. History has made it abundantly clear that without meaningful missions and realistic training, Reservists respond predictably. Without purpose, they lose interest and individually and organizationally they degenerate. Reservists responded effectively in Desert Storm because they understood their mission, they were trained and mentally prepared to enter the conflict. Had the Reserve components had only a reinforcing role, their response would lacked the energy and necessary "can do" attitude.

The other precept espoused in the Total Force Policy report that is crucial to the future role of our Nation's Reserve forces is that "Reserve combat forces should not be used for contingencies lasting less than 60 days."

This dictum contains the general flaws in logic inherent in over dependence on reconstitution of our current military capability in a timely manner when needed. For example, this concept will require the capability to predict the duration of "contingencies" or possibly more important, to define precisely what is a contingency so we can then identify the "less than" and "more than 60 day" contingencies distinct from other possible military requirements. The ability to make such distinctions would be fundamental to our ability to be able to plan to provide the requisite military capabilities.

The report also postulates that, "For contingencies expected to last less than 30 days, a U.S. response should not require a Presidential call-up of individual Reservist or Reserve units. Continued reliance could be placed on voluntary participation by Reservists who possess unique skills and on augmentation from Reserve aviation units to support strategic airlift operations during the initial response to such a contingency."

Again, the ability to predict the duration of a contingency is key to planning under this concept and to being able to identify actions that must occur starting on the first day of any contingency. This thesis is also self-contradicting since it postulates dependence on individual volunteers and on unit augmentation, both without using the involuntary recall authority that will be necessary to ensure that either a complete unit or all the individual Reservists with the required skills will be available when called.

Reservists will volunteer when needed. They will also perform professionally. These facts have been clearly demonstrated particularly during the past decade. However, it is not prudent to plan to depend solely on volunteers particularly when the mechanism exists to call the specific units and individuals that are needed for a particular military operation.

There certainly was some rationale for dependence on volunteers before President Bush broke the long standing precedent of not calling Reservists when needed. Volunteers were the only Reserve personnel that had been used in the recent past. This first-time, and highly successful, use of the Presidential recall authority for Operation Desert Shield has laid to rest the myth that, for political reasons, Reservists would be called to active duty involuntarily only if our national security is gravely threatened and then only long after the Active duty forces were actually engaged in combat.

It is also a form of abdication of responsibility by Department of Defense leadership when they attempt to shift the burden of responsibility, which should be theirs when they request or initiate involuntary recall, to individual Reservists by consistently expecting Reservists to volunteer in the needed skills and numbers and in a timely manner. After all, even those Reservists who would be genuinely willing to serve if called may be reluctant to volunteer because of the reaction to and consequences of their volunteering from their employer or family when it is common knowledge that each Selected Reservist is subject to involuntary call to active duty if they are needed for any operational requirement.

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

As has been suggested, one of the criticisms of the Total Force Study Report is that it did not include the Gulf war experience. Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the first real test of the Total Force Policy. This major conflict and the lessons learned will, hopefully, do more to shape military policy than any military experience in recent history. Much analysis has yet to be done if we are to fully benefit from the lessons learned, but many conclusions can already be drawn, and a preliminary report card on the Total Force Policy has already written.

When the ground war began on January 16, there were roughly 540,000 military personnel in the Persian Gulf. Nearly 106,000 of those deployed to the Gulf area were members of the National Guard and Reserve, about one fifth of the forces deployed. In addition, a total of roughly 228,000 Reservists were ultimately activated in support of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, used the word "magnificent" to characterize the contributions of the Reserve components to Operation Desert Storm. In a recent statement to the House Armed Services Committee, General Powell described the application of the Total Force Policy as follows: "The success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last then years to strengthen the Total Force concept."

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Stephen M. Duncan, in addressing Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield, testified on April 16, ". . . there can be no doubt that both the call to active duty and the performance of the National Guardsmen and Reservists who have served in connection with that conflict, have been marked by extraordinary success."

Thus, the first of many lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war is that the Total Force Policy works. Up to the time of the involuntary call to active duty under authority granted by the President, and the subsequent arrival and performance of the almost 28,000 Guardsmen and Reservists who served during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the efficacy of the Total Force Policy to meet the de-

mands of a major military conflict was pure conjecture. It should now be apparent to even the most outspoken critic of the Total Force Policy that Reserve forces, when properly structured, equitably funded, and adequately trained, can and will perform when called upon.

A corollary of this lesson is that the responsiveness and capability of any specific Reserve unit is directly related to the resources dedicated to that unit. This axiom applies across-the-board to Reserve manning, full-time support personnel, operating and training funds, and command attention. It should also be apparent that much of the legislation and many of the military regulations and procedures which have been designed to support and enhance our modern concept of Reserve forces received their first real test during this operation. Obviously, a complete review is in order so that appropriate changes can be made before the next call of Reservist to active duty.

In discussing the success of the Total Force Policy, which in the words of Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, was "vindicated" by Desert Storm, we would be remiss if we were not to give recognition where it is due. While the men and women of the Armed Forces deserve the acclaim for a decisive Persian Gulf victory, the Congress, and this subcommittee specifically, deserves much of the credit for the outstanding performance of the Reserve components and the Total Force Policy. The Congress has consistently provided sound policy, preserved needed force structure, supplied necessary full-time support personnel and has added funding for dedicated, modern equipment for the Guard and Reserve. Without your backing, the Reserve components could not have contributed so effectively to the Total Force.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

A historical perspective is important to any discussion of the role of Reserve forces. In that portion of the fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Act quoted above, the Congress noted the key role the citizen-soldier has played in our history.

Throughout the debates on the structure for our new government following the Revolutionary War is the principal of the citizen's responsibility for the Nation's defense and for the maintenance of only a small standing army in peacetime. The "Militia Clause" was placed in the Constitution particularly to assure the potential to raise a large Federal army when it was needed and only then.

Following World War II, General George Marshall expressed support for the concept of returning to greater dependence on our Reserve forces when he said in his Report to the Secretary of War, "We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world. And the peace can be maintained only by the strong. What must we do to remain strong and still not bankrupt ourselves on military expenditures to maintain a prohibitively expensive professional army" President Washington . . . proposed a program for the peacetime training of a citizen army rather than a large professional army."

Any review of our history should remind us that our Nation has a long tradition of defending itself with "Citizen soldiers" and that the post World War II years, with a large standing Active duty force are an aberration in our fundamental concept of how best to provide for the common defense.

While cost-effectiveness may be the primary reason for greater use of the Reserve component, a very important by-product of that use is its impact on national will. With the abolition of the draft, the Reservist provides that critical link to the communities around the Nation where national will is forged. No other practical alternative—to either conscription or use of the Reserve components—has been proposed to sustain the marriage of the American military with the will of the populace. Reserve component presence in over 4,000 communities nationwide is not only a military asset, but is a living reminder of national security and a rallying point for national resolve.

LIMITATIONS AND ATTRIBUTES OF RESERVE FORCES

In trumpeting the role of she Reserve components, we would not suggest that the Reserve forces are a panacea that will permit massive reductions in Active force strength with unrealistic projections of cost savings. It must be recognized that accompanying the use of the Reserve components is some loss in peacetime deployment capability or contingency response time.

One should not assume that the Reserve Force portion of the Total Force equation is without inherent limitations and persistent challenges. In the same manner, challenges and limitations affect the other elements of the Total Force. However, as a spokesman for Reserve forces and for purposes of this testimony, I will touch on only some of the most prominent characteristics of Reserve Forces:

• Reserve units can not normally provide the forces needed for routine deployments.

• Many Reservists cannot routinely dedicate more than the one weekend a month and one 2 week training period each year to their military duties because of other demands on their time.

• Reserve personnel normally require longer periods of time to transition to new equipment or learn new skills than similar Active force personnel as a direct result of the inherent limitations on Reserve training time.

• The location of Reserve units is limited by the demographics of the actual and potential Reserve personnel populations.

• There is a practical limitation on the proportion of most mission areas that can be placed in the Reserve Forces without loosing the economic advantage of accessing prior active duty service personnel into the Reserve who already have much of their required military skill training.

• Reservists are not normally as readily available for short notice military requirements as Active force personnel.

Offsetting these limitations (at least in part) are some unique attributes of Reservists that are not normally qualities of Active force personnel:

• Many Reservists already have received their military training when they affiliate with the Reserve forces as the result of prior active duty service.

• The existing military skills of Reservists are often enhanced or reinforced by their civilian job experience and training.

• Reservists provide a unique link with the civilian population since they, figuratively speaking, have a foot in each community.

• As a general rule, Reserve forces cost less to sustain than similar Active force units. The annual savings vary by type of unit with hardware intensive units costing 10 to 20 percent less in the Reserve and manpower intensive Reserve unit costs being as low as 15 to 20 percent of similar Active force units.

• When adequately resourced (with personnel, modern equipment, funding and training opportunities), Reserve units can attain and maintain the highest levels of readiness.

Overriding these characteristics are some institutional biases and perceptions of decision makers within the Department of Defense:

• There is a relatively rigid Department of Defense budget system that tends to allocate resources in historical ratios, i.e. a very high proportion of available resources being earmarked for the Active forces.

• The competition for resources fosters an Active versus Reserve force attitude in a budget and planning system that is controlled by the Active forces.

• Notwithstanding the demonstrated abilities and availability of Reservists to perform peacetime, contingency or wartime missions, there is a ingrained reluctance to depend on Reserve forces.

THE CENTRAL CONCERN

Central to our concern is the future of the Reserve components of the United States. The Reserve Officers Association is apprehensive because we see unwarranted negative signals regarding the prospects for the Guard and Reserve. The intent of the military departments, the planners within the Department of Defense, and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the future of our Nation's Reserve forces does not match the views of either the Congress or this association.

Of immediate concern is the fiscal years 1992-1993 DOD budget request. Force structure cuts proposed by the budget request seem to ignore the cost-effectiveness of the Guard and Reserve and include cuts that would reduce related Reserve component capability far more severely than savings would warrant. Without your continued support, the Reserve components may never again be able to provide the kind of military capability that insured the success of Operation Desert Storm.

In defending the proposed Reserve forces reductions, a DOD spokesman maintained that cuts were being applied to the Active and Reserve components "across-the-board." Having failed in its congressionally mandated Total Force Study to provide clear criteria and a force mix strategy, DOD has also failed to provide needed rationale for its proposed force reductions. Accordingly, force reductions appear to be budget driven, "fair share" cuts. Because Reserve forces are demographically constrained, have longer training cycles and are thus less flexible than are Active forces, the restoration of Reserve forces cannot be accomplished as easily as can the forces of the Active components. Given the cost-effectiveness of the Guard and Reserve and in the absence of clear rationale to make the sizable reductions that have been proposed, we urge this committee to reject all Reserve strength reductions that are solely budget driven.

Allow me to quote from the Editorial in the June 10 issue of the Navy Times:

> The House of Representatives did the Nation a favor in late May when it rejected the Bush administration's plan to cut Selected Reserve strength by 207,000 next year.
>
> The proposed cut was not the fruit of a careful, thoughtful analysis of a military drawdown, which Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have said is so important to the future readiness of the force.
>
> Rather it appeared to be a share-the-pain approach to Reserve manning with a primary goal of achieving quick savings in defense dollars . . .
>
> Service leaders like to praise the skills and contributions of Reservists, and we believe they mean it. The trouble is, it doesn't count for much when the doors are closed, budgets are on the table and money is tight.

As has already been suggested, the Reserve component could not possibly have contributed so effectively to the total fighting force were it not for the provision of modern equipment in past years. While any drawdown of the Active forces will produce some equipment that can be made available for the Reserve components, much of the equipment needed by the Reserve components either does not exist in the Active force or is in short supply. Therefore, we use the Congress to continue its equipment modernization program, which has proven so effective, through the add-on of funding for equipment procurement.

CONCLUSIONS

America must retain the fundamental principal of one military force—"the Total Force"—including the cost-effective application of both Active and Reserve forces. Our military forces have achieved unprecedented successes and levels of readiness in the past decade. This achievement should be the foundation for enduring national strategies and not be abandoned for new theoretical concepts that are still unproven, such as dependence on reconstitution of forces or total dependence on the Active force for all contingencies lasting less than 60 days. The Total Force, which started as a concept and evolved to a policy, became a reality on August 22, 1990. Prudence demands that we take advantage of this maturation of policy.

Both the Active and Reserve forces must have legitimate roles in the Total Force of the future. The role of the Active force should be to provide the majority of the combat ready forces, to set doctrine and standards, develop and conduct training for all components, and to provide the capability for rapid response and mobilization expansion.

The Reserve components must not be restricted to a reinforcing or reconstitution role in the future, but must be a respected full partner in our strategy for the 1990s and beyond. The purpose of the Reserve forces is not to replace the Active forces, but to complement them. To do this the Reserve forces must train to a mutually acceptable level of readiness in peacetime and be able to expand and augment the Active force structure to meet contingency or war requirements.

The principle, first advocated over 20 years ago, that "If there are not good and cogent reasons for a unit to be in the Active forces, it should be in the Reserve" was proposed as an maxim for the recent Total Force Policy Study Group. Apparently it provoked a response that was just the opposite of what was intended. The object of the Department of Defense budget request for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 seems to be to retain as large an Active force as possible.

It is also important to remember that attaining high levels of readiness in the Reserve components is not only theoretically possible but is now a proven fact. The questions regarding readiness that need to be answered are: what are reasonable readiness goals in light of resources available and the perceived threat, and how do these requirements fit with the demographics of Reserve unit locations and the locations of individual Reservists and the economic efficiencies of having a particular military capability in the Reserve rather than the Active force structure? The objective of this debate must be to determine the optimal way to defend all legitimate interests of the Nation, not how to maintain the largest Active or Reserve force in peacetime.

National strength has three components, a strong economy, a credible military, and a strong national will. The Reserve Forces contribute to and are an integral part of all three. First, Reservists contribute to the productive segment of the Nation's economy as workers and tax paying citizens. The individual members of a large standing military do not contribute to the wealth of our Nation through the production of goods or services. In addition, a truly strong economy must be based on far more than the military-industrial complex.

Second, a strong viable Reserve force is, and must be, an inseparable part of the Nation's military; a cost-effective augmentation to the Active force and the marrow of our mobilization base.

Finally, Reservists are a principal part of the grass roots of our society that aid in developing and articulating the national will. Today, a politically acceptable decision to commit Reserve forces is one of our strongest demonstrations of national resolve.

In the euphoria following our recent success on the Arabian Peninsula, we must not lose sight of what makes a nation great and what are the sources of our national will. The roots of national will lie in the belief that applying military power to resolve international disputes must be the last option. The idea of an all Active contingency force to fight what might be an unpopular war is offensive to our collective will. The last option—military intervention—is a national burden to be shared by the active duty professionals with the citizen soldiers, sailors and airmen and their families and communities. Once the burden of the military option is accepted by the Total Force, the Nation also accents it with relative ease because of the broad scope of the military structure that is already collectively involved.

Certainly, one lesson we carried into the Persian Gulf war was that it should not be "another Vietnam." There are many dimensions to the difference between these two military operations, but obviously one of the most striking was the contrast between the national will in each case. The early and extensive involvement of the Guard and Reserve was instrumental in achieving the rallying of the vast majority of our population behind our military and in support of our national objectives. The enthusiasm and professional military performance of these Reservists reinforced this wave of national support.

IN SUMMARY

- The Total Force Policy provides a cost-effective, combat capable force that makes the best use of resources in the face of severe budget constraints.
- The Total Force Policy has been successfully tested in both minor and major contingencies throughout the past decade.
- Well trained and equipped Reservists have demonstrated that they can perform as professionals equal in skill and dedication to their active duty counterparts.
- The use of Reserve components of the Total Force in contingency operations brings a vital citizens' involvement and consensus to these conflicts.
- Therefore, the Total Force Policy should be reaffirmed and sufficient resources should be allocated to increase the proportion of our Nation's military capability in the Reserve components and to ensure their effectiveness.

Thank you for the opportunity to present the Reserve Officers Association's views on these important subjects. Your support for the men and women in uniform, both Active and Reserve, is sincerely appreciated. I'll be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. Admiral Smith.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. LESTER ROBERT SMITH, USNR (RETIRED), NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION

Admiral SMITH. I am a little concerned about this Total Force Study. To use Senator Ford's words, something funny happened on the way to the Hill between the draft interim report and the interim report that came out. The initial report, as you know, seemed to be very supportive of Reserves, even talked of putting more structure into the Guard and Reserve and talked about the savings that could be had there. But to use his words, Senator Ford's words, incredibly, either 9 months of work was discarded in 2 weeks before the publication of the report, or the draft interim report did not coincide with the predetermined outcome of higher authorities.

I do not know if that was the case at all, but if you go back 1 year there were those arguing, while they might concede that the Reserves and Guard were capable and ready, they could not be used, they could not be mobilized, and therefore, we need to reduce them. And a lot of that was going on.

Well, that has been put to bed now. We have recalled them, and people no longer talk about the Reserves and Guard should be reduced because they are not available. They went from that to talking about readiness, and perhaps we should not have as much in the Guard and Reserve because they are not ready. And the biggest example I think that I have heard of is the Roundout brigade in the Army.

And I am not going to sit here and pretend to tell you I know anything about the cause of that. But I do know this from my experience, that you give Reservists or Guardsmen the equipment and the opportunity to train, and they will become ready.

Now, the Marines did it. Company B of the 4th Battalion did a marvelous job and we heard about that. But what we have not heard today is that they were assigned M-60 tanks and they were mobilized, called up in December. They were given Abrams, sent to California, and given 23 days of training on those things, went out there and set a record in combat that may not ever be exceeded. It is just a marvelous job. And I believe, I know that the Guard's people could do the same thing. Given the training, given the equipment, they will be ready.

Then the argument gets around to cost, and the report talks to the cost savings or implying little cost savings amongst Reserve and Guard units. And in the Navy's case they used an example of guided missile fast frigates, and fighter squadrons.

Now, the fighter squadrons give only about a 40 to 50 percent cost savings. And I will grant you that because of the amount of active duty and deployment time they have, that they do spend a lot of operational money, and that if they did not operate quite so much, they would not spend quite so much.

But you heard Admiral Baker say that 80 percent of the Naval Reserve is augment and reenforcing and sustaining. And those people, the costs of those units are less, such as your medical units, which were one-third of the people aboard the Mercy and the Comfort, i.e. Reservists. All of your cargo handling, 72 hours after they were mobilized we had Reserve cargo handling people in Europe unloading cargo. Those people were ready to go, and they cost less than 20 percent of equivalent active duty units.

So I do not think that their cost is accurately shown, and on your Forcerons and where you are talking about your high cost, what you get are units and capabilities equivalent to those of your Active forces. How do we know? Well, we look at the Air Forces' Gunsmoke, which is there bi-annual air-to-ground competition and their William Tell bi-annual air-to-air competition, and we find Reserve and Guard units winning that more than occasionally.

We have a worldwide reconnaissance competition. And who do they send to represent the Navy, but a Reserve squadron, the best the Navy had. So those outfits, while maybe only saving 50 percent, are ready and can be deployed immediately.

The other thing that the force study talks to that bothers me is this reconstituted program whereby the plan to take people and bring them—they keep talking about pre-trained individual manpower, and I read that as IRR, and we are going to bring them back when we need them, put them with a cadre and bring them up to speed.

Well, there is a lot of problems that I do not think have really been answered. One is can you always get them? Do you know where they are? Two, will they be willing to go? That was a big question people had about the Reserve and Guard, would they be willing to go? Well, let me speak for the Naval Reserve. Twenty thousand were called up and six said no. That is less than the number of active duty people who missed their ships when they deployed. Then we say are they physically ready? You have no idea whether those people are physically ready to go. In the Selected Reserve, we can make sure they are.

And then are their skills current? And I know that, Mr. Chairman, you better than anyone is aware that putting somebody through flight training does not necessarily make them a highly proficient aviator. Putting them through carrier training, does not make them necessarily a fine carrier aviator. And certainly a little bit of practice does not make them a top combat pilot. It takes a lot more than a few months to turn out a good combat pilot who can work as part of a team. And the same is true whether we are talking about ships or minesweepers or what have you.

So I guess the bottom line is that, as we said, Total Force Policy has evolved, it has been proven, and it has been tested, and it works. And I think that the Reserves and Guard provide a cost-effective, capable, and ready part of the force and we ought to be thinking very carefully before we jump into this reconstituted policy.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Smith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY REAR ADM. LESTER ROBERT SMITH, USNR (RETIRED), NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION

TOTAL FORCE

Total Force Policy formalized the total force concept that had evolved in the post World War II period, was given recognition by the Secretary of Defense in 1970, and officially adopted as National Defense Policy in 1973. It has served our Nation well, and certainly deserves substantial credit for the astounding success of Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations.

The Naval Reserve Association subscribes to the time tested theory "that if it isn't broken, don't fix it." In that vein, NRA was hopeful that the Total Force Policy Report, requested in the fiscal years 1990–1991 Defense Authorization Act, would recommend continuance of this proven policy with perhaps some fine tuning to accommodate the changing world relationships and constrained domestic resources. To the credit of the members of the Study Group, and especially the Chairman and Vice Chairman, the first draft interim report appeared to do exactly that. Then to quote from Senator Ford's Total Force Policy and Guard and Reserve statement published in the Congressional Record October 22, 1990, "Something funny happened on the way to the Hill. The substance of the formal interim report is in stark contrast to an early August draft which went into some detail on the success of the Total Force Policy, the planning principles which might be used in developing future force structure and budgets, and discussion of several issues which related to placing structure in the Guard and Reserve rather than the Active components. The draft indicated that cost savings should be a significant consideration, that call-up authority will be used when required, and that the Guard and Reserve should be considered for mission tasking across the full spectrum of military operations from contingencies through full mobilization.

"Incredibly, either 9 months of works was discarded in the 2 weeks before publication of the report, or the draft interim report did not coincide with the predetermined outcome of higher authorities."

It is now evident the problem was that in fact "the draft interim report did not coincide with the predetermined outcome of higher authorities."

Historically, whenever either the perceived threat permitted or fiscal constraints dictated a reduction in the Active military force, there has been a rational policy of retaining the maximum affordable defense capability by relying to a greater degree upon cost effective Reserve forces. Last year Congress placed great emphasis upon placing "greater reliance upon Reserve forces" in policy statements, report language, and in the fiscal year 1991 Defense Appropriations Act.

Apparently this defense policy initiative was the source of considerable concern to those with an opposing view of the correct composition of the total force. What better standard bearer than the Department of Defense Policy "Guru" who has a reputation for not favoring Reserve forces. With the ground swell of support for enhanced Guard and Reserve participation evident, there was an urgent need to prevent the Total Force Policy Report from institutionalizing an increased role for the Reserve components in the total force.

RECONSTITUTION OF FORCES

Taking timely advantage of the radical changes in world politics and Soviet-U.S. relations, a new strategy and force posture policy was devised (hatched) entitled "Crisis Response and Reconstitution" which among other things effectively relegated the Guard and Reserve forces to a relatively minor supporting role in the total force. Reconstitution is explained as meaning eliminating forces subject to some magical reincarnation, i.e. reconstitution, in time of crisis.

It is manifest from official documents originating in the DOD Strategy and Resources Offices that the Reconstitution strategy's major intended effect is to reduce Reserve force structure, and the alternative of retaining reserve units in a lower readiness and manning level is specifically opposed.

How fortuitous and timely for the Under Secretary's point of view that the President was persuaded to include a version of the "Reconstitution Policy" in his major policy address at Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990 just as the draft interim report of the Total Force Policy Study Group was nearing completion.

If there was any doubt as to the intent of "Reconstitution," one only needs to read an early August memorandum from the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Total Force Policy Study Group wherein he transmits the Office of the Under Secretary's displeasure and disagreement with the draft interim report's "reserve bias," and makes specific recommendations to conform with the "predetermined outcome of higher authority." Incredibly, this memorandum was followed by another one dated September 12 noting some conforming changes in the revised drafted but castigating the Chairman and Vice Chairman because the revised draft still exhibited the general Reserve-favorable "tilt" of the previous paper.

I'm sure I need not remind this committee that our Nation was in a "Reconstitution of Forces" mode in the 1930s when as the War in Europe developed our mobilized National Guardsmen marched with broom sticks for rifles and maneuvered with horse drawn artillery pieces without firing mechanisms. Even the guardsmen themselves might not have been available without the semi-autonomous state controlled relationship. Without a few dedicated visionaries in Congress, such as Carl Vinson, the long lead time ship building program that enabled us to win the war in the Pacific would have been non-existent. "Reconstitution of Forces" policy very nearly resulted in Japanese being the primary language in our schools today.

MAINTAINING THE SAFETY NET

It is important to note that the Soviet Navy continues to build and modernize their naval forces at an amazing pace unaffected by domestic problems, perestroika, glasnost, disarmament actions, or the purported thaw in East-West relations. Last year the Soviets completed more new modern sophisticated war ships than any year since 1980 including 10 super capable submarines compared with one U.S. submarine completed. The Soviet Navy's first aircraft carrier capable of operating the Soviet's most modern supersonic aircraft came on line to be followed by at least one more super carrier.

Soviet Naval Aviation has recently grown substantially and assumed a more prominent role with the wholesale transfer of first line aircraft from the Soviet Air Force. While the Soviet submarine deployment patterns have changed due to the greatly increased range of their missiles, their strategic capability continues to increase with the modernization of the submarines and their weapons.

Considering only the growing Soviet Naval capability and with intentions an unfathomable and changeable factor in threat appraisal, it appears to the Naval Reserve Association that our national policy should continue to provide the maximum

defense capability reasonably affordable, and that the cost effectiveness of the Reserve forces should continue to be a significant consideration in developing that total force. The Reconstitution of Forces Policy should be carefully scrutinized by Congress lest the safety-net long provided by our Reserve components be irrevocably decimated.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY REPORT

The final report of the Total Force Policy Study Group dutifully complies with the direction of higher authority by implementing Reconstitution of forces and recommending reductions in the numbers and roles of the Reserve forces.

By recommending no use of Reserve forces except volunteers in a contingency expected to last less than 30 days, the report would effectively eliminate our most highly effective, ready and trained Reserve and Guard units. There would be no requirement, motivation, or justification to maintain the instant response capability of the Guard and Reserve forces that provided the early critical force in Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

The summary of Direct Unit Cost Comparison represents only the most costly Naval Reserve ship and aircraft programs hence skewing the cost of Naval Reserve units to the high side. Most of the Naval Reserve programs, particularly those that are personnel intensive, cost much less in comparison to Active forces.

The remainder of the report largely supports the President's fiscal years 1992-1993 Defense budget submission in force composition, size and roles of the Reserve components. There certainly is a dirth of specific helpful recommendations for Congress.

"TEN FOR ONE"

In recent congressional defense authorization deliberations a misleading premise has been prominently discussed both in committee and on the floor, i.e. that in the in House version of the authorization bill, the Active force personnel are being reduced at the disproportionate race of ,1 for each guardsman or reservist. This proposition has been given considerable publicity by the media, and has been quoted as being one of three defense issues in the House bill that would trigger a Presidential veto if unchanged in the final bill.

The creative mathematics of this "10 for 1" proposition involves the intermingling of military force levels of the past 101st Congress authorizations with the fiscal years 1992-1993 DOD budget submission and the current 102nd Congress version of the fiscal years 1992-1993 defense authorization. All the Reserve components were considered as one, even though it is readily apparent that there is wide disparity in the proposed strength reductions between the various Reserve and Guard components. Also, there was no allowance made for the unique disproportionate cuts in Active Army personnel resulting from the draw down of forces in Europe, nor for last year's one-time freeze of Reserve component strength which had the overwhelming support of both Houses of Congress for good and valid reasons unrelated to the Active force planned reductions.

Contrary to the "10 for 1" relationship, the administration's fiscal year 1992 Defense budget submission proposes to reduce the Naval Reserve force disproportionately both in numbers of personnel reduced, and certainly in percentage cut. This budget reduces the Naval Reserve by 18,800 Selected Reservists from a current force of 156,000 as contrasted with only an 18,300 reduction in the Active Navy force of 565,000 personnel. This percentage reduction in Selected Reservists exceeds that of the Active Navy force by a factor of four. We feel confident other Reserve components are likewise victims of this "buzz word" factual distortion.

While this testimony diverges somewhat from the main thrust of this subcommittee hearing, the Naval Reserve Association feels strongly that the committee should be made aware of the implications of wide dissemination of this misleading information.

I will be happy to respond to your questions.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Admiral. Colonel Doyle.

STATEMENT OF COL. KEVIN DOYLE, USMCR, PRESIDENT, MARINE CORPS RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

Colonel DOYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members. It is an honor for MCROA to come before you today to testify about the reduction in the selected reserve struc-

ture. The Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association represents 5,000 members of the selected Marine Corps Reserve, the individual Ready Reserve, and retired reserve officers.

We also are proud to say that the selected Marine Corps Reserve mobilized 55 percent of its assets during the Persian Gulf crisis. Sixty six percent of the division wing team was actually called up, and we had a 99 percent show rate of Reserves being called. I think that stands to represent, for the last 10 months what we have maintained for the past 75 years, that you have had a Marine Corps Reserve and that there is strength in reserve.

I might also add that it was not just Desert Storm that the Reserve supported but also activities for the Pacific nations and Norway. We also augmented efforts in the drug war and supported domestic bases and stations to maintain operations. In other words, the total force works in the Marine Corps.

I think also, I might add, that much of the combat efficiency that we have is due to the relationship that we have with the inspector and instructor staffs and the MARTD staffs that augment us in the Reserve. We also execute several integrated operations routinely, which also gives us the ability to integrate effectively with our active duty components.

The President's budget for the 6-year defense plan proposes a reduction of some 9,000 selected Marine Corps Reserve members, 3,000 in the next year. We do not believe that—excuse me just a moment—MCROA does not believe that the Marine Corps would propose such reductions in the Reserve if it was not under some DOD mandate to reduce the active structure.

Marines hold as an article of faith that no national strategy could be correctly constituted without a dynamic air-ground Marine Corps of size and composition adequate to fulfill the expeditionary force-in-readiness role which was created by the National Defense Act of 1947. Should the Active component be forced to draw down, it would appear logical that the effect would be an increase in the size of the Marine Corps Reserve to retain that same total force capability.

We do not see the rationale of simultaneous reductions being driven in both components. A reduced strength in the Selected Reserve component must necessarily be a reserve of diminished capability.

MCROA believes that the Congress uniquely appreciates the proven performance of the Total Force Marine Corps and will provide the necessary funding to man, equip, and train the necessary forces to maintain a selected Marine Corps Reserve in the near term and in the long term.

And we thank you.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Doyle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY COL. KEVIN DOYLE, USMCR, PRESIDENT, MARINE CORPS RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

Mr. Chairman, I am Colonel Kevin Doyle, the President of the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association (MCROA). MCROA's membership reflects the leadership of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve and is representative, as well, of the Individual Ready Reserve and the Retired Marine Corps Reserve officer population. It is the single spokesman for the Marine Corps Reserve Officer and thus the leadership of the Marine Corps Reserve.

MCROA is grateful for the opportunity that it has been afforded to testify on the critical issue of selected reserve structure and, in particular, the structure of the Marine Corps Selected Reserve.

MCROA believes that it can provide a most credible insight into the view of the citizen soldier on the contentious issue of the proper balance between Active and Reserve forces and the resulting optimum structure for the Selected Reserve forces. It offers the following views with full recognition of its responsibility to represent the views of its constituents clearly but with the even greater obligation to provide the Congress with an honest assessment.

MCROA's views are based on several essential predicates that need to be stated up front. First, the Marine Corps Reserve has again proven its worth—this time in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. More than 55 percent of the entire Selected Marine Corps Reserve was mobilized with a "show rate" in excess of 99 percent. Whatever the experiences of the other services—and they are understood to be positive in the main—the Marine Corps benefited from the mobilization of its combat arms, combat support and combat service support units as well as its IRR and retired Reserve. Total force worked in the Marine Corps.

The Nation's outburst of pride, joy and gratitude—which continues to this very day—is, in no small part, a product of the congressionally driven Total Force Policy. The American People rejoiced in the magnificent performance of the U.S. led coalition forces because they were, in a very real sense, participants in Desert Storm. Not through CNN, but through the involvement of every community which saw its reservists go off to war. When the reservist leaves for war his community becomes immediately and emotionally involved in the successful prosecution of that war.

The importance of that community involvement—even more than the persuasive economics of the Total Force Policy—is the true wisdom that motivates a total force approach to structuring our Nation's military force. That insightful wisdom came from the Congress—not from a professional military analysis. The citizen soldier, who is represented in the Congress by individuals elected from his home State and districts, bears the warfighting responsibilities of citizenship in a special way. The community knows this and is appropriately supportive and grateful.

The President's budget for the Six Year Defense Plan proposes a reduction of some 9,000 Selected Marine Corps Reserve billets. MCROA's understanding of the origin of this figure is that it derives from some abstract concept of equity since certain other services are being required to take substantial cuts in their reserve structure. Equity is a concept that is properly applied only when all other surrounding circumstances are equal. They are not in this case.

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve is less than one fourth the size of the Active Marine Corps. Since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the Marine Corps has served the Nation well with a structure of three active divisions and wings and one reserve division and wing. The ratio in other services is irrelevant to the issue of whether the Marine Corps total force is appropriately sized for the perceived threat. MCROA believes that the current structure remains appropriate and we know that the Congress believes this as well.

Just as a concept of equitable sharing of reductions is illogical in the context of inter-service needs so too is it illogical intra-service. Should the Congress chose to reduce the size of the Active Marine Corps structure on some rational basis then, in the case of the Marine Corps Reserve, it would appear logical that the effect would be an increase in the size of the Marine Corps Reserve to retain the same total force capability rather than a decrease.

Of more immediate concern than the proposed elimination of nearly one quarter of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve structure over a 6 year period, however, is the proposed reduction of some 3,000 Selected Reserve billets in the coming fiscal year.

MCROA does not believe that the Marine Corps would propose such reductions if it was not under some DOD mandate to reduce the active structure. Would a Marine Corps that mobilized and deployed two entire reserve tank battalions to SWA—battalions which fought with such distinction—propose deactivating all but two companies of those battalions if it was not under some external pressure?

Would a Marine Corps which believed that it was going to be able to replace three A-4M Squadrons with F/A-18 aircraft and which mobilized portions of four Marine aircraft groups and the necessary supporting units from its reserve aviation assets and had some 3,471 Marines from the 4th MAW on active duty, propose eliminating nearly 1,700 billets in and supporting the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing if it was free to provide a logical plan for a balanced reserve air ground task force?

MCROA believes that the Congress uniquely appreciates the proven performance of the Total Force Marine Corps and will provide the necessary funding to man, equip and train the Selected Marine Corps Reserve—near term and long term.

It, of course, must be recognized that no small part of the training cost of the Reserve Marine Corps is the dedication of Active Marines to man the Inspector-Instructor staffs that are the nucleus for a viable MOS training program. A reduction in active Marine Corps structure that is so deep that it would reduce those staffs would be a potentially fatal wound to the strength and vitality of the Marine Corps Reserve.

MCROA is grateful not only for the opportunity to testify on the proposed reduction in selected reserve structure—which it opposes—but to publicly thank the Congress for its foresight in devising the Total Force Policy and in appropriating the money necessary to train and equip the Marine Corps Reserve.

Our Marine Officers have demonstrated that they can recruit and lead young citizen Marines. MCROA has confidence that the Congress will continue to fund the equipment and training needs of the Marine Corps Reserve. Our performance in Desert Storm has validated your confidence. We are equally confident in your future support and in the support of our respective communities.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

According to the base force plan, the Reserve components would have little or no role in three of the force packages: the strategic forces, the Pacific forces, and the contingency forces. Almost all the reduced Reserve component structure would be allotted to the Atlantic forces. Furthermore, the role of the Reserve component in the Atlantic forces would be that of reinforcement.

General Ensslin, one of the reasons I have heard about why the Army National Guard is being given a diminished role is because of—what we already discussed this morning—the roundout problems and so on. What comments do you have on that? I had thought all along there was some command structure that was going to go along with this. But the testimony we had this morning, it is just sort of a general thing to put on a map I guess. It is about the same as what we have always had under some different names as near as I can figure it out this morning.

But generally with this diminished role in these various areas, what effect would the planned 30 percent reduction of the Army National Guard have on the capacity of the Guard to perform its State missions? If we went along with this concept, just one area, but then what effect does this have on the State missions that the Guard are also responsible for?

General ENSSLIN. Well, in the State of Florida it would have great impact. We are perhaps subject to more callups on State active duty than most States thanks to circumstances of hurricanes, tornadoes, Mariel boat lifts, truckers' strikes, Liberty City riots, and so forth, in addition to being a real counter-narcotics effort focus. And there is no question, there are a lot of State missions that require the use of Federal assets.

Senator GLENN. It varies quite widely from State to State.

General ENSSLIN. We are moving from a forward deployed containment strategy back to a forward presence and force projection strategy. We are going to have a greater percentage of our forces based in CONUS, and the key to being able to employ those forces, again, is lift. And there is less of a requirement for the rotation base which was earlier pointed out by the Air Force as one of the considerations in the force mix arena. And I think these things provide greater opportunity for National Guard participation, as opposed to a reduction in National Guard structure.

Senator GLENN. Well, this roundout thing that we talked about earlier, and you were here through all of that, I believe it has been

a problem. I am sure you have looked at this. Is the roundout thing something that would be accomplished the same way? Instead of saying a brigade goes out, we say you integrate them across the board, you would have three brigades there? You would integrate units, say, at the platoon, the company level, something like that. You get the same number of people, but they are more dispersed throughout a unit and could be assimilated better. That is what I got out of it. Is that an answer to this or is it something else?

General ENSSLIN. Sir, I would forget it. I think one of the things that has come out of this exercise is what I call a synchronization mystique about the complexity of getting a maneuver brigade of armor and infantry ready to go. I visited the 48th Mech out at the National Training Center and I saw some outstanding soldiers working themselves to death to get the job done and getting the job done.

Had that brigade been given the opportunity to participate, I feel that they would have had the same kind of success that the Marine Corps combat formations had. But they did not have that opportunity, and at this point in time we will never know just exactly how they would have performed. But I believe that the hits that those units took in the media without anybody stepping up to come to their defense and explain the total circumstances of what was expected of them and what kind of readiness condition they were in were very unfair to those people. And I am sure that Senator Nunn knows from talking to some of his folks just how abused some of those people feel as a result of their experience.

The combat service support units that were deployed were basically deployed without post-mobilization training. Whatever post-mobilization training units got was minimal, and they just breezed through the mobilization stations, deployed, and performed superbly.

Senator GLENN. Well, when we were over in the Gulf about 9 weeks ago a small group of us met with General Schwarzkopf and he pointed out that any function that has a civilian counterpart function is something that just goes automatically, combat support, combat service support, cargo handling, fuel handling, whatever you name it right on down the line.

Where they had the problems obviously in the roundout situation, where you have to have the actual under combat fire conditions, the close coordinated fox-hole-type, rub-shoulders-type coordination, where you depend on each other is a different thing. And you just do not get that in 39 days' training a year. I think the faulty part of this was in the planning to begin with. What we thought was planned anyway was that any round out unit was expected to get some additional training to be up to speed.

General ENSSLIN. That is correct.

Senator GLENN. Well, then we went ahead and sent the 24th and then had to plug in another brigade. And that was generally misunderstood which is the fault of the leadership here, not the individuals who were out there trying to get ready as fast as they could, as you pointed out. So I support them and I think the leadership was at fault for not having been on top of that.

Chairman NUNN. Let me just add to that, I agree with what you said and what the General said. It is interesting to note that even

if you take everything that was critiqued about that brigade and say that it is accurate, even if you assume that—which I do not, but just let us for the purposes of assumption—had they been called up in September or early October, they would have been there for the ground war under anybody's most stringent condition.

So to say that the round out concept did not work to me does not make any sense at all, because they were never envisioned in a European scenario because of the lift as you mentioned, General. They never envisioned the Roundout brigades as being able to be transported with all the equipment and so forth.

On day 1 there was always a vision from the very beginning of that concept, because I was there when it started, that they would be called up for refresher training and being given time, and that it would calibrate into the ability to lift them over there with sealift and airlift. And had they been called up in September or October instead of reporting for duty, what, late November or December?

General ENSSLIN. December.

Chairman NUNN. Early December. They would have been there in time for the ground war, so I think they deserve tremendous credit. I was out there with them a couple of times, and most of them I talked to told me they thought they needed some refresher training. I talked to any number of them individually, and they felt they needed it and it was helping them. But there was a sense of real frustration that in the news media and in the public perception by a lot of people they were being held to a standard that nobody had ever envisioned for the roundout, that they be ready to get on the ship on day 1.

And frankly, had they been ready we would not have had the sealift and airlift to get them there to begin with.

So I just think that we need to take a look at what the whole concept of roundout was and congratulate those people for a superb job. And frankly, what they went through out at the National Training Center was as rigorous a training as any brigade has ever gotten I think in the experience of that center. And those people out there know that.

I also just wanted to say, and I have to go to another meeting unfortunately, that I have enjoyed this testimony very much this morning. I think this business about national will that both General Ensslin and General Hultman and others have referred to is absolutely right. I think that every unit in Georgia that went off from any town, no matter what size the unit, the community really had a stake in that whole thing. And they were following it day to day and they were 100 percent behind it.

And that was one of the great tragedies of the Vietnam war, a lack of national will. And that I think came from the lack of political leadership willing to call up the Reserves. There is nothing more disillusioning than the Reserve units to be trained for years and years and years, and then have a war and not be called to participate when clearly you need it. That was one of the biggest problems of Vietnam. And that was one of the reasons we put in effect, as most of you recall, the ability of the President to call up Reserves and Guard without declaring a national emergency.

But I also would like to just express briefly the history of that concept needs to be rethought, too, because it was never envisioned that it would be in lieu of or substitute for declaring a national emergency when we really had a war. And some people in the Pentagon are now using that authority and saying it is not enough. Maybe it is not. Maybe we all need to look at it as if it was the whole thing and that the President is never going to have to declare a national emergency.

In my opinion, the President of the United States, when we get ready to go to war, ought to be willing to declare it a national emergency. That is another part of national will. And so I do not think that 90-day, which became 180-day was ever envisioned, because I authored it. I was the sponsor of it. It was envisioned to take the place of the President being willing to callup on a national emergency. It was viewed as something that could be used easier, quicker, in a situation that was less than a national emergency.

So I hope that we do not forget the history of either the original concept of the roundout or the history of that national emergency legislation.

At some point, I would like to get all of your views about whether that non-national emergency callup authority of the President should be expanded, because there are a number of people in the Pentagon who believe it should be. And if so, where the line should be drawn. I do not know if we can go further than what it is now, but I do not think we ought to get to the point where a President can basically go to war without ever telling people in the country it is a national emergency. Because by definition, when you go to war, it is a national emergency and the whole country ought to be involved in it.

So I would like to invite you to express an opinion about that subject. I think that one may very well come up.

Senator Glenn, thank you.

[The following are the Reserve Officers Association's responses by Maj. Gen. Evan L. Hultman, AUS (Ret.) to Senator Nunn's invitation to comment on the President's call-up authority under Title 10 USC, 673b and additional missions that could be relegated to the Reserve components.]

COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT'S CALL-UP AUTHORITY

The Reserve Officers Association (ROA) believes that the early, first-time use of Title 10 USC, 673b, by the President was key to the outstanding success of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In spite of the exceptional performance of the Total Force, many lessons can and should be gained from the implementation of Title 10 USC, 673b and the subsequent use of Reserve forces. ROA would urge the Department of Defense and the Congress to consider the possible need for change. While there are a number of issues that warrant attention, there is one area that proved particularly troublesome throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Because 673b provides for a 90-day call-up and a 90-day extension, the 90 days became fixed in the minds of DOD planners and individual Reservists. It is perhaps human nature to perceive that which we want to perceive. Reservists wanted to believe and did believe that the activation would be for a relatively short duration, and many did not make the necessary arrangements or prepare mentally for more than a 90-day call-up. The perception affected the way they coped with activation in many instances, and the adverse effect on families and also employers may have been even greater.

ROA would recommend that a call-up of up to 180 days be authorized in lieu of the 90/90 call-up. A provision might well be made for the President to inform the Congress of his intention after 90 days. We believe that the 180-day call-up is more realistic in many instances and it would send a better signal to Reservists. A 180-day call-up authority would provide military planners more flexibility which might ultimately be beneficial. The longer call-up authority need not preclude an earlier release from active duty. In most every instance Reservists will accept a shorter than anticipated call to active duty, but the effect of having to serve longer than anticipated is demoralizing at best.

ROA shares Senator Nunn's concern that the President not be allowed to go to war without involving the Congress or the American people. The Persian Gulf conflict and the U.S. response to that conflict clearly demonstrates the importance of involving the American people early in any conflict of significant size or consequence. We believe history would suggest, however, that Presidents have erred in their reluctance to use their authority under 673b rather than their propensity to use the authority.

COMMENTS ON ADDITIONAL RESERVE MISSIONS

ROA agrees that the Navy has a real opportunity to increase its utilization of its Reserve force. We recognize that the Navy's unique mission requirements and the attendant requirement to maintain a relatively large portion of Naval forces deployed even during peacetime does provide some realistic limitations on the proportion of the Navy's Total Force that can be placed in the Naval Reserve. However, there is a real potential for more or expanded portions of Navy mission areas to be assigned to the Naval Reserve, particularly in aviation areas. For example, the Navy is projected to operate 12 carriers, and maintain an additional one in a training support status and operate 11 Active and two Reserve carrier air wings. A decrease in the deployment requirements would permit the transfer of an additional carrier air wing from the Active force to the Naval Reserve. In addition, the two existing Reserve carrier air wings do not have carrier based ASW aircraft assigned because of the lack of S-3 aircraft in the inventory. Indications are that the Navy is resizing its Active force S-3 squadrons thereby freeing up as many as 21 S-3 aircraft. These aircraft should be transferred to the Naval Reserve.

The Navy is planning to reduce the overall number of P-3 aircraft and plans to make proportional reductions in the number of P-3 squadrons in the Active and Reserve forces to maintain the existing two thirds Active one third Reserve ratio. A more efficient approach to address a submarine threat that continues to increase would be to maintain as many P-3 squadrons in the Naval Reserve as can be manned, and thereby achieve the largest possible total capability while using the minimum overall annual resources.

Another area that should be investigated is a proposal to maintain all the combat systems of the U.S.S. *Forrestal* in service by Naval Reservists after this ship is transferred to AVT status at Pensacola, Florida, rather than removing or "mothballing" these systems. Maintenance of these systems by Reservists appears feasible and would ensure a dramatic reduction in the time required to make this carrier ready for deployment.

One surface warfare mission that should be considered for expansion in the Naval Reserve is mine warfare. The Navy proposes to place all but one of its new Coastal Mine Hunter (MCH) ships in the Naval Reserve but none of the 14 Avenger class MCM's are programmed for the Naval Reserve. A large proportion of MCM's in the Naval Reserve Fleet (NRF) appears feasible.

These possible new missions or mission area expansions for the Naval Reserve would all require detailed analysis and identification of resources needed to support them in the Naval Reserve. In addition, all the Reserve components have resource requirements, particularly to meet equipment shortages or modernization requirements, that must be addressed so that the Reserve forces will be fully capable of meeting all the existing mission requirements.

[Response by General Weber to Senator Nunn's invitation to provide views on non-national emergency call-up authority.]

TOTAL FORCE POLICY AND MANPOWER AND FORCE STRUCTURE PLANS

The National Guard Association agrees that there is an important balance between political responsibility and military needs with respect to use of the Presiden-

tial 200,000 call-up authority. But one of our concerns is the impact of the call-up on soldiers and airmen and their families and employers.

Based on the recent experience, we would suggest that the 90/90 combination is a problem for the individual. The current 90/90 provision fosters unrealistic expectations that the soldier or airman will return home in 90 days. In reality, the call-up authority was for 180 days.

We would recommend that the call-up be authorized and executed as a 180 day activation of the member with a requirement for the President to advise Congress of the outlook at the 90 day mark. If the crisis or emergency is short lived like Grenada and Panama, then troops can be released much earlier—a pleasant adjustment. On the other hand, if the operation is similar to the Persian Gulf, some of the hardships we have witnessed could be avoided or reduced. If personnel had expected to be away for 6 months, they would have planned differently for covering their responsibilities and obligations. Employers and families would not have experienced the same disillusionment and disappointment and troop morale would not have been undercut by late notification of an extension.

As an aside, the 180 days would also allow military planners to believe that they had more flexibility in their decisions. Some of the reluctance to activate needed units would be alleviated. This change does not compromise the important principle that the executive branch involve the people and the Congress in decisions to undertake major military operations.

Senator GLENN. Go ahead, you have got more time.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. I just wanted to ask one question to Admiral Smith about the Naval Reserve. For years I have pushed the Navy, sometimes and most of the time without success. Every now and then I—and I think Admiral Kelso is looking at it much more objectively now. But are there additional missions for the Naval Reserve that are not now being fully utilized that your association can come up with?

Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. What is it you could do that you are not being called on to do? What missions could you take on in the Naval Reserve that are not being given to you now?

Admiral SMITH. Well, there has been talk about land-base tanking. And we are losing our organic tanking aboard the carriers. The A-3s are gone, the KA-3s are gone. As the KA-6s get old and start phasing out, of course there are the S-3s that we will have. But as we have found in the Persian Gulf area we needed more tanking capability to fly some of those missions, especially with the FA-18 aircraft. And that is something that could be easily done by the Reserves.

Mining is an area that the Reserves do and do quite well. They did not mobilize the aerial mine sweep capability of the Reserves. I do not know why. I think they should have. That is just an opinion. And it is a dead-end career pattern for active duty people; many of them admit that to me. And yet it is something the Reserves do with great pride. And that is both mining and anti-mine capability.

There are probably some others that given a little thought——

Chairman NUNN. Maybe you could send something for the record on that, too, if you think of it.

Admiral SMITH. Sure could.

[The information follows:]

RETENTION OF CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE AND MISSIONS

In discussing new missions and roles for the Naval Reserve, the first aspect to be considered is the retention in the Naval Reserve Force of those trained, ready, and cost effective Naval Reserve units scheduled to be disestablished for budgetary rea-

sons in fiscal years 1992 and 1993. Most of these units were utilized and proved their worth in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

The fiscal years 1992-1993 Defense Budget Submission reflected the elimination of valuable Naval Reserve programs such as:

Fiscal year 1992:

- Two Helicopter Minecountermeasures Squadrons (HM-18, HM-19), the entire Naval Reserve HM force
- One SH-2 ASW helicopter squadron (HSL-74)
- The entire Craft of Opportunity Program (COOP) harbor/shallow water mine countermeasures
- All aviation Squadron Augmentation Units (SAUs) (except 2 S-3 ASW units)
- One Construction Battalion (CB)

Fiscal year 1993:

- Four of thirteen P-3 Maritime Patrol ASW Squadrons

Our prior testimony, submitted to this committee for the record earlier this year, presents in detail the serious impact upon our Total Force capability that these ill-advised budget driven Naval Reserve Force structure cuts would effect.

In the fiscal year 1992 House Defense Appropriations bill, the House of Representatives funded the reinstatement of the fiscal year 1991 Naval Reserve force structure and the fiscal year 1991 Naval Reserve selected reserve personnel strength, recognizing the folly of prematurely deleting these manned, ready, and cost effective essential forces.

One of the more extreme examples of false economy is the deletion of the two Naval Reserve Helicopter Mine countermeasure squadrons which comprise 40 percent of the Navy's aerial mine countermeasures capability. Only last week, General Schwarzkopf, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, reiterated that the paucity and limited capability of Navy mine countermeasures forces was one of the major force deficiencies in Operation Desert Storm, and severely limited his amphibious operation options. Now DOD is eliminating a substantial minecountermeasures force "in being" for which this committee recommended and the Congress in fiscal year 1991 provided $281,000,000 to re-equip these squadrons with 12 modern, state-of-the-art, capable MH-53E helicopters. In an absurd "Catch 22" scenario, the Department of Defense refuses to procure the 12 fiscal year 1991 helicopters for the Naval Reserve because early in the fiscal year 1992 budget cycle the two squadrons were deleted based on their old helicopters of limited capability. Although Congress corrected this problem before the planned phase-out of the squadrons, the will of Congress continues to be thwarted.

The decision to disestablish HSL-74, the SH-2 helicopter ASW squadron was an equally ill advised budget-driven action. When the original decision was made early in the Navy's fiscal year 1992 POM cycle, Naval Air Station South Weymouth, where HSL-74 is based, was scheduled for closure, and all the FF-1052 Knox class frigates which utilize the LAMPS MK-1 SH-2 helicopter ASW system, were to be decommissioned. In 1991, before the beginning of this year's congressional debate on the fiscal year 1992 Defense budget, both of these actions were reversed, and NAS South Weymouth was retained in the Naval Reserve along with eight Knox class frigates requiring these helicopter ASW assets. Nevertheless, the disestablishment of HSL-74 continues on schedule leaving the eight FFT-1052 Naval Reserve frigates without LAMPS MK-1 ASW capability, and the 14 Naval Reserve FFG-7 frigates with only one each of their requirement of two SH-2 helicopters per frigate. Equally serious, the dedicated, expensively trained, Naval Reserve ASW specialists of HSL-74 will have no place to train in the Northeast United States, and will for the most part be lost to the Naval Reserve and our Nation's defense capability.

The other DOD budget driven fiscal year 1992 Naval Reserve Force cuts are similarly poor examples of cost savings versus defense capability decisions. It appears that the only practical means of preventing irreversible loss of critical cost effective Naval Reserve Forces and trained personnel is to direct retention of the current fiscal year 1991 Naval Reserve Force structure and Selected Reserve end-strength for fiscal year 1992 as has been done in the House of Representatives Appropriations bill.

Recent Department of Defense procurement rescission and reprogramming actions reinforce the necessity for Congress to spell out precisely the Reserve forces to be retained and equipped. It is requested that the Senate Armed Services Committee include in their committee report on the fiscal year 1992 Defense Authorization bill, language directing the retention in the Naval Reserve of:

- HM-18 and HM-19 Mine Countermeasures Squadrons
- HSL-74 Light Helicopter ASW Squadron
- COOP Harbor Mine Countermeasures Program

- Aviation Squadron Augmentation Units
- 17 Naval Construction Battalions (CBs)
- 13 P-3 Land-based ASW Maritime Patrol Squadrons
- The fiscal year 1991 Naval Reserve Force Structure and Selected Reserve end-strength

NEW MISSIONS FOR THE NAVAL RESERVE

The following missions and forces are recommended for consideration as Naval Reserve components, functions, forces, or missions in the Navy Total Force. In some instances the listed item will be a new mission to the Naval Reserve, while others may be examples of expanded current Naval Reserve functions and forces, or a transfer of a portion of a current active Navy function or force to the Reserve component of the Navy:

1. Establishment of two S-3B carrier based ASW squadrons to complete the complement of Carrier Reserve Air Wings 20 and 30.
2. Establishment of a U.S.S. *Forrestal*. AVT-59, Naval Reserve organization to provide a capability for AVT-59 to resume duties as an operational aircraft carrier (CV) by the maintenance of combat systems aboard and a Naval Reserve training capability for both aviation and ships operating personnel augmentees, both assigned reserve crew and other reserve personnel.
3. Land based aircraft (aerial) tankers.
4. Additional Ship Intermediate Maintenance activities at CONUS Naval Stations.
5. Expanded Naval Reserve role in MCM and MHC minesweeper operation, COOP harbor mine countermeasures program expansion, and HM helicopter aerial mine countermeasures.
6. Additional CONUS based VFC adversary squadrons to provide realistic air tactics training for fleet aviation units.
7. Medical units to man the Hospital Ships USNS *Comfort* and USNS *Mercy*.
8. Fleet Replacement Squadrons and Aviation Training Squadron augmentation, or operation.
9. Expanded Naval Reserve Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit organization.
10. Assume Fleet Electronic Warfare Support Group (FEWSG) mission.
11. TACMO ("Take Charge and Move Out") Squadrons, Airborne communications relay aircraft for national command communication with strategic submarine force.
12. Establishment of Forward Ship Battle Damage Repair Units.
13. CONUS based Vertical Onboard Delivery/Carrier Onboard Delivery (VOD/COD) mission.
14. Assume PHM Hydrofoil Squadron mission at NAS Key West for increased reserve involvement in drug interdiction and Caribbean presence.
15. If further cuts in active Navy carrier air wings are made, transfer the deleted wing to the Naval Air Reserve to maintain reconstitution capability and provide readily available attrition aircraft and crews.
16. As further reductions are made in active Navy ships, screen the minor combatants and service force ships that are leaving the fleet for assignment to the Naval Reserve Surface Force in lieu of mothball, scrap, or FMF.

While not inclusive, the above suggested missions, roles, and forces are deserving of consideration for transfer to or establishment by the Naval Reserve Force.

PRESIDENTIAL CALL-UP AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 673, 10 U.S. CODE

The authority of the President to recall up to 200,000 members of the Reserve components to active duty for operational missions under the provisions of 673b, 10 U.S. Code for a period not to exceed 90 days with an extension period of an additional 90 days, appears to be an appropriate mechanism to utilize Reserve forces for the normal expected contingency short of a major protracted conflict.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm has shown that contingencies can grow in scope and length so that reservists in greater numbers may be required for greater than the original statutory periods of 90 days plus 90 days. Whether the 180 day plus 180 day recall periods, enacted for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm should replace the current statutory periods of Section 673b, 10 U.S. Code is largely a political decision more appropriately addressed by the Congress and the Executive. The ascertainment of when the President should declare a National Emergency in order to utilize larger numbers of reservists for an extended period is a statutory matter about which the Naval Reserve Association has not taken a formal position. NRA is of the opinion that recent history has indicated that there is no urgent requirement or need to radically alter the provisions of Section 673, 10 U.S. Code.

Chairman NUNN. And I would invite the same thing to the rest of you, the Navy in particular, because I have always felt the Navy could, and certainly with the budget situation now, it seems to me the Navy itself has got a real opportunity here to greatly increase the utilization of Reserves.

Admiral SMITH. I think you have got to look at it from the point of the active duty people running the programs over in the Pentagon. Because I have been in their shoes at one time, and I have been in the Reserves, too. And to them, the Reserves are out of sight, out of mind. My goodness, we have got to cut the budget, let us cut the Reserve budget. Let us do away with their program. And they do not really sit down, I do not believe, and carefully analyze what is the most effective amount of defense can we obtain for the dollar?

And if they did that, the answer would come up Reserves. If it did not, I would be the first one to say, let us do away with the Reserves. And as a result, we are talking about taking mine capability and taking it back out of the Reserves and put it in the active duty. The budget that came forward to you all reduced the Reserves by 18,800, and yet this study was supposed to be equitable. The Active forces, the Navy, is only being reduced by 18,300 and yet they are four times our size, so that is certainly not, percentage-wise, an equitable cut.

And that is part of the problem. There are missions we can do and I shall get those to you. And I think that the Reserves in many ways can provide a most cost-effective defense when needed.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

TOTAL FORCE POLICY AND MANPOWER AND FORCE STRUCTURE PLANS

There are a number of mission areas where the National Guard could become involved. The missions that should be considered are intermittent forward presence, land defense in CONUS, catastrophic response teams dedicated to support of FEMA, Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP) and Critical Facilities Protection Program (CFPP), and air defense artillery. Based on historical precedent/experience, the National Guard has already demonstrated the capability to undertake these missions. In the case of air defense artillery, the National Guard involvement in this mission goes back to the 1950s and extensive operation/protection of the Nike/Hercules missile sites. The geographic dispersion and the familiarity with the surrounding environment of National Guard units and personnel are particular strengths in the areas of land defense, catastrophic response and KAPP/CFPP. National Guard personnel are already on location which increases their cost-effectiveness as a mission resource.

The Army National Guard could contribute to cost-effective defense and readiness through intermittent forward presence. Intermittent forward presence would entail the rotation of one brigade and selected division and corps support units from the Army National Guard. Such rotation would improve Guard readiness, integration with active duty force and signal continued commitment to our allies.

Senator GLENN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know I have always been interested in the National Guard and Reserves. I think they have done a great job for the country, and I am very proud of them.

I want to especially commend the National Guard Association of the United States, the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, and also the Naval Reserve Association and Marine Corps

Reserve Officers Association. I believe they have done a great job in support of the Reserve components.

I have one question I would like to ask all witnesses. We will just start here with General Ensslin. Are you aware of any changes to the Total Force Policy Study Report that was mandated by the DOD staff over the objections of the study group?

General ENSSLIN. Well, I think this was addressed a little earlier, Senator, where there was some discussion about some memorandums from DOD leadership to the members of the study group. And my belief is that those steps did influence the direction that the study went.

Senator THURMOND. General Weber.

General WEBER. I would comment, sir, that the early draft reports on the committee's efforts differ drastically from the final report. Something had to influence a change of direction. Now, whether or not it was done by a member of the study group or someone in the Secretariat or where, we do not know. But it is very obvious that the report changed direction midstream.

Senator THURMOND. General Hultman.

General HULTMAN. Senator, I would agree with what General Weber just said and add a footnote. One of the grave concerns we have, and I think this report was proof of it, is that the makeup of the committee that analyzes and puts it together, really, in a great measure determines what the report is going to be. And there is not anything wrong with that at all. That is the way you, gentlemen, do with your staffs and the committees all the time.

But I can say to you point blank if you looked up at the makeup of that committee, the National Guard Association was not on it. The Reserve Officers Association was not on it. Nobody at this table was represented here, who I believe do a credible job of representing fairly what the reserve dimension is. And if you are going to study and analyze the Reserve, it just seems to me that some of those key players in it ought to be a part of the committee that does the study, not just called in at a given time to give some testimony.

The same with you men here today from the committee. It was not just Senator Glenn and his own committee. He invited the Armed Services Committee and everyone in, like you, Senator Thurmond.

So that is the one point I would like to make to you for in the future. I think whenever there is going to be a study or analysis of that kind, and there is already some discussions about one or two or three in the future, that the makeup of the committee be designated. Do not leave it necessarily to somebody else as to what some proportionate part of that makeup is going to be, not necessarily naming specific individuals but naming at least the primary players, or those that they are about to do it for or do it to, are included at least as a part of the makeup.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Smith.

Admiral SMITH. I would agree with the previous ones. The first report that came out was praise for the Total Force Policy and how it had worked. It talked about putting additional structure into the Reserves. The final or interim report, not the draft, that came out, was considerably different in terms of its whole attitude toward the

Reserves. When you read it, it sounds as though they want to reduce the Reserves substantially.

And the only thing that I can find between those two, and whether there are cause and effect I cannot say, were a couple of memorandums from the Under Secretary's office to the chairman of the study.

Senator THURMOND. Colonel Doyle.

Colonel DOYLE. Senator, I am not aware of any direct influences on the publication of the report, but we concur with General Hultman in that the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association made a resolution at their last annual conference that no study should be conducted about the Reserve without Reserve participation.

General HULTMAN. And that is just not Pentagon reserve participation. That is what we are saying in the process.

Senator THURMOND. General Hultman, do you have any indicators on what impact Operation Desert Storm will have on recruiting and retention in our reserve units?

General HULTMAN. Senator Thurmond, I asked again this weekend at the Marine unit. That is a critical question, and I think the answer is not really definitive yet. I cannot give you some real broad analysis, but I can say from our standpoint, our analysis of it, that in the beginning we felt there was going to be a very serious adverse impact. And I say that point blank for many, many reasons. I am not blaming anyone, just the very nature.

When you take men and women from civilian life, and in this case we jockeyed them around in the beginning. They did not know for sure when they were going to go or how long they were going to stay. We adjusted that. We do not know for sure when they are going to come home. There were many complications that had an adverse effect, but I can say to you—and I think it is in the tradition of who these men and women—that it has been very, very low.

The Marine Active colonel and major, along with the Reserve captain of this Marine artillery unit, and I asked a number of the young men in it. They said that they did not think that they were going to lose anyone, that their morale was so keen and so high because they got a chance to prove they were a true part of the total force.

And I think that is the bottom line and I think that is what the bottom line is going to be, if we make sure we treat them fairly in looking to what the problems really have been and patching those problems up and plugging those holes which you men are about and which all of us at this table have brought to your attention and will continue to. A number of pieces of legislation, for example, a very simple one that I brought up in the hearing with Senator Inouye earlier, was that someone had indicated we ought to pay reservists when they come on active duty for whatever pay they were getting back there. Well, you know again, there are a lot of things that sound kind of fair in one way, but that is really absurd. But a possible way of handling that is to develop an insurance program paid for by the reservists themselves at whatever need level they have. For some, it is no need at all, but for some others, a doctor or somebody like that, maybe it is a $200,000 item. But there are ways to do that, and do it in a fair way and meet that challenge, just as we have done with a lot of other good legislation.

Senator THURMOND. I have just been informed there will be a vote at 1 o'clock, so we will have to rush along.

General Hultman, the reductions in the Reserve components will result in the redesignation of units and the reclassification of personnel. What impact will this have on the readiness of the Reserves?

General HULTMAN. Every time we do it, Senator, and this is probably the greatest and most serious problem of Reserve units from day 1 and will be to the end of time is constantly restructuring. And that is the point I made earlier on to Senator Glenn in my brief remarks that when you make any change of that kind in assignment, et cetera, mission, and so forth in the Reserve, it takes a great amount of time in order to get a reserve unit up to where it has got to be. So we have got to be very, very careful in the question that you are asking now.

Senator THURMOND. General Weber, Senator Dixon testified that 50 percent of the Illinois National Guard will be cut, is this an exceptional case or are other States similarly impacted?

General WEBER. Senator, it has to be an exceptional case because the cut across the board, as has been referred to several times this morning, is a little in excess of 29 percent. So across the board it is 29 percent. Most of our units are in battalion or larger size elements and, as you move one of those, particularly from a smaller State, it has a very drastic impact.

I can tell you, in some of the States it is greater than that percentage. I have been assured by the National Guard Bureau that they will make every effort in working with the Army to balance this out and as nearly as possible to a reduction of roughly 30 percent across the board, State by State.

Senator THURMOND. General Ensslin, you recommend that the Guard unit readiness be made an integral part of the parent unit readiness. In the case of a roundout unit, what authority would you give the active unit commander to influence this readiness? I am particularly interested in personnel policies such as relieving commanders who are not qualified, and so forth.

General ENSSLIN. I think that is certainly something that the commander of the division needs a voice in, and I do not know of any cases where division commanders felt that a change needed to be made where such change was not carried through by the State.

There is no question that the division commander has got to have full confidence in the brigade commander of his Roundout brigade. He also has got to have an ownership in the readiness of that brigade, and he has got to feel that it is part of his division and that it is just as important that the Roundout brigade be ready as it is his other two brigades.

Senator THURMOND. General Ensslin, I support your recommendation that if a unit is required in the structure but is not required for immediate deployment, then cost effectiveness will normally dictate that it be in the Guard. Would you give us the parameters for immediate deployment?

General ENSSLIN. I would say that if it is in the first 30 days it is in a contingency employment time frame.

Now, in terms of the availability of sea lift, let us say that anything that is not deployed and does not arrive at the point of the

contingency in 60 days ought to be looked at as being a candidate for being in the Guard and the Reserve.

Senator THURMOND. I was deeply impressed with one point there. I believe it was by General Hultman, that the community support over this entire country was so good for the Persian Gulf war because the Guard and Reserves were called out and the people back home were interested in keeping up with their exploits. Without that support we would not have gotten the results that we did, in my opinion, and I think that is a very good point.

Another factor is that we may have to have to resort to the draft if we cut the Reserves and National Guard down too much. I think it is a very difficult decision that we have to make. The Pentagon and the Armed Services Committees in the House and the Senate have a major responsibility in adjusting the Reserve component strength.

I want to thank all of you for your appearance here, and thank you for the good work you are doing. I ask that my written statement be included in the record.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond, your statement will be included in the record.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for scheduling this hearing and for your selection of witnesses. You have brought together an appropriate mix of experts and policy makers to make this a truly noteworthy hearing which hopefully, will put to rest the controversy raging in regard to the Total Force Policy concept and the reductions in the Reserve components.

Mr. Chairman, there is little doubt that dramatic changes which have occurred over the past 2 years require a review of our defense strategy and the forces required to support that strategy. There is also no doubt that the fiscal crisis facing this Nation mandates a reduction in our budget—both domestic and defense.

The President has proposed a plan on how to achieve these reductions. Now the Congress and, in particular this subcommittee, is exercising their constitutional oversight role.

Mr. Chairman, I want to focus on just one of the issues facing this committee—the reduction in our Reserve components. You have been the most vocal advocate in support of the Total Force Policy concept. It was through your initiative that the Department established the Total Force Policy Study Groups which reviewed the viability of this concept. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the product fell short of expectations and appears to be not an independent study, but a document prepared to support the goals of those making the policy.

Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense is using this flawed study as the basis for the AC-RC force structure. I agree that as the Active component forces structure is reduced, Reserve components units associated with that structure can be eliminated. However, I am not convinced that this Nation can afford—in terms of readiness—to make the drastic reductions in the National Guard and Reserves proposed by the administration. It does not make sense in terms of cost savings; it does not make sense in terms of preparedness. Over the past 200 years the Nation has always called on its citizen soldiers in time of crisis. The Active Army has historically been the first to be employed, but the bulk of our combat forces for the long haul have always been our national Guard and Reserves. Under the plan proposed by the Department of Defense these back-up forces would not be available for the long haul.

Mr. Chairman, this year the interest on our national debt is expected to rise above $300 billion—exceeding our defense budget. When faced with this kind of horrendous debts we have to ensure that we build a military force structure that provides the best defense for the lowest price. We all know that the National Guard and Reserve components consistently provide cost savings over Active components

units. These savings range from 75 to 25 percent depending on the type of unit. We cannot ignore this important factor.

Mr. Chairman, at the same timed we cannot ignore the fact that there are problems with the Reserve components that must be addressed. Among them is measuring the readiness of the Reserve component forces. We must be able to judge the true readiness of these units before they are called to active duty and they must be held to the same standards as the Active components. In my judgment, this will require greater integration of Active component personnel into the Reserve units and increased Federal authority over National Guard management and training.

Mr. Chairman, the minor problems experienced during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm should not detract from the significant contributions made by our Reserve components during these operations. The simple fact is that this Nation could not have achieved this glorious victory without its Reserve components. We ought to remember that fact as we debate the future role of our Reserve components.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. We are going to wind down in just a second here, because we do have a vote in about 5 minutes, but let me just ask a couple of things.

Colonel Doyle, I pointed out to General Gardner when we had the first panel at the witness table that over 55 percent of the Selected Reserve of the Marine Corps was activated for Desert Storm. Now, there is going to be a planned 21 percent reduction in the Marine Corps Reserve manpower. I presume that is going to have some rather drastic combat readiness effects, especially in light of the planned Active component reduction of 19 percent. Do you have any comment on that?

Colonel DOYLE. Yes, sir. That is why MCROA does not support at this point any reduction in the Selective Marine Corps Reserve. In fact, 66 percent of the division wing team was mobilized—that is 24,000 reservists—and any reduction like that would necessarily cut into, I suspect, the structure.

You do not just get a little bit less of everything you have got, you get different things, and without knowing exactly what threat we are structured against in the Active component, I think it is premature at this point to forecast any reductions in the Reserve.

Senator GLENN. Last time we were over in the Gulf, I mentioned that we met with General Schwarzkopf, and my question to him was that I did not want to hear again about what went right, we had seen that on TV and all the news reports. I said, I would like for him to tell me what went wrong.

I have been through a couple of wars myself, and I know nothing ever works as well as it was reported over here, so I said, give me a list of what went wrong so we can go back and work on it in the Armed Services Committee, and he laughed and he said, how many hours do you have for me to talk about it, number one.

But he actually talked about 20 minutes, and I thought it was interesting. Some of the things—fast sealift has been brought up here this morning, Admiral, the biggest lack right off the bat. They were trying to lease, rent, buy, beg, borrow or steal anything that would do more than 10 knots for a while to get stuff over there.

Tactical air intelligence was very poor, battlefield-type pictures—we only had one reconnaissance outfit over there, a Guard outfit out of Nevada but they were taking 2 or 3 days to get the pictures turned around and back up to the people running the missions.

But getting up to Baghdad, things like that, that was no problem. They were getting information off the satellites to make deep stuff, but I am talking about a changing battlefield situation where you need pictures an hour old or 2 hours old. We lacked that.

Minesweeping at sea, we have not done any real work on that since World War II, I guess. We need a lot of work on that. Breaching mine fields and obstacle fields on land. We have still got guys crawling up under the concertina wire with snips and probes in the sand and inch forward another 6 inches and do the same thing. Surely we can do better than that.

The line charges help out, but that is only after they have crawled up through there and done all of that. That is pretty hairy soldiering when you get doing that kind of stuff, and we talked to the people that did some of that.

Another one was on the missile detection for the Scuds and all that, of course. We needed more work on that. We have all taken great pride in developing this night capability—flare, forward-looking infrared stuff and the night goggles and the whole business. We would rather attack at night than we would in the daylight now.

That is fine, as long as the good guys are up there and the bad guys are down here, or vice versa, so you have a line and you know you can hit everything up there, but in a muddled night battlefield situation, I talked to the pilots who were making runs on tanks and could not drop for fear they were dropping on friendlies because they could not identify perfectly the silhouette of a T-72 versus an M-1.

So we need something like we have in the air for IFF—identification friend or foe—except we need it in the IR spectrum on the ground, and you cannot just throw a heat code up on the back because the enemy can pick that up and duplicate that pretty easily too, so we need some work in that area.

Reserve/Regular relationship, combat support, combat service support relationship to civilian jobs, all of these are things that he brought up over there.

I would like to pose the same question to you gentlemen here. As far as the Reserves were concerned, what did not work well, so we can fix it? General.

General ENSSLIN. I would like to make one comment about the fact that in combat service support Guardsmen do well those things that they do in civilian life, and I think that that is really a reflection of not really understanding the force. Very few Guard members do in the National Guard what they do in civilian life. For many National Guard members that is one reason to be in the National Guard. It is not to do the same thing on weekends that they do in civilian life. So I think that is something of a canard. Another canard——

Senator GLENN. I do not think what was meant was that they necessarily are person by person doing exactly the same thing they do in their civilian occupation. It is that the civilian job of being a truck driver or a fuel handler and so on, important though it is—it is a very key element, but it does not require that same kind of shoulder-to-shoulder cooperation you get in a foxhole or something like that.

General ENSSLIN. That is right.

Senator GLENN. That was the point he was making.

General ENSSLIN. Or the kind that those National Guard artillery brigades had to have as they supported the force and the drive.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General ENSSLIN. I think we need to improve the communication between the Active forces and the National Guard, particularly in the Army. I do not think that the Army leadership fully understands the National Guard.

Part of that is the fact that they do not have as much opportunity as Air Guardsmen have to associate with the Active Air Force as they fly in and out of each other's bases. I think that we need to consider how we are really going to get the Army senior leadership to really understand and appreciate what becomes half of the mobilized force when we go to war.

Senator GLENN. Good. General Weber.

General WEBER. Sir, I have two items I would like to raise, and I think the first one overshadows all the other things that went wrong. In the case of the Army they did not follow the mobilization and the war planning. We had very little semblance of what was actually done versus what was planned.

To highlight that point, we had a significant number of units that were on the Quicksilver plan that had been announced for a year that they were going out of the system that actually went to the desert and they did well. I am not criticizing them, I am just saying that we did not follow the plans as they had been developed.

The second point I would like to make is equally significant, but only insofar as the three brigades were concerned, and that is the absence of information. The only thing that we were told were the things that were going wrong, as opposed to being told that every unit had a post-mobilization requirement.

That was the planning. Every unit attained its pre-mobilization training levels, as prescribed by the Army. The units were C-2 and C-3, but this was never told. On the unit status reports it indicated the number of days of post-mobilization training that was required, so it is no wonder that the young soldiers from the 48th out at the desert said they did, in fact, need refresher training, because that was part of the plan.

Senator GLENN. Good. General Hultman.

General HULTMAN. I would agree clearly with those that Vern just mentioned, loud and clear, especially that Quicksilver item.

There were two other things I would mention. One was, the Reservist coming from the Reserve community, and the fact that, different in this war than ever before, and under the total force he is going to go back home. He is not going to stay for 3 years, 6 years, 9 years, or for the duration. We had in the beginning, if you recall, a serious dichotomy where units were brought on for 90 days and there were certain expectations back home with bosses, with wives, with their own businesses, et cetera.

Now, we all know war is contingencies and you never know all these, but at least the plan ought to indicate something that takes care of that very contingency at the outset. We should say guys and gals, we are just not coming here for 90 days, necessarily. It

may well be 180 days, or some of them even now may be pressing on to a year.

The other end of that spectrum I think is equally bad. It was a good thought, and I think most of us would agree, "first in first out," and that is fair. But unfortunately, if you have got a unit, for example, like a Reserve unit, that its function goes from beginning and to end and after it is all over, you still need that Reserve unit. Then that Reserve unit is going to have to stay there, no question, while literally everybody else goes home.

So that is one of the things in the planning and in the analysis and the communication, as Vern said, on which I think we have got to do a much better job.

Senator GLENN. Yes, like Reserves do—97 percent of civil affairs, 69 percent of the hospital, 97 percent Navy cargo handling, that is still going on over there.

General HULTMAN. That is right, yes.

Senator GLENN. There are 62 percent of Marine Corps fuel, you have 67 percent of Air Force Med-Evac. A lot of those are still going on, and so they are going to be tied down, will not get back as fast as some of the regulars would.

General HULTMAN. That is right.

Senator GLENN. That is too bad. Admiral Smith, and if you can be rather brief, because I am going to have to leave for the floor. That buzz back there was the beginning of a 15-minute period to go and vote, so I have about another 5 minutes.

Admiral SMITH. The mobilization went well. I think it was pretty well planned. There were some complaints. The biggest complain I get in the Navy side was pay. Pay, pay, pay. We had people—a doctor who went over there for 3 months, did not get a paycheck the whole time. That more than anything else could have an effect on our retention. I find morale high, but boy, there is some bitterness about pay.

Then there was a reluctance to call up some of the Forcern's or augment units, and while a few individuals went over there on their own and did well, later on I think that there is evidence that they could have used some of those people over there but they did not call them up.

Senator GLENN. Colonel Doyle.

Colonel DOYLE. Sir, we are generally pretty well pleased with the call-up, but I think if I were to find one issue it might be an interoperability—the Reserve with the Active forces. Issues around FA-18s, for example, M-1 tanks, the success story certainly of the tank company that in 10 days brought up to drive the M-1 is creditable, but I think that if we were to train with the M-1 tanks and the FA-18 that certainly has value, and if there were to be a restructure in the Reserve it would hopefully be built around modernization issues.

Senator GLENN. Good. You mentioned the pay equalization proposal earlier. That was a warning, I can tell you. The majority leader asked me to head up the Persian Gulf Personnel Benefits Task Force, which I did, and we worked long and hard on that, and people back here put the whole thing together—Fred Pang and Phil Upschulte on my staff, in particular—and we worked that through and got it all as one package on the floor, as you know.

When that idea of the pay equalization for everybody to restore their civilian pay somehow came out, I can assure you that one did not get very far, so people get a little carried away sometimes with what we are going to do in the euphoria of the moment there.

Gentlemen, you have been very patient with us today, and we appreciate you staying here. I think it has been a very interesting hearing today, and thank you all for being here. Thank you for your testimony.

We may have additional questions, and I think Sam asked you to submit some additional comments, any ideas any of you have on some of the areas he was talking about, and if we can have any responses back to additional questions we might ask as soon as possible we would appreciate it so we can include them in the record.

Thank you much. The hearing will stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

FORCE STRUCTURE PLANS

Senator DIXON. From fiscal year 1991 to fiscal year 1995, I am told, the Active Army will be reduced by approximately 24 percent and the Army National Guard will be reduced by 32 percent. I am also told by the Adjutant General of Illinois that during this period, the Illinois Army National Guard will be reduced by at least 58 percent when considering all of the Army plans.

Does this make sense considering every Illinois National Guard unit mobilized for Desert Storm met all readiness and timeliness criteria? Does this situation seem equitable?

Mr. JEHN. Current Army plans call for a four corps, 20 division force. This will result in a reduction in both divisions and separate brigades needed to support the National Military Strategy. Based on the National Guard Bureau's Command Plan, Illinois will receive an approximate reduction of 36 percent. In addition, the National Guard Bureau is developing a redistribution plan which will redistribute units from States least affected to States severely affected. This redistribution has not been completed, but could affect Illinois' percentage of reductions.

Senator DIXON. Instead of deactivating the 33rd Separate Infantry Brigade in Chicago, Illinois, could it not be trained to assist an Active Army combat unit just as the Marine Reserve units so ably assisted the 1st Marine Division in Desert Storm?

Mr. JEHN. The current National Guard Bureau Command Plan will reconstitute and modernize the 33rd Separate Infantry Brigade as a maneuver brigade of the Army National Guard's 38th Infantry Division.

TRAINING OF GUARD AND RESERVE COMBAT UNITS

Senator DIXON. The 1st Marine Division was reported to have a reserve battalion of infantry and two reserve batteries of artillery assigned to it during Desert Storm. It was reported that these units saw heavy combat and were praised before the Senate Armed Services Committee for their efforts during Desert Storm. Why could the Army not train its Guard and Reserve combat units to a level to deploy with its Active combat units during times of crisis?

Mr. JEHN. As you know, post-mobilization training has always been planned for Roundout brigades. It is simply impossible for part-time reservists to be as proficient as full-time Active soldiers in the complex tasks required in combat units. We learned during the Desert Shield/Storm that this holds true both for individual skills and unit skills. As a result, it has become evident that the post-mobilization train-up time needed to make a combat unit ready is not as short as many people had expected.

RC VS. AC MISSIONS

Senator DIXON. We have a very constrained budget, where we are trying to get the best bang for the buck. GAO reports over the last 3 years indicate that the Army Guard and Reserves have been short changed in equipment and training (a recipe for failure given the small amount to correct the problem). When we have

Army Guard units which cost about one third of what an Active Army unit costs, do we not have too many contingency missions, too many support missions, too many reinforcing missions which are being assigned to Active Army units purely in the interest of keeping alive active duty (expensive) forces, especially overseas?

Mr. JEHN. In order for the Army to accomplish its strategic role in support of the NMS, both the AC and RC will be structured and assigned missions consistent with their capabilities to achieve national military objectives. There will be a balanced mix of forces which will allow tailoring of a force package to provide the capabilities necessary to meet contingency requirement.

The basic consideration in determining the appropriate Active and Reserve force mix is availability, which in turn is dependent on warning time. The unpredictability and uncertainty of the future international environment requires the capability to rapidly project overwhelming land combat power from the continental United States to counter no notice or short notice regional threats. Some units, both combat and support, must be prepared for immediate deployment without delays for additional training. Hence, contingency forces must be primarily resourced by Active component units. Reserve component units will continue to provide required individual and unit combat support, and combat service support to augment the rapid deployment forces. The RC will also provide combat forces for backfill and reinforcement to deployed forces should the contingency become protracted or increase in magnitude, or to hedge against the possibility of a second contingency.

106th AVIATION BATTALION

Senator DIXON. The Air Force appears to use its Air Guard units very effectively in times of crisis and for additional support generally. Could not the Army use as effectively the 106th Aviation Battalion in Peoria, Illinois, for augmentation (drug interdiction, disaster relief, etc.)?

Mr. JEHN. The Army programs or tasks units only for Federal, wartime missions. The State Governor may utilize resources of the unit, while in State status, for counterdrug support or disaster relief based on requests from law enforcement or declaration of emergency conditions. The unit is equipped with UH-1 and OH-58 aircraft. The UH-1 is well suited for marijuana eradication missions in the counterdrug support arena and for transport of emergency supplies and personnel for disaster relief. The OH-58 is ideal for counterdrug aerial reconnaissance and for search and rescue missions relating to support to civil authorities.

Senator DIXON. I have heard that the 85th Division (TNG) from Illinois will be merged with the 84th Division (TNG) from Wisconsin. I also understand that what remains of the 85th will be quite insignificant compared to what the 85th originally looked like. Could you explain the rationale for this plan? Need this plan be implemented at all?

Mr. JEHN. The downsizing of the Army reduced the total requirement for the training base expansion, thereby requiring fewer training divisions. This necessitated the current proposal to reduce the total number of training divisions from 12 to 9 by merging the assets of six into three. Two of the six training divisions being merged are the 85th and 84th. These mergers are currently scheduled for fiscal year 1993.

The 85th Division is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, and the 84th Division is headquartered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Both units will be represented by retaining two brigades from the 85th and two brigades from the 84th. This will provide continued Army Reserve membership opportunities for soldiers in both geographical locations, while providing for utilization of Reserve centers and other facilities located in both areas.

[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1992 AND 1993

TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

UTILIZATION OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY SERVICES

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Glenn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Glenn, Nunn, Exon, Kennedy, Bingaman, Warner, Cohen, McCain, Lott, and Mack.

Other Senators present: Senator Roth.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director, Andrew S. Effron, general counsel, and Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.

Professional staff members present: Robert E. Bayer, David S. Lyles, and Frederick F. Y. Pang.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel; Judith A. Ansley and George K. Johnson, Jr., professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Barbara L. Braucht, Julie W. Kemp, Lisa H. Kettlewell, and Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Phillip P. Upschulte, assistant to Senator Glenn; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; John P. Gerhart, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Grayson F. Winterling, assistant to Senator Warner; Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats; Ross Lindholm, assistant to Senator Mack; and Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN GLENN, CHAIRMAN

Senator GLENN. The hearing will be in order.

The Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel meets today to receive testimony from the Department of Defense and public witnesses on the subject of the utilization of women in our military services.

I want to note that although this hearing is at the subcommittee level, all full committee members have been invited at the request of Chairman Nunn, and I had planned to do that anyway because there is a great deal of interest in the subject.

Since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, women have played an increasingly important role in our military services. In 1973, women comprised 2 percent of our Active duty forces and 1 percent of the Reserve forces. Today, we have 230,000 women on active duty, and they comprise 11 percent of our Active duty forces. We have 150,000 women in our Reserve forces, and they comprise 13 percent of our Reserve forces.

Historically, women have always played an important role in our military forces in time of war or national emergency. They volunteered to fill support jobs to free men to fight, and their contributions and sacrifices are a matter of record.

While we have depended on women to volunteer to wear the uniform in war, we have not, until the advent of the All-Volunteer Force, expected women to serve in uniform in any numbers during peacetime, so the reliance on women in our standing peacetime forces is a relatively recent phenomenon.

Now, the integration of women into our All-Volunteer Force has not been without problems. There were some tough institutional biases at the outset which were quite daunting. Some of these biases have been overcome, but others still remain. For example, even though substantial progress has been made with regard to the problem of sexual harassment in the work place, the problem still exists, and has not been completely corrected.

Women have had to struggle for acceptance in the military. Initially, there were many jobs that were closed to women because of preconceived attitudes about such things as the mechanical aptitude and physical capabilities of women. These attitudes have moderated over time, as military women have pressed for and succeeded in opening jobs, and then went on to prove themselves as fully capable as men in performing them.

This process has been evolutionary, and despite the impatience expressed by some with the pace of the evolution, it has reached a point where the key question of the day is whether or not there should be any prohibition at all on the job assignments for women in the military.

Now, before proceeding, I would like to frame this debate today with the extremes at each end. I am sure we come down in the middle somewhere, but one extreme, perhaps, was expressed in one of the newspaper columns yesterday that if we are to get into this area of opening up jobs in the military, perhaps we should have an amendment which the writer suggested as follows, and this frames one end of the debate.

The amendment would be as follows: "Females shall be enlisted or conscripted under exactly the same circumstances as males, and soldiers of each sex shall be assigned to combat roles without regard to his or her sex." That would be one extreme, obviously.

Now, as I mentioned before, our percentage of women in the military has gone up, and gone up substantially. Now, let us say that instead of the 11 percent that is the average today, that we go up to about the ratio of women in our population, which is roughly

50 percent. If we had 50 percent of the women in the military, would combat effectiveness be changed? Because that has to be the bottom line. Would national security be the same? If the answer is yes, fine. We proceed along that line. If the answer is no, then we have to ask, what jobs are open that do not reduce combat effectiveness?

Now, at the other extreme we have those who say that because of historical facts, because of their religious beliefs, because of moral values, moral reasons, that women have always been the homemakers, the care-givers, the carers for children. The men fight the battles, women take care of the home, and that is the other extreme—that women should not be in the military at all.

So maybe those are both such obvious extremes that we should not even bring them out this morning, but to me that frames the extent of this debate. Is there a middle ground? Opportunity in the United States of America should have no gender. Every job should be open for competition, provided it does not have an adverse effect on combat readiness.

I would hasten to add that I believe that goes both for officer and enlisted. I think this debate is too often framed just in terms of officer upward mobility for women and what is provided for them. We have heard little from enlisted women as to how they view this problem, and I have specifically asked that they be included in this hearing and they are being included in this hearing so we get their views.

There is a difference in promotion policies. Officers are promoted on a much more broad basis of expected command responsibilities, where enlisted are promoted far more by competition within their military occupational specialty, their MOS specialty. So that sort of frames some of the ideas in this debate, and how broad it can be.

Where are we with regard to the law at this point? Let me lay out a very brief background. Under current law, women in the Air Force may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions, and women in the Navy and Marine Corps may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions.

There are no so-called combat exclusion laws for the Army, and I think that is much misunderstood. People think the Army is prohibited by law from putting women in combat units, and that is not true. However, the Army prohibits the assignment of women to skills and positions that involve "the highest probability of direct combat" as a matter of policy.

One of the ways you advance a military career is either performance in combat or prospective performance in combat, so are their careers unnecessarily impeded?

The House recently passed a provision that would remove the statutory prohibition on the assignment of women to duty in combat aircraft. However, the House action would still leave in law the prohibition that women in the Navy and Marine Corps—except for aviators—may not be assigned to duty on vessels engaged in combat missions.

A good case can be made that women should not be barred from flying any aircraft for which they can fully qualify. Military women already fly high-performance aircraft that are not assigned

combat missions, and have proven themselves to be just as capable as men in flying the aircraft to which they have been assigned.

On the other hand, there are serious questions that need to be answered about assigning women to ground combat units in the Army and Marine Corps. For example, should we put women in the infantry or in tank crews, and if we do, what effect, if any, would that have on combat effectiveness?

There are also questions about how much support there is among the American people for opening up combat jobs to women. For example, a survey conducted by CBS News January 27 and 28 of this year asked the following question, and this was just before combat in the Gulf: "If there is ground fighting in the war, do you think women members of the armed forces there should participate in combat or not?"

Of the respondents, nearly one half—47 percent, said women should participate in combat. Now, if the poll was accurate, to me that was as surprisingly high approval rating from the American public.

So we will try to explore these and other questions with our witnesses.

To again summarize, I think we need to recognize that there are two aspects of this issue that we are attempting to reconcile. One aspect deals with equal opportunity, and the other deals with combat effectiveness, and let me just say what I believe combat effectiveness is synonymous with. It is synonymous with the ratio of United States versus enemy killed and wounded in combat. That is what saves American lives. We cannot compromise that. So I think we need to ask very pointed questions of our witnesses to see how well we can reconcile these two aspects, and that is how I intend to approach this hearing.

As I pursue my line of questioning, I want to make it clear that my initial hypothesis is that women should be provided the same opportunity as men in our military, subject to that bottom line, combat effectiveness of our military forces.

Before turning to Senator McCain for opening remarks he may have, I want to note that Senator McCain was one of the first to raise this issue and call for hearings which I agreed to, to examine this issue.

At a Manpower Subcommittee hearing on April 17, Senator McCain said, "I think it is time we reevaluated the combat exclusion policy for women. Clearly, women have demonstrated they can perform any role that they are called upon, that any male is called upon to do." Senator McCain was joined later by Senator Warner, the ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee, who also called for a hearing on this very important subject.

So I want to thank both Senators for their strong interest. Today's hearing is certainly timely, because we will have to deal with this matter in the next few weeks when we mark up the Defense authorization request. Senator McCain, do you have any opening remarks.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for holding this hearing, and as you noted I think it is a very important one. I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing today.

As we are all aware, the subject of women in combat evokes strong emotional responses on both sides of the debate. Congress and the administration I believe are obligated to reexamine this question thoroughly and with appropriate sensitivity to the passions that attend the debate.

Our goal must be to formulate policy that best serves our national security interests and the welfare of the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces. This hearing should be an important step, I believe, to meeting that goal.

The obvious impetus for the reexamination of restrictions excluding women from combat roles is the outstanding performance of U.S. servicewomen in Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. The Nation's call to arms in the Persian Gulf was not gender-specific. Both men and women were placed in harm's way to protect their country's vital interests, and women no less than their male counterparts exhibited such a high degree of professionalism and devotion to duty in the Gulf War that the entire Nation took extraordinary pride in their accomplishments.

Of the 540,758 troops who served in the Gulf, 35,355 were women. Throughout Operation Desert Storm, women performed flight operations within the combat zone. Women also performed many support, intelligence, medical, and rescue assignments that were as physically demanding as some combat assignments, and which involved some substantial risk.

Clearly, their commendable record of service in the Gulf and in all of America's past conflicts entitle women to a thorough reconsideration of a policy that closes all combat positions to them regardless of whether they can serve competently in such positions. In view of their distinguished service, a blanket denial of combat roles to women strikes many people as outdated and unfair. However, it is not in the national interest, nor in the interests of American servicemen and women, to hastily reverse this policy.

Congress, the administration, the armed services and the American public must have sufficient time to understand all the complex issues involved in assigning combat missions to women. There are a great many questions that must be answered before the Nation can determine whether this policy should be modified or reversed.

There are philosophical and practical questions involved in making this determination. The former includes whether the Nation would support putting women in combat, whether their combat service should be voluntary, whether such changes should be made slowly, on an evolutionary basis, or whether we should seek to mandate rapid, service-wide change.

On the practical side, we must examine the physical requirements for combat roles and design honest performance standards, not double standards, to evaluate whether women can meet the demands of a variety of combat roles. We must carefully weigh the cost of converting military equipment, quarters, and facilities to accommodate women in combat.

These and many other questions must be answered thoroughly so the United States can be certain that changes in the current policy would not occur at the expense of defense preparedness or the safety of military personnel.

It will take time to satisfy these imperatives, and it will involve the judgments of a great many people. Accordingly, we should pay close attention to the views and recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and to our senior military commanders, and we should listen intently to the views of junior officers and enlisted personnel, male and female, as they are the ones whose welfare will be most directly affected by any decisions we make about who will serve this Nation in combat.

Let me say at the outset of these hearings that I have been favorably impressed by the women I have met who have served in combat and support roles in some of the most demanding positions in the U.S. military, but if our hearings convince me that there is good reason to exclude women from combat roles, then I will support the current Department of Defense policy.

But if after carefully considering the testimony of the witnesses and the views of all those concerned with this question I am persuaded that the current policy must be revised, then I will actively support appropriate changes in the policy.

Until that time, I would advise all of us to keep an open mind. Like all of us here, I come to these hearings with respect and deep gratitude for the exceptional service provided this Nation by all of our Persian Gulf War veterans, and I am concerned that the opportunities for women in the military reflect the important contributions that they have made time and again to our national security.

I am concerned with fairness, with equal opportunity, but I am also concerned with ensuring that the United States Armed Services sustains the level of professionalism and readiness that was so clearly in evidence in the Persian Gulf. I am concerned with maintaining what is now recognized as the world's most capable fighting force. Women will figure prominently in this imperative. It is good that we now begin evaluating how we can best use their service.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that is the purpose of this hearing. I am pleased to be a part of the process, and I am eager to hear from today's witnesses.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Senator McCain. It has been the policy on the Armed Services Committee to have full statements only by the chairman and the ranking minority, but the interest in this particular issue is such that a number of other members have asked to be heard on this. I hope they can keep their comments to the minimum so we can get on with our witnesses here. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. I will be very brief, Mr. Chairman.

I was pleased to hear the way in which you have phrased and framed the argument. Equity is not going to be found in the extreme positions. The notion that somehow all women must be in combat or all women should be at home is simply not a tolerable juxtaposition of the issues. If we adopted the position that all women should remain at home, there would be no women in politics, in business, in sports, and certainly none in combat support missions that we witnessed in the Persian Gulf.

Technology has, in fact, revolutionized concepts of warfare. Back in 1987, Senator Proxmire and I introduced legislation to increase the number of combat support missions. That legislation did not

pass, but nonetheless, all the services have opened up far more positions than ever before.

Mr. Chairman, Justice Holmes once said that the hell of the old world's literature was found when people were taxed beyond their abilities, but Holmes saw a far deeper type of hell, a much deeper abyss, and that was when powers conscious of themselves were denied their chance, and I think what this hearing is about is to find out whether or not those powers conscious of themselves have been systematically denied their chance in the past, and whether that ought to be reversed or at least ameliorated for the future, so I commend you for the this hearing.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Senator Nunn, our full committee chairman.

Senator Nunn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To you and Senator McCain, I thank you first for having the hearing and second for inviting all the committee members to attend today, because this is enormously important.

I think the deliberations of the committee on this important subject will be greatly affected by the testimony we hear here today, so we appreciate your getting the subcommittee together and inviting all of us here today, and we appreciate the witnesses coming and giving us their frank and candid opinions.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join others here commending the Chair for having this hearing. I wrote the Secretary of Defense on May 8 of this year, and I ask that my letter be incorporated in the record.

Senator GLENN. Without objection, it will be included.

[The information follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, May 8, 1991.

Hon. RICHARD CHENEY,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Operation Desert Storm added another notable chapter in the long history of women in our armed forces. In most cases, women performed right alongside their male counterparts and, by most accounts, performed in a professional manner which provides no basis for distinction.

By law and by policy, our armed forces have excluded women from combat roles. Traditionally, women have been assigned to a multitude of combat support jobs that were contemplated at least initially, as keeping them relatively safe from combat risks. Unfortunately, the evolution of warfighting technology on land and at sea has greatly reduced the security of all areas. Risks are now shared by combat and combat support elements.

Additionally, the SCUD attacks on U.S. forces dramatically changed the public perception that combat forces are separated from their supporting forces and that rear areas provide a substantially greater degree of safety from risks. As tactical ballistic missile technology improves and proliferates, it is quite conceivable that supporting forces, whose role is to sustain the operating forces, could become the equal focus of an adversary's attacks.

The face of war has changed significantly while our assignment policies for women have been resistant to change due to what may be antiquated legal restrictions. I believe it is time that Congress again review the combat exclusion laws that limit the assignment of women to many duty positions in our armed forces.

Accordingly, I have asked the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, to hold a full committee hearing to receive testimony on our assignment policies for women and the legal restrictions to their assignment. The recent, valua-

ble report of DACOWITS will be introduced at this hearing. Prior to such a hearing, I would very much like to offer you and General Powell the opportunity to share your views on this matter with the committee prior to your testimony.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely

JOHN WARNER,
Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Armed Services.

Senator WARNER. At which time, like Senator McCain, I felt that this decision should be examined in the light of the very positive chapter created by professionalism of the women that served in the Gulf.

Further, that we should not, as a Congress, make a decision, as did the House in many respects—the House of Representatives made their decision, so far as I can determine, based on very limited testimony.

I think this issue is so important it merited a committee hearing, and for that reason I commend you and also we will receive the testimony, as I said in my letter, not only from the representatives of the Secretary of Defense but also the senior members of each of the services.

I have not made up my mind on this, and I keep an open mind, as stated by Senator McCain, but I do have one very fixed conviction, and that is, should the Congress elect to change the laws, we must do so in a manner that reposes complete discretion in the Secretary of Defense to make those decisions as to how to implement this step forward.

To me, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, that is essential. We should not, as a Congress, make a historic judgment to change the law and then try and implement it and micromanage it.

I thank the Chair.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. Senator Kennedy?

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to join in commending you for having these hearings.

I support the elimination of the current restrictions. I believe what the test and the challenge should be is the real ability of women to assume the particular responsibility for which they have aspired to within the military.

I hope with the elimination of the restrictions that we will not have a Pentagon that is just going to continue along by their own regulations what was there in terms of the restrictive legislation. I think we have a responsibility to follow that up.

But I would hope that the test would be what their ability is. I think that should be the test, and their capacity, and that there should be an on-going continuing evaluation of that capability. I think that is in the best interests of the military forces and the security of the country.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. Senator Mack? No comment? Fine, thank you.

I wanted to recognize Senator Roth, who has introduced a bill—S. 1076—that would authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to prescribe the conditions under which female members of the Armed Forces may be assigned to duty in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions.

Senator Roth has asked for the opportunity to comment on the bill, and we are happy to accommodate him at this time. Senator Roth?

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM V. ROTH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Senator ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. As you said, strong feelings held by both proponents and opponents, as well as relevant hard data from the Persian Gulf War, makes this a lively topic for debate. I believe that when you look at the data it will become clear that it is time to remove the congressionally-imposed exclusion of women serving in combat aircraft.

Over the last 20 years, women have become an integral part of our national defense. The percentage of women in uniform has grown by a factor of five. In 1972, women made up only 2 percent of military personnel. Now they comprise 11 percent.

As the number of female troops has grown, women have been placed in support positions increasingly tied to combat. Modern technology has changed the concept of the support zone so that support and combat functions must be performed in an integrated manner within the combat zone.

For example, the reach of high tech weaponry such as aircraft and missiles now extend far beyond the front lines of the battlefield. Currently, women aviators serve on transport and other utility aircraft. Women also serve in air defense units that use land-based missiles to shoot down enemy aircraft.

Over the last 8 years, an increasing number of American military women have been sent into hostile situations. One hundred and ten women were deployed in Grenada. Women served on the crews of tanker aircraft refueling bombers used in Libya. There were 240 women aboard a destroyer tender, a repair ship, working to repair the *Stark* after it was hit by an Iraqi missile in the Persian Gulf. In addition 600 women were included in the attack on Panama, and about 33,000 women were deployed to the Persian Gulf in Operation Desert Shield.

Perhaps never before in modern history have so many women displayed such valor and competence in battle as America's military women exhibited during the Persian Gulf crisis, and these women performed courageously while under attack whether operating on friendly soil or behind enemy lines.

One prominent example of the vital role that women performed in Operation Desert Storm was the case of Major Marie Rossi, an Army helicopter pilot who ferried troops behind enemy lines in the early days of the ground war, and shortly after the press featured her in its coverage of the ground war, Major Rossi was killed in a helicopter crash while bravely fulfilling her duties.

On the basis of their outstanding performance in Operation Desert Storm, Congress ought to remove restrictions that preclude women from competing for combat pilot positions. The arbitrary restrictions that exclude women from becoming combat pilots was established by the Congress, not the Defense Department.

In mid-May, as you mentioned, I did introduce a bill to remove the congressional imposed restriction against women serving as combat pilots. The Secretary of Defense supports such legislation, and of course the House version of the fiscal year 1992 Defense authorization bill contains similar language.

S. 1076 does not require the Defense Department to have women combat pilots. Rather, it removes the restriction against female aviators. Given the courage and distinguished performance of the women who served in Operation Desert Storm, I believe it is time to remove the arbitrary restriction on women who wish to fly combat aircraft.

I think, Mr. Chairman, the morning paper says it all: "Female Fliers Earn Respect."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Senator Roth. I have no questions. Are there any questions of Senator Roth?

Thank you, Senator Roth. We appreciate your remarks. We may be back in touch with you to get some additional views at a later time.

We have divided this hearing this morning into four segments. First, we will receive testimony on the administration's policies with regard to the utilization of women in the military.

We had invited Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood to testify for the administration. He had a scheduling conflict and was not available. We have Mr. Christopher Jehn, who is no stranger to this committee. We welcome him again. He is the assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel and will represent the administration and testify in Secretary Atwood's place.

Our second panel is composed of the uniformed chiefs of each of our military services who are responsible for implementing the administration's policies. Our third panel is composed of men and women from each of our military services who are directly affected by the administration's policies, and these include both officer and enlisted, because we may have some difference in their views on wanting to get into the combat role.

Our fourth panel is composed of public witnesses who represent different views on this subject. I must say when we announced the hearing, we had a large number of groups and individuals who volunteered to testify, and we asked as many of them as wished to do so to submit statements for the record, and without objection those statements will be included in the record.

Mr. Jehn, we will start with you. Would you please come up to the table and give your testimony? Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER JEHN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

Mr. JEHN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased I have the opportunity to appear before you today. We are here to discuss an important issue that I think deserves full and open debate, so I compliment the Armed Services Committee and this subcommittee for its leadership in calling this hearing.

Let me get right to the heart of the matter. Should we repeal or significantly change the combat exclusion laws? I submit this is a

much more complex question than it seems to many. Changing the law is just the first step. As some of the Senators have observed, we then must next decide—the Department of Defense must next decide how and even whether to change the policy.

At the moment, we have a policy we understand and that works quite well; so before changing it, we would have to assure ourselves that doing so would not adversely affect combat effectiveness and readiness. Combat effectiveness and readiness are our first priority.

So we are dealing here, I think, with an area of considerable uncertainty; but despite that, I think there are some facts that all of us can easily recognize. First, as some of you have already noted, there has been enormous progress in the role of women in the military over the last 20 years. Amidst the current discussion, it is sometimes easy to forget that as recently as 1973, less than 2 percent of the force were women. Today, over 220,000 women represent nearly 11 percent of the active duty force.

Women are in a wide range of jobs. Over 1.2 million positions in today's military are open to women. In short, women are an essential and key part of today's military. They have done well in everything we asked of them, and I think the most recent experience in the Persian Gulf supports that statement. Further evidence, however, is that women are promoted at a rate that exceeds or equals that of their male colleagues.

Now, if Congress does change the laws, as Senator Warner has just noted, it is important that we be given the flexibility to implement any new law consistent with maintaining combat effectiveness and readiness. We will proceed in a careful, deliberate manner, because we have much to learn here. We will be moving into uncharted territory.

So we have a lot to learn from the debate, and I expect this hearing will spark further debate, so we are looking forward to it. While we are here to give you our views, this important, complex issue should not be decided by the Department of Defense alone, so we are at least as interested in your views—the views of the Congress and those of the American people—as I suspect all of you are in ours.

Therefore, we welcome this hearing, and we look forward to discussing this important issue with you.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jehn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER JEHN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and discuss women in the military. This morning, I will update you on the current status of military women, their role in Operation Desert Storm, and our views regarding proposed changes to the combat exclusion statutes.

Today, there are nearly 223,000 women (34,307 officers and 188,532 enlisted) serving on active duty, making up 11 percent of our force. Although this is a reduction of about 6,000 from 1989 due to force reductions, it represents a slight increase in the proportional representation of women (from 10.8 to 10.9 percent). During this same period, the number of women in our Selected Reserve Force increased by over 4,000, to nearly 151,000, or 13.1 percent of this force.

Over the last few years, career opportunities for women have continued to expand within the limits of combat exclusion laws and related department policies. For example, within the Navy, shipboard positions open to women have climbed from ap-

proximately 6,400 in 1987 to over 8,000 in 1990, and are planned to increase to 11,000 positions by 1995. Opportunities for women within each of the services differ based on the impact of combat exclusion and the services' individual missions. Opportunities range from over 99 percent of all skills and 97 percent of all positions being open in the Air Force, to 80 percent of all skills and 20 percent of all positions in the Marine Corps. Overall, 87 percent of all Active duty skills, or over 1.2 million positions are currently open to women in the military.

Thousands of women have entered nontraditional skills, although the, majority of our military women continue to serve in traditional skills. Within the officer corps, 43 percent of the women are serving as health care professionals. For enlisted women, 35 percent are concentrated in functional support and administrative specialities, including personnel, finance, and data processing.

Whether enlisting into a traditional or nontraditional skill, women entering the military have historically been of high quality. also, once on active duty, they have fared well in promotions and other measures of quality. In 1989, the General Accounting Office completed a study on possible impediments to the career progression of women. One of the factors it looked at was promotions. using data from 1986 through 1988, the study found that women were generally promoted at a rate similar to men, and for those who pursue a military career, they tend to advance more rapidly than men. In looking at promotions to general and flag officer, it is important to keep in mind that 20 years ago women made up less than 2 percent of our force. These women are now competing for the flag ranks that make up less than one half of 1 percent of our officer force. Obviously, the number of women being selected to flag rank will be far lower than the numbers of men selected, based strictly on the numbers eligible for promotion. this factor contributes to the perception that there is a "glass ceiling" for women. The GAO study I mentioned earlier found that promotion rates, even to flag rank, were similar for eligible males and females. However, the GAO did note that "people serving in combat specialty career fields are generally promoted more rapidly than people in noncombat specialties, and are generally promoted to higher levels." While this is true, I believe our promotion system has done a good job of insuring that women are provided outstanding career opportunities through the grade of brigadier general.

All our Active duty personnel, men and women, were affected directly or indirectly by the events in the Persian Gulf. Operation Desert Storm required the largest rapid deployment of United States military personnel since World War II. It also was the largest one time deployment of military women in our Nation's history. On February 28, there were over 35,000 military women deployed in the theater, making up 6.6 percent of our overall Gulf Force.

By all indications, women who served in the Gulf performed their duties magnificently. They served in hundreds of different skill's on land, at sea, and in the air. Many served as commanders and as key staff-officers.

As a part of our efforts to document lessons learned about the war, we are in the process of collecting and analyzing data on the role of women in the Gulf. Some of the information we will review includes: deployability differences between men and women; analysis of the reasons why some personnel were returned early from the Gulf; comparison of pregnancy rates, both before and during the Gulf War; reasons for discharge or separation; along with a number of subjective analyses. We expect our data collection to be completed by the middle of July, with analysis to be finished this fall. The results will be the basis for our final report to you in January 1992 on the role of women in the Gulf as required by the Persian Gulf Supplemental Authorization Act. We will also use the results to refine current policies regarding the utilization of women in the military.

One of the issues we watched closely during the Gulf War was the effectiveness of our combat exclusion policies. Current combat exclusion laws and our related Department policies restricting women from direct combat positions, such as fighter aircraft, combatant ships, and the infantry, were designed to reduce their exposure to hostilities. Our initial conclusion is that while some women were tragically killed, wounded, or captured, they were not in jobs that had a high probability of engaging in direct combat. Therefore, our policies complied with the spirit and intent of the law.

Over the years, the Department has continually reviewed and expanded opportunities for women in the military. However, we have reached the point where further expansion of opportunities is very difficult within the current combat exclusion laws and the associated policies that reflect their intent.

While the House bill would repeal most legal restrictions associated with women flying combat aircraft, it would leave intact the limitations on the assignment of Navy women to combat vessels. Thus, it could inadvertently create inequities or in-

consistencies since it would allow female naval officer aviators to serve on combatant ships in an air wing or air element, but restrict all other female officers and enlisted personnel from assignment to such vessels. The proposed Senate version (S. 1076) has similar consequences.

If part or all of the current combat exclusion laws repealed, the Department will:

- Review the action taken by Congress, and the legislative intent in the conference report explaining that action. We would use that guidance as the benchmark for our efforts.
- Review all appropriate current Department and service policies.
- Recommend to the Secretary of Defense such new policies, if any, as may be appropriate.

Our objective would be to insure that opportunities for women are expanded or changed to the extent doing so would not degrade readiness or combat effectiveness.

Therefore, we believe the implementation of any new policies would occur over several years in an orderly, deliberate manner. During this period, the Department would continue to assign women under our current policy. Continuing to operate under our current policy would be the best way to maintain the stability in the force necessary to accomplish the Department's mission during that period of review and possible change. Once again, we must ensure there is no adverse impact on readiness or combat effectiveness.

In closing, let me reemphasize that the Department of Defense continues to offer women outstanding career opportunities. We are extremely proud of that and the contributions women make to our national security. If the current combat exclusion laws are changed, we will take the necessary steps to review and, if necessary, revise the Department's policies on the roles of women in the military.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I am prepared to respond to your questions.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, Mr. Jehn.

We will be on a 6-minute rule this morning, since we have a number of people here and the committee early bird rule will also apply.

Mr. Jehn, as you are aware, the House has passed a provision that would not require, but would permit women to be assigned to duty in combat aircraft.

If the House provision is adopted, then the only assignment restriction law that would be left on the books would be the portion of the Navy law prohibiting the assignment of women to duty on combat vessels. Does the administration support the House provision?

Mr. JEHN. Well, that is an interesting question, sir. Actually, I think our position on the House legislation is that the law needs to be as clear as possible, and that we have the flexibility, as Senator Warner said earlier, to prescribe the role of women as completely and carefully as is necessary. The Secretary of Defense is always willing to accept further authority that the Congress may delegate to him, but I think the key point here is that we be given sufficient flexibility to ensure that any new policy that may be implied by or derived from that law is implemented with due concern for combat effectiveness and readiness.

Senator GLENN. Well, if you had that kind of flexibility, would you advocate the complete repeal of the so-called combat exclusion laws?

Mr. JEHN. Not at this time, sir, I would not.

Senator GLENN. Even if you had that kind of discretion?

Mr. JEHN. If what you are asking is, would we completely open all occupations in the military to women, the answer to that is not immediately. We would certainly want to look very carefully at our existing policy and existing occupations and ask whether they

ought to be changed, and to what extent we ought to open those occupations.

Senator GLENN. You have stated for the record that if combat exclusion laws were repealed, the Department of Defense would be obligated—and I repeat the word obligated—to allow women to enter any career area for which they qualify. Does that reflect the unequivocal position of the administration that DOD would have no discretion at all in prohibiting the assignment of women to any position for which they qualify?

This is a different thing now, and whether you are trying to fill combat positions with the very best for combat, where kill ratio is the judgment of the success of combat—it is one thing to say you just qualify at a basic level. It is another thing to say that you want the best you have, whether it is women or men, in a particular position. Do you feel that if the combat exclusion laws were repealed you would not have that kind of discretion?

Mr. JEHN. It would depend on the circumstances under which they were repealed.

We certainly want and would hope that the legislative debate and the language both in any reports accompanying the new law and the law itself would give the Secretary of Defense the authority that we know he already has to prescribe the roles of women and obviously recognize that authority.

I would like to, though, comment a little more on that statement for the record, since that apparently has caused some confusion and people on both sides of the issue have been citing it as evidence that the administration has a clear, unequivocal position on all of this.

Let me emphasize again something I said a few moments ago. Our first concern is combat effectiveness and readiness; and let me say at this point, there is no evidence or other reason to believe that changing, markedly changing or repealing the laws, will enhance combat effectiveness and readiness.

Now, what we meant by that earlier statement you just read a moment ago is that, if women can do a job without adversely affecting combat effectiveness and readiness, we will use them. What I cannot tell you today is what new jobs they might qualify for that are presently closed to them, and that is what the question was asking me to do.

Senator GLENN. Well, I am sure the administration wants to see as much equal opportunity as possible, whether in civilian ranks or Government service or the military, but along with equal opportunity, would the administration advocate equal responsibility and risk by requiring women to register for the draft?

Mr. JEHN. In our judgment, there is no necessary connection between action taken on the combat exclusion laws and the requirement to have women register for the draft, but nonetheless I think it is important to note that while Congress may pass a law—in fact, you could pass a law today that required women to register for the draft, even with the combat exclusion laws, but the legislative history and the legal opinions—*Rostker* v. *Goldberg* is probably the most notable on this score—have obviously relied very heavily on the combat exclusion laws to justify exempting women from reg-

istering, but I am not a constitutional lawyer. I do not know what ultimately would transpire here.

Senator GLENN. Okay. There are no laws on the books now that prohibit the assignment of women to ground combat positions, but women are currently prohibited from assignment to such positions just as a matter of DOD policy. So this idea that you do not have discretion does not quite fly. You have discretion right now.

Mr. JEHN. Absolutely.

Senator GLENN. If we changed this to the same thing the Army has now, it would not mean that you would be obligated to put people in those positions any more than you are obligated to in the Army right now. What is your view on that? Does the administration support the assignment of women to ground combat units?

Mr. JEHN. First, we agree with your point about our already having the discretion. The Secretary clearly has the authority to prescribe the roles of women today, and, as you have noted in the case of the Army, that is exactly what he is doing. We think if the laws are changed it would be extremely helpful to have a clear statement from the Congress that recognizes this already existing authority.

As far as supporting the further expansion of the roles of women within the Army is concerned, I am not prepared to tell you today what in fact would transpire in that regard if the laws were changed. Clearly what we would have to do, as Senator McCain has suggested, is proceed here in a very careful and deliberate way.

Let me point out that we have had considerable progress and considerable change in the role of women over the last 20 years, and I think all of us will agree, so far, that change has been very successful, in the sense that women have been placed in a position where they can both enjoy considerable opportunity and challenge, and participate in a significant and essential way to our military mission.

I think one of the hallmarks of the success we have enjoyed so far is the fact that we have proceeded in a very slow and deliberate fashion, and that is exactly what we intend to do should any changes occur today.

Senator GLENN. My time is up. Thank you.

Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Jehn, let me get back to square one here. We are in agreement that the performance of women in the Persian Gulf War was extraordinarily successful.

Mr. JEHN. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. The Persian Gulf War, however, should not be the only criteria that we look at for the role of women in combat.

Mr. JEHN. I agree.

Senator MCCAIN. You are arguing before the Secretary of Defense that we should carefully evaluate this policy and come up with recommendations over X period of time?

Mr. JEHN. If the laws are changed.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, you are going to recommend to the Congress whether the law should be changed or not, is that correct?

Mr. JEHN. We will implement, of course, whatever laws the Congress and the American people wish to pass in this regard. The De-

partment is not seeking or anticipating momentous change in this regard, and that was the message I was trying to convey earlier: that we are going to proceed, regardless of what happens here now, in a very careful and deliberate way. This is an important issue to women and to our national security and the effectiveness and readiness of the military.

Senator MCCAIN. We can expect recommendations from the Department of Defense as to what, if any, changes need to be made?

Mr. JEHN. Let me describe what we would want, if any changes were made, and I think in a sense I have given part of my answer already in that regard.

If there is any change at all, we would want a law that affords the Department maximum flexibility in deciding where and how to use women.

Senator MCCAIN. I understand that, Mr. Jehn, but if you want to be part of the process, are you going to be making recommendations to the Congress as to what you feel the policy should be, or any legislative changes should be?

Mr. JEHN. Well, as I said, what we look at right now is a policy that we think is working, and working well, and so we are not looking to make momentous or important changes at the moment.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, let me strongly urge you to, reevaluate the whole policy at the highest levels, and with the greatest degree of attention, and at some point, hopefully within a few months, come back to the Congress with your conclusions and your recommendations, whether they be no change, some change, and what policy changes, if they are not legislative changes, that you intend to make vis-a-vis this issue. Do you see my point?

Mr. JEHN. I certainly do, sir, and we will and are, in fact, looking at the policy right now. I think ultimately you are asking where we should change the policy.

Senator MCCAIN. No, I am not asking for that. I am asking you to give us some kind of road map that you are going to be following so that we can get your recommendations or the information of policy changes that do not require legislative input but I think clearly fall under the oversight of this subcommittee. Do you see my point?

Mr. JEHN. I think it is important to make a distinction between law and policy——

Senator MCCAIN. Yes.

Mr. JEHN. And I hope I am being as clear as I can be there. We believe our current policy is consistent with current law. Should the law be changed, the Department will, you can be sure, carefully and deliberately review current policy in light of the new law and obviously make recommendations—people like myself and the services will be making recommendations to the Secretary as to how that policy ought to be changed.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I will try one more time, Mr. Secretary. One more time.

If you want to have an input into the process that is clearly the oversight of Congress, which is the subject of this hearing, I strongly recommend that there be policy review with recommendations, if any, to this Committee and to the Congress, whether there should be changes in the law or not, number 1.

Second. If you contemplate changes in policy within existing law, which as a result of the Chairman's questioning clearly you have some flexibility in doing so, you also do the same, within a certain period of time, because the American people I do not believe will be satisfied with just, well, we do not do anything except react to what Congress does.

I do not think it is in your best interest to just react. I think if you want to be part of the process here you should be making recommendations to the Congress and you should be informing the Congress as to what your policy changes, if any, are, and justification for doing same. You see my point?

Mr. JEHN. I understand your point exactly, sir, and I would just like to emphasize that as I said earlier I do not think the Department of Defense ought to be a sole actor here, and I think that is what you are saying. If you want to engage us in a dialogue about what the correct change in the law and policy ought to be, we look forward to discussing this with you.

Senator MCCAIN. Good, and what I would also ask that you do is, within some period of time, say we will be prepared to make recommendations to the Congress and discuss possible changes in policy, or rationalize no change in policy with you as of a certain date. I would suggest 3 or 4 months would be, I would hope, sufficient time to give the situation a thorough review.

On the issue, Mr. Secretary, of women in combat aircraft, does it trouble you if we assigned women pilots, Navy pilots, to aircraft carriers that it would not be fair at all if we did not assign women nonaviators to aircraft carriers as well? Does that not seem to be sort of a contradiction to you?

Mr. JEHN. I agree. It is an inconsistency that some can perceive as an inequity to some women officers, that under the current House language—and this is a point we made in my prepared statement—under the current House language, women officers who are aviators may be assigned to aircraft carriers as part of the air wing, but not, for example, as part of the ship's company; and frankly this strikes me, and I know it strikes many, as a real inconsistency, and that is a difficulty we see with the House language.

Senator MCCAIN. My time has expired. Let me recommend again, Mr. Jehn, that we be part of a dialogue and a process here that reaches certain conclusions and recommendations rather than you taking the position just reacting to whatever Congress might do. I think that is in everybody's best interest.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Just a couple of questions, Mr. Jehn. Following up on Senator McCain, it would be very helpful to us if your review took place between now and mid-September. The reason I say that is because we will in all likelihood be in conference, and this will be one of the important items, so whatever you come up with in late October or November is not going to have much effect on the legislative process.

Mr. JEHN. I understand that.

Senator NUNN. If you come up with a framework or a concept, it could have a real effect in the conference in September, probably up until October 1.

Two questions that I would put to you that I will also submit in writing, and you can either comment on them now or get legal counsel to look at them, there are two legal parts of this question. One has already been alluded to, and that is the draft registration.

The Supreme Court decision in 1982, I believe, relied heavily on the policy—not necessarily the law but the policy—of combat exclusion to uphold the draft registration law, which did not compel women to register, and of course the law is always challenged by men who say they are being discriminated against.

The policy, then, was the main ingredient the Court made in its decision to uphold that law. If the policy is completely changed—that is, if the policy of the Department of Defense moves from one of combat exclusion to no combat exclusion in any service—then my question would be to your legal counsel, whether that would then require, in effect, ultimately with a constitutional decision, would the Court in all likelihood rule that women would have to be registered and then would be subjected to the draft? So that is question number 1.

The second question relates to a legal question too, a little bit more remote, but in some cases perhaps not more remote. I understand that the services' policy—and I do not believe this is in the law—says that all males in the military are subject to being called into combat or put under combat arms if needed, no matter what their classification.

In other words, whether they are truck drivers or cooks or mechanics or whatever, that they are subjected to being put into a combat position. It is my understanding that women are not. Do you know the answer to that? Is that correct?

Mr. JEHN. If you are asking for a strict, narrow, legal interpretation——

Senator NUNN. I am not asking legally, just policywise. What is the policy?

Mr. JEHN. Policywise, of course, we have a volunteer military, and while individuals are occasionally transferred into occupational areas that they did not volunteer for, it is only after training and appropriate qualification. So, in the most general sense, this sort of a policy, at least in peacetime, does not apply to men or women at the moment.

Senator NUNN. I would like for you to check on that. That is not my understanding, but you may be right. I will ask the service chiefs that, too.

My understanding is that all men are subjected to being put into combat positions, and of course the question, if my premise is correct—and maybe it is not. If it is correct, do we then move into a very hazy area legally vis-a-vis by having women in the military who are permitted to go into combat but who are not under the possibility or potential of being required to go into combat? Does that set up a legal challenge by men saying they are not being treated fairly because they are subjected to go into combat?

That one is more remote, because it would probably only come up once there had been a compelling combat classification change,

but it could very well happen, and I think we have to anticipate those kinds of legal challenges, because they inevitably occur.

Would you please both answer the factual question about the policy for the record, and also get the legal counsel to give us the legal opinion about whether that indeed presents a problem?

Mr. JEHN. I can do that, but let me just make one observation in regard to the last point you made, and that is we would expect that, if the roles of women are expanded in the military, we would require of women the same obligations and responsibilities that we require of men who are equally situated. So I am not sure the extent to which the hypothetical situation you posed would in fact occur.

Senator NUNN. Well then, in effect, if one service—it may be this varies from service—requires any man in the military, no matter what their classification, no matter what their job description, to go to combat on call (obviously with training. I mean, that is another requirement), if that is the case, what you are saying is once the combat exclusion was eliminated as a matter of policy, if it happened in a service then you would also subject all women in the service to be called into combat even if they did not choose to be, even if they did not volunteer to be? That is the question.

Mr. JEHN. Yes. That would certainly be my reaction. I guess I could ask all of you the same question, though. It seems to me that that is exactly something that ought to come out of our discussion of whether to repeal these laws or change them in any significant way and change our policy.

Senator NUNN. The problem is, I asked you first. [Laughter.]

If I had known the answer, I would not have asked the question. Because it really does—in a serious way, relate to the Department of Defense policy, and it is not simply a theoretical question.

Mr. JEHN. No, I quite agree with you, it is an important and serious question, and all I was trying to say there was that I think we are looking to the Congress and the American people, for that matter, for guidance on a lot of these questions, too. As I said, this is a complex issue.

Senator NUNN. My impression is these questions have not been discussed, and have not been examined, and have not been debated at this point, and I think we have an obligation to at least think through them.

Mr. JEHN. You are absolutely right.

Senator NUNN. We may not have absolutely clear answers when we get through the thought process, but we should at least anticipate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, one of the problems I have is you say you are looking to Congress for the answers, and when Congress takes action, the Congress is accused of micromanagement, and so I think it is important as Senator McCain and others have indicated that the Department take an affirmative role here.

I would like to go back to the future with you, if I might, and say your opening statement said "The current policy we understand, and it works well." Now, I could take the same statement, I

assume, if you were testifying back in 1972—you are an assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel. I assume in 1972 you would have come before this committee and said, "The current policy we understand, and it works well."

So we have had nearly 20 years of change—technological change, experiential change—and you come before the committee today saying, we understand the current law and policy and it works well. That is not particularly helpful to those of us who are examining whether or not we ought to change.

You indicate, for example, that we need the flexibility to ensure combat effectiveness. Senator Glenn, the chairman, has indicated that is his test as well, and indeed it should be. What factors do you take into account which would bear upon combat effectiveness?

Mr. JEHN. Well, obviously the first one that you take into consideration would be the actual ability to perform specific individual tasks, but other considerations would be the extent to which the inclusion of women in units will affect overall combat effectiveness of those units, and I think the only point I have been trying to make all along here is that we do not know the answers to a lot of these questions because what people are proposing we do here are things we have never done before.

Senator COHEN. But first we have to know what questions are being asked. For example, is there a fear that women would be taken prisoners of war and be treated more harshly, or sexually assaulted as prisoners of war? Is that one of the factors that would be taken into account, question 1?

No. 2. Is there a fear there would be a loss of morale among men who might have to work in close quarters with women?

No. 3. Is there a fear that women could not perform as well under combat stress?

Are those kinds of questions being asked by the Department and then looking to the experience we have had since 1972, because unless you do that, to say that we want to have a policy which reflects the flexibility to ensure combat effectiveness, how do we measure that? I do not know.

Mr. JEHN. Well, we have limited experience, of course, in all of these matters, and that is part of the difficulty here. When we talk about using women in combat, in a sense, we do not get evidence on which to base that decision until we have combat, and that might well be too late.

However, we have just had a major war in which, as everybody has observed, to the extent that women were integrated and used in that war, the general consensus and belief is that women performed professionally and well, and that a lot of the objections and concerns people raised about putting women in these situations I think were answered.

To date, however, I would argue that most of our evidence is anecdotal, it is not systematic. We are at work today, as we speak—people on my staff and on the military department staffs—collecting information of a systematic nature. As you may know, the Department is required to come back to the Congress with an interim report in July and a final report in January on lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War. One of the important elements of that investigation, and hence those reports, will be exactly the types of

questions regarding the performance of women that you have just raised.

Senator COHEN. I do not think we ought to be hedging any words during the course of this hearing, debate, dialogue, whatever. We ought to raise the fundamental issues. What are the fears, the social policies, the apprehensions, and whether or not they have been addressed during the Persian Gulf or the Panama conflict, short as it was, and what are the reasonable expectations for the future?

But it serves no purpose for the Department, or perhaps even if our chiefs come later, to say we like the law as it is, it is working well, but if you change it we will carry it out. That does not help us, and then to say well, it is in your court. You want to run with the ball, take the ball and run it, we will carry out whatever you decide, that is not helpful to this committee.

What we need to know is what kind of questions are being asked, what kind of answers are being provided to you, and then we would like to have you say either, we support this, we think it is a good direction to go, or we are opposed to it for the following reasons.

Mr. JEHN. Today, I can tell you the kinds of questions, and you have outlined some of them we are looking at. We are going to be looking at deployability of women, the effect of pregnancies, which has been mentioned frequently, the effect of women and men working at close quarters on the effectiveness of the units to which they are assigned, and so on. This is information we are now collecting, so those questions I can tell you that we are looking at right now, but I cannot today give you the answers. That is my point.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Senator Kennedy?

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join in those disappointed that the administration has not got a position and some recommendations on this issue so that we could give some consideration to it.

It seems to me that the criteria ought to be the ability of women to perform the function, both mentally and physically. I mean, if we do a gender classification I think we are behind the curve in terms of understanding the lessons which have been learned both in terms of the Persian Gulf and in other areas of policy.

The question is, can the woman perform both physically and mentally to do the job? Now, if we do not do that, if that is not the criteria, then we are denying women the opportunity to make a contribution to the services.

If we do not do that, we are putting an additional burden on the men. If we are going to shrink in size, for example, the military force—shrink in size, in terms of the Navy, the fleet—we are going to have a smaller pool of men to go out to sea. It means that they are going out, they are going to be away from their families over a longer period of time. You are putting an additional burden on them.

Then if we do not put the right person in the right job, we are not fulfilling our real national security interests. What is in the security interests is having the right person, man or woman, in the right job.

So I would certainly hope that whatever criteria is going to come from the Department, that it is going to be based upon ability rather than gender. I mean, if we get into a situation in terms of the combat arms, are we prepared to say that every single male soldier in the combat arms is better than any single woman might be in the combat arms, once we move on in terms of classification? We are effectively saying that. Maybe that is where the administration is going to come out.

But it just seems to me that unless we are going to have a judgment made upon what the various criteria is going to be in terms of the combat arms, both mental and physical, and certainly it is realistic to expect, in terms of whether the civilian or the military, they are going to be different requirements—clearly there are.

You have got the cement movers in civilian life. People have got to have a certain criteria in terms of strength. That is going to be overwhelmingly in terms of men—cement plants and factories. There are other times that there are not.

I would just be interested in your own thinking, whether you are looking at this and cannot give us a sort of policy, a recommendation—you know, how you are looking—what your recommendations are going to be. Are you going to look at it in terms of gender, or are you going to look at it in terms of ability? What is your departure point?

Mr. JEHN. My expectation is we will do both, sir—that we will ask questions about the physical requirements, for example, of the job, psychological, mental requirements, and ask whether it is reasonable to expect women to be able to perform to those standards.

But I think we also have to ask the questions some of which Senator Cohen mentioned about the effects of incorporating women into the units, if ultimately, in both cases, the point of the question is to determine what effect expanding the role of women will have on the combat effectiveness of our military forces.

Senator KENNEDY. What were the lessons of the Gulf, their involvement in integration in terms of the various units that they worked?

Mr. JEHN. I would say, as I said to Senator Cohen——

Senator KENNEDY. You can say it to me.

Mr. JEHN. Yes. All I am going to say is, the evidence we have, while it is anecdotal, is almost entirely favorable in the sense that integration worked well. Women performed in a professional and competent manner, as I might say we all expected.

Senator KENNEDY. All right. So the question in terms of the involvement in the unit, at least in the experience of the Gulf, has worked out satisfactorily?

Mr. JEHN. I think that is correct.

Senator KENNEDY. What is the next step?

Mr. JEHN. The next step is to ask that question in a systematic way. As I said, what we have right now is anecdotal evidence, and inferences we make on the basis of the fact that we have heard of no serious problems. No serious problems have been brought to our attention.

Senator KENNEDY. But how do you go about evaluating in a comprehensive way, if you have not got the anecdotal evidence, people, it has gone along pretty well, what are you going to study to find

out whether it did work or did not? I mean, do you have anecdotal evidence that it did not?

Mr. JEHN. No. I know of no anecdotal evidence——

Senator KENNEDY. Okay. So we have resolved the question in terms of the involvement or integration of the system. What is your next concern, besides the ability of women to perform a function, both that they have to have the physical capability and the mental capability—mental toughness to deal with those situations. What is your next one?

Mr. JEHN. Well, the question before us is not entirely how do they perform in jobs and units to which they are now assigned, but how will they perform in jobs and units we may assign them to in the future that we do not now assign them to, and that is a much more difficult question.

Senator KENNEDY. In what respect?

Mr. JEHN. Well, we have no evidence.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, is this not the egg—we cannot do it because we have not got evidence, and we have not got evidence because we have not done it? I mean, that seems to be a circuitous kind of reasoning on it.

If the best evidence to date is in the various kinds of units that they have functioned, it has worked well. You are not prepared to indicate today—you have known you are coming up to the hearing—that there is any indication that there is not. It has worked well. Then you say well, we do not know how it is going to happen over here, and therefore we are not going to move ahead, I guess, is what you are saying.

Mr. JEHN. No. What I am saying is that what we need to do is rather than base decisions on anecdotal evidence and stories, we need to collect that evidence in a systematic nature. That is what is going on right now, and we will have a much more complete picture than we have today.

As of today, I have no evidence that women did not perform as expected and their units were not adversely affected, but what I do not have in front of me is systematic evidence, evidence that is collected across the broadest range of experience, and we will have that in a matter of a few months.

Senator KENNEDY. Just, finally—my time is up—did you find any evidence at all, under any circumstances in the Gulf, that women that were providing any of the particular varied functions which they did provide, a wide range of different functions, were not capable, able either physically or mentally, to deal with those jobs?

Mr. JEHN. No, sir.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In my opening statement, I mentioned the fact that should Congress take some action, repeal, modification, of these current laws, that we should make an affirmative statement that we leave the broadest amount of discretion to the Secretary of Defense to implement such changes as he deems necessary, I presume upon the advice and counsel of his respective service Chiefs.

I understand in your testimony thus far you have not taken a position on whether you should not modify, repeal, or otherwise, but, I understand in your opening statement, you do agree with me

that we should, if we make a change, give the Secretary broad discretion?

Mr. JEHN. Absolutely, sir. I think that is essential.

Senator WARNER. Would you be willing to suggest to this committee—that is, the Secretary of Defense—the language that he deemed would be most useful?

Mr. JEHN. I think we could probably do that, yes, sir. I have talked at length with the Secretary about just this issue, and I think this is a thing he feels most strongly about, that we need to make sure that as the laws are changed that the Department, in particular the Secretary, is given the authority by virtue of the way the law is written, to set and establish a new policy that is based on the expert advice and counsel of military leadership in the Pentagon.

Senator WARNER. Yesterday, a group of Senators had the opportunity to visit with the Secretary on a broad range of issues, and this one came up, and I think that our colloquy here today, in my recollection, carefully parallels the views expressed by the Secretary yesterday.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me add my welcome to you, Secretary Jehn, for being here today. I have been listening with great interest to your remarks and answers to the questions. I would just like to reference back, if I might, from page 5 of your prepared statement.

When you say "If part or all of the current combat exclusion laws are repealed the Department will"—and then you go on to list several efforts that the Department will take.

Is it fair, then, to say that you and the administration are not pushing this concept of combat duties for our female personnel, but if assigned the task you would do your best to carry it out?

Mr. JEHN. I think that is a very fair characterization, and is consistent with what Senator Warner and I were just discussing a moment ago.

I think it is essential, though, that the Secretary of Defense be given the flexibility to determine the policies affecting the assignment of women so that we can in fact do the sorts of things I mention in the statement.

Senator EXON. Well, Mr. Secretary, I am not sure that I would quarrel with that a great deal, except that just a carte blanche authority to do something without any concept of how that would be carried out is something that I am not sure this subcommittee or the full Armed Services Committee would want to give.

Let me get into just a few parameters, if I might, to see if I can pry a little bit more of your thinking on these matters than you seemingly have wanted to come forth with in this hearing.

Now, to start out with, it seems to me—at least I cannot envision a situation where we would be advocating a combat role for assault Marine forces or infantry forces for women. Now, there are some people that say, why not? Well, I am not going into all of the reasons for that today, but it would seem to me that with my background and experience, that is not what we would want, and that would not be best for the overall operations of an assault force.

Maybe I could be convinced that it would be all right, but at least that is my point of view at the present time.

However, let us go to a totally different matter. I see no reason why a woman would not make an excellent combat fighter aircraft pilot, which seems to me is a totally different situation than what I had previously described.

Since you have not been able to come forth with any conclusions that you have now, would it be fair to say that—or, let me put it this way. Do you have any hesitation, sitting there this morning, against women being granted combat aircraft authority?

Mr. JEHN. Based on what I know today, I do not have any hesitation, but I certainly do not feel comfortable advocating it, either. I personally poorly understand the physiological and psychological evidence on this score.

Many people, however, as you know, believe women are perfectly well suited to flying combat aircraft and certainly, should we open combat aircraft to women pilots, I would expect, and certainly urge, that the performance standards we expect of them be exactly the same as those of the men, and the women who could do it would make the grade, as it were.

Senator EXON. Well, you know, there are certain men who do not meet the psychological profile, I suspect, of being a combat fighter pilot, is that right?

Mr. JEHN. That is correct. Not everyone makes it.

Senator EXON. Then it would be also safe to assume, would it not, that all women therefore would not fit the psychological evaluation to be a fighter pilot?

Mr. JEHN. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. What I am trying to do, Mr. Secretary, is draw a line somewhere between women involved in assault Marine activities, or assault ground infantry forces as combined with all of the other wealth of combat-related duties in which I think women would perform well.

I do think that some parameters have to be designed here, and I therefore am not against the concept of giving the Secretary some flexibility. On the other hand, if we pass something like that and the Secretary of the Air Force, for example, might decide that we do not want women in any combat role—I am not saying that is his position—I think that would be somewhat of a disappointment to this committee.

What we have got to have, it seems to me, Mr. Secretary, is a more forthcoming attitude from people like you in the administration to help us design what kind of a bill eventually comes out.

I have no further questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Senator Mack?

Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might just build on that point, and what has been stressed, I think, by a number of my colleagues, but maybe from a slightly different perspective.

It is obvious to me that this committee and the Congress can in fact make a determination about what it wants to do with respect to this issue without any input from you or from the administration.

But I think the key—again, it has been mentioned by several of my colleagues, and you have stressed it on several occasions this morning—is the desire to have flexibility, and I would just suggest to you that the amount of flexibility that you end up with is going to be determined by the amount of input that you give us to get an idea from you where you are headed. So I think that the point that has been made by Senator McCain and others is vital to the issue of flexibility.

The second point that I would make is that I would just like to remind everybody that in the early stages of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, I heard from a lot of constituents who were concerned about both husband and wife serving in the military.

If you recall, there were many who came back to the Congress with suggestions that ought to be changed, that that was not right, that should not occur, that we ought to release either one or the other of those individuals from those responsibilities. So there is a lot of pressure out there on the other side from the standpoint of what we as a Nation want to have happen.

The only question I would really raise at this point is that—and it is really kind of drawn out of some footage I saw on television last night, and maybe others saw it, a female instructor, T38, I think, taking male pilots through their annual check to see if they could get out of a spin.

It indicated that that was difficult for a number of people, but she did it twice a day, and I must say that I was quite impressed with what I saw last evening from that respect. I do not know whether you saw that, or whether you heard about it.

In using the terms combat effectiveness and readiness, what are the concerns that you would have for that pilot, that instructor, for example, as to why you would not think that she would be capable of carrying out combat missions?

Mr. JEHN. Obviously, what you were watching was an instructor pilot, and many of the instructor pilots are women. They perform very professionally and well in those jobs. They are dangerous jobs and they require a great deal of skill.

Obviously, though, a woman or a man acting as an instructor pilot is not required to perform as wide a range of skills and tasks as a combat pilot, and so it is entirely possible that a man or a woman who is a perfectly satisfactory instructor pilot may not be equally competent or qualified to be a combat fighter pilot.

Senator MACK. Can you give me some specifics on that?

Mr. JEHN. Well, the biggest difference, of course, is that a combat pilot—and I think I would like to defer to some extent to some of those we have in the room here, particularly Senator McCain and Senator Glenn—but obviously the most critical difference between the role of an instructor pilot and that of a fighter pilot is that in addition to flying the aircraft, which both of them have to do, the fighter pilot has to worry about engaging the enemy and operating weapons systems, firing guns, missiles and the like. That is, as the saying goes, a significant increase in the work load facing the pilot.

Senator MACK. Let me just pursue that. Are you concerned about the psychological impact or the physical capability of firing the missiles or the guns and so forth?

Mr. JEHN. Well, the first question is whether in fact this greater work load can simply be handled, and that would be a question you would ask regardless of whether the pilot is a man or a woman.

If I might, though, I would just like to comment a little on your other remark having to do with the questions people have been putting to me, because I think the point you make about the other questions that have been raised regarding the role of women in the military, concerning our deployment of single parents and both parents in a dual military couple are important. I think the only point I have been trying to make is that, to the extent the members of this subcommittee are asking me to tell you what the Department's judgment would be about expanding the role of women in specific occupations and specific occupational areas, I just simply cannot do that today.

It is a very complicated question that requires a lot more study than any of us have given to it, and I think part of the difficulty we face in responding to those questions today is, I think, highlighted by the comments you made. Just a couple of months ago we were defending sending women into the Persian Gulf at all, much less expanding their role into combat jobs that they are not now included in.

So I think this change, if you will, in the nature of the questions and the nature of the issues we are being asked to address is a sufficiently important and complex one that I do not want to give any quick, sort of hip shots today on the issue, and that is all I am trying to say. I realize at times I have not been as clear as I might have been.

Senator MACK. Well, I certainly agree with you. I think that they are important questions, and I am not chastising you for not coming up here with all the answers. My only point was that you are going to get greater flexibility if we have a better understanding of where you want to go.

Mr. JEHN. Yes, sir, I understand that.

Senator MACK. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. I do want a second round very briefly for any follow-up questions not to exceed 2 minutes for each person, and I have only one question I wanted to ask.

The House has passed a provision related to the issue of utilization of women in the military. The provision would prohibit a mother of a child less than 6 months old from being activated from the Reserves without her consent or in the active component from being assigned to a duty location that would require separation from her child without her consent.

Now, this obviously means, should you then assign people to combat units where the close coordination is necessary and so on, if that is likely to be a problem. Does the administration support the House provision?

Mr. JEHN. We do not. We do not feel it is necessary. As you know, we are working a policy in this area. Our experience in the Persian Gulf War taught us that each of the services has a slightly different policy, and what we are trying to do right now is impose some uniformity and consistency on those policies across the services. Once we do so, this kind of legislation will not be necessary, so we are opposed to it.

Senator GLENN. That was going to be the second part of my question. When can we expect that new DOD regulation? What we ran into, for everyone's information, at the beginning of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm was the fact that the difference services' had different appeals processes.

Mr. JEHN. Exactly.

Senator GLENN. If a woman was pregnant, or the family situation had changed, or her care-giver changed, when she departed on active duty and that had not been updated. We had, I believe, around 50 appeals. About 16 of those were valid and the people were excused from whatever their assignment was.

But in going into that we found out that different services had very different regulations and different appeals procedures, and we asked the Department of Defense to come up with a standard procedure on this. That was in February that we passed that Sense of the Senate resolution. When will we have the final report?

Mr. JEHN. We already have a draft policy that is out for comment and coordination by the services, and my recollection is that we expect comments and reactions from them back almost momentarily. So I would hope that very soon we will be able to resolve any differences that may still exist and get that policy out.

Senator GLENN. My time is up. Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A follow-up to what Senator Mack was discussing, the piece that was on television last night. I was very impressed at the skills and quality of the pilot, but also near the end of the interview that pilot was asked by the reporter if she was ready to leave her child—she was a single parent—if she was ready to leave her child for a 7-month period of time, and she said she was not ready to make that choice yet.

If we move forward with changes in policy or the law, those choices may be made for people in that same situation. That is why I countenance some care as we go through this process.

Have you had a chance, Secretary Jehn, to look at the experience of the Israeli Defense Forces? I say that because I think you could make a case that they are a society very much like our own, a democratic Government, et cetera, and they have experience, obviously, a great deal of combat and conflict in which they have had to utilize virtually their entire population, and I wonder if you had any look at that experience of the Israeli Defense Forces?

Mr. JEHN. To some extent, yes. I would not go so far, by any means, to characterize myself as an expert on what and how the Israeli Defense Forces use women, but I think there is a bit of mythology surrounding that right now. Israeli women are not included in combat MOS's and combat units, contrary to opinion on that subject.

In fact, even the draft, which does apply to women, affords women much more opportunity for exemption and waivers, so I believe only about half of the women actually wind up getting drafted and serving in the military. When they do serve, they serve in what we call traditional occupations for females, certainly not in what we would call combat units or combat MOS's.

Senator MCCAIN. That is all the questions I have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Senator Nunn, anything further? Senator Cohen? Okay. Fine.

Mr. Jehn, thank you very much. We appreciate your being here this morning.

Mr. JEHN. Thank you very much.

Senator GLENN. It has been very helpful. We hope you can get that study over to us at the earliest, so if there is any legislation required this year we have a chance to get it in, so we make these standard procedures for all of the military services.

Our second panel consists of the Chiefs of our military services: General Carl Vuono, Chief of Staff, United States Army; Adm. Frank Kelso, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. Al Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Gen. Merrill McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff.

I want to note while they are coming to the table this morning that General Vuono and General Gray are about to retire within a very few weeks, after very distinguished military careers.

I would expect that perhaps this might even be their last appearance before a congressional committee, and I just want to thank them very much for being here and even more importantly, I want to take this opportunity to thank them for their outstanding service to this Nation of ours. They have given long and diligent service to the country.

Let me congratulate you and wish you the very best in your retirement, whatever your pursuits may be.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, let me just echo that. General Vuono and General Gray have been terrific leaders in every job they have held in the military including the top job in their respective services. They have served our Nation extremely well and we wish them well in their retirement, and we assure them that we will continue to call on them from time to time to give their views and we appreciate very much them being with us today.

So we wish them well in their retirement.

Senator GLENN. Gentlemen, the issue before us today is one that there is a great deal of interest in, we have seen a lot of writing about it. We have all received boxes of letters on this subject and a lot of calls, discussion back home in our respective States.

It is a very important issue and how we deal with it could have a very profound effect on each of your respective services. We obviously appreciate your candid views because we will be depending on them to help guide us in our actions.

I think we will just start across and see if you gentlemen have any opening remarks. General Vuono?

STATEMENT OF GEN. CARL E. VUONO, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General VUONO. Let me make a few short comments and talk to you about the Army's policy. The Army's current policy on women in combat, which we call the direct combat exclusion policy, is designed to allow the Army to meet our requirements for land forces. It has evolved since the late 1970's, shortly before the disestablishment of the Women's Army Corps.

We implement this direct combat exclusion policy through what we call a direct combat probability coding system. This system ascribes to each Army job an assessment of the probability of personnel in that job participating in direct combat. It recognizes that because of the nature of warfare, there is no way to prevent women from exposure to combat or from becoming casualties. However, it attempts to decrease their exposure to direct combat and hence limit casualties.

Today, over 90 percent of the Army's occupational skills are open to the Army's female soldiers. Our women are only excluded from assignment to those units whose mission is to engage in direct combat or requires them to locate with or near such units.

This is the policy that we have developed and the policy that is in effect today. I just wanted to mention that to the committee in my opening statement. I will be happy to respond to any questions.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Admiral Kelso?

STATEMENT OF ADM. FRANK B. KELSO II, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY

Admiral KELSO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the role of women in our Navy and to address the proposed changes to the current laws.

I am certainly well aware that this is one of the most important issues and perhaps one with the greatest social implications that I will address during my term in office.

The recent war in Iraq I think provided visible examples of the progress that women in the military have made during the past two decades. The fact that the female officer and sailor performed in an outstanding manner was certainly no surprise to those of us who serve with them each day.

What occurred in Iraq projected their performance before the American people at a time when the public's interest was focused, I think, to an unprecedented degree. But as we reflect on that conflict, there is an area of caution that I think we should observe.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were so unique that we must be careful to the degree to which we change our future policies as a result of it. To an incredible degree, military commanders were able to control the situation entirely. We were able to establish ourselves quickly. We were able to build up without opposition and then to strike when and how we choose.

This result was a phenomenal victory in a very short time, with a remarkably small casualty list which I do not think many of us predicted.

My fellow Chiefs and I work in concert with the Chairman, we have one primary mission which overrides all others: to provide a ready and combat-effective fighting force to defend our country. All other issues that we may consider are secondary.

When asked about the future prospects for women in combat in recent testimony, General Schwarzkopf replied that changes in this area must be made in the interest of military effectiveness, not as an issue concerning equal opportunity.

On this question, as in most others, General Schwarzkopf and I are in total agreement. This does not mean that I oppose progress on this issue. Far from it, I firmly believe that we must let the role of women in the military evolve, and we are doing so in the Navy today in the manning of many of our ships and the logistics roles.

We are expanding the roles of women on our logistics ships and in some aviation squadrons and I fully support these changes. But there is a delicate balance between equal opportunity for men and women and maintaining combat effectiveness of our forces.

The environment of a combatant ship at sea for long periods is difficult for men. Living accommodations are very close and privacy is very hard to ensure. Space for weapons, spare parts, and food is at a premium and future designs will look for even additional space for such purposes.

The law I believe as written recognizes these issues and has served us well. I believe it should be continued.

Sir, this completes my opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Kelso follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. FRANK B. KELSO, II, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the issue of changing the Combat Exclusion Law.

Obviously this is not a simple issue. It is one with a very high degree of personal philosophical involvement by virtually everyone with an opinion on the issue, and one which elicits very strong feelings within the service, from seaman to admiral. That is why I am very pleased to see the committee take a thoughtful and measured approach in your deliberations on this matter.

As I see the subject of women in combat and contemplate changes to the combat exclusion law from my perspective as CNO, it becomes much more than an issue of social change; it becomes much more than an issue of equal opportunity; and it becomes more than a possible reflection of the current mood of the country. It is all these things to be sure. But in my mind, the overriding consideration as we discuss this issue, is the maintenance of readiness and combat effectiveness of your Navy.

If I believed the simple stroke of a pen could bring sweeping changes that would satisfy all calls for equality of opportunity in all career fields and specialties without negatively impacting our combat effectiveness, I would be all for it. But I do not believe that we can make the type of changes to the law that would achieve these goals in a rapid manner without such an impact. And that is why after careful consideration, I hope you will give our leadership the authority and flexibility to effect change in a manner consistent with the best interests of our combat effectiveness.

Without going into an in-depth history of women in the Navy—and an impressive history it is I might add—let me sketch briefly the service of our Navy women in the unique aspect of service-at-sea.

We've come a long way in a relatively short time. From no women at sea, and none with at-sea experience except for previous service on hospital ships, we began placing women in noncombatant ships in 1978. Today we have 62,000 women in the Navy, and almost 9,000 are serving at sea. We have a woman commanding a ship, and another en route to command-at-sea later this year. We also have a woman in command of a jet squadron, and more will follow. In the key assignment leading up to command of a ship, service as an Executive Officer, 16 women currently serve in that capacity. The trend is clear. We have established policies within the current framework of the law, that allow us to make evolutionary changes, achieving a climate of ever-increasing opportunity while maintaining readiness.

Women serve in 87 of our 102 enlisted specialties today. Only those relating directly to service in combatant ships, presently excluded by law, are not open to them. Across our Navy, women's promotion opportunities are equal to their male counterparts both for officers and enlisted. And their retention rates are similar. So, by all objective measures, our present program is working. I am proud of our progress to date, and I am committed to continued progress.

In the recent instance of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, our Navy women performed superbly. Over 2,500 women were among the 90,000-plus personnel who served in that conflict. They served in every capacity permitted by law. Our

assignment policies worked. Every woman assigned to a unit that deployed to Southwest Asia was sent with that unit under exactly the same rules and regulations as their male shipmates. They served as ship's company in hospital and supply ships, in the ships of the Combat Logistics Force, and in Repair ships and tenders. They flew helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft. They were members of construction units, and fleet hospitals. They served as public affairs officers and chaplains. Female reservists joined their male shipmates in port and harbor security, sealift and shipping coordination, intelligence, communications and cargo handling tasks. They were both an important and an effective part of the Navy team's successful contribution to winning the Gulf war. All this was accomplished under the present law, and within the bounds of current regulations.

I firmly believe that we have a superlative record of providing ever increasing opportunities for women. That record, of a greatly increased role for women, has been established over a period a years—as we moved deliberately and purposefully to broaden the opportunities and expand the career fields open to them. We have been evolutionary, not revolutionary, in this regard, and I believe that has served our country very well.

Since its passage in 1956 and amendment in 1978, 10 USC 6015 has served well to reflect our national will about the role of women in the Navy. It has provided the Secretary of the Navy with the necessary legal authority to provide regulations appropriate to the integration of women within the force.

The law as written has served us well in my opinion. We have been able to expand the roles of women in our Navy in an orderly fashion and I believe we are doing so effectively.

However, if part or all of the current law is changed, I will fully support the Secretary, and will take the necessary steps to assist in the review and revision the Department's policies to implement the law and to respond to congressional intent.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. General McPeak?

STATEMENT OF GEN. MERRILL A. McPEAK, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General MCPEAK. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss the role of women in the Air Force and in particular, their suitability for even greater participation in those career specialties that carry higher risk in combat operations.

Over the years, the Air Force has dramatically expanded career opportunities for women. There are now a total of 74,040 women in the active Air Force; 13,000 plus officers and over 60,000 enlisted. The female population has increased from 2.3 percent in 1972 to 14 percent today.

Women entering the Air Force have historically been of high quality. They have fared well in promotions and for those who pursue a military career, they have advanced more rapidly than men. Both pilot and navigator women have been selected at a higher rate than their male counterparts over the past 4 years for promotion to the grades of captain through lieutenant colonel.

Air Force employment of women today is guided by strict adherence to the combat exclusion law and the DOD "Risk Rule." Ninety-seven percent of Air Force positions are open to women now. All officer career fields are open to women. However, the combat exclusion law and DOD "Risk Rule" do not allow assignment of women to aircraft that engage in combat missions or operations that expose them to direct combat, hostile fire or capture. Accordingly, female officers are excluded from fighters, bombers, gun ships, forward air control aircraft, most helicopters and some reconnaissance aircraft. All but four enlisted career fields are open to women. The excluded career areas are defensive aerial gunner,

para-rescue and recovery, combat control, and tactical air command and control.

Aircraft open to women officers and enlisted personnel include transports, tankers, airborne command and control, mission support, some helicopters, reconnaissance and trainers. In 1989, the Air Force opened C-141 air drop missions; C-130 aircraft (except special operations), and C-17s. Physiological restrictions for the TR-1 and the U-2 were removed, opening these aircraft to women.

Within otherwise open career fields and systems, the DOD "Risk Rule" imposes some added limits such as those applied to C-130 special operations due to the nature of the mission.

Personally, I am not eager to increase exposure of our women to additional risk. However, the Air Force does not believe in artificially barring anybody from doing any job. If the combat aircraft exclusion law is changed, I will recommend to the Secretary that a gender-neutral assignment system be used to fill all positions, including combat aircraft, with the "best qualified" man or woman selected for each position, according to a single set of standards. Such an assignment policy would have to be phased in over time.

We are committed to sustaining our strong tradition of equal opportunity for qualified men and women and are proud of the contributions women make to the Air Force.

Mr. Chairman and Members of this committee, that completes my statement. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General McPeak follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL MERRILL A. MCPEAK

UTILIZATION OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss the role of women in the Air Force, and in particular, their suitability or even greater participation in those career specialties that carry, higher risk in combat operations.

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We are committed to sustaining our strong tradition of equal opportunity for qualified men and women and are proud of the contributions women make to the Air Force.

Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee, this completes my statement on the utilization of women in the Air Force. I am prepared to respond to your questions.

Senator GLENN. General Gray?

STATEMENT OF GEN. ALFRED M. GRAY, JR., USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, U. S. MARINE CORPS

General GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to appear before this committee, as always.

Combat preparedness and readiness must be the hallmark of your Marines. Mission preparedness to do what must be done throughout the globe must always be the philosophy of your Corps.

We assign all Marines based on their abilities and their capabilities, and this assignment process has worked very, very well in the past and has served us well in this past year.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, in my judgment, was not the ultimate test in terms of sustained combat, particularly sustained offensive combat for a long period of time. It was a short war as we know and it was sans, if you will, much of the vigor of ground combat and associated combat arms, day-in, day-out, long patrolling, hostile jungles, mountains, cold weather operations and the like, days and weeks, not just hours of hardship on the trail, running ridges and all of that.

And so your Commandant would suggest some caution with respect to using the Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm scenario as the scenario for all combat in the future.

Our women Marines are Marines. They are very proud and they are very capable and we would not be as prepared as we are today without their performance. They make a significant contribution.

They are in assignments, in your Commandant's judgment, where they should be, and we have about the right numbers and the right skills. I have talked to thousands of our women Marines through the years and so has the rest of our leadership.

We do not find our women Marines wanting a change. They seem to be satisfied with what they do. They like the assignments. They like the reason that they came into the Corps and we have a system that provides equal promotional opportunity, equal career path if you will, and above all, equal recognition through the rewards system with their male counterparts.

Our forces, of course, have to be prepared for forward deployment, amphibious forcible entry and all of that in the expeditionary environment. And so we are always concerned with anything that may possibly detract from combat preparedness.

Again, we think the system has served us well, and we do not see any requirement to change the system at this time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, gentlemen, all of you.

I would ask each of you if you have talked to your women officers about this and the top enlisted people in each of your services and what their views are and do you find a difference in the views of the officers and the enlisted women?

General Vuono?

General VUONO. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we have done that, and we do find some differences. Some of the officers believe that we should open more of our combat units to female soldiers. I do not get that same ground swell feeling among the enlisted soldiers.

I think you make an interesting point about opening up all of these combat units that are now closed to women—there is not that high a percentage, as I said in my opening statement. If this occurs, female soldiers would be assigned to those units in some cases without a choice and that puts a little different spin on the ball. As you know, if we open these units up, then women soldiers, like male soldiers, would be assigned without a choice. So I have not seen or heard a major ground swell for us to change our policy which is based on a very deliberate, very detailed look over a period of time at all of our specialties to determine which we should further open up to women soldiers.

Senator GLENN. Do you find complaints that some of the women officers are unsatisfied that the lack of having a combat background or at least a training for combat background will impede their move up the promotion ladder?

General VUONO. I am sure there is some of that. I have heard some, but again, the numbers are not overwhelming in my sampling.

Senator GLENN. How about the enlisted?

General VUONO. Same thing on the enlisted side. I would think that on the enlisted side, it may not be as great a desire for opening up more combat units as there is on the officer side.

Senator GLENN. Admiral Kelso, would you address that same series of questions without my repeating them?

Admiral KELSO. Yes, sir. I have talked with many people on this issue, and as you can imagine, there are many varying views within the Navy. I have talked to my Master Chief of the Navy.

I have also talked to many of our young women on this issue, and I think there has always been a worry, particularly among some officers, that without the ability to serve in a combat position, they would be excluded from serving in the top jobs in the Navy. That is a concern of theirs and always has been.

I might add that it has always been a personal concern of mine, too. I believe that nobody has served our Nation in the military better than our young women have, and they have done it extremely well in many, many places around the world.

I give you my advice based on looking at the whole, not on any one section or one individual doing their job. But I have the greatest respect for our young women. Our promotion rates are the same basically, even for those women who decide to make it a career.

I think you will find the Navy's enlisted community as well as its officer community in the female ranks divided on this issue. There are those who clearly want to serve at any place and there are

those who feel that the traditional ratings that are currently open to them are all right.

I view it from the standpoint that we have started this progression in the Navy, to start opening up our ships. We started back in the 1970s and we made another step again in 1986, to open up another class of combat support ships, and we are in the process of doing that.

My observation then is that there are things that we have to learn as we go forward. We find problems and we address those problems, and we are expanding as we go in an orderly fashion.

I think that is the role we should continue to have, and we should let it evolve until we know how to do it. So I think in any section of the Navy you are going to find varying opinions, depending on where you sit on this issue, sir.

Senator GLENN. General McPeak?

General MCPEAK. Mr. Chairman, few women who I talk to in the Air Force want themselves to be fighter pilots or para-rescuemen or to push into some career field where they have hitherto been excluded.

On the other hand, there is almost universal agreement, consensus, that any women who wants to do that and who is physically capable of doing it and can pass the standards for it, ought to be allowed to do it without any artificial impediments being placed in the way.

So I guess that would be the general feeling in the Air Force that I run into.

Senator GLENN. General Gray, I think you have already partially addressed that, but go ahead.

General GRAY. Thank you, sir. We believe in the Corps, that we are a military profession and concerned leadership must always be discussing opportunities, promotion and otherwise with all of their people, regardless of whether they are male or female.

We believe our people understand the promotion system and we do not see any of this discussion about, if I was in this particular professional field or that, it would enhance my opportunity for promotion.

This tells me that the leadership is out there leading and getting the facts across to our people. You do not get promoted in the Corps based upon whether you go to combat or not. There is a concern, for example, amongst many of your Marines, that because they did not go to Kuwait, they may not get promoted.

And we have explained to them in great detail, including many personal visits from your Commandant, that you get promoted in the Marine Corps when you are in the black. For those of you who are not in the marksmanship business, that is the bulls-eye area.

And when you are in there, you are going to get promoted and when you are not, when you are out there in the two or three ring, you probably will not be, and it does not matter what your gender is or anything else like that.

So this I think is the main reason that our people are not, in my judgment, concerned about this. I would add again, we do not see this request to want to fly airplanes or be in the ground combat arms. It simply is not there today in the total force, active or re-

serve of your Corps. That does not mean there might not be one or two, but there is absolutely no indication of this whatsoever.

And we are proud of this. We believe that our women understand that you need women and you need men and they are different, thank goodness. And it will always be that, and so I await your further questions.

Senator GLENN. Gentlemen, have you discussed this in the tank over there, when you are all there with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? Have you discussed this particular issue and have you made recommendations to the Chairman and has he made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on this issue?

Admiral Kelso or any of you.

Admiral KELSO. We have discussed it, Senator Glenn, but we have not, at this point in time, made a recommendation. We have discussed it with the Chairman and with the Secretary of Defense, but there was not a consensus to make a recommendation there.

Senator GLENN. But has the Chairman made a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense?

General GRAY. I will answer that. No, he has not, Senator, and I believe, and he will have to speak for himself, but I believe it is the Chairman's view that this is a matter for the service chiefs and the service secretaries to discuss and to take the lead on.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. My time is up, but just one more brief question here, the House has passed a provision that would prohibit a mother of a child less than 6 months old from being activated in the Reserves without her consent or any active component from being assigned to duty location that requires separation from her child without her consent.

Would you give me your views on that? Is that something that precludes women from a more active combat role, General Gray?

General GRAY. I think something like that has to be looked at very, very carefully. We all have our views and we have the policy, and clearly everybody must be prepared to go and to serve.

Within that context, we in the Corps, as you know, adopted a very individualistic policy for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In our words, our analysis, your Commandant's analysis of the requirements were such that we could afford to be very careful.

And so we did not split families, or use single parents except in unusual cases when everything was a-okay and voluntary and the like. So we did not have that. So this is really best discussed by the others.

Senator GLENN. General McPeak?

General MCPEAK. I am not sure I understand the law, sir. I do not think pregnancy is an advantage in combat.

Senator GLENN. No. The question was, the House passed a provision that prohibits a mother of a child less than 6 months old from being activated in the Reserves or the Active component without her being assigned to a duty location that would require separation.

General MCPEAK. I think it is a good idea. They have a good idea there.

Senator GLENN. Would than then preclude them from serving in a combat assignment role?

General McPeak. It would no doubt have some impact on our operational readiness.

Senator Glenn. Admiral Kelso?

Admiral Kelso. I do not know the proposed law exactly, Senator, but I do not have any problem with the idea in principle. I would prefer to have the Department retain the capability to make the decision to implement that policy themselves, however. We would then follow the policy to make sure that we took care of the child.

Senator Glenn. It is not law yet. That is the reason we are asking for guidance. It is just in the House provision. General Vuono.

General Vuono. Senator, combat readiness is our paramount business, and as we go to smaller forces, we have to have every soldier as available as we possibly can make that soldier. I have serious reservations about any further restrictions by law or whatever that detracts from that.

Now your specific point here on what is in the House bill we are looking at right now. Our policy is not quite 6 months, but we are looking at it. In a broader context, however, anything that the Congress does that restricts the deployability of our forces, I have great problems with. Again, this is because we are reducing the force and we have to have everybody deployable.

Senator Glenn. Senator McCain?

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also would like to echo your sentiments about our appreciation for General Gray and General Vuono. We do very much appreciate everything you have done for our country, and it is with regret that we see you leave and many times we feel that you are not replaceable, but the beauty of our system is that we are able to have capable and outstanding followers who will take your role.

That is not to say you will not be missed, you certainly will be. And I especially appreciate both General Vuono and General Gray's candid views before this committee on a variety of issues including this one.

And along those lines, perhaps beginning with you, General Gray, is it your personal opinion that Congress should repeal the combat exclusion laws or that they should be modified?

General Gray. In my own judgment, I see no need to change the law or the exclusion policy at this time, Senator.

With respect to what the Congress should do or not do and the American people and the like, my own view is that we need to have the flexibility to develop policies within our military departments that are consistent with our missions and tasks and the less, if you will, of the over-supervision and micromanagement, the better it is for those of us who are charged with these responsibilities.

Because we, after all, are responsible to the parents and the loved ones for the young men and women they send to us, and that is a total responsibility. It includes, for example, ensuring that they are stronger morally and mentally and physically when they leave us than when they join us.

It is like all the concern about quality of life and taking care of people and all of that, but there is no higher responsibility than bringing them back home alive. So as much flexibility as we can

have here I am sure that at least your Commandant would appreciate that.

But we see in the Corps no need to change anything. Things seem to be going extraordinarily well. We have done superbly well around the globe in the past few years, and so to bring a change perhaps strictly for the sake of change, without careful thought, your Commandant would be against that.

Senator McCAIN. General McPeak?

General McPEAK. The question is, would I like to see the law——

Senator McCAIN. In your personal opinion, should Congress repeal the combat exclusion laws or should there be policy changes within the Department of Defense regarding the role of women in combat?

General McPEAK. I find great comfort in the law. I would like it to stay on the books personally. I am not enthusiastic about increasing the risk of women in combat. But that is a different question than the policy question. If the law is changed, then I believe I have to go beyond my personal prejudices in this and to think about my responsibilities in a policy context to the institution I head.

And there I think that the most important consideration is that we reflect the best aspects of our society, one of which I take to be as much opportunity for people as possible.

And so I would be inclined, as I said in my statement, should the law go off the books, to recommend to the Secretary that we gradually continue to open these cockpit positions to women based on a set of standards which if they can meet the standard and they want to do it, then they should have the opportunity to do it.

Senator McCAIN. But your personal view right now is you would not like to see the laws changed?

General McPEAK. I have no problem with the law at present. As I say, I am not anxious to shove women forward in combat. It is just a personal prejudice.

Senator McCAIN. Admiral Kelso.

Admiral KELSO. Yes, sir, as I said, it is my personal view that the law should remain as it stands. I also certainly understand though, Senator, that this is an issue for the American people and for the Congress to decide, and I do it with some personal worry about the young woman who wants to fly an airplane in combat or wants to ride on a ship. I understand the anguish that that might give her.

And if the Congress chooses to change the law or the Department chooses to change the policy, I will do everything in my power to implement that law or that policy to the very best of my ability to ensure that all receive the opportunity.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Admiral.

General VUONO. I do not believe you should change the law. You should keep it the way it is. As you know, the Army is not governed by the law. Ours is policy. Our policy is reviewed, as I said, very carefully, very deliberately and my personal view is that the policy is sound and I would continue that policy, even if you saw fit to overturn the law, which I urge you not to do.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, General.

If I could focus in on Admiral Kelso and General McPeak for a minute on the issue at hand or one of the most immediate aspects

of this issue, is the role of women as far as fighter pilots are concerned or combat aircraft is concerned, I think is a more appropriate description.

How do you respond, General McPeak, if I could start with you, to the complaint that I hear from Air Force and Navy women pilots that because of their exclusion from a combat role therefore their opportunity, not just for promotion, but for what every fighter pilot aspires to, and that is command of a front-line combat squadron or air wing or the next level up, they are prohibited from attaining such goals which is frankly, the ambition of all young fighter pilots as soon as they receive their wings.

How do you respond to that, General?

General MCPEAK. Well, I have not got a good response to it. The fact of the matter is, as I noted in my opening statement, women have been promoted, women pilots have been promoted at better rates than their male contemporaries. So the performance of the Air Force in this regard, I think has been pretty good as far as giving the best career opportunities to people.

But what you say makes a lot of sense, and I have certainly heard it from some women in my institution, that we have erected artificial impediments in their view, in some views, to certain jobs.

And so the burden of proof is on us to say why we should do that. All I got to fall back on, like I say, is my own private reluctance to push women in this direction. It is an old fashioned attitude, but that is my attitude, and if the law changes, I do not think we will have any choice except to apply a single standard and a gender-neutral approach on that.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, General.

Admiral, would you respond?

Admiral KELSO. Yes, sir. Well, I certainly have great sympathy for the young women who is obviously an excellent aviator, who can fly an airplane well and do her job very well, and who sees this as a law that keeps her from going to where she wants to go.

I have a little different issue in the Navy than we have in the Air Force, in that I cannot see how the proposed law makes any sense—that we would put a young woman aviator in an embarked squadron, but another young enlisted woman could not be in the maintenance division of that squadron.

I fundamentally think we are proceeding along at a measured pace, seeing how it works out on our ships. We are not to the point today where I think that we can fully assess where we are. So I am in a position of having to make a judgment for the whole which is difficult to make at this point in time.

And that is where my judgment comes down at this time, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask each of you a couple of questions, starting with General Vuono. General, what are the standards of the Army today when men come in to the Army, do they have one standard and women another standard in terms of physical standards? What are your policies or are they the same?

General VUONO. The physical policies are the same. We do not give any kind of an entrance physical aptitude training test when they come in. They have to meet certain height and weight standards, certain medical standards, and certain intelligence level standards.

Senator NUNN. That is to get in the Army.

General VUONO. That is right.

Senator NUNN. How about when you go through basic training?

General VUONO. There are some differences. They take the same test and so forth in terms of the physical aptitude training test. There are some differences in the scoring levels and in the requirements to meet certain standards between men and women. These are based on the physical make-up of males and females in terms of upper body strength and so forth.

Senator NUNN. So there are differences in the physical tests in the Army?

General VUONO. Yes, sir. The test is the same; the standards are a little different.

Senator NUNN. The test is the same, but to achieve passing grades on that test, there is a lower criterion, is that right?

General VUONO. Correct.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Kelso, how about the Navy?

Admiral KELSO. I think that is fundamentally the same in the Navy, sir. We have a fitness standard and the standard is different for males and females. It is not substantially different, but it is a little different.

Senator NUNN. How about for male and female pilots?

Admiral KELSO. I do not believe there is any difference. We had that issue awhile back, and I do not think—within the range they can fit in the cockpit and all—that there are any differences.

We used to have some length of arms and issues like that ratios, but they were taken off, so they are the same for both.

Senator NUNN. General Vuono, is there any difference in the physical qualifications in the Army for male and female pilots now?

General VUONO. No. Males and females take the same physical aptitude training test. They must, however, achieve different standards. And by the way, the standards are not just different for males and females, they are different for age groups. For example, a 25-year-old male or female has a different score that they must achieve to meet the standard than one 35.

Senator NUNN. What you are saying, there is a difference in age in terms of expectations on the test. The test is the same.

General VUONO. We all take the same test.

Senator NUNN. There is a difference in what you have to have to pass the test as to age and as to sex?

General VUONO. That is right.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, how about in the Navy? Is there a difference in what you have to have to achieve, to pass the test as far as both age and sex?

Admiral KELSO. Yes, and we stop the test at age 50, the physical fitness test is no longer mandatory for those over 50 in the Navy.

Senator NUNN. But there is a distinction between what the women have to achieve and the men have to achieve?

Admiral KELSO. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. General McPeak.

General MCPEAK. Yes, sir. The physical fitness standards in the Air Force are different for men and women.

Senator NUNN. General Gray?

General GRAY. Yes. The entrance examination for everybody, mentally and all of that is the same, the minimum medical qualifications for enlistment and all of that type of thing, but the physical standard requirements are definitely different between male and female in the Marine Corps, for the obvious reasons of physical strength and the like.

Senator NUNN. General McPeak, you said if the Congress changed the law, you would recommend the policy be changed also. If you made that recommendation, you also said, as I understood it, that the standards would then be the same, so they would meet exactly the same standards for a combat pilot, female as male.

General MCPEAK. Right.

Senator NUNN. Would that be a change in Air Force policy now as far as pilots are concerned or would that be following the same?

General MCPEAK. No, sir. We apply the same—for instance, if you are going to be a transport pilot in the U.S. Air Force now, you have to go the same school and pass——

Senator NUNN. There is no difference in the physical test there?

General MCPEAK. There is because we apply different physical fitness standards to men and women in every specialty. So that is a separate question——

Senator NUNN. You are saying you would change that if they went into combat.

General MCPEAK. I do not see how you could. For instance, we have a different body fat standard for women than we have for men, and if we applied the male body fat standard to women, we would end up, a lot of women would have to leave the Air Force.

Senator NUNN. You have obviously judged in your other noncombat flying that that is not a material difference that should disqualify, is that right?

General MCPEAK. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. Does the same general rule apply to combat? Would it be the same, that the differences in physical achievement requirements do not matter in combat, like they do not in transport aircraft?

General MCPEAK. I do not believe that we can apply masculine physical fitness standards to women pilots and expect that to work because that does not match. What I meant about the standards is, standards of performance and flying training would have to be the same.

Senator NUNN. Well, have you reached the conclusion then that the differences in physical capabilities for men and women is not a material or relevant factor in terms of flying combat aircraft?

General MCPEAK. I am not sure about that. We do not have much data on that.

Senator NUNN. You have reached that conclusion as far as transport aircraft obviously.

General MCPEAK. Yes, that is correct. And by the way, for instance in bomber aircraft, I am confident that women can physical-

ly meet the physical demands of flying bombers, so there is one type of combat airplane you might be able to push into.

Senator NUNN. So flying an F-15 might have different physical requirements than flying a B-1 bomber or a B-2 bomber?

General MCPEAK. In my judgment it definitely does have different physical requirements, but the question is whether you can find women who can meet those physical requirements.

Senator NUNN. But in your statement a little whole ago you were not trying to "find women to meet those physical requirements."

General MCPEAK. No, that is right.

Senator NUNN. You were saying if the policy changes you were going to lay down the rule and every test, as I understood it, was going to be the same. But now you are backing off of that and saying that the test would be different.

General MCPEAK. No. I am saying the test for F-15 pilots is the relevant test and it ought to be the same test. If a women passes it and wants to fly the F-15, then in my judgment, we should not erect a policy barrier against her doing that in the Air Force.

Senator NUNN. General Gray?

General GRAY. We have a somewhat different situation, as you well know, Senator, in the Corps. First of all, all of our Marine officers who become naval aviators are ground combat arms qualified, and each pilot must be fully prepared to be a forward air controller for example who calls in air, naval gun fire, artillery and the like.

He must be prepared to serve as air liaison officer and the like. He must be fully prepared to go with our air naval gun fire liaison units aboard ship, and ashore, with ground infantry units of foreign countries and the like.

And so there is a high physical standard of excellence here which must be met and maintained. And our pilots have to go through very rigorous SERE or survival escape and evasion type training, and they must maintain currency there, along with the water survival testing and all of that because of our Maritime mission.

And so it is an extraordinarily high standard of excellence which must be met, and you cannot have a dual standard. You cannot have a dual standard in these kinds of combat and aviation combat organizations wherein esprit de corps, pride, integrity, cohesion, all of that is so much a vital part of mission accomplishment.

And in my judgment you are not going to find very many, if any, other than males, who can meet these kinds of stringent combat physical requirements and related tasks.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions, but my time is expired, so I will come back.

Senator GLENN. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think it should be noted for the record that this is the first time the Commandant of the Marine Corps has placed so much distance between himself and the Commander of the Naval forces.

We took note, General Gray, that you refused to sit in the chair assigned to you next to the Admiral. [Laughter.]

I do not know if that is any kind of implied criticism of Goldwater-Nickles or not, Mr. Chairman, but we will call upon the Commandant——

General GRAY. I will put your book on the reading list. [Laughter.]

Senator COHEN. Well, if you are going to mention it, you should mention the name.

Senator NUNN. He has quit sending them out free, General, that is the problem now. He does not give them away anymore.

Senator COHEN. If I could draw the attention of the panel to the statement that our tests ought to be based upon military effectiveness and not equal opportunity.

It seems to me that there is some notion that if you favor equal opportunity you therefore are opposed to military effectiveness, and I think what basically the people who serve on this committee and in this Congress are saying, do not confuse the two.

That when you talk about equal opportunity, it is equal opportunity to compete for those positions which will provide for our military effectiveness. It is not simply a jobs bill as such. And we should not confuse that.

General McPeak, I appreciate your personal views on what you said about not wanting to increase the risk to women. But I ask you a question, suppose you had a women pilot, she is an instructor pilot of superior intelligence, great physical conditioning and in every way she was superior to a male counterpart vying for a combat position.

Would your personal judgment be because you would not want to see the risk to her life increase by putting her in a combat role, that you would pick the male over the female under those circumstances?

General MCPEAK. That is correct.

Senator COHEN. So in other words, you would have a militarily less effective situation because of a personal view?

General MCPEAK. Well, I admit, it does not make much sense, but that is the way I feel about it.

Senator COHEN. But the test, according to all the panel members is combat effectiveness. So if we can find women who are in fact equal to or in some cases superior to male counterparts, should not the policy be that we ought to have the most effective military capability that we can possibly put together. Admiral Kelso.

Admiral KELSO. Well, certainly, Senator, I think all of us believe that we should have the most effective military we can put together. The question you pose is not a very simple one to answer when you look at one individual case or a few individual cases.

That is basically the crux and the difficulty of answering this question as I face the issue of how to make the whole thing work. We in the Navy, for example, have had our problems of putting men and women together on ships and creating an environment that they both can work comfortably in, that their families are comfortable with.

And so I make my recommendation in a bigger context. I wish I could make it exactly on each case as it is raised; that is the dilemma of this whole issue for me. It is a very difficult personal dilemma—how to deal with the issue as a whole.

Senator COHEN. Well, one of the reasons I raised the question with the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretary I should say, is we want to find out what the criteria are. Is it simply a question of matching capability? Is it morale? Is it fear of POW status? Is it fear of escape, as General Gray just talked about, of being on the ground, trying to evade and avoid enemy forces?

We have to have some kind of established criteria that we are measuring this against because if you get into a situation I have given you, and you have a single women who is obviously a very gifted individual and she says, yes, I want to fly. I want to be there. I want to go in and take that missile system out. I want to take those aircraft out.

And you say, no, sorry, you are a woman. Now it seems to me that we can change the law, but give flexibility in a policy as opposed to having an exclusion preventing the policy from ever being implemented. Because I resay, that if we did not have the kind of social changes that took place between the 1970's and the 1990's, you would not see that increase from 2 percent to 11 percent that we currently have in the forces, I think, General Vuono, that you mentioned.

General McPeak, the issue was raised about female instructor pilots and the question is, can they handle additional workloads, is the way in which it was phrased? In other words, not just flying aircraft, but can they fly through heavy air defenses? Could they fly air-to-air combat missions? Could they fire missiles? Could they drop bombs?

Would the stress level be different for a woman as opposed to a male? So that was raised as one of the issues to be resolved and one of the difficulties, of course is we do not have much empirical evidence because they have not been allowed.

So how do you ever resolve that issue? How do you make those kinds of judgments, as to whether or not they would be able to handle the additional workload as compared to a man?

General MCPEAK. Well, if the law is changed, Senator, then I think we will have to push into this area and we will get some data.

Senator COHEN. Well, the argument is, do not change the law until we have the evidence and we cannot get the evidence until we change the law.

General MCPEAK. Well, there is a certain amount of evidence. The Canadian Air Force, for instance, has had women fighter pilots now for 3 years or 4 years, a small number, but there is some evidence there, and there are some other air forces that have some data.

I just do not know of any way to do it except to open these areas up and collect the data, find out. Now we know some things about women based on just the physics of it. We know that for instance, the ability to pull Gs relates to height rather than sex in general, and for instance—but, that a man and a woman of the same height——

Senator COHEN. If you are taller, you pull more Gs or——

General MCPEAK. You pull fewer, yes.

Senator COHEN. Fewer.

General McPeak. Yes, the brain is farther from the heart, so it is tougher to pump the blood up and keep the brain working if you are tall.

That is why we say, you got to be short and stupid to be a fighter pilot. [Laughter.]

Senator Cohen. I see some Air Force personnel raising their hands behind you in support of that statement.

Senator Glenn. Not only Air Force personnel, I might add.

Senator Cohen. I have never commented upon your height, Senator Glenn. [Laughter.]

General McPeak. So we have found that the ability to pull Gs for instance is roughly evenly distributed among the sexes because women are by and large shorter so that if you normalized for height, men, as it turns out, biologically, can pull more Gs. We have tested that, there is centrifuge data on it.

But as a consequence of the distribution of height in the population, it turns out that in general men and women, if you ran a random group of men against a random group of women, they have similar or identical ability to pull G's.

So we have a lot of data like that, and if you asked me about my judgment on such things, it seems to me that the data indicates that there are some women, at least some women who can do this combat job as well as men. Okay.

So it is the law that is preventing us from pushing into this area, and I find comfort in that. That is my personal prejudice that I talk about.

Senator Cohen. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Glenn. Thank you.

Sam, you want a second round?

Senator Nunn. Let me pursue one other line of questioning, and I would like to check my facts on this and see if I am wrong anywhere along the line here, and I would invite any of you to comment.

Although we have an all volunteer force, once a person joins the armed forces, he or she is subject to military orders, including involuntary reclassification to a different skill or position.

These orders can be enforced by the criminal sanctions of the Code of Military Justice. It is my understanding that under current policy, men can be involuntary reassigned into combat arms if necessary to meet the military manpower needs.

Starting with you, General Vuono, is that correct? Can men be involuntarily assigned from one classification in to combat arms?

General Vuono. That is right, they can.

Senator Nunn. And that is the Army policy or is that law?

General Vuono. I would have to check on that.

Senator Nunn. I believe it is policy.

General Vuono. I believe it is policy and it is based on our policy of how we code our various positions in the Army, between male and female.

Senator Nunn. Admiral Kelso, same question to you.

Admiral Kelso. I believe it is the policy of the Navy that we can assign a male to a particular position, based on the needs of the service. We are excluded from assigning females based on H.R. 6015 as it currently reads, to ships that have a combat mission.

Senator NUNN. General McPeak.

General MCPEAK. All men and women in the Air Force are trained for combat in the sense that they get training to use weapons, sidearms and so on and under an emergency situation, of course, they can be ordered to turn to and fight.

Senator NUNN. Men and women or just men?

General MCPEAK. Men and women. Well, not the medical corps, not the chaplain. I mean, there are some exclusions like that, that do not apply, not sex related, but everybody else——

Senator NUNN. Well, women could not be under the law, could they?

General MCPEAK. They shoot firearms and are ordered to use them, yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. You can assign women to combat under the law then?

General MCPEAK. Well, I do not know why not, and if I needed to, if the base was under attack, I sure would as a commander.

Senator NUNN. You mean an emergency situation?

General MCPEAK. Absolutely. We have women who are under arms today. They perform perimeter guard, security with rifles, not just handguns. So we have them out there in that——

Senator NUNN. I am not talking about picking up a rifle and shooting somebody who is about to invade the base. I am saying, assigning a women to a combat classification?

General MCPEAK. Well, in the sense that we do not have infantry to assign them to, we would not take a female crew chief and say, okay, tomorrow you are going to be a paratrooper, but we hand them a rifle and say, perform combat duties to defend the base, yes.

Senator NUNN. General Gray.

General GRAY. All of the Marines, of course, have an advanced infantry training for defensive purposes, and our women go through a superb program, in fact, 3 or 4 more days than the men at Parris Island.

Senator NUNN. But all I am asking you is whether you can reassign men from a noncombat to a combat position.

General GRAY. When you come in the Marine Corps, you go where the Commandant wants you to go with the assignment he gives you, and he can reassign you at any time and he does, to meet the requirements of the Corps.

Senator NUNN. The second question I was going to ask, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, is whether under the current policy, women cannot be reassigned to combat arms under current policy?

General GRAY. We do not assign women to combat arms in the Marine Corps because we do not assign women when there is any prospect of offensive combat action, but they are trained for defensive combat and emergencies and that type of thing, but it is offensive combat action that is the driver in the Corps.

Senator NUNN. General Vuono.

General VUONO. In the Army we do not assign women to those positions that are coded to exclude female soldiers and those are the ones that involve direct combat or require locating with or near such units.

Senator NUNN. Well, my bottom line and I will go ahead and ask you this, General Vuono and to each of you, if we expand the opportunities of women into combat arms, could we sustain, as a matter of policy, a distinction between men and women in terms of involuntary assignment?

And I am speaking of those women in the Army or in the Navy or in the Air Force or in the Marine Corps who do not choose to go into combat. That is the question.

General VUONO. First of all, as you know, my position is very clear on this. I do not want you to change the law, nor do I want the Congress to direct us to make any policy changes that would inhibit the policy that we have now.

Senator NUNN. I understand that. I am assuming that we do change the law.

General VUONO. I understand that, but I just wanted to make sure that we were clear on that again, because sometimes we get confused, some of us do.

Should you change the law, and open up all of those positions to women soldiers, then they could be involuntarily assigned to those positions.

Senator NUNN. Admiral?

Admiral KELSO. I would assume if we changed the law to take the combat exclusion away, that we would open all ratings to women and they would be assigned the same as men, to the needs of the service.

Senator NUNN. If we do it only for pilots, you would say that would open up the whole thing?

Admiral KELSO. No, sir. Do you mean the law as it is currently written, the House bill?

Senator NUNN. Right.

Admiral KELSO. I would think that would only apply to pilots.

Senator NUNN. General McPeak?

General MCPEAK. If you remove the legal inhibition, Senator, I believe you would be hard-pressed not to require involuntary retraining when the service needs required it, and you would have to be willing to stand up to that legal test I think.

Senator NUNN. General Gray?

General GRAY. If the combat exclusion statutes are removed from the law with respect to pilots and how I understand it today, I would hope that those in the leadership roles on the other side of the river would continue to look at this from the standpoint of what is good for the country and what is good for the people who defend our country, which is another way of saying, it should not automatically then become a bunch of women pilots running around or doing this or doing that.

Each service and each military department has unique challenges that they have to come to grips with. Clearly, if you have other than full assignment authority, then you are going to have discrimination of the type that you do not want either. You cannot have it both ways.

Senator NUNN. My point is, I think we have to contemplate this as we contemplate changes in the law, because you have what the basic recruiter out there is going to tell to a young female who comes in to enlist and she is given a choice of classifications, or at

least a preference, I understand, when they come in, and you try to accommodate those and she is told what she would go into and what she would not go into.

We had better understand that the implications here are rather significant, and we are going to need to think through those questions because you are going to have a different story to tell out there at the recruiting station, if by signing up, they then are subjecting themselves to reclassification at the discretion of the service into combat arms.

General GRAY. If I could—this is crucial. One of the reasons that I believe that we are pretty successful here is because we make it very clear what you can do and what you cannot do, and people are going to have to understand that under this other concept, when you come in you are liable to go to combat type billets and their parents need to understand and everything else like that.

And I believe that everything that could happen under this new concept would cause quite a thought process around the country if that was clearly understood.

General VUONO. Senator, could I just pick up on that because I think you have hit upon a very key point, and not only the point that Al made in terms of being subject to service in combat units without a choice, but I also think you must consider the registration for the draft in your deliberations.

It would seem to me that you would have to open up registration for the draft to women if there are no restrictions at all on women serving in all units.

Senator NUNN. There is a possibility. I do not know how the Corps would rule on that. It is an interesting legal question. There is an awful lot of relationship between the draft and the Army policy, more relationship between the draft and Army policy because of so many draftees, and that is where you have to expand in a war.

General VUONO. That is right.

Senator NUNN. Much more relationship there than would be the relationship to the Navy and the Air Force, particularly in terms of flying airplanes.

There is certainly a big question there, but it would probably be more tied to Army policy than it would be opening up slots for pilots.

General VUONO. But it is one that I believe that we would have to look very carefully at. As we look at the near-term implications of the policy, we also have to look at a broader range of issues, particularly as we go to a smaller force because one day we may need to expand that force.

Senator NUNN. Which you will if you get into a major war.

General VUONO. Exactly.

Senator NUNN. No doubt about it.

General VUONO. Exactly.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

General McPeak, you seem to indicate that you feel that the high performance aircraft, the F-15 requirements, things like that, might be the break point between where you could assign pilots or not.

I noted in the Air Force Times a short time ago an article here by some fighter pilots that they had written in a rebuttal to a previous article and I was not planning to use this this morning, but since it came up I think maybe I will because I think we too often tend to think that if you are a pilot, you are a pilot and so you are qualified to do everything.

If you are helicopter pilot, you are just as qualified to do everything else and vice versa and so on, and these people make a point here that I wanted to make. They also get into the costs of this.

And I would ask a question at the end of this about the costs, if you have looked at them. They mentioned an earlier article here, a May 20 editorial. It is called, "Edging toward equality", which they say "grasps for solid ground by referring to the excellent job women did flying tankers and transports in war zones, Libya and Panama." And they also point out, "This in no way represents a valid test of their capabilities in combat. Tankers and transports do not fly through direct hostilities, therefore your claim that 'combat is a test service members of both genders have passed' is invalid."

They point out that: "We are a group of fighter pilots and our lives will be directly affected by this decision. We do not question that any person can be taught to fly any aircraft. Flying fighters, however, is not an individual effort, but rather a team effort. There are unspoken contracts and a division of responsibilities between wingmen. Our lives depend on each other's performance. The bond evolves from the time we spend together, there can be no dissent among us. . ." and ". . . how will this affect the standards if we go to this?"

And then later on in the article, "There is no question a woman can fly a fighter during take off and landing. Now let us put that fighter in its fourth engagement of a sortie at 9 Gs with an MiG on the tail, an air-to-air missile on the way, chaff and flares, the lead screaming on the radio to jink for guns and we find ourselves in a completely different scenario."

"At 9 Gs all the muscle mass in the body is being called upon to squeeze blood back into the brain, the neck, which is used to support a 30 pound head-helmet combination which is now maneuvering 270 pounds, and the lungs are still trying to catch up with the previous three engagements."

"This is just the physical side. The mental side is trying to communicate with lead and come up with a split second plan that will mean the difference between life or death."

"Are there women who can possibly deal with these physical demands? No question about it. The question is, will these unique few be identified among the many who apply?" which was a point that you made a little while ago, I believe.

"Will it be America's first true merit system as opposed to the traditional quota system?" This is a point on the cost though that I had not really thought about that much until I read this.

"Is the public aware that to train a combat qualified fighter pilot it costs approximately $6 million? In the interest of the nation, these pilots must be ready to go 30 days out of 30 days. Is this equal opportunity enough reason to allow a fighter pilot to be unable to work for approximately a year in order to bring a pregnancy to a successful end?"

"In addition, an F-16 pilot who has not flown for 180 days must be on temporary duty to attend a formal requalification course. This type of additional training is costly."

[The article referred to follows:]

Group of fighter pilots opposes having women in the ranks

Your paper presents the issue of women in combat as an incredibly one-sided argument. In essence, all you have done is to fall into the now "politically correct" way of thinking. Never mind any valid reasons as to why women should not be there, because valid or not, any mention of it would be sexist. This word tends to make people nervous and results in the censorship of some valid arguments against the subject. We in no way intend to single out a gender for the purpose of sexism. Instead, we desire to convey some valid concerns from the people who will be directly affected by this latest push.

When dealing with life or death, equal opportunity employment is of far less importance. This is why the exclusionary law came into existence. It would seem that Congress has forgotten this fact, and certain individuals like Rep. Patricia Schroeder, D-Colo., jump in and try to exploit our quick victory over a paper tiger.

The May 20 editorial ("Edging toward equality") gauges for solid ground by referring to the excellent job women did flying tankers and transports in "wartimes" (Libya and Panama). This in no way represents a valid test of their capabilities in combat.

Tankers and transports do not fly through direct hostilities, therefore, your claim that "combat is a test to see members of both genders have passed" is invalid.

Schroeder's claim that the performance of women in the gulf merits positions in combat cockpits is like comparing apples and oranges.

We are a group of fighter pilots, and it is our lives that will be directly affected by this decision. We do not question that any person can be taught to fly any aircraft. Flying fighters, however, is not an individual effort, but rather a team effort. There are unspoken contracts and a division of responsibilities between wingmen. Our lives depend on each other's performance.

The bond evolves from the time we spend together. There can be no dissent among us. We have witnessed dissent in our past focusing that evolved from homosexual female interaction. While at the Air Force Academy and during our time spent in Air Training Command, all of us agree that this interaction had a definite effect on morale.

The cold fact is that men and women will always be treated differently. The real question now is: how will this affect the standards in a fighter (or bomber) squadron. Will they improve, stay the same or go down?

Another argument is the physical strength difference that so many try to dismiss because it is politically correct to believe that gender difference is no longer real. Why in such an educated society do we find it necessary to close our eyes to the facts of life? There is no question that a woman can fly a fighter during takeoff and landing. Now let's put that fighter in its fourth engagement of a sortie, at 9 Gs with a Mig on the tail, an elbow at an outside an the way, chaff and flares and the lead screaming on the radio to pick his guns and we find ourselves in a completely different scenario.

At 9 Gs all the muscle mass in the body is being called upon to squeeze blood back into the brain; the neck, which is used to support a 30-pound head/helmet combination, is now maneuvering 270 pounds, and the lungs are still trying to catch up with the previous three engagements. This is just the physical side. The mental side is trying to communicate with lead and come up with a split second plan that will mean the difference between life or death.

Are these women who can proudly deal with the explosive death? The question about it. The question is will these unique few be identified among the many who apply? Will it be America's first true secret system as opposed to the traditional quota system?

Is the public aware that to train a combat qualified fighter pilot costs approximately $6 million? In the interest of the nation, these pilots must be ready to go 90 days out of 90 days. Is this equal opportunity enough reason to allow a fighter pilot to be unable to work for approximately a year in order to bring a pregnancy to a successful end?

In addition, an F-16 pilot who has not flown for 180 days must go on temporary duty to attend a formal requalification course. This type of additional training is costly.

The votes that really count are not those of a political committee far removed from the reality of the fighter and the real threat, whose lives will be on the line.

Paul H. Belmonte
Capt, USAF

William L. Spurlon
Capt, USAF

Joseph S. Matchette
Capt, USAF

Bryan E. Bradham
Capt, USAF

Gary B. Gay
Capt, USAF

Brian M. Seibel
Capt, USAF

Brian R. Heinrich
Capt, USAF

W. Gary Love
Capt, USAF

Jon W. Quaid
Capt, USAF

Fred T. Bowron
Capt, USAF

T.R. Goodson Jr.
Capt, USAF

Lisa Ellison
Capt, USAF

Senator GLENN. If you go with a gender neutral policy that you are talking about, have you run any estimates as to the numbers of people who would have to be trained or retrained under this policy and whether that is going to be a major expense or is this something that is not a major issue?

General MCPEAK. Well, I have no data on it. So I do not know. My judgment is it would not be a large expense. I disagree with just about everything in this letter, so I——

Senator MCCAIN. I note that is from Luke Air Force Base.

General MCPEAK. Yes, and by the way, they are a good bunch of kids here, probably pretty tough in combat. So they are a bunch of guys I would like to have on my side, but I do not agree with some of the points they have made in this letter.

In any case, I do not think they really hit the issue. The question is not, can all women pull 9 Gs with a Mig on their tail and go through four engagements. The question is, are there any who can and do they want to be fighter pilots, and if so, should we slam the door? That is the question.

So I do not think there are a great many quite frankly who can do that, and I have indicated my traditional views in this regard personally, that I am not enthusiastic about pressing women to do that.

But if there are some who can do it and who want to do it, then it is hard for me to say that they should not be allowed to do it.

Senator GLENN. Senator McCain, do you have any questions in the second round?

Senator MCCAIN. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman, on the subject of the Supreme Court decision concerning women being registered for the draft. I think a perusal of Judge Rehnquist's opinion clearly indicates that the basis of that decision was related to the combat exclusion law passed by Congress, which then gave the rationale for not registering women for the draft.

I think that that issue would clearly be revisited in the courts if the combat exclusion were lifted and I wonder if there is any disagreement with that view. General Vuono, would you?

General VUONO. No. I think absolutely, it would have to be revisited.

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, we may want you to respond to questions that other committee members may have. We also would solicit your close cooperation with Mr. Jehn on getting that guidance to us that we previously requested in February and any additional testimony or any additional views you have, we would appreciate your letting us know about them because we are going to have to deal with some of these things this year.

We appreciate your being here this morning. Thank you very much.

I want to welcome our third panel, our military men and women representatives from each of our military services. From the U.S. Army, Lt. Col. Gary Thomas, Infantry Battalion Commander, 101st Airborne out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Staff Sgt. Susan Leifeste, Motor Sergeant, 82d Airborne, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

From the Navy, Lt. Brenda Marie Holdener, Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 6, out of NAS, Norfolk, Virginia; Master Chief Electronics Technician, Richard Frey, Submarine Specialist, Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Chicago, Illinois.

From the Marine Corps, Capt. Michael Shupp, Company Commander, Company A, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion out of Camp Pendleton, California; Gunnery Sgt. Jean Amico, Headquarters Company, Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California.

From the U.S. Air Force, Maj. Christine Prewitt, Senior Pilot, Flight Scheduler, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland; Master Sgt. Glenn Palmer, Combat Controller, Chief Standardization Training, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

Please be seated. I want to thank you all for being here today. I know you had to get here on very short notice, but short notices in the military are not all that new and unexpected, so you can count on things like that from time to time.

I do not want you to feel that you are being out-dazzled here today by all of the stars and bars and braid that you had parade to the table ahead of you. We expect you to give your views of this from your particular vantage point.

The reason we asked you here, is because you can give us a working level perspective on this very important issue. So we want you to give us your very best shot on what you think because what you tell us today could very well wind up to be what we end up doing.

So maybe I could start off by asking you to tell us a little bit about yourselves, who you are, what you do and then what you think about opening up combat positions to women which is basically the situation we are in.

Start over here, Gunnery Sergeant Amico, would you start off for us please.

STATEMENT OF JEAN A. AMICO, GUNNERY SERGEANT, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION, 1ST MARINE DIVISION, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA

Sergeant AMICO. Sir, I work in the G–6 Section of the 1st Marine Division. During the Southwest Asia conflict, I was the Electronics Maintenance Officer or Electronics Maintenance Chief rather for the Division.

I now work as an Equipment Specialist. I deal with the big projects in the communications field of the Marine Corps, particularly SINCGARS, PLRS, and GPS.

I am very happy with the job that I do in the Marine Corps. I do not wish to go into an offensive combat role. I feel that my talents are much better utilized in the position that I fill now.

Senator GLENN. Is your feeling the one that is generally felt by women in the Marine Corps in the enlisted ranks, you believe?

Sergeant AMICO. I believe it is, sir. The position of the enlisted Marine women is that we want to do our job wherever the Marine Corps needs us to do it. But we do not aspire to other jobs more in the combat roles than we are already in.

When we go into a combat environment, we are at danger and we know that, and we do not have a problem with that because we are with our people and doing our job the way that we have been trained to do it.

We do not wish to carry a rifle and lug a pack around and live the way the grunts do. [Laughter.]

Senator GLENN. Sergeant Leifeste.

STATEMENT OF SUSAN LEIFESTE, STAFF SERGEANT, MOTOR SERGEANT, 82D AIRBORNE, FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

Sergeant LEIFESTE. Sir, my name is Susan Leifeste. I am 27 years old. I have been in the Army for 9 years come August. I have spent 3½ years in division. While I was deployed to Saudi Arabia, I served as a Battalion Maintenance Inspector until I took over the motor pool in November.

I have 15 men and two women who work for me, and I also agree. I think the policies and the laws should stay the way they are right now because there are physical differences dealing with hygiene, mostly with hygiene of a female. I know I carried 6 months of supplies with me, and it took up half of a foot locker for female hygiene.

And I have not talked to too many people who care to become infantry people or take on that job. There is a difference, as maintenance is my specialty, infantry is their specialty and that is all they do, that is all they are trained to do, and that is what they are good at.

And those are the people who, they are forward to us. I think it is important that they are best people who are forward of us and physically I do not think a female would be able to keep up with the male, where we are talking infantry.

There are some I have met who come very close and who could do the same job, but I think the policy should stay the same. It should not be changed.

Senator GLENN. Okay, Lt. Col. Gary Thomas, you are Infantry Battalion Commander out of the 101st Airborne.

STATEMENT OF GARY THOMAS, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, INFANTRY BATTALION COMMANDER, 101ST AIRBORNE, FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY

Colonel THOMAS. That is correct, sir. I have been in the Army 21 years. I am 42 years old. I came in 1970 as an enlisted man and got commissioned in 1971. I have led special forces operating detachments for about 7 years, and I have been in infantry battalions primarily for the last 8 years or 9 years.

The last 31 months in service I commanded the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry of the 101st Airborne Division, Air Assault where it was my tremendous pleasure to lead those men in preparation for deployment to Saudi Arabia, lead them through the defense of Saudi Arabia, the attack into Iraq and the end of the war and then redeploy them successfully to the United States. I gave up command of that battalion some 10 days ago.

I do not believe women should be placed in combat duty roles with the infantry or other combat arms in the Army. I think the Army's policy right now is extremely effective. The key element to success on the battlefield in ground combat is cohesion and team work, and anything that cuts away at the edge of cohesion or team work, be it individually, at crew or team level could adversely impact on our ability to be victorious on the battlefield.

You have already heard testimony that indicates the physical test for women, while being the same is not evaluated the same. There are different standards, different standards in body fat, weight and content. There is a difference in the ability of women to handle upper body strength tasks.

In combat arms, upper body strength tasks, the ability to lift extreme weights as we did in Saudi Arabia, every one of my soldiers carried, day in and day out, 110 pounds of equipment and ammunition into combat and throughout defense and offense operations.

The ability to dig holes in a short period of time with crude equipment, picks and shovels is critical in combat. Plus, the ability of those individuals as a group to cohere and operate effectively is undercut by fraternization which does occur with the mixing of male and females, despite our best efforts and our most professional attitude of all of us in the service.

So I would tell you, I think it would adversely effect combat operations in combat arms units if we changed that policy in the United States Army.

If you change the policy in accordance with the House law, you need to look very carefully at the position of air liaison officers in infantry battalions and infantry brigades and forward deployed units.

Pilots are ALOs and so pilots will be assigned down to infantry battalions to coordinate the command and control of aircraft. So if you do take a look at this law and if the law is passed, we all need to look very carefully at how we implement that and then bring it on down into the combat arms units in the United States Army and Marine Corps at that level.

Senator GLENN. Captain Shupp, you are Company Commander, Company A, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion out of Camp Pendleton. What are your views?

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. SHUPP, CAPTAIN, COMPANY COMMANDER, COMPANY A, 1ST LIGHT ARMORED INFANTRY BATTALION, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA

Captain SHUPP. Yes sir, I am a Light Armored Infantry Company Commander. I have been in the Marine Corps for 10 years.

I was deployed to Southwest Asia from August until April. Company A of Light Armored Infantry, part of Task Force Shepherd, took part in reconnaissance and security missions for the Marine Division. We attacked the enemy penetrations that tried to come across the Saudi Arabian border in January. When the ground war started, we drove deep into Kuwait, swept through two mechanized infantry battalions and continued into Kuwait City.

Alpha Company, as part of Task Force Shepherd, was part of the force that captured and secured Kuwait International Airport.

I do not believe women should be involved in direct combat offensive operations. I believe the system that we have right now really works and we have proved that in Southwest Asia.

I think anything that we do that could hamper the cohesion or combat readiness of our forces should not occur.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Master Chief Electronics Technician Richard Frey. You are a Submarine Specialist out of the Naval Training Center Great Lakes.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD FREY, MASTER CHIEF ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN, SUBMARINE SPECIALIST, NAVAL TRAINING CENTER GREAT LAKES, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Chief FREY. Yes, sir. I have been in the Navy since 1973, 17 years. I am presently a Command Master Chief for the Naval Training Center Great Lakes.

I have been on three fast attack submarines and associated with tenders in that area. I presently just finished up with the Navy Women's Study Group. I was a member of the panel of the Navy Women's Study Group.

My feelings on women in the Navy is, if we make our standards and requirements equal and they can pass those standards and requirements, then I think they should be given the opportunity to go in that field that they want to go into.

Senator GLENN. Master Sgt. Glenn Palmer, Combat Controller Chief, Standardization Training, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

STATEMENT OF GLENN E. PALMER, COMBAT CONTROLLER, CHIEF, STANDARDIZATION TRAINING, SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS

Chief PALMER. Senator, I have been a Combat Controller for 15 years, one of the four enlisted AFSCs which do not allow women.

I personally feel that currently less than 20 percent of the volunteers that we have make it through the end of training and are awarded their beret.

I personally and professionally welcome anyone who can pass that training standard, and would fight next to them.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Lt. Brenda Marie Holdener, Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Six out of NAS, Norfolk.

STATEMENT OF BRENDA MARIE HOLDENER, LIEUTENANT, HELICOPTER COMBAT SUPPORT SQUADRON SIX, NAS, NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

Lieutenant HOLDENER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I fly. I am H-46 pilot, that is a helicopter pilot who deploys on combat support ships.

I am currently the quality assurance officer in my squadron. I was deployed during Desert Shield and Desert Storm on the USN *Siris*. I was the air attachment officer in charge. I was in charge of two H-46 helicopters and approximately 30 individuals who were under me and we provided combat support throughout the Red Sea.

I was actually in that area for 2 months while deployed. I think I might be a little bit out-numbered up here. I totally support seeing some changes. I think there are definite issues that need to be addressed as in just changing the policy to let women fly combat aircraft, especially in the Navy. This will not make my job any easier because it still does not allow me to go on ships other than the ones that I am already able to go on such as combat support ships.

And so I am very selfish in the opinion that I would like to see changes just because that would afford me more opportunities. Being prior enlisted, I understand that there are some differences in the enlisted concerns, but can women do that job? Can the women do the job in a combat arena? I feel, yes, and I personally feel that I would like to see it changed.

Senator GLENN. Maj. Christine Prewitt, Senior Pilot, Flight Scheduler, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE PREWITT, MAJOR, SENIOR PILOT, FLIGHT SCHEDULER, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, MARYLAND

Major PREWITT. Sir, thank you. Chris Prewitt, as you said. I have been in the Air Force for a little over 14 years, and I have been flying the last 12 years of that.

I was an instructor pilot, T-37s at Williams Air Force Base and Randolph Air Force Base. I flew Medivac in the Pacific for 3 years, and I am at Andrews flying C-12s right now.

Men and women in the Air Force go through identical pilot training. There are no differences whatsoever in the training received. At the end of the training period, we are listed as fighter qualified or fighter qualified and instructor qualified.

To be an instructor, you have to have been fighter qualified. So every female who is in the Air Force out there flying right now is also fighter qualified, according to the Air Force standards. And that is a cut. You know, if you have made that, you have made that cut.

And it seems to me, if you have made that cut, you should be able to go on and fly those kinds of airplanes. I do not see where there should be any differences.

Senator GLENN. Thank you all for your statements, and it seems to me we do have some difference of opinion here.

Lieutenant Holdener, do you say you were enlisted before?

Lieutenant HOLDENER. Yes, sir. That is correct.

Senator GLENN. Do you think there is a difference of opinion on this between officers and enlisted? Because we do not seem to get much agitation for change from the enlisted ranks, but we do from the officer ranks that, I presume, which is based on the fact that to go up the ladder in promotions, you normally would either have to be combat available or combat assigned or have combat experience. Is that the basic difference?

Lieutenant HOLDENER. I think one of the basic differences is, when you are talking officer and warfare specialties—I mean, I know in my opinion, the reason why I went to H-46 is because it offered a warfare specialty. I got to go to a ship. I got to do exactly the same thing that my male counterparts would do, and so that is something that attracted me to that community, the combat support community.

I think that the people I know, the enlisted women and enlisted men, if you are talking senior enlisted, are all professionals. They want to be there. They have stayed in the Navy because they have worked hard to be where they are, and they are interested in continuing that and in continuing their career.

I think that there are definitely other problems when we are talking with younger, junior enlisted women, but it is the same with the men. They have no direction. They do not know, really, what they want to do. They may have gone into the Navy for another reason, or because they had no other direction, and so I think that you would find that they would have a different opinion, or a different interest, in whether it happens or not.

Senator GLENN. How about you, Major Prewitt, do you have any thoughts on that as to the officer/enlisted situation?

Major PREWITT. Right now, in the Air Force, the majority of the enlisted positions are open to women. The ones that are not, generally, require some sort of physical, like the combat controllers, that kind of thing.

Senator GLENN. But, in general, would it not be true that in the enlisted ranks, your promotion is more on your specialty area and your expertise in that MOS than it is on looking at a broader career command structure future.

Major PREWITT. Yes, sir. General McPeak was not a heavy driver, and that says it all, really, for the Air Force.

Senator GLENN. One reason given by some, and we have heard it discussed here some this morning, for not assigning women to combat units is that only a small handful could qualify and their assignment in small numbers might hurt unit cohesion. What do you think of that assertion? Would that be a difference?

Major PREWITT. Are you speaking to me, sir?

Senator GLENN. Yes.

Major PREWITT. I have, as a female pilot in the Air Force, been in units where I have been the only female. And as long as you are

out there, doing the job, day by day, shoulder to shoulder, it does not seem to make a big difference after a while. Initially, there is a little bit of a reluctance, and you basically have to go in there and prove yourself. But once you have gone past that stuff, it does not really seem to matter.

Senator GLENN. To the Army and Marine officers here, as you know, the main mission of the Army and Marine Corps, of course, is ground combat. It stands to reason the people assigned to ground combat positions would have a better chance to reach the top from a career standpoint.

Do you think that the combat exclusion policies on the career opportunities, has it really affected promotion, Captain Shupp, for female officers in the Marine Corps to have this combat exclusion in there?

Captain SHUPP. Sir, I do not have enough experience with female officers to answer that question for you at this time.

Senator GLENN. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas, how about in the Army?

Colonel THOMAS. No, sir. I do not think it has limited women's promotion. I think women have been promoted. Statistically, I think if you look at it, you will find that the women have been promoted very well in the Army.

However, realistically, because of the emphasis on ground combat and combat action on the part of the Army, at the very top pinnacle of the Army, there are going to be more officers who have experience with combat arms. However, there is plenty of upward mobility in all MOS's and all officers' skills throughout the Army to accommodate most of the females as well as the males in the Army, depending irrelevantly to where their MOS is.

Senator GLENN. Well, in your service in the Army and in the Marine Corps, also, you have a situation that always comes up, and that is, hand-to-hand combat, bayonets at the throat, things like that are things that are brought up as tasks that you want the men doing, basically, or that they are better qualified, although I suppose there are some women just as tough—a big, strong woman would be better in a situation like that than a small, weak man. But you do not assign people on that basis, generally. Do you have any comment in that particular area? Just the physical effects of hand-to-hand combat, is that an important factor, or is that sort of passe in war these days, anyway?

Colonel THOMAS. It is not passé in the infantry, that is for sure. The basis of all combat for the infantrymen is still from 300 meters in to bayonet and knife level, and so, all infantrymen have to be able to fight hand to hand.

We do do a lot of training on it, still, with the bayonet and the knife and hand-to-hand techniques. It is a psychological training program, and I think you could take any soldier who can do the physical characteristics and can do the physical requirements and you can train him to fight hand to hand in combat when needed. But to do it as a team and as a group and rely on each other consistently is where you run into difficulties.

Senator GLENN. Yes. Sergeant Amico, you are a Gunnery Sergeant now. Do you aspire to higher rank in the Marine Corps? If

so, do you think that the lack of combat experience and so on might affect that chance of promotion?

Sergeant AMICO. Sir, I believe that Gunnery Sergeant is the best rank in the Marine Corps. However, I do not wish to remain a Gunnery Sergeant for 8 years, which is what would happen if I retired at this rank.

I do expect to be promoted, and I do not expect anything to stand in my way.

Senator GLENN. Have you applied for OCS?

Sergeant AMICO. No, sir. I prefer to be enlisted.

Senator GLENN. Okay. Sergeant Leifeste, my time is up, but could you answer those same questions?

Sergeant LEIFESTE. Could you repeat that question, please?

Senator GLENN. Yes. Do you aspire to higher rank, and how do you plan to get there? Will the lack of combat experience or having an assignment to a combat area impede your progress up the promotion ladder from where you are now?

Sergeant LEIFESTE. Sir, combat experience really has nothing to do with my job as it is. I feel that how much an individual applies themself—and it all boils down to, you have to go to college. Your record has to look good. It is just how much you are applying yourself, the schools you go to, different experiences and moving around, not staying at duty assignments. I think that has a bearing on it, also.

Promotion, I think that is dependent just on the person themselves, just how much you are going to apply yourself to get what you want.

Senator GLENN. My time is up on this round. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for being here. We appreciate your service.

Master Sergeant Palmer, you stated that less than 20 percent to go through the rigorous training for your specialty are successful. And then you said if any person, no matter what gender, could pass that test you would welcome them in your organization. Is that a proper paraphrase of your statement?

Sergeant PALMER. That is affirmative, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. Does that mean in your view that the women should go through the exact same physical tests that the males do to quality for your specialty?

Sergeant PALMER. Absolutely, Senator. What we do is very physical.

Senator MCCAIN. Equivalency?

Sergeant PALMER. No equivalency. They meet the standard, it is go or no go. If they make the standard, then I highly endorse their position in combat control.

Senator MCCAIN. Master Chief Frey, do you share that view or should there be equivalent physical tests?

Chief FREY. Sir, I think if we set the standard and we set the test, no matter if you are male or female, if you pass the test I think you should be accepted into that opportunity.

Senator MCCAIN. Master Chief, on the submarines, you mentioned that you served on two, I believe, attack submarines. Is that correct?

Chief FREY. Yes, sir.

Senator McCAIN. Would you find that there would a habitability problem onboard those submarines as far as the close living conditions that would exist if women were part of the crew?

Chief FREY. There would definitely be close quarters, obviously. But if we take a look at it and we are all professionals and we take a look at it and slowly move into that situation, I do not think that would be a problem. We obviously would have to change some of the habitation that is in it to accommodate the females, but I do not believe that would be a problem.

Senator McCAIN. In other words, with additional facilities onboard the submarine, you mean?

Chief FREY. Yes, sir.

Senator McCAIN. Lieutenant Holdener, Lt. Col. Thomas mentioned in his statement, that he believed that there was a fraternization problem that could arise. Do you share that view?

Lieutenant HOLDENER. I really do not share that view, and basically, because I believe that it comes again that you need to gain the respect of your troops. There is an initial problem. Fraternization is a problem throughout the military. I mean, it is not whether females are there or whether you have females in command. It could be between commands that do not have any females and one that does.

So it is a problem that is throughout the military. It is dealt with; there are policies to take care of that; and do I professionally feel that I have ever had a problem with that? I do not.

Senator McCAIN. As you know, as the legislation has presently come from the House, women would then be allowed to be part of the air wing onboard an aircraft carrier. But my reading of the legislation is that they would not be able, then, to be ship's company. Does that seem fair to you?

Lieutenant HOLDENER. No, it does not, sir.

Senator McCAIN. And so, would you like to see it that women would be part of the ship's company and air wing staff, as well as part of the squadrons?

Lieutenant HOLDENER. My understanding of the current legislation is that they are just going to change it that women can fly fighter aircraft. Obviously, in the Navy, since we go to sea, that is going to present a problem, and if they are going to allow women to go to sea under that policy, saying they will be part of an air wing and they are TAD to that ship, you know, then why are we not doing that now. And so, I feel that it needs to be if we are going to allow women to be on that ship, then we should allow it across the board, not just for the pilots, but for the enlisted also. I mean, why are we putting it out just for women pilots when there are not just women pilots in the Navy?

Senator McCAIN. A previous witness in another panel of Navy people was a Navy Lieutenant Commander, a woman, who alleged or stated in her view that there was significant habitability problems onboard some of the ships. Do you agree with that?

Lieutenant HOLDENER. That is correct, sir, I do agree that there are habitability problems. There is only a small number of ships that have been into overhaul to accommodate women, to have the accommodations to support having women on ship's company.

Senator McCAIN. So from your experience, we would have to make some design changes in our ships, or at least modifications in rework?

Lieutenant HOLDENER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCAIN. Staff Sergeant Leifeste, you and Gunnery Sergeant Amico, in your years of experience in the military have you seen the majority opinion to be seeking combat roles for your fellow women members of the Army and Marine Corps, or have you seen a desire not to? Basically, what has been the tenor of the combined about 20 years of experience, between the two of you? Sergeant Leifeste.

Sergeant LEIFESTE. Actually, I feel that the issue is more with planes and ships than with the infantry. I, myself, have not met anybody who has had the desire to be infantry. Myself, it is not too desirable.

Senator McCAIN. In how many years?

Sergeant LEIFESTE. Nine years in August, sir. Army-wise, I just do not see any real desire for females to go into the combat arms.

Senator McCAIN. Sergeant Amico.

Sergeant AMICO. Sir, I have not seen among the women I know any desire to go into the combat arms area.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. So, Major Prewitt, what I think we are seeing here is what Senator Glenn alluded to a minute ago. There seems to be a significant difference in views between enlisted and officer on this issue, would you agree?

Major PREWITT. Well, my perspective is mostly from the vantage point of the female pilots in the Air Force, and they are all officers. I would have to say——

Senator McCAIN. Surely you deal with enlisted women quite often.

Major PREWITT. In my job, occasionally, yes, I do. But as I said, there are so few enlisted specialties not open to women that it is not a big point of contention at all. It is not something that someone discusses or anything. There are very few jobs in the Air Force that are closed to enlisted women.

Senator McCAIN. Could I ask Lieutenant Holdener to answer that question, Mr. Chairman? My time is expired.

Lieutenant HOLDENER. I just understand that you want to know what the enlisted women's views are?

Senator McCAIN. In other words, do you agree that there seems to be a division here of opinion as far as enlisted women are concerned, and officers are concerned, mainly centered around the lack of career opportunity on the one hand and, obviously, a view that there is career opportunity for enlisted women. Would you agree with that?

Lieutenant HOLDENER. I agree that there are some differences of opinion and that the enlisted women, maybe, do not feel that they are being more slighted. I feel that the officers tend to have that more, but it comes down to the training and, once again going back to what was pointed out earlier, that the enlisted promotion is based on, you know, their rating and their job qualifications that they do in addition to their evals. If they do a professional job and they are trained properly as, if all of us are trained properly to do our job, then the promotion will still exist.

Senator McCain. Thank you all very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Glenn. Senator Nunn.

Senator Nunn. Just one question. I really offer it for anybody to answer it. If we pass a basic repeal of the combat exclusion provisions now—and I am not talking about just pilots, now, I would be talking about a broader aspect here because I think pilots might be a distinction here—but if that leads to the services being able to, or even being required to legally, reclassify involuntarily women to assignments of combat, does this have an effect on any of your views?

In other words, I think most people are approaching this issue as a voluntary question. I think all of us would like to approach it as a voluntary question. The law, the policies, and the equal protection interpretations of the Constitution, may not allow us that luxury over a period of time. I do not know the answer to that, but I think it is something we have to contemplate.

So my question is, if this becomes not simply voluntary, but that the military services—Marine, Navy, Army, Air Force—would be able to basically reclassify an enlisted or officer female from noncombat classification to combat, would that have any affect on your opinion?

Colonel Thomas. I would say it would reinforce my opinion, Senator Nunn. I would say if inadvertently the result of the law being passed is a ruling by a court or legal authority that says we must reclassify, or be forced to reclassify, people irrespective of gender into combat arms, then I would say it would have a tremendous detremental impact on combat capability in the United States Army.

Senator Nunn. Thank you very much. Also, the question of what effect would it have on women being willing to go into the military for the jobs they now hold. Let me ask, Sergeant, do you have any views on this, either of you?

If enlisted personnel that you know in the military were basically able to be reclassified in combat by the service, would that have an effect on (a) recruitment, (b) retention?

Sergeant Leifeste. You are saying if they can be involuntarily be reclassified?

Senator Nunn. Right.

Sergeant Leifeste. Yes, sir, I think it would. I think if someone were going to enlist into, say, the Army and there was a possibility that they might be assigned, or reclassified, as an infantry person, then that would tend to change—that would change my mind. It would make me think twice before I did, because like I said before, it is not the most desirable job in the world, and that is all they do, 24 hours a day.

Senator Nunn. Sergeant Amico.

Sergeant Amico. Sir, if the law did change then I believe that enlistments of women in the Marine Corps would definitely go down, and we are only a little less than 5 percent of the Marine Corps strength now, so I do not think we would have very many women Marines left.

At this point in time in my career, I can say that no matter what job the Marine Corps gave me to do, I would do it to the best of my ability, so it would not have any effect on me.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. Let me ask any others. Sergeant?

Sergeant PALMER. Senator Nunn, I would say that anyone who enlists in the military for the purpose of defending our country who will not take any job of the officers appointed over them, do not need to be in the military.

Senator NUNN. Okay. Lieutenant?

Lieutenant HOLDENER. I tend to agree with that. I mean, you already get that choice and you should know that you are joining the military service, and if you are not willing to defend your country, then I do not want them in my Navy. That is what I say.

Senator NUNN. Major?

Major PREWITT. Yes, sir. We are not a work project. We are the military and when you put up your hand and put on the uniform, I think you agree to take it all on. It is just part of the job.

Senator NUNN. Okay. Any other views?

Chief FREY. Yes, sir. I feel the same way as most of the panel does.

Senator NUNN. I think we are split two and two, right now. [Laughter.]

Chief FREY. Yes, sir. I am going to try and cross that line.

I feel that if we do change, that they will think twice, possibly. But now, those of us who came in before also thought about it, too, when we first came in. It is going to be a change, but I do believe that it is not going to have that much of an effect on them.

Senator NUNN. Good. Thank you. Colonel?

Colonel THOMAS. Senator Nunn, I would just like to point up—and we have argued this before—you are looking at a difference in the end of the business. There is a distant end of the business and its requirements and then there is the last 300 meters end of the business and its requirements. And so, in combat arms, artillery, armor, infantry, combat engineers, the requirements are quite a bit different and therefore the attitude of women in the Army and the Marine Corps is different towards what that impacts on them, and in all fairness, their ability to really do those jobs and do them successfully and be successful themselves in their goals.

Senator NUNN. I agree. I think we may have, as has been observed here, we may have a difference of opinion between enlisted and officers. But I also think we may have a difference of opinion between different classifications of what people are doing, too, and also between services. The Army and the Marine Corps are not the same as the Air Force and Navy, particularly as far as pilots are concerned.

I do not know, Mr. Chairman. Right now, I do not think we probably have time before the markup for another hearing, but it might be good to sample, a little broader sample, in terms of checking with enlisted personnel, for instance, in the Navy and in the Air Force and checking with officers, female officers, in the Marine Corps and Army so that we make sure that we have as broad a sample as we need to make at least preliminary judgment. We are not trying to get a poll, but I think it would be helpful if we did that.

Senator GLENN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. I have the same concern expressed by Senator Nunn on the recruiting were this to come to pass, but I

would like to refine Senator Nunn's question. As I read the law and the regulations, if we were to make a change then you would have to treat men and women alike, and in the Army now an individual, male, is subject to reclassification involuntarily. Consequently, if this change is made, a women would have to be treated the same way as a male or vice versa—a male treated the same way as a woman.

It is not a question of if; it would happen. Simply that the law change would mandate that you would have to, once you raised your hand, accept any job to which you were assigned. And if I understand the testimony, I think, of our two sergeants—and it has been very impressive—that would be a deterrent on recruiting and likely end up in a loss of valuable people, female people, into the armed services.

If I might direct attention to the two distinguished officers at the other end. As we proceed here, and I hope that the Congress does not try and micromanage this situation, but it would seem to me, if in fact we make a decision to broaden the opportunities, certainly in the aviation area, that that individual is, by and large, one who has achieved pilot status, is a matured and a very responsible individual, and possibly could better deal with the stresses of the habitation than, say, the younger 17-, 18-, 19-year-olds.

Do either of you officers have an opinion on that?

Major PREWITT. I feel that the Air Force Pilot Training Program is very rigorous and very demanding. You have to have a college education. You have to meet certain criteria to even get into it. And to go through it takes a lot of maturity; it takes decision-making ability; you have to go through all the wickets. And at the end, you are a person who can do many things and stand up to many stresses.

I do think it is a maturing process, the entire thing. I think you are right. You do end up with a different individual at the end of it all. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Lieutenant?

Lieutenant HOLDENER. Yes, sir. I agree with what you are saying. That because of the stresses that you need to go through just to become a naval aviator and to punch all the tickets, that you would possibly be more mature, to handle the habitability problems that would arise, because of that maturity.

Senator WARNER. Last question to the Master Chief regarding submarines. The most valuable thing on a submarine is space, and it would appear to me that no matter how many women you had aboard, they would have to have an equal amount of space to the male for certain areas to maintain their privacy. And I am just wondering in the design of the submarines, whether or not that space can be yielded up.

Chief FREY. Yes, sir, you are right. The privacy is the number 1. With the space so small in submarines, that if we take a look at the design and we change our design to match that and our plan is to put women on the submarines, I think we have the space to be able to do that. The number of women would also take down the number of men you have on a submarine.

Senator WARNER. Of all naval ships, it would appear to me the submarine would be the most difficult, first to find space, and then,

second, to make the habitability problems work because of the confining nature of that type of vessel.

But do I understand that your study, in which you were an active participant in the Navy, felt that submarines could be adapted if the law were changed to accept women?

Chief FREY. Yes, sir. The study that we did did not specifically state that. My opinion on that was the submarine force could have a habitat that would allow women to come onboard.

Senator WARNER. So the study did not specifically direct its attention to any type of naval ship or contrast the various types of naval ships?

Chief FREY. Yes, sir, they did take a look at the different types of ships.

Senator WARNER. And was there any conclusion with respect to the submarine?

Chief FREY. I do not believe that specifically came out. I do not remember right offhand, sir, though it was discussed.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much. It is an impressive panel, and I hope that you found this a measure of personal pride to come before the Senate today and give your views. Thank you.

Senator GLENN. Thank you all very much. You have done an excellent job here today, and Gunnery Sergeant Amico, over here, and Captain Shupp, I have had a little experience in the Marine Corps myself in times past, and I think Captain Shupp would probably join me in saying Gunnery Sergeants really do run the Marine Corps. It took me a little while to find that out in my early days.

Captain SHUPP. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Thank you all very much. We might ask you to reply to additional questions that we can include in the record when other Senators have a chance to review the record, and we appreciate very much your being here this morning. Thank you.

I want to welcome our fourth panel. This is the last panel, and we appreciate their patience in being with us here today and sticking with us this long. It has been rather a long hearing.

Our next panel is Ms. Becky Costantino, Chair of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, better known as DACOWITS. DACOWITS is an advisory body chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act to provide counsel to the Secretary of Defense on matters concerning women in our military services.

Also Ms. Shirley Sagawa, senior counsel, director of family and youth policy of the National Women's Law Center.

Mrs. Elaine Donnelly, representing the Coalition for Military Readiness. Mrs. Donnelly is also a former member of DACOWITS.

And Gen. Robert Barrow, Former Commandant of the Marine Corps.

We welcome all of you this morning and we appreciate your waiting with us through this rather lengthy hearing this morning.

I would like each of you to summarize your views on the proceedings. Why do we not start with Ms. Costantino. Could you start off, please?

STATEMENT OF BECKY COSTANTINO, CHAIR, DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE SERVICES

Ms. COSTANTINO. Mr. Chairman and committee Members. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today as Chair of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services. I do not represent the Department of Defense, and the views expressed are not presented as official DOD policy. However, in the Committee's advisory role to the Secretary of Defense, he has been made aware of our position regarding the repeal of combat exclusion.

I have submitted a statement for the record and would now like to address some specific concerns from that statement. I would like to begin by thanking all of you for your support for our military men and women during Operation Desert Storm. As a result of Operation Desert Storm, the media and the national leadership raised the public consciousness regarding the significant contributions servicewomen make to the military. The repeated praise by the leadership of our servicemen and women throughout the operation meant more to military women than the country realizes. Although seemingly insignificant, it marked the first time the servicewomen's contributions were publicly acknowledged.

The DACOWITS meets semiannually in full conference and also visits with military women throughout the United States and at various overseas installations. The most significant area addressed at the DACOWITS latest conference, which concluded April 24, was our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense regarding the repeal of combat exclusion.

The DACOWITS recommended that the Secretary of Defense support the repeal and our rationale states: The events in the Persian Gulf demonstrated that the entire theater of operation is part of the modern battlefield, where exposure to the risks of combat extended to all members of the armed forces. The DACOWITS believes that with the repeal of the combat exclusion statutes, flexibility is given to the services to fully utilize all qualified resources. Ability rather than gender becomes the basis for assignment; acceptance of servicewomen as full partners is enhanced; and opportunities are expanded for servicewomen to compete fairly for assignments and promotions.

Even though the Department of Defense has conducted a continuing review and expansion of opportunities for women in the military through the years, it has reached a point where further expansion of opportunities is very difficult within the current combat exclusion laws and the associated policies that reflect their intent.

The expanded roles that resulted from the 1988 DOD Task Force were evident in the numbers of women involved in Operation Desert Storm. The performance of those military women was repeatedly described as magnificent by the senior, civilian, and military leadership throughout DOD. Those military women made contributions that noticeably enhanced combat readiness of the total force. The women say they simply did the job they were trained to do.

Recently, a Pentagon spokesperson indicated the Department of Defense welcomed legislation which would give them the authority

to decide where the line should be drawn, rather than having Congress set the limits on the role of women in combat. While DACOWITS clearly advocates expanded opportunities for women consistent with maintaining combat readiness standards, make no mistake. We recognize that if the laws are repealed and DOD is permitted to conduct incremental, methodical, measured, and reasonable analysis of positions which are currently closed to women, there most likely will be areas which will remain closed to women.

However, providing DOD the flexibility to conduct reviews to determine the best placement of its resources will provide a specific basis for opening or closing positions to women. Physical- and physiological-based gender differences which could negatively impact combat readiness would be valid reasons for closing positions for women. Limitations based on substantiated rationale would be more acceptable than the current limitations of the law, which are strictly gender-related with an assumed intent of protecting the servicewomen's exposure to hostile fire.

Servicewomen go through the same training, make the same sacrifices, and sign the same contract as servicemen. They want an opportunity to fulfill their commitments and serve their country to the best of the abilities. They do not expect special treatment or want standards to be reduced to assure their success. They do not want exemptions and exceptions. They merely want a chance to compete equally with the knowledge that if they are good enough, they will be allowed to utilize their skills.

They know that equal opportunity means equal responsibility and they are willing to accept the responsibility and corresponding risks. Equal responsibility, equal opportunity, and equal commitment, recognizing always that readiness is top priority.

In recent hearings, we understand that Defense representatives indicated they would like to see the decision for setting policy placed in the Pentagon. But, they added, they thought the policy was about right the way it is. As Senator Cohen stated earlier, that has probably been said for the last 20 years.

The performance of American servicewomen in the Gulf calls into question existing restrictions and highlights the benefits of fully using the capabilities of all personnel to further enhance combat readiness and to optimize the quality of the force. The time has come to give the chain of command the flexibility to use their best people to accomplish the tasks which our country asks of them. Perhaps the time is about right for another step forward for Americans, for another leap of faith, which will continue to make our military the most efficient and effective, respected and admired in the world, unencumbered by combat exclusion laws.

Sometimes those who fight in opposition to women being in the military and in combat roles forget the reason these women join. They join for the same reasons the men, but primarily because they want to be full-fledged defenders of our country and our military.

The spirit of the U.S. servicewomen was captured by the comments made in a CNN telecast, when Major Marie Rossi said: I think if you talk to the women who are professionals in the military, we see ourselves as soldiers. We do not really see it as man versus woman.

As a Nation, we now know what we will do if women become prisoners of war. We will wear yellow ribbons for them and prayer for their early return. We now know what we will do if women die for their country. We will grieve for them and bury them beside their brothers in Arlington.

The lesson of the Gulf War is that those who support a strong defense and those who want to expand opportunities for women in the military are on the same team. In spite of the inequities the law creates, servicewomen set aside personal frustrations and become part of a team whose objective is to protect and defend the United States.

America deserves the best force we can maintain to defend the Nation, and national security is the reason women serve. Equality works both ways. Women receive equal pay and equal training. They want equity and the opportunity to impact combat effectiveness by being in the pool of resources available to best support the military establishment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Costantino follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MRS. BECKY COSTANTINO, CHAIR, DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE SERVICES

Mister Chairman and committee members, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today in my capacity as Chair of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services. I do not represent the Department of Defense, and the views expressed are not presented as official DOD position. However in the committee's advisory role to the Secretary of Defense, he has been made aware of our position regarding the repeal of combat exclusion.

Before I begin, I'd like to thank all the military men and women who served so faithfully and competently during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Obviously, that covers all those who were deployed to the Persian Gulf, but there were thousands who served just as tirelessly and with less notice and fanfare, in support roles in the continental United States and in many locations throughout the rest of the world. I'd also like to thank you for your support of our servicemembers and their families.

As a result of Operation Desert Storm, the media and the national leadership raised the public consciousness regarding the significant contributions servicewomen make to the military. The repeated praise by the leadership of our "service men and women" throughout the operation meant more to military women than the country realizes. Although seemingly insignificant, it marked the first time servicewomen's contributions were publicly acknowledged.

The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (better known by its acronym "DACOWITS") was established in 1951 to advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on Policies and Matters relating to women in the armed services. The committee is composed of non-Federal Government civilian women and men who are appointed for a term of 3 years. The DACOWITS meets semiannually in full conference, and as a result of these conferences, we make recommendations, request information, and identify continuing concerns to the services, service Secretaries, or the Secretary of Defense. The committee members also visit with military women throughout the United States and at various over-seas installations.

The most significant area addressed at the DACOWITS latest conference, which concluded April 24, was our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense regarding the repeal of combat exclusion. The DACOWITS recommended that the Secretary of Defense support the repeal of Title 10, U.S.C. 6015 (U.S. Navy) and 8549 (U.S. Air Force), the combat exclusion statutes. Our rationale for this recommendation is:

The events in the Persian Gulf demonstrated that the entire theater of operation is part of the modern battlefield, where exposure to the risks of combat extended to all members of the Armed Forces. The DACOWITS believes that with the repeal of the combat exclusion statutes:

— Flexibility is given to the services to fully utilize all qualified resources.
— Ability rather than gender becomes the basis for assignment.

— Acceptance of servicewomen as full partners is enhanced opportunities are expanded for servicewomen to compete fairly for assignments and promotion.

Even though the Department of Defense has conducted a continuing review and expansion of opportunities for women in the military through the years, it has reached a point where further expansion of opportunities is very difficult within the current combat exclusion laws and the associated policies that reflect their intent.

The current laws and policies place limitations on the assignment of women. Many limitations were eliminated by the DOD's Task Force on Women conducted in 1988. As a result of that study, DOD adopted a clearer standard for determining which positions would be opened to women. The result was the opening of over 30,000 additional positions from which women were previously excluded.

The expanded roles that resulted from the 1988 DOD Task Force were evident in the numbers of women involved in Operation Desert Storm. The performance of those military women was repeatedly described as magnificent by the senior civilian and military leadership throughout DOD. Those military women made contributions that noticeably enhanced combat readiness of the total force. The women say they simply did the job they were trained to do.

Recently a Pentagon spokesperson indicated the Department of Defense welcomed legislation which would give them the authority to decide where the line should be drawn, rather than having Congress set the limits on the role of women in combat.

While DACOWITS clearly advocates expanded opportunities for women consistent with maintaining combat readiness standards, make no mistake, we recognize that if the laws are repealed and DOD is permitted to conduct incremental, methodical, measured and reasonable analysis of positions which are currently closed to women, there most likely will be areas which will remain closed to women. However, providing DOD the flexibility to conduct reviews to determine the best placement of its resources will provide, a specific basis for opening or closing positions to women. Physical and physiological based gender differences which could negatively impact combat readiness would be valid reasons for closing positions for women. Limitations based on substantiated rationale would be more acceptable than the current limitations of the laws which are strictly gender related with an assumed intent of protecting the servicewomen's exposure to hostile fire.

Servicewomen go through the same training, make the same sacrifices, and sign the same contract as servicemen. They want an opportunity to fulfill their commitments and serve their country to the best of their abilities. They don't expect special treatment, or want standards to be reduced to assure their success. They don't want exemptions and exceptions. They merely want a chance to compete equally, with the knowledge that if they're good enough, they'll be allowed to utilize all their skills. They know that equal opportunity means equal responsibility, and they're willing to accept the responsibility and corresponding risks. Equal responsibility, equal opportunity, and equal commitment—recognizing always that readiness is top priority.

In recent hearings, we understand that Defense representatives indicated they would like to see the decision for setting policy placed in the pentagon. But, they added, they thought the policy was "about right the way it is." In the early 1970s, when the All-Volunteer Force was instituted, and recruitment of women was a necessity to fulfill the "manpower" requirements, the military leadership said they thought the roles of women were "about right", as primarily medical and administrative positions. At that time women were given automatic discharges if they became pregnant. In 1976, they were reluctant to see women admitted to the Service Academies and believed it would degrade the effectiveness and quality of those institutions. In 1988, when the DOD Task Force report on women came out, which recommended the opening of thousands of positions for women, there was certainly some disagreement from the services, who felt things were "about right" as they were and more roles for women were not necessary.

During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, we saw the military join together to oppose the attempts to legislate restrictions on the deployment of single parents and dual-military couples. It would have seriously impacted on combat readiness! We also saw 35,000 women serving in a wider range of jobs than ever before. Pentagon officials were quick to point out the competence and quality of those women, and said that the job couldn't have been done without them."

The performance of American servicewomen in the Gulf calls into question existing restrictions and highlights the benefits fully using the capabilities of all personnel to further enhance combat readiness, and to optimize the quality of the force. The time has come to give the chain of command the flexibility to use their best people to accomplish the tasks which our country asks of them.

Perhaps the time is "about right" for another step forward for Americans . . . for another "leap of faith", which will continue to make our military the most efficient and effective, respected and admired in the world, unencumbered by combat exclusion laws.

Sometimes those who fight in opposition to women being in the military, and in combat roles, forget the reason these women join. They join for the same reasons as men, but primarily because they want to be full-fledged defenders of our country and our military. The majority do not join with the idea that they will be protected; they join the military to serve their country.

Military men and women who join the service do so with full knowledge of the level of their contractual commitments. An Army woman who served as a captain in the Persian Gulf said, "When you become a soldier, you come in for the total purpose—to defend your country."

An Army staff sergeant conveyed her pride in serving when she said, "I felt challenged, relied upon and an equal participant . . . to be treated as a soldier with all allied forces working together toward a common goal has been my glimpse at freedom. I have trained soldiers as a team, which is exactly how they behaved to survive. I am part of a structured but competitive world. I am a soldier in the U.S. Army."

An Army specialist, and single parent, one of the service-women wounded in the war, said, "I didn't think of myself as being a woman up there . . . I have to pull my weight just like everybody else does in the Army . . . when single parents join the Army they know what they are getting into."

The spirit of the U.S. servicewomen was captured by the comments made in a CNN telecast when Major Marie Rossi said, "I think if you talk to the women who are professionals in the military, we see ourselves as soldiers; we don't really see it as man versus woman."

As a Nation, we now know what we will do if women become prisoners of war: we will wear yellow ribbons for them, and pray for their early return. We now know what we will do if women die for their country: we will grieve for them, and bury them beside their brothers at Arlington.

The lesson of the Gulf War is that those who support a strong defense and those who want to expand opportunities for women in the military are on the same team. In spite of the inequities the law creates, servicewomen set aside personal frustrations and become part of a team whose objective is to protect and defend the United States. America deserves the best force we can maintain to defend the Nation, and national security is the reason women serve.

Equality works both ways. Women receive equal pay and equal training. They want equity in the opportunity to impact combat effectiveness by being in the pool of resources available to best support the military establishment.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to express our views on why the combat exclusion statutes should be repealed. This concludes my comments and I welcome your questions.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Ms. Sagawa.

STATEMENT OF SHIRLEY SAGAWA, SENIOR COUNSEL/DIRECTOR OF FAMILY AND YOUTH POLICY, NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER

Ms. SAGAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very honored and pleased to have the opportunity to testify here today on behalf of my organization, the National Women's Law Center, as well as a group of other organizations we have been working with on issues relating to women in the military.

These groups include the American Association of University Women, the American Nurses Association, the Center for Women's Policy Studies, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Wider Opportunities for Women.

There is no question that the heroic performance of women in Operation Desert Storm showed that the decades of progress that they have made toward equality in the Armed Forces have been well spent. Nonetheless, I think it is clear that significant impediments remain for women who want to serve their country through

military service, and the greatest of these are the combat restrictions that you are considering today.

In addition to limiting the career potential of military women, however, combat restrictions prevent the armed services from achieving the highest possible level of military preparedness. Military women recruits generally have higher education levels than male recruits and are well qualified to carry out many assignments on modern combat planes and ships as we have heard earlier. Yet, under current policy, if the best qualified person for a position in a combat unit turns out to be a woman, the military will not give the best qualified person that job.

Instead of using gender as a proxy for ability, the military should select individuals for combat positions based on their ability to do the job. Many of today's combat positions do not require significant physical strength; however, even in cases of jobs that do require great physical strength, assignments should be made based on the individual's ability to perform and should not be denied to an otherwise qualified person simply because of her gender.

This year the Supreme Court reaffirmed in *UAW* v. *Johnson Controls* that in Title VII cases, the Court has, "refused to allow employers to use sex as a proxy for strength."

It is time for Congress and DOD to eliminate gender-based classifications unless they can show in each case that concerns about a woman's ability to perform her job safely and efficiently are confined to those aspects of the woman's job-related activities that fall within the essence of the military's mission. This is what civilian employers are required to do under Title VII, according to Johnson Controls. The U.S. military should do no less.

I want to give a couple of examples of inappropriate reasons for classifying employees based on gender. The first would be because of concerns for their safety. A second would be because they are mothers or potential mothers. Again in *Johnson Controls*, the Supreme Court made clear that civilian employers may not limit opportunities for women because of concern for the employee's future children.

When the Senate debated this issue in the Persian Gulf conflict, it appropriately rejected proposals to bar single parents and one-parent in a dual military couple from serving in a war zone or to allow those personnel to opt out of war zone service at their own discretion. Such policies would, because units must be able to deploy on short notice, ultimately prevent such parents from training for assignments that might involve deployment even if they wish to do so and do not give sufficient weight to the decisions of parents in an All-Volunteer Force to provide for their children through military careers, despite the risks that such service poses.

This does not mean that the groups I am testifying on behalf of oppose efforts to have the military personnel balance work and family responsibilities. On the contrary, we support the military's decision to provide benefits to these families as long as they are offered on a gender-neutral basis and do not disadvantage personnel who take advantage of them.

In sum, in order to help clarify these issues, we propose that the following criteria be used to reevaluate utilization of women in the military. First, assignments to jobs should be made based on an in-

dividual's ability to do the job, not on his or her gender. As a first step, Congress should repeal the statutory restrictions on assignment of women to combat vessels and aircraft.

Second, barring exceptional circumstances, all individuals in the military should be prepared to carry out the responsibilities of their jobs regardless of gender or parental status. To this end, we urge that Congress continue to reject efforts to allow single parents and one-parent in a dual military couple to opt out of war-zone service.

Third, the military should continue to help both male and female personnel balance work and family responsibilities, as this will result in improved job performance and increase overall readiness. Such efforts should include extension of the House-passed provision allowing for a 6-month period of nondeployability, without their consent, for new mothers to fathers as well; increasing funding for high-quality child care; and eliminating restrictions on abortions in military hospitals overseas.

Finally, the military should continue efforts to eliminate sexual harassment and other forms of gender bias. Repeal of combat exclusions will go a long way towards ending the second-class status of women which has lead to harassment and discriminatory treatment.

We hope that Congress will act quickly to repeal the combat exclusion laws and hope that the Department of Defense will move with all deliberate speed to remove additional barriers that limit the ability of a large portion of the population from contributing their talents to the service of the Nation. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sagawa follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHIRLEY SAGAWA, SENIOR COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR OF FAMILY AND YOUTH POLICY, NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify today regarding utilization of women in the military. I am a senior counsel with the National Women's Law Center, which since 1972 has worked to affect policy to better reflect the needs and rights of women. At the beginning of the Desert Storm operation, we organized a coalition of women's organizations to discuss issues regarding women in the military. I am testifying today on behalf of several members of this informal coalition, including the American Association of University Women, American Nurses Association, the Center for Women's Policy Studies, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Wider Opportunities for Women.

We all have reason to applaud the 33,000 women who participated in Desert Storm. All accounts suggest that their excellent performance put to rest the basic stereotypes that have guided policy regarding utilization of women in the military. In the Gulf War, women—who made up 6 percent of the service personnel deployed—were exposed to much the same risks as men, serving in combat support roles alongside combat troops. Women did not flee this dangerous duty, and the men they served with were not hindered in their ability to perform because of the presence of women. Other nations did not perceive the United States armed services as weak because the force included women. Further, the American public, while disturbed about the capture of two women prisoners of war and saddened by the deaths of 13 women military personnel, was concerned about the safety of all those serving in the Gulf, male and female alike, and mourned equally for both men and women who were killed.

The heroic performance of women in Desert Storm followed three decades of progress toward equality for women in the Armed Forces. During the 1960s and 1970s, restrictions were lifted on the highest rank that women may achieve. the percentage of officers and enlisted personnel who may be women, women's participation in ROTC, the ability of husbands of servicewomen to be considered dependents, the ability of pregnant women and mothers to serve in the military, women's serv-

ice on Navy ships, and women's admission to the major service academies. Since 1972, the number of women in the Armed Forces has increased 450 percent, from 2 percent in 1972 to 11 percent today.

Nonetheless, significant impediments remain for women who want to serve their country through military service. According to a 1990 study by the Defense Manpower Data Center, sexual harassment was reported to be a problem by almost two-thirds of military women, one-third of whom believed that reporting the problem would have adverse consequences for them. A 1988 General Accounting Office study found that the services limit the number of jobs that women may hold beyond the requirements of the combat exclusion and related program needs."

However, combat restrictions—based in law (10 U.S.C. 6015 and 8549) and policy present the greatest barrier preventing women from advancing in the military. Therefore, we are pleased that this Subcommittee has chosen to reconsider the utilization of women in the military based on the experience of the Gulf War and in the context of societal changes generally.

In addition to limiting the career potential of military women; combat restrictions prevent the armed services from achieving the highest possible level of military preparedness. Military women recruits generally have higher education levels than male recruits, and are well qualified to carry out many assignments on modem combat planes and ships. Yet under current policy, if the best qualified person for a position in a combat unit turns out to be a woman, the military will not give the best qualified person the job. Furthermore, arbitrary limitations lead to inconsistent policies about what women can and cannot do, which creates confusion in times of war.

Instead of using gender as a proxy for ability the military should select individuals for combat positions based on their ability to do the job. As the Department of Defense concluded in 1979, "large numbers of women, properly trained and selected, have the physical and mental ability to serve in the entire range of military classifications." Many of today's "combat" positions do not require significant physical strength. However, even in jobs that require great physical strength, assignments should be made based on the individual's ability to perform the job, and not be denied to an otherwise qualified person simply because of her gender. This year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed in *UAW* v. *Johnson Controls* that in Title VII cases the Court has "refused to allow employers to use sex as a proxy for strength." It is time for Congress and DOD to eliminate gender-based classifications unless they can show in each case that "concerns about a woman's ability to perform her job safely and efficiently" are confined to "those aspects of the woman's job-related activities that fall within the 'essence' " of the military's mission. This is what civilian employers are required to do under Title VII according to *Johnson Controls*. The U.S. military should do no less.

An example of an inappropriate reason for classifying employees would be barring women from certain assignments because they are mothers or potential mothers. The Supreme Court made clear in *Johnson Controls* that civilian employers may not limit opportunities for women because of concern for employees' future children: "Decisions about the welfare of future children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them, rather than to the employers who hire those parents." [1] This principle is a good one. When the Senate debated this issue during the Persian Gulf conflict, it appropriately rejected proposals to bar single parents and one parent in a dual military couple from serving in a war zone, or to allow these personnel to opt out of war-zone service at their own discretion. Such policies would, because units must be able to deploy on short notice, ultimately prevent such parents from training for assignments that might involve deployment, even if they wished to do so. Existing policy, which requires parents to have up-to-date dependent care plans and allows individuals to request hardship deferrals, reassignments, or discharges if family responsibilities prevent them from deploying, appropriately addresses family problems on a case-by-case basis. However, more sweeping policies that classify individuals based on their gender or parental status do not give sufficient weight to the decisions of parents in an All-Volunteer Force to provide for their children through military careers despite the risks that such service poses.

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[1] The Court in *Johnson Controls* also states that *Dothard* v. *Rawlinson* established that "danger to a woman herself does not justify discrimination." This principle is inconsistent with the 1988 DOD Risk Rule, which states that "risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture are proper criteria for closing noncombat positions or units to women, providing that the type, degree, and duration of such risks are *equal to or greater than* that experienced by combat units in the same theater of operations."

This does not mean that we oppose efforts to help military personnel balance work and family responsibilities. On -the contrary, we strongly support the military's decision to provide benefits to these families, as long as they are offered on a gender-neutral basis and do not disadvantage personnel who take advantage of them. The Department of Defense operates the largest employer-provided child care system in the world, with over 600 high-quality centers serving 120,000 children. Health care and housing for personnel and dependents make military service attractive for many young parents. The military is also forward-thinking in providing 6 weeks of paid leave for mothers at the birth of a child, and we urge that fathers be allowed this benefit. Similarly, we would welcome the House proposal to bar deployment, without their consent, of new mothers for 6 months after the birth or adoption of a child *if it covered new fathers as well.*

In order to help clarify these issues, we propose that the following criteria be used to reevaluate utilization of women in the military. First, assignments to jobs should be made based on an individual's ability to do the job, not on his or her gender. As a first step, Congress should repeal statutory restrictions on assignment of women to combat vessels and aircraft. Second, barring exceptional circumstances, all individuals in tee military should be prepared to carry out the responsibilities of their jobs, regardless of gender or parental status. To this end, we urge that Congress continue to reject efforts to allow single parents and one parent in a dual-military couple to opt out of war-zone service Third, the military should continue to help both male and female personnel balance work and family responsibilities, as this will result in improved job performance and increase overall readiness. Such efforts should include extension of the House-passed provision allowing for a 6-month period of nondeployability, without their- consent, for new mothers to fathers as well; increasing funding for high-quality child care; and eliminating restrictions on abortions in military hospitals overseas. Finally, the military should continue efforts to eliminate sexual harassment and other forms of gender bias. Repeal of combat exclusions will go a long way towards ending the second class status of women which has lead to harassment and discriminatory treatment.

These policies will enable the military to utilize women in a manner consistent with principles of fair employment. The policies will improve military readiness and allow the military to fully use the talents of fifty percent of the population. These changes will expand opportunities for women to serve their country on an equal basis. We hope that Congress will act quickly to repeal the combat exclusion laws, and hope that the Department of Defense will move with all deliberate speed to remove additional barriers that limit the ability of a large portion of the population from contributing their talents to the service of the Nation.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. Ms. Donnelly.

STATEMENT OF ELAINE DONNELLY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COALITION FOR MILITARY READINESS

Mrs. DONNELLY. Thank you, Senator Glenn. I really appreciate the chance to testify today. I do have a formal statement. I would like it to be in the record and I hope that you will have a chance to review it.

Senator GLENN. The entire statement will be included in the record.

Mrs. DONNELLY. Thank you. I am going to put it aside for now because I have been struck by the questions that have been put to the witnesses here today. I congratulate you for the quality of the questions.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Mrs. DONNELLY. The answers given were absolutely profound. If they are told to the American people in the honest way that they were presented, I think the American people would realize and know that this current legislation or action by Congress to repeal the combat restrictions would be a terrible mistake.

I want to clarify one thing. A number of people have said, well, the Secretary of Defense would like flexibility, that he would not mind having the power to make decisions on this issue, on whether

or not women should be in combat. But when I was appointed to be a member of the DACOWITS committee, I was handed a little sheet of paper here that has the combat restrictions right on it, and I counted the lines—only about 10 lines. It is a statement of principle, with regard to the Air Force and the Navy, and then the policies that flow from the law with regard to the Army, that Congress does not want women to be in front-line combat.

What is the definition of combat? People are talking about it as if what happened in the Gulf War—certainly, people were in combat in the front lines, but the women were not. I really think we need to talk about the definition of combat. It is right here, right out of the DACOWITS manual: "Engaging an enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with enemy personnel, and substantial risk of capture. . ."

It occurred to me coming here that Congress has the right to set policy on whether or not women should be in combat, and I may be the last one, the last American, civilian, to address you about whether or not this policy should remain as it is or whether it should be changed. As it has been said today—all of the Pentagon representatives you heard said—if the law is changed, they will implement it, and they will do so with the same kind of vigor that they did in sending mothers of young children to fight the war in the Persian Gulf.

I think Congress ought to retain the right to say that they do not want women in combat, because if they give the power away, they will never be able to get it back. That is because of the political pressures that are very evident in the Pentagon, pressures that prevent people from even speaking frankly. If they are field commanders or wing commanders, to criticize the idea of woman being in combat is considered tantamount to destroying one's career.

Yes, there are good people in the Pentagon, and I think there are honest people, but we did not hear from the Secretary of Defense today that they endorse this legislation. I think that some people in the Pentagon would like to remain unaccountable to the American people, but I hope that the Congress will remember that the American people do not want to be shut out of this decision. This is going to affect our daughters and our granddaughters and men and women all across the world.

We are not just concerned about danger to women. We are concerned about dangers to both men and women and effectiveness and readiness, and believe that we should not make a change in the law that would cause serious problems.

The only reason that we are here today is because of a surprise amendment that came out of the House Armed Services Committee. There were no hearings at the time. Representative Pat Schroeder's amendment is deceptively simple. It is billed as a permissive amendment, but it actually would mandate a massive departure in our policy, which has not been successfully accomplished anywhere else in the world.

There are several reasons and I will outline just a few why this bill should be defeated. First of all, the repeal would be mandatory. It would not be optional. Combat would not be a choice made by individual pilots—as has been said several times today. Senator

Nunn's questions brought this out—policies regarding individual soldiers and naval personnel can be changed at very short notice.

Christopher Jehn said that if the law changes, the Pentagon will be obligated to implement it. There is no such thing as optional combat in time of war, and I know that you know that, Senator Glenn. As in the Gulf War, even in a volunteer Army, people have no choice as to whether or not they will be mobilized in time of war.

We know that the change in policy will not be limited to aviators alone. The testimony has already been given. It would be untenable and perhaps unfair in the view of some to open up Navy aircraft but not the aircraft carriers on which the female aviators would be landing. The ship's company and also smaller ships would have to be open and integrated with women and once that happens, then the pressure to open up the Army positions, Army helicopters, combat helicopters, and other positions would be irresistible.

Then you have the problem of the ground combat, the definition that I mentioned earlier, which is to engage the enemy. Certainly, the enlisted women ought to have a say in this, but as it was made clear today, the enlisted women do not want to go to in combat. Surely, we should listen to that because they are the ones, once the rules change, who would pay the biggest price.

We also can tell, and we knew it before but we can see even more clearly today, that the issue of whether or not women should be registered for the draft is tied up in this simple change in the law that everybody is talking about. The 1981 *Rostker* v. *Goldberg* decision was keyed to the fact that women are exempt from combat duty. If the exemption is taken away, obviously the rules would change. And by the way, the most prominent former member of DACOWITS is Sandra Day O'Connor, who I am sure would have a lot of influence over this decision.

There has been concern about dual standards. We heard remarkable testimony today in which everyone said, yes, the men and women take the same tests, but the results are scored differently. That, Senator Glenn, is gender norming. It distorts the conception of whether or not women are indeed qualified for the jobs in which they are placed. These controversial dual standards were examined very closely in the trial involving the Virginia Military Institute. A Federal court yesterday ruled in favor of the VMI, and it was found that having dual standards to promote affirmative action is indeed causing problems at the service academies, and that problem needs to be looked at.

By the way, I saw gender norming in action when I went to West Point and when I went to Quantico—it was very impressive the way women were doing the physical tests, but I also noted that the scores were different. I saw it with my own eyes, and we have had plenty of testimony to that effect today. The question is, will the same gender norming, dual testing techniques and scores be used with regard to aviators? I know that both of you Senators on this panel who are aviators know, that the penalty for politics in aviation can be death. You do not make decisions——

Senator WARNER. I have to correct that. I failed to achieve the status of being an aviator, and was a ground-pounder like General Barrow.

Mrs. DONNELLY. Excuse me. I was referring to Senator McCain, but obviously he is not here right now. But I meant to refer to Senator McCain.

Senator WARNER. Never would I try to equate my modest record with the distinguished Senator from Ohio. [Laughter.]

Mrs. DONNELLY. Well, I have not had the privilege of flying these aircraft, but I do think the letter that was brought into the record by Senator Glenn today does cause me a lot of concern, and I hope that other people would wonder, too. Can we make decisions regarding aviators based on political decisions and affirmative action credits that are based on gender-norming scores? This is a legitimate question that needs to be answered.

I think we ought to look at what are the standards in the Army. Just before I joined the DACOWITS committee, I found out that the tests that are being given with regard to physical strength are not being used as a qualifying standard. The Women in the Army study was designed to do exactly what Ms. Costantino has said, in fact, what everyone here says they want. Standards that reflect the jobs so that the individual is matched to the job.

But when it came to the DACOWITS committee, they said, oh, no, that is not fair to women; we do not want tests that are going to exclude so many women, and the Army backed down and they turned the tests into nothing more than a recruiting guidance tool. That means that we do not have a real definition of "qualified" with regard to soldiers today. We have been getting by all these years in peacetime. What is going to happen in time of war?

Vietnam lasted 16 years from the first casualty to the last. I am glad the Gulf War was so short, but can we afford to have people in jobs for which they are not qualified? Look what is happening already. These policies need to be studied and perhaps reversed, but I do not think that is ever going to happen if we rush so quickly to make this change. And by the way, when Canada moved to repeal their combat restrictions, they kept the standards very high. They did not adjust them for women. There is no gender norming in Canada.

Out of 102 women who went into the infantry training, only 1 passed. She has since left the Army. So why are we not doing things as honestly as they are done in Canada? I think we ought to consider that before we take this step.

In the same way, the Navy adjusted their anthropometric standards. I do not claim to be an expert on G-forces, but I do remember that during my term a political decision was made because the DACOWITS complained that two-thirds of the women could not meet the anthropometric standards. Now, maybe we got by with that in peace time. Is the same kind of political decision going to be made with regards to combat ships, where both men and women, not to mention expensive aircraft, might be at risk? I think that would be a mistake.

Instead of moving to put women in combat, we have got to do something about the sociological problems. I am sure that all the Senators on this panel got letters from people worried about the little babies being left behind during the Gulf War. Dual service couples being given 48 hours notice and handing over children to care givers the children hardly know. Sixty-four percent of the

American people said it is unacceptable to deploy parents of young children to war.

What is the Pentagon doing about it? Nothing. I went to the recent DACOWITS meeting. They talked about 50-50 subsidies for child care, for institutional care. What are we going to do in the next war? Put the children in the institutions and say this is a success? Now, granted, the Pentagon is more concerned with battle damage assessments, not family damage assessments. To them, success is getting everybody off to war, and I understand that. I am not criticizing that, but certainly there ought to be a balance of interests recognized. I think it is part of our American values to recognize that we do not treat children in this way, whether there is a war going on or not.

Also, there were reports of heightened pregnancy rates during the war. This issue has been treated very delicately here today, but Congressman Dornan on the House floor said there were over 1,200 women evacuated from the Gulf War, and it is a closely kept secret. It is very difficult to get these figures, but I think we need to talk about this.

Reports of pregnancies on individual ships, such as the U.S.S. *Acadia*, do not relate to whether pregnancies are any higher or lower than civilian rates. The difference is that when you have a woman who is pregnant in the civilian world, you can replace her in her job. But when you have a Navy ship going to war, a pregnancy causes a problem in the short-handed unit, and that interferes with readiness and morale.

The problems of fraternization and harassment are indeed real. They are related to lack of privacy. There was lack of privacy in the tents in the desert. Before we move to put women in fighter squadrons and Navy ships, this has to be looked into.

And by the way, I visited a Navy ship at the Mayport Naval Base and I asked the Captain to see where the enlisted women would be, if all of a sudden the combat restrictions were repealed. This was a frigate, an average-sized ship.

I went to the berthing areas and I saw all the bunks from floor to ceiling, and the Captain agreed there was no way to reconfigure that ship unless it was done at terribly large expense. Now I have heard that some ships have already been reconfigured by taking away the lounges and the social areas that the sailors need for their personal morale, so this is indeed a cost factor that ought to be looked into. Million dollar training costs for fighter pilots are something that ought to be considered, especially when you have an average 10 percent figure of military women becoming pregnant.

One point that needs to be made here, and maybe it was evident from the testimony. There is no affirmative case for this legislation. Now I know there is a markup scheduled in July, but why does this bill or any other bill have to be passed at this particular time? I think that it has been made clear today that women are being promoted at rates faster than men, and the combat exemptions are not interfering with career progression. There really is no affirmative case for this legislation.

I hope that Congress will not abdicate its responsibility in this area, and I will conclude with this. There is more that I would like to say.

If Congress gives this power away, I am afraid that they will never be able to get it back. The field, wing, and fleet commanders out in the field will have no say in the process. It is to be made perhaps at a very high level and I would hate to see some commanders out there fighting a future war, having to choose between the safety of their own troops and whether or not their career will be interfered with.

I want to just say one more thing: that I do admire and respect the women in the military. I learned in visiting many military bases as a conscientious member of DACOWITS why so many women value this career, but I am not convinced that women should be in combat. I find that the DACOWITS committee, in particular, discriminates against views that are not in tune with the prevailing ideology.

Yes, members can come to the meetings. Yes, you can be there, but there is never any questioning of the basic agenda. And as a minority member on the committee, it became very clear that I could be there but the agenda was not going to change.

The American people are really not represented on the DACOWITS committee. Certainly, the enlisted women are underrepresented, or given lip-service, because their interests are not being watched out for. This is part of the problem.

The DACOWITS resolution that was mentioned by Ms. Costantino passed with only 3 minutes allowed for a member to speak against it. That is about typical of the way that opposing views are presented on that advisory committee.

[A copy of the resolution follows:]

D A C O W I T S

SPRING 1991
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DISSENTING VIEW TO RECOMMENDATION #1:
REPEAL OF COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUTES

We, the undersigned, believe that it is fitting and appropriate for DACOWITS to assist and advise the Secretary of Defense on policies and matters relating to women in the Services. Likewise we strongly believe women should be given every possible chance for full advancement in the military services. However it constitutes a rush to judgment to recommend the elimination of the combat exclusion laws without the benefit of making a fully informed decision. The recommendation cites the events in the Persian Gulf as support for this action. Yet the bulk of the information available thus far is that which has been provided by the popular press and electronic mass media, which is euphoric and reflective of the great victory achieved in the Middle East.

It is ill-advised and irresponsible for DACOWITS to advise the Secretary of Defense without regard for the evidence of Southwest Asia which will eventually emerge from the actual experience of men and women involved. There are indications from some of the reports that fundamental problems still exist.

The greatest issue related to the repeal of combat exclusion laws and policies, which was not dealt with in any way, has to do with the effect this action may have in the future on the larger universe of women in America. It appears that repeal of the laws and policies would do away with the legal basis for the draft exemption for women, thus obligating all young American women to any future draft and possibly combat services in any future war. This action dramatically effects not only the battle front but the home front.

Eunice Van Winkle Ray

Claude Swafford

Wash Times 30 APR 91

SUZANNE FIELDS

Fraying the fabric of family

Who can forget the soldier in the Desert Storm who carried her baby's photograph on her helmet?

Who can forget the pictures of departing women caressing infants who would have been suckling at their breasts if their Moms hadn't had more important things to do, like driving a truck?

Who can forget the children, whose first words to Mommy were "bye-bye"?

This is national policy that inflicts havoc on our children, destroying the fabric of family, and in another time every man would agree that this is a strange way to fight a war to protect hearth and home. But some people in Washington were trying last week to make sure that young women will be put in harm's way the next time we fight a war.

No jelly bean stuff for Mom.

The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS, in the military jargon), appointed by the secretary of defense (who gives them office space in the Pentagon) to make recommendations to the Pentagon, voted overwhelmingly to repeal the combat exclusion for women.

Most of the DACOWITS military strategists are well-to-do Republican women who have never held a gun and who no doubt earnestly hope they'll never have to. They've listened to hundreds of female officers talk about "glass ceilings," promotions and career opportunities. Now they can recognize a good fighter when they see one. If changing the rules means that someday women who don't want to fight will have to fight anyway, that's just a chance the ladies of DACOWITS are willing to take.

DACOWITS panelists, who talked a lot about "combat readiness," think they've got the Big Mo for equal opportunity misery in wartime, and now they're taking their message to Congress.

A few courageous DACOWITS voices tried to debate the issue, to talk about the implications and consequences for the American family. They wanted hard facts from the Gulf war, not stirring anecdotes.

They wanted to meet the enlisted women who testified before the House Armed Services Committee last year that they didn't want combat.

They wanted to talk about the 10 percent of military women who are pregnant at any given time, the emotional and financial costs of day care for combat mothers in a long war. These skeptics got only three minutes to raise questions. This was considerably less than the time allotted to a woman who complained that sanitary napkins were scarce in the desert, and that it was difficult for women to keep their minds on their jobs when they were thinking about their menstrual cycles.

Unlike men, women risked "humiliation" and "ridicule" if menstrual blood soiled their uniforms, complained Gail Dawson, president of International Forecast and Analysis. "It could hurt their performance."

The subject of differences in physical strength of men and women was studiously ignored, as was discussion of how the armed services, including the academies, have created double standards for physical tests to accommodate women.

The panelists dismissed as irrelevant the impact of what the repeal of the combat exclusion may be on any future draft. A 1981 Supreme Court decision upheld the exemption of women from the draft by reasoning that the draft existed to supply troops for combat. Since women were exempt from combat, they were exempt from the draft. Once this exclusion is removed, it's difficult to see how conscription would not apply to all young women if it applied to all young men.

A powerful argument against women in combat was made by a colonel in the Marines and a Vietnam veteran who, it seems to me, reflects common-sensical reality in the theater of the absurd.

"Why," he asked, "do these women in the service want to trade the best of what it means to be a woman for the worst of what it means to be a man?"

OFFICER TIME-IN-SERVICE (TIS) AT PROMOTION



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TIS AT PROMOTION DURING FY 87



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From: Military Women in the Department of Defense Volume VI, July 1988

Group of fighter pilots opposes having women in the ranks

Your paper presents the issue of women in combat as an incredibly one-sided argument. In essence, all you have done is to fall into the new "politically correct" way of thinking. Never mind any valid reasons as to why women should not be there, inasmuch valid or not, any mention of it would be sexist. This would tend to make simple sarcasm and results in the censorship of some valid arguments against the subject. We in no way intend to single out a gender for the purpose of sexism. Instead, we desire to convey some valid concerns from the people who will be directly affected by this latest push.

When dealing with life or death, equal-opportunity employment is of far less importance. This is why the enlistment law came into existence. It would seem that Congress has forgotten this fact, and certain individuals like Rep. Patricia Schroeder, D-Colo., prompt to and try to exploit our quick victory over a puny foe.

The May 20 editorial ("Edging toward equality") groups for solid ground by referring to the excellent job women did flying tankers and transports in "war zones" (Iraq and Panama). This in no way represents a valid test of their capabilities in combat.

Tankers and transports do not fly through direct hostilities, therefore, your claim that "combat is a test service members of both genders have passed" is invalid.

Schroeder's claim that the performance of women in the gulf merits positions in combat cockpits is like comparing apples and oranges.

We are a group of fighter pilots, and it is our lives that will be directly affected by this decision. We do not question that any person can be taught to fly any aircraft. Flying fighters, however, is not an individual effort, but rather a team effort. There are unspoken contracts and a division of responsibilities between wingmen. Our lives depend on each other's performance.

The bond evolves from the time we spend together. There can be no distinction among us. We have witnessed dissent in our past training that evolved from homosexual/lesbian interaction. While at the Air Force Academy and during our time spent in Air Training Command, all of us agree that this interaction had a deleterious effect on morale.

The cold fact is that men and women will always be treated differently. The real question now is: how will this affect the standards in a fighter for combat squadron? Will they improve, stay the same or go down?

Another argument is the physical strength difference that so many try to dismiss because it is politically correct to believe that gender differences no longer exist. Why is such an educated society as we find it today so apt to close our eyes to the facts of life? There is no question that a woman can fly a fighter during takeoff and landing. Now let's put that fighter in its fourth engagement of a hot'n, at 9 G's with a Mig on the tail, so as to not muddle up the way, shaft and thrust and the bad screaming on the radio to pick he guns and we find ourselves in a completely different scenario.

At 9 G's all the muscle mass in the body is being called upon to pressure blood back into the brain, the neck, which is used to support a 30 pound head without consideration to now maneuvering 270 pounds, and the lungs are still trying to catch up with the previous three engagements. That is just the physical side. The mental side is trying to communicate with head and come up with a split second plan that will mean the difference between life or death.

Are there women who can possibly do it with these physical demands? No question about it. The question is will these unique few be absorbed among the many who apply? Will it be American's best interest served as opposed to the traditional quota system?

Is the public aware that to train a combat-qualified fighter pilot costs approximately $6 million? Is the interest of the nation, these pilots must be ready to go 30 days out of 30 days. Is this equal opportunity enough reason to allow a fighter pilot to be unable to work for approximately a year in order to bring a pregnancy to a successful end?

In addition, an F-16 pilot who has not flown for 180 days must go on temporary duty to attend a formal requalification course. This type of additional training is costly.

The votes that really count are not those of a politician committee far removed from the reality of the pilot but the votes of those who put a pilot in the air.

Paul R. Delmarle
Lt. U.S. USAF

William L. Sparrow
Capt. USAF

Joseph S. Matchette
Lt. U.S. USAF

Bryan P. Bingham
Lt. U.S. USAF

Gary B. Guy
Lt. U.S. USAF

Brian M. Schaal
Capt. U.S.A.F.

Dean K. Osborn
Lt. U.S.A.F.

W. Gary Lee
Capt. U.S.A.F.

Jon W. Walker
Lt. U.S. U.S.A.F.

Boyd I. Bowman
Capt. U.S.A.F.

J.P. Goodwin Jr.
Lt. U.S. U.S.A.F.

Luke AFB, Ariz.

APPENDIX

Following are excerpts from the transcript of proceedings in Civil Action No. 90-0126-R before The Honorable Jackson L. Kiser, Roanoke, Virginia, on April 8, 1991, in United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Roanoke Division. The excerpts are typed exactly as they appear in the testimony.

The witness (A) is Colonel Patrick Allen Toffler, Director, Office of Institutional Research, U.S. Military Academy, West Point.

The cross-examining attorney (Q) is William A. Clineburg, defending the Virginia Military Institute, et. al.

♦ ♦ ♦

Page 528

BY MR. CLINEBURG:

Q There is turnover every year in the cadet corps, correct, Colonel Toffler?

A Yes.

Q And because of that turnover, it's necessary to educate the incoming cadets about these physiological differences, and in your judgment the integration of women has been a success?

A That's right.

Q It's fair to say so far the cadets have not bought your argument?

A No, that's not not fair to say.

Q It's not true that there are studies which show that the male and female cadets at West Point believe that integration has not been a success?

A The current information we have comes from a survey that we do of first classmen just prior to graduation, and that survey indicates that there are substantial portions of the corps, both men and women, who do not view the integration of women as having been fully successful.

Q So, that's a yes answer?

A That's my answer.

Page 537

Q This is a memorandum about cadet perceptions on quotas. Correct?

A That's right.

Q And one of the things it talks about down at the bottom under 2-B is the issue of proportional representation?

A Correct.

Q And it states in there that in an effort to achieve proportional representation, we may well place a lesser but fully qualified cadet ahead of another fully qualified cadet. Correct?

A That's what it says.

Q And this is a memorandum to the superintendent of West Point. Correct?

A It's by the current, by the then chief of staff, Colonel Derring.

Q Over on page two it gives some examples.

Q Some examples of some other impacts of the quota system, correct, specifically under paragraph two about engineer branching. Do you see that?

A Yes, but what quota system are you talking about?

Q Well, let's look at the specific issue that he addresses. I think that will be clear. He indicates in the last sentence of subparagraph two that, "Five of six women who went engineers stood lower in the class than any of their 107 male counterparts."

He says that probably contributes to the cadet perception of bias.

Does that help you with respect to your statement you were unaware of any quota system?

A No, because the Army sent to the Military Academy a set of quotas for each branch that has a gender difference, so there is a set of quotas, if you will, for engineers that are for men and a set of quotas that are for women. And those quotas have got to be met, and so when the women are going for the engineer branch quotas, they are being compared with the performance of women, and the men are going for the men. It has nothing to do with the Military Academy and it has nothing to do with any specific unit.

Q But in the judgement of Colonel Derring., at least, or Deering, excuse me, that may contribute to the perception of cadets, that there is some bias operating. Is that right?

A That's right.

♦ ♦ ♦

) SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH

OCTOBER 30, 1990 * 35¢ DAILY/75¢ SUNDAY

PERSIAN GULF

Women endure desert life

Soldiers rethinking duty on front lines

A MILITARY BASE IN EAST SAUDI ARABIA — Before coming to Saudi Arabia, women of the 360th Transportation Company were concerned about concessions they might have to make in a country where females are restricted in what they do and how they act.

But so far, they've had little exposure to Saudi society. Most of their problems stem not from Islam but from their own military.

Pvt. Geraldine Alsup, a truck driver for the 360th, sometimes wears a scarf over her face in deference to the Islamic belief that women should not be exposed. It's a token gesture to the host country, where women are usually not allowed to drive a car.

"It doesn't bother me; it's just being polite," said Alsup. "Besides, being in the military, I'm used to discrimination."

The frontier conditions, lack of privacy, sexual tension and fear of war have combined to make women soldiers rethink their roles. Some members of

the 360th say the Army hasn't done much to accommodate the needs of female troops serving in Operation Desert Shield. Others question whether women should be here at all.

Sgt. Wendy Thornton is no wimp. She joined the Army five years ago, just out of high school, because she wanted to drive a truck. Now she's at the wheel of a 5-ton tractor-trailer hauling water through the desert.

But even she thinks women's liberation has gone far enough.

"I don't think females should be over here. They can't handle it," she said. "Those feminists back home who say we have a right to fight are not out here sitting in the heat, carrying an M-16 and a gas mask, spending 18 hours on the road every day and sleeping in fear you're gonna get gassed."

Although women have been integrated into the armed forces since the early 1970s, this is the first large-scale deployment of female soldiers to a potential combat zone. As a result, Operation Desert Shield will be watched closely by those who argue that women should have the right to carry arms and fight alongside men.

But the realities of living and working with their male counterparts in a stressful environment has caused some women soldiers to change their attitudes. Some of the women don't see themselves as warriors and resent being sent over here.

Outside field showers are only a few feet from those of the men and provide little privacy. Latrines are four-seaters with panels and screens around them. There is no toilet paper, and the door swings open at the slightest gust of wind.

The military provides laundry service, but there is sometimes a five-day wait. One woman was seen washing her clothes in a trash can filled with water, stomping on them like a winemaker crushing grapes.

The unsanitary conditions have led to health problems for some women in the 360th.

There's also a lack of privacy. The company put males and females in the same tents, instead of having separate women's quarters that are typical of field exercises.

"We planned to put a partition to provide a little privacy," said Capt. Steve Fraunfelter, commander of the 360th.

See WOMEN/A3

Associated Press

Brian Brainerd/photo pool

Pvt. Geraldine Alsup, 19, with the 360th Transportation Company, covers her face in deference to Islamic customs.

Women/Military unaccommodating

From A1

"But we want to preserve the integrity of the platoon, so the women will stay where they are."

For the women, even dressing is a challenge. At first they would trudge through the sand to the latrine 100 yards away. But many complain that it is inconvenient and foul-smelling; they've taken to dressing in the dark or when the men aren't looking.

"I'm kind of used to it. Most of the men know me and don't pay much attention," said Spec. 4 Robin Williams. "But my husband wouldn't like it if he knew."

One thing that does worry her and other women is the sexual tension that has already surfaced.

"If you talk to the guys, it's the only thing on their mind," Williams said. "It gets us a little wound up, 'cause we're the only women around. I just hope it's only talk."

Women at this base are staying in well-lighted areas and not walking alone at night. But the area is relatively secure. There are guards and outside lighting and few isolated areas.

What happens when the company moves to the desert for six months or more?

"It's going to be a mess in the field," said Staff Sgt. Eugenia Edwards. "The Army may try to control it, but things are no different than back on the streets. Everybody needs sex once in a while, and these young soldiers can't get enough of it."

And that need certainly isn't restricted to men. A walk along the beach at night reveals couples in the shadows, lying back in the sand or wrapped in each other's arms.

There are rumors that some female soldiers are selling their favors. One story has a woman supposedly charging $50 for sex and leaving the base after several weeks with $3,000. Whether or not it happened, the story is troublesome to the women because they don't want men to get the wrong impression.

The Army didn't help matters by handing out condoms to the male soldiers before they left Fort Carson, although it's a necessary precaution.

"Who do they think these guys are going to use them with, the ladies in veils?" Williams asked. "That's like telling them it's OK to, you know, do it with us."

The pain of separation from home is rough on everyone, but especially those with husbands and children.

Pvt. April Rolle of the 360th has been apart from her family for five months. She was sent to Saudi Arabia a few weeks after returning from a training course and has not even moved her family from Miami to Colorado Springs.

"This is no place for a mother with two kids. They're the only thing I think about," she said. "I've had no chance to nurture that relationship. All they talk about is dad, and it makes me feel guilty."

The pain is so intense for some women that they have trouble concentrating on their work. Williams could not control her anguish and began sobbing when asked about her two children.

"It's like this: I'm a woman and a mother before I'm a soldier," she said, wiping tears from her eyes. "Out here I think more about my family than my job, and, yes, that could affect my performance if things got intense here."

These emotions are not unique to the women. Male soldiers eat the same food, fight the same heat and sand and wait in the same long lines. They have families, too, and miss them just as much. Nobody wants to be here, and some men resent the complaints by women.

It took us this long to get used to the idea of women in the Army, and now they say they don't want to be here," said a male mechanic for the 360th who asked that his name not be used. "What are we supposed to think?"

One source of irritation among the men is that at least four of the 22 women in their company — some of them single — were confirmed to be pregnant less than six days before being shipped out to Saudi Arabia. Under military regulations, a pregnant woman cannot be deployed, and they were left behind.

"Yes, it happened," said company commander Fraunfelter. "I can't say whether they did it on purpose to get out of this, but they knew we were going for more than a month.

"I hope they want that child, because an 18-year commitment to get out of a six-month assignment is pretty drastic," he said. "I told them that if anyone aborts, they'll be on the next plane over here."

What the women fear, like the men, is war. Army policy bars women from combat units. But there is no such thing as a non-combat zone when chemical weapons are involved, and support units like the 360th are constantly running to the front to deliver supplies.

Earlier this year, Rep. Pat Schroeder, D-Colo., proposed legislation allowing women, who make up about 11 percent of Army troops, to serve in combat roles for a four-year trial. Schroeder argued that the combat exclusion doesn't really keep women out of harm's way but does keep them from promotion in certain areas. The bill, based on a report by a Pentagon advisory board, did not move out of a House subcommittee.

But the debate over women in combat continues. As the reality of combat life slowly sinks in, some women also have made a startling realization about themselves.

"I'd rather be home cooking and cleaning, all those things I've been complaining about for 26 years," Rolle said. "People say we need to prove ourselves, but we shouldn't have to do it this way. It's too risky."

Added Williams: "If this is a test, I'm gonna fail. A lot of other women are, too, and I guess we're just going to have to accept that."

Gazette Telegraph reporter Genevieve Henderson is a member of the media pool covering Fort Carson troop activity in the Persian Gulf.

Mrs. DONNELLY. We are hearing arguments that the American people are ready for women in combat because there were some casualties. Well, this is a very curious argument. I do not think the American people are going to accept more casualties in time of war because of bad policy decisions made at any level, within in the Congress or in the Pentagon.

I agree with General Schwarzkopf that this is a national defense issue. It is not a women's rights issue, and I hope that as more information is sorted out that everyone will look at all the ramifications of this sweeping legislation. If we do not have all the facts, and we know from Mr. Jehn's reluctance to say when they are going to be available, why should such radical change be rushed into? There is no affirmative case for it.

I think we have to look at the central question. It involves national defense and our children. If we are not fighting for our country and our children, then just whom are we fighting for?

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Donnelly follows:]

STATEMENT OF ELAINE DONNELLY

FORMER MEMBER OF THE DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE SERVICES (DACOWITS)

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. Although I am a former member of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, (1984-1986) my statement does not reflect the official position of the DACOWITS, which has long favored repeal of women's exemptions from draft registration and combat duty in a future war. (40th Anniversary booklet, February 1991, p. 9)

Supporters of the Coalition for Military Readiness, an informal network of pro-family and pro-defense groups, are concerned about a wide range of issues, including sociological and family problems which were all too apparent during the recent Gulf War. We are also concerned about the diversion of defense budget funds from advanced military systems, including SDI, needed for true readiness into the next century. As you know, the Defense Budget Authorization bill that you are considering has sections that relate to both concerns.

Civilians and military people alike were astonished to learn that on May 8, the House Armed Services Sub-Committee approved Rep. Patricia Schroeder's surprise amendment to begin the phased repeal of laws and regulations exempting women from combat duty, starting with Air Force and Navy/Marine aircraft on combat missions. The voice vote was taken late in the evening behind closed doors, without advance notice or public hearings, and without a legislative history that would suggest limits to its scope.

With breathtaking speed, and for no compelling reason, the House rushed to abdicate a crucial element of Congress' responsibility to set policy for the military. By handing over enormous power to the Pentagon officials, who are unelected and inaccessible to the American people, the House signaled that henceforth, average citizens, including women, will be shut out of the decision-making process when it comes to women and families in the military.

We have been told that we will have no say on the question of whether our daughters will be equally subject to registration for the draft, or whether women and mothers should be used in close combat jobs in future wars.

The views of enlisted women, who would suffer the worst consequences of this move to put women in combat, have also been ignored in this rush to legislate. All of this is being done before there has been sufficient time to analyze what happened in the Persian Gulf War.

Instead, the narrow interests of a small group of ambitious female officers--some of whom feel they have an inherent right to be members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--are being vigorously promoted by the tax-funded, non-accountable Pentagon insider group known as the DACOWITS.

Given the DACOWITS' paramount concern for promoting the issue we are discussing today, I would like to comment on my observations and experiences as a former member of this influential advisory committee. Before doing so, however, I will direct my remarks to the issue at hand.

Why the Schroeder Amendment Should Be Defeated

As was the case with the Equal Rights Amendment, which was rejected by the states after many years of debate, the Schroeder amendment is deceptively simple. Billed as permissive legislation which would "allow" women to fly Air Force and Navy/Marine aircraft engaged in combat missions, the Amendment would actually mandate a radical departure in military policy which has never been successfully attempted anywhere else in the world in modern history.

The following are reasons why I believe that passage of the Schroeder amendment would be harmful to men, women, children and national defense as a whole:

1) Repeal of Combat Exemptions Would be Mandatory, Not Optional

A. The "choice" to fly combat missions would not be made by individual female pilots, but by Defense Department and military authorities who are obliged to carry out orders.

-- Assistant Defense Secretary Christopher Jehn has already said that if the law is changed, the Pentagon will be "obligated" to use it (Navy Times, 3 June 1991).

-- For political and career reasons, field/wing/fleet commanders would have little or no opportunity to disagree, once policies have been set by the Pentagon authorities.

B. In an actual war, there is no such thing as "optional" combat duty for personnel assigned to combat jobs. Just as volunteers had no "choice" in the matter of deployment to Saudi Arabia, women who don't wish to participate in combat will have no more "choice" than the men. Any plan to put women in combat positions, but then excuse them once a war begins, would be totally unworkable.

2) Repeal of Combat Exemptions Could Not Be Limited to Air Force and Navy/Marine Fliers Alone

A. Navy combat aircraft must land on aircraft carriers which would, in turn, have to be opened up to women flying combat aircraft. Smaller vessels, such as frigates, destroyers and submarines would also have to be opened to women, together with Marine amphibious craft and forces which are governed by Navy law.

B. Once Air Force and Navy female aviators are training for combat missions, pressures to repeal existing regulations regarding Army combat aircraft would be irresistible. In recent years the DACOWITS and like-minded Pentagon officials have been particularly militant and successful in eliminating "inconsistencies" between the services.

C. If female officers are flying combat aircraft, ground combat positions for enlisted women would have to be opened up as well. The Army, Navy and Marines would have no legal basis to exempt women from close combat positions in wartime, including artillery or infantry duty in foxholes, tanks and amphibious landing craft.

3) Repeal of Combat Exemptions Would Lead to Registration for the Draft and Combat Duty on an Equal Basis

A. In its 1981 Rostker v. Goldberg decision the Supreme Court upheld young women's exemption from the draft against an ACLU challenge, tying it firmly to women's legal exemption from combat duty. But if combat restrictions are repealed and the ACLU challenges the issue again, Rostker would likely be reversed. Young women would then be equally subject to all Selective Service obligations, including combat duty in a future war (Rostker v. Goldberg, 25 June 1981).

B. It is significant to note that Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who is a former member of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, expressed warm and continuing support for the DACOWITS' activities and agenda at their recent 40th anniversary dinner.

4) Dual Standards Cause Concern About Qualifications

A. Testimony presented in a recent trial of the Virginia Military Institute's right to remain all-male, with regard to policies in effect at West Point, proved that controversial "dual standards" are being used to promote affirmative action for women at the service academies.

-- As I saw myself in visits to West Point and Quantico Marine base, "gender-norming" systems call for the routine "adjustment" of physical test scores so that women can graduate without meeting the same standards as the men. Even though it is obvious that women are given more time to perform less demanding tasks, briefers continue to insist that "women are doing the same things as the men."

-- If similar "gender-norming" techniques are used to pad the performance scores of would-be female fighter pilots, in order to promote affirmative action goals similar to those used at the service academies, the lives of both men and women, not to mention expensive aircraft, may be put at risk (Transcript of VMI trial, as excerpted by Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 836, June 14, 1991, p. 14).

B. The 1982 Women in the Army (WITA) project was designed to be a credible plan for the testing of individual soldiers' strength and stamina, combined with systematic ratings to determine the physical demands of all Army jobs, ranging from light to very heavy. The object of the WITA study was to accomplish what most proponents of combat exemption repeal said they wanted--gender-neutral tests to ensure that all personnel would be qualified for their assignments.

Unfortunately, in 1983 the Army yielded to political pressures from the DACOWITS, which complained that the physical tests were inherently unfair to women who were less likely to pass. The Army's battery of physical tests (known by the acronym MEPSCAT) were therefore reduced to nothing more than a "recruiting guidance" tool, rather than true qualifying standards like those used in Canada.

-- The Canadian military tried hard (with a $500,000 advertising campaign in the late 1980s) to recruit women for infantry jobs. (Southam News, Ottawa, 27 October 1987). They did

not, however, "adjust" physical training and qualifications standards to accommodate women.

-- According to figures from the Canadian Defence Ministry, over a period of four years, of 102 women who enlisted in infantry training, only one graduated. That woman served her three-year mandatory term and then left the army (Heritage, p. 11). Women who did not meet the qualifications for combat jobs were assigned to other occupations.

-- The Canadian policy of keeping training standards high contrasts with that of the United States Army, which allows women to claim jobs that are known to be beyond their physical strength. Many of the Schroeder proponents who insist that only "qualified" women should be in combat jobs are the same ones who attacked the objective standards proposed by the WITA study. The problem is that "gender-norming" policies have already destroyed the meaning of the word "qualified" in the American Army.

C. In the same way, Navy aviation policies have been influenced by political pressures from the DACOWITS.

-- When the Navy attempted in the mid-1980s to change its anthropometric standards for safety reasons--because taller pilots with longer limbs can control the aircraft better and, if necessary, eject with fewer injuries--the DACOWITS complained that the revisions were unfair to three-quarters of the women. The Navy eventually backed down for the sake of "equal opportunity" in peacetime. At the time there was little reason to believe that women might actually fly fighter aircraft. The policy could prove dangerous, however, if women fly combat aircraft in time of war.

D. No one knows how women would measure up in aggressive "kill or be killed" aerial dogfights. One female pilot who was being trained to fly the F-16 for the Netherlands did not qualify for physical reasons (Testimony, House Armed Services Military Personnel & Compensation Sub-Committee, 20 March 1990: 69).

5) Combat Positions Would Not Be for Peacetime Only

A. Some have suggested that Schroeder's amendment would only result in women flying high-performance combat aircraft for training, test-pilot, or domestic defense purposes only. There is no language or legislative history to support this assumption.

B. Furthermore, it would be economically indefensible to adopt such a policy. According to the Air Force, in answer to an inquiry from the DACOWITS, training costs for pilots, excluding undergraduate training, range from $120,000 in the AC-130 to $1,578,000 in the F-111D.

6) Sociological Problems Must Be Resolved First

A. Instead of rushing to put women into combat, Congress must do something about the problem of mothers, single parents, and dual-service couples leaving their children behind on their way to war.

-- The spectacle of helmeted mothers kissing tiny babies and young children good-bye at armory gates traumatized the nation during the recent Gulf War. According to a February 1991 poll quoted by the Associated Press, 64 percent of respondents said they felt it was unacceptable for the United States to deploy women with young children to a war zone.

-- The feminist theory that women and men are exactly alike, and that it makes no difference who does the mothering and who does the soldiering, was put to the ultimate test by the Pentagon in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. But the massive and unprecedented wartime social experiment failed because children don't conform with feminist theories. A number of psychologists reported evidence of severe grief and depression among children left behind, especially those of single parents and dual service parents who were shipped out at the same time.

B. In addition, there were many reports of heightened pregnancy rates before and during mobilization to the Gulf War.

-- Rep. Robert K. Dornan (R-CA) recently said on the House floor that according to CENTCOM officials, over 1,200 women were evacuated home from the Persian Gulf theater during Operations Desert Shield/Storm. This figure, however, has been closely guarded; Pentagon officials become extremely defensive whenever the subject comes up.

-- News reports of pregnancies at sea, including 36 reported aboard the U.S.S. Acadia during its 7-month tour to the Persian Gulf, cannot be dismissed by comparisons with civilian pregnancy rates. Civilian workers are easily replaceable when they become pregnant, but when women are evacuated from Navy ships or ground units due to pregnancy, their units must deploy short-handed. Ten to 15 percent of military women become pregnant each year-- a situation which affects both readiness and morale.

C. Persistent reports of fraternization, improper conduct, harassment and problems related to lack of privacy in desert tents must also be investigated fully and honestly before moving to integrate women in fighter squadrons, Navy ships and ground/amphibious combat units.

7) Costs of Implementation Cannot Be Ignored

A. The cost of re-configuring Navy ships to accommodate enlisted women in cramped quarters could be enormous.

B. In addition, the impact of co-ed crews on family morale cannot be ignored, because higher attrition rates increase personnel costs.

C. Million dollar training costs for female combat pilots are another factor to be considered, in light of expected averages in pregnancy and attrition rates.

D. Current 50-50 child care subsidies from the Defense Department, primarily for pay increases for institutional child care workers, work to encourage single parenthood in the military. Virtually nothing is being done for children who will be left behind by parents being deployed to fight the next war.

not cloud our judgment, or cause the Congress to act prematurely.

-- It is ludicrous to suggest, as so many Schroeder advocates do, that virtually nothing went wrong during the largest mobilization of military women in our history.

-- The American people are entitled to know the facts before any decision is made about women in combat. It is patronizing and insulting to women to suggest that Congress should act first, and then deal with the facts later. This issue should be legislated with no less care than is customary with far less important issues.

B. Schroeder's hasty, irresponsible, and costly amendment would be virtually irrevocable if enacted into law. The lives of both male and female soldiers, plus our national defense interests as a nation, must not be sacrificed for the sake of social experimentation.

An Alternative Agenda for Congress

Instead of rushing to put women in combat positions, the Senate should delete the Schroeder Amendment from the Defense Budget Authorization bill, and then keep it out of the Conference Report. After disposing of Schroeder's amendment and similar legislation, the Defense Department should do everything it can to gather and evaluate first-hand reports on everything that went on in the Gulf War that related to the first large-scale mobilization of women to a war zone.

At the same time, Congress should re-evaluate and reverse the liberal recruitment and retention policies that caused so many obvious problems during the Gulf War. For example:

1. Military commanders are better equipped to make battle damage assessments than family damage assessments. Nevertheless, the obvious damage done to families and young children during the last war cannot be forgotten or swept under the rug. Long-term steps must be taken to resolve the problem before the next war begins.

   Wartime exemptions for single and dual-service parents won't work; nor will 50-50 child care subsidies and pay increases for institutional child care workers--the only proposals discussed at the recent Spring DACOWITS meeting. Institutional care will not solve the problem of young children being psychologically damaged by long-term separation from their mothers.

   The military should consider making a phased return to the pre-1976 policy of honorably discharging mothers and single parents with custody of minor children. (The policy was changed because the Carter Administration refused to challenge a lower court ruling favoring pregnant servicewomen.)

8) There Is No Affirmative Case or Genuine Support for the Schroeder Amendment

A. The push for Schroeder's amendment comes primarily from a small number of ambitious female officers who claim that combat exemptions interfere with career progression. But Pentagon statistical tables clearly show that female officers

and enlisted personnel in all branches of the service are being promoted at faster rates than men. (See charts attached excerpted from the Defense Department publication Military Women in the Department of Defense, Volume VI, July 1988.)

B. Female officers who aspire to be four-star generals have no right to achieve their ambition by means of affirmative action, at the expense of enlisted women who will have to pay the price in time of war.

C. There is an abundance of evidence that enlisted women do not want to be forced into combat positions, including public and confidential testimony heard by members of the House Armed Services Committee in the aftermath of the Panama invasion (Hearings, March 1990). According to a 1988 Defense Department Report, enlisted women are avoiding thousands of "non-traditional" jobs that are already open to them in all branches of service (David J. Armor, Chairman, January 1988.)

9) Congress Must Not Abdicate Its Responsibility to Set Policy

A. Civilian control of the military is a sound and time-honored principle. If Congress abdicates this authority, it will be virtually impossible to get it back. It would be the height of irresponsibility if--for less than convincing reasons--Congress passes the buck to inaccessible Pentagon officials, or those who must carry out their orders without dissent.

B. Military personnel at all levels who do not enforce "equal opportunity" policies of the Defense Department are subject to severe career penalties. Field, wing and fleet commanders should not be put in an untenable position, in which they might be forced to choose between their own careers and the safety or readiness of their troops.

C. If Congress abdicates its responsibility in this important area of policy, the American people will be shut out; with virtually no way to influence future Pentagon policies affecting women and families in the military.

10) Congress Should Not Rush to Legislate Radical Changes Before All the Facts Are In

A. Peacetime euphoria in the wake of the successful Gulf War, combined with pride in our male and female soldiers, must not cloud our judgment, or cause the Congress to act prematurely.

-- It is ludicrous to suggest, as so many Schroeder advocates do, that virtually nothing went wrong during the largest mobilization of military women in our history.

-- The American people are entitled to know the facts before any decision is made about women in combat. It is patronizing and insulting to women to suggest that Congress should act first, and then deal with the facts later. This issue should be legislated with no less care than is customary with far less important issues.

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   The military should consider making a phased return to the pre-1976 policy of honorably discharging mothers and single parents with custody of minor children. (The policy was changed because the Carter Administration refused to challenge a lower court ruling favoring pregnant servicewomen.)

   Exceptions might be made for veterans with at least 10 years of service--most of whom have older children instead of infants--but it must be remembered that the military is there to defend the country; it doesn't owe a job to anyone.

2. The Defense Department should review the troubling legacy of dual standards at the service academies, and revisit the 1983 Army decision to use physical tests as recruiting guidance tools rather than true qualifying standards. Current dual standards allow and even encourage women to take non-traditional jobs that are known to be beyond their physical strength.

   Affirmative action policies that depend on gender-norming of test scores may be contributing to the chronic problem of sexual harassment, which the services seem unable to eradicate.

   (It is interesting to note that according to a 1989 letter from Canadian Defence Minister Bill McKnight, incidents of sexual harassment in Canada are rare. As explained above, that country does not use dual standards to accommodate women in their training programs.)

3. Instead of working so hard to recruit women by promising them more than the military can possibly deliver, the volunteer forces ought to re-evaluate and change their advertising and recruiting strategies to appeal to young single men who are most likely to be, as the job requires, "deployable worldwide on short notice."

   It was embarrassing for this country to see young mothers being torn from their children during the last war, while healthy young men strode around in Desert Storm t-shirts. Anyone can be trained to drive a Hum-Vee, but a child has only one mother.

4. Something must be done to preserve some measure of privacy between service men and women, to the same degree that usually is the case in the civilian workforce. A number of feminist observers criticized Arab customs that are demeaning to women by western standards, but the practice of quartering women in tents with men is also contrary to American cultural values.

   Sociological problems such as fraternization, sexual harassment, or rape are not improved by policies that don't account for human frailties and sexual differences between men and women.

5. In view of family-related problems that were so obvious during the Gulf War, and in view of budget and personnel cutbacks, it doesn't make sense to continue the pressure for recruiting quotas for female soldiers. Numbers of women should be allowed to find their own level, and the armed services should stop promising more in the way of social and career benefits than they can possibly deliver.

6. Finally, the Pentagon should consider abolishing the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, the powerful political force which promotes the interests of female officers more than anything else. The first word in the Committee's name is "Defense," but as a former Chairman told the Charlotte Observer, "The Committee's major concern is career opportunities for women" (27 November 1989).

   Official attempts to appease the Committee have resulted in recruiting quotas, relaxed physical standards, peculiar, unrealistic family policies, and incremental policy changes that have defied the clear intent of Congress by shrinking the definition of "combat" almost to the vanishing point.

I would like to point out that I was a conscientious, active member of the DACOWITS. I attended all meetings and most briefings, visited many military bases on my own, and wrote many inquiries and recommendations that did not relate to the combat issue. I came to respect and admire the dedicated, patriotic women serving in all branches of the service, and to understand why so many women are drawn to military life in the volunteer armed services.

Still, I remain unconvinced that women should be required to serve in direct combat roles--the few military occupational specialties (MOS) which are still closed to women. The reason is that women do not have an equal opportunity to survive, or to help their fellow soldiers survive, in a true combat environment during time of war.

The military is more than an equal opportunity employer, its purpose is to defend the country. I see this as a national defense

issue, not a women's rights issue, and my definition of women's rights is considerably different from civilian women who are pushing for other women to go into combat.

I agree with General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who recently told this Committee that decisions on what roles women should play in war must be based on military standards, not women's rights (AP report, 12 June 1991).

During my term I found that the DACOWITS does not present opposing views on the combat issue, nor does the Committee tolerate dissent very well. Military advisors who told me in private of their strong reservations about the Committee's actions were clearly not free to diverge from "politically correct" opinions and the DACOWITS' feminist agenda--primarily because doing so would put their careers at risk.

My recently completed monograph entitled Politics and the Pentagon--the Role of Women in the Military, written for academic credit, analyzes the political power and agenda of the DACOWITS. Among other things, the monograph describes how "political correctness" is enforced throughout the entire military establishment when legitimate questions are raised about women in the military. To an amazing degree, both disapproval of dissent and praise for acquiescence are used to influence members and Pentagon officials on far-reaching policy matters.

The DACOWITS is a persistent and diligent advisory committee, familiar with military jargon and adept at playing insider politics at the Pentagon. It is accustomed to being catered to and entertained by high-level officials in all branches of the service.

Military personnel assigned to work with the DACOWITS try very hard to say what the Committee wants to hear; virtually no one questions its basic assumptions or legislative agenda. This is why it is that only the existing combat exemptions stand between current Pentagon policies--which have already been stretched too far--and total capitulation to feminist demands.

The DACOWITS is focused and determined, but it most definitely does not represent the views of women in general, or even the views of all women serving in the military today. After several months of research and reflection I have come to the conclusion that although the Committee has undoubtedly done some good things for women over the past 40 years, its main flaw is its inability to recognize that some of its well-meaning recommendations have harmed women more than helped them.

At the recent 40th anniversary Spring meeting, during which a resolution was passed calling for repeal of the combat exemptions, only three minutes were allowed for the expression of an opposing view by one of the current members. That resolution has served to begin an illusion of momentum for repeal of combat exemptions--part of a sophisticated campaign that is obviously designed to exploit feelings of euphoria in the aftermath of the successful Gulf War.

Pride in our returning soldiers is certainly justified, but it cannot excuse the passage of irresponsible, hasty and virtually irreversible legislation which could do great harm to women, men, children and our national defense effort as a whole.

Proponents of the Schroeder amendment seem to be basing their case on the curious argument that the American people are now ready to accept female casualties during time of war. But the American

people will not stand for more injuries and deaths among soldiers of either sex because of social experimentation in the military, achieved with policies that are dangerous and unwise.

The American people applaud the men and women who served in the Gulf War, but we are not likely to forget the awful toll on the children who were left behind.

As complete information becomes more readily available, and we sort out the experiences of men, women and families during that war, people are likely to return to a central question that must be faced before the next war begins: If we are not fighting for our country--and our children--then whom are we fighting for?

* * * * *

PARTIAL LISTING OF ORGANIZATIONS

SUPPORTING THE COALITION FOR MILITARY READINESS

In Alphabetical Order -- Names for Identification Purposes Only

American Conservative Union
David Keene, President

American Defense Lobby
Michael W. Thompson, Chairman

American Defense Institute
Capt. Eugene B. "Red" McDaniel USN (Ret.) President

Center for the Military and Society
Brian Mitchell, President

Concerned Women for America
Beverly LaHaye, President

CNP Action, Inc.
Art Kelly, Vice President

Coalitions for America
Paul Weyrich, National Chairman

Eagle Forum
Phyllis Schlafly, President

Family Research Council
Gary Bauer, President

Freedom Alliance
Ben Hart, Executive Director

High Frontier, Inc.
Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.), Director

Senator GLENN. Thank you. General Barrow, we thank you for your patience in being with us and sitting through all the hearing this morning. We appreciate your being here.

General BARROW. Thank you, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Could I join in welcoming this distinguished American? I had the privilege of working with him when I was in the Department of the Navy, and I watched him move through the senior ranks of the Marine Corps, which movement was predicated solely on accomplishment and merit and capability.

We are fortunate to have him for many reasons. He was awarded the Nation's second-highest recognition for valor under combat conditions. You speak from a solid base of experience.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT H. BARROW, USMC (RET) FORMER COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General BARROW. You are most kind, sir. For a moment I thought I had perhaps been rendered irrelevant, with some of this testimony. I will try to be brief and to the point.

This is not nor should it be about women's rights, equal opportunity or career assignments for enhancement purposes for selection to higher rank. It is most assuredly about combat effectiveness, combat readiness, winning the next conflict, and so we are talking about national security.

Those who advocate change have some strange arguments, one of which is that there is a de facto women in combat situation already, that women have been shot at, that they have heard gunfire, that they have been in areas where they could have been hit with missiles. But exposure to danger is not combat, combat is a lot more than that. It is a lot more than getting shot at or even getting killed by being shot at. Combat is finding and closing with and killing or capturing the enemy. It is killing, that is what it is.

And it is done in an environment that is often as difficult as you can possibly imagine—extremes of climate, brutality, deaths, dying. It is uncivilized, and women cannot do it. Nor should they be even thought of as doing it. The requirements for strength and endurance renders them unable to do it.

And I may be old fashioned, but I think the very nature of women disqualifies them from doing it. Women give life, sustain life, nurture life, they do not take it.

I just cannot imagine why we are engaged in this debate about even the possibility of pushing women into the combat part of our profession. The most harm that could come would probably come to what it would do to the men in that kind of situation.

I know in some circles it is very popular to ridicule something called male bonding, but it is real, and one has to have experienced it to understand it. It does not lend itself to easy explanation.

It is cohesiveness. I heard some of those words this morning; it is cohesiveness. It is mutual respect and admiration. It is one for all and all for one. It is believing as a unit that no one else could do what this unit is being asked to do.

Perhaps Shakespeare said it best of all: "We few, we precious few, we band of brothers." For that is what it is, and that would be shattered, that would be destroyed. If you want to make a combat

unit ineffective, assign some women to it. It is a destructive proposition, and the thing that puzzles me about this, there is no military requirement for it. There is no military need to put women in combat. We have all the men we need for those requirements.

Male bonding is not peculiar to people down at, say, the infantry level. There has been a lot of comments here about combat flying. Male bonding flourishes there. Fighter squadrons, attack squadrons, those men—if they have nothing else in common, it is the belief that they and they alone are able to do what they have been asked to do. And that is male bonding. And we want to play around with this sort of thing, and perhaps do away with it.

And who would be called on to pick up the rifle and do these things in the ground combat area? The ones who do not want to do it, as well as the ones who are not qualified, the young women soldiers and women Marines.

I know them well. Our women Marines serve with great skill. They have a special spirit about them. Indeed they are creme de la creme. I have never met one who wanted to be an infantryman. Then who wants them to be an infantryman? The hard-line feminists do, that is who wants them to be an infantryman. They have their agenda and it does not have anything to do with national security. They are willing to put our daughters at risk.

The other attendant problems to being in a combat situation—sexual harassment, fraternization, favoritism, resentment, male backlash, all of these things—would be insurmountable for anyone to deal with. Who would deal with it? Not some faceless political appointee over there in the Pentagon, but the corporals and the sergeants and the lieutenants and the captains would have to maintain good order and discipline and also fight the war.

It does not work. It would not work, and so that moves me to say this: Please, Congress of the United States, you keep this responsibility. You draw the line. Do not pass it to DOD. Do not pass it to the executive branch, because they come and go.

You have some continuity and you would put it in law. They put it in policy. The policy can change at a whim. Now we all believe in civilian control of the military, but sometimes that authority is abusive and coercive, and exercised quietly. You do not necessarily know about it.

People in the civilian hierarchy of the Pentagon often compel the military to do things not because it is the right thing but because they can be made to do it.

Now I heard Senator Cohen this morning say, we should not be—you, in the Congress—micromanaging. If you gave this authority to the Secretary of Defense, it would not be but a short couple of years and you would be very much into micromanaging. It might be:

"Mr. Secretary, what is this we hear about you are going to put women in the Navy SEAL teams", or whatever. They change the policy to fit the pressure.

Congress has the responsibility and it is the best place for the line to be drawn. The line should be determined by you, established in law. There is not a lot of mystery about where the line should be. It may be exactly where it is now, although part by law and part by policy.

And if you look at it and have any doubts about it, move it back. Do not move it forward.

I do worry about the draft. I do not know if C-SPAN is picking this up or not; hope they are. We have heard enough about the draft today, to excite the parents. Maybe you will get more mail, Senator. I hope you do.

I believe that if this thing persists, that the logical conclusion is that somewhere down the road women would not only register for it, but if we had a draft, they would be compelled to serve, and yes, they could end up in the infantry.

I reflected last night at some length about places I have been, things I have done in my 41 years in the Marine Corps and three wars.

Senator WARNER. And I think, General, you should put aside modesty and put in the record today the exact combat situations and the period that you served in them.

General BARROW. Well, I was in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, command in all three. And I found nowhere in my mental exploration, any place for women to be down in the ground combat element.

Indeed, I went so far as to reflect on one campaign in particular, the Chosin Reservoir, 40 years ago, November and December 1950, in North Korea, probably one of the greatest epics of all times. The 1st Marine Division confronted eight Chinese divisions spread out over a long 35- to 40-mile linear disposition, north-south, in extreme cold, minus 25. Winds out of Siberia bringing the wind chill factor down to God knows what.

Mountains, constant attacking—they attacking us; we attacking them—for days, night and day. Death all about; frostbite, inadequate clothing. I said, suppose we had 15 percent women, 20 percent women?

My supposing led me to say I would not be here. I guess, Kim Il Sung would be taking care of my bones, along with everybody else's in North Korea.

I know about my service. If women were placed in combat units in the Marine Corps it would destroy the Marine Corps, something no enemy has been able to do in over 200 years.

So my recommendation is to make the law clear and unambiguous. Do not let it be policy. Draw the line where it would be clear and unambiguous.

And that is about all I have to say, sir.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, General.

Ms. Costantino, what would be your policy or what have you recommended to the Secretary of Defense as to where to draw the line on this? Would there be any restrictions at all?

Would all the positions down into every level of combat be open to women, is that what you have recommended?

Ms. COSTANTINO. No, sir, that is not our recommendation.

Senator GLENN. What is the recommendation?

Ms. COSTANTINO. Our recommendation is for the repeal of 6015 and 8549, which prevent women from serving on certain aircraft and vessels. Army is already setting their own policy on where they think women should serve.

Senator GLENN. And that is not restricted in law, right now. That is just a policy.

Ms. COSTANTINO. And we would assume that if the laws were changed that the Secretary of Defense would do a detailed analysis of all of the positions in the military, in the different branches, and based on combat readiness and the quality of the service, would make any decisions as to opening new positions or not. And I have every confidence that that kind of analysis would, in fact, open a lot of positions for women.

Senator GLENN. Has DACOWITS debated this, or deliberated on this, since the House passed its provision?

Ms. COSTANTINO. Our spring conference was April 24th, so I believe the House passed their decision after that.

Senator GLENN. Yes. Did you take into account different physiological, sociological studies or analyses as part of your analysis?

Ms. COSTANTINO. Yes, sir, we have and we are not expecting that they would lower standards in order to allow women to be able to get into positions. We think that there should be a standard to get a job done, and if women can meet that standard then they should be allowed to have a chance at it.

Senator GLENN. Have you made these recommendations now to the Secretary of Defense?

Ms. COSTANTINO. Our recommendation to the Secretary is solely that he support repeal of combat exclusion, this particular recommendation. We did make a recommendation 2 years ago that asked for a 4-year test program through the Army with the idea in mind that it would develop the data that they spoke of earlier, the fact that they cannot get the data without putting women into those positions, so they do not know if they could serve. And that was why we had suggested a 4-year test program—so that the information could be gathered and we could see, once and for all, if women were capable of serving in those positions.

We had directed that to the Army because they were not covered by law and would have been able to institute such a test. The Navy or the Air Force, of course, could not do that without the laws being repealed.

Senator GLENN. Ms. Sagawa, would the organizations that you represent advocate equal responsibility and risk by requiring women to register for the draft and be called up on the same basis as men?

Ms. SAGAWA. I have not talked to every organization that I am speaking on behalf of on that subject specifically, but I believe that it would be appropriate that women be treated equally with respect to the draft. I am sure that there are many men who would not care to be drafted and there are many women who would not care to be drafted.

Senator GLENN. You would recommend that we include women in the registration that we have now.

Ms. SAGAWA. That is right. I believe that the military needs the women of this country and that in the event of a conflict, that the women of this country would be prepared to serve the country.

Senator GLENN. Do you see this mainly as an equal opportunity for women, or have you also weighed this off against the combat

requirements that I spoke about earlier and that General Barrow has spoken so eloquently about today?

Ms. SAGAWA. I have tried to give it very careful consideration because I do not think we would want to see the military just open the door, have everybody run in whether they are qualified or not. Yes, you cannot have equal opportunity unless you are looking at equal qualifications and ability to do a job, and so, yes, I think it is tremendously important that we consider military effectiveness and equal opportunity and see how they work together. I do not think these two ideas are inconsistent at all.

Senator GLENN. The court has held in at least one past case, that this area of equality of opportunity does not extend to the military. It has to be defined by Congress and the Pentagon. Do you accept that, or do you contest that?

Ms. SAGAWA. Well, I think that the highest authority for that is the Constitution, and that has been interpreted in various ways. But I believe that Congress does have a responsibility with respect to equal opportunity and that the Department of Defense does, as well.

Senator GLENN. The Constitution is what they ruled on, though, and said that this was never intended to mean that the military could not set the requirements for who should go into combat or what the most effective combat force composition should be.

Ms. SAGAWA. Are you speaking of the *Rostker* case?

Senator GLENN. I believe that was the case, yes.

Ms. SAGAWA. I think that the military does have the responsibility to set combat requirements and if the military should find that there are certain positions within a combat unit that women cannot do for some reason, then that would be a reason to consider not involving them. But if it is simply because they are women and not because they are not able to do the job, that would not be appropriate.

Senator GLENN. Ms. Donnelly, you have done some research in these areas. Have you come across evidence that women cannot perform satisfactorily in combat flying jobs or ground combat jobs?

Mrs. DONNELLY. Well, there were a number of tests done that were constantly referred to at DACOWITS meetings as evidence that women were performing in wonderful, phenomenal ways. This is a monograph that I wrote, called *Politics and the Pentagon: The Role of Women in the Military.*

It describes, for instance, an artillery study that was done in which women were said to do well, but the women were only shooting from a fixed position. They did not have to move the ammunition and the guns and go from place to place the way the men did, and so—as so often happens with DACOWITS policies—they will say, see, women are doing the same thing as the men, they are shooting the guns. But they leave out the fact that the circumstances under which they were doing the job were not at all the same.

Moving ammunition crates that are empty, compared to men moving those that are full, is not the same thing. And, yet, I can give you dozens of examples—they are in this monograph—where test results are burnished and polished and made to sound like

something absolutely phenomenal, when really the circumstances are not the same.

Senator GLENN. Yes. General Barrow, I will read this from a list of prepared questions we had worked out earlier here and I think the first part of this question is not necessary.

It says: General Barrow, as a combat veteran and Former Commandant of the Marine Corps, how do you feel about the assignment of women in combat positions. I think I will eliminate that one. You need not reply.

But I would carry on with another part of this, and that is, where would you draw the line? Right now, we have women permitted in most of the services, completely in combat support, combat service support. These are the Reserves, also. And those are, by and large, functions or areas of responsibility that do not require as much, as you talked about, the male bonding, the unit cohesiveness, the reason you have boot camp to sort of make people's responsibilities more to the unit than they are afraid of getting hurt themselves. That type of thing.

Where would you place the limits, if you were doing it?

General BARROW. I am not too sure that they are not perhaps appropriately placed now. I have not followed it that closely, the precision of it, but any time someone looks at it and has doubts, do not push it toward the direction of combat. Push it away from it. And if there is debate, move it that way.

I would assume that where the line is should be revisited every 4 or 5 years to determine adherence. I think that we are probably in the general area of correctness at this time.

Senator GLENN. Ms. Costantino, how would you handle this issue of children? Because that is one that keeps coming up, time after time, and it is a very real one. If you assign people in the specific combat units, ground combat units, where this cohesion is necessary and then at a critical time that person has to leave and has a child. They are out for 6 months, or whatever it is. In a combat support or combat service support role, perhaps that is not as critical.

How do you handle that if you are going to put people in the combat positions? Is that a factor to be considered?

Ms. COSTANTINO. I think it is a factor to be considered, but I do not think that it is necessarily true it would not be as critical in a service support or a combat support role. Pregnancy is an issue in the military now and it has been as long as women have been admitted into the military.

It is not as much of an issue as the media has made it appear to be. I know that the Navy has done some studies on lost time on the job due to pregnancy, and have found that, in fact, total lost time for women, including pregnancy, is less than lost time for men due to injuries or other reasons.

I think pregnancy is going to be a concern.

Senator GLENN. What I am concerned about is not so much time off the job or whether you are putting in a 40-hour week in the military or not, it is that you have a certain unit cohesiveness that is built up. It is for real, and it is not a joke.

Ms. COSTANTINO. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. And General Barrow was correct in that, and it is in squadrons and it is in ground units. Those that are engaged in direct, actual combat have that cohesiveness and that is the reason they are able to do their job. If you start breaking up those teams at a critical time, you do reduce combat readiness or combat effectiveness. And that, as I said earlier in my opening remarks, I think that means kill ratios, and that is what wins battles.

And it is tough and it is hard, but war is brutal and tough and hard, and that is it. And so, how do you do that? How do you assign people to combat units and then maybe have them out for 6 months or gone at a critical time or whatever. How do we address that?

Ms. COSTANTINO. It appears that pregnancy is something that is pretty much planned by many women in the military right now. They plan their pregnancies around what they know their jobs are going to be. I do not know that the pregnancy rate as far as causing a loss in a combat unit would be any higher than any other rates, maybe. I am sure anytime a military unit goes into action, there are going to be some unexpected losses, whether they are due to a broken leg from a football game or some other problem at home.

Senator GLENN. Well, that is true, and I do not want to imply I think everybody who is out there in combat is suddenly going to get pregnant or have a baby in the war zone, or something like that. I am not implying anything like that whatsoever, but I think it is something that we have to consider in relation to where you assign people and whether it is going to have a potential of being disruptive or not.

It is not really that much of a problem in the combat support or combat service support roles because those units, while they require a cohesion, too, they are not quite as critical as those who are directly under the unit operation where you are directly under fire.

Ms. COSTANTINO. Senator, if I might add just one point.

Senator GLENN. Sure.

Ms. COSTANTINO. I think that is another element that would have to be analyzed by the Department of Defense in deciding which positions might be open to women, and they would have to determine if that was going to be a significant factor.

Senator GLENN. General Barrow, just one last question. If we really did remove the restrictions that are on there now, you make the point that some future person in the Pentagon can reverse some of these things by policy, then, because these things would not be in law.

How much of a danger do you think that is? I do not know, but I would guess from the testimony we have had here this morning and from previous conversations on this that if we did take the laws off the books, that there probably would not be that much real change.

General BARROW. There may not be at the outset, Senator, but there would be a constant pushing for change and the law would be able to resist that. You would have law to say that is where it is, but there would be a constant pushing to change if it were just policy.

Senator GLENN. Okay, but the point right now is that the law is all over the lot on this. It says one thing for the Navy, one thing for the Air Force, another thing for the Army—it does not say anything for the Army, and yet they have had their policy of combat exclusion, and that is not in law. So we are all over the lot on this one.

General BARROW. But if you recall, I recommended that you create a law that embraces all of the services and establishes the line, so to speak. In other words, start all over again, but keep the responsibility. Do not let it become one of policy.

The changes over there, in people, and the kinds of pressure they are under is at times downright onerous, and sometimes it is seemingly insignificant but it has ways of growing. Some of them are just petty annoyances, but I will give you one.

Al Gray sat here this morning, testifying. Do you recall 2 or so years ago he said publicly that women would not be assigned to Marine Security Guard duty with U.S. Embassies, which they should not be. That is not combat, but it is potentially hazardous, and it is often in foreign countries that do not like the presence of women in such positions, and so they are assigned to places where it is alright. And that takes away the opportunity for men to rotate out of hardship tours into the ones that would give them some relief, the women are holding those positions.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General BARROW. He said, no, women will not do that. And the Secretary of Defense simply overruled him, publicly I might add, which was a little extra embarrassment.

Those kind of things are small, but it shows you the authority that is there which, we all recognize, as appropriate in terms of having civilian authority, but it can be heavy handed. It can be abusive. It is often done in an insidious way. The uniformed services would be fighting the problem all the time, responding to pressures to change.

Mrs. DONNELLY. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Yes.

Mrs. DONNELLY. I would like to comment on that, because I was on the inside, and I have seen how the political pressure brought to bear by the DACOWITS committee influences Pentagon policies. Many times when I would ask questions about issues, such as the one the General just mentioned, people would come up to me afterwards and say, you know, you were correct. You were right, and I agree with you, but I cannot say so because my career in the military could be inhibited if I say so. Equal opportunity policies are enforced by this kind of pressure that is driven by the DACOWITS committee.

It is a very diligent committee. It has well-meaning members, but the agenda does not tolerate dissent. And that is part of the problem here, Senator. For people to say, well, it will not matter if we change the law is at best disingenuous. It does not account for the intense pressure coming from this unaccountable, single-minded group. I have seen how changes are made. They have gone much further than anyone ever expected, and I do not think it should continue.

Senator GLENN. That is going to have to be the last word today. We had planned to end the hearing at 12:30, as you all knew, and it is now already 1:45, so it shows the interest that there has been in this particular subject.

We obviously are going to be addressing this. I do not know whether we are going to have to have more hearings, as Senator Nunn suggested we might. Perhaps we will have to do that. We appreciate very much all of you being here and sticking with us throughout the length of the hearing, this morning.

Thank you much. The hearing will stand recessed.

[Additional information and prepared statements submitted for the hearing record follow:]

Virginia FEDERATION OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL WOMEN'S CLUBS, INC.

OFFICE OF:

Karen R. Keesling
Immediate Past President
3504 Stoneybrae Dr.
Falls Church, VA 22044

June 24, 1991

Hon. John Glenn
United States Senate
505 Hart
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Glenn,

I am writing to urge your support of an amendment to repeal the Air Force combat exclusion law (10 U.S.C. 8549). This amendment was adopted by the House of Representatives to also include women flying for the other Services.

The Virginia Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc. adopted the enclosed resolution at its 70th annual convention held from May 16 - 19, 1991 encouraging the repeal of this combat exclusion law.

The events in the Persian Gulf have highlighted the changing battlefield where exposure to risk of combat extended to all members of the Armed Services.

Again, we urge you to support repeal of this restrictive statute to provide the Services the flexibility to fully utilize all qualified personnel based on their ability rather than their gender.

Sincerely,

Karen R. Keesling

Karen R. Keesling

RESOLUTION #4
WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES

WHEREAS, The participation and contributions of the 35,000 women who served in the Persian Gulf demonstrated that the entire Theater of Operation is part of the modern battlefield, where exposure to the risks of combat extended to all members of the Armed Forces; and

WHEREAS, Title 10, U.S.C. 6015 prohibits women from assignment to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions and Title 10, U.S.C. 8549 prohibits women from assignment to duty in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions; and

WHEREAS, The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), an advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense, has long urged the repeal of these combat exclusion statutes. At their Spring 1991 conference, they again recommended repeal of these restrictive statutes; and

WHEREAS, BPW/USA has a history of supporting expanded opportunities for women in the military, now, therefore,

BE IT RESOLVED THAT, BPW/USA urges President Bush, Secretary Cheney, General Powell and members of Congress to support legislation to repeal the combat exclusion statutes to provide the individual Services the flexibility to fully utilize all qualified personnel based on their ability rather than their gender; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT, a copy of this resolution be sent to BPW/USA for presentation at the National Convention and copies of the resolution be sent to President Bush, Secretary Cheney, General Powell, members of the Virginia congressional delegation and other members of Congress as deemed appropriate by the State President.

★ ★ ★ *WOMEN IN THE U.S. ARMED SERVICES: THE WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF* ★ ★ ★

U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf War, the first large-scale U.S. military operation since the establishment of the All Volunteer Force, numbered over 537,000 men and women, including approximately 100,000 reservists. An additional 128,000 reservists were activated and assigned to military installations in the United States and Europe.

Over 33,300 U.S. military women served in key combat-support positions throughout the Persian Gulf region. Women piloted and crewed planes and helicopters, directed artillery, drove trucks, ran prisoner-of-war facilities, served on support and repair ships and in port security units and construction battalions, and did a myriad of other jobs crucial to the success of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. And, of course, many women served in the vital medical and administrative jobs where women have always been well represented.

The important roles performed by military women in the Persian Gulf war reflect the record proportions that women have reached in the active and reserve components of the U.S. military services since 1973. Although better represented in some services than in others, women are integral in all the services. Today almost 378,550 women are members of the U. S. Armed Services, constituting 11 percent of all active duty personnel and 13 percent of the ready reserves.[1]

Here are some key facts about women in each of the U.S. services, followed by a summary of information about women in the forces of other countries allied against Iraq in the Persian Gulf.[2]

ARMY

* Positions currently open to women: 52 percent *

There is no statute that explicitly restricts the assignment of women in the Army, but it is Army policy to exclude women from positions it determines would have routine engagement in direct combat.

Women in the Total Army Force:

- 83,200 active duty women (11 percent of the active duty force)[3]
- 63,100 women in the Army Reserve (21 percent of the Army Reserve)
- 31,500 women in the Army National Guard (7 percent of the Guard)

Women deployed to the Persian Gulf: 26,000

- Army women participated in the initial invasion into Kuwait and Iraq. They were assigned to forward support units in the following specialties: flying helicopters to transport personnel, equipment, and supplies; air defense artillery; military police; intelligence; transportation; ordnance; chemical and biological warfare; special operations; communications; medical search and rescue; and with medical facilities forward in the battle area.

- About 270 women served with U.S. Patriot missile battalions in Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey.

- Two women commanded battalions--a Military Police battalion and a Material Maintenance battalion--in Operation Desert Storm. Women were also in command of companies, aircraft squadrons, and platoons and squads in a variety of units.

- Female reservists deployed by the Army performed the following functions: medical, chemical defense and decontamination, transportation, construction, maintenance, supply, communications,

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[1] This includes women in the Coast Guard. See sections on the individual services for specifics about the various components of the reserves; see appendix for a definition of "ready reserves."

[2] WREI wishes to thank the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Department of Defense (DOD) Reserve Affairs for their cooperation in verifying information. Information on military women in allied militaries was provided by DOD.

[3] All personnel numbers for Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard are rounded to the nearest hundred; percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number.

legal, military police (law enforcement, prisoner-of-war control, and vehicle traffic control), general administration, finance, data processing, utilities operation, civil affairs, intelligence, military history, public affairs, postal, graves registration, and rear area operations control.

- Eleven Army women lost their lives in Saudi Arabia. Five of the 122 U.S. troops killed in action were Army enlisted women. Two women, a truck driver and a flight surgeon, were among the 25 U.S. personnel held prisoner of war by Iraq; both received the Purple Heart for combat injuries.

NAVY

* Positions currently open to women: 59 percent *

Job assignments for Navy women are restricted by statute and Navy policy: women cannot serve on ships, or fly aircraft, that are expected to be engaged in a combat mission. However, women are allowed to serve temporary duty on combat ships as well as to train men to fly combat planes. Women can be assigned to selected ships of the Combat Logistics Force, to Navy auxiliary ships such as repair, research, and training vessels, and to civilian contract ships. Some 8,500 Navy women currently serve on over 70 Navy and civilian ships.

Women in the Total Navy Force:

- 57,100 active duty women (10 percent of the active duty force)
- 23,100 women in the Navy Reserve (14 percent of the Navy Reserve)

Women deployed to the Persian Gulf: 2,500

- Navy women served on hospital ships, supply ships, oilers and ammunition ships of the Combat Logistics Force, and repair ships.
- Women Navy pilots flew helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft.
- Women served in Navy construction battalions, fleet hospitals, reconnaissance squadrons, and as public affairs officers.
- Female Navy reservists in the Gulf performed medical, port and harbor security, sealift and shipping coordination, intelligence, logistics, communications, and cargo handling duties.

MARINE CORPS

* Positions currently open to women: 20 percent *

The Marine Corps is a part of the Department of Navy; therefore, job assignments for Marine Corps women are subject to the statutory prohibitions that pertain to Navy women, as well as to other restrictions imposed by Corps policy.

Women in the Total Marine Force:

- 9,300 active duty women (five percent of the active duty force)[4]
- 1,800 women in the Marine Corps Reserve (five percent of the Marine reserve)

Women Marines in the Persian Gulf: 1,000

- The women Marines who served in Saudi Arabia were the first female Marines deployed to any conflict since the Vietnam era.
- Women Marines were assigned to logistics, intelligence, transportation, communication, aviation support, administration, and public affairs duties.

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[4] One reason that the female percentage of Marine Corps personnel is lower than the other services is that the Corps has no medical or chaplain branches of its own; it receives these services from the Navy.

AIR FORCE

* Positions currently open to women: 97 percent *

Women are prohibited by statute from serving in aircraft engaged in a combat mission. It should be noted, however, that female medical, dental, chaplains, and other such professionals are specifically exempted from this exclusion.

Women in the Total Air Force:

* 73,600 active duty women (14 percent of the active duty force)
* 16,000 women in the Air Force Reserve (19 percent of the reserve force)
* 15,500 women in the Air National Guard (13 percent of the Air Guard)

Women deployed to the Persian Gulf: 3,800

- Active and reserve women served in military airlift, airlift terminal and cargo management, aerial refueling, communications, intelligence, firefighting, aeromedical evacuation, and a wide variety of support activities similar to those performed by the Army.
- Air Force women pilots flew and crewed strategic transport, tactical transport, tankers, reconnaissance (AWACS), and aeromedical airlift aircraft.

COAST GUARD

* Positions currently open to women: 100 percent *

Although a uniformed service, the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Transportation, and the statutory restrictions that pertain to military women in the Department of Defense do not apply to Coast Guard women. Women have served aboard Coast Guard ships since 1977.

Women in the Total Coast Guard Force:

* 2,600 active duty women (seven percent of the active duty force)
* 1,750 women serve in the Coast Guard Reserve (15 percent of the reserve force)

Women deployed to the Persian Gulf: 13

- Coast Guard women serving in the Gulf were assigned to port security positions.

ALLIED NATIONS

Women are known to have been included in the forces of the following nations of the coalition of nations aligned against Iraq:

- **Canada** deployed about 150 women (3 percent of Canadian personnel deployed), who served on combat ships, in combat support positions, and on the Canadian hospital ship.
- **France** deployed thirteen women (out of 10,000 French personnel deployed), who served in medical positions.
- **Great Britain** deployed approximately 800 women (1.5 percent of Great Britain's personnel deployed). Fifty two women served on combat ships of the Royal Navy.
- **Kuwait:** Nine women were among 250 Kuwaiti volunteers trained at Fort Dix, N.J., before being assigned to U.S. Army units in the Persian Gulf region.

APPENDIX - COMBAT EXCLUSIONS

There is no law that prohibits women from "serving in combat." The statutes, which do not apply to the Army, specify only that women may not serve on ships and aircraft engaged in combat missions. However, nothing in the law bars the services from applying combat exclusions to units other than ships or aircraft, and all the services have done so. More important, the law does not define "combat mission." That task is left to the discretion of DOD and the individual services, and how they define combat determines what jobs are closed to women.

Statutory restrictions on women in the U.S. military

- *Title 10, U.S.C. 6015* applies to the Navy and Marine Corps. It states:

  Women may not be assigned duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions nor may they be assigned to other than temporary duty on vessels of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels of similar classification not expected to be assigned to combat missions.

  In addition, Marine Corps policy prohibits the assignment of women Marines to any unit within which they would likely become engaged in direct combat operations with the enemy, or to any assignment that has been designated by the Secretary of the Navy as requiring "an armed combat trained Marine."

- *Title 10, U.S.C. 8549* applies to the Air Force. It states:

  Female members of the Air Force, except those designated under section 8067 of this title, or appointed with a view to designation under that section, may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions. (The exceptions designated under Section 8067 are medical and dental professionals, and chaplains and other professionals.)

- No statute restricts the assignment of women in the Army. The statute that covers the Army, *Title 10, U.S.C. 3012*, gives the Secretary of the Army authority to determine personnel policy for the Army. The Secretary of the Army has developed policies that exclude women from "routine engagement in direct combat." The Army justifies its exclusionary policies as being consistent with an implied Congressional intent (which is explicit in the Navy and Air Force exclusionary statutes).

Terms and Definitions

Direct Combat: Direct combat is defined as "engaging an enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy's personnel, and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, or shock effect in order to destroy or capture, or while repelling assault by fire, close combat or counterattack."

Risk Rule: Developed in 1988 by a DOD Task Force on Women in the Military in an attempt to standardize positions closed to women across the services, the risk rule states that "non-combat units can be closed to women on grounds of risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture provided that the type, degree, and duration of such risks are equal to or greater than that experienced by combat units in the same theater of operations."

Combat Support: Combat support positions provide operational assistance to the combat arm. Army and Air Force women are fully integrated in combat support roles and specialties; Marine Corps women are not. Navy women serve on selected "underway replenishment ships" of the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) that ferry supplies, fuel, and ammunition from port to the CLF ships that support the battle group. Navy policy precludes permanent assignment of women to CLF ships that sail with the battle group.

Combat Service Support: Combat service support positions provide logistical, technical, and administrative services--such as, for example, personnel and finance--to the combat arm. Military women in all branches serve in combat service support roles.

Ready Reserve: The ready reserve is divided into two subcategories: the Select Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Members of the Select Reserve are assigned to units, perform approximately two weeks of active duty training each year and at least one weekend of inactive duty training or "drill" per month. Members of the Individual Ready Reserve are not assigned to units. The Army activated approximately 20,000 men and women of the IRR in the following specialties to serve as "fillers" to bolster understrength units: medical personnel, truck drivers, mechanics, supply personnel, and artillery personnel.

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Women in the U.S. Armed Services: The War in the Persian Gulf was prepared by Carolyn Becraft, March, 1991.

Sources:

Goldich, Robert L. "Persian Gulf War: U.S. Reserve Callup and Reliance on the Reserves, Congressional Research Service, January 24, 1991.

U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Center, 1990.

U.S. Department of Defense, Task Force on Women in the Military, January 1989.

Statement

of

Brian Mitchell

Author of *Weak Link*

As a former Army officer, former reporter for *Navy Times*, and author of *Weak Link: The Feminization of the American Military*, I fully understand the significance of the proposal to repeal the so-called combat exclusion laws, and it should surprise no one that I oppose repeal.

Yet a prudent person does not need the help of experts to see that it is unwise and, indeed, irresponsible to repeal the combat exclusions at this time. We have just been through the first major war in which women played a large integrated role. We are facing the first opportunity to document either the success or the failure of our policy of gender integration. We have yet to see even a preliminary evaluation of the impact of gender integration on military operations. A thorough evaluation by the General Accounting Office is in the works, due later this year. It therefore makes no sense to rush to repeal the combat exclusions now, when we know so little and will soon know so much.

It is ironic that the rush for repeal comes just as evidence of significant problems with gender integration of the military is becoming a matter of public record.

* We have just seen, in the Iraqi war, that the military faces a perplexing problem with regard to mothers and single parents assigned to deployable units. If mothers and single parents are deployed with their units in time of war, their children suffer. If mothers and single parents are allowed to stay home during the next war, the military suffers.

* We have just seen, in the trial of the Virginia Military Institute, how the U.S. Army and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point have deliberately misled the American public about the effect of gender integration on the academy. It has been shown in court how West Point has lowered standards, doubled standards, and used quotas to protect and advance female cadets, despite public pronouncements by West Point officials that men and women are treated equally and that the institution was not radically changed by the integration of women.

* We have just seen, in a recent article in *Military Law Review* [attached], that the U.S. Army uses rigid quotas to protect women and minorities in the promotion process. The author of the article, an Army lawyer, concludes that these quotas would not withstand the test established recently by the U.S. Supreme Court in *City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.* He is now out of the Army and is planning a class action lawsuit charging the Army with race and sex discrimination.

We may yet see, when more of our experience in the war becomes known, other reasons questioning the status quo. There have been reports that quite a few women exercised their option to become pregnant to avoid deploying overseas. (An Army unit from Fort Carson, Colo., saw 18 percent of its women suddenly

reports of women so upset by being separated from their families that they were regularly issued valium to keep them from falling apart. There have been reports of men and women sharing everything from tents to latrines. There have been allegations of widespread fraternization, sexual promiscuity, sexual harrassment, and prostitution.

These reports, if substantiated, would indicate that repealing any part of the combat exclusions would be another step in the wrong direction. This can be said without regarding the predictable consequences of repeal. Repeal would:

1) make all service women eligible for involuntary assignment to combat duty as the military situation requires.

2) force the services to train and assign women as combat pilots and to assign women aboard combat naval vessels, regardless of any problems this policy might cause.

3) force all military men and women into an officially radical feminist world in which traditional views of men and women are discouraged and suppressed.

4) undermine the legal basis for exempting women from the draft, thereby obligating all future generations of American women to any future draft and to combat service in any future war.

5) set the stage for further attacks upon traditional family values.

6) weaken the military's existing ban on homosexuals.

Regarding this last point, I would note that the military already is finding it difficult to argue against excluding homosexuals while defending the integration of women. By insisting that the services can easily handle fraternization, sexual harassment, and other morale problems caused by the mixing men and women in close quarters for long periods of time, the military is undermining its argument against homosexuals, who are thought to cause similar problems. Homosexual activists are already using this inconsistency to their advantage. Repeal of the combat exclusions would only encourage them in their pursuit of acceptance by the military.

Regarding the second point, we should remember that when the services have been forced to open jobs to women in the past, the services have often accomplished this by establishing quotas for women in those jobs and by sex-norming standards to ensure that the quotas are met. This happened when women were admitted to the service academies. It happened when women were first admitted to Navy and Air Force flight programs. We have every reason to believe it would happen again if the law barring women from combat aircraft is repealed. The Defense Department simply has not the political will to resist pressure to put women in the cockpit in the absense of statutory exclusions, even if good reasons exist not to do so.

The eleven young flyers whose letter appeared last week in *Air Force Times* know this, and no assurances from desk-jockeys in the Pentagon will dispell their suspicions. We can make them obey, but we cannot make them believe. Despite assurances to the contrary, they will believe, with good reason, that the introduction of women into combat flying billets will be governed by a quota system similar to the quota systems used in

promotions, assignments, and accessions. The trust and confidence they place in their superiors, in their service, and in their elected officials will only be diminished by forcing them to entrust their lives to a policy dictated by media hype and feminist politics.

I therefore urge this committee not to proceed toward repeal of the existing combat exclusions until the problems experienced in the Iraqi War have been documented and a full investigation of the military use of women has been completed and publicly reviewed. We owe it to the men whose lives depend on our actions not to act in haste, but with utmost deliberation and candor.

EQUAL BUT SEPARATE: CAN THE ARMY'S AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM WITHSTAND JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AFTER *CROSON*?

by Captain Donovan R. Bigelow*

I. INTRODUCTION

For the first time in the relatively short history of affirmative action jurisprudence,[1] the Supreme Court has issued an opinion in which a majority of its members joined.[2] In *City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.*[3] the Court clarified the scope of judicial review in affirmative action cases and provided additional guidance for analyzing the compatibility of those programs with the constitutional requirement[4] that all citizens be treated equally under the law.

This article examines the Army's affirmative action program for promotions in light of *Croson*. It briefly reviews the flow of case law prior to and since the seminal case of *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke*, examines the analytical structure endorsed by the Court in *Croson*, and analyzes the Army's promotion system in terms of its consistency with the *Croson* standards.

II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: *BAKKE* TO *CROSON*

Obviously, equal protection analysis does not begin with the *Bakke* case. The law has followed an evolutionary path that began with the

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[1]The first direct holding on the constitutionality of an affirmative action program was in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

[2]Rosenfeld, *Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality*, 87 Mich L. Rev. 1729 n.2 (June 1989).

[3]109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).

[4]U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. Because of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the standards of equal protection analysis under the fourteenth amendment are virtually identical to the fifth amendment. Federal legislation is now subject to the same level of judicial scrutiny in terms of equal protection as is state action. E. Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today 389-90 (1978). While the Court in *Croson* distinguishes some aspects of the analysis that might apply differently to congressional action, the thrust of the Court's decision puts a similar burden on both the federal and state governments.

passage of the fourteenth amendment[6] and continued on through *Plessy v. Ferguson*,[7] *Korematsu v. United States*,[8] *Brown v. Board of Education*,[9] and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The stage was set for the *Bakke* decision by the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari in *DeFunis v. Odegaard*,[9] wherein Justice Douglas—in an impassioned dissent reminiscent of Justice Harlan's dissent in *Plessy* and foreshadowing *Croson* twenty-five years later—argued that "there is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred."[10]

Between 1978 and 1980, the Supreme Court decided *Bakke* and three additional cases on the subject of affirmative action.[11] In those cases, the Court attempted to provide the conceptual framework for analyzing affirmative action programs in terms of the equal protection requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.[12] Unfortunately, due to the divisiveness of the issues and the inability of the Court to reach a majority decision, no consistent and readily applicable principles existed to guide lower courts and legislatures.[13]

Between 1986 and 1987, the Supreme Court issued five additional decisions dealing with various aspects of affirmative action.[14] As with the first generation of decisions, however, unity was decidedly lacking, with the justices dividing generally along "conservative" and "liberal" lines, and swing votes being shared by Justices Powell and O'Connor. Deciphering usable guidance from these cases is extremely problematic given the number of separate opinions and the frequency with which the justices concurred or dissented from various parts of the decisions.[15]

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[6]U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

[7]163 U.S. 537 (1896) (law providing for separate railway carriages for white and colored races found constitutional).

[8]323 U.S. 214 (1944) (internment of Japanese Americans in camps along the west coast during World War II held to be constitutional).

[9]347 U.S. 483 (1954) (petitioner sought to overturn laws permitting racial segregation in public schools; legalized segregation held to have denied petitioner equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment).

[9]416 U.S. 312 (1974) (petitioner Defunis, a white male, brought suit after being denied admission to the University of Washington Law School; ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the action as moot because Defunis, having had his admission ordered by the trial court, was due to graduate before the Supreme Court could reach the merits).

[10]*Id.* at 336.

[11]United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).

[12]*See supra* note 4.

[13]Sadurski, *The Second Generation of American Affirmative-Action Decisions*, 12 Sydney L. Rev. 159 n.2 (1989).

[14]Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).

[15]Sadurski, *supra* note 13, at 160.

That was the status of the law when Richmond, Virginia, mandated a thirty percent minority set-aside program for city-sponsored construction projects.

III. *CROSON* AND THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ANALYSIS

In its disposition of *Croson*, the Court resolved much of the confusion surrounding affirmative action. Although the decision contained three concurring opinions, six of the justices supported the basic analytical structure of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Justice Stevens simply added more reasons in support of it;[16] Justice Kennedy argued that the Federal Government should be subject, under virtually all circumstances, to the same level of scrutiny as the states;[17] while Justice Scalia demanded a color-blind constitution.[18] These concurring opinions did not provide any support to proponents of affirmative action programs; the opinions all support the strict scrutiny required by Justice O'Connor. To the extent that a concurring opinion indicates disagreement, a close reading of the positions of the concurring justices shows that they either would demand an even higher standard or would erect an almost per se rule against racial classifications.

With its decision in *Croson*, the Court virtually swept away the last twelve years of affirmative action case law. It rejected not only the arguments of both parties and the supporting *amici*, but also found the lower courts' holdings to be insufficient:

> The parties and their supporting *amici* fight an initial battle over the scope of the city's power to adopt legislation designed to address the effects of past discrimination. Relying on our decision in *Wygant* [476 U.S. 267 (1986)], appellee argues that the city must limit any race-based remedial efforts to eradicating the effects of its own prior discrimination. This is essentially the position taken by the Court of Appeals below. Appellant argues that our decision in *Fullilove* [448 U.S. 448 (1980)] is controlling, and that as a result the city of Richmond enjoys sweeping legislative power to define and attack the effects of prior discrimination in its local construction industry. We find that neither of these two rather stark alternatives can withstand analysis.[19]

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[16] *Croson*, 109 S. Ct. at 730.
[17] *Id.* at 734.
[18] *Id.* at 735.
[19] *Id.* at 717.

The Court left no doubt that any race-based classification would be subjected to the strictest judicial scrutiny.[20] "[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the

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[20]A possible exception to the otherwise strict scrutiny of racially-based affirmative action programs is found in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). The issue was the constitutionality of two minority preference policies adopted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

In accordance with the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC adopted two minority preference policies in the transfer or sale of radio or television licenses. Non-minority applicants challenged the validity of these policies, which caused the FCC to begin an inquiry into their validity. That inquiry was terminated when Congress enacted the FCC appropriations legislation for fiscal year 1988. That legislation prohibited any examination or alteration of the minority policies by prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for that purpose.

In a five to four decision, with Justice Stevens providing the swing vote, the Supreme Court held that in equal protection analysis of policies mandated by specific congressional acts the Court need not apply the strict scrutiny mandated in the review of other governmental bodies. Such congressionally-mandated policies and programs need only serve an important governmental objective and be substantially related to the achievement of that objective.

The majority distinguished these cases and the different test applied in them from the guidance given in the *Croson* case. "It is of overriding significance in these cases that the FCC's minority ownership programs have been specifically approved—indeed, mandated — by Congress." *Id.* at 3008. Additionally, the Court noted that "race-conscious classifications adopted by Congress to address racial and ethnic discrimination are subject to a different standard than such classifications prescribed by state and local governments." *Id.* at 3009.

In analyzing the applicability of the *Metro* case to the Army's affirmative action program for promotions, two considerations should control. First, in *Croson*, the Court left open the possibility of a congressional exception. Analyzing the applicability of the *Fullilove* case, the Court in *Croson* recognized that Congress, "unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment." *Croson*, 109 S. Ct. at 719. "[O]ther governmental entities might have to show more than Congress before undertaking race-conscious measures." *Id.*

The clear implication in both the *Croson* and the *Metro* cases is that only Congress will be accorded the lesser standard of review in equal protection analysis. Even then, only to the extent that Congress specifically approves particular race-conscious remedial measures will the Court grant deference to a coordinate branch's own constitutional mandate. The cases cannot be read to infer a broad federal license to engage in affirmative action. Language such as "governmental unit" and "governmental entity" strongly implies that the various federal agencies will be held to the same strict standard as local and state agencies, barring specific congressional mandates covering a particular federal agency's actions.

Second, the balance of the Court is likely to shift in favor of reducing even further the scope of affirmative action programs. With Justice Souter replacing Justice Brennan, the Court's direction is clear. Although no justice's position in a particular case can be predicted with certainty, a strong indication of Justice Souter's position on affirmative action was revealed in a speech he gave in 1976. When he was the New Hampshire Attorney General, Souter attacked affirmative action as "affirmative discrimination." USA Today, July 26, 1990, at 6a.

The narrow language of the *Metro* decision provides no comfort for the proponents of affirmative action. Only to the extent that specific congressional language can be found to support a particular program will the lesser test be applied. Given the probable direction of the Court, even that narrow exception may be short-lived.

race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification."[21] This approach is attributable directly to the justices' belief that the rights at issue were individual rights and that the concept of "group" rights is inimical to a just society.[22] Consequently, the Court has changed the focus of its analysis in these cases from broad consideration of social or class issues to an emphasis on the individual. Citing Justice Powell in *Bakke*, the Court expressed support for the proposition that "the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color."[23]

Given this strict scrutiny standard of review,[24] two questions remain. First, what governmental interests, if any, are compelling enough to justify the use of racial classifications? Second, how must a particular classification be tailored to avoid being rejected as overbroad?

A. WHEN WILL RACE-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS BE UPHELD?

A classification based on race can be justified only as a remedy for present discrimination. "Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are reserved strictly for remedial settings, they may actually promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."[25] Under *Croson*, the discrimination must be shown to originate in the governmental unit presently attempting to remedy existing racial prejudice. "It is essential that state and local agencies establish the presence of discrimination in their own bailiwicks, based either upon their own fact-finding processes or upon determinations made by other competent institutions."[26]

In addition, a strong nexus must be shown between the identified discrimination and the injury alleged. Any program granting advantages to one racial group over another can be justified only to the

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[21] *Croson*, 109 S. Ct. at 721.

[22] *Id.* at 721, 735.

[23] *Id.* at 721.

[24] "Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool." *Id.*

[25] *Id.*

[26] *Id.* at 727.

extent that the "reasons for any such classification [are] clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate."[27] Clearly, the Court will subject any classification based on race to the strictest scrutiny possible.

B. HOW MUST AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM BE TAILORED?

Assuming the existence of individual discrimination, at what factors will the Court look to determine whether a particular classification is overbroad? The Court specifically has rejected the proposition that race-based classification can be justified by the existence of generalized historical discrimination. "Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy."[28]

> While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota. . . . Like the claim that discrimination in primary and secondary schooling justifies a rigid racial preference in medical school admissions, an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.[29]

Justice Scalia showed an "unwillingness to conclude, outside the context of school assignment, that the continuing effects of prior discrimination can be equated with state maintenance of a discriminatory system."[30] He observed that once the discrimination is stopped, there is "no further obligation to use racial reassignments to eliminate the continuing effects" of past discrimination.[31] It is unclear whether the justices believed that the existence of societal discrimination was insufficient, per se, to justify a racial classification or whether it was simply too amorphous a concept to fulfill the requirement of specific harm. The Court recognized the "sorry history" of discrimination, but, without more, it would not uphold a race-based classification.

In addition, an attempt to raise the number of minority participants in a given field is no longer an acceptable justification for a racial

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[27] *Id.*
[28] *Id.* at 723.
[29] *Id.* at 724.
[30] *Id.* at 738.
[31] *Id.*

classification when the source of the disparity is alleged to be the historical disadvantages labored under by the targeted beneficiaries. Citing *Bakke*, the Court said, "Among the justifications offered in support of the plan were the desire to 'reduc[e] the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical school and the medical profession' and the need to 'counter the effect[s] of societal discrimination.'"[32] Attempting to raise the number of minority participants in a given field, absent a showing of present discrimination, now is condemned as "discrimination for its own sake," which is "forbidden by the Constitution."[33]

Critical to the Court's handling of the historical discrimination issue was its observation that, while gross statistical disparities may show discrimination, "it is equally clear that '[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population [rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications] may have little probative value.'"[34]

The requirement that statistical evidence of discrimination be limited to the professional group to which the individual belongs, rather than to the larger racial group, has enormous potential impact. When a class of minority members establishes itself in a profession, the argument may be inescapable that, by definition, they have not been the victims of discrimination to a sufficient degree to warrant remedial affirmative action.

Because the focus is now on remedying "wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination,"[35] claims of societal discrimination may fail either to raise the necessary factual predicate of presently existing prejudice or to allow for a remedy that can be tailored narrowly.

The *Croson* Court also found wanting the theory that minority participation must be increased because minority children are in need of "'role models' to alleviate the effects of prior discrimination in society."[36] The Court flatly denied that statistical differences in numbers or percentages were probative of employment discrimination. The Court also noted that those differences, because they had

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[32] *Id.* at 722 (quoting *Bakke*, 438 U.S. at 270).

[33] *Id.*

[34] *Id.* at 725 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)).

[35] *Id.* at 723.

[36] *Id.*

"no relation to some basis for believing a constitutional or statutory violation had occurred," would be the basis for "race-based decision making essentially limitless in scope and duration."[37]

Apparently, for the sake of analytical clarity and consistency, the Court simply was drawing a bright line between past and present discrimination. The Court's conclusion that numerical disparity had *no* probative value in determining the existence of present discrimination was counterintuitive, but absolutely necessary to the Court's position. If the Court were to admit that historical discrimination could be the basis for present race-based classifications, it would be impossible to draw a meaningful line between the burdens that could be placed on affected individuals and the amount of assistance needed by minorities to overcome past obstacles.

Similarly, the Court found unpersuasive the claim that when discrimination pervades a particular industry, discrimination could be extrapolated from that fact to an assumption that a particular individual in the industry was a victim of discrimination. "Like the 'role model' theory. . .a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy. It 'has no logical stopping point.'"[38] The Court's analysis was influenced by the twin concerns of finding sufficient discrimination to establish a causal link to a specific harm and the difficulty of constructing a narrow remedy.

The Court now requires strong evidence of particularized discrimination before a prima facie case for a remedy can be made. How much weight should be given to the proponent's stated objectives for a particular affirmative action plan? If a plan must remedy a present discriminatory practice, how much weight should be given to the planner's own belief concerning the nature and scope of the problem?

The Court was emphatic that the traditional judicial deference towards the fact-finding processes of legislative bodies has no role to play in the review of equal protection cases.[39]

> [M]ere recitation of a 'benign' or legitimate purpose for a racial classification, is entitled to little or no weight. . . . Racial classifications are suspect, and that means that simple legisla-

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[37] *Id.*
[38] *Id.*
[39] *Id.* at 724-25.

> tive assurances of good intention cannot suffice.... [W]hen a legislative body chooses to employ a suspect classification, it cannot rest upon a generalized assertion as to the classification's relevance to its goals.[40]

In concluding its analysis of the scope of judicial review, the Court used its strongest language to justify the strict scrutiny of racial classifications: "The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis."[41] Citing *Korematsu v. United States*[42] for this last proposition, the Court was reinforcing its position as the final arbiter of the scope of constitutional protections, and all but challenging the other branches of government by referencing their most notable failure to protect all individuals equally.

The Court recognized the difficulty it was imposing on bureaucracies by mandating an individualized approach to solving racial discrimination cases. The justices, however, were wholly unsympathetic to complaints concerning those burdens:

> Given the existence of an individualized procedure, the city's only interest in maintaining a quota system rather than investigating the need for remedial action in particular cases would seem to be simple administrative convenience. But the interest in avoiding the bureaucratic effort necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who truly have suffered the effects of prior discrimination cannot justify a rigid line drawn on the basis of a suspect classification.[43]

Tailoring a proposed remedy must involve mechanisms that preclude beneficiaries who have not been the victims of particularized discrimination. As the Court observed, if a "successful black, Hispanic, or Oriental entrepreneur from anywhere in the country enjoys an absolute preference over other citizens based solely on their race," the program is not tailored sufficiently to pass judicial muster.[44]

Additionally, tailoring as to duration now will be required. Any plan must have, as part of its implementation procedures, some recognizable stopping point to assure "all citizens that the deviation from

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[40] *Id.*
[41] *Id.* at 725.
[42] 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
[43] *Croson*, 109 S. Ct. at 729.
[44] *Id.*

the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself."[45] The Court's point was that once the problem is corrected, unequal intervention by government must stop. Having focused on individual discriminatory effects, the government is presumed to have ascertained an appropriate stop-point for its efforts.

Geographic tailoring or tailoring by governmental unit is also necessary under *Croson*. The Court disputed the notion that "findings of discrimination may be 'shared' from jurisdiction to jurisdiction . . . .We have never approved the extrapolation of discrimination in one jurisdiction from the experience of another."[46]

This is another aspect of the Court's initial determination that historical discrimination is no longer a relevant factor. If the emphasis now is on identifiable victims of present discrimination, evidence of general or historical discrimination would have no more relevance than general crime statistics to a particular criminal trial.

Additionally, no affirmative action program should be upheld by the Court unless a detailed and documented effort has been made to consider the use of a race-neutral means to ameliorate the problem. "In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several factors, including the efficacy of alternative remedies."[47] If the governmental unit involved can devise a remedial program involving additional training and education or the development of independently funded programs to assist minorities, the Court will require those measures rather than allow the use of set-asides as part of existing programs.

The analysis of race-neutral solutions specifically should include consideration of the potential race-neutral causes of the disparity in numbers that a particular affirmative action program is designed to remedy. The Court likely will strike down set-asides when reliable evidence exists that the source of the disparity is not discrimination.[48]

In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia strongly condemned the use of numerical quotas. Quoting Professor Bickel, he stated:

[A] racial quota derogates the human dignity and individuality

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[45] *Id.* at 730.
[46] *Id.* at 727.
[47] *Id.* at 728.
[48] *Id.* at 728-30.

> of all to whom it is applied; it is invidious in principle as well as in practice. Moreover, it can easily be turned against those it purports to help. The history of the racial quota is a history of subjugation, not beneficence. Its evil lies not in its name, but in its effects: a quota is a divider of society, a creator of castes, and it is all the worse for its racial base, especially in a society desperately striving for an equality that will make race irrelevant.[49]

Justice Scalia believed those words to be both "true and increasingly prophetic," and he stressed the importance of "not losing sight of the fact that even 'benign' racial quotas have individual victims, whose very real injustice we ignore whenever we deny them enforcement of their right not to be disadvantaged on the basis of race."[50]

A majority of the Court now seems to view any numerical quota as a per se violation of the requirement to tailor carefully racial classifications. Underlying a quota is the assumption that some statistical correlation should exist between the number of minorities in the general population and the number in the targeted activity. The Court found this entirely unpersuasive. A quota "rests upon the 'completely unrealistic' assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population."[51] Any affirmative action program with fixed percentages or quotas is unlikely to withstand the exacting judicial scrutiny now extended to this class of cases. Merely calling a quota a "goal" or "target" will not control. The Court will look carefully at the factual basis for the set-aside with little deference to the judgment of the particular governmental unit.[52]

IV. THE ARMY'S AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM

The starting point for analyzing the Army's affirmative action program is Department of Defense Directive 1350.2.[53] One of the several policies implemented by this directive requires that "the Military Ser-

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[49] *Id.* at 739.

[50] *Id.*

[51] *Id.* at 728.

[52] "The mere recitation of a benign or compensatory purpose for the use of a racial classification would essentially entitle the States to exercise the full power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and insulate any racial classification from judicial scrutiny under § 1. We believe that such a result would be contrary to the intentions of the Framers. . . ." *Id.* at 719.

[53] Dep't of Defense Directive 1350.2, The Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity Program (Dec. 23, 1988).

vices. . . maintain military EO and affirmative action programs. Discrimination that adversely affects persons or groups based on race, color, religion, gender, age, or national origin, and that is not supported legally, is contrary to good order and discipline, and is counterproductive to combat readiness and mission accomplishment. . . ."[54]

Under this guidance, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel is required to "[e]stablish categories and monitor specific goals to be included in the affirmative action programs and annual military EO assessments of each DOD Component."[55] The Heads of DOD Components are responsible for the establishment of "[a]ffirmative action programs that identify and resolve EO problems through formulating, maintaining, and reviewing affirmative action plans (AAPs) with established objectives and milestones and including accountability in personnel management . . . ."[56]

The directive establishes racial and ethnic categories that are to be the basis of the department's affirmative action programs and the monitoring process.[57] The categories include American Indian or Alaskan native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black (not of Hispanic origin), Hispanic, and white.

Each DOD component must submit an annual Military Equal Opportunity Assessment (MEOA), which is to include an overall assessment of each component's Affirmative Action Plans (AAPs) and EO programs generally.[58] The MEOA should include an analysis, including detailed quantitative data, concerning ten areas of concern divided both by racial category and gender.[59] "Promotions" is one of the categories.

Department of Defense Instruction 1350.3[60] supplements the above directive and "emphasizes the use of standardized procedures that support longitudinal analysis throughout the Department of Defense."[61] The instruction provides additional guidance on the AAP developed by the service or component. AAPs may contain "initia-

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[54] *Id.* at 2.
[55] *Id.* at 3.
[56] *Id.* at 4.
[57] *Id.* at 2-1; 2-2.
[58] *Id.* at 3-1.
[59] *Id.*
[60] Dep't of Defense Instruction 1350.3, Affirmative Action Planning and Assessment Process (Feb. 29, 1988).
[61] *Id.* at 1.

tives, processes, systems, activities, objectives, goals, and milestones that have been established to achieve the objectives of the equal opportunity program."[62]

The Army uses Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, to pass this and other guidance to commanders at all levels. Paragraph 6-13 specifies the scope and content of the Army's AAP:

> Affirmative action plans will be comprised of planned, achievable steps to eliminate practices that deny equal opportunity to soldiers and their families. These steps are as follows:
>
> > a. AAP's will be developed and implemented by heads of Army Staff agencies and their Field operating agencies and by each MACOM . . . , installation, separate unit, agency, and activity down to and including brigade or equivalent level. Plans will include conditions requiring affirmative action, remedial action steps (with goals and milestones as necessary), and a description of the end-condition sought for each condition included. AAP's will be reviewed at least annually to access [sic] the effectiveness of action steps [sic], to initiate new actions, and to sustain goals already achieved.

Paragraph 6-16, AR 600-20, requires an annual report from all major commands (MACOMs) and the heads of designated Army staff agencies or directorates. The report must outline "the progress made in achieving the established EO Goals as reflected in the AAP for the organization. It will assess achievements and shortfalls and include plans or actions programmed to correct problems or conditions that currently exist." Subparagraph c requires the commander to list the affirmative actions taken during the reporting period, the goals achieved, goals not achieved and why, and the actions planned to achieve and/or modify the goals.

Finally, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-26, Department of the Army Affirmative Action Plan, establishes specific affirmative actions and responsibilities for personnel management within the Army.[63] Chapter 2 contains specific affirmative action goals and objectives. These "[g]oals are intended to be realistic and achievable, with measurable prospects of attainment. Goals are not ceilings, nor are

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[62] *Id.* at 1-1.

[63] Dep't of the Army, Pam. 600-26, Department of the Army Affirmative Action Plan (23 May 1990).

they base figures that are to be reached at the expense of requisite qualifications and standards. *In affirmative action efforts, goals are not quotas.*"[84]

Paragraph 2-5, DA Pam 600-26, requires, among other things, that results of promotion selections be maintained for review, that instructions to selection boards contain guidance on equal opportunity, and that significant variances from the goals be brought to the board's attention prior to adjournment. The board must explain the variances in its after action report.

The Army's entire affirmative action program for promotions is summarized in paragraph 2-5(4): "Selection rates for all categories should not be less than the overall selection rate for the total population considered. . . ."

This method for calculating the affirmative action goals for minority and female officers is explained in paragraph 3-4. The Army has developed the concept of a "Representation Index" (RI) to assist in determining the percentage of minority officers that should be maintained in the force structure.

> The result of a hypothetical selection board, illustrates how the RI is used. The RI can be computed by following the procedure outlines [sic] below:
>
> (a) Total number eligible (considered) equal 1000.
>
> (b) Number of "group 1" that are eligible (considered) equal 160.
>
> (c) Expected percentage equal 160/1000 equal 16 percent.
>
> (d) Total number selected equal 500.
>
> (e) Expected number equal .16 times 500 equal 80.
>
> (f) Actual number of "group 1" selected equal 60.
>
> (g) Representation Index equal (60/80 times 100) minus 100 equal negative 25 percent.
>
> (h) The resultant percentage means that "group 1s" are

[84]DA Pam 600-26, para. 2-1 (emphasis added).

> under-represented in this selection board by 25 percent. The percentage does not say anything about what caused the difference. The long term goals are to arrive at the point where the RI's approach zero.

The concept of the "expected number" apparently was derived from Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-43, Measuring Changes in Institutional Racial Discrimination in the Army, April 1977. The assumption underlying the concept is that "[i]f skin color is not related in any way to type of assignment, then one would expect to find white and black officers assigned to command positions *in proportion to their total numbers in the Army*."[64] "The meaning of such an indicator can thus be read directly. If the indicator is zero or close to it, this means there is no evidence of racial discrimination on that dimension."[64]

The Army has concluded that, to the extent the percentage of minorities and women are "under-represented," as calculated by the difference between the "expected number" and the actual percentage of minority members or women represented in the general pool, there is evidence of discrimination that is the appropriate subject for affirmative action "goals." The affirmative action program is designed to achieve and to maintain this percentage representation indefinitely.

V. THE ARMY'S PROMOTION SYSTEM

When a promotion board is convened, the members are given very detailed instructions concerning both the procedures to be followed in the selection process and the policy guidance underlying their choices. While minor variations in this guidance exist among the boards for the various ranks and specialty branches, the procedures followed and the guidance given are virtually identical for all Army promotion boards.[67]

Guidance is given in the form of a detailed written memorandum and an oral briefing given by the Director of Military Personnel Management (DMPM)—usually a major general. This oral briefing, among other things, specifically highlights the importance of the af-

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[64]Dep't of the Army, Pam. 600-43, Measuring Changes in Institutional Racial Discrimination in the Army, para. 2-4 (April 1977) (emphasis in the original).

[64]*Id.* para. 2-5.

[67]Information from Officer Sustainment and Development Branch, Officer Division, Director of Military Personnel Management, Pentagon, Conversation with LTC Chaffee and LTC Rangel, 9 February 1990 [hereinafter Information].

firmative action goals to be met for the various minority groups and women, and addresses the procedures for reporting potential failure to meet them prior to adjournment. The board will not be released until its reasons for failure to meet the goals are sufficiently explained to the DMPM. The board may be directed to revise its findings based on the affirmative action goals.[68]

Phase I of the process requires that all eligible files be reviewed and rank ordered from highest to lowest. This ranking from the most deserving to the least desirable officer is known as the Order of Merit List (OML). Those officers then are divided into two categories. Those considered "fully qualified" for promotion are the files that reflect the belief that if the available promotion slots were unlimited, all of these "fully qualified" officers would be promoted. The remaining files are listed as "not fully qualified" and are set aside for later review. A determination by the board that an officer is "not fully qualified" removes any realistic possibility for promotion. The vast majority of eligible officers are considered fully qualified.[69]

Phase II is a review of the files for potential below-the-zone promotions. The maximum number of below-the-zone promotions is limited by the initial guidance given to the board. A similar OML is created for the potential below-the-zone promotion candidates and this list then is integrated into the original OML containing all of the fully qualified officers. This second list represents the board's best judgment concerning the relative quality of all of the selected officers.[70]

Phase III uses the OML finalized in Phase II to identify those officers "best qualified" for promotion. This entails simply drawing a line at that point on the OML that equals the number of authorized promotions. At this point, the board must consider the Army's policy concerning affirmative action and equal opportunity. The guidance is clear:

> The Army is firmly committed to providing equal opportunity for minority and female officers in all facets of their career development, utilization, and progression. In evaluating the records of minority and female officers, the board should be

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[68] *Id.*

[69] *Id.*

[70] Memorandum from U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, 10 January 1990, Subject: Promotion Lists to Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps (JA) and Dental Corps (DC) Competitive Categories, Enclosure 1 [hereinafter Memorandum].

> aware that past personal and institutional discrimination may have operated to the disadvantage of minority and female officers. Such discrimination may have manifested itself in disproportionately lower evaluation reports, assignments of lesser importance or responsibility, etc. These factors shall be taken into consideration in evaluating these officers' potential to make continued significant contributions to the Army. The goal for this board is to achieve a percentage of minority and female selections from the promotion zone not less than the selection rate for the total number of officers in the promotion zone (first-time considered category).[71]

The reasons given for the importance of meeting the stated goals are that "to the extent that each board achieves it, there will be a clear perception of equal opportunity to the Army at large and selectees will be afforded future opportunities for career progression to the benefit of the Army."[72] The OML, as it exists at the beginning of Phase III, represents the board's considered belief that the officers are listed, top to bottom, in order of quality and potential for future service. The "best qualified" line represents the number of officers authorized for promotion. For example, if one hundred officers are in the zone and only fifty promotions are authorized, the best qualified line will be drawn under the name of the fiftieth officer on the OML. If, after drawing the best qualified line, the goals for minority or women officers are not met, the "lowest" nonminority above the best qualified line will be replaced with the "highest" minority under the line. This process will continue until all the various categories of minority and women officers are filled or the board determines that the goals should not be met in a particular case. This is possible if insufficient numbers of minority or women officers exist to choose from or if the quality of the remaining officers is so low that it would not be in the Army's best interests to select them over the best qualified nonminority officers.

Over approximately the last twelve-month period, thirty-four officer promotion boards have been held Armywide. Only one board has failed to meet the goals given it for minority and women officers.[73] Currently, the Army's policy is that the OML created at the beginning of Phase III of the promotion process be destroyed prior to release of the OML that has been "adjusted" for consistency with the minority and female goals. No official records are kept of which

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[71] *Id.* at enclosure 2, p. 5.
[72] *Id.*
[73] *See* Information, *supra* note 67.

nonminority officers were "bumped" from the OML to promote minority officers.[74] The mere fact that a particular number or percentage of minority officers were promoted, by itself, may not be evidence of reverse discrimination. Nevertheless, the fact that the only hard evidence is destroyed intentionally could lead to the conclusion that some changes were made.

Before May 1988, a slightly different system was used. Instead of a goal for minority and female officers identical to the "expected number," a window or range was used to identify that minimum or maximum percentage variation from the expected number that would be considered satisfactory. The purpose was to help minority officers overcome the perceived institutional or personal discrimination to which they may have been subjected. A review of the variations from the expected number resulted in the then Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs concluding that these variations were too great. The present system was developed specifically to produce a more exact match between promotions and the percentage of minority and women officers in the general pool.[75]

VI. ARMY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION STRICTLY SCRUTINIZED

If the affirmative action aspect of the Army's promotion system is challenged, a federal court likely would find it unacceptable in light of *Croson*. The Army has failed to articulate compelling government interests justifying such a system and has not sufficiently tailored the program to avoid over-inclusiveness.

A. WHAT GOVERNMENT INTERESTS DOES THE ARMY CITE IN SUPPORT OF ITS EXTENSIVE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION/ EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS? [76]

First, DOD Directive 1350.2 states that discrimination is contrary to good order and discipline and is counterproductive to combat

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[74] *Id.*

[75] *Id.*

[76] While this article has focused on the Army's promotion system in its analysis of the *Croson* case, the Army has numerous affirmative action programs in areas such as accessions and selections for military schooling. All such programs now must be reviewed for compliance with the new standards of *Croson*. To the extent they do not meet the requirements the Army faces the prospect of virtually continuous litigation.

readiness. Second, the guidance given to the board members places importance on these concerns because, if appropriately addressed, the general population will have a perception of equal opportunity within the Army. Related to this last factor is the apparent assumption that selectees will be afforded opportunities for career progression that would not otherwise exist.[77]

These and other expressed reasons within the DOD Directive do not rise to the level of urgency required by the Court in *Croson*. Under that holding, a specific showing of present discrimination must be made to justify unequal protection.[78] The Army's reliance on the possibility of past institutional discrimination is insufficient. The key rationale in the quoted guidance from the Memorandum given to the promotion boards is that "personal and institutional discrimination *may* have operated to the disadvantage of minority and female officers. Such discrimination *may* have manifested itself in *disproportionately* lower evaluation reports, assignments of lessor importance or responsibility, etc. . . ."[79] The Army is basing its affirmative action program on the apparently unsupported assumption that discrimination might have affected some unspecified minority officers' careers adversely.

Additionally, no evidence exists that the Army's affirmative action plan is attempting to remedy presently existing discrimination in the Army. The *Croson* Court emphasized that one government unit no longer can extrapolate discrimination from the society in general or from some other institution as a justification for unequal treatment.[80]

Moreover, there is no showing anywhere in the documents comprising the Army affirmative action policy that there is a nexus between any past discrimination and the disparity between the "expected number" and the actual percentage of minority or women officers promoted. The *Croson* Court has held that the mere recitation of percentages is insufficient and may itself be unconstitutional discrimination.[81] The Army's complete and unquestioning reliance on the concept of the "expected number" puts the program on untenable legal ground.

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[77] *See* Memorandum, *supra* note 70, at Enclosure 2.
[78] *Croson*, 109 S. Ct. at 721.
[79] *See* Memorandum, *supra* note 70, at 5.
[80] *Croson*, 109 S. Ct. at 723.
[81] *Id.* at 722.

B. HAS THE ARMY ADEQUATELY TAILORED ITS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM?

The *Croson* Court held that once discrimination has been remedied there is no longer a justification for unequal treatment. The Army focuses on maintaining a fixed percentage of minority and women officers instead of concentrating on the existence of individual discrimination. As a result, it is impossible to say when the problem has been corrected. Because the Army is committed to a percentage that may be affected by many influences beyond discrimination, and because the Army's emphasis is as much on maintaining as it is on achieving the expected number, the program has no foreseeable end.[82]

Croson raised the issue of discrimination against sectors of the workforce possessing special qualifications.[83] The Army assumes that minority members are fungible in terms of discrimination and that discrimination is pervasive across geographic as well as economic lines. The question the Army must now address is how to demonstrate that an individual currently is suffering discrimination in the Medical Corps, the Dental Corps, or the Judge Advocate General's Corps. It will be problematic, at best, to show how a senior field grade officer possessing certain professional skills has been the victim of past discrimination, much less ongoing prejudice.

The Army cannot argue that such individual scrutiny is too time-consuming, inconvenient, or expensive. The Court has shown little sympathy for bureaucratic burdens when balancing the requirements for equal protection.[84]

Similarly, the various minority categories that the Army has singled out for special treatment are overbroad. Clearly, there are minorities and women who have not been the victims of discrimination either by society or the Army. The Court will require that affirmative action programs be tailored sufficiently to avoid creating beneficiaries who have not themselves been victims of discrimination.[85] Also, the Army program is tailored insufficiently because there is no evidence supporting the Army's policy of using the "expected number" across the board for all minority groups and women. Some attempt must be made in affirmative action programs to distinguish the need for relief and the scope of the problem.

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[82]DA Pam 600-26, para. 3-4(b)(3)(h).
[83]*Croson*, 109 S. Ct. at 725.
[84]*Id.* at 729.
[85]*Id.* at 728.

Additionally, the Army has at its disposal a series of race-neutral alternatives that the Court will require it to use before authorizing unequal treatment.[86] A victim of discrimination may now petition for relief through several Army channels.[87]

Finally, the rigid percentage goal embodied in the concept of the expected number cannot fairly be characterized as anything other than a quota. Every level of command guidance emphasizes the importance of meeting and maintaining these goals. The fact that they have been adhered to rigidly by virtually every board over the last twelve months belies the claim that these percentages are mere guidelines or one of several factors that board members may or may not consider at their option. No practical distinction exists between the percentage set-aside in the *Croson* case and the Army's attempt to set aside a percentage of promotion slots for virtually the same minority groups. Given the powerful language used by the Court in condemning quotas in any form, it seems unlikely that the Army's policy could be seen as anything but a quota. A reviewing court likely would ignore the Army's characterization of this system to the contrary.

VII. CONCLUSION

Ironically, the Army's success in overcoming both institutional and personal discrimination has made affirmative action programs superfluous. As we approach the 100th anniversary of Justice Harlan's great dissent in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, perhaps it is time to recognize that, while we do not yet have a color-blind constitution, it is time for a color-blind Army. This will not be a politically easy issue to resolve, but the current guidance from the Supreme Court is clear. The Army immediately should review the existing affirmative action programs in light of *Croson* and dismantle those aspects of these programs that cannot be justified on the basis of presently existing, individual discrimination. And we should do so with something much greater than all deliberate speed.

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[86] *Id.* at 729.

[87] *E.g.*, Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 138, 10 U.S.C. § 838 (1982); Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), 10 U.S.C § 1552 (1982).

STATEMENT TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

by PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY

President, Eagle Forum

June 18, 1991

Current law forbids the assignment of women to military combat roles in the Air Force, Navy and Marines. Women, of course, can volunteer for those services, but they are excluded -- or protected -- (whichever language you prefer) from the most dangerous of the military assignments. An attempt was made in 1979 during the Carter Administration to repeal the combat exclusion laws. Hearings were held by the House Military Personnel Subcommittee, after which the proposal quietly died and never came to a vote.

On May 8, 1991, Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) presented what the Washington Post called "a surprise measure" to a closed meeting of the House Armed Services Committee and, on a voice vote, it was approved without any hearing or roll call. Calling this a "landmark action," the Congressional news release described it like this: "The House Armed Services Committee voted to allow women to fly combat missions as Air Force and Navy pilots." The Washington Post called this a "legislative watershed" and Congresswoman Schroeder later said, "I never dreamed we would get it out of the House Committee on Armed Services."

The Schroeder amendment was attached to the 1992 Defense Authorization bill and passed by the full House on May 22. If agreed to by the Senate, it would repeal the laws that exclude women from military combat duty in the Air Force, Navy and Marines.

The proposal to assign women to combat duty in the U.S. Armed Services is a very bad idea for many reasons.

The Pregnancy Problem. The proposal to repeal the combat exclusion laws is based on the feminist ideology that there isn't any difference between men and women -- that men and women are fungibles in all occupations, even in the most demanding, vicious, and dangerous occupation called military combat.

So, how does the military deal with the problem that women get pregnant and men do not? When a servicewoman gets pregnant, she is

given the option of resigning immediately (i.e., escaping from the remainder of her term of enlistment, or having limited duty during pregnancy, receiving full medical benefits, receiving paid maternity leave ranging from six weeks to a couple of months, and promising to accept deployment then to anywhere in the world.

It costs $1 million, more or less depending on the type of aircraft, to train a pilot in the U.S. Armed Services. When war comes and there is some nasty fighting to do, every female pilot would have the option to say: "Pardon me, fellas. I'm taking nine months off from flying in order to be pregnant, and then a couple of months more to recuperate. You guys go ahead and kill off the enemy, and I'll see you all in about a year."

All the female pilots won't get pregnant, but some of them will. Even if they promise, at the start of their training, not to get pregnant, some of them will change their minds. Based on actual experience since the sexual integration of the U.S. Armed Services, about ten percent of servicewomen are pregnant at any one time. The pregnancy discharge rate during Desert Shield and Desert Storm was four times higher than normal.

But a few facts leaked out despite tight military news management. When the ship Acadia docked in San Diego, it had 36 pregnant crew members. When the Yellowstone docked, 20 of the crew were pregnant. The Navy spokesman defensively protested, "These women have a right to get pregnant."

Columnist Jack Anderson reported from Saudi Arabia that doctors told him "their most frequent visitors were women asking for pregnancy tests because a positive result would be a ticket home."

This situation is not fair or just or equal. The life of a serviceperson in peacetime can be interesting, exciting, and career-productive. The life of a serviceperson in wartime can be nasty, dangerous, and fatal. Our All Volunteer Army is voluntary when GI Joe and GI Jane sign up -- but, once they sign up, it's not supposed to be voluntary as to whether or not they take the wartime duty when it comes.

Repealing the combat-exclusion laws for women would give women expensive aircraft training in peacetime along with the choice to opt

out (by pregnancy) when the nasty duty comes along. Of course, the men would get no such option.

The military women who appear on panels and on television to argue that pregnancy is not a problem are usually career women with no children and well over childbearing age. The women eligible for combat assignment are in their prime childbearing years: 18 to 26 years old.

There is no way out of this dilemma. We hear a constant refrain that "times have changed" and that "public attitudes have changed." There is no change in the fact that young, healthy women are apt to get pregnant. Feminist ideology has not yet corrupted our thinking to the extent that the military would send a pregnant pilot up to engage in aerial dogfighting with the enemy.

Repealing the combat exclusion cannot by any stretch of the imagination be justified as "equal rights" or "an end to discrimination." Repealing the combat exclusion would be manifestly unfair and discriminatory against all men and against those women who want to pursue a serious military career and do not become pregnant.

The Motherhood Problem. After a year of pregnancy and maternity leave, during which time the servicewoman has received full pay but others have been doing all or part of her work, we face the motherhood problem. Present military policy is based on the feminist notion that there isn't any difference between motherhood and fatherhood, and that, after maternity leave, the new mother is fully deployable to anywhere in the world. After all, she voluntarily enlisted, so she is supposed to make daycare arrangements for her baby.

This is the policy which the American people watched in amazement when we saw press photos of nursing mothers of six-, ten-, and twelve-week-old babies -- plus mothers of two and three preschool children -- being shipped out to the Gulf War. Some were women on active duty; some women were called up from the reserves after completing their term of enlistment.

The sending of these mothers out to fight a war shows that the military has acquiesced in the feminist fallacy that having a baby is no more incapacitating than breaking a leg; i.e., after six weeks or so, the person is fully deployable.

Pregnancy and motherhood are simply not compatible with military service. It is wrong to pretend that a woman who is pregnant or has a baby is ready to ship out to fight a war. She is not ready, and she shouldn't be paid as though she were ready.

It's ridiculous even to discuss women in combat until the military comes to grips with the pregnancy and motherhood questions. The present policies are contrary to combat readiness, common sense, and respect for family integrity.

When the press photos of mothers tearfully saying goodbye to their infants hit the press, the feminists responded by seeking a gender-neutral legislative response. They tried to divert public discussion to problems of single parents and of dual-career military parents deployed to the Gulf.

But pregnancy and motherhood are not gender-neutral situations, and we should not pretend they are. Human experience recognizes that the mother of a six-week-old baby can never be combat ready like the father of a six-week-old baby.

The military has consistently concealed how many mothers of babies were deployed to the Gulf War. The public is entitled to know this figure. Instead, the military has released only the figure of "single parents" and asserts that there are more single parent fathers than mothers. It is evidence of the dishonesty of the military that one statistic lumps together both mothers who have recently given birth and have custody of small children along with fathers who do not have custody at all. The pretense that this is the same problem is a fantasy propagated by childless feminists.

We need an investigation of the stress that the Gulf War placed on mothers and on their children when women with babies under age 3 were deployed to the Gulf War. How did these mothers perform on the job when they were yearning for their babies at home? In addition, our society has an obligation to be concerned about the harm caused to the babies by sending their mothers out to the Gulf War. It is a national embarrassment that the Pentagon acquiesced in the feminist delusion that driving a jeep in the Middle East was more important than a mother taking care of her own baby.

The Affirmative Action Quota Problem. Repealing the combat exclusion laws so that women officers can fly planes in military combat would mean Affirmative Action Quotas for women in an occupation in which they cannot compete equally with men. We know this would be the result because of the mountain of evidence that women are not performing equally with men in military service today.

We can thank the recent Virginia Military Institute (VMI) trial for providing us with proof about how Affirmative Action functions for female cadets at West Point. Those who are suing VMI to force it to admit women and to feminize its curriculum called as their witness Colonel Patrick Toffler, a West Point spokesman, who was supposed to testify that sexual integration is a success at the U.S. Military Academy. During five hours of cross-examination under oath, he revealed a lot of things that West Point has heretofore concealed.

Colonel Toffler admitted that West Point does not require the same physical performance of female cadets that it requires of male cadets. He admitted that West Point has dual standards for males and females; that women cadets do not pass the same physical tests as the men, and that, if they perform the same task, the women are given higher grades. Female cadets are allowed to hold leadership positions based on their padded scores.

Colonel Toffler admitted how the training has been changed -- "modified" he called it -- to accommodate what the female cadets are physically capable of doing and so that they won't be "psychologically discouraged"; e.g., a number of events have been eliminated from the obstacle course "which require considerable upper-body strength," cadets now run in jogging shoes instead of in boots, a lighter-weight rifle has been substituted, judo is allowed to substitute for boxing, and the forced march carrying a heavy pack has been eliminated.

Colonel Toffler admitted that West Point has a sexual quota system for the admission of women cadets and for their assignment after graduation (such as to the engineers). "Those quotas have got to be met," he said. The women cadets do not compete with the men, but compete only against each other for designated female quota slots.

Colonel Toffler admitted that, to accommodate the women who cannot perform as well as the men, West Point has changed from equal training

of all cadets to "comparable or equivalent training." This is a concept that, if men and women exert equivalent effort, they will be ranked as though they had achieved equal performance. An example is the pull-ups, which women lack the arm strength to do, so they are required only to exert "comparable effort" to do a "flexed arm hang."

Colonel Toffler admitted that no free speech is permitted about the performance of women at West Point. Female cadets are allowed to correct their superiors who use such words as "chairman" instead of "chairperson," but men are not permitted to make any negative statement about women in the military. The New York Times reported on May 26 that it is a "career-killer" for a man to utter anything negative about the performance of women. Colonel Toffler even said that the cadets are given sensitivity training to help promote acceptance of the sexually integrated program.

This situation is similar to Affirmative Action for minorities, which has been taking place for years while authorities have been denying it and covering it up. When a student at Georgetown University exposed the truth about minority quotas for admission to law school, he narrowly escaped expulsion because the authorities didn't want their practice known.

The American public has just discovered that, for the last ten years the government has been engaging in a process called "race norming," i.e., falsifying the employment test scores of minorities and then deceiving prospective employers.

Thanks to Colonel Toffler's sworn testimony, we know that West Point has been engaged in a similar practice -- we might call it "sex norming" -- and then hiding it from the public.

We can reasonably infer that the practice at West Point is carried on also at the Naval and Air Force Academies. We can also reasonably infer that the same practice would obtain if female officers were admitted into the highly demanding and competitive program for flying combat aircraft precisely because the prime candidates for these jobs would be the female Academy graduates who have enjoyed Affirmative Action benefits ever since they entered the military.

The Problem of Who Makes the Combat Decision. The Congressional news release issued after the Schroeder amendment was passed in a closed House Armed Services Committee meeting explained it thusly: "The committee action would not require the services to place women on combat missions, but would give them the option by lifting the statutory prohibition that exists today for the Air Force and Navy."

"Allow" and "option" are certainly very different words from "assign" and "require."

It is probable that, when the House Armed Services Committee passed the Schroeder amendment, the Members thought they were merely giving the military the discretion to open some combat jobs to women.

However, this plan to pass the buck from Congress to the Armed Services was knocked into a cocked hat when Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Personnel Christopher Jehn gave a written response to questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee in which he stated that, if Congress gives the Defense Department the authority to allow women to serve in combat jobs, the Department of Defense will "be obligated" to use that authority.

It is one thing to "allow" the Defense Department to open some combat jobs to women, and it is something else again to mandate the assignment of women to combat jobs and missions, just like men.

The Problem of Enlisted Women Versus Female Officers. All this push for women in combat is coming only from the female officers. Enlisted women do <u>not</u> want repeal of the combat exclusion laws. The women officers are seeking their career advancement at the expense of the enlisted women who would get the heavy and dangerous work without any of the glamour of piloting planes.

Repealing the combat exclusion laws would betray the enlisted women because they signed up when the law assured them they would be excluded from combat. Professor Charles Moskos of Northwestern University interviewed scores of women who served in the Panama invasion, and he didn't find <u>any</u> enlisted women who favor repeal of the combat exclusion laws.

The two laws which would be repealed by the Schroeder amendment do not cover the Army, which maintains its combat exclusion policy by Army

regulation. However, this Army policy is clearly tied to and grounded in the legislative policy established by Congress through the combat exclusion laws that apply to the Air Force, Navy and Marines. The repeal of those laws would cut the constitutional ground out from under the Army policy.

The Problem of Making Women Liable to Conscription. In the landmark case of Rostker v. Goldberg decided June 25, 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it is constitutional for Congress to exempt all women from the military draft and from draft registration. In that decision, the Court recognized the reality that draft registration, conscription, and military combat are all one continuum.

The court based its decision on the fact that any military draft is for the purpose of raising combat troops. If women are not eligible for combat duty, then it makes no sense to draft them or to register them for the draft.

What the Court said was this: "Women as a group, unlike men as a group, are not eligible for combat. The restrictions on the participation of women in combat in the Navy and Air Force are statutory," citing 10 U.S.C. 6015 and 8549 (the sections targeted for repeal by the Schroeder amendment). The Army and Marine Corps prohibit the use of women in combat as a matter of policy in conformity with those statutes.

The Court's decision in Rostker hammered the point home hard. "The existence of the combat restrictions clearly indicates the basis for Congress' decision to exempt women from registration. The purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from combat, Congress concluded that they would not be needed in the event of a draft, and therefore decided not to register them."

The Court quoted from the legislative history of the draft law. The Senate report stated: "The principle that women should not intentionally and routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys wide support among our people. It is universally supported by military leaders who have testified before the Committee. . . . Current law and policy exclude women from being assigned to combat in our military

forces, and the Committee reaffirms this policy."

The Court again cited the legislative history spelled out in the Senate Report: "The policy precluding the use of women in combat is, in the Committee's view, the most important reason for not including women in a registration system."

Under current federal law, every young man of age 18 must register for the military draft. No young women are required to register. It is clear that this exemption of women is based on the laws that exclude women from military combat, since the only purpose of a draft is to induct for combat. If the government could promise that all those drafted would never see combat, we obviously would never need conscription!

The oft-stated goal of the radical feminists is a totally gender-neutral society, and the military is the cutting edge. Their three-step scenario to achieve this goal starts with repealing the combat exclusion laws, while telling the public that this change would apply only to women who volunteer. Step number two will be to make the draft registration law gender neutral, while reassuring the public that a draft will never be reimposed. Step number three will be to impose some kind of conscription or universal military service, thereby inducting young women along with young men.

Most advocates of repealing the combat-exclusion laws admit that they seek a reimposition of the draft. That may seem unlikely, but then who would have guessed that any Congressmen would have voted to send women into military combat?

The radical feminists would then be able to use the raw power of government to force us toward the gender-neutral society which is their longtime goal.

The Problem With Their Arguments. The advocates of assigning women to military combat assert that American attitudes have changed. On the contrary, the Associated Press poll of February 1991 reported that the American public by two-to-one thinks that the military policy of sending mothers to the Gulf War was wrong. Sending moms to battle is not acceptable to any Americans except the radical feminists who are over military and childbearing age and haven't any daughters.

The advocates of assigning women to military combat assert that the 33,000 women who served in the Persian Gulf proved that women can and should serve in combat. First of all, by any historical standard, the Gulf War was not real combat; it was, as one soldier described it, "a turkey shoot." During the entire six-week war, with some 540,000 Americans in the region, only about 100 U.S. troops died from hostile fire as compared to more than 100,000 enemy deaths -- a precedent-shattering ratio of 1,000 to one.

The few U.S. servicewomen who were killed in the Gulf War prove only that women in a war zone can be killed, which was always obvious. These deaths certainly do not prove that units comprising both men and women can survive successfully when engaging in combat. Combat occurs when a unit must keep fighting while members of the unit are being killed by enemy fire. Even the mini-invasion of Panama provided more combat than the Gulf War.

We don't know what the Gulf War proved about the performance of servicewomen there because the military won't tell us. The American public got only the news which the military chose to give us, and, as reported by the New York Times of May 26, 1991, military policy permits no negative comment about the performance of women.

The Problem of the Feminist Attack On Our Culture. The combat exclusion laws are a rational legislative recognition of fundamental differences between men and women. The combat exclusion laws have been fully supported by the American people through all the wars of this century. The armies and navies of every potential enemy are exclusively male, and no women diminish their combat readiness.

Fighting wars is a mission that requires tough, tenacious and courageous men to endure the most primitive and uncivilized situations and pain in order to survive, plus determination to kill enemies who are just as tough, tenacious and courageous, and probably vicious and sadistic, too. Men are attracted to serve in the military because of its intensely masculine character. The qualities that make them good soldiers -- aggressiveness, risk-taking, and enjoyment of body-contact competition -- are conspicuously absent in women.

Pretending that women can perform equally with men in tasks that require those attributes is not only dishonest; it corrupts the system.

Only a tiny minority of American women choose a military career at all, and of those only a tiny minority are agitating to get combat jobs (in peacetime, of course), namely, the officers. This little group of ambitious women should not be allowed to impose their peculiar views of gender neutrality on our nation.

The whole idea of men sending women, including mothers, out to fight the enemy is uncivilized, degrading, barbaric, and embarrassing. It's contrary to our culture, to our respect for men and women, and to our belief in the importance of the family and motherhood. And furthermore, no one respects a man who would let a woman do his fighting for him.

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
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June 14, 1991

BY OVERNIGHT MAIL
Senator John W. Warner
225 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C., 20510

RE: Combat Exclusion Laws

Dear Senator Warner,

The laws and policies which exclude women from assignment to combat roles in the United States military were recently considered by the House of Representatives, which as you know voted to amend them to permit women to serve in combat roles in the Air Force and, with respect to its planes, in the Navy. We are aware that Armed Services has hearings on this subject starting tomorrow.

The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, a professional organization with over 19,000 members, has recently completed a study of the combat exclusion laws and policies, a copy of which is enclosed for your review. The Association recommends the repeal of those laws and policies for a variety of reasons related to the military mission.

Combat exclusion is a policy under assault by demographic realities (despite any proposed force reductions), by the services' redefinition of their operational terms (which have narrowed the combat exclusion and which assure inconsistency in application from service to service), by actual military practice (women are at risk in modern warfare whether they are flying direct combat support or are commanding Patriot missile batteries in the rear) and by the realization that women can and wish to contribute materially to the military mission.

After our considered review, it appears to this Association that there are sound reasons for the equal participation of women in all facets of the mission of the armed forces for which they are capable, and for job assignments to be determined by the military services themselves based both on the military's needs and on the abilities and merit of the service man or woman -- without regard to arbitrary factors. We do not recommend lowering job standards or altering them in ways unrelated to the task.

We thank you for your attention to this matter, and if there is any way in which this Association can be of assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate to call upon us.

Sincerely,

Stephen J. Shapiro

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

THE COMBAT EXCLUSION LAWS: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS GONE

I. INTRODUCTION

This report examines what is today publicly considered a controversial issue: whether women should be fully integrated into the single facet of the United States armed forces from which they are now excluded: combat. It was not controversial in 1987 when the President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York asked the Committee on Military Affairs and Justice to participate in an Association-wide examination of issues concerning women and the law. At that time, outside of military circles, most people had not considered the combat exclusion laws a pressing issue. The public generally was unconcerned with the matter, as was the Congress and the media. In fact, the Committee's own subcommittee thought after a year's review that there may be too little public interest in the issue to pursue it as a full report.

Not long thereafter, however, the United States invaded Panama. During that event the press gave a good deal of coverage to a military woman who, it was said, led an attack on a Panamanian military installation. Suddenly, the issue of women in combat was cover-story news.

The Committee determined to focus on the federal laws which prohibit women from combat positions in the Air Force and the Navy (the only services which are, in fact, restricted by legislation when making their job assignments), and on the Army's similar but voluntary policy. Further, the Committee -- whose jurisdiction is military affairs -- determined to answer the self-posed question of whether these statutory provisions should be repealed from the perspective of the armed services themselves, that is, from the point of view of the military mission. Although certainly many other issues are implicated, not the least of which are questions of career opportunity for women and issues of sex discrimination, the Association has other committees which

can examine the subject from those perspectives, including the Committee on Civil Rights and the Committee on Sex and the Law. Therefore, this report does not attempt to review the combat exclusion laws from a civil rights, equal protection perspective or from the perspective of women's rights and employment; nor does the report address, except by identification, the broad sociological aspects of this issue.

We recognized that as civilians with little or no military experience, we would be relying on the literature, on our discussions with those more intimately involved and on our judgment and common sense. It was not our intention, nor do we pretend, to have performed our own studies, unearthed new data or divined theories that scholars at many of the fine military institutions have not already developed. We do hope, however, that we have sufficiently focused the sharp light of critical inquiry that lawyers are so adept at shining on the particular question at hand, synthesized much of the available public data and recent military experiences and then drawn a conclusion in a way that an interested person would find helpful in trying to come to his or her own conclusion on this matter. We also note the high level of personal cooperation that we have received from every level of the military, including both the civilian leadership and the professional military, with whom we do not cease to be impressed.

II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. History of Women's Participation in U.S. Armed Services

Women participated in both the regular active duty forces and in the reserve forces of the United States armed forces prior to the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 ("1948 Act"),[1] the post-World War II legislation which granted women permanent status in all the armed services for the first time. For example, the Army Nurse Corps was organized in 1901, followed by the Navy Nurse Corps in 1908. In 1917, the Navy authorized the enrollment of women in the Naval Reserve for the

1 Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 356 (1948).

ratings of yeoman, electrician (radio), and other ratings which were considered "essential",[2] and the Marine Corps instituted a similar program in 1918. In 1942, the Army established the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) in response to the manpower shortage during World War II. The Navy Women's Reserve and Marine Corps Women's Reserve were also created in 1942, after political infighting within the Navy and on Capitol Hill and with the personal intervention of Mrs. Roosevelt.[3] Later in 1942 the Coast Guard Women's Reserve was established. In 1943, WAAC was replaced with the Women's Army Corps ("WAC"), which afforded women full military status rather than mere auxiliary status. Women serving in the Naval Reserve were known as Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Services (WAVES); civilian women serving in the Army Air Force were known as Women's Air Force Service Pilots (WASPS); and women serving in the Coast Guard were known as SPAR(an acronym derived from the Coast Guard motto, "Semper Paratus - Always Ready"). By the end of World War II, 350,000 women had served in an armed force of

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2 Maj. Gen. Jeanne Holm, USAF (Ret.), Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution, Presidio Press, Novato, Ca. (1982), at 10.

3 Id. at 25-27, citing Joy Bright Hancock [Capt., USN (Ret.)], Lady in the Navy, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis (1972), at 56. The Army's WAAC legislation, introduced by Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers in May 1941, was passed after the War Department's resistance collapsed with the attack on Pearl Harbor and developing manpower shortages. The legislation was a compromise inasmuch as the War Department would not support full military status for women and some members of Congress opposed giving women any military status whatsoever. Rogers sought some military status for women so that, unlike the women who served during World War I, they would have the financial relief enjoyed by male service members (e.g., veterans' gratuities or care) when their health was damaged as a result of war service. The Navy however, did not support the WAAC legislation and had refused the Army's offer for a joint bill to provide auxiliaries for both services. As with the Army, however, the Navy realized by mid-1941 that serious manpower shortages would be created on shore as men were sent for fleet duty and to the forward bases. By the spring of 1942, the Navy agreed to make women members of the Naval Reserve. Resistance was nevertheless met in the Senate Naval Affairs Committee (but not in the House), and from those who attempted to side-step the Secretary of the Navy by convincing the President that auxiliary, rather than full military, status should be granted. The First Lady intervened to prevent this end-run. Mrs. Roosevelt acted on a letter sent by Dean Harriet Elliott of the University of North Carolina which explained the need for full military status and solicited the First Lady's help in obtaining the President's approval.

approximately 12,000,000,[4] in comparison to the 39,000 women in service at the end of World War I.

The 1948 Act built on these entities and granted women permanent status in the armed services. In addition, it codified significant restrictions on their status within the services. For example, the Act created a prohibition on women serving in combat; a separate rank and promotion structure for women and men; different minimum age restrictions on enlistment between women and men; a limitation on total female enlisted strength of 2% of personnel on duty in the regular establishment of each service; a 10% ceiling on female officers who could serve as permanent regular lieutenant colonels and Navy commanders; and a 20% ceiling in the Navy for the number of lieutenant commanders. Under the 1948 Act, the services' use of women is permissive, not mandatory. Its ultimate importance, however, despite its restrictions, was that by providing permanent status to women in all the armed forces (regular and reserve), the 1948 Act provided for a nucleus of trained women who could be mobilized in the event of a national emergency.

The statutory or policy basis for the exclusion of women from combat differs for each service. The Navy restriction is contained in 10 USC 6015,[5] which prohibits the permanent assignment of female members of the Navy to duty on vessels or on aircraft that are "engaged in combat missions" or on other than temporary duty to vessels except in the case of hospital ships, naval transports and similar vessels not expected to be assigned to combat missions. Notably, in 1948, there were no hospital ships or transports in the fleet, and the reference to vessels of similar classification not expected to be assigned combat missions was not added to the statute until 1978. The Marine Corps falls under the Department of the Navy and adheres to the restrictions in 10 USC 6015.

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4 After each World War, demobilization occurred, greatly reducing the number and role of women. Id. at 16-20, 98-105.

5 See text of 10 USC 6015 set forth in the Appendix.

The Navy combat prohibition evolved from an amendment, proposed during the 1948 Armed Services Committee hearings by Rep. Carl Vinson to a larger piece of legislation which itself did not contain the ban. It is not clear why Congressman Vinson proposed the amendment, nor why Congress adopted it, since it engendered little debate. As Judge John Sirica concluded in Owens v. Brown, the case which found that the absolute ban on assignment of female personnel to sea duty, except in certain ships, abridges the equal protection guaranty embodied in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment:[6]

> The part of Section 6015 being challenged . . . was added casually, over the military's objection and without significant deliberation . . . . The provision was not directed at enhancing military preparedness . . . (n)or was it inserted to take account of the practical considerations associated with integrated shipbound personnel . . . . Instead, the sense of the discussion is that Section 6015's bar against assigning females to shipboard duty was premised on the notion that duty at sea is part of an essentially masculine tradition.[7]

The statutory restrictions applicable to the Air Force are also contained in the 1948 Act at 10 USC 8549.[8] They prohibit the permanent assignment of female members "to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions." There are, however, exceptions to the prohibition for women in medical, dental, veterinary, and medical services, nursing and medical specialists and judge advocate and chaplain functions, all of which are designated in 10 USC 8067.

The Army, on the contrary, is not prohibited by law from assigning women to combat duty. Rather, 10 USC 3012 provides that the Secretary of the Army may assign, detail and prescribe the duties of members of the Army without restriction. Notably, the Army resisted a statutory ban because it believed that future combat areas could not be identified since "modern warfare makes the entire United States

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6 See infra, p. 11, 455 F. Supp. 291, 305 (D.D.C. 1978).
7 Id. at 306.
8 See text of 10 USC 8549 set forth in the Appendix.

vulnerable as a combat area in the future."[9] However, as a matter of policy the Army has prohibited women from routine engagement in combat. Prior to its statutory dissolution in 1978,[10] WAC existed as a separate unit and had its own exclusion policy; after 1978, the Army developed a service-wide combat exclusion policy in an attempt to remain consistent with the intent of Congress when 10 USC 6015 and 8549 became effective.[11]

In June 1948, there were 1,296 line and staff women officers and 6,476 enlisted women in the four branches of the armed service.[12] From 1948 to 1969, women comprised on average 1.2% of the total armed forces, and they served mainly in health care and clerical positions.[13] However, today women make up approximately 14% of the Air Force (and 19% of the Air Force Reserve), 11% of the Army (and 21% of the Army Reserve), 10% of the Navy (and 14% of the Navy Reserve) and 5% of the Marine Corps (and 5% of the Marine reserve).[14] Thus, 378,550 women now represent approximately 11% of all active duty personnel and approximately 13% of all ready reserve forces, which together comprise the United States armed services .[15]

The substantial increase in the number of women in the military indicated by the foregoing statistics and the number of career fields open to women are the direct result of political and legal decisions since 1967, concurrent with pressures for greater

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9 Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1947, Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 80: 1 [G.P.O. 1947], at 88 (statement of Colonel Mary Hallaren).
10 Pub. L. No. 95-485.
11 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 100th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., November 19, 1987 at 68-69 (statement of Martin M. Ferber); and Department of Defense Report, Task Force on Women in the Military, January 1988 (hereinafter cited as "DoD Task Force Report").
12 Holm, supra note 2 at 128.
13 Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach, Women and the Military, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (1977) at 12.
14 Becraft, "Women in the U.S. Armed Services: The War in the Persian Gulf", Women's Research and Education Institute, March 1991, at 1. See also "Some Missile Crews to Pair Men and Women", New York Times, December 8, 1987 at A1, A28.
15 Id. See also "Are Women the Weak Link in the Military?", U.S. News and World Report, November 20, 1989 at 61.

access to personnel resources created by the nation's commitment to an all volunteer armed force.[16] Some of these matters are discussed below.

In 1967, faced with opposition to continued conscription, Congress amended the 1948 Act, and, among other things, revised the restrictions on women holding ranks and eliminated a 2% female limit on the regular line officers and enlisted strengths.[17] This was done in an effort to find alternative sources of personnel and to ensure that women would be in a position to make a worthwhile contribution to the services in which they served.[18] It was also designed to enable female officers commissioned during World War II and later integrated into the regular services to stay on, rather than to be forced into early retirement. These were women caught in promotion bottlenecks and career stagnation owing to the artificial statutory barriers established by the 1948 Act. Department of Defense ("DoD") Assistant Secretary for Manpower Thomas Morris, after pressure from the DoD's Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services ("DACOWITS") , and despite DoD reluctance, ordered in 1965 that legislation be drafted to "seek parity [between men and women] only in respect to recognizing merit and performance."[19]

With debates about the Equal Rights Amendment in the background and sexual stereotyping coming under Constitutional attack in the courts, the services preferred to make their own internal examination of sex discrimination practices rather than face external interference.[20] In 1969, by administrative action, the Reserve Officers Training Corps ("ROTC") was opened to women for the Air Force, and in

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16 Carolyn H. Becraft, "Military Women: Policies and Politics", paper presented at the 5th Annual Women and Work Conference, The University of Texas at Arlington, May 2, 1988.
17 Pub. L. No. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (1967).
18 Holm, supra note 2 at 192.
19 Id. at 199. DACOWITS is a group of about 35 civilians appointed to serve three year terms as advisors to the Secretary of Defense on issues relating to military women. For the Department of Transportation, Coast Guard women also come under the purview of DACOWITS.
20 Id. at 267.

1972 the ROTC was opened to women for the Army and Navy as well, the latter after witnessing the success of the Air Force program.[21] In 1973 Navy women were permitted to enter pilot training, and in 1974 the minimum age for service was made the same for both men and women.[22]

Before 1975 women were denied entrance to the service academies by armed services regulations, and each of the services unequivocally opposed their entrance.[23] By Congressional action in 1976, however, women were finally admitted to the three major service academies: Army, Navy and Air Force,[24] 10 USC chapter 403 (regarding the United States Military Academy), 10 USC chapter 603 (regarding the United States Naval Academy), and 10 USC chapter 903 (regarding the United States Air Force Academy). Women had already been admitted to the U.S. Coast Guard and Merchant Marine Academies on the initiative of those institutions.

The Army, Navy and Air Force opposed women's entry to their service academies on the theory that the academies are institutions focused on producing leadership for combat and women cannot fill combat roles.[25] Their position was countered by a General Accounting Office report which demonstrated statistically that the academies' graduates did not necessarily obtain combat assignments. Samuel S. Stratton, Representative from New York, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the overwhelming opposition within the DoD to admission of women to the service academies was "based on nothing more than inertia and resistance to

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21 Id. at 270. Some of the resistance to the Army and Navy efforts came from WAC and WAVE Directors who preferred separate women's programs as a means of controlling the training and quality of women officers and who feared a coeducational ROTC would jeopardize them.
22 Pub. L. No. 93-290, 88 Stat. 173 (1974).
23 Hearings Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel, Subcomm. 2 of the House Armed Services Comm. on H.R. 9832, 10705, 11267, 11268, 11711, 13729, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 Part 5 (1974) (Serial No. 94-9 May 29, 1974) (hereinafter cited as "1974 Hearings").
24 Dept. of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-106, 89 Stat. 531, 537 (1975).
25 1974 Hearings, supra note 23.

change" and, further, that "service academy training gives almost no military or combat training to its graduates whatsoever. These are primarily engineering schools . . . ."[26]

C. The Role of Litigation

Paralleling these changes was the political movement during the 1960's and 1970's for equal opportunity for women. This gave new momentum to judicial and non-judicial efforts to eliminate discriminatory treatment of women in the armed forces. The rejection by Congress of an amendment to the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, which would have altered it to exclude women from the draft, suggests Congressional anticipation of a significantly greater military role for women.[27] In fact, the ultimate catalyst in revising discriminatory policies was not Congress, the White House or the DoD, but, rather, the federal courts.[28] Judicial decisions during the 1970's removed many of the legal impediments to women's participation in the military and provided women access to many of the rights and benefits male personnel had: the right to receive the same benefits for their dependents as males;[29] the right to remain in the service after bearing children;[30] the right to attend military academies; the right to serve on some previously restricted ships;[31] and the right not to be mandatorily discharged in the same period of time as men are discharged in acknowledgment of women's fewer promotional opportunities.[32] The constitutionality

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26 Id. at 35, 37. Representative Stratton was a cosponsor of H.R. 11268 and described himself as senior member of the Committee who was often classed as belonging to its more conservative and military wing, as well as a member of the Board of Visitors of the U.S. Naval Academy, and as a 31-year member of the U.S. Naval Reserve, six of which were on active duty.

27 Binkin and Bach, supra note 13 at 14.

28 Holm, supra note 2 at 266.

29 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).

30 Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F. 2d. 1114 (2d Cir. 1976).

31 Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978).

32 Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). Under the scheme, a male naval officer who failed to be promoted on two consecutive occasions was subject to a mandatory discharge, while a woman naval officer was subject to such a discharge only if, after 13 years of service, she was not on the promotion list. In Ballard, a male had claimed his

of the military's policy of mandatory discharge for pregnant females was rendered moot when the mandatory discharge policy was abandoned before the Supreme Court could resolve the conflict in lower court rulings.[33]

The combat ban itself was the subject of a suit[34] brought by a female student at the University of Pennsylvania who failed to receive a Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps ("NROTC") scholarship and thereupon challenged the Navy's grant of a disproportionate number of NROTC scholarships to men. The court held, however, that Ms. Kovach lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Navy's two-year program because her educational background did not make her eligible for selection by the Navy,[35] and, thus, the constitutionality of the ban was not tested.

In Rostker v. Goldberg,[36] the United States Supreme Court addressed the controversial issue of a male-only military draft. While the court did not rule on the constitutionality of the combat exclusion or on the constitutionality of a statute governing conscription, it displayed deference to Congress because of the national security dimension and overturned the Third Circuit's decision that the new registration provisions of the Military Selective Service Act ("MSSA") -- which provided for all-male future drafts -- were gender discriminatory in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that "[i]t would be blinking reality to say that our precedents requiring deference to Congress in military affairs are not implicated by the present case"[37] and that "Congress had acted well

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discharge was impermissible because, had he been female, he would have four more years to obtain a promotion.

33 Binkin and Bach, supra note 13 at 44.

34 Kovach v. Middendorf, 424 F. Supp. 72 (D. Del. 1976).

35 Id. at 79-80.

36 453 U.S. 57 (1981). The vote was 6-3, with Justices White, Marshall and Brennan dissenting. The case did not involve a challenge to the statutes or policies that prohibit female members of the Armed Forces from serving in combat.

37 Id. at 68-69.

within its constitutional authority when it authorized the registration of men and not women under the Military Selective Service Act."[38]

Justice Marshall, dissenting, wrote that there was no legal basis for Congress to exclude women from draft registration, and he criticized Congress for its eagerness to accept women in the all-volunteer force but its unwillingness to allow women to register for a future draft. In addition, he criticized the other members of the bench for not critically analyzing the testimony given before Congress on the issue, and dismissed any suggestion that a future draft would of necessity only be implemented to fill combat-destined positions. Further, he opposed blind obedience to Congress in the area of national security and declared that "the phrase 'war power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support any exercise of congressional power which can be brought within its ambit."[39]

The 1948 Act was amended again in October 1978 to permit assignment of women to limited sea duty.[40] This legislation followed on the heels of a district court decision in connection with the combat ban, Owens v. Brown,[41] which found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds the Navy's absolute ban on female assignment to ships. The Court found that the Navy is limited in its assignment power only by the general combat restriction. Judge Sirica characterized the legislative history of Section 6015 as one which only "tends to suggest a statutory purpose more related to the traditional way of thinking about women than to the demands of military preparedness."[42] As a result of the 1978 amendment, women were permitted to serve on permanent duty on Navy vessels not expected to be assigned combat missions and

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38 Id. at 83.
39 Id. at 112-113, citing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-264 (1967).
40 Pub. L. No. 95-485, Title VIII, Section 808, 92 Stat. 1623 (1978), amending 10 USC 6015.
41 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978).
42 Id. at 306.

up to six months temporary duty on other Navy ships; this change still left the core of the Navy, the combat fleet, with no women.

In 1978, the Navy began to allow access to sea trials (a basic component of the seaman's job description) to female civilian engineers and technicians who worked to overhaul Navy ships and submarines. This change occurred only after the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") found the Navy liable for sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, an issue brought before it by a woman after she had exhausted the Navy's internal grievance procedures. The Navy had argued that admission of women to its sea trials would imperil Navy crew privacy.[43]

D. Department of Defense Actions

In 1973, the DoD draft of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act ("DOPMA") would have repealed 10 USC 6015 and 8549, the provisions which embody the combat restrictions. However, the services were able to convince DoD to withdraw the repeal portions of DOPMA since the controversy which would attend the issue of women in combat, they argued, could delay the passage of DOPMA.[44] Instead, Congress expressed its desire that the services clarify the combat exclusion,[45] and it statutorily directed that the Secretary of Defense:

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43 Hearings Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of House Comm. on Armed Services, November 15, 1983, at 4 (statement of Carolyn Becraft, Director, National Information Center on Women and the Military, Women's Equity Action League) at 4. Such privacy arguments were absent in the recent 1990 House hearings during which the Navy boasted of a 21% increase in female officers and 92% increase over Fiscal Year 1988 in female enlisted personnel serving at sea. "Women in the Armed Forces," Hearings Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of House Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., March 20, 1990 at 32 (statement of Vice Adm. J.M. Boorda, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower, Personnel and Training).

44 Holm, supra note 2 at 337.

45 Pub. L. No. 95-79, 91 Stat. 327 (1977).

> For the purpose of promoting equality and expanding job opportunities for the female members of the Armed Forces . . . submit to the Congress a definition of the term "combat", together with recommendations on expanding job classifications to which female members of the armed services may be assigned, and recommendations on any changes in law necessary to implement these recommendations.[46]

Following DoD's new definition of combat in 1978,[47] DoD proposed legislation in 1979 which again proposed repeal of Sections 6015 and 8549 in order to overcome the constriction on Navy and Air Force personnel policies. However, the November 1979 hearings before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee ended without a decision regarding repeal of the combat exclusions, and the proposal was again dropped.[48] Proponents of the proposed legislation, including Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert B. Pirie and DACOWITS Chairman Sally K. Richardson, argued for the greatest possible flexibility in personnel policies and pointed out that the 1948 Act restrictions were no longer useful because of the widespread use of women in the military.[49] Official witnesses of the Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard supported repeal, but many retired personnel and the Marine Corps representatives, including Lt. Gen. Edward J. Bronars, the Corps' Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, testified against it. For example, Army General William Westmoreland (Ret.) stated:

> "[T]he political administration seems to be trying to use the military as a vehicle to further social change in our society . . . . No man with gumption wants a woman to fight his Nation's battles. I do not believe the American public . . . wants to see women . . . do a man's job and that is to fight."[50]

Another major legislative step was taken in 1978 when Congress abolished WAC as a separate unit.[51] Thereafter, women were integrated into the mainstream

46 Id.
47 See Section II infra at p. 17.
48 The legislation was introduced as H.R. 4256. Holm, supra note 2 at 338; E. Collier, CRS Issue Brief, January 29, 1990, at 8.
49 Women in the Military, Hearings Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of House Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., Nov. 13 - 16, 1979 and Feb. 11, 1980.
50 Id. at 75.
51 Pub. L. No. 95-485.

Army. This was part of a process of eliminating the support structures which had been established in conjunction with the 1948 Act, a process which went hand-in-hand with decisions to end differential treatment and to effect integration.

The Coast Guard's success in 1977 with two fully integrated crews on two cutters encouraged it to use mixed crews on many other ships and in 1978 to remove all assignment restrictions based on sex. The Coast Guard's emphasis on adult, professional behavior proved to be successful.[52] Shortly after such removal, two women were chosen to command 95-foot cutters.[53]

With the new Reagan administration's coming into office in January 1981, the Army and Air Force chose to challenge the increasing involvement of women in the services by submitting to the Reagan transition team a proposal to "pause" in the military's recruitment of women pending a review of the impact of women on readiness and military strength.[54] Senator Proxmire attacked the Army and Air Force proposal as a ploy to undermine the All Volunteer Force at the expense of women, thereby justifying a return to the draft in order to meet personnel goals during the Reagan military build-up. He thought the Army and Air Force were attempting to use a new

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52 Holm, supra note at 333.
53 Id. at 334.
54 Id. at 381. The Army established a Women in the Army Policy Review Group, whose report was published on November 12, 1982. The Group recommended: (1) Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test ("MEPSCAT") to measure the physical strength of recruits and (2) Direct Combat Probability Code ("DCPC"). Under the 1983 DCPC policy, which replaced the Combat Exclusion Policy established by the Secretary of the Army in 1977, discussed supra at 6, women may be assigned to all units that do not routinely perform their mission forward of the brigade rear boundary. The DCPC ascribes to each Army job an assessment of probability of that job's participating in direct combat. Women cannot be assigned to P1 (highest probability) jobs. Battlefield location has the greatest impact on the "P" rating of a position, the other factors are job specialty, the unit's mission and tactical doctrine. The DCPC system closes many noncombat positions or units to women. As a result of the Group's study, it was recommended that 23 military occupational specialties be closed to women.

administration as an excuse to deny women equal pay, promotion, and enlistment rights.[55]

After the DoD policy review was completed in 1981, the five-year enlisted female accession goals were ultimately negotiated between the DoD and each service individually. Soon after taking office the administration announced a goal to increase the number of military personnel by 200,000 within the All Volunteer Force structure, or about ten percent, by 1985. In doing so, the Reagan administration resisted the urgings of the military community to revive the draft. The qualitative and quantitative need for women thereupon became a reality, and in October 1983, Asst. Secretary of Defense Lawrence J. Korb proposed that the Army increase its recruitment of women to 75,000 (11.1 percent of Army enlistment) by 1989. As a result, the Army reopened to women thirteen of the twenty-three job classifications it had previously proposed closing.

The trend continued when the Air Force, beginning January 1, 1988, assigned paired mixed-sex officer crews to the deep underground stations that control intercontinental nuclear missiles to permit better scheduling of crews. These crews operate 100 central centers for 1,000 missiles on seven bases across the western plains. Men had previously complained that women were not carrying their share of the duty, a consequence of the Air Force's requirement that women serve in the silos only with other women.[56] The Strategic Air Command expects that women will eventually comprise 20% of the 1200 officers who operate these missile centers.[57]

In February 1988, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci ordered the following service-wide reforms as a renewed effort to set standards of fairness for women: (1) the Air Force would allow women aboard high altitude reconnaissance aircraft such as

55 Holm, supra note 2 at 384-385, citing Sen. William Proxmire, press release, March 4, 1981.
56 "Some Missile Crews to Pair Men and Women", New York Times, December 8, 1987 at A1.
57 "Mixed Missile Crews a Success", Minerva's Bulletin Board, Spring 1989, at 11.

the SR-71 Blackbird, the TR-1 and the U-2; (2) the Marine Corps would permit women to serve as security guards at U.S. embassies (similar guard duty positions had already been open to women in the Army and Air Force)[58]; (3) the Navy would permit female personnel on EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft, and would assign women to the combat logistics force;[59] and (4) the Army would consider opening certain brigade positions, such as forward support battalions, which do not face the same combat risks as front-line battalions.[60] These steps to enhance the role of women in military service were based on the recommendations of the DoD Task Force, headed by Dr. David J. Armor, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, which produced in 1987 the DoD Task Force Report.[61]

III. APPLICATION OF THE COMBAT EXCLUSION LAWS AND POLICIES

A. Definition and Application of Terms.

The utilization of women by each branch of the Armed Forces differs on the basis of each service's interpretation of the term "combat." The definition of terms relating to combat, which definitions were not provided in the 1948 Act, differ among the services as well. Both the interpretation and the definitions have changed over time. Generally these changes have been the subtle and sometimes not-so-subtle efforts of the various branches to skirt the restrictions imposed on women's roles in combat and to move women into more combat-related positions.

In February 1978, Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan responded to Congress' demand for a definition of the term combat.[62] DoD's response indicated a cautious but expansive attitude toward women in combat:

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58 New York Times, February 3, 1988, pp. A1 and A23, at A23.
59 The effect of this would open up approximately 9,000 new positions for female sailors previously unavailable to them.
60 "Redefining a Woman's Place", Time, February 15, 1988 at 27.
61 DoD Task Force Report, supra note 11.
62 See Section II, supra at 13.

> Combat means "engaging an enemy or being engaged by an enemy in armed conflict"; (ii) a person is "in combat" when in a geographic area designated as a combat/hostile fire zone by the Secretary of Defense or other specific circumstances and events; and (iii) a combat mission is "a mission of a unit, ship, aircraft or task organization which has as one of its primary objectives to seek out, reconnoiter, or engage an enemy". A service member in combat is authorized to receive combat/hostile fire pay and earn combat awards. Women have received hostile fire pay and combat awards in past conflicts. Women have served in combat in many skills during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Army nurses have served in combat for over a hundred years, although they and other medical personnel are considered noncombatants. Since the word "combat" has historically been used to include such a broad range of activities, the Department of Defense does not believe that the term provides a useful basis for expanding the opportunities for women in the service."[63]

Additional definitions are discussed below and from them can be seen the restrictions on which the services have relied either to open or close positions to women in the military:

(1) Combat Mission: This one term, which is the only one used to establish the combat exclusion in 10 USC 6015 and 8549, is not defined statutorily. Each service uses its own definition of combat mission. In the Navy, women cannot obtain an assignment, on the basis of that service's stated definition of combat mission, to aircraft carriers, destroyers or submarines[64] since under "combat missions" the Navy includes not only ships and aircraft but also "units" (such as SEALS and mobile construction battalions) and "task organizations" (such as Combat Logistics Force ships which are part of the task organization of a Carrier Battle Group). Reconnaissance aircraft were closed to women on the basis of the Secretary's definition of a combat mission until 1988, when women were assigned to the air crew of fleet air reconnaissance squadrons aircraft in the shore-based EP-3.[65] Also after 1988, Navy

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63 Hearings on Military Posture and Assignment of Women to Ships: Hearings on H.R. 10929 and H.R. 7431, before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1179-88 (1978) (Serial No. 95-96, Feb 15, 1978), at 1190-1192.
64 Ferber, supra note 11 at 68.
65 DoD Task Force Report, supra note 11.

women were given assignments to selected Combat Logistics Force ("CLF") ships, which included oilers, store ships and ammunition ships.[66]

The Marine Corps employs the Navy restrictions. In addition, the Marine Corps adds as a factor the level of physical risk.[67]

The Coast Guard situation is unique. All positions in the Coast Guard, a Department of Transportation agency in peacetime and a DoD agency when determined by the President, have been open to women since 1978. However, in time of war or national emergency, Coast Guard ships come under the command of the Navy, which might thus require that women be removed from their Coast Guard ships under the Navy's differing policies and statutory obligations.

The Air Force prohibits women on combat mission aircraft, i.e., aircraft whose principal mission is to deliver munitions or other destructive materials against an enemy or to perform aerial activity over hostile territory where enemy fire is expected and where risk of capture is substantial.[68] On this basis, women cannot be assigned to Air Force fighter and bomber aircraft. Further, they cannot perform certain combat-related duties, such as combat control, tactical air command and control, aerial gunnery, pararescue and recovery. Additionally, women are still excluded from some specific combat related positions within otherwise-open fields and specialties.[69] The Air Force has opened to women the Red Horse and Mobile Aerial Port Squadrons, the TR-1, U-2, TU-2, C-29 (Flight Check) aircraft, EC-130 (for all missions), C-141 airdrop missions, C-130 aircraft (except for special operations low level missions) and the C-17

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66 Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Comm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 100th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., October 1, November 19, 1987 and February 4, 1988 at 182 (statement of Vice Adm. Leon A. Edney, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower, Personnel and Training).
67 Ferber, supra note 11 at 68.
68 DoD Task Force Report, supra note 11.
69 Hearings Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of House Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., March 20, 1990, at 41. (statement of Lt. Gen. Thomas A. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Department of the Air Force).

aircraft.[70] Special operations aircraft, which are still off-limits to women, include AC-130 gunships, MC-130s, HC-130s and MH-53 and MH-60 helicopters.[71]

(2) Close Combat: This was defined by the DoD in 1978 as "engaging an enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy's personnel, and a substantial risk of capture".[72] In 1985 the "and" was changed from "or", making the definition more narrow and allowing more assignments to be deemed something other than close combat. No women serve in positions considered to be "close combat" in any of the military branches.

(3) Direct Combat: This Army term was defined in 1982, expanding on the DoD's definition of close combat, as "engaging an enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy's personnel, and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, or shock effect in order to destroy or capture him, or while repelling his assault by fire, close combat or counterattack." No Army women serve in direct combat roles.

The Marine Corps defines "direct combat operations" as seeking out, reconnoitering, or engaging in offensive action. Notably, in the Marine Corps women can, therefore, be assigned to combat support and combat service support units in a designated hostile fire area where they could become involved in a defensive combat action resulting from an enemy attack, even with the attendant risk of capture.[73]

(4) Combat Support: These positions provide operational assistance to the combat troops, i.e., direct engineering, police, communications and intelligence support. Women in the Army and Air Force serve in combat support roles and

70 Id.
71 "Air Force Opens Airdrop Crews to Women", Minerva's Bulletin Board, Summer 1990 at 10.
72 Ferber, supra note 11 at 68.
73 Id.

specialties. In the Navy, women are now being assigned to some of the ships which carry supplies, fuel and ammunition and that directly support the battle group. The Navy draws support ships from two sources: (i) the Mobile Logistics Force Ships ("MLF's") (renamed in November 1986 the CLF ships, whereupon these ships previously classified as "auxiliary" ships were given the status of "other combatants"), and (ii) the Military Sealift Command ("MSC"), which contracts civilian ships to the Navy. Notably, MSC ships -- which perform the same function as CLF's but differ only in that they do not travel continuously with the combatant group -- have no gender restrictions, while CLF ships do. MLF's were renamed CLF ships in 1986, apparently to restrict women. The result was a temporary halt to the momentum toward opening more sea positions to Navy women.[74] However, certain of the CLF ships were opened to women after 1988, in response to the DoD Task Force Report.[75]

(5) Combat Service Support: These positions provide logistical, technical and administrative services to the combat arm. Military women in all branches serve in combat service support roles.

Not only are the many definitions seemingly inconsistent from one branch to another, they do not fully comply with stated DoD policy. The DoD Task Force Report identified twenty-nine specific areas where potential inconsistencies exist in application of policy either between two or more Services or with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Defense, and it found that in seven of these areas, service policy failed to conform to the law and DoD guidelines.[76] The DoD Task Force Report, taking the statutory bans as a given, studied "risk" interpretation of the law and the use

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74 Women's Equity Action League, Vol. 16, No. 1, Feb/March 1987, at 1, 7.
75 Id.
76 The seven areas are: (1) battlefield location as a criterion for determining combat exclusion in the Army, (2) CLF ships, (3) fleet air reconnaissance squadrons (VQ1/VQ2), (4) Naval Mobile Construction Battalions ("NMCB"), (5) Marine Security Guard ("MSG") and Marine Corps Security Forces ("MCSF"), (6) Air Force Red Horse and Mobile Aerial Port Squadrons and (7) Air Force Reconnaissance Aircraft.

of risk in the closure of noncombat positions to women, where the "risk of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture is . . . equal to or greater than that experienced by associated combat units with which they are normally associated within a given theater of operations."[77]

It was expected that this risk rule would challenge the Army's use of battlefield criteria; the Air Force's use of exposure to hostile fire (or hostile territory) and risk of capture; and the Navy's application of combat mission to "units" and "task organizations" rather than to individual vessels. However, to believe that the risk rule is a valid method, one must assume that risk itself can be predicted, measured quantified and compared. Further, to be efficient the risk rule would require that the risk thresholds of the various services be the same, which is not necessarily the case since each service determines its own criteria.

B. Excluded Positions

Currently, of the 28 Marine enlistment option fields, three fields are reportedly closed to women: infantry, combat arms, and combat support (artillery).[78] Army policy prohibits women in 10% of its career fields.[79] On the basis of the Navy combat restriction, 13 out of 99 ratings are closed to enlisted women, including fire control technician, gunner's mate, sonar technician and electronics warfare system technician.[80] In the Air Force, women work in all but four enlisted career areas: defensive aerial gunner, pararescue, combat control, and tactical air command and control.[81] The percentages of total positions open to women are 52% in the Army,

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77 DoD Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 10.
78 Minerva's Bulletin Board, Spring 1989, at 5.
79 Hearings Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of House Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., March 20, 1990 at 24. (statement of Gen. Allen K. Ono, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army).
80 Ellen C. Collier, "Women in the Armed Forces", February 27, 1987, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, CRS, at 7.
81 1987 Hearings, supra note 66, at 41.

59% in the Navy, 20% in the Marine Corps, 97% in the Air Force and 100% in the Coast Guard.[82]

C. Demographic Realities.

Demographically, the pool of males eligible for military service has been shrinking from a 1978 level of 2.13 million men reaching the age of 18, to a predicted 1992 level of 1.61 million, with no rise expected until the turn of the century.[83] As for the quality of personnel, in 1980 more than 25% of all new male recruits and almost 50% of the Army's male recruits had abilities ranked "below average." Further, during the 1980's many top male technicians were recruited away from the services to lucrative jobs in the private sector, ceding many of the high-tech communications, electronics and scientific specialties to women.[84] Thus, the availability of a sufficient number of qualified males has not been historically assured.

Implementation of the proposed reduction in the size of the armed forces, contemplated to commence in 1991 as a possible post-Cold War era benefit, was described at a DACOWITS meeting in November 1990 as follows:

> The services are beginning the drawdown by weeding out lower-performance service members. Standards for first-term reenlistments are being tightened, while officers who fail to meet "up-or-out" career promotion points are given an early exit.[85]

Air Force Major Steven Maurmann, deputy director of officer and enlisted personnel management for the Pentagon, stated that under the aforedescribed process women should fare well because they tend to be better-educated than men, reenlist at higher rates and get promoted faster. Furthermore, he indicated, selected early retirement

82 Becraft, supra note 14. The Marine Corps has no medical or chaplain services, relying instead on those of the Navy. This absence reduces the number of Marine Corps total job positions open to women. Id.
83 Binkin and Bach, supra note 13, at 66, citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Projections of the Population of the United States: 1975 to 2050", Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 601 (GPO, 1975), at 42-59.
84 "Women in Combat?", Newsweek, November 11, 1985, at 37.
85 "Women May Have Edge in Drawdown", Army Times, November 5, 1990 at 12.

plans to reduce the size of the officer corps should affect women less than men since few women have 20 or more years of service. With respect to specific services, Major Maurmann explained that Army officials are maintaining an accessions "floor" for women so that, during the drawdown, the proportion of women in the Army actually will increase in the short term. He said that Navy officials predict that the loss of sea billets for women will be balanced by the decommissioning of combatant ships that have all-male crews.

Marine Col. Russell Appleton, head of the manpower planning branch at Marine Corps headquarters, stated, "My gut feeling is, we're not going to see a significant change in the balance of men and women in the Marine Corps force."[86] These beliefs were echoed by Army Secretary Michael Stone, when he told this Committee that he anticipated the future would offer full military career opportunities for women and that the male/female ratios would probably not change despite force reductions.[87]

In sum, it appears that any force reductions will not adversely affect military women more than men, based on current personnel ratios. Accordingly, there seems to be little basis for an argument that force reductions, when they occur, will undermine the growing role and need for women in the services. In fact, recent experiences in the Persian Gulf seem to indicate [illegible] concern about women in the services than about the future of recruitment by the military reserves of qualified personnel and their retention.[88]

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86 Id.
87 Remarks to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York's Committee on Military Affairs and Justice at its meeting on April 1, 1991. Copy of Minutes of the meeting on file in the Association's Library.
88 "In Wake of Gulf War, New Military Fight Looms Over Use of Reservists and Women in Combat", The Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1991, at A 16; "All Volunteer tour de force Raises New Issues", Army Times, March 18, 1991.

D. Doctrinal Changes

Both the concept of what constitutes the "battlefield", as well as the nature of military strategy and doctrine, have been transformed with the effect that a larger percentage of military personnel is exposed to physical risk in wartime than ever before. It seems undisputed that the battlefield will no longer be a stationary, orderly, distinct front line and that perhaps all military personnel, including those considered support, will be exposed to danger. This is because contemporary battle doctrine, which has changed to reflect technological realities, now calls first for striking supply lines in the rear of the battle area in order to destroy the logistical base of the opposing force and thereby cripple the combat arm of a force.[89]

For example, the following wartime tasks would expose the females performing them to substantial risk of capture, hostile fire or death: Air Force ground launched cruise missile ("GLCM") batteries; refueling tankers and the MSC ships which travel to and supply battle groups; airborne early warning and control systems; Army forward support battalions, which provide combat service support forward of the brigade's rear boundary; army rear-of-brigade artillery;[90] Coast Guard ships which may have combat missions in warfare; and Marine Corps support units which in a designated hostile fire area would involve women in defensive combat action.[91]

With Navy women now providing actual battle group support, they are arguably subject to many of the same combat risks as battle group sailors, although the site of attack may differ from the site where the offensive combat mission is intended to occur. Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb articulated why support positions are even more tempting targets than the front line posts: "A woman cannot fly a fighter or a bomber, but she can fly a tanker to refuel them. Now let's have an intellectual exercise: you are a Soviet fighter pilot and you've got one missile. What do

89 See, for example, note 94.
90 DoD Task Force Report, supra note 11.
91 Ferber, supra note 11, at 68.

you shoot down? You get the tanker, you got the bombers."[92] Military Analyst Jacqueline Davis has noted that in a European conflict the Soviets plan to strike first "against rear-area targets -- where most of the women would be."[93] The U.S. pursued the same strategy in Operation Desert Storm, where the five strategic priorities were (1) to destroy Iraq's command-and-control network, (2) to blind its radar and SAM antiaircraft missiles while grounding its air force, (3) to ravage the factories, depots and labs undergirding the Iraqi army, (4) to wreck the Iraqi airfields, ports, highways and bridges and, finally, (5) to humble the Republican Guard on the ground. Thus, ground combat on a front line -- where U.S. military women would not be -- occurred only after the destruction of communication and transportation networks and supply sources in the rear.[94]

The services' perception of this all-force risk exposure is further confirmed by the type of training reportedly now provided to women. Apparently, during the basic course women receive twice as much training on nuclear/biological/chemical ("NBC") defense than on tactics used in defending the company's perimeter, on the theory that NBC training is of greater practical use.[95]

If military women not in combat are nonetheless subject to the threat of NBC attack, this suggests that the combat exclusions are obsolete insofar as they are based on fear of risk to women. Women will not be protected from the uncontrollable physical risks of war even in their rear or airborne support roles. In fact, seven of the twelve female service members who died in the conflict were not killed in combat, but in accidents incidental to the deployment of forces.[96]

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92 "Women in Combat?", Newsweek, November 11, 1985, pp. 35-38 at 37.
93 "Cultural Fears are at War with Reality", USA Today, January 24, 1990, 1A, 2A at 2A.
94 "The Secret History of the War", Newsweek, March 18, 1991, pp. 28-32, at 29.
95 Dorothy Schneider and Carl J. Schneider, Sound Off, American Military Women Speak Out, E.P. Dutton, New York (1988) at 155.
96 "Lost Cause," The Economist, April 27, 1991, at 26.

While military doctrine has been reevaluated, women's assignments and opportunities have not been similarly reconsidered to reflect revised technological and doctrinal realities. Instead, the changes made in women's roles have been implemented because of political decisions, valid military recruitment needs (e.g., the need to rely on a volunteer force and the inability to recruit adequate numbers of qualified men) and the need to provide viable career paths for mid-career service women thus recruited.[97] Were the modern concepts of battle to be fully applied to otherwise qualified (but for the combat exclusion) female service members, they would provide an additional reason to integrate women into the remaining combat positions now closed to them.

E. Recent Military Engagements

It is often argued that American citizens are unwilling to accept the capture or death of women in combat. Yet, throughout the nation's history women have suffered and have been exposed to military casualties without particular public outcry. More than 200 nurses died in World War I, another 200 in World War II and 7 in Vietnam.[98] During World War II, military nurses, along with male soldiers, endured the prisons in Japan and Germany, the jungles and bombings of Bataan, the Malinta tunnel on Corregidor and the internment camps in the Philippines.[99]

Recent history provides fresher examples of female involvement in military operations. In actions in Libya, Grenada, Honduras, Panama and the Persian Gulf, female service members were at high risk. In 1974, a female Navy pilot flew a C-130 into Beirut airport with supplies for the Marine contingent encamped and under fire there.[100] During the 1983 Grenada invasion, Air Force women flew cargo planes into

97 Becraft, supra note 16.
98 "Kiddo, You've Come a Long Way, Soldier", Soldiers, March 1988.
99 Frank, "Army and Navy Nurses Held as Prisoners of War During World War II", Minerva, Vol. VI, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 82-90.
100 "Women in Combat", Newsweek, November 11, 1985, at 36.

the island country in the midst of battle with supplies and equipment for U.S. combat forces, and Army women provided combat support as military police, communications specialists, helicopter crew chiefs and munitions specialists.[101] In Honduras, women Air Force maintenance officers on repair missions flew over hostile territory during guerilla fighting. In West Germany, which itself was a designated combat zone, women commanded Air Force operating bases and crewed battalions of the Lance battlefield missile. During the 1986 Libya attack, Navy women pilots performed carrier landings as part of the antiterrorism operation, and Air Force women pilots served on crews that provided combat support to fighter planes. In fact, they flew the tankers that refueled the attacking FB-111's.[102] In 1987, the destroyer tender USS Acadia, with a 20% female crew, sailed into the Persian Gulf during the Iran - Iraq War to repair the frigate USS Stark which had been hit by Iraqi missiles with the loss of 37 sailors.[103] "It's kidding oneself to think those aren't combat roles," said Lawrence Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense.[104]

A very recent example of female involvement in military operations is the U.S. military invasion of Panama in December 1989, in which approximately 600 of the 24,500 U.S. soldiers who participated were women. A female Army captain, Linda Bray, was apparently the first women to command American troops in battle when she led a military police unit to capture a Panamanian Defense Force ("P.D.F.") guard-dog kennel defended by P.D.F. troops. Fire was exchanged during the attack.

Interestingly, a lawsuit was commenced in 1990 by Sgt. Rhonda Maskus of the 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina against the Army's Inspector General after a male soldier was deployed to Panama in her stead.[105] Sgt. Maskus is a

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101 "Women in Combat Focus of Hearings", New York Times, October 1, 1987, p. A15, Col. 1.
102 Id.
103 Collier, supra note 48, at 7.
104 "Redefining a Woman's Place", Time, February 15, 1988 at 27.
105 "Female Soldier Files Invasion Complaint", Los Angeles Times, January 15, 1990, Part A, Page 22.

Spanish linguist and intelligence analyst who described herself as "a major factor in the contingency planning for Panama," while her male counterpart who was deployed apparently was not an expert on Panama.[106] While Maskus would not have had a combat role in the invasion, several Army women did have combat roles.[107]

In response to the suit, Christopher Jehn, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, stated that "we have not taken a public position because it's not a technical, management or budgetary issue. It's really an emotional, political issue that we think needs to be resolved in the Congress . . ."[108] This statement by a ranking DoD official illustrates that the real impediment to repeal of the combat exclusion appears not to be military requirements, but rather social and political resistance to complete integration.

Experiences from the recent Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf only reinforce the trend to have women participate in dangerous military missions. Over 33,000 U.S. military women of a total of 537,000 male and female troops (including approximately 100,000 reservists) served in key combat-support positions throughout the Persian Gulf region. Army women participated in the initial invasion into Kuwait and Iraq,[109] and women were "attached" to combat units, although they were assigned to noncombat service specialties (including the command of Patriot missile batteries), which put them at virtually the same risk as men in combat positions.[110] In Desert Storm, twelve service women were killed in the war, including five in direct combat action; two women were captured by Iraq.[111]

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106 "Female Soldier Blames Policy For Panama Exclusion", Associated Press, January 14, 1990.
107 "Female Soldier, Blocked From Panama, Charges Discrimination", Reuters, January 14, 1990.
108 CBS News, Face the Nation, Interview, January 14, 1990. (Emphasis supplied).
109 Becraft, supra note 14.
110 "American Women Deploy for Operation Desert Shield", Minerva's Bulletin Board, Fall/Winter 1990, at 2.
111 The Economist, supra note 96.

Following the Gulf war, it was reported that Defense Secretary Dick Cheney "suggested that barriers against women in combat should be loosened."[112] The Secretary said of the female troops: "They did a bang-up job . . . . They were every bit as professional as their male colleagues." He indicated that he "wouldn't be at all surprised [if the role of women in combat] expanded in the years ahead."[113]

IV. IMPACT OF, AND ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST, STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS AND RESTRICTIVE POLICIES

A. Impact

The combat restrictions appear adversely to affect the management of the armed forces. That personnel otherwise capable of handling an assignment cannot be so assigned impedes efficient management and assignment of available personnel; at least 11% of the active force and 13% of the ready reserves are denied to Pentagon combat planners because they may not be used in combat.

In turn, this adversely affects morale and the services' ability to retain both men and women.[114] Morale is also not enhanced by the repeated shifts in DoD policy, i.e., redefining the positions in which women can serve, closing and then reopening positions. This results in reassignment, retraining and career uncertainty.[115] One might speculate that morale among female soldiers and sailors is also adversely affected when they are barred fror tasks they feel they can perform.

With regard to management of the Coast Guard, former Coast Guard Commandant Adm. James S. Gracey stated that removing women from vessels in wartime would not only degrade the operational readiness of those vessels while

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112 "In Wake of Gulf War, New Military Fights Looms Over Use of Reservists and Women in Combat", Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1991, at A16.
113 Id.
114 Ferber, supra note 11. (comment appears in GAO version of Ferber's prepared statement, but is missing in the transcript of the Hearings of November 19, 1987).
115 Schneider and Schneider, supra note 95, at 162.

replacements are being trained but would also directly interfere with management of forces. He explained that "I flatly refuse to [remove women from my ships]. If I have a woman commanding a ship in the Bering Sea, I am not about to bring that ship home nor am I about to fly a helicopter out there to pick up its commanding officer just because she happens to wear a skirt once in a while. Forget it."[116]

At times of conflict, skilled replacements would need to be located, if available. Transporting personnel to the ships and locating replacements would cause delays. Disruption of the crew's cohesiveness would also occur at the worst possible time. As a result, the survivability of the ship would be significantly affected.[117] Coast Guard ships would, thereby, be limited by the combat restriction to limited use in roles such as antisubmarine warfare, mine countermeasures and coastal defense.

Additionally, there are several ways in which women themselves are adversely affected by the combat exclusion, whether statutorily derived or policy-based. These restrictions are indirectly responsible for limitations on the access of women to the advantages of military service, which include equal pay for equal work, non-cash benefits such as the retirement program, medical care, commissary and exchange facilities, low cost insurance, veterans bonuses, veterans loans, veterans preference in federal and state government employment, extra points for veterans on civil service tests, Veterans Home Assistance loans; and on the job training. Further, these restrictions place limitations on career progression for women already in the service.[118]

As to career advancement, for example, the avenue to the highest levels of leadership in the services is through command, either an Army battalion, a ship or an air wing.[119] While women are apparently eligible for 88% of all military

116 "Women in Combat?", Newsweek, November 11, 1985, at 37.
117 "Dilemma: Coast Guard Women and Combat", Proceedings, September 1989.
118 K. Kelly, "The Exclusion of Women from Combat: Withstanding the Challenge", JAG Journal, Summer 1984, Issue 33, at 84-85.
119 Time, December 15, 1988 at 27.

job classifications, according to the Pentagon these constitute only about 50% of the more than 2,000,000 military positions presently available.[120] Interestingly, even some non-combat jobs are closed to women merely to permit men in overseas combat assignments to be rotated into stateside jobs.[121] Approximately 33,000 female officers' careers in the armed forces are thus presently impeded by their exclusion from combat commands.[122]

Pentagon policies are also described as the source of some of the discriminatory practices whose justification is tied to the statutory exclusion of women from the military's basic mission.[123] This perpetuates a feeling within the services that women in the services are a necessary evil. The most damaging of these policies is that which limits the total number of women entering each of the branches of the armed services.[124] To determine the number of women permitted to enter, the services calculate the number of positions women cannot fill because of combat and combat related restrictions and subtract that number from the total number of positions available. After the quotas are filled, women are turned away regardless of their qualifications. While the quotas expand, in absolute terms the number of women allowed to serve remains small.[125] Once women do manage to enter the military, they find certain specialties closed to them and find quotas limiting the number of women

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120 "Battle Lines Are Shifting on Women in War" New York Times, January 25, 1990, at D23. According to the General Accounting Office ("GAO") report to Congress of September 1988, half of the approximately two million jobs were closed to women because of the combat exclusion policy, sea/shore rotation requirements on the Navy and overseas/stateside rotation for combat jobs in the Army and the Air Force. Additionally, restrictions on non-combat job assignments, e.g., job quotas or ceilings, are imposed by the different service branches. GAO, Women in the Military: More Military Jobs Can be Opened Under Current Statutes, Washington, D.C.: USGAO, NSIAD-88-222, September 1989.

121 Id.

122 The New Republic, February 19, 1990, pp. 7-9 at 8.

123 J. Goodman, "Women, War and Equality: An Examination of Sex Discrimination in the Military", Women's Rights Law Reporter, Volume 5, Number 4, Summer 1979, at 251.

124 Id.

125 Id. at 252.

who may enter a specialty which is technically open to them. "In general, then, the rules for men are the norms . . . [while the] rules for women are the exceptions . . . , reinforcing stereotypes about proper roles for women . . . . The stereotype reinforced is a particularly damaging one -- that women are out of place in the military, that their presence is a tolerated, but unwelcome, exception, based on necessity."[126]

B. Arguments advanced in favor of the combat exclusion rules.

It has been said that Pentagon opponents to opening combat positions to women do not honestly express their reservations in public and that proponents of full integration work from the assumption that, beneath a shallow public debate, the only real sources of opposition are sexism and the political cowardice of legislators.[127] As late as 1978,[128] during hearings before the House Committee on Armed Services, Chief of Naval Personnel James Watkins conceded that he knew of not "one report in the entire Pentagon that really addresses an analysis of the problems of why women should or should not be in combat".[129]

Outlined below are some of the most frequently stated arguments for the combat exclusion and their counterarguments.

1. Women should not be hurt or killed in combat.

It is argued that the public demands that women should be kept out of harm's way, and the sight of female service members arriving home in body bags would be anathema to a public otherwise tolerating wartime casualties. This argument, relying merely on the perceptions of those who advance it and on anecdotal evidence, belies the fact that women are already at substantial risk of injury or death in their

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126 Goodman, supra note 123, at 253; and Collier, supra note 48, at 8.
127 "Soldier Boys, Soldier Girls", The New Republic, 2/19/90, pp. 7-9 at 7.
128 Also See note 162.
129 Goodman, supra note 109 at 243-269.

noncombat and semi-combat positions. Further, and ironically, because it is even closer to home, the public is aware of the deaths of women police and fire fighters.[130]

U.S. military history in fact demonstrates that when the nation's level of military activities is reduced, women are no longer needed in service and their military activity is commensurately reduced; however, when military emergencies arise a role for women in service is quickly rediscovered.[131] This results in the irony that women have served in the military in greater numbers precisely when the risks were the greatest, but their military participation was less acceptable when the risks were lower.[132] Finally, we doubt whether there is any rational basis for distinguishing between the value of men's lives and women's lives.

2. Women lack the physical ability to be combat soldiers.

A second argument consistently raised by those opposed to removing the official restrictions on women in combat is that women lack the physical capabilities -- strength, stamina, and muscle -- necessary to perform such essential combat tasks as lifting and carrying. In challenge to this argument, proponents of integration cite the fact that not all combat positions require physical strength and stamina. In fact, properly stated this issue is quite narrow. The exclusionary statutes proscribe women on combatant ships and aircraft, not on land. Sailors and fliers need physical strength as only one of many attributes necessary to perform successfully. Technical skills and

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130 Women daily are killed and mutilated in the "combat zone" of our urban areas. In civilian society, a woman is raped every six minutes, and approximately half of all sexual assaults occur in the woman's own home. D'Amico, "Women at Arms: The Combat Controversy", Minerva, Vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 1-19 at 6. The rate of rape in the U.S. is greater than that of any other nation. "Rapes Surge to 'Epidemic' Level", New York Post, March 27, 1991 at 7.

131 See discussion supra, at 4.

132 See Hearings Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation Committee of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 100th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., October 1, November 19, 1987 and February 4, 1988, at 92 (statement of Mady Wechsler Segal).

eye-hand coordination are highly valued aboard today's flying and floating high-tech weapons platforms.

Further, while the services' size requirements are based on the "average" man and "average" woman,[133] the issue of female body size is addressed by citing the example of the even smaller size of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese (both the men and women) who fought against the French and the United States in Southeast Asia. Clearly, the larger body size of Americans did not dictate a military success.[134]

Until recently, the only American experience in using women in tactical combat-type roles was the Army's experience in 1942, and it appeared to confirm that women soldiers were at the least proficient and sometimes better than their male counterparts at their assigned tasks.[135] General George C. Marshall initiated an experiment to determine whether and what antiaircraft artillery ("AAA") duties could be performed by women. The experiment was conducted on the nation's east coast (where air attacks were feared, particularly near Washington, D.C.) and was kept secret from the public, in part because of the use of highly classified equipment and in part because of anticipated adverse publicity which might result from knowledge that the tactical unit was a mixed male/female unit. Women were employed in over half of the jobs in two mixed-gender batteries, although they were not assigned actually to fire guns and were not trained in small weapons. The conclusions reached were that WAAC's could successfully perform many of the AAA tasks, that women were superior to men in all functions involving delicacy of manual dexterity (such as operation of the gun's director, height finder, radar and searchlight control systems), and that women were superior to men in the performance of routine repetitive tasks. The AAA Command requested that it retain the WAAC unit and be authorized to obtain ten

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133 D'Amico, supra note 130, at 6.
134 Roush, "Combat Exclusion: Military Necessity or Another Name for Bigotry", Minerva, Fall 1990, Vol. VII, No. 3, pp. 1-15 at 5. See discussion infra, at note 171.
135 Holm, supra note 2 at 66-67.

times more. The Army General Staff concurred with the conclusions but refused to allocate women for that purpose because of the reduced need for AAA protection on the east coast by the time of the decision.[136]

In any event, integration advocates do not now suggest that the services lower their objective standards, only that women be evaluated as individuals along with men, with job assignments determined by individual merit based on gender-neutral, job-related qualifications. Men who lack a high level of upper body strength are not prohibited from combat duty simply because of their gender, as are women. Finally, it is important to realize that education may become an even more important attribute than physical strength given the growing complexity of modern weapon systems. "On a ship, war is high-tech . . . . Men aren't any better at video games than women," said a former Navy submariner.[137]

3. Women combat soldiers will interfere with or even prevent the "male bonding" necessary to a combat unit.

A third theme, psychologically based and advanced by those opposing further integration, is that women will interfere with "male-bonding," a theory of some anthropologists and evolutionary biologists about how men will draw together and reject females as colleagues in situations which threaten social order, such as combat.[138] The male bonding theory is challenged on the ground that it is speculative and that "person-to-person" bonding and teamwork are, in fact, the relevant group dynamics, which are not restricted to males.[139]

136 Id.
137 "Our Women in the Desert", Newsweek, September 10, 1990, at 23.
138 See e.g., Lionel Tiger, Men in Groups, London, Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1989 at 84-85.
139 This seems to have been borne out in para-military examples, where women have often figured prominently in group combat and combat-like circumstances, such as in terrorist and guerilla groups. Examples of such para-military groups in which women are included in their combat and combat-like missions include the German Rote Armee Fraktion, the U.S. Weathermen, the Japanese Red Army and the Italian Red

It is mission essential that the soldiers who train together go together into a combat situation.[140] This would seem to apply equally well to mixed-gender groups as to all-male groups. One author, who was associated with the National Defense University, served as a Ford Foundation Fellow and was a faculty member of the Naval Academy, summarized the three elements required for such bonding: organization for a common goal, the presence of danger and a willingness to sacrifice. He specifically noted that none of these elements is gender-specific.[141]

The Army in fact conducted research tests in 1977, known as MAX-WAC and REFWAC, during combat exercises in an effort to determine whether and at what level the addition of women to a unit resulted in deteriorated unit performance. The MAX-WAC and REFWAC results indicated that women performed as well in the field as in garrison and that the key to a unit's performance was not the male/female ratio, but, rather the quality of its leadership.[142]

4. Women do not have the psychological wherewithal to perform well in combat.

Advocates of the combat exclusion argue that women are too emotional, too volatile and the like to perform well under the psychological stress of combat. However, women who serve in urban police and fire fighting forces appear to have served competently under analogous stress.[143] Further, any notion that men are uniquely suited for combat is undermined by the widespread experience with shell shock and modern post traumatic stress disorders which affect a percentage of male

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Brigades. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1987, at 80, 225.

140 "Women in Combat?, Newsweek, November 11, 1985, pp. 36-38 at 37, quoting Air Force Major Iris Hageney who oversaw maintenance for a fleet of F-15 fighters.

141 Roush, supra note 134, at 8.

142 Holm, supra note 2 at 257-258.

143 A 1990 national poll conducted by McCall's jointly with Representative Patricia Schroeder of Colorado revealed that 67% of respondents (755 women were interviewed) saw no difference between women risking their lives as policewomen or fire fighters and those who risked their lives in the military. Dusky, "Combat Ban Stops Women's Progress, Not Bullets", McCall's, May 1990, pp. 26-28, at 26.

soldiers post-combat.[144] In addition, several U.S. Army studies, as well as documentation of the reactions of women (including POW's) during World War II, do not support the argument that women are psychologically unfit.[145]

The overall World War II experience showed that women can function effectively in combat zones under conditions of severe hardship for extended periods; and that women function optimally when they feel their military job contributes to the mission and when treated like mature, responsible adults.[146] Finally, the argument that women are psychologically unfit for combat sounds a familiar bell since it resembles the arguments formerly used to prevent blacks from fighting with whites in combat. Before President Truman ordered the U.S. armed forces integrated in 1948 by Executive Order 9981, following World War I blacks were excluded from combat because of a belief that they were poor fighters, that they were too cowardly, too stupid, or would break their weapons.[147] This, of course, proved not to be the case.

5. Pregnancy and child-rearing prevent women from effectively serving in combat.

Some critics argue that the issue of pregnancy is a handicap to integrating women into combat jobs and negatively affects military readiness, the ability to deploy rapidly and the length of women's service careers.[148] Women's child-care responsibilities are treated as a corollary to this position,[149] although it is arguable

144 Lieberman, "Women in Combat", Federal Bar News & Journal, May 1990, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 215-221 at 219.
145 Holm, supra note 2 at 95. In regard to the unique problems encountered by women overseas during World War II, Maj.. Margaret D. Craighill, M.D. (consultant to the Army Surgeon General on women's health and welfare) did identify a type of combat psycho-reaction experienced by women only: the defense of their character and the double standard of morality.
146 Id.
147 "Our Women in the Desert", Newsweek, September 10, 1990 at 23.
148 See, e.g., B. Mitchell, Weak Link: Feminization of the American Military (Washington D.C. Regnery Gateway, 1989); and J. Yarbrough, "Sex and the Military, The Feminist Mistake," Current, Nov. 1985, pp. 27-32, at 31.
149 Segal, "The Argument for Female Combatants," in Female Soldiers: Combatants or Noncombatants? Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Goldman (Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1982), Ch. 14: 221-275.

that this particular concern stems from a particular societal perception that the "proper" role of women is as child-rearing homemakers. The undesirability of removing military fathers from their young children is rarely suggested.

It would not seem difficult for the services to account through readiness policies for the five to ten percent of military women who are pregnant at any given time.[150] For example, before 1978, pregnancy led to immediate discharge from the service. Today, however, there is a six-week post-birth maternity leave policy; after the leave, women are expected to finish their tours.[151]

While not a direct response to the criticism that the potential of pregnancy reduces military readiness, it should be noted that males appear to have the higher level of unauthorized absences ("AWOL"), often, in fact, related to drug and alcohol problems. Notably, in comparison to World War II WAAC's, "the official history shows that [World War II] men were 89 times more likely to go AWOL, 85 times more apt to get drunk and 150 times more apt to commit offenses" than were WAAC's, although these statistics perhaps may be somewhat explained by the greater off-duty supervision of women and the peer pressure among women to adhere to higher group standards of conduct.[152] Nonetheless, a 1977 DoD study of a sample group over a six-month period showed that in the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force men had a higher rate than women of absenteeism because of AWOL and alcohol abuse than women serving in those branches, and in the Navy men had a higher overall rate than women of lost time.[153] Thus, the data might be read to suggest that readiness would actually be enhanced to the extent that the services made greater use of those personnel with the lower absentee rates.

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150 M. Moore, "New Lifestyles Undercut Readiness, Strain Facilities", The Washington Post, September 25, 1989, at A1.
151 Id.
152 Holm, supra note 2, at 85.
153 Collier, supra note 48, at 6.

In contrast, some have questioned the impact on readiness of the thousands of male high school dropouts recruited in years past. An Air Force General, in her 1982 book, complained that many of the recruits joining the All Volunteer Force were unable to read training manuals.[154] A 1981 Background Review of Women in the Military revealed that high school diploma graduate rates remained higher for women than for men in all branches of the armed services except the Air Force.[155] Former Pentagon manpower chief Lawrence Korb has said that "(M)ilitary women are worth the trouble because they are better disciplined, less insubordinate and worthy of quicker promotions than their male counterparts".[156]

Anthropologist Margaret Mead is cited as an authority for a related justification offered for the combat exclusion, namely the "cultural imperative" to arm men and not women in order to allow for the biological reproduction of society.[157] It is questionable whether the number of child bearing women in the armed forces is enough to represent a threat to the U.S population, even assuming that all were to go into combat and that all those were to be killed. Further, perpetual combat is not the rule and, thus, the risk of many female military deaths is quite low. Finally, closing off combat positions to women does not eliminate the risk of death for those women already serving in noncombat positions or, for that matter, in the general civilian population. It should be recalled that during the Persian Gulf war, women were among

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154 Holm, supra note 2 at 384. The high school graduation rate of Army recruits appears to have improved in recent years. (See New York Times, January 29, 1991, Section A, p.13).
155 Collier, supra note 48, at 5.
156 "Are Women the Weak Link in the Military?", U.S. News & World Report, November 20, 1989, at 61.
157 D'Amico, supra note 130, at 10, citing Margaret Mead, "Women on National Service", Teacher's College Record of Columbia University, 73:1 (September 1971):61 and Mead, "A National Service System as a Solution to a Variety of Problems", in The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives, ed. Sol Tax (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1967): 107-108.

those killed in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia -- well at the rear -- by an Iraqi Scud missile which struck an American barracks.[158]

6. The presence of women will lead to sexual fraternization and disruption of discipline.

An expectation of sexual fraternization between men and women is another argument offered by those opposing repeal of the exclusion laws.[159] This argument assumes that the services' existing rules against such fraternization will not be obeyed. However, in practice, in instances where men and women have been assigned to mixed-gender crews at the Air Force's Minuteman intercontinental nuclear missile stations, sexual misconduct has not occurred despite the isolation and the lack of individual privacy in the deep underground rooms in which the two-person, 24-hour shifts are performed.[160]

7. The image of the United States armed forces will suffer if women participate in combat.

Finally, some voice a fear that other nations will perceive the United States as militarily weak if it utilizes women in combat roles. The simple answers to this argument are that it is a highly speculative and that other nations, allies such as Canada, Norway and Denmark, have paved the way by eliminating gender discrimination in their armed forces.[161] While the armed forces of these nations may be small relative to that of the U.S., Congress' great interest in the policy decisions and the experiences of these countries is evident in the effort by the House Committee on

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158 See, e.g., "Yellow Ribbons Didn't Bring Her Home," Newsday, Feb. 28, 1991, at 8.
159 Yarbrough, supra note 148, at 30.
160 "Mixed Missile Crews a Success", Minerva's Bulletin Board, Spring, 1989, at 11.
161 See discussion infra, at pp. 43 - 51, infra.

Armed Services to form a panel for its 1980 hearings comprised of, inter alia, representatives from Canada, Denmark, Israel and the Netherlands.

Lt. Gen. Thomas A. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel of the Air Force recently summed up the issue of women in combat. Before the House Armed Services Committee, he referred to the comments of Lt. General A.K. Ono, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Army, and testified as follows:

> I kind of agree with what General Ono says on the whole issue. It is a national issue. If we are ready to put women in combat, the one thing I am sure of is there is probably not a combat job in the United States Air Force that women cannot do. They can fly fighters, they can pull Gs, they can do all those things. They are physically capable. I think they are emotionally capable; and so the issue is if you want us to put them there, just remove the law and the Air Force will do that.[162]

This attitude appears to reflect a growing one within the upper echelons of the military establishment.

V. PUBLIC OPINION

Recent surveys and polls may reflect what the American public thinks about the issue of sending women into combat. That the Equal Rights Amendment was not ratified may have taught us, however, that the public is not ready to accept full integration of women into society at large, much less into all facets of the military establishment. At this time, there appears to be little or no public pressure to eliminate the combat restrictions.[163]

Nevertheless, according to a nationwide telephone poll conducted by the New York Times and CBS News during January 13-15, 1990 (with a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points), 72% of respondents said women

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162 1987 Hearings, supra note 66, at 53.

163 Although this Report was drafted in 1990, at the time it was completed the United States had ended the war with Iraq, and the issue of women in combat had received wide-spread publicity because of the prevalence of women soldiers in Operation Desert Storm and the attendant issues created by Saudi Arabian national customs regarding females.

should be allowed to serve in combat units if they wished to, 26% said they should not and 2% had no opinion.[164] This poll was conducted following publicity of the participation of women in the Panama invasion a month earlier. An earlier, 1982 poll, taken by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago revealed that 84% of the American public supported keeping or increasing the proportion of women in the services, and 62% supported allowing women to be fighter pilots.[165]

VI. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, POLICIES AND RESULTS

Of the fifteen member NATO countries, only three (Italy, Iceland -- which has no formal military -- and Spain) do not utilize the personnel power of women in their military. There are few women in the military of four of the NATO countries: the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and Turkey, and in those cases the role of women is limited. Greece has more women involved in its armed forces with somewhat more diverse functions, but their role is also limited. In France, women are excluded from front-line combat by law, but some Navy women have been assigned to surface warships on a trial basis since as early as 1983. Women's participation in the United Kingdom and in Scandinavian countries is fairly extensive, and is discussed in greater detail below.[166]

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164 New York Times, supra note 120.
165 Hearings Before Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of House Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., March 20, 1990 (statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder).
166 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 100th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., October 1, November 19, 1987 and February 4, 1988, at 90 (statement of Sandra Carson Stanley).

A. Canada

As the result of a 1990 ruling by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, which hears cases of discrimination against federal employees,[167] it is now a violation of Canadian law to bar women from combat occupations in the Canadian Armed Forces ("CAF") or to place restrictions on their numbers. Following this decision, Canada's official policy is to remove all such restrictions (except with respect to female employment in submarines).[168] The CAF has also been "directed [to] remove any remaining employment restrictions based on sex", a forbidden basis for job discrimination under Canada's Human Rights Act.[169] Earlier, in 1987, full job opportunity was possible within the Canadian Air Command, including fighter pilot status, which opened its ranks to women. In brief, "it is now Canadian Forces policy that systemic barriers to the employment of women are to be removed."[170]

The removal of the barriers, however, did not provide instant integration of Canada's forces, particularly in the basic combat roles of the Army's land forces: infantry, armor and field artillery. The initial data from Ottawa indicated that only one of sixty women in the infantry successfully completed the first sixteen-week training program. The difficulties appear to center on physical ability and stamina in the face of infantry training.[171] Better selection and screening methods of recruits for physical ability, as well greater preparation of recruits for those physical rigors, are being considered by the CAF; apparently, lowering standards is not being considered.

In the Canadian navy, however, as of September 1989, sixty women sailors and officers were serving on replenishment ships and on a tender vessel, and women were

167 Matter of the Canadian Human Rights Act, Gauthier, et al., released February 20, 1990 as part of an "Aide-Memoire" from the Department of National Defence in Ottawa.
168 See Major C.D. Lamerson, "The Evolution of a Mixed-Gender Canadian Forces", Minerva, Vol. VII, Numbers 3 and 4, Fall/Winter 1989, pp. 19-24, at 22.
169 Matter of the Canadian Human Rights Act, supra note 167.
170 Memoire fr. National Defence, supra note 167.
171 M. Moore, "Canada's Leap to Equality in Combat; Controversial Move Lifts Legal but not Physical Barriers", The Washington Post, September 26, 1989, at A1.

scheduled to be transferred to a destroyer with a mixed-gender crew. Further, the Canadian air force had the first two women fighter pilots in the world assigned to potential combat missions in fighter squadrons.[172]

Generally, Canada has seen a marked increase in female participation in other, non-combat occupations, as well as in the reserves, such as administrative and medical units. In fact, over a twenty year period, as in the United States armed forces, a six-fold increase has resulted in active and reservist participation by women in Canada, reaching 8,700 -- over ten percent of the CAF -- by September 1989.[173] There is "affirmative action" in Canada to increase the numbers of women in the combat arms. The Government has had too low a ratio of women in such service with significant periods of service in combat units for "meaningful conclusions to be drawn."[174] It should be noted, however, that Canada deployed 150 women in Operation Desert Storm, some of whom served on combat ships and in combat support positions.[175]

B. United Kingdom

Great Britain has the same policy as does Canada, officially accepting all women willing to apply for comparable positions within the Women's Royal Army Corps ("WRAC"). WRAC will be integrated with the male forces under a new "frame-work for assessing the career opportunities and employment categories available to female officers and soldiers."[176] However, the program is too much in its infancy, with active deployment rules still in draft, to come to any empirical judgment about its success. It is estimated that the plan will take 10-15 years to be completely

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172 Id.
173 Lamerson, supra note 168, at 19.
174 Memoire fr. National Defence, supra note 167, at 2-4.
175 Becraft, supra note 14, at 3.
176 "Final Press Release on 'Long Term Role and Employment of Women in the Army'", (with attached Q and A Brief), fr. Ministry of Defence, London, January 3, 1990.

implemented.[177] Unlike Canada, however, the armed services in Great Britain are exempt from the Sex Discrimination Act, that nation's equal opportunities legislation.[178]

Lord Arran, Britain's Under Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, has gone on record as saying: "I welcome the opportunity to enhance the role of women in the Army. Our aim will be to give women, as far as is possible, equivalent opportunities to their male counterparts."[179] The British now wish to make more opportunities fully open to women careerists to enable them "to compete with their male counterparts for promotions and appointments,"[180] although WRAC will not be disbanded under the new expansion.

In practice, even if not in law, the British Government still maintains an official restriction on women serving in posts likely to be involved in direct combat. These restrictions, for example, apply to British Army combat-armed units which are designated to be sent in wartime to brigade areas, i.e., the front line, ahead of divisional and corps areas. Regardless of assignment, however, recruit training is identical. The exception to the restriction is medical units -- which include women -- where no such restriction applies. Medical staffs are theoretically at less risk since they are accorded greater protection under the Geneva Convention,[181] although as a practical matter, however, medical units often are in the front lines of battle, as in the Gulf War.

In Northern Ireland, British women have consistently served "extensively in the province" in typical combat ready-preparedness and have distinguished themselves there.[182] Consistent with U.S. practice, neither the British nor the Canadian systems

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177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.

presently excludes women from the military police (combat support) or combat service support branches (Quartermaster, Ordinance, Transportation, Chemical, Medical Service Corps.). Exposure to danger, then, is still the reality for women in those services, even if their roles are designated "non-combat".

C. Israel

Israel is the only democracy that conscripts women into the military. The Israeli Defense Forces ("IDF") were organized shortly after the State of Israel was created in 1948, and women today comprise about eleven percent of the IDF.[183] However, laws governing compulsory service are more liberal for women than for men. Men aged 18 to 29 serve three years compulsory service while women aged 18 to 25 serve only two years. Further, there are broader exemptions from military service for women (e.g., health, pregnancy, motherhood, marriage before eighteen or religious conviction).[184] In addition, reserve military duty is also more burdensome for men, who must complete 30 days of reserve duty annually until age 55. Single women, on the other hand, are usually exempted by age 24, except for certain duties deemed "vital" (such as physicians and nurses), where the maximum age is 38. Married women are not expected to perform reserve duty, although married men are expected to do so.

In the IDF, women administratively are under the jurisdiction of Cheil Nashim,[185] the Women's Army Corps, which allows service in all branches of the military except one: combat duty. The national attitude toward women is paternalistic, evidenced in part by the belief that the army protects women. The threat of rape and torture of prisoners of war is often cited as the reason for barring women from combat.[186] The Israeli experience is to have women in all other facets of military

183 "CHEN - The IDF's Women's Corps", IDF Spokesman, August 1989.
184 Binkin and Bach, supra note 13, at 132.
185 IDF Spokesman, supra note 183.
186 Johnson, "Military Roles of Israeli Women", Minerva, Fall/Winter 1989, pp. 10-18, at 13.

service once they are inducted -- assuming they are physically and mentally qualified and have no religious scruples against service -- specifically in order to free men for the infantry service.[187] Notably, as a result of the demands placed on the IDF because of the recent Palestinian uprising, hundreds of women have been trained in combat techniques in order to become combat instructors for male soldiers, thus freeing the men for combat duty in the West Bank and Gaza. They instruct in sharpshooting, use of explosives, chemical warfare and tank driving. In addition, some now serve in the administered territory as behind-the-lines operations officers or non-commissioned staff, assisting in coordinating military actions and sometimes going on patrol themselves.[188]

Women's placement in the IDF, then, has been in the traditional occupations (e.g., clerical and service), mirroring the society's religious and family traditions. While the trend is to expand the military occupations available for women, they do not yet serve in actual combat roles. Interestingly, it is reported that IDF women soon become disillusioned with predominantly clerical/technical support jobs and seek more intellectual and professional fulfillment.[189] Women's mandatory two-year service tours are not, therefore, as often repeated as are those of men. Notably, the IDF's female recruits are, on induction, of a higher intellectual caliber and have more education than do the majority of the male recruits.[190] Thus, it appears that their job "placement" disappoints, not their abilities or "esprit de corps". This frustration allegedly stems from the inability of the system to utilize proven female capabilities.[191]

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187 Id.
188 "Israeli Women Soldiers Move Into Previously Male-Only Jobs," Minerva's Bulletin Board, Winter 1989, at 9.
189 Lt. Nicole Lazar, "Aspects of the Service of Women Soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces," Department of Behavioral Sciences, Israel Defense Forces (undated).
190 Id.
191 Id.

D. Scandinavian Countries

In Denmark, the military was open to women on a voluntary basis in 1962; the enlistment of privates began in 1971, and the service academies and the opportunity to be commissioned became available in 1974.[192] Notably, a four-year study was authorized by the Danish Ministry of Defence and carried out in the Navy between September 1981 and April 1985. A total of 99 women were recruited for shipboard service for combat-purpose vessels, such as seaward defence craft, minelayers, fast patrol boats and fishery protection ships. It was found that women's professional capabilities were "fully equal to those of their male colleagues".[193] As a result of the military's experiment, in 1988, all restrictions concerning the employment of women in the armed forces were eliminated. In practice, however, Danish women are still excluded from close-quarters submarine duty (which no country other than Norway has opened to women) and as fighter pilots in high performance fighters.[194] Women in the Danish Army and Air Force have performed beside their male counterparts in tank companies and field artillery batteries, as well as part of "Hawk" missile squadrons.[195]

Denmark maintains standing forces numbering only about 30,000, with far fewer logistical problems than with the global, combat-ready forces of the U.S. Denmark appears firmly committed to equality in its military and points to its comprehensive equal rights law of 1978 and to the United Nations "Convention on Elimination of all

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192 Letter of P.A. Anderson, Office of the Chief of Defence, Denmark, April 10, 1990, to Subcommittee on Women in Combat of the Committee on Military Affairs and Justice of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York ("Danish Chief of Defence Letter"). The Letter also noted that in the event the NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development determines that flying in high performance fighter planes does not endanger women more than it does men, women would be permitted as fighter pilots.

193 Susan Schluter, "Experimental Scheme for Employment of Women in the Danish Navy", Enlisted Women on Board Her Majesty's Ships, June 1982; Susan Schluter, "Women in the Navy", 21st International Symposium on Applied Military Psychology, Paris, June 17-21, 1985. (The Danish Army and Air Force commenced their projects at the end of 1984.).

194 Danish Chief of Defence Letter, supra note 192.

195 International Herald Tribune, September 22, 1987, at 1.

Forms of Discrimination Against Women, New York 1979," which it ratified without reservations.[196] Denmark had a practical, military reason to encourage the non-discriminatory use of women in its armed forces: the threat to future recruitment posed by Denmark's declining birth rate.[197]

Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway also have programs for female integration in military assignments, with almost all specialties, including those with direct, offensive combat functions, open to women in principle.[198] Norway opened combat jobs to women in 1984 and permits women to serve even as submariners. The Netherlands opened all its military jobs to women in 1983.[199] In the Netherlands, compulsory military service does not apply to women, although reserve duty is required for all women who have served in the armed forces.[200] In practice, women are excluded in the Netherlands only from service on board submarines, and in the Marine Corps, with no exclusions applicable to the Army or Air Force. In Sweden, although there are no women pilots in the Air Force, the Navy and Air Force have more successfully integrated women than the Army. In the Swedish Navy, women are excluded only from service on submarines and as naval commandos for fear that deep sea pressure might cause miscarriages in pregnant sailors.[201]

E. U.S.S.R.

The U.S.S.R. regards the role of military women during peacetime as generally

196 See Danish Chief of Defence Letter, supra note 192.
197 International Herald Tribune, September 22, 1987, at 1.
198 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 100th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., October 1, November 19, 1987 and February 4, 1988 at 90. (statement of Dr. Sandra Carson Stanley).
199 M. Moore, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of the House Comm. on Armed Services, March 20, 1990 at 57 (statement of Rear Admiral J. Steven Tichelman, The Netherlands Defense and Naval Attache).
200 Tichelman, supra note 199, at 57.
201 "Swedish Women Serve on Combat Vessels", Minerva's Bulletin Board, Spring, 1989, at 13.

an auxiliary one. However, the Universal Military Service Law of 1967[202] requires conscription of women during wartime and, in addition, requires women to be prepared for a broad call-up for which the U.S.S.R. has preparatory procedures.[203] During World War II, the U.S.S.R. formed three all-female air regiments, all of which were involved in combat. The fighter regiment flew cover for Soviet combat units from the Volga River to Vienna, carried out 4,419 combat missions and fought 125 air battles; the short-range day bomber regiment served in the Baltic States, at Stalingrad and at other front-line areas; and the night light-bomber unit carried out missions as far away as Berlin.[204]

F. Summary

Many of the NATO members, certain other U.S. allies or neutral countries, and even the Soviet Union appear to be at least as progressive as the United States in integrating women into the armed services, and some are decidedly ahead since they make no distinction between their male and female service members in combat assignments. Further, the international trend among the industrialized nations appears to be toward full integration of women into the armed forces, both for political reasons (e.g., civil rights) and for military reasons (e.g., declining male demographics). However, for those nations where women have been fully integrated into the armed services, including into combat roles, they have not been greatly tested under actual combat conditions and, in general, the combat success of such efforts has yet to be gauged.

VII. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS

In 1987, Senators Cohen and Proxmire introduced Senate Bill S.581 which was

202 Holm, supra note 2, at 361.
203 Id.
204 Holm, supra note 2, at 315; Binkin and Bach, supra note 13, at 124-125.

intended to increase the number of combat support assignments available to women in the armed services. For the Army, the bill would have authorized the assignment of women to combat support and combat service support units. The Navy would have been able to assign women to combat support ships, including vessels which have the capacity to provide underway replenishment. The Air Force would have been able to assign women to reconnaissance, training, or transport aircraft, but not to aircraft "engaged in combat missions."

Although it was recognized that the bill was intended to authorize the practice that many such positions were already filled by women, S.581 was criticized as potentially causing confusion. For example, the Air Force contended that the "reconnaissance aircraft" specified in the bill may be exposed to hostile fire under certain conditions; the Navy contended that the ships which would be opened to women have a combat mission when travelling with a fleet task force; and in the Army, more than 143,000 positions labeled as "non-combat," but nonetheless filled only by men, would be available to women. Interestingly, the Senate bill sidestepped the larger issue of the 1948 law's ban on combat for women in the Air Force and Navy; it simply sought to bring that law into line with current personnel practices and principles of equal opportunity for women. The proposal died without great support.

In 1989, DACOWITS recommended the test use of women by the Army in all military occupational specialties then closed to them. DACOWITS believed that such a test could help determine whether the federal statutes which codify the combat exclusion should be repealed.[205] A similar experimental program for each military service has been previously suggested as a "reasonable" approach in the 1977 Brookings Institution study prepared by Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach.[206] The DACOWITS

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205 "DACOWITS Recommends That Army Test Use of Women in Combat Roles," Minerva's Bulletin Board, Winter 1989, at 4-5.
206 Binkin and Bach, supra note 13, at 110.

recommendation became the basis of a bill introduced in the House in early 1990 by Representative Patricia Schroeder of Colorado bearing No. HR 3868.

Representative Schroeder, in her remarks to the House of Representatives, explained that her bill would open up on a test basis those Army positions which are now closed to women. She observed that the individual competence of military women has already been recognized, and that barring them from combat command positions tends to limit women's career opportunities. The bill would have directed the Army to allow women into all the military occupational specialties currently closed to them. The Army would then evaluate the effectiveness of the integrated units throughout the four year period. Rep. Schroeder noted that until the four-year study is completed the Congress would not know if the objections to women in combat are based on anything more substantial than conjecture.[207] The Army rejected Rep. Schroeder's proposition, and the bill was not adopted.[208]

VIII. CONCLUSION

Combat exclusion of women is a policy under assault by demographic realities, by the services' redefining of their operational terms, by actual military practice and doctrine and by the realization that women can and wish to contribute materially to the military mission. Yet, the policy seems to have taken on a life of its own, separate from any meaningful purpose which might justify gender discrimination. As reported by the General Accounting Office in 1988, "the services limit the number of jobs that women may hold beyond the requirements of the combat exclusion and related program needs."[209] With a real demographic need for competent, educated personnel and the percentage of women in the armed forces steadily increasing, the issue of the statutory

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207 Statement of Rep. Schroeder upon introducing bill, HR3868, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., January 23, 1990.
208 "Our Women in the Desert", Newsweek, September 10, 1990 pp. 22-25, at 23.
209 Collier, supra note 48, at 4 (emphasis supplied).

and policy exclusion of women from the remaining narrowly-defined combat jobs cries out for a review.

Although women are now eligible for 88% of all military job classifications, this amounts to only about half the more than two million service jobs. The other half is prohibited to women as "combat" roles or jobs that must be reserved for combat-qualified men who also require non-combat assignments in order to be promoted[210] or to round-out their rotation.[211] These exclusions are the largest obstacle to career progress for military women and have not at the same time proven to be essential to military readiness and success. The exclusions may actually diminish the ability of the military effectively to fulfill its mission by arbitrarily denying it access to a large pool of qualified, able personnel. Instead, the military must limit certain job assignments to only one gender group. Furthermore, the combat exclusion statutes were not derived from clearly-expressed Congressional objectives, so that the effects of the restrictions cannot be measured against their purposes. Finally, the hodgepodge of definitions that the various services use virtually ensure inconsistency among them in the roles women can play, while at the same time suggesting that the services themselves are narrowing the defined limits of "combat" in order to enable more qualified personnel to participate more fully.

The competence and performance of women who have served are not challenged. Women have proved themselves able to operate sophisticated aircraft, command ICBM silo centers, repair vehicles, fire small arms accurately, command missile batteries during combat and perform the majority of military functions. U.S. and international studies confirm this; the Gulf war reconfirmed it. It appears the

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210 Id.

211 Since only men can serve on Navy combat ships, that service also closes many non-combat shore jobs to women, thereby allowing male sailors to rotate their assignments between sea duty and shore billets. Molly Moore, "Open Doors Don't Yield Equality; 'Combat' Ban Symbolizes Limits to Female Advancement in Services", The Washington Post, September 24, 1989, p. A1; "Women in Combat: Battle Lines Shift", New York Times, p. A1 Column 3, at p. D23 Column 2.

challenges to women's involvement in these roles arise out of emotional, political and often vague sociological theories: "male bonding," and possible adverse effects on morale; women's relative lack of physical strength and size; the social unacceptability of women captured or killed in combat; and the negative effect on military readiness because of pregnancy and child care. Although these arguments have been effectively countered in a variety of ways, they nonetheless continue to be advanced in support of the combat exclusion laws.

Further, there appears to be a minor international trend, particularly among the developed nations traditionally involved in the Western alliance, away from a policy excluding women from combat roles. For example, Canada and Denmark have abandoned combat exclusions for military women, and are committed to continued integration on a gender-neutral basis. Norway has dropped the last operational barrier: close quarters combat jobs aboard submarines.

Presently, women in the military appear necessary, particularly because of a diminishing pool of available personnel in a time when operating in multiple international locations may be important. A hoped-for benefit of the post-Cold War era (if indeed that is what we are now in) -- a reduced force structure -- may be delayed because of the Persian Gulf war and instability in the Soviet Union. Additionally, the combat forces of the future appear likely to rely increasingly on weapons systems requiring education and technical skills as opposed to brute strength.

Looking to the future, however, women should not be victims of the vagaries of demographic trends and political decisions; that is, they should not be faced with displacement ahead of men if and when -- and simply because -- the population of military-age men increases or as a result of treaties which reduce the size of U.S. military forces[212] or because of budget cuts which would have the same effect.

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212 See, e.g., the INF, treaty which requires eliminating U.S. Pershing IA missiles, thus displacing approximately 6,000 men.

As Representative Schroeder has acknowledged, the clear distinction made to date is between letting women shoot and letting them be shot at, the first unacceptable and the latter, apparently, acceptable. To this Committee, this offensive/defensive distinction appears unsupportable. Further, we are not convinced that further studies need to be conducted on the issue of women's ability to perform in the armed forces in positions for which they have met and can continue to meet the qualifications. Nothing we have observed from recent military engagements, including the successful performance of women in Operation Desert Storm, suggests a need for further studies.

There are sound reasons for the equal participation of women in all facets of the mission of the armed forces for which they are capable, and for job assignments to be determined by the military services themselves based on both the needs of the military and on the abilities and merit of the service man or woman -- without regard to arbitrary factors. It also appears to us that there is an enlightened and growing constituency within the upper levels of the military for efficient, unrestricted access to the full, national pool of potential personnel. The military appears increasingly willing and able to make unbiased assignments, an objective which could be made more

attainable with the commitment of the national political leadership. We, therefore, recommend both the repeal of the combat exclusion laws and the revocation of similar policies.

New York City, New York
April 1, 1991

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

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* Member of the Subcommittee on Women in Combat. Ms. Golar was principal author of the Report.
** Voting not to adopt the Report. See Opposing Statements, infra.

APPENDIX

Sec. 6015. Women members: duty; qualifications restrictions

The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe the manner in which women officers, women warrant officers, and enlisted women members of the Regular Navy and the Regular Marine Corps shall be trained and qualified for military duty. The Secretary may prescribe the kind of military duty to which such women members may be assigned and the military authority which they exercise. However, women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions nor may they be assigned to other than temporary duty on vessels of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels of a similar classification not expected to be assigned combat missions.

Sec. 8549. Duties: female members; limitations

Female members of the Air force, except those designated under section 8067 of this title [10 USCS Sec. 8067], or appointed with a view to designation under that section, may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions.

OPPOSING STATEMENT

The Combat Exclusion Law Report ("Report") prepared by this Committee relies too heavily on mass media articles and commentary as the purported empirical basis for its conclusions. The subcommittee's efforts to research the area are greatly appreciated; however, the full and fair evaluation of empirical and anecdotal evidence which is necessary to reach a balanced conclusion is beyond the scope of this Committee.

This Committee's Report should focus on the legal and policy issues relating to women's serving in "combat" positions. Those issues primarily are:

1. whether the planned substantial reduction the level of U.S. armed forces require enlarging the pool of persons eligible for combat positions;
2. whether including women in combat positions enhances or potentially inhibits readiness for rapid deployment;
3. whether service in the armed forces is merely a form of Federal jobs program or something else;
4. whether women serving in combat positions enhance or potentially decrease unit morale.

For the reasons set forth below, the Report provides no credible evidence or policy arguments proving that women serving in combat positions will have a positive impact on any of the above vital public policy issues.

1. The fundamental policy basis cited by the Report for making women eligible for combat positions is a purported demographic need because of a shrinking pool of eligible men to fill those positions. However, in order to comply with recent budget resolutions and a perceived reduction in potential threats, the Department of Defense has prepared plans to reduce its force structures, including active duty personnel, between 20%-25% by fiscal year 1995. That reduction in forces combined with the fact that the general population has increased approximately 5% in the last decade invalidates the fundamental basis on which the Report relies. Absent this foundation, there is no compelling basis for the Report's conclusions.

2. The Report provides no empirical or anecdotal evidence that including women in combat positions will enhance combat readiness. In view of the shrinking force structure, U.S. defense doctrine will rely even more heavily on maintaining a high degree of combat readiness and the ability rapidly to deploy active duty forces to protect U.S. citizens and interests. The fundamental policy consideration driving all military decisions for the foreseeable future is whether the proposal enhances readiness.

Anecdotal evidence from the armed services' involvement in the Persian Gulf indicates that readiness may suffer by including women in combat positions. At literally the eleventh hours, only days before combined air/land operations commenced, there were legislative proposals in the Congress to give "relief" to single mothers and married couples serving in the Gulf with children at home. That relief could have included immediate rotation back home to care for their family. That legislative proposal was certainly humane and may have policy merit. However, from the military planning perspective, it could severely hamstring unit commanders as a result of losing key personnel at crucial times. Juggling personnel because of the loss of women combat personnel during hostilities certainly does not enhance, and may

negatively affect combat readiness. Including women in combat positions will serve to complicate command decisions at a time when readiness is already being strained as a result of planned reduction of force levels.

3. The Report makes the implicit assumption that military service is often another form of Federal jobs program. The Report, in effect, places careerism and career advancement as primary consideration for the armed services' personnel policies.

The primary mission of U.S. armed forces is to go into harm's way, when so ordered by the civilian command authority, in order to protect U.S. citizens and vital national interests. Careerism undoubtedly exists in the armed forces; that phenomenon is, however, a vice not a virtue. Policy emphasis should be placed on encouraging military service based on the idea of noble and selfless public service. The Report's recommendation that military personnel policy be tailored to serve individuals' career interests undermines the armed services' primary mission.

4. The Report cites some examples from mass media articles which describe competent and devoted women serving in the military without resulting morale problems. Basing conclusions on that form of anecdotal evidence is dubious, particularly where the Report fails to give a balanced view of anecdotal evidence to the contrary. One possible result of opening all combat positions to women would be a concentration of women in "combat" roles or fixed wing and helicopter pilots, but an absence of women serving in front line infantry and artillery positions. This is a logical result in view of the different physical requirements for those very different types of "combat" positions. There has historically been a resentment amongst "mud troops" to those serving in air forces. Air combat is viewed by them as a "clean" form of warfare taking place above the fray of ground combat. Dividing air and ground forces along gender lines could exacerbate this pre-existing tension and result in morale problems and have a negative impact on the coordination of air and ground forces, which forces proved so vital in the recent Gulf campaign.

In view of the fact the Report does not prove that the four vital policy matters outlined above will be enhanced by removing combat exclusion regulations, I oppose its adoption.

This opposition does not mean the issue of women's role in the military should not be further evaluated. Unquestionably, any arbitrary limitations as to promotion or unfair compensation which result from the exclusion regulations should be rectified. There is no honest debate that women serve with distinction and currently play an effective role in the military. Their contribution should be fairly and justly recognized and compensated.

However, those issues can be resolved without the wholesale elimination of the rational and valid limitations on combat duty.

Nicholas Kamillatos
Committee Secretary

OPPOSING STATEMENT

I oppose the adoption of the report entitled "The Combat Exclusion Laws: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone."

The Conclusion at the close of the report appears to be composed essentially of the following propositions:

1. " ... the issue of the statutory and policy exclusion of women from the remaining narrowly-defined combat jobs cries out for a review."

2. The exclusions "are the largest obstacle to career progress for military women and have not at the same time proven to be essential to military readiness and success".

3. "The competence and performance of women who have served are not challenged."

4. "Presently, women in the military appear to be necessary".

The report recommends repeal of the combat exclusion statutes and a reversal of the combat exclusion policies of the Army and Marine Corps. Because I find the primary rationale for this call to be a desire to open career (i.e., job) opportunities for women, and because I do not find in the report (nor do I believe that there exists) a convincing argument that such a repeal and reversal would enhance the fighting effectiveness of the armed forces, and because further I believe that the report unduly minimizes the risks and disadvantages of such repeal and reversal, I oppose adoption of the report.

As to the first of the above propositions, I dissent from the view that our present policy, exclusion of women from combat, is anachronistic. Because we must in my opinion still, at the end of the twentieth century, be prepared to field armies made up of very large numbers of soldiers for ground combat, in close proximity to each other and in circumstances where success may require extreme physical exertion and extreme physical endurance, I believe that the smaller physical strength of women is far more important that the report concedes. In a pitched battle, the possibility of whose recurrence I believe it would be folly for us to discount, that army is likely to prevail which (perhaps after destruction on both sides of much of the high-tech material) after forced marches producing utter exhaustion, is able to turn around and counterattack.

Such physical strength and endurance, importantly reinforced by the indispensable moral factor of spirit or "elan", is importantly what won for the French at the Battle of the Marne, when Foch said "Victory will come to the side that outlasts the other!"

As to the moral factor of spirit, I believe that the report wrongly minimizes, in its comments on "male bonding", the cohesiveness achievable among a mass of male soldiers and the likely adverse effect on that cohesiveness of the presence of women soldiers of, on average, substantially lesser physical strength and endurance.

Of course the mechanization of warfare has changed the face of war in the past seventy years. However, I believe that we will ignore at our peril the principle that willingness to fight on after and in spite of exhaustion and despite the destruction of

technologically advanced weapons may decide the outcome -- and that we should be prepared for such an eventuality. The winning side is still likely to be the one whose infantry is willing to advance, to accept heavy casualties, and by inflicting casualties to destroy the opponent's army and hold the ground until the opponent concedes defeat. Our recent success in the Persian Gulf does not in my opinion represent the kind of test for which the United States should be prepared.

As to the opening of career opportunities for women, I do not believe that to be the function of the armed forces -- although, as is detailed in Brian Mitchell's book "The Weak Link" (cited in note 148 at page 37 of the report), the services have already gone far to meet this political demand by eroding the combat exclusions.

I certainly do not challenge the competence or performance of women in handling sophisticated weapons. I question their ability to handle artillery shells weighing 50 or 100 pounds, and perhaps their ability to change truck tires. I certainly do not challenge their courage. Women have, in small, highly motivated elite units, shown themselves to be dedicated, fearless and deadly. Examples are cited in note 139 at page 35 of the report. This experience of recent decades does not however in my opinion give any indication of how a gender-mixed mass army, perforce including thousands with little political sophistication or commitment, will fight in a hard-fought campaign. Nor does it tell us what will be the morale of a mixed-gender crew in the close quarters aboard a ship after weeks at sea in bad weather, with incessant calls to general quarters and no shore leave.

As to the proposition that "[p]resently, women in the military appear to be necessary", to the extent that this is true, I believe it to be a consequence of the all-volunteer policy, which policy I consider to be a mistake. In my opinion we should have a system of compulsory universal military service, with the necessary numbers chosen by lot.

At page 25 the report finds confirmation of its assertion that all members of the armed forces will be exposed to the risk of injury or death in the type of training now given to women, namely "twice as much training on nuclear/biological/chemical ('NBC') defense than on tactics used in defending the company's perimeter, on the theory that NBC training is of greater practical use." The report ignores the possibility, which I believe to be the fact, that women are given NBC training instead of offensive infantry-combat training because they are unsuited to and physically incapable of sustaining the latter.

It may well be that in future wars all members of the armed forces, as well of the civilian population, will be more exposed to the risk of injury and death than was true in past wars for rear area troops and for the civilian population. That is not a reason why the combat exclusion statutes and policies should be repealed. Neither is the "need to provide viable career paths for mid-career service women" cited at page 26 of the report.

The report asserts age page 33 that the issue of physical strength "properly stated, ... is quite narrow. The exclusionary statutes proscribe women on combatant ships and aircraft, not on land." This in my opinion ignores the overriding question of the assignment of women to combat positions in the Army and the Marine Corps, both of which now, I believe in reliance on the exclusionary statutes, preclude the use of women in combat as a matter of established policy. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 76. In both the Army and the Marine Corps, in infantry, artillery and armor (and

perhaps elsewhere) physical strength and stamina are in my opinion essential characteristics of a soldier.

The fact (report at page 53) that women are now eligible for 88% of all military job classifications proves nothing as to how many of the total number of military positions ("jobs" in the wording of the report) are, or should be, open to women. That will depend on how the total number of positions is distributed among those classifications. If (as I believe rightly) most of those positions, at least in the Army and the Marine Corps, are in infantry and other classifications where superior physical strength and endurance are, as one might say, bona fide occupational qualifications, then women are rightly held to a percentage of the total positions far below 88%.

Nor do I believe it conclusive, nor even highly significant, even if true, that (report at page 53) the exclusion of women from combat under present statutes and Army and Marine Corps policy constitute "the largest obstacle to career progress for military women." The function of the armed forces is not to provide career progress to any segment of the population. Their function is to defend the United States in war.

J. Philip Anderegg

OPPOSING STATEMENT

I wish to register my opposition to the adoption of the Committee's report entitled, "The Combat Exclusion Laws: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone." This statement is not intended to be a comprehensive response to the report, rather it summarizes some of my objections. While the report raises valid concerns with the current application of the combat exclusion laws, I do not agree with its call for blanket repeal of the statutes applicable to the Navy and Air Force and the comparable Army policy.

In its introduction, the report claims the issue will be approached "from the point of view of the military mission." (See, Report, p.1) In my view, however, the report fails to demonstrate how repealing the combat exclusion laws would serve to improve our armed forces. Instead, it relies upon outdated, inaccurate information on recruit quality and demographic changes and an undue emphasis on opening military "job" opportunities for women to support its call for repeal. None of the arguments presented are persuasive that immediate repeal is necessary. Some refinement of the combat exclusion rules may well be called for, particularly given the role of women in the Persian Gulf conflict. However, I believe this report is seriously flawed and should not be adopted. I set out below some of the reasons for my opposition to the report.

First, I believe the report is based, at least in part, on outdated, inaccurate information. The authors cite data on the quality of incoming recruits as supporting the need for elimination of the combat exclusion rules. Yet the information on recruit quality presented is from 1980-1981 and is simply no longer relevant. For the Army, upwards of 97% of the fourth quarter, 1990 recruits are high school graduates and 72% scored in the top half of the entrance aptitude test, reportedly the best results ever (See, New York Times, January 29, 1991, Section A, p.13) The mental capabilities of recent enlistees have obviously improved dramatically over the levels from the early 1980's cited in the report. The claim that the quality of enlistees mandates heavier reliance on female recruits is belied by more current information.

A second claim underlying the report is that changes in demographics in the U.S. will result in a diminished pool of qualified young men, thus requiring increased reliance on women. Although the relevant population group is declining, this argument is largely negated by the impending reduction in the size of the military. The services are planning for a 20% reduction in force over the next five years. Already, the recruiting goal for the Army was reduced from 135,000 at the beginning of fiscal 1989 to 88,000 for fiscal 1990. (See, New York Times, March 16, 1991, Section 1, p.9) Budget pressures and the changes in Europe are likely to increase the trend toward a smaller defense establishment. While women recruits will continue to play an important part in meeting the needs of the services, the claim that changes in demographics will force an increase in the proportion of women in the military is dubious.

F' ancial issues raise a third concern - the expense associated with removing all combat exclusion limits would be significant. The report cites with approval the decision by Canada and some Scandinavian countries to integrate fully their armed forces. But the Canadian experience described in the report points out the potential cost of eliminating the combat exclusion. At. p.43-44, the report notes that only 1 of 60 women who entered infantry training with the Canadian Army was able to complete the course. In these times of declining resources for the military, should we be pursuing a policy change which will result in similar excessive training costs? Is the

mission of the military really going to be advanced by attempting to open all combat arms billet to women?

In my opinion, the report glosses over the impact of physical characteristics on effectiveness for combat duty. A large number of combat billets, particularly in the Marine Corps and Army, require significant physical strength. The Canadian experience noted above is illustrative.

If providing the best defense possible is the desired goal, which it must be, then I believe the effect of physical differences should be given more consideration. Despite the increasing technical complexity of modern warfare, we still need large numbers of service members to serve in the infantry and other physically demanding billets. We should not compromise the quality of our combat forces in the context of an attempt to provide equal opportunities for women in the military.

Another biological fact given short shrift by the report's authors is pregnancy. A certain percentage of young women in the military will be pregnant at any given time. The more physically taxing the female service member's billet, the more likely pregnancy will interfere with her performance. The report complains of the potential disruption of shipboard units caused by the removal of trained women due to combat exclusion rules. (See, Report at p.29-30) Yet an example from the recent Persian Gulf conflict demonstrates the comparably disruptive effect of pregnancy on crews afloat. Some 36 Navy personnel aboard the USS Acadia, ten percent of the women assigned to the ship, were found to be pregnant and had to be transferred during its deployment to the Gulf. Of these 36, some 22 became pregnant after the ship deployed. (See, New York Times, April 30, 1991, Section A, p.17) While this one incident may be anomalous, it points to a potentially severe problem which the report virtually ignores.

The report suggests that only prejudice and "political cowardice" in Congress prevent the repeal of the combat exclusion laws. (See Report, p.32) I believe that instead, the authors have chosen to gloss over many opposing arguments and focus on the weaker one, such as, 'Americans do not want to see women filled in combat.' Recent events have proven that the 'combat zone' is an amorphous concept. Women in the military have been and will continue to be exposed to grave risks during times of conflict, regardless of their specific role. But this fact of exposure to danger does not negate the purpose of the combat exclusion laws.

Whatever their original intent, the combat exclusion laws as currently applied serve to restrict the role of women in combat arms billets. In my opinion, men are generally better suited to fill some of these billets - infantry, artillery, special forces - than are women. The combat exclusion rules should be refined to reflect changes in modern warfare, but wholesale repeal is unwarranted.

Nothing presented by this report persuades me that the effectiveness of our military forces will be increased eliminating the combat exclusion laws. In fact, I believe the opposite to be true. The purpose of our military establishment is not to provide educational opportunities for young men and women, nor to train them to be better citizens, nor to provide them an alternative career path with good benefits and early retirement. The mission of our armed forces is to defend the interests of the United States. A reasoned review and modification of the combat exclusion laws may further that mission. The alternative proposed by the Committee, immediate repeal, would not.

James G. O'Connor

[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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